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Peace Agreements and International Peace Operations: the Case of Sierra Leone

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Peace Agreements and International Peace Operations: The Case of Sierra Leone

by

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Haruyuki Irie
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

In recent years, the high rate of civil wars relapsing back to another conflict has alarmed policymakers and scholars alike. Civil wars tend to be costly for everyone: the citizens living in the country are deprived of the protection of a legitimate government, the region that hosts the conflict suffers from political instability and possible spillovers, and the international community fears the future implications of the conflict possibly breeding terrorist organizations. Although the importance of the issue has resulted in increased attention, there is no consensus as to how to resolve it. One of the important findings in previous studies on this subject, however, points to the significance of international involvement.

This study investigates why international peace operations matter in concluding successful peace agreements. It also attempts to tackle the issue of what characteristics of peace operations (such as robust force deployment, enhanced Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, or DDR, capabilities, or international and domestic legitimacy) are more likely to lead to the long-term sustainability of peace agreements. The correlation between international peace operations and successful peace agreements are already established in the literature. The aim of this project, therefore, is to closely examine 1) if there is any causal relations between the two variables and 2) how those causal relations operate (through finding any intervening variables or processes).

After introducing the hypotheses on international intervention and peace agreements, the project then turns to a case study of Sierra Leonean peace agreements in 1999 and 2000. The Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) played an important role in the conflict by deploying their monitoring force, ECOMOG, and supporting the civilian-elected
government. The United Nations was also pivotal in providing peace operations; however it provided insufficient manpower to fulfill its mandate until more robust force was deployed in 2000. Two peace agreements signed in 1999 and 2000 provide important cases that can shed light on why and how international interventions matter in concluding a successful peace agreement. Further, the chronological proximity of the two events allows us to control for many of the environmental variables while concentrating on the focus of this paper: effect of international intervention on peace agreements.

I argue that international peace operation matters to successful peace agreements on two specific functions that it can provide for the negotiating parties: spoiler management and credible guarantee. Previous literature has also pointed out that peace operations organized by international bodies can also ensure political legitimacy of the newly established agreement among the domestic as well as international audience, but the case study of this project does not yield the same conclusion. The author suspects that this is because measures taken to establish the negative peace in the country is more important for the sustainability of agreements than factors related to positive peace (such as political legitimacy). This finding, however, does not mean that political legitimacy is not important for the post-war society in the long-term; however within the scope of this thesis (i.e. immediate aftermath of civil wars), the above argument seems to hold.

The importance of this study can be discussed on both theoretical and practical grounds. In terms of its theoretical implications, this study will contribute to the literature of international peace operations by assessing the connection between different types of international intervention and successful peace agreements. Although numerous studies have explored the importance of international interventions in relation to peace agreements (largely by studying the
statistical correlations between the two), there are only limited number of works in the literature that discusses why and how this mechanism plays out in the real world.\(^1\) The value of this research can be found in bridging this gap in the literature.

On a more practical note, this study can contribute directly to the policymaking of the states and international organizations that are involved in peace operations. Given the renewed interests paid by the UN with the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005 (Sierra Leone is one of four agenda countries on the Commission), it is all the more important to assess the contributing factors of successful peace agreements to the termination of civil wars. This research contributes to this larger concern of why and how the international community (through international organizations) can help societies following civil wars to sustain their peace agreements by developing effective interventions.

1.2 Literature review

A brief survey of the literature shows that international intervention in civil war situations can alleviate tensions between warring parties and eventually lead to a more successful peace agreement. There are mainly two trends in the literature: one that looks at international intervention from a global perspective and assesses its legitimacy and effectiveness, and another that focuses on the sustenance of peace agreements and the factors that can ensure better international policy making in a post-conflict country. The latter is more relevant for this current research, but both are reviewed below to present a comprehensive picture of the literature of peace agreements and international coercion.

**International interventions**

In the first camp, Bellamy and Williams tackle the debate on which actors and institutions can authorize and execute effective peace operations. Their particular interest lies on the “regionalization” of peace operations, and they assess previous operations conducted by non-UN actors in light of three criteria: international legitimacy of the operation, effectiveness in achieving the mandate, and their ability to contribute to regional and international peace and security. Through case studies on Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, and Burundi, the authors conclude that non-UN peace operations “have not fundamentally challenged international society’s norm of nonintervention without host-state consent.” Furthermore, they point out that this trend of regional operations may reduce the likelihood that poorer parts of the world would enjoy the benefits of higher quality peace operations.

Closely related the above authors, Ottaway and Lacina also review incidences of international intervention that occurred in the 1990s. In contrast to Bellamy and Williams, they find that the course of 1990s intervention practices show that states are increasingly willing to “disregard the notion of sovereignty” and conduct more extreme interventions (sometimes in a unilateral form). They also mention, however, that international interventions have had a “surprisingly limited ability to bring positive transformation to [the] targeted country.”

These authors show two characteristics in the literature. First, it is plausible to say that international intervention has become a more available policy tool in the international community since the 1990s. Increasing numbers of UN and non-UN peace operations support this assumption. Although this may seem to pose some challenges to international law, the above authors agree that states have generally accepted international interventions so long as the action

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3 Ibid.
is backed by legitimate authority (such as the UN Security Council or regional organizations) and executed with a limited goal in mind.

Second, there is a continuing debate as to whether regionalization of peace operations is essentially good or bad for the effectiveness of operations. This variable is considered in this research as one of the issues of importance in the Sierra Leone case. On the one hand, “global” operations tend to enjoy higher international legitimacy; however they are slow in the deployment process and constantly constrained by interests of large powers. Regional operations, on the other hand, can be deployed more rapidly, but they tend to suffer from legitimacy issue and force capacity. Future peace operations, therefore, may be made more effective by combining the two and complementing their operations. The example from Sierra Leone testifies to this effect.

**Peace accords**

The authors cited below from the second camp of the literature closely examine the extent in which past international peace operations were successful and how this can be explained from quantitative and qualitative perspectives. Quinn, Mason, and Gurses discuss the likelihood of sustaining peace after civil wars and statistically examine the probability of ending a war following (1) a government victory, (2) a rebel victory, and (3) a negotiated settlement. They find that civil wars are less likely to recur following “a rebel victory and peace agreements supported by peacekeeping forces.” They explain these findings utilizing the theory of “dual sovereignty,” first expounded by Charles Tilly. This theory takes organizational capacity and popular support of the opposition group and compares them with that of the government. When the government does not dominate these factors, the “dual sovereignty” (and the existence of alternative sources of national authority other than the government) emerges and the civil war is
more likely to continue. Based on this theory, a rebel victory or a negotiated settlement with peacekeeping force is more likely to result in a successful end of a civil war. This is because: (1) when rebels win, government does not have the above two elements of sovereignty and thus is unable to fight them back, and (2) when negotiations are reached with the presence of international forces, the international community can provide sufficient guarantee to the peace agreement that it becomes feasible for both parties to believe in the ceasefire.

Walter's argument parallels that of the above authors. She claims that investigating and resolving the underlying issues on why the war is fought is not enough to successfully end a civil war. Through her statistical study on number of civil wars as well as a case study on Mozambique, she concludes that, in order to end a civil war with a negotiated settlement, "designing credible guarantees on the terms of the agreement" is essential. This task is usually a difficult one to accomplish without outside assistance.

Hartzell and Hoddie strengthen the importance of international intervention by studying dozens of civil wars to investigate the relationship between power-sharing agreements and successful termination of the wars. They identify four forms of power-sharing dimensions (political, territorial, military, and economic) to be important in the conclusion of a civil war. Their findings suggest that "the more dimensions of power sharing among former combatants specified in a peace agreement the higher the likelihood that peace will endure." According to the authors, this is because these conditions foster a sense of security among former enemies and create a condition that is likely to sustain peace.

