Neo-Populism and Political Mass Communication in Latin America: Press Freedom, Media Access, and Democracy

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NEO-POPULISM AND POLITICAL MASS COMMUNICATION IN
LATIN AMERICA:
Press Freedom, Media Access, and Democracy

A THESIS
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MASTER OF ARTS IN DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

By
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Seton Hall University
April 26, 2006
I would like to express a sincere gratitude to my parents, my brother, friends, professors, and all my anonymous heroes who supported me in the conclusion of this project.

My parents, who are exceptionally the best human beings alive; this achievement is entirely for you. Thank you for teaching me the art of dedication, love, and tolerance. Furthermore, thank you for your continuous support and advice.

My brother, who is the most intelligent person in this world; I would like to thank you for giving me all the moral and intellectual support in this everlasting journey.

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"The greatest achievement of the human spirit is to live up to one's opportunities and make the most of one's resources." Marquis de Vauvenargues
This paper studies the relationship between neo-populism and political mass communication in Latin America. Through a quantitative assessment, this research aims to examine the role that media politics plays in strengthening democracy and neo-populism in eighteen Latin American countries. In particular, the author examines two key elements of the political mass communication concept: press freedom and media access. Can neo-populism be understood without an assessment of media politics? Do political pressure and control of media content, combined with widespread access to different channels of mass communication strengthen neo-populism in Latin America?

The author concludes that while Latin American countries are increasingly becoming more leftist, only three countries in Latin America are following a clear left-wing neo-populist pattern: Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia. In these countries, political pressure and control on media content are used as instruments to strengthen the neo-populist structure.

More time and representative data is needed in order to consider neo-populism as a widespread practice in Latin America.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background

Twenty years ago, concepts such as state decentralization, liberalization, populism, and democracy were implemented in the majority of Latin American countries. This was a political, social, cultural, and economic experiment that for almost two decades ruled the political system in the region. The 2004 Latinobarómetro Summary Report underlines the present condition of the political environment in Latin America:

"Democracy is back in all Latin American countries for more than a decade now, and even with the hard evidence shown in these data about the lack of support for authoritarian rulers to regain power under the claim of the masses, the real threat of authoritarianism for the region still persists in the communications agenda. (p. 4)"

The current political scenario in Latin America is developing into one of the most interesting political phenomena of this century. In the region, "the support for democracy moved from 61% in 1996 to 53% in 2004, while the support for authoritarian regimes oscillates between 18% in 1996 to 15% in 2004" (Latinobarómetro, 2004, p. 4). Latin American democracy has been a political practice with rather unique features. On the one hand, democracy has given the region political and economic freedom. On the other hand, in many Latin American nations, ineffective democratic practices have deeply impacted the social, political, and cultural foundations.

Overall, obstacles such as the failure to generate wealth for the poor, the negligence towards chronic institutional crises, lack of efficient and effective leadership, and inconsistent application of economic and social policies have made democracy a
target of much criticism. Furthermore, these factors have contributed to a deterioration of the cultural and social meanings of true democratic practice. Whether these aspects result from inappropriate macroeconomic policies, social disparities, poverty, cultural clashes, or an ideological mishmash, the reality is that democratic vulnerability weakens a regional political system and creates more opportunities for the emergence of new ideologies and political transformations.

In particular, when democracy as a political system has failed to fulfill people's basic needs and poor leadership has undermined democratic practice, the roles that ideologies and political processes play in today's Latin American societies is a meaningful and powerful one. Both circumstances are ultimately catalysts of major social and ideological changes. Whatever the causes might be, these social and ideological changes are primarily driven by a series of economic policies, political ideas, social movements, charismatic leader(s), or other cultural, political, or social phenomena.

Overall, when democracy is fragile, different political ideals start to emerge. Neo-populism is the response to a political system that has not been able to provide social stability. Neo-populism is the result of a complex mix of societal, structural, and political factors (Mazzoleni, 2003). While it does not follow an exact ideological pattern in Latin America, it does emerge as a consequence of negligent democratic practices. In countries where democracy still exists and neo-populist governments are hypothetically established, such as in the case of Venezuela, or in countries where neo-populist governments are starting to arise as a new political force, as in Bolivia, the neo-populist practice varies across the region. In some cases, there is a clear and rigid neo-populist structure that rules a nation. In other cases, the structure shifts to a moderate neo-populist system.
The trend of neo-populist governments established in Latin America could be considered a recent phenomenon. But the existence of traditional populist governments in Latin America's political history is not. There have been a variety of populist governments: autocratic, moderate, and radical. From a historical point of view, there are three key classifications of ideologies in the contemporary Latin American political system. They are populism, democracy, and the current trend of consolidation of neo-populist governments (Barnechea, 2005, p.18). Other authors suggest there are three stages of populism in Latin America: “classic populism” of the 1930s through the 1960s, “late populism” of the 1970s through the 1980s, and finally the “neoliberalization of populism” of the 1980s through the 1990s (Demmers, Fernandez, & Hogenboom, 2001).

The current relationship between neo-populism and democracy across the Latin America could be seen as both negative and positive. Whether neo-populism can be recognized as advancing democracy, or as a system that hinders democratic practice, the emergence of this phenomenon within the current Latin American political setting cannot be ignored. From a political standpoint, neo-populism is the newest aspect of a historical political and social transformation in the region. It is a prolongation of the classical populist model, but with new instruments to advertise social change and to control the political message. Concretely, it refers to modern ideals of mass mobilization and political control on media content to achieve mass support.

Contemporary neo-populist tendencies among different governments in Latin America have several common factors. On average, these types of governments possess a charismatic leader, a political strategy focused on mass mobilization, and a persistent anti-elitist political rhetoric. Furthermore, the most advanced neo-populist tendencies in
the region are characterized by effective strategies of modern politics mediated. This includes the persistent political pressure and control on media content and the use of an advanced political engineering structure.

The twenty-first century's neo-populist governments are all developing a common aspect that requires the analysis and understanding of the 'political mass communication' dynamic. According to Blumler (2003), neo-populist governments have a strong specific reason for relating their misfortunes and successes to the media factors. This includes many of the features that are closely associated with the neo-populist ideal of mass support, legitimatization, and recognition. Blumler (2005) identifies three particular neo-populist claims: challenges to a corrupt official system; presentation of the movement through a charismatic leader; and a rhetoric that is emotional, strident, sensational, unqualified, blunt, and direct.

In a world in which political and geographical boundaries are weakened and influenced by globalization, it becomes even more crucial to recognize the ways in which 'political mass communication' is used to build political identities, and consequently, to support political action. In Latin American, where politics, leadership, and social support are shaped by continuous structural changes—organizations, political leaders, economic policies, social interaction, ideologies—the relationship between the power of the mass media, the political media content, the freedom of speech and of the press, and the access to different channels of communication cannot be underestimated. It is imperative to understand the diverse patterns that are constructing this new political reality in the region.
In order to avoid any inaccurate assumptions in this paper, neo-populism will be seen as a regional political trend instead of an established practice. The current wave of neo-populist governments in the region is an important phenomenon that needs to be analyzed for two main reasons. First, the tendency towards the establishment of neo-populism gratifies the ideological need of a social claim for structural political change. Whether the society as an entity is asking for it or not, through the right channels of communication, this new political notion is becoming the most recent feature of political practice on the continent.

Second, neo-populism, as an ideology, is developing a very particular type of mediatization of politics. From a ‘political mass communication’ approach, it is important to analyze how neo-populists see leadership as a political practice. This leadership is characterized by constant criticism of the political elite, the use of advance means of communications to reach the masses, the implementation of political pressure to control and influence the media content, and the close relationship between masses and charismatic leadership, thereby strengthening a political and ideological system.

This paper aims to study the relationship between the tendency towards the establishment of neo-populist governments and their interaction with the media systems. In particular, this research pays close attention to two important elements of the ‘political mass communication’ notion: the freedom of the press, and media access to different modes of communication. The objective is to discuss neo-populism as a political
phenomenon and to examine, through quantitative analysis, the role that media systems
play in strengthening the neo-populist practice in Latin America.

First, this study will discuss how some of the main elements of the ‘political mass
communication’ concept are playing a central role in constructing a nation’s political
reality—political pressure, press freedom, control on media content, the access to means
of communication, etc. Second, how ‘political mass communication’ and its means
complement and/or strengthen the neo-populist practice.

Chapter I explores the ideas behind the emergence of neo-populism in the region,
concretely, the current transition from democracy to neo-populism. Chapter II reviews
three main sources of literature that have studied both phenomena from a political and
communicational approach. Chapter III outlines the comparative methodology based on
a quantitative study of eighteen Latin American countries. Chapter IV underlines the
main findings. Chapter IV discusses the current neo-populist tendencies, the media factor,
the future social and political implications of neo-populism in the region, and other
potential research questions regarding neo-populism and media systems in Latin America.

This paper will significantly contribute to expand the current literature on
‘political mass communication’ and the study of neo-populism, two relatively new
phenomena that are rapidly taking over the sociopolitical arena in Latin America. In
addition, this paper seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the conditions that
affect neo-populism’s emergence, and to some extent, its consolidation. As Blumler
(2003) argues, “[T]he role of political communication ... would prove an indispensable
(not merely useful) tool for understanding the fortunes of neo-populist movements in
contemporary politics” (xvi).
Can neo-populism in the region be understood without an assessment of contemporary media politics? This paper is based on the assumption that the current neo-populist phenomenon cannot be understood without a detailed examination of contemporary media politics in the region (Waisbord, 2003). The objective is to analyze how neo-populist governments in the region utilize different channels of mass communication (print media, television, radio) and political procedures (political pressure and control over media content) to achieve their political and ideological goals: to attract the masses, to gain political support, and in some cases, to sustain their popularity, regardless of their performance as political leaders.

Assuming that neo-populism in Latin America cannot be understood without an examination of the contemporary media politics in the region (Waisbord, 2003), the research question is:

RQ: Do political pressure and control over media content, combined with widespread access to different channels of mass communication, strengthen neo-populism in Latin America?

