The Role of the President in Achieving Balance Between Athletics and Academics at Division I-A Institutions

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THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT IN ACHIEVING BALANCE BETWEEN ATHLETICS AND ACADEMICS AT DIVISION I-A INSTITUTIONS

BY

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ABSTRACT

While athletic success is revered in today's society, the ability of students to graduate is not nearly so much of a focus, as evidenced by the fact that the national undergraduate graduation rate hovers around an average of 60 percent. This study was conducted to examine selected NCAA Division I-A schools to determine if institutions are able to balance athletics and academics, and to identify the role the president of the institution plays in trying to achieve and maintain that balance.

College athletes have drifted away from the mission of higher education to becoming an entertainment enterprise running almost parallel to, not within, their sponsoring institution. Top basketball and football coaches command salaries that exceed that of the institution's president, and far surpass salaries of the faculty. Along with an exorbitant salary, elite coaches are also granted the authority to remain autonomous from the institution. In the same vein as their coaches, college athletes are also afforded numerous considerations and luxuries not offered the general student population.

The underlying motivation for this divide is purely financial. Coaches are attracted to Division I-A schools for the large salaries, extensive budgets, and copious amenities. Student-athletes choose Division I-A institutions for the visibility needed to help them obtain high-paying professional contracts. Consequently, schools are literally spending money as fast as they generate it in order to compete for the best coaches and recruits, and that in the sum of billions of dollars a year.

This study looks at a sample of Division I-A colleges with successful athletic programs in order to determine the relationship between academic and athletic performance. Findings of the study indicate that, under certain conditions, the president
plays an important role in balancing athletics and academics at Division I-A institutions. However, those with the greatest influence on college athletics are those who contribute financially to an institution. This, in turn, moves the center of power outside the institution, which is a dangerous place for it to be. By examining the results of the comparison of the case studies, a set of best practices has been determined.
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Finally, to the members of my committee, Dr. Suriano and Dr. DiBisceglie, thank you for all your advice and assistance with helping me achieve this milestone.

KK
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to those who led me to the path I am on, and who continue to support me every step of the way: my parents and grandmother, Kenneth, Illona, and Muriel Koehler. Thank you for leading by example, I am proud to follow in your footsteps.
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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Scandal, fraud, violence, drug and alcohol abuse, and theft—these words are all frequently found in the headlines pertaining to college sports stories today. Something that started as an outlet for students from their studies has turned into an entertainment monolith, bringing millions of dollars into colleges and universities that achieve athletic success. While the overarching mission of institutions of higher education is to teach today’s students to become tomorrow’s leaders and contributing members of society, sporting event scores are the news that is being reported on a daily basis in the local and national media. Numerous college leaders claim that student-athletes are students first, and athletes second; but, a majority of the general public can name the institution’s mascot more easily than a faculty member, and most would agree that success is often defined by athletic accomplishments, rather than academic performance.

Conversely, the reality for student-athletes on the most competitive teams of the elite sports at Division I-A schools, is that their graduation rates often fail to meet the national average for undergraduates at four-year schools. According to the 2004 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Graduation Rates Report Data, for the cohorts entering in the 1997-98 school year, the overall graduation rate for student-athletes is two percent higher (62%) than their general student body counterparts (60%). However, when further broke down by sport, some alarming trends appear. In the two high profile, revenue-generating sports, student-athletes participating in men’s basketball have only a 44 percent graduation rate, while football players have a slightly better graduation rate of
55 percent. Illustrating the severity of the problem, a recent study looked at the graduation rates for the teams participating in the 2005 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament and found that 43 teams, out of 65, would not be eligible for the tournament if a simple 50 percent minimum graduation rate for basketball players was in place.

There are over 361,000 student-athletes competing today, with only a minute fraction moving on to professional careers. The harsh reality is that in the premier sports, men’s basketball and football, only 1.3 percent and 2.0 percent of student athletes move on to play professionally. The devastating factor is that student-athletes are so highly recruited for their athletic prowess, yet most of them leave without an opportunity to compete in the major leagues or a college degree. Since most professional athletes sign multi-million dollar contracts, it is the allure of achieving this level of compensation that drives student-athletes through the higher education system. This is due to the fact that aside from baseball, there are no minor leagues in the United States, and the only available venue to showcase their talent and raise their visibility is college athletics.

The financial commitment made to these student-athletes is enormous. In order to stay competitive, institutions offer huge salaries and numerous incentives to high-profile coaches in order to attract elite recruits and media attention to their programs; and that in the anticipation of increased visibility and revenue generation. However, high-profile coaches simultaneously require high-profile venues for their athletes to play in, and schools get excited about the probability of selling thousands of tickets to home games, which leads to a cycle of never-ending facility upgrades. Each of these factors contributes to what the media has called the college sports “arms race.” In an article published in USA Today, Jodi Upton reveals, “Major-college spending on sports hit an all-time high of
$3.6 billion in 2003-04... spending by the Division I-A schools could exceed $4 billion when the 2004-05 figures are completed” (October 19, 2005, p. 1).

Spending to stay competitive in such a permeated market has spiraled out of control. For example, the University of Michigan experienced overwhelming athletic success in the fiscal year 1999: the football team shared the Big Ten Conference title, won the Citrus Bowl and finished 12th in the nation; the men’s ice hockey team (having won the Championship the year before) made it to the second round of the NCAA tournament before losing in overtime; the women’s basketball team had a winning season, finishing 18-11; and the men’s gymnastic team won the national championship. Even though they experienced great achievements on the playing fields, the university had a deficit of $2.8 million in the Athletic Department budget. Higher education scholars Schulman and Bowen ask, “How is it possible that—in the same year that the football team set national attendance record, with an average of 110,965 fans attending six home games—the athletic department could show a net loss of $2.8 million?” (2001, p. xxiii). While revenues for the University of Michigan rose 30 percent in the five years before FY99, expenses had increased 70 percent due to additional travel and facility improvements. Post-season bowl game appearance fees helped bridge the gap some years, but in FY99, the gap caught up with them. If institutions with the largest programs and most expansive facilities cannot figure out how to turn a consistent profit, then programs that do not have anywhere near the same amount of resources are not going to be able to field competitive programs. This, in turn, segregates the level of competition even further; and, in some cases, can lead schools to invest even more money in improving athletics over academics.
Institutional mission may be the driving force of a university, but can more people recite a school’s mission, or its fight song? College athletics has become an entity of its own in the world of higher education. They are loosely associated with the institution that sponsors the sports, often operating independently and making their own rules as well, but tolerated due to the marketing opportunities and revenue generating possibilities.

Athletic programs at most institutions are regulated by the NCAA, which boasts 1,027 institutional members. Within the NCAA, there are 100 athletic conferences divided into five Divisions from the elite, I-A, down through I-AA, I-AAA, II, and III. Division I-A is the highest level of competition, and as the quality of play increases from Division III up to Division I, so do available resources. Division I-A teams attract the best talent: athletes are highly recruited, and are usually offered full scholarships in the major sports. Men’s basketball and football are regularly televised and charge the most for tickets to their games. Due to the media exposure and the crowds attracted, sponsorship dollars are readily available. In most cases, the best seats in the arena or stadium are assigned to the people who donate the most to the institution, and usually that is specifically to the athletic department.

College athletics have drifted away from the mission of higher education, becoming an entertainment enterprise running almost parallel to, not within, their sponsoring institution. Top basketball and football coaches command salaries that exceed that of the institution’s president, and far surpass salaries of the faculty. Along with an exorbitant salary, elite coaches are also granted autonomy from the institution. They are spared the responsibility of administrative duties required of other staff members, such as meetings and committee work. Like their coaches, college athletes are also afforded
numerous considerations and luxuries not offered to the general student population. This in turn creates a substantial divide between student-athletes and their peers on campus.

In the end, almost half of the students in the elite sports of football and men’s basketball leave without attaining a degree, or the skills necessary for creating a solid future in society. They are presented with an opportunity to learn, but are encouraged to work much harder on their athletic game than their academic pursuits. Because there is under a two percent chance that these athletes will go on to complete at a professional level, thousands of athletes are left behind, and only about half of them attain college degrees.

While athletic success is revered in today’s society, the ability of students to graduate is not nearly so much of a focus, as evidenced by the fact that the national undergraduate graduation rate hovers around an average of 60 percent. The statistics presented regarding the atrocious overall national graduation rate, and the even lower graduation rates of student-athletes, combined with the exorbitant amount of money being directed toward athletics rather than academics, sets the foundation for this research. This study was conducted to determine why, as a nation, we are setting the priority on athletic accomplishments rather than academic performance, and who is letting this happen.

**Athletic and Academic Balance**

There are some exceptions to the rule; some institutions do effectively balance athletics and academics. A handful of Division I-A schools have been able to run clean, efficient athletic departments that achieve athletic success without monopolizing
resources needed by the general university population. This is evidenced by the amount of revenue generated by the department to subsist on their own, and most importantly, these institutions also graduate their student-athletes.

Balancing athletic programs and academic performance can be done effectively and can lead an institution to achieve success in both areas as is evidenced by half of the sample schools in this study.

Significance of the Study

To better understand how such athletic and academic balance is achieved, this study examined two dynamics of power—organizational structure and finance—at a set of Division I-A schools. This involved identifying where the influential positions in the athletic department are located in relation to the position of the president of the institution, and how institutional resources are allocated to, and generated by, the athletic department. By quantifying balance, and identifying those with the power to control it, this analysis created a clearer structure of college athletics, demonstrating whether and when the president has the power to be able to manage and reform college athletics in the best interest of higher education.

By thoroughly examining the components of colleges’ reporting processes, power distribution, financial allocations, and levels of compensation, in institutions that balance athletic and academic success, and then contrasting them to those institutions that cannot: this study provides a foundation for defining the conditions necessary for leaders who wish to achieve such balance.
While literature exists on both leadership and athletics in higher education, the knowledge base on how the two interact is extremely limited, as is comprehensive literature on the role of internal and external stakeholders. This study reveals the extent to which the president of an institution has the power to effect change, and how schools that manage to achieve a balance between athletic and academic success can set an example for those who cannot.

Research Questions

Four key research questions guided the design and execution of the study:

Research Question 1 - Organizational Structure - How is the reporting structure designed to create an appropriate balance between managing the prestige and publicity of athletics and to enforce the importance of academics?

The organizational chart of each institution was examined to determine the reporting structure of the athletic department. Due to the conflicting nature of the business of college athletics versus the pursuit of academic achievement, athletic departments at Division I-A schools have historically been afforded a great degree of autonomy as far as institutional policy is concerned. This has allowed them to report directly to the president, or an administrative designee of the president’s choice, without being subject to scrutiny from the rest of the campus. Nonetheless, at their own discretion, some schools have begun to have student-athletes fall under the jurisdiction of the provost’s office, or academic affairs. This change is a direct result of embarrassingly low graduation rates, and a trend toward making student-athletes more accountable for
their academic commitment to the classroom—in addition to their athletic commitments on the playing field: since schools are making significant financial investments in both areas. Most student-athletes in premier sports are on full or partial scholarships, are afforded special housing arrangements, receive their books as part of their scholarship, and are afforded benefits such as free athletic apparel and meal money. Each of these benefits has a significant price tag associated with it, and the school is incurring the costs for each student-athlete. The organizational reporting structure was examined to determine whether graduation rates are higher at schools that have athletics report through the academic affairs channel versus those who report directly to the president

The organizational reporting structure of the schools was obtained through their institutional websites.

Research Question 2 - Financial Information - What is the expense to revenue ratio of the athletic programs of schools participating in Division I-A athletics? More specifically, do their so-called “revenue-generating sports” actually make a profit? How does that effect the operation of the athletic department?

As leader of the institution, the president usually has the final say over the allocation of resources once the Trustees approve the budget. After tracing the reporting structure, it is important to see where finances are directed in order to determine how much institutional support athletic programs receive. That is to establish whether they are a financial burden or generate considerable revenue. The financial reports that institutions submit to the NCAA were evaluated to determine the amount of money these schools put into and receive from athletics. In order for schools to remain eligible for NCAA
competition, they must submit their financial information each year. Their commitment to athletics was examined as a percentage of their overall budget. This information was obtained from the Revenues and Expenses of Divisions I and II Intercollegiate Athletics Programs published by the NCAA. While this is the official publication for the financial reporting for NCAA schools, it must be noted that there is a great deal of controversy surrounding how schools report their numbers, and what they include in their totals. Therefore, auxiliary reports and/or articles were used to determine the ability to compare institutions.

Research Question 3 - Power – Who has the power to influence the significance of the role of athletics?

Numerous internal and external stakeholders will be examined to determine the extent of the influence they have on both the president of the individual institution and college athletics. As each situation is unique, specific stakeholders were identified at each institution. This information was elicited through the institution’s website, local and national on-line media coverage, NCAA reports, and through other media outlets as necessary. By thoroughly examining media coverage and institutional statements, a picture of who the decision makers are appeared. Information regarding structural changes, interaction with federal and local legislators, supportiveness of the faculty, coverage of recent scandals, and NCAA reports revealed the constituents vying for the most attention.
Research Question 4 - Presidentia’ Characteristics – What are the most evident traits of an effective leader who can maintain balance in a Division I-A institution?

In anticipation of identifying trends in and among institutions, each area was examined to see if there are identifying factors of presidential leadership leading to the balance and imbalance of college athletics and academic achievement in an environment of fiscal responsibility at the 10 institutions chosen. The president’s tenure, previous experience, and position on athletics were evaluated to ensure relevance to the situation, specifically in the fiscal year 2005. However, in each case it was also important to examine the school’s history to determine how the institution has evolved as far as athletics are concerned, and if the president’s role in regulating athletic culture, or the occurrence of athletic scandals or fiscal irresponsibility during their tenure, has resulted in their being reprimanded or terminated.

Limitations and Delimitations of the Study

The study examined data from the 2004-2005 academic year, unless otherwise noted. While every effort has been made to thoroughly explain the terminology used throughout the text, those who are not familiar with intercollegiate athletics may refer to Appendix A for a list of the definitions of key terms used in the study.

Due to the broad guidelines under which financial information is reported to the NCAA, the literature is sometimes subject to interpretation. This issue will be explored in more depth in the Financial Reporting section of this paper.

The sample consisted of the 117 schools that were members of Division I-A at the time the data was collected. As of the 2006-07 school year, Division I-A consists of 119
member institutions. Of the 117 members, three schools, the United States Naval, Military, and Air Force Academies, did not report separate student-athlete graduation rates as they do not grant athletic aid. Consequently, a difference could not be calculated and they were excluded from the sample, since there was no indicator of balance.

As there is a significant lack of academic literature covering intercollegiate athletics, popular media sources are frequently used. Because it is mutually beneficial for members of the media to have good working relationships with the institutions they cover, stories may tend to be biased either toward or against certain institutions. However, only data are used in the research, opinions and speculation are not. Wherever possible, more than one source has been consulted to confirm the data used.

Summary of Findings

The underlying factor in both managing athletics and achieving balance is finance. Organizational structure has an impact on student-athlete graduation rates, but the motivation of the athletic department is strictly financial, not academic. There are numerous stakeholders involved in college athletics aside from the student-athletes and athletic administration such as alumni, ticket holders, members of the local community, and those with political interest for example, but the group that receives the most attention is those who contribute the greatest amounts of money. The president has the greatest amount of power as is represented on the organizational chart, but the major donors and elite head coaches have an inordinate amount of influence on their decisions regarding athletics. This is a major issue because it shifts a great deal of power outside the main reporting structure of the institution, and this to people who are only loosely
associated with the school. Schools that balance athletics and academics have strong presidents who have a significant amount of tenure at the institution. They have also made a concerted effort to achieve and maintain balance. Schools that are unable to achieve balance usually have an autonomous reporting structure for athletics as well as placing greater emphasis on athletic success; and as a result, have been involved in athletic scandals and assessed numerous violations.

Organization of the Chapters

The research conducted through this study is reported in the next four chapters. Chapter Two delves into the existing research regarding the role of athletics, the impact of organizational structure, finance in intercollegiate athletics, leadership, and power, and specifically the role of the president, in American higher education and college sports. The third chapter discusses how the sample was obtained, the methodology of the study, and how the data were analyzed. Chapter Four presents the findings of the data collection. The findings for each variable are presented by school and compared in and among each institution. Along with suggestions for future research, conclusions and recommendations for both policy and practice are made in Chapter Five.
CHAPTER II
Review of Related Literature

Chapter two presents a review of the relevant literature divided into four major sections: explaining what college athletics consists of and the role college sports play in American society; the major stakeholders in college sports; how college athletics are integrated into higher education; and why institutions of higher education have such a vested interest in athletic programs. Gaining an understanding of these areas helps further define the characteristics of balanced institutions and their leadership, and the many challenges that affect being able to effectively attain and maintain balance between athletics and academics in order to achieve success in both areas.

Part one will examine how college athletics has evolved from an extracurricular activity to a parallel enterprise; it will also look at the role athletics play in American culture and higher education. Concerning college athletics, part two will look at the internal and external constituent groups, and those that are placed on the organizational chart, but have greater external interests. Part three will show how athletics has been integrated into an endeavor that started out with a solely academic mission. Part four will set forth the reasons why schools choose to sponsor sports programs, and why they invest such large amounts of money into them.

Part One – What is College Athletics?

Proponents of intercollegiate athletics, “believe that sports build character, provide essential training for success in the modern world, and develop the individual
values of teamwork, self-sacrifice, discipline, and achievement”, while opponents, “see college sports as a corrupting influence on academic life that distort good values, teach students and sports fans to cheat to win, and undermine the university’s core values of quality and integrity” (The Center, p. 3). In order to see how we arrived at this crossroad, it is important to look at how college athletics has evolved, and how it fits into both higher education and American culture.

In his book, The American College & University: A History, Frederick Rudolph (1990) explains that students are behind the effort to introduce opportunities for involvement outside the classroom into the higher education community, and over time, these activities, (the extra-curriculum), started to eclipse the importance of the academic curriculum in the eyes of the student body, therefore changing the direction of higher education (p. 137). One of the most pronounced and enduring components of extracurricular activity is athletics. The incorporation of athletic programs redefined the way constituent groups thought about their institution, how they identified with it, and created opportunities for involvement as either an athlete or a spectator. Lewis explains, “After students organized it, collegiate sport revolutionized campus life, turned institutions of higher education into athletic agencies, brought changes in the curriculum and influenced administrative policy” (1970, p. 222).

Just as a caste system exists in larger society, so exists a similar system in American college athletics. While schools are divided into NCAA Divisions, sports are generally divided into two sectors; revenue generating and non-revenue generating, the “haves” and the “have-nots.” Due to their ability to charge admission to their games, revenue-generating sports usually have the biggest budgets and the most visibility. The
major revenue-generating sports on most college campuses are men’s basketball and football. These two sports are commonly referred to as elite programs, or premier sports, as they garner the greatest amount of recognition through extensive media coverage.

Non-revenue generating sports, however, make up the majority of the athletic programs at most institutions. Most women’s sports, aside from basketball and individual sports such as tennis and golf, are considered non-revenue generating. Revenue generating sports usually have the best facilities, prime practice schedules, and easiest travel arrangements, i.e., chartered flights versus taking a bus or van.

While a large chasm exists between revenue generating and non-revenue generating sports, there is also a great divide between the high profile Division I schools, those that aspire to be elite, and those struggling to maintain their place in the division: which further increases competition on and off the field. As previously noted, the NCAA breaks down its members into different Divisions, I, II, and III. Division I offers the most scholarships, and the greatest opportunity for visibility since it is the most competitive. Division II offers partial scholarships, and an average level of competition. Division III does not offer scholarships, and most athletes play more than one sport as a recreational activity.

Division I is further segmented into three groups. Both Division I-A and I-AA schools have football teams; however, I-A has more elaborate programs with larger stadiums and the highest attendance levels. Division I-AA institutions do not have football, but are usually highly competitive in men’s basketball.

As evidenced by the fact that there are over 1,000 members in the NCAA, and the tremendous amount of media coverage they receive: athletics are a major part of
American higher education. In some institutions, the athletic culture has actually evolved into the larger institutional culture, which brings to light where institutional mission fits in with intercollegiate athletics and vice versa. Conversely, as a society, we are much more interested in athletic accomplishments than academic achievements.

*Role of athletics in American culture.* College athletics permeate today’s society. Advertisements are on billboards and in magazines, numerous games can be found on television at almost any point in time, branded merchandise hangs somewhere in almost every retail outlet, and billions of dollars are spent on tickets to games each year. Why are American institutions of higher education obsessed with athletics? Pascalella, a noted researcher in the area of the impact of college on students, explains, “The public’s image of an institution as well as its attractiveness to prospective students are often influenced by the performance of its athletic teams” (Howard-Hamilton & Sica, 2001, p. 35). Institutions capitalize on the attention brought to them by college athletics and they try to deliver a message about their academic programs when possible. In the meantime, they continue to benefit from the financial awards of national recognition for athletics.

Aside from every imaginable kind of apparel, stickers and ornaments are placed on cars, branded furniture and team flags adorn homes, and recently a company even started selling team-colored paint and logo packages as part of the $3 billion annual market for licensed collegiate merchandise. Schools continually change uniform colors, and release new logos to compete for their piece of the licensing market.

Institutions also capitalize on the fact that people want something to believe in and to be a part of the action. Why else would an alumnus donate $2 million to the University of Southern California just to make certain the mascot’s horse is well cared
The general audience can understand the allegories of sports, and relate to athletic competition more than they do academic endeavors. They comprehend the battle of good vs. evil much easier that quantum physics or existentialism. Fans pay hundreds and into the thousands of dollars to attend a few games a year, to wear their team’s licensed apparel, or to watch their favorite teams on satellite television, all just to be a part of the community.

Many Americans grow up with sports. Aside from being inundated with media coverage, mandatory physical education classes commence with a child’s early elementary educational endeavors. Unlike other countries, the United States does not have a formal set of training grounds for aspiring athletes. Therefore, children are funneled through the education system and allowed to participate on extracurricular sports teams at a young age. Those with professional aspirations, and extraordinary talent, move through the system to go and compete on the national stage of Division I-A athletics.

*Role of athletics in American higher education.* In his book, *Games Colleges Play: Scandal and Reform in Intercollegiate Athletics,* John Thelin explains that, historically, the process of determining the role of athletics has been almost as large as the legacy of the games colleges actually play (1996, p. i2). It is acknowledged that college athletics exist, and that they are a part of higher education, but exactly how the two fit together remains to be seen. Thelin also believes that it is an enduring issue as shown by the fact, “A theme for higher education in the twentieth century is that American colleges and universities have had difficulty achieving (and maintaining) a proper balance of academics and athletics” (1996, p. 11).
Just as the organizational structure, financial reporting, and dispersion of power is different at each institution, so is the role of athletics. Some institutions pride themselves on being “jock schools” and winning National Championships, while others see college athletics as a necessary evil. Most Division I-A schools walk a fine line between the two. While they embrace their athletic culture as a main source of revenue, most acknowledge the fact that there is a significant risk in doing so.

In November of 2003, The Center, a research enterprise focused on the competitive national context for major research universities located at the University of Florida, issued an Annual Report titled, *The Sports Imperative in America’s Research Universities*. This report, while focusing on research universities, examined the role of athletics in larger American society. The researchers at The Center concluded that the fact that American colleges and universities place a large emphasis on intercollegiate athletics is one of the primary things that set them apart from their counterparts elsewhere in the world. The report goes on to explain, “Athletics in America’s colleges has a long and enduring tradition that represents a fundamental construct within the activities of almost every type of higher-education institution, and sustains its vitality and significance in the face of substantial fiscal and managerial challenges” (The Center, 2003, p. 3).

While an institution sees an opportunity to strengthen its brand, reach new audiences, and capture media attention associated with successful athletic teams, they are investing considerable resources, and are risking their academic reputation and perceived institutional value in doing so. However, they believe the benefits far outweigh the detriments, due for instance, to the fact that, “No other university activity except sports
has a defined place within a special section of every daily newspaper in America” (The Center, 2003, p. 14).

**Athletics vs. academics.** College athletics present a challenge to the underlying mission of higher education, since they are relied on by being a part of the sponsoring institution; but, they have little to no impact on the academic success of an institution or its students. In their article, “How College Affects Student Athletes,” Howard-Hamilton and Sina (2001) quote Thelin (1994) noting, “College and university athletics have been referred to as ‘American higher education’s “peculiar institution”’. Their presence is pervasive, yet their proper balance with academics remains puzzling” (p. 41).

An internal competition between the mission of the institution and that of its athletic department tends to exist in those institutions with storied athletic programs as they strive to maintain their success on and off the field in an era of extremely limited resources. A basic example of this segregation is demonstrated by the physical separation of the offices of the athletic departments as they are usually housed in an arena or stadium on campus. Due to the large parking accommodations that accompany them, these facilities are usually located on the periphery of the campus. As a rule, athletic offices are frequently renovated, and well decorated to impress recruits and their families. Conversely, faculty and administrators frequently compete for space in academic buildings that tend to be a commodity, and are usually sparsely furnished.

This divide is further translated into the student body, separating student-athletes from the general population of undergraduates. Examples of the priority granted to student-athletes begins with the admissions process; for instance, “Because total enrollment at selective institutions is relatively constant, many of the places taken by
recruited athletes are places that would otherwise have been occupied by students with more focused intellectual aspirations” (Siegfried & Getz, 2002, p. 2). Admitting students based on their academic aspirations instead of their athletic ability could potentially increase the overall academic statistics of incoming classes, such as grade point averages and test scores. It could also positively influence institutions’ retention rate, since a number of athletes in the NCAA leave for professional teams after only one or two years at the school, others cannot manage to meet even minimal academic requirements.

However, in order to compete at the highest athletic level, it is a common theory that institutions are inclined to grant exceptions (that would not be extended to other students) to athletes who show the promise of helping their teams succeed. In their study, Shulman and Bowen (2001) found that athletes who are highly recruited end up on the carefully designed lists submitted by coaches of those who should have special consideration when their applications are reviewed. This affords the prospective athlete a very substantial statistical advantage in the admissions process, a much greater advantage than that enjoyed by other targeted groups, such as underrepresented minority students and children of staff members or alumni. (p. 259). For example, from 2004-2006 approximately 70 percent of scholarship athletes at the University of California, Los Angeles, were special admits as opposed to just three percent of the much larger general student population.6

Once they arrive on campus, athletes are usually guided into the same academic programs, which are usually instructed by faculty who support athletics; and they matriculate through the program together, away from the more serious students at the
institution. Athletes are assigned personal tutors and academic advisors, and are given frequent accommodations to miss class for travel or games.

While there are certain minimal academic requirements to be met, student-athletes in the major sports are recruited by coaches to campus for one reason, to win games. Due to their hectic schedule of practice, workouts, traveling, team meetings, game preparations, and the actual competitions themselves: most athletes in the elite sports think that classes just get in the way.

Aside from the added benefits they receive, and the special treatment from faculty and administrators: football and basketball players are also revered by their peers, fellow students who spend money to cheer them on during games. Obtaining this stature and visibility is a perk of attending an institution, getting to be a superstar on campus is something special. However, when they exhaust their eligibility and/or graduate, the overwhelming majority of student-athletes do not go on to professional careers, they end up just like the rest of the undergraduates, forced to grow up and get a job.

The other cost of college athletics. Arizona State, Georgia Tech, Mississippi State; University of Memphis, University of Georgia, University of Illinois, University of Washington: What do each of these major Division I-A universities have in common? Not only did each of them participate in a post-season championship in men’s basketball or football during the 2004-2005 season, they each have had major infraction cases before the NCAA during the same time period. Ineligible participation, impermissible tutoring assistance, extra benefits, unethical conduct, and lack of institutional control are just a few examples from a few of the above mentioned cases.
Aside from the financial costs, because of the notoriety and financial windfall that college athletics attract, there is a significant price to pay regarding image and perception. Due to a rash of NCAA violations that have resulted in suspensions, fines, and even some cases, death: college athletic scandals have been a topic of extensive media coverage over the past few years. Coaches, players, administrators, and even presidents are feeling the increased necessity to win, and are extending the lengths colleges and universities will go to do it.

Suicide, cheating, and violent acts are more common as the stakes are raised and the pressure increases. Athletic success has been said to have a positive impact on enrollment applications and donations to the institution, and has created a need to “win by any means” mentality in a number of elite programs. As recent history has shown, college coaches seem to be of the mindset to act now, and ask permission later, often leaving their reputation and that of the university and its leadership severely wounded. Due to their role in institutional perception and financial promise, athletics are usually seen as “a necessary evil,” but just how far institutions are willing to go to compromise their academic stature falls to their leaders to regulate. According to Doug Lederman’s article, The NCAA Dishonor Roll, “In total, 48 of the 326 Division I colleges, or about one in seven, were punished for rules violations” between 2000 and 2004 (2005, p. 1). Schools must ask themselves, which is more important, a win-loss record, or the ability to graduate students and student-athletes who can successfully participate in society?