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5 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, "Sustaining the Peace": 173.
7 Hartzell and Hoddie, "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing": 318.
8 Ibid.
This group of scholars point to two important factors in relation to peace agreements. They are (1) credible guarantee of the agreement and (2) the degree of power sharing between the government and the rebels. The first element may explain why international interventions are necessary: without the third party guarantee, conflicting parties cannot come to a durable agreement because of lack faith in each other and possibility of cheating. The second factor points to the nature of the agreement; how much each party is willing to compromise on its demand in relation to the other side. This factor, however, seems to be relatively less important compared to other elements discussed in the project, as the case study of Sierra Leone will show.

**Spoiler problem**

Another aspect of the second camp of the literature emphasizes specifically the spoiler problem and how they should be handled. Stedman pioneers the study of peace agreement spoilers by identifying their differing goals and commitments. He claims that each spoiler can be categorized into either (1) limited, (2) greedy, or (3) total. While limited and greedy spoilers tend to be more flexible in their goals and thus willing to negotiate, total spoilers have extremely fixed goals that negotiating with them would not alter their positions or demands. This type of spoilers essentially needs to be suppressed for the peace agreements to be successful. These various types of spoilers differ in their goals and purposes for undermining a peace agreement. Furthermore, he addresses the possibility of change in the three types. In order to address this issue, the locus of spoiler behavior must be explored, clarifying whether its leader or the followers have more control over the characteristics and actions of the spoiler group.\(^9\) Based on these categorical understandings of spoilers, the author argues for three strategies to be applicable depending on the type and locus of the spoilers: inducement, socialization, or

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He then conducts case studies from Rwanda, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique and find these preliminary typology to be useful guide to forming strategies against spoilers.

From a different perspective, Greenhill and Major, though acknowledging the foundational work done by Stedman, argue that the causal mechanism works in the opposite way than stated by Stedman; rather than types of spoilers determining the kinds of outcomes possible, the kinds of possible outcomes decide the types of the spoilers. The authors term this reverse mechanism as “capability-based model” and show that three of the case studies conducted by the above author can be explained better with this revised model. Specifically, factors such as “expected utility of continuing to fight,” “credible commitment” of third-party guarantees, a “shift in domestic political incentives,” and “international distribution of power” affect the capabilities and possible maneuvers that spoilers can have in the peace agreement process.

This literature on spoiler problem is relevant in assessing the reasons why international interventions matter because it ties into the issue of credible guarantee provided by international forces. It also sheds light on the following question: do differing types of spoilers (or environmental conditions if one follows the Greenhill and Major’s model) produce different needs for international interventions and their mandates? Towards the end and immediate aftermath of the conflict, warring parties (including spoilers) tend to be locked into their positions and impede the peace negotiations. Flexibility that can be brought by the impartiality of the peace operations can be an important asset in tackling this problem.

In the following chapter, each of these factors is explored further and phrased as hypotheses. Chapter Two discusses the debate between regionalization of the peace operations

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10 Ibid. 12.
and how it could make the interventions more or less effective in forming peace agreements. This chapter then turns to the credible guarantee provided by international peace operations and the spoiler problem in relation to the effects of international peace operations. Spoilers can be parties to the peace negotiation or not, and it is crucial to devise different policies on various types of spoilers. Chapter Three explains the methodology of the case study of this thesis. Chapter Four introduces the case from Sierra Leone and provides a comparative study on two peace agreements that were signed in 1999 and 2000. The case selection of Sierra Leone is based on the important effects that international peace operations played in restoring the security in the country. Based on the theories explained in chapter two, the comparative case study gives a vivid picture as to how some of these theories can be useful in practice. Chapter Five concludes the study and provides future research directions.
CHAPTER II: LEGITIMACY, CREDIBLE GUARANTEE, AND SPOILER MANAGEMENT

2.1 International Peace Operation: Globalism and Regionalism

The history of international peace operations can be traced back to the early years of the United Nations (UN). In the post-WWII world, the international community held high hopes for the newly established international organization and particularly for the new provision on the use of force enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The international organization was, for the first time in history, legally endowed with the power to organize forceful interventions and maintain international peace and security, something that the founding fathers of the organization called the “teeth” for policy enforcement. The operations that immediately followed the formation of the UN traditionally focused on inter-state conflicts and intervened only when there was consent of the states. These interventions were collectively termed “first generation” peace operation.

“Second generation” of peace operations soon followed, as more and more interventions were devised especially after the Cold War. This new generation had a distinctive feature that, in these types of peace operations, the international community could intervene even without the consent of the intervened state. This shift was largely due to the changing international political climate after the end of the Cold War and the changing nature of warfare. These interventions have focused more on intra-state conflicts and civil wars. This shift has also broadened understandings of security issues from a state-centric view to a wider concept of human security.

Throughout the evolution of international peace operations, continuous tension was felt in regards to the concept of state sovereignty. By intervening in the internal affairs of a state (i.e. civil war), the UN was constantly obligated to justify its actions under the banner of international peace and security. This has become an increasingly important factor in providing international
legitimacy to peace operations, as more and more regional and state actors become involved with peace operations.

Regionalization of Peace Operations

It is in this context of enlarging the scope of peace operations that the regionalization debate takes place. Nonetheless, cooperation between the UN and regional organizations is a not an unfamiliar topic in international political discourse. In fact, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter specifies that regional organizations need to work in tandem with the world body. This is the source of international legitimacy that the UN can provide to regional peace operations. Bellamy and Williams begin their study on this issue by asking the following question: “which actors and institutions can authorize and conduct peace operations more effectively”? The two authors evaluate past operations in terms of three criteria: “their legitimacy, effectiveness in achieving their mandate, and their ability to contribute to stable peace and security in the respective region.”\(^\text{13}\) These criteria provide some grounds on how international interventions should be viewed and evaluated for their legitimacy and effectiveness.

While many regional organizations have been involved with peace operations in recent years, various organizations in Africa have been the most active ones in this sphere. There are currently operations in Sudan and Somalia led by the African Union (AU). (The former is a joint operation with the UN while the latter is phasing into UN led peace operations.) The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, have also been heavily involved in peace operations in Western Africa. One can observe regionalization also in the NATO-led peace operation in Kosovo in late 1990s and Australian-led operations in East Timor and Solomon Islands.\(^\text{14}\) These show that there is an increasing trend

\(^\text{14}\) Ibid 184-189.
(and perhaps demands) for regional organizations to become involved with resolving civil conflicts.

Regionalized peace operations posit some advantages when compared with international peace operations. One large advantage is their swiftness to mobilize and deploy the forces in the war zone. While the UN peacekeepers may take longer to mobilize due to slow resource commitment from the member states and lack of standing army, regional powers and organizations are already located in the warring region and can quickly formulate and execute the intervention plans. This has a particular benefit when dealing with civil wars, where the situation on ground can quickly deteriorate if it is left untouched for weeks or months. Also there is a positive externality that repeated regional interventions can bring. Regional powers become trained in civil war interventions and they grow more effective in terminating the civil conflicts in the region. Regional organizations (and member states of those organizations) also tend to have better understanding and leverage in the regional politics.

However, there are some disadvantages to regionalized peace operations as well. Regional peace operation is oftentimes endorsed by the UN Security Council but not always so. ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone was largely supported by the UN, but NATO bombing in Kosovo presented a more controversial debate on what regional security arrangements can and should do. Regional organizations, in short, suffer from lack of international and domestic legitimacy due to their region specific nature. There is mixed opinion in the literature of international humanitarian intervention (or Responsibility to Protect as some may call it) on whether military interventions without the consent of the intervened state can be legally acceptable and politically effective. Regional interventions without a larger support of the

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15Mary Ellen O’Connell, “The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo,” Human Rights Quarterly28.1: 67. In this article O’Connell describes the distinction between Chapter VII and VIII of the UN Charter and the controversial nature of regional forceful intervention when it is conducted without Security Council’s consent.
international community can run into the similar issue of the lack of international support and legitimacy.