The paper will affirmatively answer this question. Through a quantitative assessment, this research will show that there is a direct relationship between neo-populism and the media factor (control on media content + media access). The more neo-
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populist the country, the more the ideology will rely upon the media to maintain broad-based political support.

Subsidiary Questions

The following questions are focused on discussing, from a wider perspective, some complementing ideas on neo-populism and its political repercussion in the region:

- How do neo-populist governments manipulate and use the masses in order to achieve political steadiness and political power?
- What are the neo-populist effects on democracy?
- Is neo-populism a positive or negative factor in sustaining democracy?
- How can the media create a balanced relation between media factors and political reality?
- Does political pressure and control over media content represent a threat to democratic practice in Latin America?
- What is the common denominator among neo-populist governments in the region?
- How effective and/or important is control over media content in a neo-populist scenario?

Hypotheses

Based on the assumption that the more neo-populist the country is, the more the ideology will rely on the media content in order to maintain mass political support, the following hypotheses will be examined in this paper:
H: The higher the Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI), the higher the Governance Latin America Index (GLI) in the region.

H₂: The higher the Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI), the lower the Governance Latin America Index (GLI) in the region.

This is explained by the mathematical relation that sustains as the Governance Latin America Index (GLI) increases, the sustainability of the democratic practice in the region is highly correlated to an increase of the Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI). On the other hand, as the Governance Latin America Index (GLI) decreases, the emergence of neo-populist governments in Latin America is highly correlated to an increase of the Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI). A rigorous control over media content, a gradual strengthening of the channels of mass communication, plus a high degree of political restrictiveness towards press freedom, will contribute to a trend of neo-populist governance.

Limitations

In this section, the author has identified four limitations. First, there is a conceptual debate regarding the definition of populism and neo-populism; both concepts have "chameleonistic-like qualities" (Taggart, 2000, p. 1). Second, the qualitative nature of previous research provides a methodology limitation. Third, the data available is, in most
Fourth, there is a lack of 'political communication' literature that studies the region. Since the study of 'political communication' in Latin America is only beginning to fully develop as a social science, it is very difficult to analyze the variables without taking into consideration some American and European approaches. The following is a brief discussion of the abovementioned limitations:

**Conceptual Debate**

There is a conceptual limitation with regard to an universal agreement on the definition of populism and neo-populism. "Populism has been viewed by many social scientists as a multifaceted, historically specific occurrence and by others as primarily an economic policy, a political strategy or a sociological phenomenon" (Dugas, 2004, p. 1118). "Populism is difficult to systematically analyze" (Trautman 1997, p. xvi). In addition, Betz and Immerfall (1998) maintain that like any other ideological approach—fascism or right wing extremism—populism has been complex to label. In his book, Populism, Taggart (2000) emphasizes that populism "[H]as an essential impalpability, an awkward conceptual slipperiness" (p. 1).

Many theoretical approaches have attempted to agree on one universally accepted definition for both terms. For many years, theorists have attempted to study the phenomenon from a single view, but populism and neo-populism are complex concepts. "The significant disparities between the traditional and newer forms of populism have produced a lively debate over precisely what this concept should signify" (Dugas, 2003, p. 10).
Many social scientists have outlined the political nature of this phenomenon (De la Torre 2000). Other theorists study it from an economic point view (Weyland, 2003); and there is also the sociohistorical approach (Weyland, 2003; Conniff, 1999). Since the concept has a wide application, the author will study neo-populism as a political tendency.

Methodological Constraint

The current literature that examines neo-populism and ‘political mass communication’ in Latin America analyzes both phenomena from a qualitative perspective; particularly comparative analyses by Weyland, Mazzoleni, Waissbord, etc. As a result, finding quantitative research that makes reference to the study of ‘political mass communication’ and its influence on the emergence and establishment of neo-populist governments in Latin America is not a simple task. In this case, it becomes difficult, but not impossible, to concentrate efforts in developing a quantitative methodology. Although this provides a significant methodological limitation, it also creates an opportunity to experiment with an empirical examination of this topic.

Data

The data available is, in many cases, targeted to a specific region (Europe, North America). Many worldwide organizations have gathered efforts to provide numerical data. Although organizations such as the World Bank (WB), the Interamerican
Development Bank (IDB), the United Nations Developing Program (UNDP), the United Nations (UN), Latinobarometro, and others have made important contributions to provide data for the Latin American region, access to the information is limited, and sometimes, very costly.

**Political Communication as a Social Science in Latin America**

"As discussed elsewhere in this volume, much existing research on political communications is based upon studies of the United States, as well as paired cross-national comparisons, for example between Britain and Germany" (Norris, 2004, p. 121). The limited literature available in the field of 'political communication' studies in Latin America represents a major constraint. Since 'political communication' as a social science is now starting to produce important research, the reliance on American and European approaches in order to comprehend the Latin American political reality continues to be a required practice.

**Definition of Terms**

Populism and neo-populism are two concepts with common features. But at the same time, the current neo-populist tendency has created distinctive patterns. For the purpose of this paper, it is imperative to define both terms in order to understand the difference between the classical populist and the current neo-populist approach. On the other hand, concepts such as 'political mass communication,' 'mass media,' 'freedom of
the press' (press freedom), and 'the masses' are also relevant notions to be fully defined in this paper. In addition, concepts such as social change and political socialization are important ideas that will be mentioned throughout the course of this paper. Hence, a clear definition of both terms will contribute to recognize some of the social and cultural elements behind the emergence and development of neo-populist governments in Latin America.

Populism

According to Mayorga (2003), the concept of populism can be analyzed from four theoretical perspectives:

1) the historical-sociological perspective which stressed social mobilizations and sociopolitical coalitions arising in the context of the crisis of 3 oligarchic domination, the early stages of industrialization and the transition from a traditional to a modern society (for example, Germani); 2) the economic perspective drawing attention to populism as a type of redistributive policies and state intervention in the economy which were a result of the weakness and inability of economic elites to develop its class hegemony (for example, Weffort, Ianni); 3) the ideological perspective which identified populism with a specific discourse articulating the constitution of a "popular actor" and the contradiction between this actor and the dominant classes (for example, Laclau), and 4) the political perspective which explains populism as a pattern of mobilization of subaltern and/or excluded masses by personalistic leaders that is not based on institutional structures of political mediation (for example, Cotler, Mouzelis, Weyland, Mayorga). (p.3)

This paper will study populism as a political concept. Populism will be defined as a political movement or regime led by a charismatic leader who mobilizes large masses of primarily lower class people in a personalistic fashion, without the resource to a highly organized or ideologically rooted political party (Dugas, 2003, p.1118).
Neo-populism

Although a commonly accepted definition of neo-populism has not yet been established, there are five broad agreements on the main elements of this concept. First, this section will outline the key elements and their implications. Second, from the above elements, an effort to create a concept of new-populism that is able to fulfill the objectives in this research will be addressed. According to Weyland (1996), Werz (2003), Dugas (2003), Canovan (1999), Rovira (2005), De la Torre (2000), and Mazzoleni (2003), the five main identifiable elements of neo-populism as a political phenomenon are:

I. Neo-populism leadership is characterized by a personalistic form of political leadership; usually charismatic by nature. The neo-populist leaders see themselves as true democrats. "They address the 'people' and speak for the people, claiming that political legitimacy resides within the 'people'" (Mazzoleni, 2003, p.4).

II. Neo-populism entails a political strategy of mass mobilization that favors direct, unmediated ties to followers over highly organized political parties. It fosters a sense of direct contact between the leader and followers (Dugas, 2003, p. 1119).

III. Neo-populism uses an anti-elitist political discourse. This type of discourse presents "the struggle between the people and the oligarchy as moral and ethical fight between good and evil, redemption and fall" (De la Torre, 2000, p. 140).
IV. Neo-populism applies the mediatization of politics as an element of modernization. This is the newest feature of this concept. As the mass media has been gradually developing its means of communication to address the masses and attract their interest, neo-populism as a political practice has been adapting to this reality. The uses of advanced marketing techniques, image consulting and theatrical political symbolism are some of the main mechanisms (Rovira, 2005).

V. Neo-populism makes use of advanced methods of political engineering. Survey, opinion polls, and other research methods are commonly implemented by neo-populists in order to develop a political discourse that meets the needs and expectations of the masses (Rovira, 2005).

From these five aspects, neo-populism will be understood as: a particular type of political movement and leadership characterized by the presence of a charismatic leader, a personalistic one that entitles a political strategy of mass mobilization to build close and emotional ties to followers. An anti-elitist political discourse is designed and implemented as part of a political strategy to reach the masses; with an emphasis on the struggle between the people and the oligarchy. Through the mediatization of politics as an element of modernization, neo-populism is able to create and sustain social and mass support. The uses of advanced marketing techniques, image consulting, and theatrical political symbolism are some of the main mechanisms. In addition, the implementation of advanced methods of political engineering, like surveys, opinion polls, and other research techniques are commonly put into practice by neo-populists in order to develop a political discourse and a political system that meets the masses' needs and expectations.
Originally, political communication referred to the study of communication from a government to its electorate, and later to exchanges of political discourse between a governing majority and the opposition. Subsequently, the field was broadened to studies of the media's role in forming public opinion, and then to the influence of opinion polls on politics. Nowadays, the term encompasses studies of the role of communication in political life in the wider sense, embracing the media, opinion polls, political marketing and publicity, with a particular focus on elections. In fact, political communication could even be considered as referring to any communication that has a political purpose. This definition, although rather broad, has the advantage of embracing two major characteristics of contemporary politics: the broadening of the political sphere and the increasing amount of space given to communication, through the influence of the media and public opinion as reflected in opinion polls (Wolton, 2000).