Previous attempts at intercollegiate athletic reform. “Periodic attempts at meaningful athletics reform are almost a part of higher education’s history as the classroom lecture” (Gertody, 2001, p. 1.). While we are currently barraged with stories of
scandals about student-athletes and coaches impropriety, this is nothing new. Since its inception, college athletics has been subjected to a series of attempts at reform. Major issues with intercollegiate athletics officially date back to 1905 when President Theodore Roosevelt summoned leaders of college athletics to two White House conferences to encourage reform in college football.

College athletics encompass a little bit of everything, the good, the bad and the ugly. Sporting events provide entertainment, give people a reason to celebrate, and in some cases encourage fans to financially support the sponsoring institution. College sports also lead to cost overruns, budget issues, and unbelievably low graduation rates. The ugly side of college athletics is even worse; fraud, scandal, cheating, and violence are just a few of the well-publicized outcomes. The fact is, college athletics is a part of American society, and it is not going to just go away as is proven by the fact that as bad as it gets, teams continue to sell t-shirts and tickets. By further examining who is involved, how athletes fit into the organization, and why schools invest such a significant proportion of their resources in them will help determine the best plan of action to help ease the burden, and mitigate the problems.

Part Two – Who are the major constituent groups involved in college athletics?

Most Americans are familiar with college athletics in one way or another. Some are fanatical about cheering on their team, while some merely tolerate the fact that institutions of higher education have sports teams, and some just know that they exist. Those who have an interest in college sports seem to far outnumber those who do not as evidenced by the fact that the information is accessible almost anywhere. There are now
entire television channels dedicated to college sports, and you can find a game on at almost any time of the day or night. By just picking up a local newspaper, you can catch up on regional and national scores. The results of games are announced on local and national radio because people want to know. Games are broadcast on the Internet for people who want to see games that may not be on television or are outside of their media market. This section will look at those with a vested interest in college athletics to determine who has the power and influence to affect change or reform in college athletics.

**Key Internal Stakeholders**

*Student-Athletes.* Students are the central stakeholders in any institution; without students to serve, the institution would cease to exist. In comparison, student-athletes are the central part of the universe of intercollegiate athletics. Because of their intense practice, travel, and competition schedules, athletes are usually afforded a number of “perks” or exceptions not granted to the general student population, which sets them apart both hierarchically and even physically, even though they are technically still part of the general student body. While the administration encourages student-athletes to be involved in the larger campus culture, their hectic schedules and celebrity status on campus limit them from doing so. Steve Bahls, President of Augustana College (a Division II school), explains that the difference in college experience for Division I-A student-athletes is like a “parallel campus universe for athletes that rarely, briefly and then only by necessity, intersects with the world of their student peers” (August 8, 2006, p. 1). The media frequently cites examples of this great divide to show the elevated role
athletes are accustomed to on campus. A few instances of how athletes receive preferential treatment follows. Once they are enrolled, student-athletes usually have the greatest flexibility as far as academics are concerned. Most schools have academic advisors in the athletic department specifically assigned to student-athletes by their teams. These advisors are responsible for working with the faculty to arrange for schedule changes as necessary and to monitor the student-athlete’s progress and performance so they can retain their academic eligibility. Student-athletes are often given preferred housing as well to make sure that they can get to classes and practices on time. In addition, they are usually assigned to coveted on-campus accommodations due to their schedules and the ability to keep teams together for games over holiday breaks. Due to their intense training and competition schedules, they often eat in different locations and at different times from their general student body counterparts. They are also privileged to a much more diverse and elaborate menu, which is set by their nutritionists or strength coaches. Additional benefits for student-athletes include being provided numerous sets of apparel and sneakers: meal money is given to players on game days for any contests that would cause the students to miss a regularly scheduled meal on campus. A consequence of the added support and benefits that most athletes receive because of their athletic ability, is that a rift is created between the athletes and the students at large. When athletes are treated to such luxurious, they tend to believe they are entitled, and take on an elitist air.

In their study of how attending college effects students, researchers found irony in the fact that, “According to the NCAA, institutions are to provide an environment in which the athlete and the athletic program play an essential role in the student body”
(Howard-Hamilton & Sina, 2001, p. 41). At first glance the previous statement gives the impression of aligning itself to the mission of both the university and the athletic department. Intercollegiate athletics create a number of opportunities for students to be involved, while the institution is looking to encourage students to participate in activities that further their personal development. However, it is not that simple. Since there are an extremely limited number of positions on the teams to offer to the general student population, most students are relegated to the role of fan. Even though most fans revere the players on their teams, there is a significant divide between the athletes on campus and the general student body: especially between the athletic community and those who do not follow sports. As noted by Sigfried & Getz (2002), “The isolation of athletes from other students is pervasive and growing” (p. 2). An increasing number of student-athletes look at college as a “pit stop” on their way to the professional ranks, spending only a year or two on campus. These players tend not to make an effort to be involved in the college community as their focus is on getting to the professional leagues, not on attaining a degree. The small, but growing sector of these student-athletes also furthers the rift between students and student-athletes. Once again, the issue of where athletics fit in with institutional mission is raised; is the focus on the student, or the athlete, and who makes the decision?

*The president of the institution.* The role of the president of an institution of higher education has changed over the years. In her article regarding the history of the role of the president in higher education, Gray explains, “The president’s responsibility has its source in the nature of the institution’s mission, always imperfectly realized and always vulnerable to controversy and radical misunderstanding” (1999, p. 107).
As the American system of higher education has evolved, so has its organizational hierarchy. During the formative years of American higher education, the majority of the institutional power was housed in the office of the president. So much so that, “The office of the president emerged as the central force that has given United States higher education a distinctive character among systems of higher education in the world” (Duryea, 1973, p. 7). However, in his article, “Evolution of University Organization,” E.D. Duryea explains that by the year 1906 the managerial burden of the president’s position began to necessitate what has become an administrative bureaucracy. Numerous committees, councils, and administrative positions were created to deal with issues for which the president alone was historically responsible.

Nonetheless, intercollegiate sports are usually a priority of the president’s attention because of the onus to protect such an important asset. Most presidents, while they may not like it, accept the fact that high-profile sports programs may attract students, generate revenue, and even keep the alumni happy. However, in light of the last decade of increasing athletic scandals, there does seem to be a stronger resistance to athletic autonomy and a greater call for reform in collegiate athletics.

W. R. Cowley found through his research that presidential leadership was a key component of an institution’s climb to eminence. He explained, “Our American social system, as well as its political system, thrives or falters depending on the quality of its leadership. Colleges and universities, focal institutions in the life of a nation, need especially strong leaders” (Keller, 2001, p. 315). The characteristics of presidents have started to change in recent years. Whereas the majority of previous presidents moved up the ranks from the faculty, through the administration, and into the president’s office with
solely academic experience, institutions are now starting to hire candidates from the corporate world. Bringing a business background to an academic world can be challenging, but it can also help focus institutions to be more fiscally responsible by targeting their advertising dollars more efficiently, defining their markets or prospective students better, and encouraging increased fiscal accountability.

In his article, “The Dilemma of Presidential Leadership,” Birnbaum noted, “Changing demographic trends, fiscal constraints, and unrealistic public expectations now make it virtually impossible for most presidents to provide the leadership that is expected” (1999, p. 323). Birnbaum further explained that as the lines of their responsibility were blurred as they were forced to delegate tasks to others, they are now experiencing role ambiguity, as they respond both to their own personal interpretations of their roles, and to the legitimate demands of many groups. Because of the number of people involved, Birnbaum concludes, “Their success or failure may be due more to the vagaries of luck and history than to their own dedication and skill” (Birnbaum, 1999, p. 333).

Nonetheless, they are being more than fairly compensated for their efforts. A recent survey in The Chronicle for Higher Education found that the number of presidents of public institutions earning at least $500,000 annually nearly doubled since the prior year’s survey. Due to the corporate influence of those on the board of trustees, the practice of ratcheting up president’s salaries to attract and keep star candidates has gained approval in the market.

While some people are taking control away from the president, others are giving them more. On August 1, 1997, the NCAA implemented a change in its governance
structure that provided greater autonomy for each division and more control to the presidents of member colleges and universities. Under the new governance structure, school and conference athletic department administrators play a primary role in the maintenance of college sports, and in most instances, for developing legislation that the presidents then consider for each division of the Association. This gives more power to the NCAA’s membership and helps presidents become more involved in the process of creating and implementing new initiatives, while at the same time, makes them more accountable for their success.

In regard to college athletics, Murray Sperber, in his book, *Beer and Circus: How Big-Time College Sports is Crippling Undergraduate Education*, explains, “When a president deals with college sports, three things can happen, and two of them are bad.” Sperber continues, “The only good outcome is if the president’s university has a winning team in a high-profile sport; then the CEO can ride the wave of victory and good feeling.” Sperber explains that negative outcomes occur much more frequently, and are usually derived from issues such as confrontations with coaches or players (i.e., over recruiting or contract issues with a revered coach, or eligibility issues with star players). The other negative result deals with scandal itself, the larger sanctions and bad press that come out of an incident in which a player or coach commits an infraction, or even worse, a crime (p. 25).

While the aforementioned reform efforts have generated a good bit of publicity for the NCAA, they have not been widely accepted as influential change. However, in January of 2005, NCAA President Dr. Myles Brand once again noted in his State of the Association Address, “Athletics must be fully integrated into the educational mission of
its home university or college” (Brand, 2005, p. 1). The president must ensure that the practices of the institution in regard to athletics constantly align with the greater mission. In order for changes to be made, and constituent groups to buy into reform efforts, the president must lead a collaborative effort, while maintaining the ability to be decisive and move forward.

The faculty. At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, the faculty started to play a substantial role in the administration and direction of an institution. Their voices became louder, and their opinions stronger. Keller explains, “American professors began to emulate their European counterparts and assert themselves as partners with the trustees, presidents and deans in governing their institutions and deciding on priorities for the future” (2001, p. 308).

However, as their personal perceived stature started to evolve, the relationship of faculty to their institution also changed. Sociologist Burton Clark explained that faculty began to separate into two factions: local and cosmopolitan. “Local” professors tended to identify with their institution, were active on institutional and faculty committees, and were well integrated into the community. “Cosmopolitan” faculty members tended to identify more with their subject and colleagues at other institutions than those at their current place of employment (Sperber, 2000, p. 76). Keller explains, “Most American professors continue to see themselves as independent semi-professionals, free to lecture or consult off campus, conduct research instead of teach, and own a business on the side” (Keller, 2001, p. 312).

The disconnection between faculty members and their institutions can be either a benefit or detriment when it comes to athletics. Faculty members seem to fall on one side
or the other, fans of student-athletes, or opponents. Because student-athletes must retain their academic eligibility in order to play their sport, faculty are often put in difficult situations to help an athlete pass a test, assignment, or course. Student-athletes, with the assistance of their academic advisors, usually know which teachers to take, and how their athletic status will be regarded. Faculty members who appreciate athletics usually help the student-athlete get successfully through the class, while those who do not feel any affinity for the sponsoring institution could care less.

There are a few organized groups of faculty members, such as the Drake Group, who are staunch opponents of college sports and continuously demand reform. However, their efforts have not been rewarded since changes have not been made to date. The role of the Drake Group in particular will be further examined in the section on key external stakeholders.

A related issue is that of faculty compensation. When opponents of college sports look to make a case about the excess spending in athletics, they frequently turn to faculty compensation. According to an article in The Chronicle of Higher Education, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) released a report stating that the average faculty salary increased 3.1 percent while inflation rose 3.5 percent in 2005-06. The average salary for all professors was approximately $70,000, led by average salaries of approximately $100,000 at doctoral research universities and just over $130,000 at private doctoral institutions. On a financial scale, the contrast between athletics and academics is evident. At Duke, on the high end of the faculty compensation spectrum, a full professor makes $136,400 while the basketball coach is compensated approximately $1.5 million through salary and incentives. At Auburn, the low end of the faculty
compensation scale, full professors’ average salaries are $95,400, while the football coach is making $2,231,000.

*Key External Stakeholders*

Aside from the many internal stakeholders, intercollegiate athletics are subject to scrutiny from a number of external forces. Figure 1 shows a representation of the groups that a president is subject to being pressured by.
Figure 1. External Constituent Groups that Influence the President of an Institution
The Board of Trustees. While Boards are associated with specific institutions, they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the school as such since they are the ruling body that oversees the operation. They do not generally receive compensation from an institution and are therefore treated as external forces.

The Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB) released a report in September of 2006 titled, *The Leadership Imperative: The Report of the AGB Task Force on the State of the Presidency in American Higher Education*. This report reached a number of interesting conclusions. Among them, was that new presidents reported feeling abandoned by their boards once in office; or conversely, that the board was leading their hand, and interfering in operational or management issues. Presidents believed that such pressures undermined their ability to lead. The report urged board members to act as advocates for both the president and the institution, to help deal with controversial issues, and to keep the institution's needs above their personal, professional, or political aspirations.

It also must be noted that most board members bring a corporate perspective to an academic setting, which changes the culture of the interaction. Board members from the corporate world are looking for accountability, efficiency, and results, which are usually harder to evaluate in a historically academic setting and may be affronting to a president with a purely academic background.

It is also essential for a president to understand where the board stands in regard to athletics in order to be an effective leader. A successful president can use this to their advantage in negotiating with the board and the athletic administration. Because of the fact that the Board approves the institutional budget, they have the greatest amount of
power over the operation of the school. Defining the priority of athletics by the amount of institutional support they are awarded sets the example for the president to follow.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The NCAA membership is made up of the most elite American institutions, the schools that television networks will spend billions of dollars to televise. Therefore, most colleges and universities aspire to join in order to receive both the increased visibility and their share of the financial distribution from television and marketing contracts. However, there are a number of requirements that need to be met, including such things as facility standards and Title IX compliance (equal opportunity based on gender). Standards such as attendance goals and participation requirements for the number of student-athletes on each team are set high; therefore, institutions must strive to meet and maintain expectations in the area of athletics, in some cases sacrificing resources that would usually go to the general student population.

The NCAA is the largest and most powerful governing body of Intercollegiate Athletics and is the home for all of the top schools in the country. While there are a few other minor associations, the NCAA by far has the greatest name recognition and financial resources. According to their website, two examples of the main mission of the NCAA are: to propose legislation to deal with athletics problems at the suggestion of their member institutions and to represent intercollegiate athletics in legislative and regulatory matters on the state and Federal levels (i.e., tax status, anti-bribery and gambling laws, television rights, or financial aid issues); and to promote sports and championship events from their national office in conjunction with each member institution’s efforts. More importantly, the NCAA technically owns all the property
right associated with any nationally broadcast game and all of the Championship games, including the logos, the ability to sell advertising space in printed programs and on television, and collect revenue from Championship ticket sales. Therefore, they also have the ability to sell sponsorship packages independently from a school or conference.

While they are technically a non-profit entity and give the majority of the proceeds back to their institutions, the NCAA certainly has its critics. Faculty, former student-athletes, and the media are the largest opponents of the Association and have historically taken the NCAA to task for not addressing difficult situations or levying strict enough punishments in certain cases.

When sanctions are handed down from the NCAA, punishments can range from losing recruiting rights to having the number of scholarships a school can offer cut, to forfeiting championship games, each of which result in lost revenues. For example, reducing the number of athletic scholarships can encourage star players to attend other institutions where a scholarship is guaranteed, which in turn weakens the competitive strength of the sport. Losing the right to compete in post-season bowl games or tournament games means a major loss of revenue. Because of receiving the sanctions, schools are often encouraged to fire an offending coach, which then produces a lag in program development and recruitment. This is usually accompanied by a buyout of their contract, which is an enormous added expense.

The staff of the NCAA’s enforcement team has grown over the past few years, but the new total number of enforcement agents, (5), and those who audit institutions and investigate allegations of impropriety (19), only bring the grand total to a staff of 25 for the 1,027 active members of the NCAA. According to The National Collegiate Athletic
Association Revised Budget for Fiscal Year Ended August 31, 2007, the percentage of total operating expenses dedicated to enforcement was a mere 0.90 percent of their budget. It is interesting to note that while they preach the opposite, when it comes to investing resources, even the NCAA emphasizes revenue generation over academic enforcement. The entire area of membership programs and services, where enforcement falls, receives just 12 percent of the total budget. Enforcement is combined with ambiguous areas such as Membership Education and Outreach, budgeted over $7.5 million, Membership Service and Governance budgeted at $19 million, and Branding and Communications at over $12 million. Each of these areas, which are difficult to attribute a tangible meaning to, far outpaces the investment in enforcement services, which is just a bit over $5 million.

Government/Special Interest Groups. The Federal and State Governments also have an interest in athletics since they are providing a substantial portion of the financial aid to most institutions of higher education, and want to make sure these funds are used appropriately. Senator John McCain, along with many various subcommittees, have introduced a number of bills to reform college sports in the interest of regulating gambling on intercollegiate athletics, reforming recruiting practices, steroid use, and amateur status of student-athletes, to name a few. However, little if any legislation has been passed, most of it is referred to the NCAA.

There are a number of special interest groups concerned with athletics in higher education; however, two have had a sustained presence and garnered significant media attention in the challenge to reform college athletics, The Drake Group and The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics.
The Drake Group – Faculty Coalition. The Drake Group is one of the largest and most organized opponents of intercollegiate athletic excess, and is comprised of faculty members from across the country. According to their web site, "The mission of The Drake Group (TDG) is to help faculty and staff defend academic integrity in the face of the burgeoning college sport industry.\(^\text{10}\) The website for the Drake Group lobbies for proposals to reform the current state of athletics to ensure quality education for college athletes, supports faculty whose job security is threatened for defending academic standards, and disseminates information on current issues and controversies in sport and higher education in hopes that athletic departments at elite schools will cease to set the agenda for the institution at large. Dr. Frank G. Splitt, a member of the Drake Group, explains, "The Drake Group works on the premise that college sports aren’t themselves evil, but rather, it’s the related academic corruption that should be exposed and eliminated" (Lederman, 2005, May 24, p. 3).

One of the proposals from the Drake Group has gone straight to Congress. The Drake Group has been working on a congressional initiative on disclosure and to have Congress enforce a quid pro quo, "Making the continuation of the NCAA’s non-profit status contingent upon the implementation of specific reform measures that would assure that college athletes are really legitimate, degree-seeking students" (Lederman, 2005, May 24, p. 4). The NCAA counters the Drake Group by calling them radicals, and dismissing them and their proposals. However, the Drake Group is successful at attracting the attention of those in the popular media who want to gauge the faculty perspective. However, as previously noted, at the NCAA, their opinion has not been one granted significant consideration.
The Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics – Prominent Watchdog

Group. There are a few other organizations that are proponents of athletic reform, such as the loosely organized Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletics, and the National Institute for Sports Reform; however, the Knight Commission is the only one that has viable financing and the attention of the NCAA.

One of the actions taken in response to scandals and major issues in college athletics has been the appointment of a committee assigned to monitor and evaluate college athletics in the United States. According to their website, John S. and James L. Knight formed The Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics in October of 1989 in response to more than a decade of highly visible scandals in college sports. The goal of the Commission was to recommend a reform agenda that emphasized academic values in an arena where commercialization of college sports often overshadowed the underlying goals of higher education.11

Since their initial report, the Knight Commission has issued a series of calls for reform and has evolved into a watchdog for college athletics. In their most recent report, A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports and Higher Education, published in 2001 on the 10 year anniversary of their first report, The Knight Commission states that the problems of big-time sports have grown rather than diminished, “Academic transgressions, a financial arms race, and commercialization — all are evidence of the widening chasm between higher education's ideals and big-time college sports” (p. 14).

Knight Commission reports are widely referenced in the media, and they have begun to work with the NCAA on a consistent basis, granting them a certain degree of authority on matters pertaining to NCAA athletics. They have approached the principal
issues less emotionally than The Drake Group, which could be a major reason that they have had the opportunity to advance their agenda, and have their opinions and recommendations heard.

*Other constituent groups.* Alumni, parents, current students, and local community members each have different opinions, and create opportunities to express them, especially when they disagree with what is happening in an athletic program. As each of these groups is important for a number of reasons, a president must address their concerns and communicate with them both as a group, and individually to influence their perception. The financial participation of alumni is a large part of the fundraising program at most institutions, and also has an effect on institutional rankings, such as the highly regarded *US News and World Report*’s annual ranking of the best colleges and universities in the United States. Current students and their parents and prospective students and their parents can affect an institution by choosing to pay tuition elsewhere. Members of the local community can protest expansion efforts, and make it difficult for an institution to peacefully co-exist in the area. Each of these groups is also eager to provide comments when the media is looking for information that the institution is hesitant to provide.

*Friends of athletics – corporate sponsors and boosters.* This group is one of the hardest to regulate, yet they yield a great deal of power due to their ability to channel revenue, legally or illegally, into athletic programs. Identifying these people can be difficult because, in certain situations, both the coaches and the donors involved wish to remain anonymous so they do not draw attention to the program or possible acts of indiscretion.
Corporate sponsors usually have legitimate contracts that delineate exactly what they give to, and get from an athletic program; however, accommodations that may not be expressed in writing are also frequently made, such as a car dealer providing transportation for a player, or a local restaurant letting the star quarterback eat for free.

Boosters on the other hand, tend to make their own rules. Often called, “friends of the program,” they provide incentives to recruits to encourage them to attend a particular institution, they set-up employment opportunities for student-athletes to get paid for little or no work, they make airline tickets magically appear if a student-athlete needs to get home, and all of this usually occurs without the benefits or finances being traced back to the school. However, the term “booster” tends to be used interchangeably as some schools have recognized booster clubs that are regulated by the NCAA, and serve as more of a spirit squad or fan club.

*Internal by Position, External by Nature*

There are a few positions in American higher education that fall on the institution’s organizational chart, but have minimal interaction with their fellow colleagues. These positions are usually found in the revenue generating areas such as research and athletics. Those who fill these positions are usually protected by the president and board of trustees, and are left alone as long as their performance is strong and they are achieving their objectives of obtaining grants, or winning games.

Three key positions that play a role in the athletic success of a Division I-A institution are the athletic director, the head football coach, and the head basketball coach. Athletic directors usually work very closely with the president due to the
visibility, financial investment, and marketing power of college sports. Head coaches tend to have the most autonomy on campus, and the added benefit of also being protected by their athletic director. The majority of time spent by those in these three positions is usually dealing with people outside of their sponsoring institution. Figure 2 represents a diagram of the usual structure of an organizational chart in higher education.
Figure 2. Example of an Organizational Chart in American Higher Education
Athletic Directors. While athletic directors seem to have a great deal of visibility and control, in essence they are contract negotiators and administrators. They handle the issues the coaches cannot, and they mediate the issues coaches do not want to deal with. While they are remunerated handsomely, their salaries pale in comparison to elite head coaches, even though they often work extremely long hours and attend most events.

According to The Chronicle of Higher Education’s Median Salaries of College Administrators by Job Category and Type of Institution for 2005-06, the average salary for an athletic director is $86,350. This figure includes the salaries of the high end of the spectrum, doctoral institutions paying an average of $167,200, and the low end of the spectrum, two-year colleges paying an average of $62,444.12

Football coaches. Head Football coaches are on the top of the athletic hierarchy at most Division I-A institutions. They command the highest salaries even though they only play approximately 12 games a year. In November of 2006, USA Today released a report on the current statistics of the income of head coaches in Division I-A. The report found that coaches at top-level institutions earn an average of $950,000 (without incentives or additional perks), 42 coaches make $1 million or more, (up from just five in 1999), and nine have eclipsed the $2 million mark. Aside from a base salary, coaches have numerous financial incentives to win games and championships, and a number of amenities such as cars, homes, country club memberships, tickets to games, and expense budgets, at their fingertips. Media and apparel contracts and sports camp revenue also supplement their income. Speaking engagements are another source of income, but have to be approved by the institution. It must be noted that only approximately 25 percent of a coaches pay is derived from the salary provided by the institution. “Outside sources” such as book deals,
exclusive apparel and shoe contracts which require a coach only wear a certain brand name on the sidelines, personal media contracts to appear on television or radio shows, or revenue generated by sports camps make up the rest.

*Men’s basketball coaches.* Head men’s basketball coaches are extremely well compensated, but usually fall short of the compensation of the football coaches. There are approximately 12 head basketball coaches in Division I-A earning a salary of $1 million or more. They are offered similar incentives and amenities as those the football coaches receive.

Aside from the financial accommodations, football and men’s basketball coaches usually have access to the best fitness facilities, numerous staff members and assistant coaches, and premier office space, which affords them a better opportunity to attract prize recruits.

All three positions are placed somewhere on the organizational chart, but contact with the rest of the administration and faculty is extremely limited. These three positions, through the efforts of their assistant coaches and administrators, deal almost exclusively with those outside of the university. Athletic Directors are usually responsible for monitoring fundraising efforts, networking with other schools to set up competition contracts, and negotiating sponsorship and contract agreements, most of which take place with people outside of their institution. Sponsorship commitments and recruiting obligations take up the majority of the time a coach is not concentrating on his team, or the next game.

While there are numerous stakeholders involved in higher education, those who achieve the most results are those with a financial investment in a program. Faculty, staff,
students, and alumni are offered an opportunity by the media to express their opinion, but
do not seem to have any real impact on policy or procedure unless they are also major
donors to a specific institution to affect change at that school. Government officials and
interest groups continue to debate the pros and cons of college sports; but at the end of
the day, the NCAA is the only one enacting any legislation at all.

Elite coaches and major donors are those with the loudest voices. In most cases,
their demands are met swiftly and effectively. Through their intimate relationship with
the president, coupled with the fact that they usually donate large amounts of money, the
members of the board of trustees also have significant influence. In the end, and with the
media watching, the president makes the decisions, but there is usually someone from the
athletic department or board of trustees leading their hand.

Part Three – How has Athletics been Integrated into American Higher Education?

What started out as an informal competition is now the lifeblood of many
institutions of higher education. Since we have seen how college athletics has evolved,
and who has a vested interest, it is important to see how athletics have been integrated
into higher education, and to what level they are incorporated into the larger
administration, or if they are running parallel as an autonomous enterprise.

Organizational Structure of American Higher Education.

Organizational structure in American Higher Education is extremely complex,
and while the basic outline is similar at most institutions, a blueprint does not exist. At
the institutional level, the college or university president (sometimes called the
chancellor), usually holds the highest rank. Numerous vice presidents report to the
president, and they make up the rest of the executive administration. Vice presidents are
usually responsible for areas such as academics, (usually called the provost), admissions,
student affairs, external affairs, and finance.

Students, the major university audience, are usually managed by a number of
intermediaries such as teachers, advisors, or mentors, and only report through the
academic structure. If these students also happen to be athletes, they are segmented out,
and then they are usually under the jurisdiction of the Athletic Department, and in turn
protected by the president. This is where one of the major differences in how institutions
handle their reporting structure lies. Schools that seem to balance academic and athletic
performance have their student-athletes report through the academic structure, while
those focused on athletics supervise their student-athletes through the Athletic
Department administration, independent of the academic structure. Figure 3 simplifies
this internal reporting structure.

However, as represented by the dotted line, due to the atrocius graduation rates
of athletes in the elite sports, and the increased frequency of academic fraud, the
leadership at some institutions is starting to force their student-athletes to report through
the same channels as the general undergraduate population in hopes of alleviating these
issues.
Figure 3. Example of Internal Reporting Structure through Academic Channels
Since its inception as a simple game between two institutions, American intercollegiate athletics has evolved into a billion dollar industry. Ticket sales, seat licenses, sponsorship contracts, apparel and merchandise sales, concessions revenue, fundraising efforts, postseason appearances, and media contracts all drive revenue into an institution, but schools are spending the money as fast, or faster than they make it.

According to a statement released by Myles Brand, president of the NCAA, budgets for intercollegiate athletics are growing three to four times as fast as institutional budgets, and they have been for the last decade. Eighty schools of the 117 in Division I-A spent an average of 12 percent more on their basketball programs in 2004-05 than the year before, mostly due to the skyrocketing costs of coaches’ salaries. According to a report released by the NCAA, spending on Division I-A football programs increased 14 percent between 2001 and 2003. The underlying issue is that the majority of athletic programs are not self-sufficient, and they receive substantial support from their sponsoring institutions, a fact that is not always apparent on their financial statements. According to an article in USA Today, somewhere between 80 percent and 95 percent of Division I-A athletic departments rely on support from the institution’s general fund or activity fees assessed to students to balance their budget.