Therefore, it is argued here that international interventions backed by international community (mainly by the UN Security Council) provides the best form of effective intervention available to alleviate the scourge of civil wars. Further, this can help improve the international legitimacy of peace agreements after the civil war by providing international assistance for the previously warring parties to agree to each other. This enhanced international legitimacy can in turn provide domestic support from the local populations, further increasing the likelihood of the success of peace agreements to be held following bloody civil wars.

**Building international legitimacy**

Building international legitimacy is not an easy task, but when it is established, the concept can play a powerful role in the decision-making and evaluation process. In addition to the organizations discussed in the above sections, the South African Development Community (SADC), the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC), and the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) have also conducted regional peace operations with or without the UN backing. ¹⁶ Many times preceded by organizational arrangements between states but sometimes by unilateral action of certain countries, these interventions have questioned the international legitimacy of regional peace operation in differing levels.

The NATO intervention is repeatedly brought up as an example because of the successful outcome that the operation had on the security situation in Kosovo. Even though air bombing operations in the region produced significant collateral damage and flared up controversy across countries on the legitimacy of international intervention, it had a positive impact on stopping Milosevic from further terrorizing the region and ignoring international pleas for stopping the

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war. This factor of international commitment and enforcement capability is a topic that is further elaborated later in this thesis, but at this moment the focus is on the legitimate nature of ceasefire and peace agreement that regional and international peace operations can bring. The example from Kosovo clearly states that this can be a difficult topic to assess legally and politically, especially when the operation seems to have yielded positive results.

Another example of regional peace operations can be found in the ECOWAS operations in Liberia. In response to civil war that erupted in the country led by Charles Taylor, the regional organization created the Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that was swiftly deployed in 1990. The ECOMOG soon became under attacks by the rebel group, and its soldiers were criticized for looting, pillaging, and using unnecessary amount of violence toward the local populations.\(^{17}\) The intervention yielded some success by leading a process of peace talks between the parties, but the means by which the organization pursued its goal was under constant questioning. This is an example where regional organization bore some success in terms of the outcome of the intervention but did not build their operation on international legitimacy and standard of peace operations.\(^{18}\)

Examples, such as above, illuminate the fact that regional peace operations can be effective but many times are seen as illegitimate when viewed from international legal and political standpoint. The swiftness of the force deployment and sophisticated knowledge of the region (both politically and geographically) can make the regional organizations more functionally well-prepared to conduct interventions. However, because of the ad hoc nature of the operation and dubious legal status that the regional operations inherently possess, the


\(^{18}\) A similar issue can be found in the current peace operations in Somalia. As the operation continues to be led solely by neighboring countries, the UN struggles to phase the regional peace operation into one led by the international forces and meets the international standard.
international community tends to be critical of these outcomes even if they produce positive results.

**Building domestic legitimacy**

Regional peace operations also tend to suffer from domestic legitimacy problem as well. The source of discontent among the local population can be found in the conduct of the peacekeepers in the intervened country. Because of lack of monitoring and evaluation from the international community, regionalized peace operations tend to create more unnecessary sufferings on the part of the domestic populations when compared to internationally brokered interventions. The collateral damage in Kosovo air bombing and looting in Liberia are examples of such issues of regional peace operations. Because there is relatively less international attention paid and pressure provided on these peace operations, the intervening force can have a lower standard compared to more experienced UN interventions.

Domestic legitimacy of operation is directly connected to the success of peace agreements in the country. When domestic constituencies support the intervention by the international community, there is less reason for the local population to revolt against the peace negotiations. Higher support from the domestic audience also means that they are likely to support the subsequent process of peacebuilding and reconstruction after the signing of peace agreements, which in turn increases the expectations for successful peace negotiations. Of course, the increased support among the domestic audience alone does not determine that ceasefire and peace agreements will be successful. More discussion on how to deal with the rebels and spoilers are explored in the subsequent sections.

What the above discussions show is that regionalized peace operations tend to suffer from legitimacy issue from both international and domestic standpoints. In order to build
legitimate support in both ways, it is necessary to incorporate regional operations with international backed forces led by the UN. This shift to hybrid operations is already happening on the ground, especially in African countries. However, the international community should put more emphasis on this type of operations because higher international legitimacy can create more successful peace agreements following civil wars. A hypothesis that can be derived is therefore:

**Hypothesis 1: International peace operations foster greater political legitimacy in the peace agreement, thus enhancing the likelihood of the successful peace agreements.**

The case study introduced in chapter four explores how regional and international peace operations successfully worked together in Sierra Leone and led the negotiation into the successful agreement in 2000. Before examining this case in depth, however, this project now turns to two other important factors that international peace operations can bring to the signing of successful peace agreements: “credible guarantee” and “spoiler management.”

### 2.2 Credible Guarantee

**Proponents of the concept**

As discussed in Chapter One, Walter has proposed the concept of “credible guarantee” as an important element for peace agreements to be sustainable. This concept basically points to the importance of international peace operations acting as the third party to guarantee the enforcement of the peace agreements. There are several theories in which this credible guarantee can be discussed. Two of them are paid special attention below: prisoner’s dilemma theory and dual sovereignty theory. Though these two theories point to differing power dynamics in the post-conflict peacemaking, they both explain the difficulty of former adversaries trying to achieve a trustable agreement during the peace process after the civil war.
The first theory, prisoner's dilemma, is widely applied in political science and economics in order to understand decision-making in a game where information asymmetry and incentives to cheat permeates in both players. The most basic form of the prisoner's dilemma posits that two parties trying to make a decision on either defecting or cooperating with another. The result of the game is that they choose to defect because it is the dominant strategy in the pay-off matrix, even when the payoff of cooperation is higher. This is because the parties employ the strategy of avoiding maximum loss and thus rationally choose the most ineffective outcome of the game. They are also under the threat of defection, so even when there is communications between the two, it is difficult to come to a cooperative strategy.

Post-civil war situation remarkably resembles this prisoner's dilemma game. Because both parties think that each other is not trustworthy, they do not share all the information they possess and thus become inefficient decision makers. Peace agreements formed in this situation tend to be fragile because there is no third party that can guarantee the agreement. In other words, when there is no international intervention, there is no entity that can communicate between the "prisoners" and they need to make their decisions on their own on whether to agree to the peace or continue the war. International organizations can become important third party who can be the bridge between the conflicting parties and facilitate cooperative behaviors between the two.

Another concept that helps explaining the importance of credible guarantee is dual sovereignty theory. This theory sheds light on the motivation of each party to take control of the country after the end of civil war. Sovereignty is commonly understood as an inherent right of a state to exist and grounded in the principle of non-interference by outsiders regarding its internal affairs. The traditional notion of sovereignty develops around a state which has a government, stable population and clearly marked territorial boundaries. In theory, the government has the
monopoly over the control of forces in the country through its executive and legislative branches. This control of the state power, however, becomes questionable when a civil war erupts in the country and different factions start to assert their right to take control of the state. Thus, the dual sovereignty emerges.

The current literature explains that the dual sovereignty is likely to be resolved after two kinds of outcomes of the civil war: rebel victory or negotiated settlement with international peacekeepers. Rebel victories are likely to resolve dual sovereignty because it terminates the government capability to rule the country. In this outcome, often the former politicians ruling the country escape to another country in order to avoid further persecutions and confrontations. When the government side wins, however, the popular animosity towards the government tends to remain unresolved and become a potential cause for future civil wars. In either case, dual sovereignty could be resolved through force, but the former tend to bring longer-term solution than the latter.

Negotiated settlement with international peace operations provides the second effective way of resolving violent civil conflict. As discussed above, previously warring parties have the problem of trusting each other; thus having a neutral party to resolve the issue is a crucial asset in the negotiation process. Neutrality of the international involvement can assure the negotiating parties that there are no outside interests involved with the assistance. This in turn provides a safe space for the negotiation to take place, increasing the likelihood of crafting successful peace agreements. This function of neutral third party involvement is most apparent in crafting the peace agreements, but it is also beneficial in maintaining the peace agreements, as it could be observed in the following section on spoiler problem.