According to Esser & Pfetisch (2004), mass communication "involves information that is produced by media organizations and disseminated by means of technological carries to audiences that are potentially unlimited, heterogeneous, and anonymous to the producers of the messages (Rogers, 1973, p. 298)." In addition, from a classical standpoint, McQuail (2000) states that mass communication refers to: "the simultaneous transmission from a single or centralized (and organized) sender to all or most of a population recurring and standardized set of messages (news, information, fiction, entertainment, and spectacle), without there being much possibility of responding or answering back (p. 5)."
Mass Media

McQuail (2000) states:

The term ‘mass media’ is shorthand to describe means of communication that operate in a large scale, reaching and involving virtually everyone in society to a greater or lesser degree. It refers to a number of media that are now long established and familiar, such as newspapers, magazines, film, television ... (p.4)

Masses

According to McQuail (2000),

The term describes a very large but amorphous set of individuals that engage in similar behavior, under external influence, and are viewed by their would be manipulators as having little or not separate identity, forms of organization or power, autonomy, integrity or self determination. It represents one view of the media audience. It is used with the same negative connotations in a number of related expressions, including mass behavior, mass opinion, mass consumption, mass culture, mass society, etc. and of course ‘mass communication’ itself. (p.498).

Freedom of the Press (Press Freedom)

The fundamental freedom of individual, political, and human rights that guarantees by law the right of all citizens to publish without advance censorship or permission by authority, or fear of reprisal. It has to be exercised within the limits of law and with respect to the right of others. In practice, freedom of the press is often limited by (economic) barriers of access to the means of publication. The right is usually regarded as fundamental to political democracy. It is related to, but distinct from freedom of expression, opinion, or belief, and also freedom of information and the First Amendment (McQuail, 2000, p. 496).
Social Change

From a general perspective, according to Shackman, Ya-Lin, & Wang (2004), this concept refers to a change in the nature of the social institutions, social behaviors, and/or the social relations of a community of people or society. The term is used to examine the study of history, economics, politics, as well as topics such as the success or failure of political systems, globalization, and democratization. This concept can study political and sociological approach models as complex as revolutions, ideological transitions, and paradigms shifts.

Shackman, Ya-Lin, & Wang (2004) assert that social change can occur under the following conditions:

- It can be slow, gradual, incremental, and evolutionary; in this it might be barely noticeable.
- It could arise fast, radical, sudden and revolutionary; it might even take people by surprise.
- It could take over a wide in scope, affecting almost all people in a society or limited in scope, affecting only a small number of people.

Political Socialization

Political socialization is a precondition for maintaining, altering, and adapting a system to a changing national and international environment [...]. Political socialization entails the adoption of central elements of a given political culture, political knowledge, attitudes, and models of political actions by citizens from an early age on. From perspectives of comparative political communication, it is interesting to explore the respective roles of the mass media as an institution of political socialization in different systems (Stevenson, 2004, p. 389).
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

It is fundamental to study how the media presence has transformed, influenced, and energized neo-populist responses in the region. There are two main considerations regarding neo-populism and political communication literature in Latin America. First, the scholarly literature on neo-populism has paid little attention to the role that media has played in the establishment of this political tendency across the region. Second, the current studies on both phenomena examine neo-populism and political communication as separate subjects. Few studies have contributed to examine the relationship between new-populism and ‘political mass communication’—free press and media access. The following are three major academic works that explore both variables from a qualitative (comparative analysis) and a quantitative approach:

In this paper, Norris (2004) asks, "What can be done to strengthen democratic development and, in particular what is the role of the media in this process?" (p. 1). This paper suggests that the mass media has a positive impact on two important factors that sustain the democratic practice: good governance and human development. Under democratic conditions, if both function effectively as regulators and as a civic forum, they will facilitate a diversity of voices in public debate.

First, Pippas highlights some of the most relevant discussions on theories of mass communication. Afterwards, the author examines different media systems around the world. In this section, Pippas outlines the comparative methodology, underlines the typology, and then compares media access and freedom in 135 nations around the world (Pippas, 2004).

The main contribution of this study to this paper lies in the theoretical approach and its application to the neo-populist emergence and the study of media systems in the Latin American region. The study theorizes that media systems strengthen good governance and promote positive development outcomes most effectively under two conditions (Pippas, 2004):

- where there is an unfettered and independent free press;
- and where there is widespread access to mass communications.

These two conditions are central notions for the current paper. They are fundamental premises to observe the neo-populist phenomenon and to comprehend how media systems in Latin America meet and complement neo-populist objectives. Pippas studies both conditions under democratic practices at a global level. On the contrary, this
The research confirms that media systems characterized by widespread mass access and by an autonomous press are most directly associated with methodical indicators of good governance and human development (Pippas, 2004). Countries with these types of media system experience less corruption, higher political stability, a more effective rule of law, as well as better development outcomes (higher per capita income, greater literacy, etc.) (Pippas, 2004).

As a final remark, Pippas (2004) concludes by suggesting that “strengthening the channels of communication is vital for development, particularly for electoral democracies that are in the process of establishing more effective political and economic institutions” (p. 13).

The Media and Neo-Populism: A Contemporary Comparative Analysis

This book is focused on media politics and the rise of neo-populist governments in different regions of the world. The idea that modern politics is in large part communication is one of the main statements in this work. There has been substantial academic analyses of neo-populist parties that have emerged around the world in response to globalization and the complex socio-economic divisions it has produced. This book, however, by focusing on populism's relationship with the media, offers a different perspective.
The research takes into consideration a phenomenon that is challenging the current European and Latin American democracies. The editors provide a critical framework for an analysis of the stages of neo-populist leaders and governments. Furthermore, it provides a thoughtful comparative analysis between the elites and tabloid approaches to neo-populism.

The book highlights the assumption that political leaders, parties, and movements ignore media power, press relations, and communication strategies at their risk. The cases studies presented in this book discuss the various approaches of neo-populist parties in different regions of the world (Europe, Latin America, North America, India, etc). It provides a guide to understand how neo-populist states have used mass media to gain recognition in the social setting as well as to project their images and messages to target audiences through them.

Mazzoleni (2003) states “[T]heir contribution to the rise of populist groups in several national instances is a field that warrants investigation (p. 6).” Throughout this extensive research, one of the most important contributions lies in the recognition of the distinctive nature of the modern commercial media. In particular, how media has an enormous capacity to affect the opinions and attitudes of mass audiences in the political and social arena.

This research emphasizes the necessity to recognize the contribution of the media to the establishment of neo-populism. Bulmer (2003) states that

“[L]ittle attention has been paid on how the media work as the initiators or catalyst of populist sentiments, how media content may voice sectional populist claims, or
how mainstream new media may act (or react) as paladins of the existing political order by restraining the wider diffusion of populism (p.2)

As a final remark, the research concludes by highlighting some relevant considerations for this paper and for future studies on neo-populism and the media factor:

- There are clear differences in the socio-economic-political contexts (the structural factors) that are framing the rise of the various neo-populist parties. On the other hand, there are apparent similarities across most cases in their media representation (Stewart et all, 2003).
- There is a behavioral pattern regarding neo-populist leaders and their interaction with the media factors. In all the cases, and at an early stage, these leaders are astute news makers. They have the capacity "[T]o generate controversy within the secure constant and at times enthusiastic coverage by "popular" media" (Stewart et all., 2003, p.233).
- There is more research needed to determine if the media is also powerful enough to contain the political and electoral support given to neo-populist leaders and parties by million of citizen who experience increasing anxiety due to the unexpected effects of globalization in their cultures, life styles, standards of living and security (Stewart et all, 2003, p.236).

**Neo-populism and the Media in Latin America: Media Effect in Brazil and Peru**

In this paper, Boas (2004) states, “In recent years, several Latin America countries have witnessed the election of neo-populist presidents who emerged from the outside of the political establishment, bypassed intermediary institutions in their appeals to voters, and oriented their campaigns towards the atomized poor” (p.27). This study examines the role of television in the electoral success of neo-populist politicians. Furthermore, it opens a new debate for arguing the extent and the influence of television in the consolidation of political power.
The research highlights a key conceptualization of neo-populism and the positive relation between this phenomenon and the growing political science of television. Boas (2004) takes as a reference Weyland’s notion: a comparison between the classical populist and neo-populist model. Weyland argues that “television has helped neo-populists to connect with the masses much as radio did for traditional populists, but that modern-day television has been even more effective in covering politician’s charismatic qualities” (Boas, 2004, p.28).

Although this research is based on elections and their final outcomes, there are valuable elements to take into consideration. One of the main contributions of this paper to the neo-populist as well as the political communication literature is the effort to establish a single concept of neo-populism that entitles and recognizes the importance of media to address the masses and to sustain the ideological theme. In order to establish a satisfactory definition on neo-populism, from previous literature and different approaches, the author compares populism and neo-populism. Boas (2005) states the following concept:

A definition of populism as a political strategy includes two key characteristics: populists relate to the masses in a top-down fashion that seeks to subordinate or bypass established forms of political intermediation, and they focus their efforts on appealing to a previously excluded political constituency (Weyland, 1996). Following this definition, neopopulism implies the populism of the 1980s to the present, in which the target of appeals is the atomized poor and informal sector rather than the organized working class. Neopopulism differs from classical populism precisely because this new constituency lacks formal organization. While classical populists circumvented existing political institutions in their appeals to the masses, they typically created new institutions to mobilize workers (Collier, 2001) (p. 30).

In addition, from Weyland’s work, Boas (2005) “distinguish between two types of neo-populists: those who take over and subordinate an existing political party and those who emerge from outside of the established party system, eschewing all ties to existing...
parties" (p. 30). This observation contributes the definition and outlines the main characteristics of neo-populism as a political system—one of the main objectives of this paper.

Another input is the quantitative nature of the research. So far, there have been various comparative studies on neo-populism and the media, but few have tried to take the qualitative research and turn it into a quantitative report. Boas (2005) "conduct an analysis of survey data to address the impact of television exposure on voting behavior in elections where at least one candidate was a neo-populist outsider" (p.28). The author studies whether television is beneficial to neo-populist candidates' political strategies, or whether the influence of television in these elections derives more from biased coverage of the campaign. Boas (2004) compares the impact of television in three elections held in South America (Collor de Mello in Brazil; Toledo and Fujimori in Peru). These findings suggest that bias is the more reliable predictor of television's impact on Latin American presidential elections, rather than the presence of a neo-populist candidate.