The NCAA News reports, “By the latest reckoning, higher education is bringing in about $4 billion annually in revenue from its athletics programs” (“The Funding Dilemma,” 2002, September 16, p. 1). For example, CBS Television alone signed an 11-year, $6 billion dollar television contract in 1999 to televise NCAA regular season and tournament basketball games (Rozin & Ziegel, 2003, p. 2). With the introduction of
satellite television, college athletics now permeate the landscape and can be viewed almost anywhere, at any time. The 2004 NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament alone generated $389 million from television rights, and an additional $35 million from ticket sales and sponsorships.\(^{15}\)

It was expected that programs would be spending the exact same amount as they were generating; but in reality, due to the issues of the lack of transparency in the financial accounting process, they are probably spending more. Recent studies show that even though schools are now spending millions of dollars to field competitive teams and accommodate fans, “The new data further confirms earlier findings that increased operating expenditures for football or basketball do not produce increases in winning, operating net revenue, academic quality or alumni giving.”\(^{16}\)

According to a press release on their website, on October 27, 2004, the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate athletics met to discuss this topic and concluded:

> The evidence and the conclusions are inescapable. Runaway costs do not equate with winning or more revenue for general university purposes. While researchers continue to try to account for the true costs of athletics, presidents and trustees must continue to focus on this issue of runaway spending with little or no return.\(^{17}\)

It was this revelation that led Myles Brand to commission a task force of mostly 50 college presidents to study the landscape of finance in intercollegiate athletics. In response to an NCAA Convention in January 2005, where Brand heard that numerous veteran leaders of higher education felt that the current trends in athletics were not sustainable, or socially desirable, Brand set forth a charge for the Fiscal Responsibility Subcommittee to take a serious look at the finances of athletics. Their findings were expected: that there was no common set of variables or reporting structures, and that the lack of solid data was an impediment. Due to the fact that institutions are fierce
competition both on the field and off the field, when it comes to recruits or coaching candidates, institutions are more than hesitant to reveal what they are spending.

The financial accounting aspect of collegiate athletics is one of much discussion. While governed by the NCAA, institutions themselves determine where to house and how to handle athletic departments. For example, some institutions keep fundraising for athletics under the university umbrella, while others house them separately as their own affiliated entity. Some institutions report security costs for games and competitions as athletic expenditures, while others assume it is for the greater good of the university and do not report their expenses. Other institutions tend to blur the lines as to who is responsible for certain services such as facility maintenance, administrative support, and computers and electronics, which then affect the institutional operating budget instead of the athletic budget. Gifts-in-kind made to the athletic department can also be accounted for differently, as can financial aid awarded to current or prospective student-athletes, again improving the appearance of the athletic department’s budget.

The Presidential Task Force unequivocally determined that there needs to be a better system of financial reporting by Division I-A schools as this has been a topic of debate for many years. The reporting of expenses has been up to individual interpretation by the institution, so it is very unlikely that there is a solid foundation to determine exactly what schools are spending.

After looking at the organizational structure to see where—in theory—the power lies, it is also imperative to look at how the money is divided—in practice—to trace the financial resources awarded to determine if the athletic department is granted fiscal autonomy as well. It is also important to determine how much revenue the athletic
departments generate, and what portion, if any, goes into the general operating budget for the institution. It must be examined how and if shortfalls are being made up, and especially at whose expense. Are programs, scholarships, or institutional resources being sacrificed for the greater good of the sport teams, and who is making the decision?

Part Four - Why do Colleges Participate in Intercollegiate Athletics?

Competition is tough for institutions of higher education as the number of schools and educational programs continues to increase while the government funding and financial aid available to students decreases. Colleges and universities are always seeking ways to stay competitive and relevant in a saturated market. Pascarella, Truckenmiller, et al. (1999) explain, “There can be little doubt that intercollegiate athletics is one of the significant filters through which the public looks at postsecondary education” (p. 1). Institutions believe that if they can capture attention through athletics, they can parlay that into an opportunity to present their product.

Return on Investment.

An old saying states you have to spend money to make money, which is the mantra of most athletic directors. Major programs hedge their bets on the “intangible” aspects of the notoriety of college sports. Coaches and administrators acknowledge you can quantify ticket sales and marketing revenue, but they also frequently cite the results of their efforts that are harder to measure such as the value of media coverage, the impact on admission applications, and increases in fundraising. Nonetheless, studies have shown that there is no significant link between spending and winning percentages. According to
a study from 2005, which was conducted by consultants Jonathan and Peter Orszag of
Competition Policy Associates, for every dollar spent on men’s basketball or football,
colleges earned exactly one dollar. They also found that there is no statistical evidence
that increased spending positively affects winning percentage, and little to no evidence
that higher winning percentages positively influence alumni giving and fundraising
efforts. 18

Fundraising.

While there is a widely held perception that athletic success has a positive impact
on donations to the institution, research has shown that there is little if any increase, and
any increases are usually restricted to athletic funds as a result of a post-season
appearance or championship in the premier sports of football and men’s basketball
(Humphreys & Mondello, 2005; Frank, 2004). Athletic administrators also claim that
they help raise the visibility of the institution and thereby attract general donations, which
is even harder to quantify.

Increase in Applications for Admission.

Another result of increased visibility due to athletic prominence has been coined
“The Flutie Factor” by the popular media in order to explain the 25 percent increase in
applications to Boston College for admission after famed football quarterback Doug
Flutie threw a game-winning touchdown in a big game for the BC Eagles. This term has
been used to explain a short-lived spike in applications for admission after a team has
won a big game or championship (Sperber, 2000, p. 60). However, the legitimacy or quality of the applicants has not been studied.

While there is an immense amount of literature that advocates and opposes college athletics, and even more that just reports the stories and scores, information on how the pieces fit together, and the role of leadership in maintaining, improving, and advancing college sports is minimal at best. A comprehensive review of the literature regarding college athletics presented the four major areas that were covered in this literature review as relates to the ability to achieve a balance between athletics and academics in higher education.

College athletics has a defined role in American culture, and has held that role for many years. Because it reaches further than just the sponsoring institution, numerous stakeholders have ideas and opinions on how to make college sports better, and more efficient. However, those with the most influence, usually based on their financial giving, are the only ones who can actually affect change. The president is responsible for dealing with the others, and protecting the athletic department and elite coaches from distractions. The president's reach is also extended to student-athletes in the interest of fielding competitive teams and upholding winning traditions. Due to the sheer volume of financial opportunity, schools are enticed to participate in Division I-A sports. They hedge their bets on increases in attendance and fundraising, while continuing to enjoy the notoriety brought by top-notch programs. However, there is a price to pay. Programs that operate outside ethical guidelines are caught and punished more often than not. This can result in a smattering of negative attention brought by the media, but usually does not have a significant impact on the revenue generated by the athletic programs.
By researching each of these four areas, a solid understanding of college athletics as pertains to the ability to balance athletics and academics at institutions of higher education has been established. Now, a closer look can be taken at the specific factors that affect balance, the characteristics of the presidents who are able to achieve and maintain balance between athletics and academics, and the circumstances regarding those that lack the ability to do so.
CHAPTER III
Methodology

While previous literature suggests that the best way to manage reform or change is at the presidential level and through a collaborative effort, few details are offered on how to translate that into common practice. The purpose of this study was to better understand how academics and athletics can be balanced at colleges with highly competitive athletic programs. For this study, effective management involves balancing athletics with academics by ensuring that student-athletes graduate at a rate comparable to the general student population, and above the national average of 60 percent; that athletic programs are not operating at a deficit, and that there has been minimal violation of NCAA or institutional standards. To accomplish this purpose, a sample of Division I-A colleges with successful athletic programs was selected for close examination. Case studies of each school’s key administrative and financial practices were conducted, and the results of each case were compared to evaluate cross-case patterns.

Conceptual Framework

Each case study was guided by the insights into administrative behavior provided by Victor Baldridge’s theory about the political model of organizations. Organizational theory has traditionally been broken down into three distinct models of governance: the bureaucratic model, the collegial model, and the political model. The bureaucratic model views governance as top-down from institutional leadership down the chain of command through organizational groups through established channels of communication. The
collegial model professes a faith in the ability of the organization to act as a group to reach a consensus to make decisions. The political model believes that influence is power, not necessarily authority.

The functioning of college athletics does not follow the tenets of either the bureaucratic or collegial models of organizational theory. When examining American higher education through the lens of college athletics, it is apparent that the political model succinctly describes the present state of governance. For example, premier coaches, who, on the organizational chart, appear to have less authority than the director of athletics, actually maintain a higher level of power. The nature of this control is therefore political, and is best described by theories of political power.

The model applied to this study is primarily attributed to J. Victor Baldridge. In his seminal piece, *Power and Conflict in the University: Research in the Sociology of Complex Organizations* (1971), he based the political model on three theoretical sources: conflict theory, community power studies, and the theory of interest groups in organizations. Conflict theory breaks up the social systems into interest groups and then looks at how they handle conflict and change. Looking at who holds power within a community defines what power is and who sets the goals of the organization. Baldridge also acknowledges that interest groups have significant influence on an organization.

Baldridge sets forth the basic assumptions of the political model as follows:

(a) Conflict is natural and to be expected in any complex organization;

(b) Most major decisions are controlled by a small number of executive administrators;
(c) Numerous power blocs and interest groups exist within a university and each tries to ensure the primacy of their values and goals;
(d) External interest groups also wield a great deal of power over decision making within the university and;
(e) The ability of interest groups to exert pressure and engage in bargaining severely limits the formal authority of the bureaucratic system.

Each of these assumptions ties directly into intercollegiate athletics today.

(a) Conflict is rampant as institutions are constantly forced to make decisions. Whether it is dealing with the allocation of resources, enforcing institutional rules or NCAA regulations, or recruiting student-athletes, institutions are forced to choose one team, coach, player, etc. over another; thereby creating conflict.
(b) A small number of people, the president of the institution, the athletic director, and the head coach of the team in question usually make the decisions about college athletics.
(c) The list of internal interest groups in college athletics is extensive. Members of the student body, student-athletes, coaches, faculty, and administrators all have a vested interest in seeing their athletic programs succeed, as it is a gateway to increased exposure, and therefore an increase in funding. However, each of these groups also believes in the legitimacy of their own agenda and the precedence it should take in the overall scope of the institution.
(d) When taking into account the number of groups outside of the university with a vested interest in the success of an athletic program, the list becomes
exponentially longer. The Board of Trustees, the NCAA, parents, alumni, boosters, state and local legislators, local sponsors, and community members, also have a voice in the proceedings of their teams.

(e) With so many parties involved, and when each of them feels entitled to give their opinion based on their vested (usually financial) interest in the program, consensus is hard to obtain. Therefore, institutional leadership is forced to negotiate or bargain between groups to ensure a positive outcome, while most of the time relinquishing some of their power in the process. By determining the legitimate power of the president, it can be determined whether the position has both the ability, and the power to deal with athletics under its own accord.

A specific example of a political model that represents how most universities with elite athletic departments are organized is Henry Mintzberg’s Theory of Professional Bureaucracy. Mintzberg explains the Professional Bureaucracy, “hires duly trained and indoctrinated specialists-professionals-for the operating core, and then gives them considerable control over their own work” (1979, p. 50). This easily translates into the area of athletics as, “Control over his own work means that the professional works relatively independently of his colleagues, but closely with the clients he serves,” for example, student-athletes, administrators, and coaches (Mintzberg, 1979, p. 50). While the language is different, the principle coincides with Baldrige’s belief that the person with the most influence may not necessarily be at the top of the organizational chart. Figure 4 shows a graphic representation of Mintzberg’s Theory of Professional Bureaucracy.
As the diagram shows, in this circumstance, the athletic director would report directly to the president, and while the athletic director may be the liaison for the institutional operating core, the coaching staff makes up the operating core of the athletic department with little or no contact with the institutional operating core. If there were no teams to coach, there would not be an athletic program. The coaching staffs are usually more autonomous on a college campus; as they have one team to deal with and they have to achieve one main objective in order to keep their job, win games. In a Professional Bureaucracy, the higher the level of expertise, the higher the level of authority, which can be translated in today’s society as compensation, as shown by the million-dollar coaching salaries prevalent today.

This means that the power is located at the lower levels of the organizational hierarchy, as evidenced by the fact that most coaches are paid more than athletic directors (and in most cases, the institution’s president), even though they report directly to the athletic director on the organizational chart. Mintzberg also explains that since this is where the power lies, there is an added element of mobility as the affiliation usually resides in the profession, and not the institution at which it is practiced, which is illustrated by the frequent turnover in college coaching positions as people move on to higher ranking or higher paying positions.
Figure 4. Mintzberg’s Theory of Professional Bureaucracy
Research Questions

The following questions were used to guide the research:

Research Question 1 - Organizational Structure at schools that manage the prestige and publicity of athletics and enforcing the importance of academics – What are the reporting structures inside and outside of the athletic department?

Institutions of higher education handle athletic departments in one of two ways, granting them autonomy from the requirements of the rest of the executive administration, or incorporating them into the system.

Research Question 2 - Financial Information – What is the expense to revenue ratio of the athletic programs of schools participating in Division I-A athletics? More specifically, do their so-called “revenue-generating sports” actually make a profit? How does that effect the operation of the athletic department?

It is a fact that colleges and universities are spending millions of dollars on athletics; however, it must be determined what portion of the reported expenses are allocated for the premier sports, and what percentage of revenues are generated by these sports to determine which programs receive priority.

Research Question 3 - Power – What are the connections among formal reporting structures, finances of athletic departments, points of power within the organization and the level of influence of internal and external constituents?
By determining where the power lies on the organizational chart, and how finances are allocated, the process of determining who has the most influence can begin. However, due to the large number of constituent groups with vested interest in college athletics, financial and otherwise, power is further disseminated both inside and outside of the institution.

Research Question 4 – Presidential Characteristics – What role has the president played in maintaining a balance between athletics and academics at Division I-A institutions?

Specifically, how does a president’s tenure, previous experience, and position on athletics impact balance at an institution?

In each case, it is also important to examine the school’s history to determine how the institution has evolved as far as athletics are concerned, and whether the president’s role in regulating athletic culture, or the occurrence of athletic scandals or fiscal irresponsibility during their tenure, has resulted in the president being reprimanded or terminated. Conversely, it must also be noted if they were brought in to clean up after a previous scandal.

Refining the Sample

The 10 schools in the sample for this study were selected from the 117 institutions in Division I-A. This set of schools was categorized with three criteria: relationship between student-athlete graduation rate and average undergraduate graduation rate, the level of athletic success within Division I-A, and the extent of inappropriate behavior in athletics.
Graduation Rates. Graduation rates were examined in order to identify the institutions with balanced rates and those with the most imbalanced rates. First, however, schools that did not meet the national average of a 60 percent undergraduate graduation rate were eliminated. An inability to meet the 60 percent graduation rate indicates that statistically the college is not particularly successful in promoting academics for any of its students as shown by their inability to graduate. The remaining schools were then sorted by the difference between the undergraduate graduation rate and that of its student-athletes. Schools that achieve balance are categorized as those with a difference of 10 percent or less in the graduation rates of the undergrads versus student-athletes, meaning that there is an equal emphasis on academics for student-athletes. Imbalance is defined as those institutions that have a difference greater than 10 percent between the two graduation rates. The ten percent differential accounts for the increased athletic responsibilities of student-athletes, but ensures that there is an active effort to assist them with their studies, and that they are held accountable for their academic performance as well. This information was obtained from the NCAA report on graduation rates at http://www.ncaaconline.org/grad_rates/2004-d1/index.html.

Graduation rates were studied and among the sample schools to determine the level of academic standing of each institution relative to its peers as well as serving as one of the indicators of balance. Table 1 represents the rating of each segment of graduation rates in this study.
Table 1

Rating of Graduation Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Graduation Rate</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90-100%</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-89%</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79%</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69%</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By determining the level of academic commitment, it was then possible to examine how athletics are managed in relation to academics, and the emphasis placed on each by the executive administration.

**Athletic performance.** Athletic success across the NCAA's Division I is measured by the institution's Director's Cup ranking. The National Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics (NACDA) ranks and honors institutions maintaining broad-based athletics programs that achieve success in a number of sports. Each Division I institution is awarded points based on the athletic prowess of their teams in 10 men's and 10 women's sports. The overall champion is the institution that records the highest number of points in their division's Sports Academy Directors' Cup standings. The standings used in this study were published by NACDA on June 29, 2005.\(^\text{19}\) It is important to note that the Top 100 includes schools from the larger pool of 326 Division I schools, not just those in Division I-A. This study will look at the first quarter, or Top 25, representing those with the highest level of athletic performance.
Evaluating the athletic achievements of each institution and comparing them to academic performance allowed for conclusions to be drawn about where an institution’s priorities lie: in winning games, or graduating students. Also, looking at the history of athletic accomplishments assisted in determining the legacy of athletics at each particular institution in order to determine if the president was forced to change an existing culture, or maintain the status quo.

Because the purpose of the study is to examine institutions with highly competitive athletic programs, schools in the Low Athletic Performance categories were subsequently eliminated. Since the top schools would be found in the first quadrant, numbers 1-25, schools 26-50 were eliminated as well. Table 2 displays the final results of the schools included in the sample.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schools Included in Sample</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOT BALANCED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH ATHLETIC PERFORMANCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOW ATHLETIC PERFORMANCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Athletic misconduct. Once the schools were determined by focusing on the High Athletic Performance categories, they were further categorized by looking at the number of violations they have been assessed by the NCAA, which in essence acts as a barometer
of the role of ethics in their athletic programs. Schools that are sanctioned have broken one or more rules set by the NCAA, which means they have violated ethical standards. Examples of NCAA violations are academic fraud, allowing ineligible players to compete to gain an advantage, giving players extra benefits or knowledge of players accepting benefits or payments from boosters, unethical conduct such as using performance-enhancing substances, and lack of institutional control. Schools that commit violations usually lose the ability to recruit, participate in tournaments, and offer scholarships: all which negatively impact the image of the institution and the bottom line of the major sports programs.

The mean of the violations of the 10 schools in the sample is four. Schools with a number of violations close to the mean (3-5) were eliminated, while schools with violations at the low end and high end of the continuum were retained (0, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8 infractions). Through the extensive media coverage of college athletics, history has shown that it is possible to win games while running a clean program; however, that is the exception, not the rule. Examining the number of infractions an institution has incurred allowed a clearer picture to be painted about an institution. The number of violations shows whether clear ethical and administrative boundaries are set, or adhered to. For this study, Table 3 presents the severity of the number of violations.
Table 3

Rating of Violations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Violations</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Violations are sometimes seen as the cost of doing business in an era where cheating is expected. Schools will try anything they can to gain a competitive edge on the field or in the recruiting market. By comparing the number of violations to athletic success, it can be determined how athletic programs are run at each institution, and the level of misconduct a president will allow.

Table 4 presents the Director’s Cup ranking, the difference between graduation rates, and the number of NCAA violations assessed to institutions that are able to achieve balance. Looking at this information provides a snapshot of each institution (to evaluate how ethically they run their program), showing their athletic accomplishments, the difference between graduation rates of the general undergraduate population and that of student-athletes, and the number of violations that have been assessed. This allows for an interpretation of an institution’s priorities; for example, Penn State is ranked lower in athletic success, but has only a one percent difference in graduation rates, showing that academics are a priority for all students at the institution. In addition, the lack of NCAA
Violations shows that even though they are firmly placed in the Top 25, they run a clean and ethical program.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Director's Cup Ranking</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Violations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uwisc</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 presents the institutions that are unable to achieve balance. By examining their Director's Cup ranking to evaluate athletic success, the difference between graduation rates, and the number of NCAA violations, they can be compared to the institutions that are able to achieve balance.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Director's Cup Ranking</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Violations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umich</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

69
In this case, for example, UCLA is one of the highest athletically performing schools, but has an extremely large difference between graduation rates, and has been assessed six violations over the years. This indicates that academic standards, rules, and regulations of conduct are not strictly adhered to.

The result of the sample is an even mix of the High and Low Difference schools, institutions that run the gamut of number of violations that have been assessed, schools that represent geographic diversity, and both public and private institutions. The sample is an accurate representation of the composition of the 117 schools in Division I-A as the majority are public, represent small, medium, and large undergraduate populations, are evenly spread out across the United States, and have different academic and athletic priorities. Table 6 presents details about the size, type and location of each institution. All schools have a Carnegie Classification of Doctoral/Research Extensive.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Undergraduate Size</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>18,140</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>6,195</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>East Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>33,972</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Northeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>6,646</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>West Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>24,970</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>West Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>23,786</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Southeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>23,714</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>15,618</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>East Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>13,310</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>East Coast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWise</td>
<td>29,766</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Midwest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data Collection and Strategy for Analysis

Once the schools in the sample were determined, case studies were conducted that examined five dimensions: the nature of academics; the role of athletics—specifically success, violations, and scandal; organizational structure; finance; and power relationships. The role of athletics was examined to see how successful the school has been athletically as determined by the number of championships they have won. The number of NCAA violations and involvement in recent scandals was evaluated to see if the athletic department at each school operates under ethical and administrative guidelines set forth by the NCAA and the sponsoring institution.

The Nature of Academics. Selectivity, academic rating and most popular majors were added to provide an understanding of the academic nature of the institution. Selectivity is ranked from less selective, to selective, to more selective, to most selective.

This information was obtained from the US News and World Report overview located at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/rankings/rankindex_brief.php. The name and location of each institution was entered into the search engine on the website to access their respective records.

In order to assess the academic rigor of an institution’s academic programs, their academic rating was obtained from The Princeton Review. This particular rating was used as it ranks institutions from the student perspective and on a number of variables not represented by other organizations. Also, it specifically quantifies an Academic Rating. The Princeton Review determines the academic rating by looking at how hard students work and what they receive for their efforts. Both The Princeton Review and US News
and *World Report* rankings are frequently cited in popular and academic media as reliable sources of college rankings.

*The Princeton Review* rates schools on a scale of 60-99. Schools achieving a rating of 60 met the minimum requirements used for ranking schools, but are at the bottom of the scale. Ratings of 90-99 represent institutions with the highest academic rating. For this study, the ratings are interpreted in Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Score</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-89</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-99</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This rating is calculated from statistical information reported by administrators and the results of student surveys at each institution. Factors weighted include how many hours students study outside of the classroom, the quality of students the school attracts, student assessment of their professors, class size, student-teacher ratio, use of teaching
assistants, amount of class discussion, ease of registration, and available resources. The most popular majors are listed after the academic ranking in order to offer an idea of the focus of the students attending that particular institution. The characteristics of each institution were obtained through the search engine on The Princeton Review’s site located at http://www.princetonreview.com/college/default.asp.

The graduation rates, academic index, rating and selectivity were examined to determine the academic stature of each institution to see if they have high or low academic standards. These variables were then compared to the ability to balance an institution in order to determine the academic patterns of balanced institutions.

The role of athletics – Success, violations, and scandal. The case studies commenced with an overview of the athletic success and scandals of each institution. It is imperative to examine the role athletics plays at its sponsoring institution as intercollegiate athletics has evolved into one of the most visible and widely recognized products of higher education, as well as one of the largest generators of revenue. Therefore, a history of the success and inappropriety of each institution was created to better understand how athletics fits into the culture of the institution. Athletic success is measured by the Director’s Cup ranking, but is also noted by the number of national championships an institution wins. The number of national championships each institution won was obtained from their respective websites and includes both NCAA national championships, those won by sports competing in other independent conferences, and those won before the NCAA commissioning a particular sport.
Nonetheless, there is an anomaly in this equation since the most visible sport, NCAA football, is the one sport where there is no true national champion. Historically, a number of media and polling organizations published their own final rankings, which created a great deal of controversy. In 1998, the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) was started to create a national championship game, and four other match-ups of highly regarded teams. Results of the games played throughout the regular season are entered into a computer program, which then picks the top two teams to play for the national championship through a mathematical equation. Every year there is a great deal of speculation and conversation about whether or not there should be a playoff system like in college basketball. Either way, schools participating in BCS Bowl Games receive hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for participating. This is another point of much-debated controversy since schools are invited to play in bowl games: they are not required to participate. Therefore, schools are excusing student-athletes from more classes, they are missing more exams, and studying less due to their athletic commitments: just so institutions can gain visibility and experience the financial windfall associated with postseason appearances.

While the NCAA is not involved with the ranking or selection of any of the teams, and does not recognize an official Division I-A champion, they do own the television rights to the teams that are participating, and for which they are handsomely compensated. In turn, they use the revenue generated as part of the disbursement to their member institutions.

Championship information used for this study was taken from the NCAA’s List of Division I Championships by School, and the NCAA’s List of Past Division I-A Football
National Champions. This information was located at
http://www.ncaa.org/champadmin/champs_listing1.html and
http://www.ncaa.org/champadmin/iafootball_past_champs.html, respectively.

Historical information was obtained by looking at each institution’s athletic web
site. The NCAA Major Infractions Database was also searched again to see exactly where
the violations were assessed, and to determine if the premier sports of football and men’s
basketball were the only offenders
(https://poomer.ncaa.org/wdbctx/LSDBI/LSDBI.home). In cases where more than one
team is involved in a violation, the institution is usually reprimanded for unethical
conduct, or lack of institutional control, which results in the assessment of one violation
in total.

Instances of scandal were researched in the popular media, and on websites that
cover college athletics, as well as in The Chronicle for Higher Education. Institutional
websites were also examined; however, these sites offer few details and little information
about such events other than the announcement of a commitment to investigate the
situation.

The status of balance at each institution was then compared to the Director’s Cup
ranking and the number of violations in order to gauge the relative athletic success, and
misbehavior at each school. By determining the role of athletics and integrity of each
institution, the study was then able to contrast athletic and academic performance.

Two dynamics of power were used to assess the situation at each institution.
Organizational structure and finance were evaluated to determine where the positions of
power are placed on the organizational chart, and how and where athletics reports in
order to determine the amount of autonomy granted to the department. The revenue and expenses of the athletic departments, as well as specific elite programs, were examined in order to determine how much of an investment is made into athletics, and whether or not they generate revenue for an institution. By looking at exactly where resources are generated and allocated, patterns of control and power can be determined. Compensation is another variable of finance that was examined to illustrate in which positions the greatest financial investment is made, in terms of salary dollars.

Organizational structure. Organizational charts were obtained from each institution's website. In most cases the reporting structure of the athletic director was obvious; but others were very vague, and inferences had to be made from the charts and information on the institution's website. If this was the case, substantiating information such as alternate listings or directory information was obtained from other web pages on the school's site.

The organizational chart is important to examine because it is the baseline for the organizational assessment of power. However, especially in the case of the athletic staff, this may not be the case, as coaches usually command the highest salary on campus, have the most autonomy in their day-to-day work, but are located somewhere in the middle level of the organizational chart.

The location of the president relative to the athletic director was identified on each school's organizational chart in order to determine the reporting structure of the department of athletics. The position to which the athletic director reports was then compared to the status of balance and the student-athlete graduation rate at each
institution to determine if there are patterns between organizational reporting structure and higher student-athlete graduation rates at schools that achieve balance.

Once the reporting structure and physical locations of power were determined, a more intricate look at how finances are budgeted, generated, and spent was needed to determine the role athletics plays in advancing each institution.

*Finance.* Each year, American institutions of higher education that sponsor sports teams have to report a number of financial and participation-based variables to the government in order to be able to participate in Federal student aid programs. The Office of Postsecondary Education in the US Department of Education compiles these reports and releases the annual Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act Report (EADA Report).

According to the website of the Office of Postsecondary Education, the EADA Report was one of the amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965 that was authorized by Congress in 1998. The mission of the report is to allow prospective students and their families to research athletic opportunities on college campuses across the United States. The findings are reported on their website, [http://www.ope.ed.gov/athletics/index.asp](http://www.ope.ed.gov/athletics/index.asp), which includes an advanced search engine to facilitate comparing institutions.

Revenues and expenses of athletic departments are reported for each institution. Appendix D contains a sample of the complete report. The revenue categories used in this study include the revenue generated by men’s basketball and football, and a grand total of all the revenue brought in by each institution’s athletic department. The expense categories used for this study include the expenses for the men’s basketball and football program as well as the total amount of expenses for the entire athletic department.
This report is the baseline for all financial reporting for athletics, as all institutions, both public and private, are forced to comply if they wish to keep their Federal funding. The NCAA also requires the schools that belong to report revenues and expenses on an annual basis. However, private schools and public schools in Pennsylvania and Delaware are not required to participate, as it does not fall within their legal obligations as set forth by their respective state governments.