*Examples of credibility guarantee*

19 Quinn, Mason, and Gurses, “Sustaining the Peace”: 173
Many international peace operations exemplify this notion of credible guarantee. For instance, peace negotiation in Western Sahara between the Frente Polisario and the Moroccan government cannot take place without the UN intervention. Currently the parties (and their neighboring states which have stake in the negotiation as well) have gone through rounds of negotiations, but the results have not been very successful. Nonetheless, considering that the alternative to the negotiation could be larger scale warfare between the Polisario and the Moroccan government, the UN has provided some sense of guarantee to the parties by deploying its peacekeepers and creating a space for peaceful dialogues. Although the prospect for peaceful reconciliation between the parties may not be bright, the fact that the UN peace operations are there to assist has substantial meaning to the conflicting parties.

Another example can be found in the on-going peace operations in the Darfur region in Sudan. The conflict has been a long issue in the country, and there are massive civilian casualties that are produced as a result. Interventions by the AU and the UN in the recent years, however, made the peace negotiation more plausible. Although the prospect of the peace in the region remains uncertain, there is no doubt that the UN/AU joint operations have infused a sense of hope to the warring parties to cooperate in the peace process.

These examples show that international peace operations can cause successful signing of peace agreements because of the credible guarantee that is provided as a result. The above two cases show the importance of having such a neutral third party, especially when the previously warring parties are distrustful of each other and thus suffer from prisoner’s dilemma and dual sovereignty. In chapter four, the case study on Sierra Leone points to a similar conclusion that international peace operations matter because of the guarantee that they can bring to end the conflict and sign the peace treaty. The proposition can be hypothesized as the following:
Hypothesis 2: *International peace operations build credible guarantee of the agreement between warring parties, thus enhancing the likelihood of successful agreements.*

2.3 Spoiler problems

The spoiler problem may be the most obvious issue in crafting and sustaining peace agreements. Spoilers can be armed militia groups, terrorists, or armed wing of the negotiating parties trying to obstruct the negotiation. These groups are sometimes self-financed, profiting from looting natural resources. However, many times these spoilers are also connected to outside power-holders which provide assistance to their activities. Involvement of Charles Taylor in the RUF movements in Sierra Leone is a case in point. The primary goal in this section, therefore, is to outline how spoilers can be contained or managed by obstructing, negotiating, or simply ignoring their activities through international peace operations.

The pioneering work introduced in Chapter One by Stedman is important in understanding the spoilers because it is the first attempt to categorize their objectives and devising different policy options. One of the categories that he proposes is “total spoiler,” which has very fixed goal and do not have any intention on negotiating over them. This type of spoilers cannot be dealt with negotiation but rather it has to be forcefully contained or ignored during the peace process. One approach that the author discusses in regards to this type of spoiler is “departing train” approach. Utilizing this policy prescription, the negotiating parties, together with a third party, can set the election date ahead of time so that spoilers must make their choice on whether to agree with the negotiation and join the election ("get on the train") or left behind without legitimate political representation in the country ("left behind the train"). This has shown effective in many peace agreements, and it should be considered as one of the main approaches to deal with total spoilers.
In this context, international peace operations can be a valuable asset to the peace process by providing force necessary to contain or fight against the spoilers. The international force can provide protection for the negotiating parties as well, enhancing the security and success rate of the process. Usually this role cannot be played by the negotiating parties because the government side tends to be weakened in their force capacity (which is part of the reason why civil war breaks out in the first place) and the rebel side may emphasize with the spoilers and do not see particular benefits in obstructing them. Neutrality of international forces, therefore, is an asset in this respect as well. International peace operations can assist the negotiating parties in this regard.

The other two types, greedy and limited spoilers discussed in the Stedman's article, are more susceptible to negotiation and thus can be dealt with by providing appropriate incentives and benefits for joining or cooperating with the peace process. These spoilers have set goals that are not mutually exclusive with the negotiating parties. Thus, the challenge here is to establish the communication between the conflicting parties and proceed in the negotiation while maintaining security in the country. International peace operations can play these roles of assisting the communication between the parties (by fully taking advantage of their neutrality in the conflict) and securing peace while the negotiations take place.

Although Greenhill and Major disagree with this categorization method to tackle the spoiler problem, their assessment do not fundamentally alter the importance of international peace operations in relation to spoilers in the negotiating and implementation phase of the peace agreement. They argue that environmental concerns dictate what types of spoilers they become, and thus they can show differing characteristics depending on what is possible in the circumstances in the country. This is a legitimate concern, and untangling the causal relationship helps when crafting the interventions. In other words, does the environment causes spoilers to act
certain ways, or are spoilers inherently fixed on their goals? This debate is an important one to be looked at when devising interventions plans, nonetheless it goes beyond the scope of this project.

The important concern is that spoiler problems leave essentially two components to be resolved: containment and communication. International peace operations, though not always successful, have dealt with these problems and have wealth of knowledge from the previous cases. Employing these experiences and their legitimacy that comes from the global nature of the operations, it can contribute significantly to the successful termination of peace agreements. Thus, the third hypothesis of this paper is as follows:

**Hypothesis 3:** International peace operations effectively combat spoiler problems, thus enhancing the likelihood of successful peace agreements.

In the below section, we turn to the case study on Sierra Leone to assess whether these causal relations (or intervening variables) of international peace operations and successful peace agreements can be established. Before the case study, however, the methodology of this study is briefly explained below.
3.1 Methodology

This project follows a comparative method of political science discipline. Specifically, it employs Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD). This method compares two similar cases that contain two differing variables. Since other variables are controlled, the two variables show some degree of correlation or, even better, causation. In the below case study, two peace agreements signed in 1999 and 2000 are compared according to the three intervening variables that are hypothesized in the above chapter. The study is essentially a within-case comparative study of peace agreements in Sierra Leone. In order to assess the relationship, "process tracing" must be conducted, showing how the causal functions work from one variable to another. This method of testing strengthens the author's argument by showing how intervening variables may play into the phenomenon we attempt to explain. While the testing procedure is heavily qualitative, the quantitative data is helpful in capturing important information related to the elements studied in this thesis.

In this project, the dependent variable (DV) is defined as the success of peace agreements. The "success" can be defined as sustainability of the peace agreement, specifically months that have passed after the signing of peace agreement without breaking out of major violence in the country. This definition follows several authors in the literature. Some scholars measure "success" by simply looking at presence or absence of violence after the peace agreements. However, this method cannot capture the relative success and failure of peace agreements. When measured by months, it is possible to quantify the results to some extent, showing the relative success and failure more clearly. Although this study heavily relies on qualitative methods of
testing, it is helpful to clarify the measurement and definition of DV since that is the central element that this study attempts to investigate.

The Independent Variable (IV), on the other hand, is the degree of international peace operations. While the definition of international peace operations includes mainly IGO interventions (the UN and other regional organizations) and coalition of the willing devise to intervene in civil war situations using military force, this research makes a distinction between IGO interventions and a coalition of the willing, since the former tends to enjoy higher international legitimacy compared to the latter. International law (and the UN Charter specifically) provides the legal basis for international military interventions devised by the UN Security Council in order to preserve international peace and security. Sometimes individual states militarily intervene in civil wars. This type of intervention, however, cannot be termed as coordinated international peace operation due its questionable legitimacy, and thus it is problematic to consider under the same category from the above two types. This study, therefore, have covered only these two types of intervention. In the chapter below, the analysis of Sierra Leonean case follows this definition of international peace operations.