A final contribution of this study is the emphasis made on the subject of 'political mass communication,' specifically the analysis on media politics. According to Boas (2005), analysts have suggested that television plays a casual role in the emergence of politicians' success; such as the case of Collor in Brazil. He also explains why television has proven particularly important for neo-populists seeking to communicate directly with the masses (Boas, 2005). One of the main reasons is that television is a medium widely accessible even in the remote regions of most Latin American countries. Hence television is a feasible mean of avoiding existing institutions and communicating a personal message to millions of voters simultaneously (Boas, 2005).
In summary, this study contains three key considerations that are helpful for the development of this paper:

- The conceptualization of neo-populism. Particularly, the inclusion of the media factor as an element to define neo-populism.
- The importance to study political communication in order to understand the rise of neo-populism in the Latin American region.
- The quantitative approach, which opens up a new path to measure and to express in numerical terms the relationship between neo-populism and media politics.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

The chosen method is a quantitative analysis. “The numerical representation and manipulation of observations for the purpose of describing and explaining the phenomena that those observations reflect” (Babbie, 2004, p.396). In this paper, the author chooses to create a Governance Latin American Index (GLI) and a Political Communication Latin American Index (PCLI) in order to study the dependent variable (Neo-populism) and the independent variable (Press Freedom + Media Access).

From 1996 to 2004, this study seeks to analyze 18 Latin American countries. The objective is to show, throughout a numerical analysis, the statistical significance of political changes over time across the region and the correlation between the Political Communication Latin American Index (PCLI) and the Governance Latin America Index (GLI). The methodology is composed by:

- Index Numbers calculation; and
- Descriptive Statistics: Linear Correlation Analysis and Linear Regression Analysis.

First, the Governance Latin America Index (GLI) seeks to show the tendency towards the establishment of neo-populist governments in the region. Second, the Political Communication Latin American Index (PCLI) seeks to show the potential for neo-populist governments to gain mass support and to control the flow of information that is transmitted to the masses. It covers all aspects of public expression and transmission of, and access to, all manner of content—the media access to the different
channels of communications (TV, radio, newspapers, etc) and the control on media content.

1. Governance Latin America Index (GLI)

The author constructs the Governance Latin America Index (GLI) by selecting six dimensions of governance. These are turned into index numbers in order to obtain the GLI. The following six dimensions of governance are taken into consideration (Appendix A-1 for definition):

1. Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI)
2. Political Participation Index (PPI)
3. Political Stability Index (PSI)
4. Government Effectiveness Index (GEI)
5. Support to Democracy Index (SDI)
6. Satisfaction with Democracy Index (SWDI)

From a logical model perspective, choosing these six dimensions of governance represents a precise approach that is statistically able to prove the political tendency towards the establishment of neo-populism in some Latin American countries. If there is a tendency of neo-populist governments in the region, with these six dimensions, the ability to estimate the role that political communication plays in strengthening neo-populism is likely to be accurate. In this case, the data is taken from reliable sources such as: the World Bank, Latinobarometro, the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, and Freedom House. This data represents a confidence interval of 95% and error margin between 3.5% - 5.0% for the whole study of the population.
1.1 Index Numbers

The primary purpose of an index number is to provide a useful value for comparing magnitudes of aggregates. The objective is to relate variables to each other and to measure the changes of these magnitudes over time. Government and statistical agencies often report time series data in the form of index numbers. They are used when it is necessary to show the average change in a large number of variables—six dimensions of governance for eighteen countries across Latin America.

In this study, the author considers \textit{Latin America} = 1.00 as a comparative base index number. The Governance Latin America index (GLI) represents the average, as well known as arithmetic mean, of the six indicators expressed as index numbers. The calculations are shown in the appendix section. The following mathematical equation is applied to the calculation of the GLI (Appendix A, Table A-2):

\[
\text{Governance Latin American Index (GLI)} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{6} X_i}{n} = \frac{(PSI+GEl+SDI+SWD1+PPl+PCLI)}{6}
\]

It is possible that the GLI for each country could be: 1 < GLI < 1. Nevertheless, it is important to establish that in this paper, a country with a GLI = 2 does not mean the country is twice higher than other country = 1. This method is the chosen one because the pondered value of the variables are complex and they often involve a high speculation degree, thus the author considers that a simple average method is an useful approach in...
order to establish reliable similarities and differences that exist in the Latin America's political scenario.

The author also obtains the index number for each governance indicator following the same procedure, which consists to turn the original tables into index numbers according to the criteria above exposed (Appendix B, tables B-1 through B-10). Nevertheless, the calculation of the Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI), whose procedure is described below, differs from the GLI's calculation.

2. Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI)

According to Pippas, “Press freedom can be expected to influence whether the impact of the news media promotes a pluralistic voice and government accountability or how far it serves to reinforce the power of established interest and state control” (2004, p.125). In addition, the media access to different channels of communication is an important factor to consider regarding press freedom. It complements McQuail’s notion of freedom of press where under different circumstances, to get the message across to the masses, access to the means of communication represent a critical communicational link—which could be often limited or not by (economic) barriers of access (2000). Therefore, the author has created a communication index that combines both scales: the Press Freedom and the Media Access Scale.

- Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI): Free Press
- Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI): Media Access
2.1 Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI1): Free Press

From the Freedom of the Press 2004 (Freedom House), this data examines worldwide the level of press freedom in each country. It comprises 23 questions divided into three broad categories (Appendix A, Table A-3):

- The legal environment,
- The political environment, and
- The economic environment.

Since the data examines 180 countries around the world, the author has selected 18 Latin American countries. Each country is rated in these three categories, with the higher numbers indicating less freedom. A country's final score is based on the total of the three categories; a score of 0 to 30 places the country in the Free Press group; 31 to 60 in the Partly Free press group; and 61 to 100 in the Not Free press group, the final score is turned into Index Number (Appendix B, Table b-16).

2.2 Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI2): Media Access

From the publication Information and Communications for Development 2006: Global Trends and Policies (World Bank), the information selected shows the most recent country-specific facts and communication technologies data drawn from diverse sources such as: International Telecommunication Union (ITU), United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), World Information and Technology and Services Alliance (WITSA), among others.
Access to the means of mass communication most commonly includes the printed press (newspapers and magazines), the traditional electronic broadcast media (radio and television), and the new technologies associated with the Internet (including email and the World Wide Web). In this case, the author takes the data provided by the World Bank ICT at-a-Glance country tables (2006), which shows the ICT world development indicators, and transform them into Index Numbers (Appendix B, Table B-13).

For the purpose of this paper, the author has selected three main channels of communication (TV, newspapers, and radio) for 18 Latin American countries. The ICT sector performance section (World Bank ICT at-a-Glance Country Tables, 2006) monitors the circulation of daily newspapers and the distribution of radio receivers and television sets per 1000 population.

The Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI) is calculated by combining the Press Freedom scale (PCLI1) and Media Access scale (PCLI2). Throughout a simple average calculation, the author obtains the Political Latin American Communication Index (PCLI) (Appendix A, Table A-2). The following formula is applied in order to obtain the PCLI:

$$PCLI = \frac{\sum X_i}{n} = \frac{(PCLI_1 + PCLI_2)}{2}$$
3. Descriptive Statistics: Linear Correlation and Linear Regression Analysis

After calculating the Governance Global Index (GLI) and Political Communication Global Index (PCLI), the author determines the relationship among them. This relationship, or more accurately the association between (GLI) and (PCLI), is established and measured by means of the correlation techniques. Furthermore, the author groups the data to simplify the statistical equations through Statistics Descriptive Tables (Appendix B, Tables B-17 and B-18).

First, the author selects the Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI) as independent variable and Governance Latin America Index (GLI) as dependent variable. In order to estimate the association between variables, these variables are plotted graphically in the scatter diagram chart. Thus, the author computes the regression line; the resulting equation will be a linear one by:

\[ Y = a + bX \quad (1.1) \]

Where the values of \( a \) and \( b \) are obtained from the “normal” equations:
Then, the author calculates the Coefficient of Correlation by using the product moment correlation coefficient $r$ for grouped data:

$$r = \sqrt{1 - \frac{S^2}{\sigma_x^2}}$$  \hspace{1cm} (1.4)

$$r = \frac{P}{n}$$  \hspace{1cm} (1.5)

Finally, the author obtains the results to measure the impact of the Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI) over Governance Latin America Index (GLI) by combining the statistics methods above mentioned.
CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

The results obtained from the methodology are classified by:

1. Descriptive Statistics per each variable—this takes into consideration the Government Latin American Index (GLI).

2. Correlation and Regression Analysis between Political Communication Latin American Index (PCLI) and the Governance Latin American Index (GLI) from 1996 to 2004.

After a detailed numerical analysis of both variables—GLI and PCLI—, the following findings will outline the main considerations and results derived from the implementation of a quantitative model. First, this section will underline the results obtained from the descriptive statistical methods per variable; this includes the six dimensions of governments (PSI, GEI, SDI, SWDI, PPI, and PCLI). From this basis, the author will highlight the countries with the highest, the lowest, and the average index. In order to address the statistical relationship between the two variables, the second part will underline the results from the correlation and regression analysis. A further examination and analysis of these results and their political implications in Latin America will be examined in chapter V.
1. Descriptive Statistics per Variables

Appendix B, table B-1 shows the minimum, the maximum, the mean (M), and the standard deviation (SD) per each dimension of Governance in Latin America. Based on these measures, the following results will be examined in detail at a later point in this paper. From highest to lowest, these values are expressed in index numbers. The idea is to provide an additional tool to understand from a quantitative approach what these findings represent in the political and communicational environment in Latin America.