The financial information from the Office of Postsecondary Education was then compared to the financial figures listed on The Indianapolis Star’s website, www.indystar.com, which has an NCAA Financial Reports Database that breaks down the NCAA report by institution. As the location of the NCAA headquarters is in Indianapolis, the local paper covers the matters of the NCAA very closely. In this case, they conducted an independent survey and achieved a 76 percent return rate. Seven of the 10 schools in this study participated. As private schools, Duke and Stanford were not forced to comply and did not submit their information. Also, due to the privacy laws of the State of Pennsylvania, Penn State, which is a public institution, did not report their figures. This report is much more detailed, and examples of the complete revenue and expense statements are included in Appendix D.

The revenue statement breaks down the revenue generated by the athletic department into a number of categories such as ticket sales, the portion of student fees allocated by the sponsoring institution, and the payments received for guarantees to participate in away games. Financial donations, government support, and direct and indirect support from the institution are also broken down. Indirect institutional support covers services such as security, buildings and grounds crews, and legal counsel that the
department uses, but does not pay for. Schools also receive money from third parties who pay a fee to be associated with the institution (such as apparel providers), and distributions from the NCAA and the athletic conference to which they belong. To generate revenue, institutions can also sell media rights, concessions, programs, parking spots, advertising space, and sponsorship packages. Other ways to generate additional resources are to hold sports camps or invest their profits into an endowment.

The expense statement delineates the amounts paid for student aid for scholarship athletes, guarantees paid to other institutions, salaries, and additional benefits for coaches and administrators, and severance payments to coaches who were let go before the end of their contract. Recruiting, travel, equipment, and game day expenses are also broken down. Operating costs for sports camps, facilities, and spirit groups are included, as are the medical insurance premiums for athletes. The cost of belonging to the NCAA and conference organizations is also included, as are miscellaneous operating expenses for printing, technology, and general office needs.

Each of these variables was entered into a spreadsheet to compare what each institution generates and spends. The information compiled by the EADA Report was added at the end to allow all 10 schools to be accounted for as Duke, Penn State and Stanford all receive allotments of Federal financial aid. It must be noted that some schools report different numbers because the OPE and NCAA have different due dates for the institutions to report by; however, those who finish their reports early report the same financial figures on both reports.

The more detailed NCAA numbers were used for schools that reported as it facilitated examining exactly where the money was raised and spent for each sport. For
the three schools that do not report to the NCAA, the OPE numbers for the general categories of football, men's basketball and grand total were used so each school was represented, and overall comparisons could be made. The percentage of the overall revenue and expenses generated by the premier sports of football and men's basketball was then calculated, and percentages were rounded up to the nearest whole number.

In order to determine the seating capacity for the men's basketball and football stadiums and arenas and to thereby understand the impact on ticket sales, http://www.sportsline.com/collegefootball/teams was used to get that information on the football stadiums, and http://www.sportsline.com/collegebasketball/teams/all was used for the basketball arenas.

The amount of revenue generated for each category was compiled into a spreadsheet in order to compare the total revenue generated by each institution, and how they were bringing it in. The number of sports programs each school sponsors were added to ensure there is some consistency in the numbers. Each individual category was compared to determine trends in institutional financing.

The total amount of expenses paid by each school was also put into a spreadsheet and broke down by category to determine spending patterns. Specific areas, such as direct and indirect institutional support, were examined to determine their impact on revenue.

An overall financial picture was created by listing the revenue, expenses, and revenue to expense difference for each institution. This created a baseline from which to observe the budgets of the specific premier sports of men's basketball and football.

College football was broken out separately to determine the revenue generated, percentage of total revenue, expenses, percentage of total expenses, and the revenue to
expense difference of each program. The stadium name and seating capacity was also included to determine the size of their facilities from which to judge the revenue brought in through ticket sales.

While men’s basketball does not generate nearly as much revenue as football, it is still the second highest revenue producer in college athletics. The same characteristics of revenue generated, percentage of total revenue, expenses, percentage of total expenses, and the revenue to expense difference of each program were evaluated. Arena information was once again included to evaluate the ability to sell tickets.

Now that the reporting structure and financial investments had been determined, in order to determine where the power lies both on paper and in practice at each institution, it was time to look at who has and had used the most power to influence the role of athletics in each institution. Reform efforts and change cannot be accomplished without the power of control.

Dynamics of power. The position of president or chancellor was examined first to determine tenure at the institution, reporting structure, and background. The way in which they came to office, who they report to, their tenure at their institution, and whether they came from an academic or business background was included in each case study. This information was obtained from each institution’s website.

Next, presidential compensation was obtained to contrast to the salaries of the head coaches and full professors at each institution. In order to assess the compensation received by each president, The Chronicle of Higher Education’s Executives’ Compensation study was used. http://chronicle.com/stats/990/. All numbers are the latest available and were submitted for the 2006-07 academic year. The figures for Penn State
and the University of Virginia cover 2005-06 because presidential compensation for '06-'07 had not been finalized before the closing date of the survey. It also must be noted that the figures for Penn State were taken from the 990 filed with the Internal Revenue Service and only included base salary, no additional compensation was included. In the case of UCLA, the most recent president's compensation was included rather than that of the interim president. As Duke and Stanford are private institutions, their information was taken from the 990 filed for 2004-05.

Housing and car allowances are included in the Chronicle's study, but the use of a state or institution-owned car or house is not. Use of such amenities, as well as benefits such as golf or country club dues and expense accounts are listed, but no dollar amounts are assessed, therefore they are not included in total compensation. As this is a common practice at most institutions, it is a pretty even playing field unless otherwise noted. The media or special interest groups, usually publicize any major exceptions.

Next, since the department has been identified as a major component of higher education due to the visibility and revenue generated by it, the characteristics of those who lead the athletic departments were examined. The roles of the athletic director, head football coach, and head men's basketball coach were examined in order to further define the authority and power designated to each position.

The athletic director is the head of the department or division of athletics and is ultimately responsible for the conduct and success of student athletes. Their professional background and the success of the athletic department during their leadership was looked at to determine their role in the institution, familiarity with college athletics prior to being appointed, the progress made, and the achievements attained while they have been in that
position. While they are usually compensated at a higher rate than other directors at an institution, positions are usually comparable to members of the executive administration, even though their titles may be different. Their compensation was not included as it is not relevant to the study. While they have power to affect change, they do not have the ability to demand reform or make drastic movements in a different direction without the blessing of the president.

The tenure, salary, background, and success of the programs under their head coaches were investigated to see how each program contributes to the success of the institution. All information was elicited from the institution’s athletic website and is included in each case study.

Salary information for football coaches was obtained from the USA Today Compensation for Division I-A College Football Coaches’ Study released on November 16, 2006. USA Today used each institution’s most recently filed IRS report, most of which were from May 2005. The categories reported are salary and other income, which generally comes from the institution in the form of bonuses due to athletic achievement, remuneration for television and radio appearances, or apparel contracts. Amenities such as the use of institutional automobiles, country club memberships, or tickets to sporting events at the institution are not included. Additional details of their contract have been provided if they were included in the survey results. It is understood that each coach receives financial rewards for performance, and tickets to sporting events. Maximum bonus figures are not included in total compensation. The database is located at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/graphics/coaches_contracts/flash.htm.
Salaries for basketball coaches were much harder to track down. The data used represent information included in articles from when the coaches were hired. Most of the details were obtained from ESPN.com and CBSSportsline.com.

In order to contrast athletic personnel incomes with the salaries of administrators with academic interests, the salaries of those at the top of the faculty hierarchy (full professors) were compiled. This information was obtained through the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) Faculty Salary Survey database hosted by The Chronicle of Higher Education at http://chronicle.com/stats/aaup/aaupresults.php. The salaries of each institution’s president, head football coach, head men’s basketball coach, and average full professor salary were then listed in a chart to compare trends in and among each institution.

The roles of two of the most influential groups in college athletics were then examined: that of boosters, or friends of athletics, and, the governing board of each institution. The board of trustees usually has a vested interest in the financial success of athletics due to the generation of revenue and visibility college sports bring. However, after years of making the headlines, they also seem to have an intimate relationship with head coaches and athletic directors. Therefore, the role and influence of the members of the board of trustees, and individual boosters was written up in each case study as well. This helped determine their relationship with the president of the institution, role in the management of athletics, and involvement with issues that may have occurred in the past.

While there are legitimate booster clubs that operate under the direction of NCAA rules, most people referred to as “boosters” of the athletic program fund athletic activities outside of the scope of the sponsoring institution. While interchangeably used with the
word “fan,” alumni, parents, community members, and even faculty and students can qualify as boosters of a program. For those on the illicit side of the spectrum, it is extremely difficult to calculate their impact as goods and services are usually given to players or recruits themselves, in most cases with little or no knowledge by the school. The impact this group has is tremendous. Due to the nature of the financial excess in college sports, coaches need help to remain competitive in the recruiting wars in order to stay successful on the field. Because of the nature of their enterprise, the only time you usually hear about boosters is when violations are uncovered. Therefore, search engines, popular media, and the Chronicle of Higher Education were searched to find details about the boosters of each institution.

Finally, the characteristics of each president were compared on the ability to achieve balance between athletics and academics at their respective institutions. The presidents’ tenure and compensation were contrasted to the institution’s Director’s Cup ranking and whether or not an athletic scandal occurred on their watch and this to determine how each of those factors affected balance at each school.

Pulling these facts together and defining the characteristics that help achieve balance between athletics and academics will determine whether the president has the actual power to do so. Chapter four will present the findings of this study.
CHAPTER IV

Findings

This chapter presents the results of the analysis conducted on the data collected. The results are presented through comparative analysis and defined trends. In comparing the sample of Division I-A schools that have successfully achieved a balance with those who have not, several clear patterns emerged.

Findings of the study indicate that under certain conditions, the president plays an important role in balancing athletics and academics at Division I-A institutions. This chapter reviews those conditions in terms of organizational structure, finance, and power. The key aspect of organizational structure is whether the president has the power to protect athletics by keeping the department under their sole jurisdiction, or if other parties are involved in the regulation of athletics due to its integration into the larger administration of the school. The key aspects of finance involve the level of institutional funding apportioned by the president, as well as the clarity of financial reports. The key issue of power concerns the excessive coaching salaries and skyrocketing costs, as well as the management of various constituent groups which are involved in college sports, both as fans and as fundraisers for athletics. The power of the president to make absolute decisions is disseminated among a large group of constituents with a vested interest in the program, most of whom do not fall under the authority of the sponsoring institution.

The sample consists of 10 schools from the 117 schools in Division I-A (Table 8). All 10 come from the top 25 in the Director’s Cup ranking, indicating their high achievement in athletics. They range in the level of balance between athletics and
academics as indicated by the difference between overall undergraduate graduation rate and the graduation rate of the institution’s student-athletes.

Table 8

Characteristics of Academic and Athletic Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Undergraduate Grad Rate</th>
<th>Student-Athlete Grad Rate</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Director’s Cup Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umich</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uwisc</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This information will be explained further throughout this chapter, which synthesizes the themes of the detailed case studies (see Appendix B for complete case studies).

Graduation Rates

Although all 10 colleges boast graduation rates above the national average, almost one-third of them have student-athlete graduation rates below 60 percent (Table 9). The graduation rates of student-athletes are broken out from the general undergraduate population, and schools are ranked from highest to lowest in both categories.
Table 9

**Ranking of Graduation Rates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Undergraduate Grad Rate</th>
<th>Student-Athlete Grad Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Duke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Stanford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>Penn State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>UVA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umich</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>UMich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>UNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>UWisc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uwisc</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Auburn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>UGA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>UCLA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It also must be noted that the two highest graduation rates for both groups belong to private institutions, which tend to have higher graduation rates than public colleges. The difference between graduation rates of the general undergraduate population and those of student-athletes were then compared to evaluate the difference indicating the importance placed on academics for student-athletes. In this study, institutions that had a difference lower than 10 percent are considered balanced, while those above 10 percent are considered imbalanced. This is based on the idea that athletics is emphasized over academics for student-athletes, or that student-athletes have greater resources available to help them graduate than the general undergraduate population has, a difference of 10 percent sets a baseline for comparison that is relatively equal, but compensates for the demands put on athletes, and compensates for the additional resources not offered to
students in the general population. Schools are ranked from greatest difference to smallest difference in Table 10.

Table 10

Status of Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Difference (%)</th>
<th>Balance Between Athletics and Academics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisc</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again the private schools, Stanford, Penn State, and Duke, are distinguished from public ones by smaller gaps between graduation rates, and in turn, their ability to achieve greater balance between academics and athletics.

Academics

All 10 institutions are “more” or “most selective,” indicating that they are in a position to turn away applicants. In general, across the higher education system in the United States, the more selective a school’s admissions process is, the higher its graduation rate. Nonetheless, selectivity does not entirely determine an institutions
academic standing. The academic index obtained from the *Princeton Review* reflects the rigor and quality of academic programs as assessed by the institution's core audience, its students. Table 11 shows the factors that were evaluated to determine an institution's overall academic standing.

Table 11

*Academic Characteristics*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Academic Index/Rating</th>
<th>Selectivity</th>
<th>Balance between Athletics and Academics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>71/Fair</td>
<td>More</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>95/Excellent</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>NR*</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>97/Excellent</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>74/Fair</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>73/Fair</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>84/Good</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>80/Good</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Most</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>88/Good</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>More</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisc</td>
<td>80/Good</td>
<td>Selective</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Did not report per state law
In terms of academic quality, these 10 schools range from fair to excellent. Fair means that they are barely engaging their students in an academic setting, while excellent means they are excelling far beyond what students expect.

Examining each school’s academic rating together with its level of balance creates a fuller picture of the academic situation. Schools with an academic rating of Fair do not have stellar graduation rates for either population of their students, as indicated by their imbalance, and their overall graduation rates. Fair institutions are only meeting the minimum expectations of their students, which in Auburn’s case is proven by the fact that only 68 percent of undergrads actually graduate. UGA is only one spot above them, graduating a meager 71 percent of undergraduates. UCLA has a higher graduation rate of 87 percent, but with an academic index of 74, the quality of their programs can be questioned. Institutions rated “Good” show the difference in quality across the spectrum of Division I-A, with two bordering on Fair at the very low end of 86, one in the middle at 84, and UVA finishing near the top at 88. Other than the private schools that received an Excellent ranking, there was no correlation between selectivity and academic rating, or academic ranking and balance.

Athletic Misconduct

Table 12 presents the results of a comparison of athletic performance and the number of violations committed by each institution. This information can help determine the character of athletics at each institution. In this study, examining the number of violations can act as an ethical barometer, showing the lengths that schools will go to win games.
Table 12

**Ranking of Athletic Performance and Misconduct**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Director’s Cup Ranking</th>
<th>Violations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCL A</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisc</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stanford stands out at the top, finishing first in athletic performance, while never having been assessed a violation. With one exception, the University of Wisconsin, schools that are balanced have the fewest violations. Conversely, schools with the most violations are imbalanced. In this situation, the University of Wisconsin is an outlier, which is not surprising, as it is located on the edge of imbalance almost meeting the threshold of a 10 percent difference between graduation rates.

College athletics do hold a specific place in American life. Fans accept, and even expect, scandals to occur as schools are going to great lengths to support their athletic programs, in some cases even compromising their values to do so. Figure 5 delineates the relationship between athletic success at the institutions and the number of NCAA violations it has committed.
While there is no direct correlation between the two, it is once again interesting to note that the private schools have the lowest number of violations (0 and 1), and the three schools that fail to meet the 60 percent national average, UCLA, UGA, and Auburn, have the highest number of violations, 6, 6, and 7, respectively.
Figure 5. Athletic Success versus Number of Violations
Organizational Structure

Institutions of higher education handle athletic departments in one of two ways. Autonomous departments are granted freedom from the requirements of the rest of the executive administration and tend to report only to the president. More integrated departments are incorporated into the system, requiring the Athletic Director report to someone in the executive administration in addition to the president. Departments that are granted autonomy usually have extensive operations and exist at large, public institutions where athletics are highly visible, and pervade the institutional culture. Integrated departments are usually found in schools with higher academic requirements, and in private schools. In cases where integrated reporting structures are found at imbalanced schools, the integrated structure has been implemented in response to past athletic scandals as an effort of reform. For example, the University of Michigan added an oversight committee after their major basketball scandal. The majority of sample colleges (80%) have autonomous athletic departments, even though they run the gamut of the number of NCAA violations. Table 13 presents the findings regarding organizational structure of the sample schools.
Table 13

**Effect of Organizational Structure on Balance and Athletic Success**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Reporting Structure</th>
<th>Reports to</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Student Athlete Grad Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>President with auxiliary report to Provost</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Provost</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
<td>Provost &amp; Vice Provost for Budget &amp; Management</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
<td>EVP and Chief Operating Officer</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisc</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>President and Advisory Board</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that the balanced schools are a mix of integrated and autonomous, as the hypothesis was that they have integrated reporting structures. However, the majority of balanced schools report to more than one person. At public institutions, athletic departments that remain autonomous and are protected by the president have lower student-athlete graduation rates. Autonomous structures at private schools do not have an impact on student-athlete graduation rates, as they are already high. Institutions that force the athletic department to report through, or in conjunction with, academic affairs have higher student-athlete graduation rates. Appendix C includes
the organizational charts from each institution used to collect the reporting structure data. Only four of the athletic departments report to someone other than the president.

Duke’s athletic director has an interesting reporting structure as he reports directly to the President, with an auxiliary report to the Provost. This allows him to remain autonomous from the rest of the central university administration. At Stanford, the director of athletics clearly reports to the provost, who reports directly to the president. The director of athletics also has an obligation to report financial information regarding operations to the vice provost for budget and auxiliary management.

At the University of Virginia, the director of athletics reports to the executive vice president and chief operating officer. In their structure, the vice president and provost are between that position and the president’s, but do not have a specific reporting line with athletics. However, there is a dual reporting line between the associate director for [athletic] compliance, the EVP & CEO, and the director of athletics; which creates an opportunity for the compliance officer to report to the university administration if they feel that there is an issue in athletics that they are not comfortable discussing with the director of athletics.

Michigan has an interesting reporting structure since the athletic director reports to the president, and an advisory board for intercollegiate athletics. The advisory board is comprised of faculty, alumni, student members, and an executive officer—for a total of sixteen members in all. It appears that this board was created to help mend their public perception in response to a brutal scandal that affected the institution a few years prior, but while it may benefit the school from a public relations standpoint, the impact of such
a structure is unclear, since the University of Michigan remains imbalanced, with a
difference of 12% and a student-athlete graduation rate of only 73%.

While the director of athletics at UNC reports directly to the chancellor, it is
interesting to note that according to the organizational chart, the director of athletics is
held in the same esteem as the vice chancellors of the institution and is the only director
to do so.

Every institution that is unable to achieve balance has the athletic director
reporting directly to the president, while the majority of schools that are able to achieve
balance have the athletic director report to more than one person. Overall, the two private
institutions with integrated reporting structures have higher graduation rates, and are
more balanced than those granted autonomy.

Finance

Division I-A colleges and universities spend millions of dollars on athletics.
Determining the portion of reported expenses allocated for the premier sports of men’s
basketball and football, and what percentage of revenues are generated by these sports,
clarifies the importance of each sport at and for each institution. Most institutions
generate enough revenue through these two major sports to subsidize any other sports
that are offered. However, that is not always the case, and some institutions actually lose
money investing millions of dollars in under-performing teams.
Revenue.

At this point, it was possible to quantify the exact role of college athletics. The 10 schools in this sample alone generate over half of a billion dollars a year ($573,819,774 reported to the Office of Postsecondary Education), in sports-related revenue. This is an astounding figure since it is representative of only 11.7 percent of the 1,177 institutions in Division I-A.

The revenue generated by the 10 schools in the study is broke down in Table 14. This shows the categories that raise the most and least amount of money for each institution. Ticket sales and contributions lead the way with over a hundred million dollars generated in each category for one year and less is by just the 10 sample schools alone.
### Table 14
**Athletic Revenue Generated**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Auburn Totals (8 sports)</th>
<th>Duke Totals (9 sports)</th>
<th>Penn State Totals (10 sports)</th>
<th>Stanford Totals (8 sports)</th>
<th>UCLA Totals (2 sports)</th>
<th>UGA Totals (1 sport)</th>
<th>UConn Totals (1 sport)</th>
<th>UVA Totals (1 sport)</th>
<th>WVU Totals (2 sports)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ticket Sales</td>
<td>$1,545,347</td>
<td>$1,103,045</td>
<td>$1,138,187</td>
<td>$1,649,425</td>
<td>$1,011,708</td>
<td>$1,169,667</td>
<td>$1,014,287</td>
<td>$1,275,926</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Fees</td>
<td>$251,946</td>
<td>$233,300</td>
<td>$308,879</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$2,454,449</td>
<td>$2,723,305</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions</td>
<td>$833,000</td>
<td>$1,056,410</td>
<td>$563,350</td>
<td>$1,674,514</td>
<td>$1,320,514</td>
<td>$360,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions</td>
<td>$16,638,034</td>
<td>$28,305,817</td>
<td>$18,342,622</td>
<td>$20,834,448</td>
<td>$7,849,991</td>
<td>$42,269,989</td>
<td>$7,849,991</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Support</td>
<td>$4,500</td>
<td>$21,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Support</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Institutional Support</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$1,871,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Institutional Support</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCAAs/Conference Distributions</td>
<td>$11,489,082</td>
<td>$10,740,875</td>
<td>$10,663,795</td>
<td>$12,774,077</td>
<td>$18,184,501</td>
<td>$12,994,340</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual School Media Rights</td>
<td>$1,701,415</td>
<td>$1,613,049</td>
<td>$1,653,000</td>
<td>$1,687,795</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$1,972,519</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concessions, Programs, Parking</td>
<td>$83,708</td>
<td>$129,793</td>
<td>$705,028</td>
<td>$1,655,472</td>
<td>$45,078</td>
<td>$6,155,759</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising &amp; Sponsorship</td>
<td>$2,899,933</td>
<td>$4,733,300</td>
<td>$971,540</td>
<td>$1,501,226</td>
<td>$1,595,333</td>
<td>$1,744,803</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports Camps</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$1,890,201</td>
<td>$178,911</td>
<td>$403,690</td>
<td>$129,192</td>
<td>$1,564,702</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endowment/Income</td>
<td>$1,115,196</td>
<td>$1,080,972</td>
<td>$213,534</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$114,469</td>
<td>$1,023,792</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$3,189,895</td>
<td>$872,116</td>
<td>$2,250,077</td>
<td>$2,673,778</td>
<td>$1,139,186</td>
<td>$2,353,484</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries Reported in NCAA</td>
<td>$60,075,065</td>
<td>$50,770,064</td>
<td>$50,770,064</td>
<td>$49,070,064</td>
<td>$54,770,064</td>
<td>$62,070,064</td>
<td>$71,070,064</td>
<td>$73,070,064</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries Reported to OPE</td>
<td>$50,770,064</td>
<td>$42,150,165</td>
<td>$50,770,064</td>
<td>$44,510,064</td>
<td>$49,070,064</td>
<td>$62,070,064</td>
<td>$71,070,064</td>
<td>$73,070,064</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference between reported totals</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Duke, Penn State, & Stanford only reported to OPE.
The schools in this sample are generating between $40 and $78 million a year from athletics. The University of Michigan leads all schools in ticket sales. Their football stadium alone holds over 107,000 fans for each of their home games, and season tickets are required for everyone to attend football, ice hockey, and men's basketball games. They maintain waiting lists for football and ice hockey season tickets, and although students, faculty, and staff are not charged admission, others must pay to attend events in volleyball, men and women's gymnastics, wrestling, baseball, softball, and for women's basketball games.

Another area of revenue generation that has been the subject of great controversy is that of student fees, a portion of which are directed to athletics. Sometimes called activity fees, or campus life fees, students are forced to pay these charges as part of their overall tuition bill. This entitles them to use the facilities on campus, attend social events, or participate in intramurals. In essence, the athletics-related portion of the fees is further supporting the operation of the athletic department, since the overhead for an intramural program is low. In addition, students at most schools are further required to pay for their tickets to attend games in the elite sports of men's basketball and football. Two departments, those at the University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin, do not receive any part of the student fees. Five other departments receive assistance, with the University of Virginia garnering almost $8 million annually. Opponents of college athletics question whether the money would be better used if invested in supporting the general student population, and not just those participating in or interested in athletics.

Another source are guarantees, fees paid by one institution for the right to play another. In essence, a guarantee is a payment for signing a contract to schedule a game.
Playing elite Division I-A schools brings increased visibility and notoriety, and at times television and sponsorship opportunities. These fees range from a few thousand dollars to cover travel expenses to tens, and even hundreds of thousands, for the best teams to make the trip. As the quality of the school’s program increases, so does the amount they charge for guarantees. The reported numbers are probably underestimates as there are probably a number of instances where top competitions are encouraged by and arranged for an institution by those whose jurisdiction falls well outside of the athletic department, such as boosters or trustees. Due to the amount of money changing hands, it must be questioned how and why institutions are paying each other large sums of money, which can be better spent on their own institutions. Georgia produced almost $2 million in guarantees while Wisconsin only generated $200,000.

Outright financial contributions are one of the most significant sources of revenue. For only the right to purchase tickets, not even for the seat itself, schools charge hundreds of dollars. If you want better seats closer to the court or field, these rights will cost thousands. The best season ticket locations, post-season conference tournament tickets, and NCAA tournament tickets cost even more. On top of that, at most schools, seating is determined based on the level and longevity of financial donations to the institution, and in most cases, specifically to athletics. The best seats in the facility go to the largest donors and those who have been associated with the program the longest. Institutions use contributions to alleviate the burden of enormous coaching salaries, pay guarantees to play the best teams, upgrade facilities to attract the best coaches and recruits, and to enhance the product of the athletic department. Another major factor in contributions to institutions of higher education is naming rights. Donors pay millions of
dollars to put their name, or the name of a loved one, on a stadium or arena, and smaller amounts to name almost anything else in the facility.

In the year 2004-05, the Universities of Georgia and Virginia led the way in contributions. Due to the popularity of Georgia football, seat licenses are sold in addition to season tickets, and Virginia recently opened up a new basketball arena. Seat locations are assigned based on giving history; therefore, the highest donors are entitled to the best seats. Finances donated to athletics are counted as restricted dollars that do not impact anything else at the institution; whereas, a portion of the general annual fund at most schools is also earmarked for athletics. When donors restrict their monies specifically for the use of athletics, they are targeting their valuable resources toward a minority of the undergraduate population.

While UCLA receives a small amount from the institution, the University of Wisconsin receives almost $4 million in direct institutional support: unrestricted funds allocated to the athletic department by the university. They could be a portion of either state funding or tuition waivers granted to scholarship athletes. The University of North Carolina and Wisconsin also receive millions of dollars in indirect institutional support, which may be where they report costs for security, as well as buildings and grounds covered by the sponsoring institution. These resources are the most valuable because they show how strong the institution’s commitment is to athletics, at the cost of not directing those or added resources to academic programs.

NCAA/Conference distributions are directly correlated with athletic success. The NCAA subsidizes those schools that appear in post-season games for their efforts. The NCAA uses the money generated by their television and sponsorship contracts and
membership fees to pay each school that participates in conference tournaments, NCAA Championships, or Bowl Games. Schools that win are usually compensated with a greater portion of the revenue that is generated. There is an inverse relationship between NCAA distribution and athletic performance, as the lower-ranked, higher performance teams generate less money than the higher-ranked teams. This is directly related to the amount of money generated. Aside from the University of Michigan and their $30 million in ticket sales due to their huge stadium, the teams that finished in the top five spots in the Director’s Cup rankings generated the least amount of money. The top five institutions have to focus on more than just the two elite sports in order to finish at the top of the poll. The schools that made the most from conference distributions were the ones who participated in the NCAA men’s basketball tournament, or college football post-season Bowl games. However, as will be discussed in the section on expenses, institutions also have to pay a membership fee to compete in their conference and Division I-A; so in essence, while the distributions are far greater than their expenses, they are actually just a return on an investment.

In most cases, schools sell their own media rights. These days, that encompasses television, radio, and Internet broadcasting rights. Depending on the demand and the size of their media markets, schools are free to set their asking price. UCLA generated the highest amount, probably due to their accessibility and location in a saturated media market. Georgia and UNC were the next two schools that generated the highest amount. With Georgia in the ultra-competitive Southeastern Conference, and UNC in the highly-ranked Atlantic Coast conference, those schools are targeted for national coverage on a regular basis due to the level of competition, and history of athletic success in football
and men’s basketball, respectively. This is the area where schools make the greatest profit. They are only responsible for making players, coaches, and administrators available to the media. However, this area is also the most volatile in times of unrest or scandal. The media pays handsomely for access to the elite representatives of the institution, so when teams are winning and everything is good, the media and marketing exposure is priceless. When times are bad, the media can be relentless, and portray the institution in a negative light, further affecting their public perception.