The reason for case selection can be found in the chronological proximity of the two peace agreements that had clearly different results. The Lomé peace agreement in 1999 did not yield much success, while the Abuja agreement in 2000 has carried the country into a more peaceful direction. The systemic similarities between the two cases are stark. The international political environment surrounding the two agreements changed little besides greater commitment that the UN showed after the collapse of Lomé Peace Accord. Internal situation of severe atrocities and political chaos did not develop very much between the two agreements as well. In fact, the only major difference was in the favorable treatment of RUF combatants in the Lomé
Accord in comparison to the Abuja Agreement. This poses a question as to why RUF did not adhere to this agreement and rather restarted their violent civil war. The case of Sierra Leone, therefore, provides a perfect testing ground for the theories discussed above.
CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY

4.1 Introduction and background

On January 18, 2002, President Kabbah of Sierra Leone declared the end of the prolonged civil war in the country. For many Sierra Leonian citizens, this not only meant the end of eleven years of atrocity, but also the beginning of a difficult peacebuilding process in the country. The civil war produced massive flows of refugees, stagnated the national economy, and destroyed the social fabric of the country.

The civil war in Sierra Leone is best known for the brutality that a myriad number of groups inflicted upon civilians: from the chief perpetrators, the rebel group (Revolutionary United Front, or the RUF), to the defected government forces and Civil Defense Forces (CDF). The RUF forcefully recruited civilians and cruelly executed not only those who were on the government’s side but also innocent people who expressed fear towards the rebels. On the surface this may seem contradictory, since the rebel group was ostensibly established to combat the corruption of the government and stand for the benefit of the civilians. However, the civil war in Sierra Leone was unique in the sense that the rebel group did not have a clear ideological backbone for its actions. Much of the violence stemmed from the grievances felt among the youth population regarding their politicians and elders, who maintained strong authority and did not allow young Sierra Leoneans to advance in the society. This assessment of the local situation in Sierra Leone prior to the war is shared by Paul Richard, who investigates the underlining cause for the brutal violence that ensued in the country. He concludes that the

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2 David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 48-55.
21 Ibid
violence was partly a "performance" of the youths in response to the long domination that they have experienced in the country before and during the civil war.\textsuperscript{22}

Therefore, on the surface the RUF was an opposition movement organized against the political domination of the government.\textsuperscript{23} However, at a deeper level it was an eruption of societal discontent especially felt among the young populations. The involvement of rebel forces in Liberia, famously led by the armed group of Charles Taylor, ignited the conflict that spread across Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{24} There were regional as well as international peace operations intervening in the conflict, which seem to have played a decisive role in ending the prolonged conflict in the country.

In order to combat this security issue that spilled over around West Africa, ECOWAS decided to intervene militarily by deploying its ECOMOG forces. Although the forces attempted to support the democratically elected civilian regime, Freetown was repeatedly taken over by the rebels. The UN decided to send its peacekeeping forces as well, but the world body found that this effort had been fertile when two peace agreements failed to be sustained and rebel forces again took control over the capital. With the help of British forces intervening in 2000 and further empowered UN forces, the international peace operation was at last able to regain control over the country and bring warring parties to sign a peace agreement that sustained the country since then.

Towards the end of the civil war, there were three peace agreements signed between the warring RUF and the Sierra Leonean government: the Abidjan Peace Accord in 1996, the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999, and the Abuja Agreement in 2000. Among these three, the first two

\textsuperscript{22} Paul Richard, Fighting for the Rainforest War, Youth, and Resources in Sierra Leone (Oxford: Heinemann Education Books, 1996).
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid
\textsuperscript{24} Keen, Conflict and Collusion, 62-70.
collapsed in the midst of difficult political negotiations and societal instability. The Abuja Agreement, however, has sustained the relationship between these previously conflicting parties and led to the creation of a more stable nation.

As a result of Lomé Peace Accord, the RUF saw numerous of its members brought inside the government as officials. Foday Sankoh, the founder and leader of the RUF, was given the title of Vice-President and became the head of a new mineral resource commission. In addition, seven other ministerial posts were given the RUF and further the rebel leaders were offered immunity for their war crimes during the civil war. Despite these preferable conditions to the RUF, the agreement still broke down and fighting ensued again. Keen points out five factors that were contributing to this result: destabilizing effect of Liberian civil war, obstruction by RUF leadership, exclusion of other factions in the civil war (notably Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and Sierra Leone Army), the weakness of DDR support, and the weak international peacekeeping forces.25

On the other hand, Abuja Agreement did not provide significant political and economic resources even to the RUF.26 This poses a puzzle to researchers because the more beneficial the agreement is to the RUF, one would suspect, the more likely that the agreement would be sustainable. In the case of this comparative study, however, this did not seem to be an important variable. Rather, the fact that Abuja Agreement saw more robust intervention by the UN, ECOMOG, Britain, and later, Guinean forces seemed to have contributed to the success of the agreement.27 Although the agreement itself was simply a ceasefire agreement without reference to much of the political issues detailed in the Lomé Accord, the international pressure on the

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negotiating parties was significantly larger than the previous agreement. The increased force
capacity and DDR capability in this operation prior to and following the Abuja Agreement
successfully led the country into a more peaceful state.

One important factor that clearly demarcates the third agreement from the first two is the
degree of international involvement present in the country. The focus of this thesis, therefore, is
to apply the hypotheses presented in chapter two and investigate whether the three intervening
variables (namely, spoiler management, credible guarantee, and political legitimacy) are in fact
present in the case of Sierra Leonean peacekeeping.

The central question of this case study is the following: “what are the factors in
international peace operations that determined the failure of the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999 and
success of the Abuja Agreement in 2000?” The chapter attempts to explain the factors that led
to the differential outcomes of the two peace agreements (dependent variable). The explanatory
variable (or independent variable) of the study is the degree of international peace operation. The
“degree” is operationalized in this study mainly by two factors: force capacity (i.e. share number
of forces and their equipments) and DDR capability. The independent variable is further
elaborated by the intervening factors: managing spoiler problem, credible guarantee, and
political legitimacy. (See Figure 1)

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2 The first Abidjan Agreement is not discussed in this project because the political circumstance and content of second Lomé Peace Accord show more similarity to those of the successful Abuja agreement. For example, both of the last two agreements stipulated that the RUF would be politically integrated into the Sierra Leonean national politics.
The importance of this case study is to test the intervening variables discussed in chapter two (management of spoiler problem, credible guarantee, and political legitimacy) in this specific case of Sierra Leone. By comparing two distinctively different peace agreements in the country, this chapter attempts to investigate if these theoretical causal relations really played out in this specific case.

4.2 International Coercion and Spoiler Problem

In order to assess the role of international peace operations prior to the signing of peace agreements in Sierra Leone, the following section is divided into two parts: first, the international (primarily the UN and African) peace operations prior to the Lomé Peace Accord; and second, British and strengthened UN intervention leading up to the Abuja Agreement. The two sections provide a comprehensive overview of the nature of international involvement in the country as well as analyses of the relations between number of troops and conclusion of peace agreements. International involvement in this context means primarily military interventions with or without
the consent of the Sierra Leonean government. These interventions were conducted to stabilize
the security situation in the country as well as regional politics in general.