1.1 Political Stability Index (PSI):

The country with the highest index number (see appendix B, Table B-3) is Costa Rica—1. 95. On the other hand, based on a SD=0. 49, Colombia is the country with the lowest political stability index—0. 25. Brazil (1. 09) and Dominican Republic (1. 00) are the nations closest to the comparative base index, which is equal to 1.

1.2 Government Effectiveness Index (GEI):

The maximum value is (1. 92); this corresponds to Chile. The country with the lowest government effectiveness index is Paraguay—0. 26; with SD equals to 0. 47. The two countries with their index closest to the comparative base equals 1 are El Salvador and Peru (appendix B, Table B-5).
1.3 Support for the Democracy Index (SDI):
The highest index number corresponds to Uruguay—1, 42. Based on an SD that equals 0, 24, the Latin American nation with the lowest support for democracy index is Brazil—0, 79. On the other hand, Nicaragua’s index—1, 00—represents the closest value to the comparative base equal 1 (Appendix B, Table B-7).

1.4 Satisfaction with Democracy Index (SWDI)
The country with the highest SWID is Uruguay—1, 75. In addition, the country with the lowest SWDI index is Panama—0, 42. This index is based on an SD equals 0, 36. The nation with the average index or closest to the comparative base that equals 1, Chile has a SWDI equal to 1, 05 (Appendix B, Table B-9).

1.5 Political Participation Index (PPI):
Costa Rica has the highest PPI—1, 93. With a SD equal to 0, 32, Guatemala’s index is the lowest among the countries examined in this paper—0, 89. Bolivia—1, 73—and Ecuador—1, 60—represent the two nations with average PPI (Appendix B, Table B-10).

1.6 Political Communication Latin American Index (PCLI):
The country with the highest value is Uruguay—2, 06. With a SD equal to 0, 35, the country with the lowest PCLI is Nicaragua (0,62). The Latin
American Nations with an average index are Colombia – 0.98—and Bolivia – 0.98. (Appendix B, Table B-7).

1.7 Governance Latin America Index (GLI):

The maximum value is 1.93 which corresponds to Uruguay. The minimum value is 0.71 for Paraguay with a $SD$ equal to 0.30. The countries with average indexes are El Salvador – 1.03—and Bolivia –1.02 (Appendix B, Table B-16).

2. Correlation and Regression Analysis between PCLI and GLI

2.1 Correlation Analysis (1994-2004):

According to the author, the independent variable is the Political Communication Latin American Index (PCLI) and the dependent variable is the Governance Latin American Index (GLI). The Correlation Coefficient (Pearson) is 0.80 for $N=18$ (Appendix B, Table B-17), which indicates a strong relationship between PCLI and GLI.

2.2 Linear Regression Analysis:

After the correlation analysis, the author calculates regression based on a linear and curve fit equation (Appendix B, Table B-19), where $R^2 = 0.63$. Therefore this equation is represented by:

$$Y = 0.40X + 0.69$$
In this discussion section, the author will analyze the results described in Chapter IV. The objective is to examine how the relationship between poor governance and political mass communication hinders democratic practice in the region. This analysis seeks to explore how poor governance creates a space for the emergence of new political systems like neo-populism. First, the author will identify the weaknesses of the democratic practice in the region. Second, the author will highlight the current political patterns in Latin America. In order to narrow the discussion, the analysis will be focused on the following countries: Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, and Uruguay. Since neo-populist tendencies are more representative in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Peru, the author will closely discuss the neo-populist phenomenon in these nations.

The correlation between neo-populism and the media factor will also be examined; specifically, how the relationship between poor governance and political mass communication deters, in some cases, the democratic practice in the region. While neo-populism is starting to develop as a political force in the region, a study of the future implications for democracy and press freedom in Latin America will be examined.

What is the future of democracy under a neo-populist system? Furthermore, what will be the direct influence on media politics? It is important to consider how neo-populist governments, by exerting a gradual control on media content, are able to centralize and limit the press freedom practice. As a final point, this chapter will discuss future ideas regarding the study of neo-populism as a political tendency in the region.
Moreover, the author will address the main considerations for future potential research questions in the area of political mass communication in Latin America.

**Analysis of Results**

According to The Economist (2005), “Latin Americans do not want to go back to dictatorship but they are still unimpressed with their democracies.” Overall, Uruguay is the country with the highest indicators of governance. Uruguay appears as the most stable country in the region, with sustained high levels throughout the period measured—nearly 80% of support.

At the top of the governance rankings, Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil possess steady governance indicators. These nations have had fairly stable governments for almost a decade. In the middle, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Bolivia, Peru, and Nicaragua are the nations with average indicators. Democracy in these countries was an established practice, but a series of political transformations and forces in the last decades, particularly in the late nineties with Mr. Chavez leading these transformations, have impacted the political culture of these countries. Such political forces seem to have longer lasting effects than any other alternations—market economy, or technological advances. (Latinobarometro Summary-Report, 2004).

At the bottom of the table, Colombia, Panama, Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Paraguay represent the countries with the lowest governance indices. (Appendix C, Table C-1). These are countries with several internal transitions. Paraguay and Colombia have two different approaches to governance: Paraguay has the most...
authoritarian government in the region, while Colombia is drawn into everlasting guerrilla conflicts that directly affect the political scenario in the country.

Ecuador is also a country with serious democratic challenges. In ten years, three presidents have been overthrown, and eight presidents have been elected. There is a clear pattern of internal instability, fragmentation, and disarticulation of democratic institutions (Valdivieso, 2006). Concerning El Salvador and Honduras, both are relatively young democracies that need to improve the democratic outcome in order to maintain political stability.

Regarding media access and press freedom, Uruguay is at the top of the table with the highest index. Press freedom is a given and respected practice, and all forms of media reach a wide range of the population. In addition, Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica are part of the top countries with high PCLIs. In terms of press freedom, however, these countries have different statuses. Costa Rica and Chile are considered free, while Argentina and Dominican Republic are partially free, and Venezuela is not free. Being at the top of the table also confirms that people in these countries have a fair access to the media.

On the other hand, countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Guatemala lay in the middle of the ranking. Among them, Colombia is the only one considered not free, while the rest are partially free. Media access is not wide accessible in the majorities of these countries, especially in rural areas. The final six Latin American countries, El Salvador, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, Honduras, and Nicaragua are at the bottom of the PCLI table (Appendix C, Table C-2). All of them are partially free in
terms of press freedom. Media access is limited in rural areas, with some differences in major cities.

In sum, the political mass communication trend in the region is reasonably clear concerning press freedom. The majority of the countries are following partially free tendencies, while only three are entirely free, with the exception of Venezuela and Colombia, where the press freedom’s status is reduced to a not free practice. Media access, in more than half of these countries, has not been developed on a large basis. The media infrastructure has not yet reached a wide spectrum of the population. In a majority of these countries, the pattern is that the access to the means of communication is more accessible in major cities, whereas in rural areas it is limited.

The extreme cases in Latin America are Uruguay and Paraguay. Uruguay is the country with the highest indices. According to the 2005 Freedom of the Press Report, Uruguay status remains “free.” In addition, in terms of democratic practices, the country maintains a consistent balance among the six dimensions of governance. Uruguay is first in support for democracy, satisfaction with the democracy, political participation, and political communication (media access and press freedom). It is second in political support and government effectiveness.

On the other hand, Paraguay is the country with the lowest governance and political mass communication indicators. Overall, Paraguay’s GLI is the lowest index among eighteen countries in Latin America. From a political approach, it could be inferred that democracy in this country is inefficiently developed. According to the 2005 Freedom of the Press Report, Paraguay’s free press status is “partially free.” This
essentially means that poor access to the means of communication and an unstable press freedom condition can tangible damage, even more, the democratic system in Paraguay.

The fluctuation of indices between these two cases creates a very particular pattern in Latin America. From the previous results (top to the bottom of the GLI and PCLI tables), there are two political patterns or tendencies in Latin America. The first tendency is characterized by those countries with consistent democratic practices and a balanced relationship between press freedom and the widespread access to different means of communication. The second tendency is characterized by those countries with clear governance disparities and political mass communication challenges—the tendency towards a strict control of press freedom by the government to achieve and/or maintain political power.

The first pattern is a democratic one. In this case, the hypothesis is correct: the higher the Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI), the higher the Governance Latin America Index (GLI). This clearly applies to three Latin American countries: Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Chile. In political terms, they are the most-stable democracies in the region today. From a political communications point of view, according to Freedom House (2005), all of them are considered “free” with regard to freedom of the press. In addition, these countries are at top of the list for media access to different channels of communication: Uruguay is first, followed by Costa Rica, and in fourth place, Chile.

The second pattern is the main focus of this paper—the neo-populist tendency. While some Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico are at the top of the GLI table, the neo-populist tendency can be inferred by the
governance indicators, the press freedom, and the media access index. Central American
countries are not exempt from this same pattern. El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and
Honduras are also undergoing deep political transformations. This situation combines
with their current press freedom status as “partially free” (Freedom House 2005) are
creating an opportunity to expose the weaknesses of democratic practice in these nations.

The second hypothesis states: the higher the Political Communication Latin
America Index (PCLI), the lower the Governance Latin America Index (GLI) in the
region. As mentioned before, the emergence of neo-populist governments in Latin
America is highly correlated to an increase of the Political Communication Latin
America Index (PCLI). This means that rigorous control on media content, a gradual
strengthening of the channels of mass communication, plus a high degree of political
restrictiveness towards press freedom, will contribute to a trend of neo-populist
governance.

The countries that are likely to prove this assumption are Venezuela, Argentina,
Ecuador, Guatemala, and Paraguay (Appendix C, Table C-3). In all of them, their PCLI
is higher than the GLI. As these countries demonstrate a lack of good governance, their
respective governments are able to compensate for their poor performance by controlling
political messages in the media. Furthermore, poor governance is a highly influential
factor that weakens already vulnerable and ineffective democracies. Under this scenario,
the author can deduce that as democracy loses mass support, the emergence of new
political ideals are likely to succeed among the disillusioned masses.