Concessions, programs, parking, advertisers, and sponsorships are all sold by each institution and they generate a significant profit. Aside from the minimal costs of staffing, food, printing programs, and the opportunity costs of those elements that make up advertising and sponsorship packages such as tickets, the balance is pure profit.

Wisconsin finishes way above the rest of the schools in this category, probably because they corner the market on the entertainment dollar since there are few professional sports in their immediate vicinity as compared to the geographic location of the other schools.

Advertisers and sponsors want to be associated with winners, as evidenced by the fact that the schools at the top of the Director’s Cup ranking bring in the most advertising and sponsorship revenue. UCLA and Michigan lead the category with $5 million and $9 million respectively. Stanford finished first, but did not report their exact figures; however, their new football stadium is rife with advertisements and sponsorship backers. Again, when things are going well, this is a great source of revenue, when teams have a losing season or are touched by scandal, sponsorship dollars are few and far between.

While the coaches that associate their names get the bulk of the profit from holding sports camps on the institutions’ campuses, the school itself usually gets a small
fee for letting them do so. The greater the name recognition of the program and the coach, the higher the fees that are charged, and the better the attendance at the camp. Some institutions allow their coaches to keep all of the profit as part of their contract and compensation. UCLA and Wisconsin generate the most revenue as they excel in both premier sports.

Investments and endowments are an outgrowth of the contribution area. Some schools choose to invest a portion of their donations to help ensure financial stability down the road. The schools are relatively similar with the exception of UNC. North Carolina does not have any return on their endowment or investment if one exists. This may have been due to the need to raise supplemental revenue to hire the new head men’s basketball coach, Roy Williams, rather than investing their resources. Virginia also has a small return, which could have been due to the similar situation of the need to raise revenue in the form of cash in order to complete construction and open the new arena.

The “Other” category is an example of the ambiguity in financial reporting in college athletics. Some schools may count revenue generated from apparel contracts in this area, which can then be transferred into added compensation for coaches, as it is a separate budget line. Other schools may count gifts-in-kind in this area for supplies or services that are donated to the athletic program. IndyStar.com, the host of the database from which this information was obtained, does not offer a further explanation for exactly what is reported in this category.
Expenses.

Not surprisingly, as these 10 institutions bring in over a half a billion dollars, they also spend over half a billion dollars, $509,125,431 to be exact. The finances of each institution will be broken down further to gauge the financial impact of specific programs at each institution.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Authorized Expenses ($)</th>
<th>Enacted Total ($)</th>
<th>Cal Poly State University ($ million)</th>
<th>Standard Total ($)</th>
<th>CCAA Total ($)</th>
<th>CCCAA Total ($)</th>
<th>AABC Total ($)</th>
<th>EFSC Total ($)</th>
<th>MSMC Total ($)</th>
<th>Total Expenses ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>$1,025,200</td>
<td>$1,025,200</td>
<td>$1,025,200</td>
<td>$1,025,200</td>
<td>$1,025,200</td>
<td>$1,025,200</td>
<td>$1,025,200</td>
<td>$1,025,200</td>
<td>$1,025,200</td>
<td>$9,025,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies and</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonded Labor</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonded Subcontract Labor</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental and Lease</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
<td>$8,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Expenses</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>$9,000,000</td>
<td>$72,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Expenses are reported in billions.*
The largest amounts are designated for paying the salaries of the coaching and administrative staff, and student aid in the form of scholarships offered to student-athletes. Student aid expenses across the institutions are similar in regard to the number of sports they sponsor. The minor variations can be attributed to the difference between in-state and out-of-state student athletes at the institution, and the number of scholarship athletes.

The amounts paid for guarantees are somewhat similar among the institutions at this level, with the exception of UCLA, which recently added a number of lower-level non-conference games to their football and men’s basketball schedules in order to help the teams start the season off with a number of wins. This helps enhance the perception of the programs to a certain extent, and is a practice followed by most institutions. In order for the lower-level teams to agree to play, and most likely lose, it must be financially beneficial for them to sign the contract; therefore, guarantees are paid to the lower-level teams.

The expense line for salaries is also somewhat similar across the institutions, but when added to the support staff salaries, Michigan and Wisconsin rise to the top. Both schools have big-name coaches in both men’s basketball and football, and in each in turn probably have a number of assistants.

Severance payments are a reality in college athletics due to the “coaching carousel” that continues to spin around, with coaches jumping on and off for more money, higher visibility, and a better opportunity to win. The largest severance expense is at the University of Virginia, and that is a result of the school going in a different direction with their men’s basketball program. While former head basketball coach Pete
Gillen’s seven Virginia teams compiled an overall record of 118-93 and competed in five postseason tournaments, he apparently was not winning enough and was fired. Under the terms of his contract, he is receiving a buyout of approximately $2 million, which is reflected in the negative balance of the expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball.

Recruiting budgets are also similar amongst the sample schools, with minor increases in the budgets of Auburn and Georgia. It is interesting to note that these are the two institutions that have been most recently affected by scandal, and as a result may have had to put more resources into recruiting to get prospective athletes to sign with a program experiencing turmoil.

Team travel is another expense that is relatively the same across the board. Geographic location can sometimes help or hinder a team based on the location of the other members in their conference, as is the case for Wisconsin. While most football teams and men’s basketball teams fly to the majority of their games, schools rely on bus transportation for the majority of the trips for their non-revenue generating sports, and for trips that are close to home for the revenue-generating sports. Some institutions have found it cost effective to either purchase and maintain their own jets, or charter private flights for their teams. While they say it is because it is in the best interest of getting student-athletes back to campus in time for early classes, in reality it is a huge boost to their recruiting efforts.

Equipment costs vary based on the number and types of sports offered. While there are facility costs to most sports, like courts for tennis, or a pool for swimming, these are also offered to the general student population and are offset by institutional support,
leaving minimal costs for uniforms, and supplies. North Carolina and Michigan spend slightly more as they sponsor more sports, 28 and 26, respectively.

Game expenses vary based on the number of sports, and the number of competitions hosted by each one. Payments must be made to referees, official scorers, ticket collectors, concession stand workers, ushers, security guards, field crew, parking attendants, announcers, and the like. Georgia spends the most money in this area by far, even though they only have average size facilities.

Expenses for promoting the programs vary across the schools, as does the capacity for their arenas. Expenses incurred in this area would be for schedule cards, game day programs, or promotional items handed out to fans in attendance. The total operating expenses for promotion at the University of North Carolina are considerably less than the rest of the schools since it sells out its home basketball games on an annual basis, and is historically non-competitive in football in the Atlantic Coast Conference: therefore, probably spending less than the other schools that promote that sport.

The two schools that spend money on sports camps also keep the majority of the profits generated as revenue. UCLA brings in $1,870,221 and spends $1,657,755 for a profit of $212,466, while Wisconsin takes in $1,864,703 and spends $1,841,201 to clear $23,502. The advantage of holding these camps on campus is to bring members of the local community closer to the institution, and to showcase the resources the school has to offer. It also helps raise the visibility of the institution in the local area, as well as providing a specific program geared to prospective recruits.

Facilities and maintenance expenses can be related to the size and type of venues in which the teams play. Most Division I-A schools have arenas and stadiums on campus.
Again, certain aspects of the upkeep and renovation costs may be incurred by the institutional budget, as it is a facility that is also used by the general student population. Georgia and UCLA pay the least amount of expenses in this category, while smaller programs like Wisconsin and Virginia spend the most.

Two schools, UNC and Wisconsin, list indirect institutional support as an expense as well, which zeroes out the revenue generated. Only UCLA counts this as a facilities or administrative expense.

Medical expenses vary based on the type and number of sports offered and the severity of injuries suffered by student-athletes during the year. The largest component of this expense is medical insurance premiums for athletes.

Memberships and dues include fees paid to belong to the NCAA, conference affiliations, or coaches associations. The University of North Carolina pays significantly more than the rest of the institutions, with the majority being spent for non-program specific memberships.

Other operating expenses include printing costs, telephone and Internet fees, publication subscriptions, office supplies and furniture, etc. These expenses are not reported in other categories. This is an area of much debate since it is only assumed what these expenses actually are, and the categories attributed to this area are ambiguous. This is also an area where team-specific expenses can be "hidden" to make the financial picture look brighter if necessary.
Overall Financial Picture.

The results are astounding. The number one institution in athletic success, Stanford, actually loses money on their athletic programs, even though they have finished atop the Director’s Cup rankings for the last 12 consecutive years. UCLA, the number one institution in NCAA Championships, located in a large city and major media market, clears a mere $2,455. Table 16 presents a snapshot of what each school generates and spends on athletics, and the difference between the two.

Table 16

Financial Characteristics of Athletics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Name</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Expense</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>$50,918,568</td>
<td>$50,796,753</td>
<td>$121,815</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>$42,156,105</td>
<td>$39,840,367</td>
<td>$2,315,738</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>$60,785,497</td>
<td>$60,218,673</td>
<td>$566,824</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>$41,525,646</td>
<td>$41,784,647</td>
<td>$(259,001)</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>$44,516,613</td>
<td>$44,514,157</td>
<td>$2,456</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>$68,787,384</td>
<td>$44,933,055</td>
<td>$23,854,329</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>$78,424,186</td>
<td>$61,387,144</td>
<td>$17,037,042</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>$49,095,212</td>
<td>$48,707,428</td>
<td>$220,784</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>$62,316,695</td>
<td>$57,409,623</td>
<td>$5,235,173</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisc</td>
<td>$75,293,892</td>
<td>$59,533,584</td>
<td>$95,510</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Used OPE figures as all schools reported.

The top two institutions that make a significant profit are the University of Georgia and the University of Michigan, both schools that are imbalanced. Their grand total of $40,891,371 is over six times the grand total of all five schools that are able to achieve balance, as they only clear $6,213,209. It also goes to show that the playing field
across the Division I-A level is not even since 99 percent of the revenue generated by the imbalanced schools comes from just two programs. Table 17 breaks the sample schools down into two categories, balanced and imbalanced in order to determine which type of institution generates the most revenue.

Table 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Profit of Athletics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imbalanced</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since football and men’s basketball are the programs that generate the most revenue, they are also the programs that spend the most. As a result, each program will be examined independently, and among the rest of the sample schools.

*College football.*

College football is one of the most highly recognized sports and the largest generator of revenue. This is due to its popularity, which increases ticket prices, and the tremendous amount of ticket sales due to the large seating capacity of its stadiums. It also boasts the largest team, since there are usually 85 scholarship athletes on a squad made up of approximately 100 players. However, the costs are also the highest due to the
number of players on the team, the amount of athletic scholarship aid awarded, the cost to transport players, and the equipment they require. Table 18 presents the financial and stadium statistics of each school’s football team.

Table 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College</th>
<th>Revenue Generated</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Revenue</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Expenses</th>
<th>Expense to Revenue Difference</th>
<th>Stadium Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>$40,563,927</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>$16,379,077</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>$24,184,850</td>
<td>87,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>$7,727,680</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>$9,314,704</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>$(1,587,024)</td>
<td>33,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>$33,236,463</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>$10,746,179</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>$22,490,284</td>
<td>107,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>$10,251,632</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>$10,900,533</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>$(648,901)</td>
<td>85,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>$18,835,497</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>$13,219,941</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>$5,615,556</td>
<td>91,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>$50,895,838</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>$12,532,495</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>$38,363,343</td>
<td>92,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>$46,396,107</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>$10,690,874</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>$35,705,233</td>
<td>107,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>$17,548,006</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>$10,569,162</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>$6,978,844</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>$17,304,450</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>$16,812,582</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>$491,868</td>
<td>61,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisc</td>
<td>$34,133,314</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>$21,993,983</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>$12,139,331</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Auburn (80%), Penn State (55%), Georgia (74%), and Michigan (59%), generate the majority of the athletic department’s revenue through the single sport of football. This
is directly related to the seating capacity of their stadiums, as they can fit between 87,000
and 107,000 paying ticket-holders.

The two private schools in the study, Duke and Stanford, both lose money on
football. They generate much less revenue than their public counterparts do, but they
continue to spend about the same.

*Men’s Basketball.*

Basketball teams are much smaller than football teams with approximately 12
scholarship athletes out of approximately 15 players on each team. Equipment costs are
much lower due to the size of the team and minimal need for equipment. Table 19
presents a snapshot of the financial situation and stadium information for each program.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Revenue Generated</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Revenue</th>
<th>Percent of Total Expenses</th>
<th>Expense to Revenue Difference</th>
<th>Stadium/Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>$4,090,066</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>$470,547</td>
<td>Beards-Eaves-Memorial Coliseum 10,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>$12,394,050</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>$4,995,278</td>
<td>Cameron Indoor Stadium 9,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>$5,168,495</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>$2,639,530</td>
<td>Indoor Stadium 15,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>$5,224,432</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>$2,669,798</td>
<td>Maples Pavilion 7,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>$7,845,821</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>$3,831,637</td>
<td>Pauley Pavilion 12,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>$4,216,910</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>$1,419,205</td>
<td>Stroger Coliseum 10,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>$7,661,227</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>$4,459,514</td>
<td>Crisler Arena 13,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>$13,234,321</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>$10,442,044</td>
<td>Dean E. Smith Center 21,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>$8,010,378</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>($1,033,100)</td>
<td>University Hall 8,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisc</td>
<td>$11,954,769</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>$8,847,201</td>
<td>Kohl Center 17,142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The University of North Carolina leads the way in men’s basketball, generating over $15 million and clearing over $10 million after expenses, all the while paying one of the highest coaching salaries in college basketball. However, the notoriety of the coach helps fill the 21,800 seats at the Dean Smith Center, which in turn, generates the revenue. This can also be seen by the proportion of revenue Duke generates, even due to the fact that they play in an arena less than half the size of UNC, but continue to sell out due to...
the popularity of Coach Krzyzewski’s program. These two programs also generate close to 30 percent of the revenue brought in by their respective athletic departments.

Auburn generates the least amount of revenue, and does not make much of a profit on their program, but does not spend much either, as only 7 percent of their total expenses go toward men’s basketball. The University of Virginia is in the red due to the severance payments to its former head coach.

Duke has taken a novel approach to financing its men’s basketball program. The Duke Basketball Venture Capital Co-Investment Fund invests in start-up companies that seem to have a promising future and profits when those companies are acquired or sell shares. The situation is a win-win, as the profits are turned over to the Duke Basketball Program without the University investing anything, and the funders receive a tax deduction for their donation. The current holdings of the fund stand at around $1 million, but the goal is to reach a point to permanently endow the men’s basketball program, which would take about $75 million. The advantage to the university’s athletic department is that they would be able to use their budgets to enhance other sports.

Stanford has a venture capital program similar to Duke, only with much deeper roots, as their program was started over 20 years ago. The Daper Investment Fund (Department of Athletics, Physical Education and Recreation) was started in 1982 and has a current value of approximately $85 million. UCLA also has an interest in the venture capital market, but has not realized a return on the investment as none of the corporations in its portfolio have gone public or been acquired.

The overall financial picture of each program is as diverse as the institutions are themselves. Table 20 presents the financial comparison of football programs and Table
21 presents the statistics of college basketball programs to clarify the role of the premier sports at each institution.

**Table 20**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Revenue Generated</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>Expense to Revenue Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>$40,563,927</td>
<td>$16,379,077</td>
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<td>Duke</td>
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<td>$9,314,704</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>$10,746,179</td>
<td>$22,490,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>$10,251,632</td>
<td>$10,900,533</td>
<td>($648,901)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>$18,835,497</td>
<td>$13,219,941</td>
<td>$5,615,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>$50,895,838</td>
<td>$12,532,495</td>
<td>$38,363,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>$46,396,107</td>
<td>$10,690,874</td>
<td>$35,705,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>$17,548,006</td>
<td>$10,569,162</td>
<td>$6,978,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>$17,304,450</td>
<td>$16,812,582</td>
<td>$491,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisc</td>
<td>$34,133,314</td>
<td>$21,993,983</td>
<td>$12,139,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$276,892,914</td>
<td>$133,159,530</td>
<td>$143,733,384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21

**Financial Comparison of Men's Basketball Programs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Revenue Generated</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>Expense to Revenue Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>$4,090,066</td>
<td>$3,619,519</td>
<td>$470,547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>$12,394,050</td>
<td>$7,400,772</td>
<td>$4,993,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>$5,168,495</td>
<td>$2,228,965</td>
<td>$2,939,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>$5,224,432</td>
<td>$2,554,634</td>
<td>$2,669,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>$7,845,021</td>
<td>$4,023,384</td>
<td>$3,821,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>$4,216,910</td>
<td>$2,797,765</td>
<td>$1,419,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMish</td>
<td>$7,661,227</td>
<td>$3,201,713</td>
<td>$4,459,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>$15,234,321</td>
<td>$4,792,277</td>
<td>$10,442,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>$8,010,378</td>
<td>$9,043,478</td>
<td>$(1,033,100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisc</td>
<td>$11,954,769</td>
<td>$3,907,568</td>
<td>$8,047,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$81,799,669</strong></td>
<td><strong>$43,870,015</strong></td>
<td><strong>$37,929,654</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The two private schools lose money on college football, but make enough money on college basketball to offset the expenses. Auburn does not make much on college basketball, but does not invest much either, which is not an issue since the athletic department is flush with revenue from the football program. The University of Virginia is experiencing a deficit this year due to the severance payment to their former men's basketball coach; however, this is only a temporary situation.

In addition to clarifying the staggering amount of money invested in these two sports, these charts demonstrate that the playing field in Division I-A is highly uneven. The variance in what schools spend and make is not nearly equal. Table 22 presents a comparison of the total profit of each institution.
### Table 22

**Comparison of Total Profit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Expense to Revenue for Football</th>
<th>Expense to Revenue for Men's Basketball</th>
<th>Total Profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>$24,184,850</td>
<td>$470,547</td>
<td>$24,655,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>($1,587,024)</td>
<td>$4,993,278</td>
<td>$3,406,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>$22,490,284</td>
<td>$2,639,530</td>
<td>$25,129,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>($648,901)</td>
<td>$2,669,798</td>
<td>$2,020,897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>$5,615,556</td>
<td>$3,821,637</td>
<td>$9,437,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>$38,363,343</td>
<td>$1,419,205</td>
<td>$39,782,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>$35,705,233</td>
<td>$4,459,514</td>
<td>$40,164,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>$6,978,844</td>
<td>10,442,044</td>
<td>$17,420,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>$491,968</td>
<td>($5,033,100)</td>
<td>($5,541,232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWisc</td>
<td>$12,139,331</td>
<td>$8,047,201</td>
<td>$20,186,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$143,733,384</td>
<td>$37,929,654</td>
<td>$181,663,038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to understand the significance of these results, it is important to recognize that these 10 schools, which represent just 11.7 percent of the Division I-A institutions, make almost $200 million a year on just two sports. While it is a staggering overall figure, it is also important to realize that there is a great difference in the amount of profit at each institution. This is why the arms race in college athletics exists. Schools hedge their bets on the idea of making more money, want to keep up with and surpass their opponents, and are now investing more and more resources into making that happen.
Power – Who has it?

It is then possible to determine exactly where the power lies, and who has the authority to make changes or initiate reform efforts. The next section will look at the key constituents involved in college athletics.

While the president is the public face of an institution and holds the highest position on the internal organizational chart, in reality he or she cannot make final decisions without the support of other key constituents. Due to the large number of constituent groups with vested interest in college athletics, financial and otherwise, power is disseminated both inside and outside of the institution.

Control.

While the president has the most power over finances and policies in the theoretical sense, that is not the truth in practice. The groups with the greatest financial investments have the greatest impact on college athletics. Institutions are happy to collect student fees and ticket revenue from alumni and the general public, but those who make major gifts get the most attention and have the most influence. There are two such groups whose main interaction with college sports revolves around finance: the board of trustees, which both controls the budget and is also comprised of a number of major donors, and the boosters. In some cases, these two roles are already intertwined. Each institution handles these groups, and their interaction with the president of the institution, in different manners.

For example, at Auburn, the board of trustees and the president have quite an intimate relationship. In 2003, Auburn was actually placed on probation by the Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools for micromanagement by the board. Upon calling for the resignation of former President William Walker after numerous indiscretions, and only 19 months in the position, members of the alumni association and faculty also called for the resignation of a trustee. Mr. Robert E. Lowder, also an alumni of the class of 1964, assisted President Walker in circumventing rules and arranging for extra benefits for student-athletes and coaches. However, Mr. Lowder’s fate was not that of deposed president Walker as Mr. Lowder is still a Trustee, and he seems to have made amends to the tune of a $4.2 million gift to the athletic department shortly after Mr. Walker was let go. That gift brought his total giving to Auburn to over $20 million. Not surprisingly, due to his financial involvement, Mr. Lowder has also served on the Board of Trustees for over two decades, dating back to 1983.

According to a report released by an outside review panel in response to this issue, Auburn must deal with the governance problems that have led to years of public controversy, and the resulting probationary period with which they were sanctioned. The report, published by higher education leadership expert James L. Fisher, suggests hiring someone from outside the university, and that major changes to the board’s bylaws should be made, specifically dealing with how trustees are appointed and how long they can serve. The report also criticized the University Senate and Alumni Association for trying to be too involved with running the institution and creating roadblocks for the president.

In 2004, the board of trustees dissolved their athletics committee to encourage the accredititing agency to eliminate the probationary period with which the university had been sanctioned. On paper, this move gave the president full responsibility and control of
the conduct and performance of the Auburn athletics program. However, members of the board will continue to work with the president to create the athletic department’s budget and benchmarks for success. The board’s executive committee and a number of other committees of the board, such as academic affairs, finance, and student affairs, will also continue to review the president’s annual report on athletics.

Interestingly, Walker’s successor, President Edward R. Richardson, was moved into the position of interim president from his role on the institution’s Board of Trustees. His first task was to get the university off probation, and then begin the search for a new leader for the institution. This is an example of the direct influence of the board on the position of president.

Georgia boasts another well-recognized trustee/booster, Mr. Don Leebern, Jr. Leebern attended the University of Georgia and played on the Bulldogs’ football squad. He recently finished his 14th year serving on the state board of regents, and has been appointed for another seven-year term. He was a vocal proponent of the president’s decision to oust Georgia’s former athletic director and long-time coach. While the university has not quantified his financial giving history, he has given at least a half million dollars to fund capital projects. However, he gets just as much media coverage for his non-financial support, as he is living with the gymnastics coach and was reprimanded by the NCAA for letting her use his private jet for a jaunt to New York City with a few members of her team.

This example shows how important it is that the role of trustee and booster is kept separate. Trustees are tasked with looking out for the best interest of the institution as a whole, while boosters tend to be overly involved in the administration and practices of
the athletic department. Merging the two roles can allow institutional resources to be allocated to athletics that may be better used elsewhere. In Georgia’s case, it shows the lack of institutional control, and the absence of leadership and management of both boosters and trustees.

While most institutions acknowledge groups that support them financially, most of them have given them a specific name, and they have shied away from using the term “booster,” since it has negative connotations based on past indiscretions. The North Carolina Educational Foundation is the legal term for this group at the University of North Carolina, but it is commonly known as the Rams Club. UNC had no qualms about asking them for their help in raising over $8 million to bring a big-name football coach to Carolina after the previous coach was fired. Asked to cover $8.05 million in supplemental compensation over the course of the seven-year contract, plus up to a $1.1 million retention bonus if he coaches five consecutive seasons, boosters have stepped up to the challenge to help their team, which has only had three winning seasons out of the last nine years.

This is the second request in four years. Outside assistance was needed in securing Williams’ future as the Tarheels basketball coach. The Rams Club answered the call, and raised over $3.9 million in supplemental compensation to ensure Roy Williams would be the next head coach. At the behest of the athletic director, the Rams Club seems to be at the beck and call of the president. They seem to show their influence the most by exerting financial influence on coaching decisions.

Paul Tudor Jones, II, has donated over $50 million to his alma mater, the University of Virginia, including $35 million to get the basketball arena named after his
father, and to be known as the top booster of the Cavaliers athletic program. However, with only one violation, Virginia has managed it keep its boosters under control.

Compensation. The phrase “money is power” translates seamlessly into college athletics. The levels of compensation indicate who has the highest power in an institution.

Table 23 lists the salaries of each of four leadership positions at an institution: the president, head football coach, head men's basketball coach, and full professor.

Table 23

Comparison of Compensation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Football Coach</th>
<th>Men's Basketball Coach</th>
<th>Full Professor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>$342,600</td>
<td>$2,231,000</td>
<td>$750,000</td>
<td>$95,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>$532,672</td>
<td>$370,200</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
<td>$136,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>$545,016</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>$116,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>$572,750</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>$156,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>$320,000</td>
<td>$881,000</td>
<td>$910,000</td>
<td>$128,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>$558,432</td>
<td>$1,713,000</td>
<td>$700,000</td>
<td>$95,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMich</td>
<td>$742,148</td>
<td>$1,454,619</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
<td>$125,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>$360,906</td>
<td>$311,200</td>
<td>$1,600,000</td>
<td>$115,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>$677,980</td>
<td>$1,785,600</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
<td>$123,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/Wisc</td>
<td>$341,495</td>
<td>$761,600</td>
<td>$700,000</td>
<td>$100,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Coaches compensation include revenue from outside sources in addition to salary
2 Faculty salaries are from 2005-06
3 Penn State did not report per the privacy laws of the state of Pennsylvania
4 Stanford did not report as it is a private school and not obligated to report
5 UCLA figure is for interim Chancellor per UCLA press release of his appointment
Since the positions are market driven, financial compensation is based on the profession, and not on an institutional scale. Salaries of head coaches are compared to their peers instead of their colleagues, as their level of compensation exemplifies the commitment to the program, which in turn influences the perception of the institution as represented in the popular media. Large compensation packages are also offered to coaches who would be coming in after a scandal, or are tasked with cleaning up a program, as they feel it has to be mutually beneficial for the coach and the school. It is interesting to note that Auburn and Georgia, two of the institutions with the highest head football coaching salaries of $2.2 million and $1.7 million respectively, have the lowest mean salaries for full professors ($95,000). Duke and UNC have extremely low coaching salaries for football, which can possibly be reflected by their terrible performance on the field. It is also obvious that they have made a conscious choice to focus on men’s basketball as they pay their head coaches at a level well above their peers.

Presidential compensation is increasingly being subjected to the same scrutiny by potential applicants. Schools have to work hard and create larger packages to attract and retain top candidates. Because of this pressure, and the influence of business-minded trustees, salaries and compensation packages have been rising in value, but still pale in comparison to those of head coaches.

The organizational and reporting structure, financial patterns, and key constituent groups present an outline of where power lies and who holds it. The locus of power is located with those who have little connection with the school, such as head coaches and major donors. Assigning power to those who are not as invested in the institution as they are in their position and moving such a substantial portion of control outside of an
institution is dangerous, and leads to a lack of institutional control as evidenced by the cases mentioned above.

**The President of the Institution**

While the president's role in regulating athletics depends on the school's above mentioned contextual factors, a presidential reprimand or termination is a clear indicator of a problem. In each case, it is important to examine the school's history to determine how the institution has evolved as far as athletics are concerned, and if the president's role in regulating athletic culture, or the occurrence of athletic scandals or fiscal irresponsibility during their tenure, has resulted in the president being reprimanded or terminated.

Table 24 presents specific dimensions of each institution's president. The time they have spent in the position of president, the compensation they receive, and whether or not they have dealt with athletic scandal, is compared to their athletic performance and ability to balance their institutions.
Table 24

Characteristics of the President of the Institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
<th>Athletic Scandal During Tenure</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Director's Cup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auburn</td>
<td>3 yrs</td>
<td>$342,600</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duke</td>
<td>2 1/2 yrs</td>
<td>$352,672</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penn State</td>
<td>11 yrs</td>
<td>$545,016</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>6 yrs</td>
<td>$572,750</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>9 yrs</td>
<td>$348,814</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGA</td>
<td>9 1/2 yrs</td>
<td>$558,432</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMIch</td>
<td>4 1/2 yrs</td>
<td>$742,148</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC</td>
<td>6 yrs</td>
<td>$360,906</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Imbalanced</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UVA</td>
<td>16 1/2 yrs</td>
<td>$677,980</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWsq</td>
<td>5 yrs</td>
<td>$341,495</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The previous experience of a president dictates how they handle athletics, both the positive and negative aspects, and how they deal with scandals. Those who have experienced trying times in their careers tend to emphasize balance more than those who have not.