Lomé Peace Accord

In the majority of years since the beginning of civil war in the country, the ECOMOG
was heavily involved with the security situation in the country. The international force first tried
to defend the government by intervening militarily. However, as the war progressed, the
government was eventually overthrown by its military, complicating the situation even further.
In February 1995, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed his Special Envoy
who negotiated a peaceful return to the civilian rule of the country. The conflict in the country
seemed to be moving toward a peaceful resolution by the signing of the Abidjan Peace Accord in
1996. However, another coup followed the agreement, and this time the army joined forces with
the RUF. The reason for the national army to defect from the government can be traced to
different factors, but retarded payments as well as low loyalty to the government largely
contributed to this incident.\footnote{David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leon.}
In 1997 the Security Council passed a resolution imposing an oil
and arms embargo on the country and authorized ECOWAS to ensure the implementation of
ECOMOG to stabilize the security situation in the country.\footnote{UNAMSIL Website, retrieved on October 14, 2009, from:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html}

In February 1998, the ECOMOG forces launched an offensive against the military junta
and the rebel group, forcing them out from the capital, Freetown. In March, President Kabbah, a
civilian leader elected before the coup, was restored to presidency. On June 1998, the Security
Council established a United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) which
aimed to make progress in the DDR process and restructure the army to enhance the security
situation. The fighting still continued in the country, and in December, the rebel-military alliance
forces started an attack to retake the capital. ECOMOG countered the attack and restored the
civilian government in the country. In this context, the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General to Sierra Leone consulted with the rebels and opened up diplomatic channels to
negotiate a power-sharing agreement between the warring forces. The Lomé Peace Accord was
signed following this turbulent period in the Sierra Leonean history.\textsuperscript{31}

Although ECOMOG involvement in the country stabilized Sierra Leone to a certain
degree, it did not suffice to maintain the security situation even in the capital. The city was
repeatedly attacked and sometimes controlled by the RUF forces, which led to the destabilization
of the political negotiation between the government and the rebel group due to changing power
balance. Particularly after the country's military force joined with the rebel group, combating
these groups became increasingly difficult because rebels now had more manpower and
weaponry. Also the merging of the two made it more difficult to distinguish the soldiers and
rebels, thus creating the term “sobel” to describe those who had the characteristics of both.\textsuperscript{32}

Even given this context, the UN refused to financially support the ECOMOG forces, which could
have conducted better military operations if given more funds.\textsuperscript{33}

The UN troops themselves also lacked force capacity and mandate to forcefully stabilize
the security situation in the country. The number of peacekeepers was not enough to combat the
rebels, particularly after when the some of the government armies defected to join the rebel
movement. As a result, the Lomé Peace Accord did not last for a long period of time, and the
country returned to its chaos soon after. One incident that testifies to this security environment is
the kidnapping of 500 peacekeepers from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid
\textsuperscript{32} Keen, \textit{Conflict and Collusion} pp.132-159.
\textsuperscript{33} Dennis Bright, "Implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement," Conciliation Resources: http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/sierra-leone/implementing-lome.php
(UNAMSIL), which severely embarrassed the international body. This underestimation of the ground situation haunted the UN mission in Sierra Leone and essentially led to the collapse of the Lomé Peace Accord.

This collective lack of sufficient international intervention on the part of the ECOMOG and the UN prior to and immediately following the Lomé Peace Accord was a critical element contributing to the failure of the agreement. Part of the reason why rebel forces continued to assault the citizens and threatened the country's government is because the security chaos allowed them to forcefully control natural resources such as diamond mines and benefit economically. The lack of international intervention to halt such criminal activities exacerbated the violence in the country and prevented it from marking a new start toward a peaceful era of reconciliation. Although many RUF leaders were given political posts and resources in the Lomé Peace Accord, these economics benefits did not reach the lower-ranked members within the rebel organization. From this perspective, one could understand that the benefit for the many of rebels within the RUF and others to continue the civil war outweighed the benefit of conducting a peace talk, though the leadership did get what they wanted. Thus, the peace process and power sharing agreements were spoiled by those unsatisfied factions within the rebel groups.

Relating back to the spoiler problem, international peace operations did not suffice to stop the operations of spoilers leading up to and immediately following the peace agreement. This can be observed in the fact that the capital city was repeatedly overtaken by the rebels and UN/ECOMOG forces were unable to stop this from happening.

**Abuja Agreement**

In contrast to the insufficient international peace operation and its force capacity prior to Lomé Peace Accord, the UN peacekeeping involvement up to the Abuja Agreement showed

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34 Curran and Woodhouse, "Cosmopolitan peacekeeping": 1058.
unprecedented commitment in its size and mandate. In Security Council Resolution 1299 issued in May 2000, the UNAMSIL force was increased to 13,000 military personnel, including 260 military observers that were already deployed. This was more than double the 6,000 military personnel that the mission had in its initiation. In March 2001, the military strength was further increased up to 17,500 with an extended mandate period.

Also following the kidnapping of the Peacekeeping soldiers was an intervention of the robust British forces in the country. This unilateral intervention was originally designed to evacuate British citizens in the country, but the situation on ground resulted in the UK forces working together with the UN forces. These international military operations contributed immensely in creating a secure zone in and around the capital and gave UNAMSIL an area in which to deploy and expand its forces. Largely due to these expanded international interventions, the security situation in the country improved considerably, now allowing for a more fruitful political negotiation to take place.

The Abuja agreement contributed in creating a space for dialogue between the Sierra Leonean government and RUF. Since the end of the war, RUF has been transformed into a political party and it now participates in the democratic elections. Without the robust intervention of the British forces and expanded support of the UN troops, however, the rebels would have continued to fight and further exacerbated the political and security chaos in the country. This is largely due to the fact that rebels (and certain factions in the military) benefited from the civil war immensely by taking control of the diamond mines and looting freely from the civilians. The commitment of the international community to establish a peaceful environment allowed for a new political process to take place and eventually for the country to end its civil war in 2002.

36 UNSC Resolution 1346 (2001)
37 Curran and Woodhouse, “Cosmopolitan peacekeeping”: 1058.
Returning to the question on "how much international intervention was needed to end the war in Sierra Leone," the history seems to show that forces that sufficed to overwhelm the rebels were necessary. This is due to the fact that the national military force was largely insufficient to combat the rebels and the political leadership lacked political legitimacy to enable its return. When there are insufficient internal security forces to counter the rebels, external intervention becomes all the more crucial for the security of the country. The Sierra Leonean case testifies to this lesson of the history.

This comparative exercise on international peace operations helps to explain how the spoiler problem can be avoided by introducing larger force capacity in the civil war situation. The Lomé Peace Accord suffered from continuous interference from the spoilers (i.e. the RUF and defected soldiers from the national army). The increased number of troops and more well-equipped British soldiers were able to eradicate the total spoilers out of the capital city and create the environment conducive to the peace agreement to be negotiated.

International peace operation is intimately linked not only to the overall security environment of a post-conflict society but also on other security functions of the country. Establishing effective policing capacity and national military are some of the main functions that international intervention can contribute as well. Particularly, former combatants and rebels first need to be disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated into the society in a peaceful manner. This aspect of international peace operation speaks to the credible guarantee that it provides to the previously warring parties. The next section of this project thus focuses on this crucial aspect of conflict resolution process and compares the credible guarantee measured by the progress in DDR process following the two peace agreements discussed above.
4.3 DDR Process and Credible Guarantee

This section concerns the DDR process that occurred in Sierra Leone before and around when the two peace agreements were signed. By looking at the extent in which the soldiers were disarmed and demobilized in the country, one can discern the impact that the DDR process had on a peaceful resolution of the conflict and success of the peace agreements. This is intimately linked to the effects of international peace operations because these operations largely phase into DDR activities as soon as the peace agreements are reached. Specifically, the international nature of the intervention provides the credible guarantee that the peace agreement can hold and there is no need for “cheating.”

Also, as a general observation, the intensity of violence in a country correlates largely with how accessible weapons are to the population. Due to the wide availability of weapons during the civil war from Liberia and beyond, the international community and the government of Sierra Leone attempted to make a progress in DDR process immediately after the two peace agreements. The seeming failure to fulfill this task in 1999, however, affected the durability of peace agreement of Lomé Accord. The DDR process after the Abuja Agreement has been more sustainable in comparison to the first agreement, and thus it contributed positively to the security situation in the country.