Countries at the bottom of the table are also vulnerable to a possible neo-populist
influence in the short and long run (Appendix C, Table C-3). All of them have common
denominators. Half of these countries have government effectiveness indicators below one. This means that government ineffectiveness is a widespread condition. Therefore, eleven countries in the region are below average in terms of political support. More than half of these countries also score below one in support for democracy. Overall, these patterns could potentially alter the political scenario to accommodate future populist leaders.

On the other hand, Colombia’s case is a distinct one. It is a country with a steady democracy, but with complex social and political conflicts. Due to Colombia’s internal struggles, media access and press freedom are in jeopardy for different political reasons, rather than the influence of a neo-populist movement or ideology in the country.

The main problem arises when only three countries out of eighteen are considered stable democracies. From a political standpoint, the idea that democracy in Latin America is a secured practice is far from reality. The disparities and inconsistencies among the six dimensions of governance, which apply to the majority of the countries in the region, is a central factor to take into consideration.

When there is inconsistent good governance practice, the ability to maintain stable democracies is more complicated. This creates a setting in which other ideals of governance can lead to a deep transformation of the current status of democracy in the region. As a result, Latin Americans are choosing leaders who promise a shift from traditional elite-driven politics, to more participatory and active democracy that focus on fulfilling the needs of the poor.

Ineffective governance opens up a space for the emergence of traditional and/or new political ideals—neo-populism, socialism, communism, authoritarianism, etc. It is
important to note that poor governance does promote political transformation. In this case, many researchers are supporting the idea that Latin America is moving towards leftist governments (Montaner, 2006).

**Tendencies: The real neo-populism**

To define exactly which countries are neo-populist is a difficult task. The current tendencies portray countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, and, the most recent case, Peru, as the epicenter of the neo-populist political transformation in Latin America (The Economist, 2006). Based on the quantitative model used in this paper, two conclusions are possible. First, in terms of governance indicators these countries are following a political transformation pattern. Second, neo-populists are using the mediatization of politics as an element of modernization; in order to advertise and promote the ideology, these neo-populist nations have taken advantage of media politics.

Regarding Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia, they all have government effectiveness and political support indicators below one (the comparative base). Although the support for democracy is apparent, people's perceptions regarding the government effectiveness are low. Second, in these countries, the political figure is characterized by a particular type of leadership in which a populist rhetoric against political elites and obsoletes democracies are intrinsic parts of a very direct connection with the masses. The valid question in this case would be: is this political transformation a neo-populist one?

According to Ghersi (2005), there is a clearly part of the left in Latin America that has followed a neo-populist tendency. Today's left-wing neo-populism pretends to
dissolve the state and to create a new one, with strong foundations on ethnic ideals. 

South America's case is specially remarkable because the political messages of Hugo 
Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia, as well as Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador 
and Ollanta Humala in Peru, are characterized by personalistic forms of political 
leadership, usually charismatic by nature (Ghersi, 2005).

Another consideration is that neo-populism is using the mediatization of politics 
as an element of modernization. In order to advertise and promote the ideology, these 
neo-populist nations have taken advantage of media politics. The objective is to 
influence and manage the political message communicated to the masses through the 
advantageous utilization of the benefits derived from media access, political pressure 
procedures, and control over media content.

Neo-populist leaders share a common association with mass media. There are 
four notable examples: Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Nestor 
Kirchner in Argentina, and a current presidential candidate in Peru, Ollanta Humala (Ruiz, 
2005). The author has chosen to discuss three Latin American countries that represent a 
clear neo-populist tendency: Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia. The leaders of these 
countries utilize a political strategy of mass mobilization that favors direct, unmediated 
ties to followers over highly organized political parties; they see themselves as true 
democrats; they have an anti-elitist political discourse; and they rely on political 
symbolism as an instrument to attract the masses, and in some cases, to maintain mass 
support.
Although Venezuela is one of the countries in Latin America with a strong democratic tradition, the political scenario has been gradually shifting towards a more populist approach. Appendix C, table C-1 shows Venezuela's indicators of governance. The two key governance dimensions are government effectiveness and political participation. In this case, Venezuela occupies the fifteenth and seventeenth places, respectively, out of eighteen countries in the region. While support for democracy still prevails in the country and satisfaction with democracy is widespread, the steady decline in press freedom over the past several years, the apparent discontent with the government performance in the last decade, and the gradual refusal to political participation by a vast majority of the nation that disagrees with Mr. Chavez government in the country have contributed to the materialization of a political transformation.

Since Mr. Chavez was elected president in 1999, the country has gone through a period of political turmoil: "the adoption of a new Constitution that many consider antidemocratic, a failed coup attempt, an unsuccessful recall referendum that large segments of society say was fixed, and a costly two-month oil-workers strike (Cue, 2006, p.26)." Gradual changes have occurred in the country for almost seven years. Each one increasingly more radical than the previous, but overall the political transformation lead by Mr. Chavez has severely altered the social and political bases.

In Venezuela, the current status is distinguished by a cultural and political revolution under Mr. Chavez. The country is experiencing drastic changes in civic culture indices. "The perception of inclusion Venezuelan citizen haves gives Mr. Chavez
an easy 40% support, while the other half of the country repudiates him. Venezuela is the one country in Latin America more split by politics" (Latinobarometro Summary-Report, 2004, p. 60). The question is to what extent this political transformation can be seen as a neo-populist change.

Based on the neo-populist definition (see p. 16), Venezuela's government and its leader Mr. Chavez characterize the political features of a neo-populist government. Chavez's leadership style is a charismatic one. He has created his own political party, el Movimiento V Republica (MVR), in which his influence and power are unquestionable. In addition, he has been able to disarticulate and to weaken the traditional political parties (Accion Democratica and COPEI). He has developed a constitutional structure in which the rule of law favors his own interests. He has virtually complete control of all state institutions, from tiny municipal governments to the Supreme Court.

For example, he has expressed his desired to govern the country until 2021. Whereas this is possible or not, his total control of the state's institutions—including the general assembly—could provide him with the opportunity to run Venezuela for many years. If the actual amendment of the constitution is approved, which seeks to establish indefinite reelections, his consolidation in power would be long-lasting.

The current monopolization of the state in the hands of Chavez has deepened another key sector in the country. The media has been constantly targeted by Chavez's government. According to Freedom House (2005),

Hostile political atmosphere has pitted the largely pro-opposition private media against the government of President Hugo Chavez and the state-controlled media". Furthermore in 2004, " the government's enactment of legislation prohibiting the broadcast of certain material, its intimidation of and denial of access to private media, and the continued harassment of journalists, directed primarily at those employed by private media outlets (Freedom of the Press Report, 2005).
Continuous attacks to the private media are part of a daily struggle in Venezuela. Chavez considers the private media his most direct enemies. He has achieved to some extent to control the flow of information (SUMATE, 2004). The political pressure and the legislative control on media content have partially strengthened his political system. In the short term, as Chavez's government deepens his revolution, the private media is likely to suffer the consequences a major control on the flow of information.

In summary, the author can assert that Venezuela is the leading example of the neo-populist pattern in Latin America. Chavez is portraying an image of a twenty first neo-populist leader. Furthermore, throughout political pressure means and the gradual control on media content, Chavez is strengthening a neo-populist system is where press freedom is not a given and respected practice. He is creating a guide for future leaders to follow; Morales in Bolivia, Humala in Peru, and other possible cases like Lopez Obrador in Mexico.

Bolivia

Bolivia is another country with a tendency towards neo-populism. Bolivia’s is one of the most recent cases of neo-populism in Latin America. There is a data constraint for Bolivia; the data used in this research is from 1996 to 2004; hence it is difficult to prove through quantitative analysis what the current tendency is. Both index PCLI and GLI are slightly different—Bolivia’s GLI is higher than the PCLI. In terms of political mass communication, although the constitution provides for press freedom, the ongoing
political crisis in the country, the economic conditions, and restrictive libel laws continued to impact the media practice (Freedom of the Press Report, 2005).

From a political approach, Bolivia is a country that has emerged, claiming for signs of compensation and redress, and aiming towards a national re-foundation with an uncertain future (Bosoer, 2006). With a new president elected in December 2005, Evo Morales has expressed his strong empathy with Venezuela's neo-populist approach (BBC News, 2006).

"Morales appears as a reaction to the failure of the traditional political system, and the disaster of the successive governments in the country of the Andes" (Bosoer, 2006). Evo Morales's message is based on a classical populist approach: a government of the poor for the poor. At this point, more time is needed in order to assert if Bolivia is moving towards a left wing neo-populist system or not.

**Peru**

According to Harman (2006), Peru has a tradition of electing populist leaders who are not government or political insiders. While writing this paper, Peru's presidential elections were in progress. Since Ollanta Humala is part of a new generation of populists in Latin America, it is vital to highlight his role within the emergence of neo-populism in the region.

"He falls in the same league" as Latin America's two left-leaning leaders: Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Bolivia's Evo Morales, says Dennis Jett, U.S. ambassador to Peru from 1996 to 1999. "He is just as wacky as Chávez and Morales, and perhaps more unpredictable, because, basically, his only experience is an attempted coup d'état and as a human rights abuser (Harman, 2006)."
His message is "Peruvians first," a message that is compelling to many in this country of 27 million (Forero, 2006). Creating a short and nationalistic slogan is a common practice among neo-populists. "As he bounds across a stage like a talk show host, declaring his love for Peru, he comes across as a fierce nationalist ready to battle the affluent and anyone who opposes him" (Forero, 2006). Peru's new political transformation has the potential to change the course of Latin America's democracy. Peru's most famous author, Mario Vargas Llosa questions the direction of the country's politics. "What is happening in the country for such political, moral and cultural blindness to take hold? ... Maintain democracy or go to dictatorship: that is what is at play in these elections." (Forero, 2006)

The political scenario is served in Latin America. This year will be characterized by important political challenges, presidential elections, and a more substantial emergence of neo-populism. Also, it is necessary to keep an eye on many Central American countries. In this region, democracy is fragile and young. It is up to the democratic institutions and leaders to prove that democracy is the ideal system in Latin America.