Some schools search long and hard for a president, as was Auburn’s case. In the end, it all came down to the one who would actually accept the responsibility of straightening out an institution in peril of losing its accreditation. After serving as an interim president for two and a half years during a national search, on September 1, 2006, Dr. Edward R. Richardson was named president by the Board of Trustees, of which he was previously a member. Richardson’s background was in the K-12 system as he was a teacher, principal, superintendent of schools for the Auburn City Board of Education, and then served as the state superintendent before making the move to Auburn University.
Dire circumstances surrounded his appointment, as his predecessor, William F. Walker, resigned after only nineteen months on the job, and a month after an accrediting association put the institution on one year’s probation because of micromanagement by the Board of Trustees. The other major issue playing a role in his dismissal was a clandestine trip to recruit another institution’s head football coach for a position that was not yet open at Auburn.

Dr. Richardson only accepted the role as a temporary assignment. His primary task was to convince the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools to lift the probationary status placed on Auburn University late in 2003. This was accomplished in December of 2004, and then Dr. Richardson turned his attention to positioning Auburn to attract a permanent president with outstanding qualifications.

While Auburn is great at fundraising and generating revenue from football, they are terrible at graduating their students. Only 68 percent of undergraduates and 56 percent of student-athletes leave Auburn with a degree. It is clear that athletics are much more of a priority than academics.

While Duke is known for its legacy of dominance in men’s basketball, in March of 2006, the lacrosse team stole the headlines. The prestigious institution was devastated by allegations that the predominately Caucasian lacrosse team hired an African-American exotic dancer, and then raped her in a house rented by members of the team. The accuser’s validity was challenged from the start, since a dancer who accompanied her refuted her statements about the evening. The coach of the number two team in the country at the time was fired, and the rest of the season was cancelled.
The scandal touched off a firestorm of controversy in the region, revisiting the age-old topics of race and privilege. The court of public opinion tried to determine what really happened, and debated whether it was a case of privileged white boys taking what they wanted, or a stripper who had too much to drink. The only person not involved in the conversation was surprisingly the one who should have been most prominent, the president of the institution.

According to an article covering the fallout from the incident, President Richard Broadhead did not know about the March 14 incident until he read about it in the student newspaper on March 20. He did not discover that the accuser was black until March 24 (Bissinger, 2006, p. 72). Due to the lack of oversight of an already troubled team (the lacrosse team had been the subject of a number of complaints about much more minor offenses), and the lack of attention paid to this specific incident, numerous constituent groups called for Broadhead’s resignation, which he did not tenure, and he continues to lead the institution.

Duke continues to lead the rankings of graduation rates, graduating 94 percent of both the undergraduate population and student-athletes. However, there is a focused effort to prioritize academics, and to have only one major sport and that in men’s basketball, which has only 12 scholarship athletes, as compared to the investment in fielding a competitive football team with 85 scholarship athletes.

Penn State’s case is interesting as President Spanier has been at the helm for over 11 years, and while they have experienced success, there has not been much of an added emphasis on athletics as evidenced by their ranking of 26th, and absence of any
violations. Spanier does a good job at balancing the requirements of the undergraduate students and the student-athletes, graduating 82 percent and 83 percent respectively.

Stanford's president has been in office over six years, and continues to keep both athletics and academics a priority as evidenced by the overall graduation rates for the undergraduate population and student-athletes of 94 percent and 87 percent respectively. While President John L. Hennessy does a great job of graduating students, he does not seem to be concerned with effectively managing the athletic department. This is evidenced by the fact that even though Stanford has maintained their position at the top spot of the Director's Cup for the last 12 consecutive years, they do not make a profit on athletics, and lost over $200,000 during the 2004-05 fiscal year.

Historically, UCLA excels athletically, as evidenced by their number one ranking of NCAA Championships with over 100, but this comes at a significant price, as evidenced by their student-athlete graduation rate of just 49 percent and their six violations. President Carnesale stepped down in 2006 after nine years at the institution.

The University of Georgia (UGA) named Dr. Michael F. Adams the 21st president on June 11, 1997. Adams has both an academic and a political background, and is well-versed in college athletics. He is a member of the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics and recently served a two-year term as President of the Southeastern Conference. In addition, he is the only person to have served as chair of both the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, and the American Council on Education.

The University of Georgia is usually in the news for their domination of their football opponents in the Southeastern Conference; however, during the 2002-03
academic year, basketball took the spotlight. The NCAA investigated allegations of impropriety that were made by an ex-player. As a result, the head coach and his assistant coach, who is also his son, were fired, and the program was slapped with numerous sanctions. The NCAA found proof that the coaches committed academic fraud by giving basketball players grades for classes that never attended, transferred money to recruits, and gave their players “extra benefits” by letting them use the athletic department’s calling card to make phone calls. The men’s basketball team at Georgia was placed on probation for four years, concluding in 2008.

President Adams also made the news when the Athens Banner-Herald published an article that was run by a number of media outlets when it was revealed he personally admitted 119 student-athletes between the fall of 1999 and 2000, though they did not meet even the most basic standards for admission to UGA. Since then, nearly 18 percent of these specially admitted students have dropped out because they were unable to meet the academic requirements set forth by the NCAA. Therefore, it is not surprising that only 51 percent of student-athletes leave UGA with a college degree, which is only 20 percent fewer than the general population’s average of a poor 71 percent.

President Coleman is firmly entrenched in her role at Michigan, having recently completed her fourth year. She began her tenure dealing with the fallout of the booster scandal involving the men’s basketball team. The attention Auburn received for its boosters’ involvement in football player in comparison to the Michigan basketball debacle. Because of the discovery of payments made to players, President Coleman called for Michigan to impose sanctions on itself in November 2002. Penalties included a one-year
postseason ban, and forfeiting 112 regular-season and tournament victories from five seasons, including its victory in the 1992 NCAA semifinal.

The NCAA was satisfied with how Coleman conducted the investigation, and accepted the self-imposed sanctions, but also banned Michigan from another year of postseason play, reduced the number of scholarships the school is allowed to have, and placed the program on probation in 2003. Since that time, Michigan has run a clean program and has held their own in the competitive Big Ten Conference, finishing fourth in the Director’s Cup rankings. Coleman lets student-athletes get away with a 73 percent graduation rate, while the rest of the student body has a solid 85 percent graduation rate.

North Carolina’s president, Dr. James Moeser, has been in office six years, and has run a clean program that consistently finishes in the top ten in the Director’s Cup. While the general student population graduates at a good rate of 83 percent, student-athletes do not fare as well, with only 70 percent attaining a degree.

Throughout his 16-year tenure at the University of Virginia, President Casteen has enforced the academic rigor expected at the institution, graduating 92 percent of undergraduate students. Student-athletes are not held to such high standards, but still graduate at a respectable rate of 83 percent. Historically, Virginia is known to have one of the highest student-athlete graduation rates for public institutions. Nonetheless, they too are on the edge of becoming imbalanced if the gap between graduation rates grows any larger.

President Wiley has been associated with the University of Wisconsin for over 40 years as a student and administrator, and has held the office of president for the last five.
Wisconsin is teetering on the edge of imbalance with a difference of 8 percent as they graduate only 76 percent of their undergraduates and 68 percent of their student-athletes.

Summary of Findings

Finances clearly play a major role in how athletics are handled by the president of an institution. As evidenced by the fact that almost half of the presidents in this study have experienced scandal during their tenure, and still managed to stay in office, athletics is a major force to be dealt with in American higher education, and is not necessarily held to the same ethical standards as other parts of the institution.

While there are numerous stakeholders involved in college athletics, those with the greatest financial investment have the most say in decisions affecting the programs to which they donate. The support of student, faculty and staff, alumni, and the local community is encouraged, but there is not nearly as much emphasis on managing those relationships as there is on cultivating donors.

Only half of the presidents in the study are able to balance athletics and academics, and of those five presidents that achieve balance, two are precipitously close to the edge of imbalance. This does not bode well when applying that percentage to the larger population of Division I-A schools.

If we as a country are to stay true to the underlying mission of educating today’s students to be tomorrow’s leaders, we must ensure that they receive a quality education. The disparity between the graduation rates of student-athletes in the premier sports and the graduation rates of the general student population is atrocious. It is obvious that due to the reporting structure at most institutions, athletes are handled outside of the regular system used to address students who do not perform well academically. Using the
protection of the president, student-athletes are able to maintain the necessary eligibility to compete on the field, while barely acknowledging their academic commitments. This also happens to be a major expense to the athletic department, and an opportunity cost to the institution, as they could fill the spot of a scholarship athlete with a paying student.

In order to align athletics with the mission of the sponsoring institution, presidents should put the same effort into supporting academic performance as they do athletic performance. This could vastly improve their graduation rates, and allow them to graduate true student-athletes, not just athletes who received a free education.
CHAPTER V
Discussion of Findings. Recommendations, and Conclusion

Of the 117 schools in Division I-A, 57 institutions, (49%), did not meet even the disturbingly low national average of a 60 percent undergraduate graduation rate. At the same time, billions of dollars are being invested in college athletics: funds that could be better used educating our youth.

A recent editorial in the New York Times summed up the general issue with college sports today, “The problem is that athletic departments have more influence on university affairs than they should. They often use that influence to undermine the institutional mission” (College Sports Get a Warning, November 6, 2006, p. A20). This is indeed a fact, and something that is not going to change anytime soon.

This study looked at the role of the president in balancing athletics and academics at Division I-A institutions in order to determine whether they have the power to effectively manage achieving both athletic performance and high academic success. While a number of studies have looked into the issues and problems with college athletics, and others have looked at leadership, this study combined the two areas of research to determine where the power to effect change, and demand performance, is located.

In an era of rising costs and dwindling resources, sound financial investments must be made in the areas that will have the greatest return on that investment for the institution. It is just as important that those resources are managed efficiently. Institutions are looking to gain a competitive edge in the highly saturated market of higher education
and are increasingly turning to athletics to raise visibility. While athletics certainly capture attention, they also monopolize much-needed resources. Aside from the financial costs, schools often sacrifice their image at the hands of athletic scandal. It is a reality that college athletics are a major part of American higher education, and that is not going to change at any point in the near future. Nonetheless, college sports can be managed to prevent them from destroying the system.

College athletics have transcended their sponsoring institutions and now operate primarily under the rules and guidelines set forth by their respective conferences and the NCAA, and pay only glancing attention to the particular values or circumstances of their own institutions. Institutions should be reminded that their mission is to educate America’s children, not just to provide entertainment for society as a whole.

While graduation rates across Division I-A are atrocious, with 49 percent of the schools unable to meet the low 60 percent national average of the undergraduate student populations, the glaring differences lie in men’s basketball and football, which is also exactly where the greatest financial investment is made. Graduation rates of 44 percent and 55 percent, respectively, represent the lack of academic performance by student-athletes, and the lack of emphasis on academics by the administration of the institution. It also shows fiscal irresponsibility, since the institution is not realizing a return on the investment of significant financial resources in the athletes’ education.

In order to demonstrate the absurdity of the financial situation, for the 2004-2005 academic year, Duke reported to the US Department of Education that it spent $7.4 million on men’s basketball. Welch Stagg, associate director at the Knight Foundation Commission, marvels at the extraordinarily high amount and asks, “How does providing
that much money to 12 basketball players contribute to Duke’s mission of educating students and student-athletes?” (Karmin, March 13, 2006, p. R4) The possibilities of what an institution could do with the approximate $616,000 investment made in each player are endless.

In the case of college football, if schools are competing to win, why do schools put the most money into a sport that does not even have a national championship? The answer is in the millions of dollars that are available due to the outrageous amounts of money the NCAA takes in from local and national media for the rights to air games, which millions of people will watch. However, in most cases, the revenue generated goes right back into the athletic department’s budget and not that of the institution. Even in those cases, the research indicates that most institutions barely break even.

This study selected a sample of 10 institutions from the 117 members of NCAA Division I-A in order to identify the conditions that help or hinder schools from achieving balance between athletics and academics. Specifically, the role of the president was examined to determine their influence on the process of being able to achieve balance.

A thorough examination of the graduation rates of the general undergraduate population and student athletes at the sample institutions allowed for the difference between the two to be determined. This was the basis for determining whether balance has been achieved at each institution. These variables were then contrasted to the institution’s Director’s Cup ranking to measure athletic success and the NCAA’s list of infractions to determine if they have violated rules in the past, and how frequently it has occurred.
From there, the study looked at organizational structure, finance, and power relationships to determine how each affected the institutions' ability to achieve and maintain balance. Patterns were found in and among the institutions. A summary of the findings is presented below.

Organizational Structure

One of the best ways for college athletics to get back in line with the mission of the institution is to mandate that the organizational or reporting structure of athletics and its auxiliary athletic-focused organizations are aligned with the appropriate academic and executive administration. In most cases, granting autonomy to the athletic department has helped widen the gap between the graduation rates of student-athletes and the general undergraduate population, and has led to an increase in the frequency of scandal. There are also numerous examples of other schools, which were not included in the sample, that make athletics report through other administrative channels, rather than just to the president, which has led to their ability to achieve greater balance.

In this study, it was expected that the balanced institutions had an integrated reporting structure; however, this was not the case. Only two schools, Stanford and Virginia, had completely integrated reporting structures, while the department of athletics at Duke University had an auxiliary report to the provost, but immediately reported to the president. Of the imbalanced institutions, only one had any responsibility to anyone other than the president. Michigan has an oversight committee comprised of alumni, faculty, and students, and which the athletic director is also a member.
It seems that an integrated system achieves better results; however, the sample used in this study is too small to draw a conclusion. Nonetheless, it can be determined that the majority of institutions in Division I-A have autonomous reporting structures and are isolated from the rest of the executive administration, and are protected by the president.

By examining the reporting structure, the positions at the top of the organizational hierarchy were identified, as illustrated by their location on the institution’s organizational chart. Looking at each position more closely and how it relates to the rest of the administration, led to the ability to ascertain the levels of power of each position. However, policy is not always practice. By tracing the financial patterns of each institution, the study determined where the greatest amount of resources are being invested, and who has the power to appropriate and control them.

Finance

Institutions must be forced to clarify their financial reporting processes, and be held accountable for the institutional resources they receive. The amount of resources devoted to athletics is alarming. However, faulty accounting procedures and sketchy reporting structures have created a number of impediments to determining the exact amounts. Schools are putting a great deal of time and money into trying to balance million dollar budgets for departments that fall well outside of their institutional mission. Even schools that win, and win consistently, cannot generate a profit as evidenced by the case of Stanford University, which has finished at the top of the Director’s Cup rankings for 12 consecutive years and lost a quarter of a million dollars.
Billions of dollars are being spent on athletics at the Division I-A level alone. These much-needed resources may be better spent on academic support and programs in order to raise the nation’s embarrassingly low graduation rates for both undergraduate students and student-athletes.

**Dynamics of Power**

College presidents listen to the concerns of alumni or friends of the athletic program as one of the many constituent groups they deal with. However, the way they deal with this specific group has changed, due to its visibility and financial influence. Currently, “University presidents put aside concerns about grumpy alumni and let the violators have it with both barrels… presidents are stepping up and saying integrity counts” (Walker, 2003, May 9, p. 2). While they go through the motions of issuing a response when the opponents of college sports speak up, in reality, they do not have the power to effect change. Presidents deal with one coach, situation, or player on a case-by-case basis, and in conjunction with the athletic director on athletics-related matters. When larger issues, scandals, or financial need arises, the president turns to the board of trustees, who usually advise them as to the direction in which they should go.

As suggested in the Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities report, a president should be able to incorporate characteristics of a collaborative style, with the decisiveness needed in today’s ever-changing world. In order to accomplish the monumental task of reigning in the excess in college sports, reform must be a collaborative effort. Research shows, “In most cases, though, where a college or university has made considerable changes or increased its quality… there has been a
delicate interplay between presidential leadership, faculty initiatives and guidance, and trustee and alumni support” (Keller, 2001, p. 317).

This study demonstrates that it is the situation of the institution, rather than the characteristics of the individual presidents that determine the ability to achieve balance. Well-educated presidents with excellent credentials still experience scandal based on the importance placed on athletic excellence at their institutions. It is also interesting to note that the two presidents with the longest tenure did not finish in the top 10 in the Director’s Cup ranking, which shows that while athletics is certainly important at Penn State and Virginia, it still remains in balance with academics.

Balanced institutions tended to have leaders with longer tenure, and to have placed athletics in a more defined, and secondary role. Leaders of these schools are tasked to manage to keep the culture of the institution on track. They also seemed to be better integrated into, and supported by, the overall structure of the institution. Imbalanced schools tend to be larger, and place an emphasis on athletics. Because of this emphasis, the athletics program tends to be protected from the central administration by allowing the athletic director to report directly to the president. While the networks of each type of institution are made up of different constituents, they both have basically the same philosophy, to align themselves with those of a common interest. In the case of the balanced schools with a greater focus on academics, the faculty and administration are included in decisions regarding the academic performance of student-athletes; while in the case of the imbalanced schools, outside sources were relied on more frequently.

The study reveals that the presidents of institutions of higher education in the United States have very little autonomous power. They exert the majority of their
influence by coordinating their efforts with allies in a political manner much more than ruling by authority. Identifying key constituents in college sports, and whether they report through the institutional structure, enables quantification of the massive financial investment into college athletics. While it is well known that there is a tremendous amount of money invested in college athletics, the sheer volume and outrageous amounts, as well as the lack of financial transparency is astounding. It is amazing that no one really knows exactly how much is invested in college sports today due to the ability to move expenses to institutional budget lines, and the lack of enforcement in reporting figures. Once it was possible to determine who is involved in decisions regarding college sports, and approximately how much money is involved, it was then possible to determine who has the power to regulate college athletics. Because the ability to initiate change is dictated by who controls the financial resources of each institution, the main source of power regarding college sports is located outside of an institution.

Implications for Policy and Practice

On a national level, the severity of the issue must be well documented to capture the attention of those who can influence higher education in America, such as Federal and state lawmakers. On the local level, schools should be made accountable for the significant resources they are investing in athletics and, in the most extreme cases, should be forced to meet certain basic academic requirements in order to remain in Division I-A. However, the NCAA is hesitant to get involved in any institutional or reform efforts to deal with the transparency of financial reporting as they are in the driver’s seat right now, bringing in over half of a billion dollars a year, $564,000,000 according to their latest
financial report. Therefore, institutional leadership, including the board of trustees, must be made to put aside their athletic interests and recognize the severity of the issue and forced to concentrate on graduating students.

It is imperative that the process of calculating and reporting financial figures regarding college athletics change. Without financial transparency, the situation will continue to spiral out of control. A fair reporting system should be implemented to ensure accurate and consistent figures can be obtained. Since the financial windfall associated with college athletics is the primary motivation for participation, an accurate cost-benefit analysis can instrumental in helping programs an institutions plan for the future to ensure they are not monopolizing valuable institutional resources.

As the leader of the institution, those who look up to that position assume that it is up to the president of a college or university to take the responsibility to make changes and implement methods of reform to manage the role of athletics to make sure the institutional mission stands strong. However, due to the dissemination of power both within, and outside of, the institution, the president must collaborate with the peer leaders of each constituent group to move the institution forward. They cannot make decisions alone. Often victims of their own success, presidents tend to fall to the periphery of power as big-name coaches and high-profile programs take over. It is imperative that they use their position to coordinate their allies to keep the best interest of the institution, and not just athletics, at the forefront. Open and honest conversation about the role of athletics in higher education, and the significance of the amount of resources allocated to them, should be discussed at the presidential level. By sharing the financial facts, schools that are striving to attain the unattainable can re-purpose the resources they are investing.
Including academic performance clauses in addition to athletic performance clauses in coaching contracts is another way to re-introduce the importance of academics back into the college athletic experience. Presidents can also include such incentives in their personal contracts to show their commitment to academic achievement.

Suggestions for Future Research

There was an overall lack of academic research on the role of athletics as pertains to the culture and management of the institution; and (other than reporting them) little on the severity of the situation regarding student-athlete graduation rates. Additionally, there seemed to be minimal coverage on the exorbitant amount of money invested in college sports. Facts and figures were mentioned: but patterns have not been explored, nor have recommendations been made on a more viable use of the institutional resources. It was apparent that college sports have defined their role in American culture, and other than the voices of a few faculty members, people have stopped asking why.

There were a few other limitations of the study. The body of literature concerning college athletes is extensive, but rife with opinion and speculation. Therefore, in most cases, popular media articles and stories, which only reported events, but did not offer interpretations, were used. Opinion and editorial pieces were referred to as such in very few instances. It was also for this reason, to eliminate bias and opinion, that personal interviews were not conducted. In addition, as there is no concrete policy for reporting revenue and expenses, the ability to compare financial reports between institutions was hindered. Therefore, two separate sets of figures were used to be able to draw comparisons as to the amount each institution actually reported.
It is imperative that transparent financial systems are integrated into college athletics. Salaries, operating costs, and facility improvements cannot continue to spiral out of control due to the lack of regulation in the industry. In order to preserve the integrity of college athletics, the true social and financial costs of funneling so much money into athletics must be determined. Are music programs being cut? Are financial aid packages for non-athletes smaller? Have the number of full-time faculty members decreased? Granted, a large portion of the money invested in college athletics comes from outside sources, but the investment of the institution is quite significant as well.

Along these lines, it must also be determined how athletics affect the overall bottom line of an institution. The impact on admissions, and even retention should be studied to determine whether the excuse they use that they help raise visibility is actually valid. As shown, athletic departments themselves rarely make a profit, and often lose money, so the intangible effects should also be determined and measured to determine if the impact is significant and sustained.

As part of the larger picture, the inability to graduate students must be examined to determine exactly why graduation rates are so low. By determining if it is access to information, or financial assistance that hinders students from completing their degree, institutional policies or procedures could change to help share pertinent information or explain financial options more clearly. If mobility is the issue, it is important to determine how that affects overall graduation rates as well.

The most important social aspect to examine is what happens to these athletes once they exhaust their eligibility, fail to meet academic standards, or are injured and are
unable to stay in school. The impact of being “used” by the industry of college athletics must be measured to find out what happens to the 98% of college basketball and football players who do not go on to play professionally, and in most cases leave without attaining a degree.

Conclusion

The president of a college or university holds the position of highest power, but does not have the actual ability to demand or impose change. However, he or she does have the power to influence athletics, as shown by the allocation of resources, or overriding admission standards. The constituents with the greatest influence on college athletics are the head coaches of the premier sports, and the top donors to the institution who more often than not also have a seat on the board of trustees. In essence, the power to control college athletics has moved outside of the sponsoring institution, which is a very dangerous place for it to be.

In order to maintain dominance in the arena of higher education, American institutions must begin to be accountable for the huge investments they are making in college athletics. There is a desperate need to know exactly what institutions are spending, and why they are spending it. Historically, college sports have been looked at as an endeavor for the good of the institution. Their impact needs to be quantified in order to make sure resources are not being wasted.

Those with the power to effect change need to realize that American higher education is in a state of crisis. As evidenced by the special admission case of Georgia, or academic fraud at Auburn, or the horrific 38 percent difference in student-athlete
graduation rates at UCLA, there is a blatant disregard for academic performance, accompanied by a lack of integrity, at a number of Division I-A institutions. The financial situation at most schools is also spiraling out of control. There is a need for presidents to look outside of their own institution at the landscape across the country in order to see that the real cost of college athletics is that students are not graduating, while resources are being poured into a team that plays 12 games a year. The costs of Division I sports programs have escalated at a rate two to three times faster than the other expenses of an institution, and demand a greater portion of institutional resources. This is not a practice that can be sustained.

By identifying the appropriate role and place of college athletics, the ability to instigate strategic reform efforts of college athletics in colleges and universities in the United States can be achieved by coordinating the organizational structure, finances, and power designated to college athletics.

Responsibility and accountability must be returned to the office of the president at colleges and universities, in order to relocate the power structure inside the sponsoring institution. While it can, and should be, a collaborative effort, there needs to be a clear leader who garners the necessary respect that resides inside each institution in order to control the amount of influence athletics is allowed to have.
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Appendix A
Definition of Key Terms

Athletic Department -- The administrative division of the institution that oversees intercollegiate athletics. The athletic department is responsible for all intercollegiate athletic teams and coaches. The athletic department manages everything from scheduling games, to ordering apparel, and making sure game day responsibilities are carried out. The senior administration usually consists of an athletic director, a senior women’s administrator to oversee women’s sports and Title IX compliance, and a compliance officer to ensure NCAA standards are met. Various other members of the administration oversee areas such as strength and conditioning coaches that work with multiple teams, health training facilities for injured athletes, academic advising departments that cater specifically to athletes, ticket and marketing officers, and facility managers. This area is also known as Athletics, or the Department of Athletics.

Athletic Director -- The highest position in the athletic department, usually reports to the vice president for student affairs, or in some cases, the president. This position is also known as the Director of Athletics.

Board of Trustees -- The governing board of the institution, comprised of members from outside the sponsoring school. In the organizational structure of the institution, the
president reports to the board, which can also be referred to as a Board of Regents, Visitors, or Overseers.

Division I-A -- To understand the scope of Division I-A institutions, the types of criteria that must be met for schools to be members of Division I-A follow: sponsor seven sports for men and women, or six and eight, respectively; minimum attendance requirements of 17,000 attendees per home football game, or an average of 20,000 for the last four years; contest and participant minimums and scheduling requirements for the sports of each gender.

Intercollegiate Athletics -- Institutional teams that compete against other college level teams from other schools; refers to the complete gamut of sports that an institution fields, such as higher-profile sports like basketball or football to lower-profile sports such as swimming or gymnastics. Other colloquial terms are college sports, athletics, or college athletics.

National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) -- Governing body of intercollegiate athletics for approximately 1,038 member institutions. There are 100 athletic conferences divided into five divisions, (Division I-A, I-AA, I-AA, II, and III), that make up the NCAA (Postsecondary Education Opportunity, 2004, p. 2).

Title IX -- The abbreviation for the Title IX Amendment of the Higher Education Act of 1972. Title IX mandates that institutions provide equal opportunity for men and
women to participate in athletics. However, since only a handful of women’s teams across the country actually generate revenue, these programs are seen as a drain on institutional resources. While football usually generates the most revenue to support these programs, it is also seen as a possible detriment to an institution due to the fact that there are usually around 85 players on a team, and if a school sponsors a football team, they must also then sponsor the same number of spots on women’s teams. This causes the size of the athletic department to increase, creating issues as far as physical plant and facilities are concerned. Consequently, additional revenue must be generated in order to subsidize the operation of a larger athletic department.
Appendix B
Case Studies

Auburn University – www.auburn.edu

Public – Carnegie Classification = Doctoral/Research Extensive
Size = 18,140
More Selective

Academic Rating = 71; Education & Engineering,
Undergrad Graduation Rate – 68%
Student-Athlete Graduation Rate – 56%
Difference between Graduation Rates – 12%
Director’s Cup Ranking - 17
Number of NCAA Violations – 7

Athletics at Auburn

Auburn has won 11 NCAA Team championships, but not in the sports you would
guess, 10 were in swimming and diving, and one was in track and field. Auburn was
named a national champion in football by at least one organization in 1913, 1957, 1983,
and 1993. Auburn is known for its prominence in football and baseball in the
Southeastern Conference.

Of Auburn’s seven violations, football was cited five times, men’s basketball
three times, and men’s tennis once. The most recent violation was assessed on April 27,
2004. On April 26, 2006, Auburn’s men’s basketball team completed its second year of probation for recruiting violations it committed, specifically for cultivating a relationship with a sponsor and sports agent who supported a local amateur team in order to entice selected high-school players on the team to go to Auburn.

However, the most recent scandal involved independent study classes, in which athletes were assigned passing grades for completing very little actual work. During the summer of 2006, a sociology chair was publicly accused by a colleague of giving preferential treatment to athletes. Another professor in the adult education program was reprimanded as well for the same offenses. As a result, both professors were forced to resign from their administrative positions, but remain on the faculty, and a new policy regarding independent study programs was put into effect. Subsequently, an internal audit also found that an athlete’s grade had been changed without the knowledge of the professor, to give the scholarship athlete the 2.0 minimum grade point average needed to graduate.

Organizational Structure at Auburn

There is a page created on the university site for the organizational chart, http://www.auburn.edu/administration/human_resources/hrorg.htm; however, when it loads there is an error message saying that it cannot be found. The athletics site has a staff directory, but it is listed alphabetically by last name, and not by department or reporting structure. It can be assumed that the president reports to the Board of Trustees, due to the media coverage of the recent scandals and the issues with the previous president, which will be explained further in the Power at Auburn section below.
Finance at Auburn

Revenue

Reported to NCAA: $50,923,068
Reported to OPE: $50,918,568
Difference: $4,500
Revenue generated by football/percentage of total revenue: $40,563,927/80%
Revenue generated by men’s basketball/percentage of total revenue:
$4,090,066/8%

Expenses

Reported to NCAA: $50,801,253
Reported to OPE: $50,796,753
Difference: $4,500
Expenses for football/percentage of total expenses: $16,379,077/32%
Expenses for men’s basketball/percentage of total expenses: $3,619,519/7%

Expense to Revenue Difference

Expense to revenue difference for football: $24,184,850
Expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball: $470,547
Expense to revenue total: $121,315
In April of 2006, Auburn signed a nine-year $51.3 million deal with ISP Sports for their multimedia and marketing rights. Their athletic director acknowledged that the deal will cover all sports, but the primary interest of fans and advertisers is in football.