Lomé Peace Accord

In order to understand the short-lived disarmament process that took place after the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord, it is helpful to look at the extent and rationale of brutal violence that permeated in the country during the war. Rebels from RUF and some factions of the military conducted a mass-killing and raping around the country to show their control over the civilian lives and resources. The use of child soldiers particularly escalated the brutality of
the violence during the war. These children were often orphans of the conflict, uneducated segments of the country, or just children from the villages in which RUF were active. The RUF rebels forced these children to take drugs and brainwashed them so that they could combat in the battlefield. Some of the child soldiers were forced to kill their own parents to cut ties with the relatives and show their loyalty toward the rebel group.  

Although scholars and journalists such as Robert Kaplan in his famous essay “The Coming Anarchy” categorize these cruel actions “primordial” or “irrational,” Park investigates specifically the amputations of limbs conducted by the rebels and claims that the rebels used these brutal tactics as “a ‘sensible,’ though terrifying, weapon of war.” In other words, she argues that the use of extensive and inhumane violence on civilians was based on a deliberate choice of the rebels in achieving their political and economic goal. Based on this understanding of the violence during the war, one can find even more importance of DDR process immediately following the peace agreements. This is because the analysis on the progress in DDR shows that rebels were not simply thugs or criminals but also rational actors advancing toward fulfilling their goals such as taking control of a part of the country’s territory and/or governance. Reintegration of these soldiers into society is, therefore, a possible and necessary step toward national reconstruction of the country.

After the signing of Lomé Peace Accord, only a brief disarmament effort followed. This was due to the RUF restarting the fighting after they decided that the new power sharing agreement was not sufficient to have a strong hold in the government. Although the Lomé Accord gave them the necessary economic power, it did not satisfy the expectation that rebel groups possessed as a result of the prolonged and profitable civil war. In other words, the Lomé

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38 Keen, *Conflict and Collusion* 92-106.
39 Park, “Making Sense of Amputations,” 582.
agreement did not provide enough “guarantee” that they would be protected from potential cheating by the government or not achieving the desire that they aimed to fulfill. The continuing looting and killing around the country and unstable security situation further exacerbated the conflict. The lack of effective DDR process in the country can be mainly attributed to insufficient support from the international community. The DDR process requires ex-combatants’ job-training and extensive psychological care to reintegrate them into a civilian life. The ECOMOG forces utterly lacked these support capacities for DDR and thus could not make progress in the efforts following the peace agreement.

This poor consequence of DDR process was largely due to the lack of capability in the international forces in building credible guarantee for the rebels. Similar to the reason why spoiler problems were not managed, the inadequate force strengths did not guarantee that the rebels groups would be better-off by agreeing to peace. Rather, many thought that continuing civil war would be more profitable due to the large control they had over the diamond mines around the country. If there have been more international forces to contain the spoilers and guarantee the peaceful transition of the country, the DDR process could have been more successful with positive result of the peace accord. However, this was not the case with the Lomé Peace Accord.

*Abuja Peace Agreement*

After the recurrence of violence following the Lomé Peace Accords and robust interventions by the British forces and the UNAMSIL troops, the DDR process progressed more rapidly. Although low-intensity fighting in the country continued until the end of the war in 2002, the international community assisted the DDR process in various parts of the country. As a result, the peace agreement led to longer term stability and eventual ceasefire between the previously
warring parties. Disarming the rebels and strengthening the security sector (mainly military and police functions) were crucial initial steps for the peace to be established in Sierra Leone. These interconnected processes of DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR) provided a framework for a negative peace to take root in the country. These foundations for peace in turn created a space for positive peace to be established and the country to politically and economically develop in the long term.

In conjunction to the DDR process, some scholars have provided hopeful insights to the prospect of SSR process in Sierra Leone. For example, Baker argues that non-state policing agencies comprised of youths fulfilled the security vacuum that was created following the end of the civil war. While this suggests that the security sector is still lacking, it can nevertheless have some positive implications, as Baker argues that youth have found a renewed sense of responsibility to protect their community and commitment to their work. These positive developments on youth empowerment can be attributed to the international intervention described above. These involvements have assisted in advancing the DDR process and creating a societal responsibility for the citizens to support their own security environment.

Ginifer, while acknowledging that Sierra Leonean case is widely regarded as one of the most “successful international interventions in sub-Saharan Africa,” nonetheless claims that the link between DDR, SSR, and democratization process was a fragile one. He argues that an incomplete SSR process opens up new opportunities for security risk in the country and creates further difficulties for the country.40 On the surface, the country has not seen a major fighting resumed after 2002. However, transformative process taken too hastily in the government and military structure can cause unnecessary tensions to mount and could lead to a backlash to the

civil war. In this regard, the author provides an important caution to the peacebuilding in the country following the Abuja Agreement.

The progress in DDR process and further development in SSR as well as democratization have had key importance in the success of Abuja Agreement. Successful international interventions have significantly affected these processes in Sierra Leone and contributed to further stabilization of the security environment in the country. The underlining factor that enabled the DDR process and subsequent SSR processes to be successful was the credible security guarantee that the international peace operation provided to both parties. Due the enhanced number of the interveners and international commitment to end the civil war, the rebels gradually decided that the peace would be more beneficial to them. The important element that contributed to this shift in considerations was provided by the international forces especially after the collapse of the Lomé agreement.

The negative peace established by these interventions, however, needs to be linked to another important factor discussed in this thesis: political legitimacy. Due to the more intangible characteristics of the concept, it is more difficult to know the extent of how much national population feel or think that their government (let it be local or national) is legitimate through its provision of important public services like security, education, and employment. Although this aspect of public acceptance of the governance following the two peace agreements deserves a special attention, it is striking to see that it does not appear to play as much of a role as the two factors previously discussed.

4.4 Political Legitimacy

This section addresses the question of political legitimacy in the governing structure and asks "how legitimate were the local and national governance perceived among the citizens,
particularly as a result of international peace operations?" Political legitimacy is an important variable in this study because international peace operations tend to have higher domestic as well as international legitimacy when compared to regional operations. The first part of this chapter discusses this issue in regards to the situation following the Lomé Peace Accord, while the second section covers the political legitimacy in post-Abuja Agreement Sierra Leone. The project finds that, while there are differing degrees of legitimacy felt by the citizens towards their national government, there was not sufficient level of legitimacy after either of the peace agreements especially in the local level. This leads us to reconsider the impact of political legitimacy in implementing international peace operations. In essence, legitimacy issue seems to have lesser impact on sustaining peace agreements in the short term when compared to management of spoilers and credible guarantee.

Before comparing the situations following each of the peace agreements, it is helpful to understand the chieftaincy system prior to the civil war in Sierra Leone. This system of local governance provided considerable power to the local chiefs who were elder leaders of respective communities. Many times, these chiefs controlled the natural resources in their regions and dominated the political and economic structure. The chiefs therefore deprived the younger generation for their educational as well as employment opportunities. Since the employment opportunities were scarce and many youths did not have adequate educations to enhance their marketability, there was a widening inequality in the socio-economic situation of the country. Therefore, the economic as well as political grievances fueled by such conditions prior to the war had formed the basis of the widespread violence in the country since 1991.

*Lomé Peace Accord*
Following the signing of 1999 peace accord, there was not much time for political legitimacy to build up in the fragile social context. The RUF was given some representation in the government by the Peace Accord, but the renewed government barely functioned and violence resumed almost immediately. At the local level, there were no real governance structures but self-serving “sobels” that controlled the communities. The rebel groups continued to hold control of regions rich in diamond resources and looted freely from the people. Widespread violence was commonplace and severe human rights violation occurred throughout the nation. 

The rule of RUF rebels could not be called legitimate local governing body because their actions did not even attempt to represent the interests of their communities at large. Rather, they did whatever they could to advance their economic as well as political interests in the chaos during the civil war. For example, they did not hesitate to use child soldiers in their operations. These children, who were deprived of education and proper mental as well as physical care, became large social issues after the end of civil war. Exploiting of natural resources by rebels also negatively affected the resource distribution amongst the local people and economic prospect of the country at large. The politics of these ruling powers in the local community were therefore remote from being seen as legitimate from the citizens.