**Neo-populism and the Media Factor**

What are the common ideas among these three neo-populist leaders? What is the relationship with the Media? According to Ruiz (2005) there are two factors that populist leaders in the region share. The first one is the idea of mass media as a political tool. Neo-populists use the media as the battle field; it is the instrument in which the political
battle takes place. Among the main considerations, neo-populists refer to war related metaphors. They talk about conflict of ideas, an army of journalists, communicational struggles, and mass media terrorism. Often, they do not leave space for critics, expression of ideas, or democratic conversational dialogue.

Ruiz (2005) highlights that the main idea these governments portray is the false impression of press freedom. They support freedom of press and speech to the extent in which they are not affected by them. For example, he refers to Venezuela's case. The government gave equipment to more than 50 local radio stations. The idea behind is to use them as weapons to battle the mediatization of politics of the enemy and to create social principles to defend the revolution. This leads to the second factor: the political battle and the mediatization of politics.

Neo-populist governments seek throughout a different type on monopolization of the media to communicate the political message to the masses (Ruiz, 2005). The objective is to weaken the private media by creating a centralized communicational strategy that communicates a homogenous political message. For example in Bolivia, the government's slogan is “a government of the poor for the poor.” The state has to be the dominant entity that constructs the political reality in the country. In order to achieve this, the private media has to lose power. The most effective way to attain this goal is by controlling the media content, changing the laws, reducing the freedom of the press, exerting political pressure over private media, and strengthening the widespread access to the means of communication in order to centralize the message.

This is happening in Venezuela where the government has gradually centralized the media practice by ratifying a “... legislation that prohibits the broadcast of certain
material, its intimidation of and denial of access to private media, and the continued harassment of journalists, directed primarily at those employed by private media outlets” (Freedom of Press Report, 2005). In Peru, a country with an extensive history on freedom of the press issues, “... the media corruption that was common in the Fujimori’s era continues to an extent today, contributing to a long-standing lack of confidence in the press as a credible institution (Freedom of the Press Report, 2005).” Coming elections in Peru will dictate the future of press freedom in the country. Based on neo-populist patterns, it could be likely to observe a gradual control on media content, more political pressure regarding press freedom, and a centralization of the media.

Bolivia’s case does not differ from the previous ones. Mr. Morales is already working towards a law that regulates the media: “... through a Congressman from the ruling political party, Morales is drafting a law to regulate the media, especially radio and television, since these are not included in the current Press Law (1925)” This proposal has been immediately rejected by press associations (Inter American Press Association, 2006).

Implications

Neo-populism: a democratic practice?

One of the major issues that derives from the neo-populist tendency is the debate regarding whether neo-populism promotes democracy or hinders the democratic practice. The current political transformation in the region represents one of the most complex
political changes in Latin America history. From the previous findings, it is necessary to underline the extent in which neo-populism can influence, positively or negatively, democracy.

On the one hand, one of the major implications that could potentially hinder democracy is the aspirations of the neo-populist leaders and their ideals. Neo-populism can be seen as an obstacle for the democratic practice if this type of political system reproduces negative elements that threaten the institutionalization of democracy. The presence of ideals such as caudillismo and clientelismo are representative elements of neo-populism that could potentially harm democracy.

For example, the article called The Return of Populism (2006) states that many of the populists in the past have been military officers. The new populists such as Chavez (Venezuela) and Humala (Peru) are retired lieutenant colonels. “Part of their appeal is that of the military caudillo, or strongman, who promises to deliver justice for the ‘people’ by firm measures against the exploiters (The Economist, 2006, p. 40). This is the essence of neo-populism. By attempting to deliver justice and by attempting to create a representative democracy—a popular one—neo-populist leaders will tend to control state institutions and will aim to disarticulate the traditional political party system. The path to achieve this could be misinterpreted by some neo-populists, because in the majority of the cases, populists in Latin America have been able to gain mass support and political power by exerting a strict control on key aspects of the political systems: media access, control on media content, political pressure, a non-existent rule of law, etc.

According to Montaner (2006), neo-populism is:

It is an ideological trend and a form of governance that amalgamates all the errors and political vices blithely and uselessly practiced by Latin Americans throughout
the 20th century: strong-man rule, patronage, statism, collectivism and anti-Americanism, to which is added—in some countries with a strong indigenous presence—the native component of resentment.

The main neo-populist objective is to challenge traditional democratic institutions. It is based on the assumption that complex political transformation cannot be even or horizontal. A change in the nature of the current democracy can lead to a transitional political change that, at this point, does not guarantee the consolidation of a more effective democracy in Latin America. According to Vargas Llosa (2003), democracy in Latin America is threatened by terrorism, a non-existent rule of law, and neo-populism.

Many countries have suffered the evils of terrorism, facing the threat posed by people and groups who aim to change society through violence. More recently several countries, especially in Latin America, have seen the emergence of neopopulist leaders, mainly due to the disappointment of the electorates with traditional politicians. Both trends must be taken very seriously by those who believe in the rule of law. Terrorism might cause societies to fall into dark regimes, and neopopulism could counter the current economic and institutional conditions that favor progress and freedom (Vargas Llosa, 2003)

On the other hand, neo-populism could also be seen as the new face of democracy in Latin America. According to Garcia (2004), neo-populism seeks to establish a practical model of social pluralism. The objective is to re-institute the real dynamic of the democratic system by emphasizing the ideal of social contract, tolerance, non-violence, rule of law, popular representation, and effective democratic institutions. If this is the case, neo-populism could positively influence democracy by changing the traditional approach in which popular representation is not exerted by political parties (elites). It is the creation of a democratic system where direct representation for the people and by the people represents the real practice and not just the theory.

In both case, the emergence of this political phenomenon provides serious questions regarding the effectiveness and productivity of democratic practices in Latin
Neo-populism and Political Mass Communication in Latin America

Neo-populists want to revive the real meaning of democracy, which is based on a re-democratization of the state (García, 2004). The path is long and complex and the political implications are many. What are the ideals behind this structural change? How are neo-populists going to take over democracy? Is democracy compatible with Neo-populism? Those are the questions that only with time could be properly answered.

Freedom of the Press

The relationship between freedom of the press and democracy cannot be underestimated. The belief is that under a democratic system, freedom of the press should be a given right and a practice. But the current political transformation towards neo-populism does create a very particular scenario regarding press freedom. In the region, the implications that emerge from a gradual control on media content plus a high degree of political pressure over the political message are complex and challenging. "Government harassment and violent attacks against journalists continue to hinder freedom of the press in Latin America (The Inter-American Press Association, 2006)."

It seems evident that there is a pattern of press freedom. From the above mentioned results, only three countries are considered "free," thirteen are "partially free," and two are classified as "not free." Is this going to be a major change within the political communication in the region? Will these "partially free" countries be influenced by a neo-populist system in which a severe control on the media content creates a surreal political reality?
In fact, the neo-populist rhetoric needs an improvement in media access in order to reach the masses. On the contrary, by repressing the freedom of the press, neo-populists have a better chance in controlling and constructing the political message and reality to their own benefit. It is about reaching the masses and keeping their support regardless of their political performance.

Neo-populist leaders like Chavez and his “Bolivarian revolution” rely upon their skills as communicators. Every Sunday, Chavez communicates with his supporters in a four-hour television program (The Economist, 2006). This is a clear representation of the charismatic leader—very characteristic of populist and neo-populist rulers—that seeks to create a direct bond with the masses. In Venezuela, the tension between private media and the government of Chavez remain high. “The government controls two national television stations, a national radio network, and a wire service; the president maintains a weekly radio show and exercises his power to preempt programming to ensure extensive broadcasting of governmental announcements in private media (Freedom House Report, 2005).”

By exemplifying this particular neo-populist leader, the objective is to highlight the actual neo-populist pattern that other left-wing leaders are willing to follow and put into practice in their respective countries. Morales in Bolivia and Humala in Peru have publicly expressed their support for Chavez ideals. In Venezuela, “Mr. Chavez used a constituent assembly to gain control of all the institutions of state (The Economist, 2006, p.40).” This is the most effective tool to control the state’s institutions and to strengthen neo-populism. Once the political debate is directed by the government, limiting the flow of information and centralizing media politics as well as constructing the political reality
to their own benefit are easy tasks. "Both Mr. Humala and Mr. Morales have promised
their followers to constitute similar assemblies (The Economist, 2006, p.40)."

The major challenge in the region is to maintain press freedom as a required
practice. Since neo-populism arises from a democratic base, it should attempt to promote,
rather than hinder, the free flow of information. As a concluding remark, to restrict and
to limit the power of the media to their own benefit has never been a successful practice
throughout different Latin American political periods—Anastasio Somoza, Porfirio Díaz,
Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, Alfredo Stroessner, and a more modern example, Alberto
Fujimori. Nothing guarantees that this time, neo-populists will be truly democrats if
there is not a true respect for and guaranteed freedom of press and speech.

Future Research

From a political approach, it is important to prioritize the study of neo-populism
as a political force in Latin America. First, researchers should center efforts on exploring
the relationship between neo-populism and democracy. Second, while neo-populism has
its roots in the classical populist notion, it is vital to overcome to the conceptual
limitations.

Regarding the association between neo-populism and democracy, various studies
should be conducted in the near future. It is imperative to continue examining this
phenomenon from both approaches: quantitative and qualitative. One of the key studies
should be focused on democracy as a generator of neo-populist leaders. Democracy
gives people the opportunity to express their concerns and ideas. Because of this
consideration, there is always an opportunity to arise and participate in politics. Neo-populist leaders, and therefore their sympathizers, have the privilege to act and to participate under a political environment in which freedom of speech is a given practice and right. Since neo-populism is essentially based on the presence of a charismatic leader, it is also necessary to understand the foundations of this particular type of leadership.