*Power at Auburn*

The President - Edward R. Richardson - $342,600

Public funds - $325,000; $16,250 car allowance provided by state; 1 house provided by state; $1,350 retirement pay

The president reports to the Auburn University Board of Trustees. After serving as an interim president for two and a half years, on September 1, 2006, Dr. Edward R. Richardson was named president by the Board of Trustees.

Richardson came into the presidency from a role on the Board of Trustees. His background was in the K-12 system as he was a teacher, principal, superintendent of schools for the Auburn City Board of Education, and then the state superintendent before making the move to Auburn University.

His predecessor, William F. Walker, resigned after only nineteen months on the job, and a month after an accrediting association put the institution on one year’s probation because of micromanagement by the Board of Trustees. The other major issue playing a role in his dismissal was a clandestine trip to recruit another institution’s head football coach for a position that was not yet open at Auburn.

Dr. Richardson only accepted the role as a temporary assignment. His primary task was to convince the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools to lift the probationary status placed upon Auburn University late in 2003. This was accomplished
in December of 2004. Then Dr. Richardson turned his attention to positioning Auburn to
attract a permanent president with outstanding qualifications. He also announced his
retirement effective December 2006.


After being associated with the Auburn Athletic Department for over 20 years as
a student-athlete, coach, and administrator, on December 22, 2004, Jacobs was named
Athletic Director.

During his short tenure, Auburn signed two major deals, one with Under Armour
Performance Apparel to be the official outfitter of the University's athletic teams, and a
nine-year extension to the current multi-media rights contract they have with ISP Sports.
The Under Armour contract is worth over $10.6 million in sponsorship, product, and
additional benefits, and will provide Auburn's athletic teams Under Armour uniforms,
cleats, apparel, and accessories. The ISP deal includes revenue to the Athletics
Department of an average of more than $5.8 million annually, which is more than double
the previous contract of nearly $2.4 million per year.

Auburn Tigers have claimed five national championships under Jacobs, including
a school-record four titles in 2005-06 and six Southeastern Conference titles in the two
years he has been at the helm of the program.

Head Football Coach – Tommy Tuberville – $2,231,000

Salary - $235,000; other income - $1,996,000; maximum bonus $716,154
Tuberville was named head coach of the Tigers in November of 1998. He has led Auburn to the most wins in school history (13), the Sugar Bowl title, and its first SEC Championship since 1989 during the 2005 season. Auburn has also won five SEC Western Division titles and has made six consecutive bowl appearances from 2000-05 under his tenure. The 2006 team finished at 6-2 in the Southeastern Conference, and 11-2 overall.

Tuberville is also being paid approximately $1.5 million under provisions related to the ISP deal for radio, television, and personal appearances.

According to his contract, Tuberville is guaranteed financial incentives for winning games, conference titles and national championships, and is given two new cars, with gas, insurance, and maintenance taken care of. He also has an annual entertainment allowance of $25,000. Since the incident with former president Walker, a clause has been added that he will be informed if they are going to speak with other coaches about his position.

Head Basketball Coach – Jeff Lebo – $750,000

Lebo was named the Tigers’ 19th head basketball coach in April of 2004. The Auburn basketball program has not enjoyed the same success as the football team, as they finished 14-17 in 2004-05, (4-12 in the Southeastern Conference and in tenth place), and eleventh in the 12-team SEC at 14-14 (5-11 in the Southeastern Conference), in 2003-04.

Influential Constituent Groups

The Board of Trustees
As you can see, the board and the president have a quite intimate relationship at Auburn. Upon calling for the resignation of president Walker, members of the alumni association and faculty also called for the resignation of Trustee Mr. Robert E. Lowder. Mr. Lowder has served on the Board since 1983, and provided the transportation for the trip Mr. Walker took to interview the football coach. However, Mr. Lowder’s fate was not that of Mr. Walker’s as Mr. Lowder is still a Trustee, and seems to have made amends to the tune of a $4.2 million gift to the athletic department shortly after Mr. Walker was let go.

According to a report released by an outside review panel led by higher education leadership expert James L. Fisher, Auburn must deal with the governance problems that have led to years of public controversy, and the probationary period with which they were sanctioned. The report suggests hiring someone from outside the university, and major changes to the board’s bylaws, specifically how trustees are appointed and how long they can serve. The report also criticized the University Senate and Alumni Association for trying to be too involved with running the institution and creating roadblocks for the president.

In 2004, the board of trustees dissolved their athletics committee to encourage the accrediting agency to eliminate the probationary period with which the university had been sanctioned. On paper, this move gave the president full responsibility and control of the conduct and performance of the Auburn athletics program. However, members of the board will continue to work with the president on creating the athletics budget and benchmarks for success. The board’s executive committee and a number of other
committees of the board, such as academic affairs, finance, and student affairs, will also continue to review the president's annual report on athletics.

Boosters

Auburn is about as well known for its boosters as it is for its athletic program. After a former coach went on the record a few years ago to document his knowledge of payments being made to prized recruits, the boosters of Auburn have been scrutinized much more closely. The most notorious Auburn booster is Mr. Bobby Lowder, a graduate of the class of 1964. It is estimated that Lowder has given over $20 million to his alma mater, at which he is also on the board of trustees, and has been since 1983. Since then, he has fought to hold his position, doling out campaign contributions to government officials who may wish to challenge him, advising numerous hiring searches from the coaching staff to the president, and exerting the power he has over his fellow trustees as one of the most influential businessmen in Alabama and that to make sure there are no surprises when issues come to a vote.
Duke University – www.duke.edu

Private - Carnegie Classification = Doctoral/Research Extensive
Size = 6,195
Most Selective
Academic Rating = 95; Economics, Psychology & Public Policy Analysis
Undergrad Graduation Rate – 94%
Student-Athlete Graduation Rate - 94%
Difference between Graduation Rates – 0%
Director’s Cup Ranking - 5
Number of NCAA Violations – 1

Athletics at Duke

Duke basketball is nationally known for its premier players and big-name coaches, in reality, Duke has only won three national championships in the sport, and eight in all. The women’s golf team accounts for half of them and men’s soccer rounds out the group. Duke only committed one violation, assessed to the men’s basketball team for utilizing improper recruiting methods in 1972.

While Duke is known for its legacy of dominance in men’s basketball, in March of 2006, the lacrosse team stole the headlines. The prestigious institution was rocked by allegations that the predominately Caucasian lacrosse team hired an African-American exotic dancer, and then raped her in a house rented by members of the team. The accuser’s validity was challenged from the start since a dancer who accompanied her refuted her statements about the evening. The coach of the number two team in the
country at the time was fired, and the rest of the season was cancelled. The scandal touched off a firestorm of controversy in the region, revisiting the age-old topics of race and privilege. The court of public opinion tried to determine what really happened, and debated whether it was a case of privileged white boys taking what they wanted, or a stripper who had too much to drink. The only person not involved in the conversation was surprising the one who should have been most prominent, the president of the institution. According to an article covering the incident, Richard Broadhead did not know about the March 14 incident until he read about it in the student newspaper on March 20. He did not discover that the accuser was black until March 24 (Bissinger, 2006, p. 72).

The Duke football team is known as a perennial doormat in the Atlantic Coast Conference. Women’s soccer is also a very strong program at Duke.

Organizational Structure at Duke

Duke’s athletic director has an interesting reporting structure as he reports directly to the President, with an auxiliary report to the Provost. However, this allows him to remain autonomous from the rest of the central university administration.

Finance at Duke

Duke only reports to the Office of Postsecondary Education as it receives federal financial aid, because it is a private school is not obligated to report to the NCAA.
Revenue
Reported to OPE: $42,156,105
Revenue generated by football/percentage of total revenue: $7,727,680/18%
Revenue generated by men’s basketball/percentage of total revenue:
$12,394,050/29%

Expenses
Reported to OPE: $39,840,367
Expenses for football/percentage of total expenses: $9,314,704/23%
Expenses for men’s basketball/percentage of total expenses: $7,400,772/19%

Expense to Revenue Difference
Expense to revenue difference for football: ($1,587,024)
Expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball: $4,993,278
Expense to revenue total: $2,315,738

It is interesting to note that Duke has taken a novel approach to financing its
tmen’s basketball program. The Duke Basketball Venture Capital Co-Investment Fund
invests in start-up companies that seem to have a promising future and profits when those
companies are acquired or sell shares. The situation is a win-win, as the profits are turned
over to the Duke Basketball Program without the University investing anything, and the
funders receive a tax deduction for their donation. The current holdings of the fund stand
at around $1 million, but the goal is to reach a point to permanently endow the men’s

175
basketball program, which would take about $75 million. The advantage to the university’s athletic department is that they would be able to use their budgets to enhance other sports.

Power at Duke

The President - Richard H. Brodhead - $532,672

Base pay - $500,000; benefits - $32,672; expense account - $3,688

On July 1, 2004, after a 32-year career at Yale University, Richard H. Brodhead became Duke’s ninth president. Brodhead has an academic background. The president reports to the Board of Trustees. While the lacrosse scandal certainly tarnished his image, and there was some objection to him staying in office, he has maintained his post.

The Athletic Director - Joe Alleva - http://goduke.com/

Alleva has been a member of the Duke athletic department since 1980 and was named the school’s sixth director of athletics on February 25, 1998. Duke garnered five of their eight national championships, and 40 ACC Championship titles under Alleva’s guidance. Duke also finished in the Top 25 in the Director’s Cup seven times, with three Top Ten rankings.

Head Football Coach – Ted Roof – $370,200

Roof was named the 20th head coach of the Blue Devils in December of 2003. They finished 0-12 in 2006, and 1-10 in 2005, and have languished near the bottom of the rankings in the Atlantic Coast Conference for years.
Head Men’s Basketball Coach – Mike Krzyzewski - $1.5 million

Coach K, as he is referred to in the popular media, is not only a coach, he is an icon. Aside from leading the Blue Devils to victory, he appears in American Express commercials, among many others, serves on the board of many high-visibility charities, and is a motivational speaker and leadership coach.

At the beginning of the 2006-07 season, Coach K owns a 753-250 career record in 31 years of coaching while attaining a 680-191 mark in 26 seasons at Duke. Some of the highlights include: Three national championships in 1991, 1992, and 2001; 12 National Coach of the Year honors; 10 Final Four appearances (finishing third on the all-time list); 16 ACC Tournament championships and 68 NCAA Tournament victories (first on the all-time list). He has taken his program to postseason play in 23 of his 26 years at Duke and is the winningest active coach in NCAA Tournament play with a stunning 68-19 record. Coach K has also led Duke to the top spot in the AP poll ranking in 13 seasons, including eight of the last nine seasons. Coach K also served his country and his alma mater, the US Military Academy, as he began his head coaching career there.

Aside from his accomplishments as a coach at Duke, he has already been enshrined at the Naismith Basketball Hall of Fame, and has served for years on the USA Basketball selection committee and as a coach for the Olympic team. In 2000, his home court at Cameron Indoor Stadium was named Coach K Court in his honor for all he has done for the institution, which is not a common honor for someone who is still actively coaching.

Upon visiting Coach K’s personal website, www.coachk.com, you can of course get highlights about Duke, but also see how Coach K has contributed to the local
community, obtain motivational quotes from him, and see how extensive his on-going involvement with the local and national media is.

Influential Constituent Groups

The Fans

Students at Duke are extremely dedicated to the basketball program. They actually camp out in “Krzyzewskiville,” a tent community named after Coach K, erected each season outside of Cameron Indoor Stadium for students wanting to get a head start on securing entrance to games. These fans are referred to as “Cameron Crazies” and are regarded as some of the best fans in all of sports, but pay a significant ticket cost for the opportunity to do. As most are children accustomed to privilege, they pay the price, but also expect a voice in the decision-making process. When Duke coaches wanted the student section moved further away from the court, students protested, and eventually an amicable compromise was made.

Alumni and Friends

Whereas some institutions turn to boosters to support their programs, Duke calls upon its extensive list of alumni that are scattered throughout the medical profession, pro sports leagues, and at the head of international corporations throughout the world. Such was the case in response to the allegations sanctioned against the lacrosse team. In the blink of an eye, former US President Bill Clinton’s personal attorney was at the disposal of the accused.
Penn State University – www.psu.edu

Public–Carnegie Classification = Doctoral/Research Extensive
Size = 33,975
More Selective
Academic Rating = Did not report per state law
Undergrad Graduation Rate – 82%
Student-Athlete Graduation Rate – 83%
Difference between Graduation Rates – 1%
Director’s Cup Ranking – 20
Number of NCAA Violations – 0

Athletics at Penn State

Penn State has won 30 NCAA national championships to stand at number 10 on the all-time Division I Championship Leaders list. Men’s gymnastics accounts for more than a third (11), fencing accounts for 10 more, men’s boxing, cross country, volleyball and wrestling, and women’s lacrosse and volleyball round out the winners. Overall, the school boasts 58 national championships, including titles won before NCAA participation, and in competition in other athletic associations.

Football reigns supreme in Happy Valley, PA and Joe Paterno, the head football coach, is revered by many for his success with players both on and off the field. Penn State has been named a national champion in the sport seven times: in 1911, 1912, 1969, 1981, 1982, 1986, and 1994. Penn State’s history seems to be spotless, the most incriminating event was actually perpetrated by the cheerleaders, as they were questioned...
by police in September 2004 to determine their role after a woman filed a complaint that she was plastered with Penn State Nittany Lions football stickers.

Organizational Structure at Penn State

At Penn State, the department of Intercollegiate Athletics reports directly to the president. It should be noted that intercollegiate athletics, along with governmental affairs, and the NCAA faculty representative, are outside of the rest of the reporting structure for the institution. Penn State was the only institution in the study to identify the NCAA faculty representative as such on their organizational chart.

Finance at Penn State

Penn State also only reports to the Office of Postsecondary Education because it receives Federal financial aid, however, it is a public school, but is not obligated to report to the NCAA per Pennsylvania state privacy laws.

Revenue

Reported to OPE: $60,785,497

Revenue generated by football/percentage of total revenue: $33,236,463/55%
Revenue generated by men’s basketball/percentage of total revenue: $5,168,495/9%

Expenses

Reported to OPE: $60,218,673
Expenses for football/percentage of total expenses: $10,746,179/18%
Expenses for men’s basketball/percentage of total expenses: $2,528,965/4%

Expense to Revenue Difference

Expense to revenue difference for football: $22,490,284
Expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball: $2,639,530
Expense to revenue total: $566,824

Power at Penn State

The President - Graham Spanier - $545,016

Public funds - $545,016: 1 car provided by the state; 1 house provided by the state

Penn State's 16th president, Dr. Graham Spanier, was appointed in 1995. Dr. Spanier is known for extensive involvement with PSU students, as he is an advisor to the Penn State Performing Magicians, he is a participant in the intramural program, and even dons the Nittany Lion mascot suit on occasion, among many other examples. President Spanier is also the host of "To the Best of My Knowledge," a live, call-in program on public television and radio in which he and his guests field questions about higher education issues or topics of local and national interest.

President Spanier has an academic background that is balanced with extensive committee and volunteer work on many boards and committees concerned with intercollegiate athletics, technology, higher education, and children’s causes.

The President reports to the Board of Trustees.
Curley is a Penn State graduate and has been a member of the athletics staff for more than 25 years. On December 30, 1993, Curley was named Director of Athletics. During his time at the helm of the athletic program, the Nittany (men’s) and Lady (women’s) Lions teams have captured 11 NCAA Championships, 38 Big Ten titles and numerous individual national and conference crowns. In 2004-05, 20 Penn State teams were represented in their respective NCAA Championships, with five teams finishing in the Top 10. Three Lady Lions teams also won Big Ten championships: soccer, swimming and diving and volleyball.

Curley is a staunch supporter of rules and guidelines as can be evidenced by his welcome page on the website, which lists the code of conduct, vision statement and overriding goals of the athletic department. He frequently mentions these items in media interviews, and the results are in the proving. Penn State does not have any NCAA violations, and boasts an 83 percent student-athlete graduation rate, well above the 62 percent national average. Penn State and Virginia tied for the sixth-highest graduation rate overall among the nation’s 117 Division I-A institutions.

Curley’s webpage is also proud to proclaim that during a 2004 visit to the University Park campus, NCAA President Myles Brand stated, “Penn State is the poster child for doing it right in college sports.”
Paterno is a legend in college football. Entering the 2006 season, he began his 41st year as head coach of the Nittany Lions, and his 56th year associated with the team. During the 2001 season, he became the leader in career wins by a major college coach.

In 2005, the Nittany Lions earned an 11-1 record, captured the Big Ten Championship, and then beat Florida State in the FedEx Orange Bowl. The 11-win season represented another milestone. Penn State earned at least 10 victories under Paterno in a fifth different decade and for the 19th time overall. Penn State went on to finish at 9-4 in 2006.

Aside from his longevity and winning ways, Paterno is known for his individual attention given to players, always seeing that his student-athletes attend class, devote the proper time to their studies, and graduate with a meaningful degree. Paterno professes that he measures team success not by athletic prowess on the field, but by the number of productive citizens who make a contribution to society.

DeChellis was raised in Pennsylvania, graduated from Penn State, and returned to join the program as the 11th head coach in 2003. DeChellis was brought in to rebuild the team, and in 2004-05, he led Penn State to its most overall wins with 15, most non-conference wins with eight, most Big Ten wins with six, first Big Ten Tournament win and first post-season appearance (National Invitation Tournament) in five seasons.
DeChellis is a believer in Curley’s philosophy and demands performance in the classroom, and involvement in the community.

_influential Constituent Groups_

Penn State chose to lead by example, as evidenced by its spotless violations record. The characteristics of integrity, leadership qualities, and high standards as evidenced by the numerous codes of conduct inspire those who want to be associated with the program to follow the rules. As a result, the program has achieved sustained success.
Stanford – www.stanford.edu

Private - Carnegie Classification = Doctoral/Research Extensive
Size = 6,646
Most Selective
Academic Rating = 97; Economics & Political Science and Government
Undergrad Graduation Rate – 94%
Student-Athlete Graduation Rate – 87%
Difference between Graduation Rates – 7%
Director’s Cup Ranking - 1
Number of NCAA Violations – 0

Athletics at Stanford

Stanford has racked up an impressive 104 national championships, including 92 in
the NCAA to finish second on the all-time Division I Championship Leaders list.
Stanford also has an unprecedented string of 12 consecutive Director’s Cup titles, as it
finished first in the nation 1995-2006. 1926 and 1940 saw Stanford named national
champions in football as well.

While they do not have any major violations, the only blemish on Stanford’s
NCAA resume is that the mascot was reprimanded, fined and suspended for conduct
during the 2006 NCAA Division I Women’s Basketball Championship in Denver as it
was not a first offense.
Organizational Structure at Stanford

At Stanford, the director of athletics clearly reports to the provost, who reports directly to the president. The director of athletics also has an obligation to report financial operations information to the vice provost for budget and auxiliaries management.

Finance at Stanford

Stanford is also a private school; therefore, it is not obligated to report to the NCAA. The information reported to the OPE is below.

Revenue

Reported to OPE: $41,525,646
Revenue generated by football/percentage of total revenue: $10,251,632/25%
Revenue generated by men’s basketball/percentage of total revenue:
$5,224,432/13%

Expenses

Reported to OPE: $41,784,647
Expenses for football/percentage of total expenses: $10,900,533/26%
Expenses for men’s basketball/percentage of total expenses: $2,554,634/6%

Expense to Revenue Difference

Expense to revenue difference for football: ($648,901)
Expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball: $2,669,798
Expense to revenue total: ($259,001)

Stanford has a venture capital program similar to Duke, only with much deeper roots, as their program was started over 20 years ago. The Daper Investment Fund (Department of Athletics, Physical Education and Recreation) was started in 1982 and has a current value of approximately $85 million.

**Power at Stanford**

**The President - John L. Hennessy - $572,750**

*Base pay - $571,837; benefits - $913; expense account - $43,254*

Stanford’s 10th president is John Hennessy. Hennessy joined the Stanford faculty in 1997, rose through the ranks from faculty member to department chair to dean to provost, and was inaugurated president in October of 2000. Hennessy has an academic background as well, in information technology. The President reports to the Board of Trustees.


Bowlsby joined the Stanford staff on July 10, 2006, after an illustrious 15-year career at the University of Iowa. Bowlsby is the institution’s sixth athletic director.
Head Football Coach – Walt Harris – Not Reported (private school)

Harris took over the football duties in December of 2004, and had not seen much success in his first two seasons, as he went 5-6 in 2005, and 1-11 in 2006, which resulted in him being dismissed after just two years in the job.

If the range of head football coach total compensation in the Pacific-10, (according to the USA Today survey), is $599,000 to $2.7 million, (including powerhouse USC), it is safe to say Stanford falls somewhere in the middle. Stanford attracted Harris from a prominent institution, is a top-tier university, and is spending $10 million on its program.

Head Men’s Basketball Coach – Trent Johnson – Not Reported (private school)

Johnson was an assistant coach at Stanford for three years, went to the University of Nevada to gain some head coaching experience, and then became the 16th head men's basketball coach at Stanford in May of 2004. In his short tenure, he led Stanford to its 11th consecutive NCAA post-season tournament appearance. For 2005-06, Johnson’s team finished with an 18-13 overall record and 11-7 mark in the Pac-10, good for a third place finish in the Conference. In his first year, the squad went 16-14 overall, 11-7 in the conference, and was shut out of the NCAA Tournament, but received a postseason invite to the NIT Tournament.
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) – www.ucla.edu

Public - Carnegie Classification = Doctoral/Research Extensive
Size = 24,970
Most Selective
Academic Rating = 74; Economics, Political Science and Government, & Psychology
Undergrad Graduation Rate – 87%
Student-Athlete Graduation Rate - 49%
Difference between Graduation Rates – 38%
Director’s Cup Ranking - 3
Number of NCAA Violations – 6

Athletics at UCLA

UCLA ranks first on the all-time NCAA Division I Championship Leaders list with 99, and 120 total. Men’s basketball gets the greatest amount of national visibility due to their 11 championship titles. Their only national championship in football occurred in 1954.

UCLA has six major violations, three apiece assessed to men’s basketball and football, and one for softball, men’s indoor track, and men’s outdoor track. The most recent case is the men’s basketball team being put on a three-year probation in 1998 for improper recruiting, extra benefits, and unethical conduct. Women’s softball was put on a three-year probation the year before for excessive financial aid awards to three softball players. They were also banned from participating in post-season tournaments for a year.
Organizational Structure at UCLA

In UCLA’s case, it was more about what the organizational chart did not report, as there was no representation of who athletics would fall under. By going to the directory on the athletic website, the reporting structure defined in the department director showed that the director of athletics is under the chancellor of the university.

Finance at UCLA

Revenue

Reported to NCAA: $46,013,054
Reported to OPE: $44,516,613
Difference: $1,496,441
Revenue generated by football/percentage of total revenue: $18,835,457/41%
Revenue generated by men’s basketball/percentage of total revenue: $7,845,021/17%

Expenses

Reported to NCAA: $46,010,599
Reported to OPE: $44,514,157
Difference: $1,496,442
Expenses for football/percentage of total expenses: $13,219,941/29%
Expenses for men’s basketball/percentage of total expenses: $4,023,384/9%
Expense to Revenue Difference

Expense to revenue difference for football: $5,615,556
Expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball: $3,821,637
Expense to revenue total: $2,455

UCLA also has an interest in the venture capital market, but has not realized a
return on the investment as none of the corporations in its portfolio have gone public or
been acquired.

Power at UCLA

The Chancellor - Norman Abrams

Annual salary - $320,000; pension and health benefits; expense account

Law professor emeritus Norman Abrams became acting chancellor of the UCLA
campus on July 1, 2006. Abrams joined the UCLA law faculty in 1959 and then served as
UCLA’s vice chancellor of academic personnel from 1991 to 2001, and as interim dean

Abrams’ predecessor was Albert Carnesale, who served from 1997 until his
retirement on June 30, 2006. Carnesale was compensated with $324,000 of public funds,
a car allowance of $8,614 provided by the state, one house, and $16,200 of deferred
compensation for a total of $348,814.

A search for a permanent chancellor continues, and is expected to be finalized by
the end of the year. The Chancellor reports to the General Counsel of the Regents.

An alum, and former baseball player at UCLA, Guerrero assumed the duties of athletic director on July 1, 2002. Under his leadership, UCLA teams have won 13 NCAA rational championships, the highest total in the nation in that period. Along with 28 conference championships, a staggering 76 teams, out of a possible 92, have qualified for NCAA post-season competition. The football team has also appeared in four bowl games.

UCLA finished second (2005-06), third (2004-05), third (2003-04) and sixth (2002-03) in the NACDA Director's Cup rankings as well. Only two schools, UCLA and Stanford, have made the top six each of the past four years.

In 2004-05, he negotiated two major deals, a new multi-million dollar agreement with ISP Sports for marketing and broadcasting of the athletic programs, and a six-year, multi-million dollar extension with adidas, which provides apparel and equipment for UCLA’s 24 sports. Guerrero also put the needs of the football team first when negotiating a deal to extend their contract to play at the Rose Bowl for an additional 20 years, by ensuring the contract included enhancements to the current stadium, which will total about $13 million.

Head Football Coach – Karl Dorrell - $881,000

Salary - $181,000; other income - $700,000; maximum bonus - $505,000

Dorrell is also an alum of UCLA and is one of the top wide receivers in UCLA history. He was hired as UCLA's 15th head coach on December 18, 2002. Since that time, UCLA steadily improved, closing out the 2005 season at 10-2 and 16th in the nation.
according to the Associated Press ranking. A 5-4 record in the Pacific-10 Conference, and ending up at 7-6 overall, represented a step backwards in 2006.

Coach Dorrell’s contract contains the same academic and athletic accomplishment incentives, and longevity bonus like of most of the other institutions. Dorell receives $225,000 for radio and television appearances. In addition, he gets another $225,000 in royalty fees from the adidas contract for endorsing and wearing their products.

*Head Men’s Basketball Coach – Ben Howland – $910,000*

*Total compensation package includes TV, shoe and apparel income; use of university cars.*

Howland was announced as the Bruins’ 12th head coach on April 3, 2003. At the end of his third year as the Bruins’ head coach, in 2006 Howland led UCLA back to the NCAA Final Four and Championship Game, for the first time in over 10 years, and to the 2006 Pac-10 Regular Season and Tournament Championship. The Bruins finished the regular season ranked seventh in the nation.

The year before, in his second season, Howland led the Bruins to an 18-11 overall record, and an 11-7 Pac-10 finish, good for a third-place tie with Stanford in the conference standings.
University of Georgia (UGA, Georgia) – www.uga.edu

Public–Carnegie Classification = Doctoral/Research Extensive
Size = 23,786
More Selective
Academic Rating = 73; Psychology
Undergrad Graduation Rate = 71%
Student-Athlete Graduation Rate = 51%
Difference between Graduation Rates = 20%
Director’s Cup Ranking = 7
Number of NCAA Violations = 6

Athletics at UGA


Usually UGA is in the news for their domination of their football opponents in the Southeastern Conference, however during the 2002-03 academic year, basketball took that place. The NCAA investigated allegations of impropriety that were made by an ex-player. As a result, the head coach and his assistant coach, who is also his son, were fired, and the program was slapped with numerous sanctions. The NCAA found proof that the coaches committed academic fraud by giving basketball players grades for classes that they never attended, transferred money to recruits, and gave their players “extra benefits” by letting them use the athletic department’s calling card to make phone calls. UGA men’s basketball was placed on probation for four years, concluding in 2008.
Of the six major infractions UGA has been cited for, football has been the culprit four times, while men's basketball has been at fault three.

Organizational Structure at UGA

The athletic director at the University of Georgia reports directly to the President. On their organizational chart, this relationship is front and center as the athletic director is featured on the top line with the vice president for legal affairs and the rest of the president's office. The rest of the executive administration is represented in the second tier below.