Also under question was the legitimacy of international forces themselves. Although the UN forces relied heavily on the international body’s neutrality and credibility, ECOMOG forces did not enjoy the same international credibility that the UN had. In addition, some troops’ misbehavior was noted in the ECOMOG forces, further decreasing the political legitimacy of the peace process and the agreement itself. Particularly prior to the British intervention, these two organizations did not work together very well and therefore failed to create positive externalities.

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41 Keen, *Conflict and Collusion*: 92-106
as a result of the operations. If the two organizations worked more in tandem, the result of Lomé Peace Accord could have been different.

*Abuja Peace Agreement*

After the signing of the peace agreement in 2000, the legitimacy of national government improved due to increased participation of various political parties. The RUF was reformed into a political party as well, but it did not receive significant popular support. In terms of the local governance, however, many authors argue that the legitimacy did not improve in comparison to the pre-civil war time in Sierra Leone. Hanlon claims that the “same old men who were responsible for the war are still in power, both in government and in a reinstated chieftaincy system, and corruption is still endemic, while young people remain jobless and largely uneducated.” The author further goes on to ask, “Is the international community helping to recreate the preconditions for war in Sierra Leone?”

This viewpoint is an important one, since the unequal power distribution prior to the war partly explains the basis of the conflict in the first place.

Jackson also offers an argument largely in line with Hanlon. He emphasizes that local governments need to be in control of the natural resources such as diamonds in their respective regions, but they are “in danger of being undermined by national politicians, trading networks and the local chiefs that control the land.” The chieftaincy system recreated after the civil war has not benefited the country but rather reinstated the dominating structure that does not allow the young population to advance in the society. Even with internationally more legitimate UN-led peace operations, the governing structure that followed the civil war did not attract much local popularity.

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43 Jackson, “Chiefs, Money and Politicians,” 49.
It is puzzling to observe, however, that this lack of political legitimacy at the local level seems to have not affected peace at the national level so far. Since the end of civil war in 2002, the country has not seen a large scale reemergence of violent conflict. This may be due to the fact that there is no specific incident that can trigger the conflict. During the 1990s, conflict in Liberia spilled over to Sierra Leone, while Charles Taylor continued to play a major role. The lack of relative regional stability and certain degree of satisfaction to the democratic national politics may have prevented the violence from resurfacing. However, if the grievance at the local level remains a problem and political legitimacy in local as well as national administrations does not improve further in the future, these factors could cause a potential problem to the socio-political climate of the country.

This comparison of political legitimacy after the peace agreements tells us two important propositions to be considered: (1) international peace operations do not necessarily lead to politically legitimate governing structure, and (2) low level of local political legitimacy alone does not contribute to an emergence of wide-spread violence in the national level. From the history of the civil conflict and particularly of the first peace accord, a “trigger” seems to have been needed for the violence to erupt in the country. The intensified international military enforcement weakened the military structure of the RUF and lowered the risk of the rebels to become another catalyst for continuing violence.

The role of international actors is again important in this context. International and regional organizations tend to be the major actors in the nation-building process (since the national government is rarely functioning in the post-conflict stage). However, a rapid and excessive intervention on the part of these actors without inputs from the local population can
lead to a disastrous outcome. The case of Sierra Leone testifies to this effect, particularly because a similar malfunctioning system from the pre-war time was reinstated in the local communities.

4.5 Assessment of the Case Study

This chapter has compared the two peace agreements from post-war Sierra Leone and addressed factors that have affected the outcomes of the agreements. The possible intervening variables covered are: spoiler management, credible guarantee, and political legitimacy. International military involvement in the country and the DDR process has largely affected the outcomes of the agreements, though the assessment on the political legitimacy at the local level seems to point out that this factor is less important compared to the other two at least in the short term. For the security situation in post-war country to stabilize, military capacity of the spoilers needs to be contained and disarmament process ought to take place subsequently. Disarmed rebels must be reintegrated into different parts of the civilian society with adequate educational opportunities and trainings offered for them. National military needs to be reorganized into a more credible and effective force to contain future eruption of violence, especially in the immediate aftermath of the conflict.

The reason that international force capacity and DDR capability of the international peace operations mattered more than political legitimacy may be found in the distinction between negative and positive peace. In order for the peace agreement to be “sticky” after the civil war, the security situation needs to be stabilized first. Factors such as educational opportunities and employment affect the positive peace of the country, and this can be rectified later in the post-conflict society. In other words, international peace operations that prioritize on managing spoiler problems and providing credible guarantee to warring parties can prove to be successful in the post-civil war situations. The conclusion that can be drawn from Sierra Leonean case study
may not be applicable to all civil wars in the world, but this study nonetheless contributes to the literature in a sense that it provides reasons for the correlation between international peace operation and successful peace agreements.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

This project has explored the connection between international peace operations and peace agreements. The theoretical discussion in chapter two has introduced three hypotheses regarding credible guarantee, spoiler problem, and political legitimacy. These hypotheses are in turn tested in the within-case comparative study of Sierra Leonean peace agreements in 1999 and 2000. The result of the study shows that there are strong connections between establishment of negative peace, credible guarantee, and spoiler problems. It is essential to deal with these issues when a country is attempting to end a civil war and enter into a peace agreement. In this transition phase, it is critical to deal with the spoilers and halt their activities that may undermine the prospect of the agreement.

Political legitimacy on the part of the international peace operations and local governance system is an important intervening variable, but it appears to have less effect in the conclusion of successful peace agreements compared to the other two variables. These elements become more prominent when the country enters the reconstruction phase, when positive peace becomes more of the focus of the society. Of course, the distinction of negative and positive peace is an arbitrary one and in reality they are intertwined. However, political and military recourses tend to be limited when peace agreements are being negotiated. Therefore, it is essential to prioritize the needs and factors that affect the success of peace agreements most directly.

Within the current literature, there is no convincing argument on why international peace operations tend to yield more successful peace agreements in civil war situations. The three
hypotheses derived from the literature seem to be the most prominent explanatory variables, but prioritizing these elements has been a challenge for scholars. The comparative study on Sierra Leonean peace agreements have shown that elements directly related to negative peace can be crucial in concluding successful peace agreements.

Some questions can be explored in the future research to further enrich the understanding of post-war peace agreements and peacebuilding. Although the negative peace established after the war can be crucial in maintaining the peace agreement and minimal security situation in the country, this is usually not sufficient to create a lasting peace in the country. Issues such as reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction must be prioritized in the subsequent phase, which is crucial for the future development of the country. Some questions that should be asked in this context are: how much and what types of international involvement tend to increase the likelihood of successful peacebuilding? When should international forces withdraw from the country for the peace agreement to be sticky in the long-term? How should democratization taken into consideration in the negotiating phase?

The lesson of Sierra Leone is a cautious one. The country has not fall into another cycle of warfare since 2002, but many point out that the fragile peace in Sierra Leone may be undermined by unequal social status that is given to local chiefs. This social discrimination by age and status tends to take over opportunities from the young population, particularly related to education and employment. The social discrimination creates discontent and grievance among the underprivileged groups, thus fueling the future possibility of war. The country, therefore, must phase out from the negative peace focused activities and start to shift its focus to building positive peace in the nation. This connection between negative and positive peace is another field that should be explored further in the future.
All across the world, countries still suffer from civil war and are in the process of peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding. Lessons learned from the previous cases of civil war termination, therefore, should be taken seriously by the international community to design effective international peace operations for these future “Sierra Leones.” The recurrence of violence after the signing of peace agreements is politically destabilizing and economically inefficient. It tends to trigger further humanitarian disasters to the local populations. The lessons of international interventions learned from Sierra Leone should be applied by focusing on spoiler management and credible guarantee when crafting the peace agreements. This can enhance the success rate of peace agreements and, hopefully, contribute in creating a world free of brutal civil wars.