From a different perspective, in order to overcome neo-populism's conceptual limitation, a concrete theoretical framework should be structured. This requires a consistent examination of the phenomenon as such, its theoretical roots, different styles, and ideological foundations. This implies that more theorists should explore the conceptualization of the term neo-populism. As previously mentioned in this paper, neo-populism is a tendency, so in order to treat neo-populism as an established political system, it is important to maintain a continuous examination in the coming years.

Regarding political mass communication, more academic work should be prioritized concerning press freedom practices in Latin America. There is a clear pattern in the region; more and more countries are heading towards negative trends; there are fewer countries considered free and there are more countries following the partial free status. Is this phenomenon associated with neo-populist governments? Does neo-populism restrict the free flow of the information? More studies need to be done in order to fully answer these questions.

Other ideas for future research are centered on the examination of political marketing techniques and the mediatization of politics used by neo-populist leaders. Political leaders—democratic, authoritarian, neo-populist, etc.—depend on the power of
the media to get the message across and to communicate with masses. Can neo-populism survive without a monopolization of the mass media? Is that the reason why political pressure and control on the media content is a central factor within the neo-populist framework? It is fundamental to continue studying media politics in Latin America. Particularly, the importance of mass communication theories, the emergence of different neo-populist leadership styles, and the role that mass media plays as the generator of political realities in Latin America.
CONCLUSION

After a statistical assessment of the variables presented in this paper (neo-populism and political communication), the following remarks are the concluding points of this study.

- From a quantitative approach, neo-populism can only be seen as a political tendency. Since neo-populism is starting to develop in the region, in order to make additional evaluations and accurate assumptions more time and more representative data are needed.
- Neo-populism in Latin America is a type of political system that does not depend on left or right wing movements. In this case, the author focused on the left-wing neo-populists: Venezuela, Peru, and Bolivia.
- Neo-populism is a structure that in theory seeks to reduce, or in some extreme cases, to eliminate the presence of traditional political parties and established elites in power.
- Neo-populism is a response to poor governance and the failure of traditional leaders and democracies in fulfilling people's needs, reducing poverty, creating wealth, and eradicating corruption.
- Currently, democracy in Latin America is in a critical state. There is a clear pattern of decline and even reversal of the democratic practice under way. Representative democracy has followed contradictory and regressive paths causing a tendency in some countries to authoritarian regimes, neo-populist regimes, delegative democracies or semi-democracies.
- There is a direct relationship between media access, press freedom, and populism. The more control the government has on media content, the more power it has to communicate with the masses and to hinder democracy by limiting the flow of information and by marketing its populist ideals.
- Press freedom in Latin America is a complex practice. Among the eighteen countries studied, only three countries are considered “free”: Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica. Two countries are considered “not free”: Venezuela and Colombia; the remaining countries are considered “partially free”.

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• The first hypothesis does fulfill the objective of this paper. The higher the political communication Latin American Index (PCLI), the higher the governance Latin America Index (GLI). Countries with a balanced relationship between the means of communication, the freedom of press, the political message, and the democratic practice are likely to use media politics as a constructive political instrument. This applies to three countries in the region—Uruguay, Chile and Costa Rica—in which democracy and freedom of press are widespread practices.

• The second hypothesis is partially proven. The higher the PCLI, the lower the GLI. In order to balance poor governance performance, only seven countries are likely to exert a gradual control on media content: Venezuela, Argentina, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Paraguay. The remaining countries are leaning towards similar conditions, but more time is needed in order to mathematically prove this assertion.

• There is not enough information to prove these seven countries are following a neo-populist path. The author can only assume that as a result of government inefficiency, political transformations are likely to occur. By restricting the free flow of information, these new tendencies are guaranteed to disarticulate the traditional structures of the democratic system in the region. Furthermore, only three countries are heading towards a left-wing neo-populist tendency: Venezuela, Bolivia, and Peru.

• It is tangible to predict that a regional trend towards a more populist political system is feasible. Having more than half of the region under a “partially free” status, with regard to freedom of the press, could potentially intensify the political changes in the region by sponsoring new tendencies like neo-populism. This paper can conclude that a gradual control over the media content, a strengthening of the means of communication plus neo-populist rhetoric could, in the short and long run, damage the democratic practice in Latin America.

• Future research needs to be conducted in order to fully understand the phenomenon and its actual implications in the region. Can neo-populism survive without a monopolization of the mass media? Is that the reason why political pressure and control on the media content are central factors within the neo-populist framework? These questions should be addressed in future studies.
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### Table A - I. Definition of the Six Dimensions of Governance in Latin America

1. **Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI):** combines the media access and the press freedom data. Media access is a standardized scale of the proportion of newspapers, TV Sets, Radio Receivers per 1000 people. Press Freedom is a scale that measures the status of the freedom of the press worldwide.

2. **Political Participation Index (PPI):** this variable indicates to what extent citizens enjoy freedom of political choice and the legal right and ability in practice to change the laws and officials that govern them. This right is sometimes known as the right to self-determination (Cingranelli & Richards, 2005).

3. **Political Stability Index (PSI):** combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism (World Bank, 2005).

4. **Government Effectiveness Index (GEi):** combines responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies (World Bank, 2005).

5. **Support to Democracy Index (SDI):** implies the legitimacy of the democratic system, and portrays the acceptance of basic values such as liberty and tolerance (Latinobarometro, 2004).

6. **Satisfaction with Democracy Index (SWDI):** is an indicator of the efficiency of a system strongly related to the government's performance (Latinobarometro, 2004).
Table A-2. Index Number Calculations

According to the methodology proposed by the author to calculate the index numbers through the original data (Appendix B):

1. The author calculates the index numbers per each variable and per country, taking into account the period 1996-2004. For example, the arithmetic mean or simple average for Political Stability Data (see appendix B Table B-1) year 1996 is 40,3 then:

   \[ \text{Index number} = \frac{63.40}{40.30} = 1.57 \]

2. After these calculations the author constructs a new table based on the index numbers (see table B-2 and B-3). The same procedure is repeated for each dimension and variable discussed in the Methodology chapter.

Governance Latin American Index (GLI):

3. The author builds up the table B-16 after calculating each dimension of Governance Latin American Index (GLI) from 1996 to 2004, expressed in terms of index numbers according to the following formula:

   \[ \text{GLI} = \frac{(PSI+GEI+SDI+SWDI+PPI+PCLI)}{6} = \frac{(1.22+1.30+1.21+1.06+1.78+1.39)}{6} = 1.33 \]
4. After obtaining the index numbers for both variables: PCLI1 and PCLI2 (Appendix B, Table B-12 and B-14), the author selects the Argentina country in the period 1996-2004 (Appendix B, Table B-15), thus:

Table A – 3. Press Freedom Categories

The legal environment: encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate (Freedom of the Press Report, 2005).

The political environment: evaluates the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats (Freedom of the Press Report, 2005).

The economic environment: the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media (Freedom of the Press Report, 2005).
### Table B - 1. Six Dimensions of Governance in Latin America 1996-2004

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<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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### Table B - 2. Political Stability Data (PSI) 1996-2004

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**Note:** Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, M (2005). Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004
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Table B-5. Government Effectiveness Index (GEI) 1996-2004
Table B-6. Support for Democracy Data 1996-2004

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Note: Summary-Report Latinobarómetro 2004
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Table B - 7. Support for Democracy Index 1996-2004
Table B - 8. Satisfaction with Democracy Data 1996-2004

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Note: Summary-Report Latinobarómetro 2004
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Note: Cingranelli, David L. & Richards, David L (2005)
Table B-11 Political Communication Free Press Data 1996-2004

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Note: Freedom of the Press Report 2005
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Table B-14. Political Communication Media Access Index (PCLI2) 1996-2004
Table B–15. Political Latin America Communication Index (PCLI) 1996-2004

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Table B – 16. Governance Latin America Index (GLI) 1996-2004

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Table B – 17. Correlation Analysis 1996-2004

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R** = Correlation coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level
PCLI= Political Communication Latin American Index
GLI= Governance Latin American Index
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### Table B - 19. Regression Analysis Summary and Parameter Estimates

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* The independent variable is PCLI.  
* Dependent Variable: GLI
Figure 1. SCATTER PLOT PCLI vs. GLI

Figure 2. Curve Fit Regression PCLI vs. GLI
### Appendix C

Table C-1. Governance Latin America Index (1996-2004)

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Table C-2. Political Communication Latin America Index (1996-2004)
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Table C-3. Political Communication Latin America Index (PCLI) & Governance Latin America Index (GLI) (1996-2004)
Appendix D

GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS INDEX 1996-2004

- Year 2004
- Year 1996

POLITICAL STABILITY INDEX BAR 1994-2006

- Year 2004
- Year 1996

- 89 -
Venezuela
Uruguay
Peru
Paraguay
Panama
Nicaragua
Mexico
Honduras
Guatemala
El Salvador
Ecuador
Dominican Rep.
Costa Rica
Colombia
Chile
Brazil
Bolivia
Argentina

0 0.5 1 1.5 2
INDEX NUMBER

Year 2004
Year 1996

Bar Chart D-4
Nagidmy Marquez
Neo-populism and Political Mass Communication in Latin America

Bar Chart D-5
GOVERNANCE LATIN AMERICAN INDEX BAR 1994-2006

Argentina
Venezuela
Uruguay
Peru
Paraguay
Panama
Mexico
Honduras
Guatemala
El Salvador
Bolivia
Argentina

Bar Chart D-6
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Appendix E

Chart E-1

GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS INDEX 1996-2004

Chart E-2

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION INDEX 1996-2004
Nagidmy Marquez

Neo-populism and Political Mass Communication in Latin America

SUPPORT TO DEMOCRACY INDEX 1996-2004

Chart E-5

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION LATIN AMERICAN INDEX (PCLI) 1996-2004

Chart E-6

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