Finance at UGA

Revenue:

 Reported to NCAA: $68,787,384
 Reported to OPE: $68,787,384
 Difference: $0

Revenue generated by football/percentage of total revenue: $50,895,838/74%
Revenue generated by men's basketball/percentage of total revenue:
$4,216,910/6%

Expenses

 Reported to NCAA: $44,933,055
 Reported to OPE: $44,933,055
 Difference: $0
Expenses for football/percentage of total expenses: $12,532,495/28%
Expenses for men’s basketball/percentage of total expenses: $2,797,705/6%

Expense to Revenue Difference

Expense to revenue difference for football: $38,363,343
Expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball: $1,419,205
Expense to revenue total: $23,854,329

Power at UGA

The President - Michael F. Adams - $558,432

Public funds - $237,989; private sources - $116,615; one house provided by the state; $150,000 deferred compensation; $13,828 retirement pay; $40,000 longevity pay;

expense account

The University of Georgia named Dr. Michael F. Adams the 21st president on June 11, 1997. Adams has both an academic and a political background. He is a member of the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics and recently served a two-year term as President of the Southeastern Conference. In addition, he is the only person to have served as chair of both the National Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, and the American Council on Education.

President Adams made the news when the Athens Banner-Herald published an article that was picked up by a number of media outlets when it was revealed that he personally admitted 119 student-athletes between the fall of 1999 and 2000, though they did not meet even the most basic standards for admission to UGA. Since then, nearly
18% of these special admits have dropped out due to the fact they were unable to meet
the academic requirements set forth by the NCAA.

The Athletic Director – Damon Evans - http://www.georgiadogs.com/

A double alum and former varsity letter winner at the University, Evans assumed
the duties of athletic director on July 1, 2004. In his first year of service, Georgia
captured three national championships and finished seventh in the NACDA Directors’
Cup for 2004-05. He was also responsible for structuring an agreement with ISP Sports to
out-source marketing rights, which ended up more than doubling sponsorship revenue. In
2005-06, the Bulldogs won one national championship and a record seven conference
titles.

Head Football Coach – Mark Richt - $1,713,000

Salary - $270,000; other income - $1,443,000; maximum bonus - $400,000

As only one of 10 head coaches in Division I history to win 50 or more games in
his first five seasons, his Georgia teams have won three Southeastern Conference (SEC)
Eastern Division titles, two SEC championships, and his 52-13 record is sixth best in the
country since 2001. The 2006 Bulldogs finished at 9-4 overall, and with a mediocre 4-4
record in the SEC.

Richt collects $800,000 for radio and television appearances, is called upon for 12
appearances at Bulldog Club events in the Southeast, and has at least two days committed
to fundraising visits with the president. He gets an additional $100,000 for holding a
sports camp at the University, and a personal allowance of $3,600 for Nike apparel, shoes
or equipment, and $530,000 for his “Equipment Endorsement Efforts,” which essentially means all he has to do is wear the free clothes and shoes he receives. Like most of the other coaches, his contract is laced with athletic and academic performance incentives. In this case, the university provides two vehicles, but Richt is responsible for the insurance, maintenance, and gas. Richt can also collect a longevity bonus of $2.4 million after completing eight years of his contract in 2013.

Head Men’s Basketball Coach - Dennis Felton - approximately $700,000

Base salary at beginning of five-year contract was $150,000; $475,000 TV, shoe & apparel income; country club membership; two cars; $75,000 for summer camp; post-season maximum bonus $225,000

On the Georgia Dogs website, it mentions that Felton iscommencing his fourth year as head coach, and then his bio continues on with all the success he had before joining UGA in 2003. Buried farther down it mentions that his record at Georgia in the first three years of his tenure was 39-49, but includes a significant improvement in the 2006 season.

Influential Constituent Groups

Boosters

Georgia boasts another well-recognized booster; Don Leebern, Jr. Leebern attended the University of Georgia and played on the Bulldogs’ football squad. He recently finished his 14th year serving on the state board of regents, and has been appointed for another seven-year term. He was a vocal proponent of the president’s
decision to oust Georgia’s former athletic director and long-time coach. While the university has not quantified his financial giving history, he has given at least a half million dollars to fund capital projects. Nonetheless, he gets just as much press for his non-financial support since he is living with the gymnastics coach and was reprimanded by the NCAA for letting her use his private jet for a jaunt to New York City with a few members of her team.
University of Michigan (Michigan) – www.umich.edu

Public - Carnegie Classification = Doctoral/Research Extensive
Size = 23,714
Most Selective
Academic Rating = 84; Economics, English Language and Literature, &
Mechanical Engineering
Undergrad Graduation Rate – 85%
Student-Athlete Graduation Rate – 73%
Difference Between Graduation Rates – 12%
Director’s Cup Ranking: 4
Number of NCAA Violations – 2

Athletics at Michigan

The University of Michigan is also in the top 10 NCAA Division 1 Championship
leaders at number eight with 32, 52 team titles in all. National championships in football
have set the foundation for a perennially strong program.

Michigan’s men’s basketball team was put on probation for four years in
November of 2003 for the provision of over $600,000 in cash or other benefits to four
former men’s basketball players by a booster of the program. The baseball team was also
censured in 1991.
Organizational Structure at Michigan

Michigan has an interesting reporting structure as the athletic director reports to the president, and an advisory board for intercollegiate athletics. The advisory board is made up of faculty, alumni, student members, and an executive officer; a total of sixteen members in all.

Finance at Michigan

Revenue

Reported to NCAA: $78,424,186
Reported to OPE: $78,424,186
Difference: $0
Revenue generated by football/percentage of total revenue: $46,396,107/59%
Revenue generated by men’s basketball/percentage of total revenue: $7,661,227/10%

Expenses

Reported to NCAA: $61,387,144
Reported to OPE: $61,387,144
Difference: $0
Expenses for football/percentage of total expenses: $10,690,874/17%
Expenses for men’s basketball/percentage of total expenses: $3,201,713/5%
Expense to Revenue Difference

Expense to revenue difference for football: $35,705,233
Expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball: $4,459,514
Expense to revenue total: $17,037,042

Michigan’s financial misfortune is one of the most frequently cited examples in materials covering what is wrong with college sports. The University of Michigan experienced overwhelming athletic success in fiscal year 1999: the football team shared the Big Ten Conference title, won the Citrus Bowl and finished 12th in the nation; the men’s ice hockey team (having won the Championship the year before) made it to the second round of the NCAA tournament before losing in overtime; the women’s basketball team had a winning season, finishing 18-11; and the men’s gymnastic team won the national championship. However, even though they experienced great achievements on the playing fields, they had a deficit of $2.8 million in the Athletic Department budget. Schulman and Bowen ask, “How is it possible that - in the same year that the football team set national attendance record, with an average of 110,965 fans attending six home games - the athletic department could show a net loss of $2.8 million?” (2001, p. xxiii).

Power at Michigan

The President - Mary Sue Coleman - $742,148
Public funds - $16,501: 1 car provided by the state; 1 house provided by the state; $75,000 deferred compensation; $100,000 retention bonus; $50,647 retirement pay
In August 2002, Mary Sue Coleman was appointed the University of Michigan’s 13th president. Among others, she has served on the Knight Commission for Intercollegiate Athletics and the NCAA Board of Directors, and the Association of American Universities Executive Committee. While she has held numerous positions at the faculty and executive administration level in higher education, she is also a biochemist by trade. Coleman reports to the Board of Regents.

Director of Intercollegiate Athletics – William C. Martin - http://www.mgoblue.com/

Martin was appointed interim director on March 3, 2000, and was subsequently named the permanent director five months later on August 1. Martin received his Master’s from Michigan in 1995. He also recently served as the president of the United States Olympic Committee, after holding a position on its board of directors for eight years. Martin’s background is in diversified real estate and banking. Upon his appointment, he indicated that he planned to donate his first-year salary back to the university to a special fund to benefit athletics.

Head Football Coach – Lloyd Carr - $1,454,619

Salary - $647,619; other income - $807,000; maximum bonus - $84,373

In 2006, Carr commenced his 12th season as head coach of the nation’s all-time winningest football program. Carr has been a member of the Wolverine football program for 26 years, serving first as an assistant coach. In 2003, Michigan reworked Carr’s contract to extend it through the 2007 season, but added the stipulation that upon its
conclusion, Carr will be appointed an associate athletics director, responsible for fundraising and public speaking.

Carr has guided the school to a bowl game in his every season at the helm, including nine straight January 1 appearances in the major bowl games, the second longest active string in college football. In 2005, Michigan finished below their usual standards at 7-5, and 5-3 in the Big Ten, but they quickly rebounded, reaching 11-2 in 2006.

Carr’s contract contains the usual incentives, and throws in $25,000 for an on-field communications system sponsorship agreement. Interestingly, Carr’s original contract also included a bonus of $55,000 to be divided among the assistant coaches; this amount was increased to $200,000 in 2003. Carr is also contractually obligated to donate $50,000 each year to endow a scholarship in his name, up to $350,000. Carr also gets an automobile, insurance, and maintenance from the school. He has to cover his own gasoline, however, he can expense work-related mileage.

Michigan can afford such amenities as they are currently sinking $226 million into upgrading their football stadium to include 3,200 new club seats and 83 new suites. The costs are being passed right along to the fans as season tickets have reached the $350 mark, and this is in addition to a $125-$500 fee for a personal seat license just to be able to have the opportunity to purchase season tickets.

Head Men’s Basketball Coach – Tommy Amaker – $500,000 to $600,000

Close to $900,000 a year with incentives
Amaker became the 15th men’s basketball coach at the University of Michigan on March 29, 2001. Amaker inherited a team that had recently been slapped with numerous NCAA violations and self-imposed sanctions. His inaugural season ended with his team at 11-18, which steadily improved to their second 20-win season in three years during the 2005-06 campaign with a 22-11 overall record on its way to finishing in the finals in the Postseason NIT.

Influential Constituent Groups

The Board of Regents

The Board of Regents consists of eight members elected at large in biennial statewide elections. The president of the University also serves as an ex officio member of the board. The Regents serve for overlapping terms of eight years, and are not compensated. According to the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the Regents have supervisory rights and final say over the control and direction of all spending of the institution’s funds. The Regents meet once a month.

Boosters

The attention Auburn received for its boosters’ involvement in football pales in comparison to the Michigan basketball debacle. Because of the discovery of payments made to players, Michigan imposed sanctions on itself in November 2002. Penalties included a one-year postseason ban, and forfeiting 112 regular-season and tournament victories from five seasons, including its victory in the 1992 NCAA semifinal.

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The NCAA was satisfied with how the investigation was conducted, and accepted
the self-imposed sanctions, but also banned Michigan from another year of postseason
play, reduced the number of scholarships the school is allowed to have and placed the
program on probation in 2003.
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill (UNC) – [www.unc.edu]

Public - Carnegie Classification = Doctoral/Research Extensive

Size = 15,618

Most Selective

Academic Rating = 80; Mass Communications/Media Studies & Psychology

Undergrad Graduation Rate – 83%

Student-Athlete Graduation Rate – 70%

Difference between Graduation Rates – 13%

Director’s Cup Ranking - 9

Number of NCAA Violations – 2

Athletics at UNC

Thirty-one NCAA national championships put UNC at ninth on the all-time championship leaders list. UNC is one of two schools in the study that has more women’s national championship teams than men’s (22 to 9), as UNC has a standout women’s soccer team that has tallied 17 by themselves. However, it is men’s basketball that has the greatest visibility and a total of five national championships (four in the NCAA).

UNC has two major infractions cases resulting in a violation, the most recent being football in 1969, preceded by men’s basketball in 1961.

Organizational Structure at UNC

The director of athletics at UNC reports directly to the chancellor, as does the rest of the executive administration. It is interesting to note that according to the
organizational chart, the director of athletics is held in the same esteem as the vice
chancellors of the institution and is the only director to do so.

There are many layers of administrative control at the top of the organizational
chart. The Chancellor of UNC-Chapel Hill reports directly to the president of the
University of North Carolina system, who then reports to the chairman of the board of
governors. There is an auxiliary report to the chair and president of the General Alumni
Association, and a more formal reporting line to the chairman of the Board of Trustees.

Finance at UNC

Revenue

Reported to NCAA: $54,838,851
Reported to OPE: $49,095,212
Difference: $5,743,639
Revenue generated by football/percentage of total revenue: $17,548,006/32%
Revenue generated by men’s basketball/percentage of total revenue:
$15,234,321/28%

Expenses

Reported to NCAA: $54,617,880
Reported to OPE: $48,707,428
Difference: $5,910,452
Expenses for football/percentage of total expenses: $10,569,162/19%
Expenses for men’s basketball/percentage of total expenses: $4,792,277/9%
Expense to Revenue Difference

Expense to revenue difference for football: $6,978,844
Expense to revenue difference for men's basketball: $10,442,044
Expense to revenue total: $220,971

Power at UNC

The Chancellor - James C. Moeser - $360,906

Public funds - $337,800; 1 car from private sources; 1 house provided by the state;
$23,106 retirement pay

Dr. Moeser was named the ninth president of UNC-Chapel Hill in 2000. Moeser's background is in the Arts as both a professor, a dean, and a concert organist. He has served on a number of advisory boards, is one of the 50 college presidents who make up the NCAA Presidential Task Force on the Future of Division I Intercollegiate Athletics, and is also a member of its fiscal responsibility subcommittee.

President of The University of North Carolina – Dr. Erskine B. Bowles

Dr. Bowles was named president of the 16-campus University of North Carolina system on January 1, 2006. Bowles' background is in finance as he began his career at Morgan Stanley, and subsequently moved into private practice, and venture capital. Bowles then moved on to the White House, as he served as director of the Small Business Administration, and then chief of staff, where he worked on the budget, and helped guide domestic and foreign policy through his committee work.
Baddour was named athletic director in 1997, but had been a part of the UNC community since his undergraduate days, which culminated in 1966. He joined the administration in 1967 and has been at the University ever since.

In Baddour's nine years as Director of Athletics, the Tar Heels have won 49 Atlantic Coast Conference championships, spread out between eighteen different teams. In 2005-06, Carolina had 24 of 28 teams reach NCAA postseason competition and finished fourth in the NACDA Director's Cup rankings.

Additionally, during his tenure, Baddour worked out funding for several facility enhancement projects, scholarships and operating budgets. He also negotiated contracts with Nike to outfit UNC's athletic teams, with Learfield Communications to direct UNC's multi-media properties, and with Wachovia for sponsorship opportunities in the Smith Center on campus.

Head Football Coach – John Bunting - $311,200

*Maximum bonus* - $43,334

Bunting was hired in December of 2000, and was fired on October 22, 2006, but was kept on to finish out the season, in which his team sank to 3-9, and 2-6 in the Atlantic Coast Conference. Bunting had returned to his alma mater and rejoined the college ranks after seven years in the professional league. In 2005, he concluded the season with a record of 5-6, 4-4 in the ACC, and was named ACC Coach of the Year by CollegeFootballNews.com for their strong schedule.
Head Men's Basketball Coach – Roy Williams - $1.6 million

Williams returned to his alma mater and took over the Tar Heel program on April 14, 2003, after leading the University of Kansas to the NCAA championship game in his 15th year at the institution.

In 2005-2006, the Tar Heels were one of the country's best stories, winning 23 games, finishing second in the ACC and earning a No. 3 seed in the NCAA Tournament, when they were predicted to finish in the basement of the ACC, and were not picked to make the postseason. Their stellar performance earned Roy Williams National and ACC Coach-of-the-Year honors.

The previous season, Williams led the Tar Heels to their fourth NCAA championship in a season that saw the Tar Heels go 33-4, and 14-2 mark in the ACC.

In his first three seasons, Carolina was 34-14 in ACC regular-season action, and the 34 wins and .708 winning percentage are the best marks ever for any ACC coach after three seasons. Williams has the highest winning percentage in the nation among active coaches with 10 years experience and the fourth highest in history, having led his teams to a 493-124 record, a victory rate of 79.9 percent.

Influential Constituent Groups

Board of Governors

The UNC-Board of Governors select the president of all the institutions in the UNC system. They also have the legal obligation to set the policies regarding the general determination, control, supervision, management, and governance of all affairs of each institution in the UNC system.
There are 32 voting members, which are elected by the General Assembly for four-year terms. Special members are non-voting members with varying terms, for example former chairman, former governors, and a student representative from the UNC Association of Student Governments.

**Board of Trustees**

The Board of Governors delegates specific duties and powers to the Board of Trustees at each institution. The Trustees are then tasked with monitoring the management and progress of their specific institution.

**Boosters**

While most institutions acknowledge groups that support them financially, most of them have given them a specific name, and have shied away from using the term “booster” as it has negative connotations due to past indiscretions. The North Carolina Educational Foundation is the fancy term for this group at the University of North Carolina, but is commonly known as the Rams Club. UNC had no qualms about asking them for their help in raising over $8 million to bring a big-name football coach to Carolina after Bunting was fired. Asked to cover $8.05 million in supplemental compensation over the course of the seven-year contract, plus up to a $1.1 million retention bonus if he coaches five consecutive seasons, boosters have stepped up to the challenge to help their team, which has only had three winning seasons out of the last nine years.
This is the second request in four years, after outside assistance was needed in securing Williams’ future as the Tarheels basketball coach, and that to the tune of $3.9 million in supplemental compensation.
University of Virginia (UVA, Virginia) - www.virginia.edu/

Public—Carnegie Classification = Doctoral/Research Extensive
Size = 13,310
Most Selective
Academic Rating = 88; Business Administration/Management, Economics, & Psychology
Undergrad Graduation Rate – 92%
Student-Athlete Graduation Rate – 83%
Difference Between Graduation Rates – 9%
Director’s Cup Ranking - 13
Number of NCAA Violations – 1

Athletics at UVA

Virginia has earned 15 NCAA national championships, and received one violation for football in 1993. UVA is in the elite Atlantic Coast Conference, and is known for being competitive, but usually finishes in the middle of the pack.

Organizational Structure at UVA

At the University of Virginia, the director of athletics reports to the executive vice president and chief operating officer. In their structure, the vice president and provost is between that position and the president, but does not have a specific reporting line with Athletics. However, there is a dual reporting line between the associate director for [athletic] compliance, the EVP & CEO, and the director of athletics, which creates an
opportunity for the compliance officer to report to the university administration if they
feel that there is an issue in athletics that they are not comfortable discussing with the
director of athletics.

Finance at UVA

Revenue

Reported to NCAA: $63,060,540
Reported to OPE: $62,316,665
Difference: $743,875

Revenue generated by football/percentage of total revenue: $17,304,450/27%
Revenue generated by men’s basketball/percentage of total revenue:
$8,010,378/13%

Expenses

Reported to NCAA: $59,825,403
Reported to OPE: $57,409,623
Difference: $2,415,780

Expenses for football/percentage of total expenses: $16,812,582/28%
Expenses for men’s basketball/percentage of total expenses: $9,043,478/15%

Expense to Revenue Difference

Expense to revenue difference for football: $491,868
Expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball: ($1,033,100)
Expense to revenue total: $3,235,137

While former head basketball coach Pete Gillen’s seven Virginia teams compiled an overall record of 118–93 and competed in five postseason tournaments, the coach was fired. Under the terms of his contract, he is receiving a buyout of approximately $2 million, which is reflected in the negative balance of the expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball.

Power at UVA

The President – John T. Casteen III - $677,980

Public funds - $162,826; private sources - $278,674; $15,000 car allowance provided by state; 1 house provided by state; $200,000 deferred compensation; $21,000 performance bonus; $480 retirement pay; club dues

Casteen assumed the presidency in August of 1990. A long-time faculty member, Casteen also served as Virginia's secretary of education, and the president of the University of Connecticut, before returning to UVA as president. He has also served as director of the American Council on Education, as a director of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, and on a number of regional governance boards. Outside of higher education, he has served on numerous audit committees of local banks and loan corporations.
Littlepage was named director of athletics in August of 2001, after having been a member of the university’s athletics administration since 1990. During 2005-06, Virginia won a national championship in men's lacrosse and claimed five ACC Championships, with individuals or teams from 19 sports representing Virginia in postseason play.

Historically, Virginia is also known to have one of the highest student-athlete graduation rates for public institutions.

Head Football Coach – Al Groh- $1,785,000

Salary - $252,000; other income - $1,533,000; maximum bonus - $940,000

Groh has led the Virginia football program to a 42-33 record, including four bowl appearances, since he arrived back at his alma mater in 2001. Since a 5-7 mark during his first season, Groh led Virginia to four consecutive winning seasons, all resulting in a bowl invitation, but ended up back at 5-7 overall in 2006.

According to his contract, which contains the normal achievement incentives, Groh also gets to use the University's aircraft and vehicles, within reason, to conduct business. His contract also has a clause to include bonuses for assistant coaches.

Something not seen in other contracts is that each year, he is also required to obtain a medical evaluation of his fitness, with the school covering the cost up to $500. Test results are confidential and only shared with the athletics director and university president. He is also required to participate in fund-raising efforts when appropriate.
Head Men’s Basketball Coach – Dave Leitao – $900,000 plus incentives

In his first season as head coach of the Cavaliers, Leitao went 15-15 with a squad that was picked to finish last in the 12-team Atlantic Coast Conference in 2005-06. The team ended up tied for seventh and in addition won its opening round game in the ACC Tournament. They also returned to post-season play with an invitation to the National Invitation Tournament.

Influential Constituent Groups

The Board of Visitors

The Rector and Visitors serve as the corporate board for the University of Virginia, is comprised of sixteen members appointed by the Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and is subject to confirmation by the General Assembly. Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee, they may also appoint a full-time student as a nonvoting member for a term of one year. For the rest of the board, there are four-year term limits. The Board of Visitors is responsible for the policies, budget, and long-term planning of the university, while also being entrusted with preserving the institution’s many long-standing traditions.

Boosters

Paul Tudor Jones, II, has donated over $50 million to his alma mater, $35 million just to get the basketball arena named after his father, and to be the top booster of the Cavaliers athletic program. However, with only one violation, Virginia has managed to keep its boosters under control.
University of Wisconsin, Madison (Wisconsin) – www.wisc.edu

Public – Carnegie Classification = Doctoral/Research Extensive
Size = 29,766
More Selective
Academic Rating = 80; English Language and Literature, Political Science and
Government, & Psychology
Undergrad Graduation Rate – 76%
Student-Athlete Graduation Rate – 68%
Difference Between Graduation Rates – 8%
Director’s Cup Ranking - 19
Number of NCAA Violations – 7

Athletics at Wisconsin

Wisconsin has 23 NCAA national championships, with one football title in 1942. Hockey is currently the elite sport at UW with six championships, but is still trying to catch men’s boxing, which garnered eight national titles from 1939-1956.

Wisconsin spread their violations around between men’s basketball with four, football with three, and men’s wrestling and tennis with one each. Exclusive of the seven assessed to the teams, and those included in the NCAA List of Institutions with the Most Infractions, the administration was also put on probation for two years in 1999 for improper administration and lack of control of athletically related income and supplemental pay. The most recent infraction occurred in 2001, as Wisconsin was put on
probation for five years in two sports: football and men’s basketball for recruiting violations and providing extra benefits.

Organizational Structure at Wisconsin

The University of Wisconsin followed the same pattern as UCLA. They did not specifically state where athletics reported to on their Leadership and Governance page; while, unlike UCLA, they did at least acknowledge they have a director of athletics. On their athletics site, they listed the university chancellor before the director of athletics; therefore, a direct reporting line can be inferred.

Finance at Wisconsin

Revenue

Reported to NCAA: $75,814,552
Reported to OPE: $75,293,898
Difference: $520,654

Revenue generated by football/percentage of total revenue: $34,133,314/45%
Revenue generated by men’s basketball/percentage of total revenue: $11,954,769/16%

Expenses

Reported to NCAA: $75,719,042
Reported to OPE: $59,533,584
Difference: $16,185,458
Expenses for football/percentage of total expenses: $21,993,983/29%
Expenses for men’s basketball/percentage of total expenses: $3,907,568/5%

Expense to Revenue Difference

Expense to revenue difference for football: $12,139,331
Expense to revenue difference for men’s basketball: $8,047,201
Expense to revenue total: $95,510

Power at Wisconsin

The President – John D. Wiley - $341,495

Public funds - $261,195; private sources - $55,000; 1 car provided by the state; 1 house provided by the state; $25,500 retirement pay; club dues

The University of Wisconsin–Madison, named John D. Wiley as the 27th chancellor in 2001. Wiley has been associated with the institution for over forty years as a graduate student, professor and administrator. He chairs both the Big Ten Council of Presidents and Chancellors and the board for the Council on Higher Education Accreditation. He is also a member of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Committee, and involved with a number of local organizations. He was appointed by and reports to the UW System Board of Regents.

The Athletic Director – Barry Alvarez - http://www.uwbadgers.com/

At the conclusion of the 2005 season, Alvarez yielded the reigns of the football program, to concentrate on running the Division of Intercollegiate Athletics. Alvarez had
guided the Badger football program from 1990-2005, including the last two seasons in a
dual role as athletic director and head football coach.

Alvarez went out on a high note as the 2005 squad finished 10-3 and pulled off a
stunning 24-10 upset win over seventh-ranked Auburn in the Capital One Bowl. That
season also marked the fourth time in school history Wisconsin won 10 games.

Head Men’s Football Coach – Bret Bielema - $761,600
Salary - $750,000; other income - $11,600; maximum bonus - $175,000

Bielema was Wisconsin’s defensive coordinator in 2004 and 2005, a period in
which the program produced a 19-6 record, before taking control of the program from
Barry Alvarez. Before coming to Wisconsin, Bielema coached at Kansas State for two
years and spent nine seasons at his alma mater, the University of Iowa. In his first year,
the Badgers finished at 12-1 overall, and 7-1 in the Big Ten Conference.

Head Men’s Basketball Coach – Bo Ryan - $700,000

Ryan arrived at the University of Wisconsin in 2001, and at the conclusion of the
2005-06 season boasted a 112-49 record during that span, going 55-25 in the Big Ten.
Ryan had the highest winning percentage among active Division I coaches with at least
20 years of coaching experience at the conclusion of the 2005-06 season. The Badgers
have compiled an impressive 72-5 home record under Ryan, including a 38-2 mark in Big
Ten games.
Influential Constituent Groups

UW System Board of Regents

There are 18 members of the board appointed to seven-year terms by the Governor of Wisconsin. There are also two student-regents who are appointed two-year terms. The Board appoints the President of the UW System, the chancellors of the 13 universities, the chancellor of UW-Extension and UW Colleges, and the deans of the 13 colleges. For each institution, the board sets admission standards, reviews and approves budgets, and establishes a regulatory framework.
Appendix C
Organizational Charts
Appendix D

Financial Reports
## Home Glossary Search Search Results

### Participants and Operating Expenses | Coaching Staff | Revenue and Expenses | Coaches' Salaries

### General Information

- **Unit ID**: 10086
- **Office of Postsecondary Education**
- **P.O. Box 351**
- **Auburn University**

### Athletic Department Information

- **AUBURN UNIVERSITY**
- **P.O. Box 351**
- **Phone**: 334-444-4160
- **Fax**: 334-469-3343
- **Sponsoring Body**: NCAA Division I-A

### Revenues

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<th>Revenue Category</th>
<th>Men's Teams</th>
<th>Women's Teams</th>
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<td>$37,050</td>
<td>$4,840,883</td>
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<td>$31,398,921</td>
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<td>Total Revenues of all sports, except football and basketball, combined</td>
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<td>Not allocated by gender/sport</td>
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<td>Grand Total</td>
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### Expenses

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<tbody>
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<td>Basketball</td>
<td>$4,297,705</td>
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<td>$20,063,074</td>
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<td>Net allocated by gender</td>
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<td>Grand Total Expenses</td>
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### Athletically Related Student Aid

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### Recruiting Expenses

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<td>Total</td>
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235
<table>
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<tr>
<th>REVENUE STATEMENT</th>
<th>EXPENSE STATEMENT</th>
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<td>Football</td>
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## Auburn University (Expense Statement)

### Revenue Statement

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantees</td>
<td>$2,600,000</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
<td>$459,000</td>
<td>$39,268</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>$4,938,831</td>
<td>$1,217,394</td>
<td>$733,577</td>
<td>$2,425,350</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$450</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coaches' Comp.</td>
<td>$1,158,820</td>
<td>$214,735</td>
<td>$141,327</td>
<td>$291,220</td>
<td>$3,705,292</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support Staff Salaries</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severance Payments</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$220,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$123,000</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting</td>
<td>$740,583</td>
<td>$235,194</td>
<td>$147,138</td>
<td>$400,646</td>
<td>$60,434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Travel</td>
<td>$796,411</td>
<td>$338,385</td>
<td>$343,434</td>
<td>$1,277,875</td>
<td>$273,362</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
<td>$317,240</td>
<td>$185,030</td>
<td>$180,724</td>
<td>$996,648</td>
<td>$186,674</td>
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<tr>
<td>Game Expenses</td>
<td>$1,439,258</td>
<td>$231,769</td>
<td>$129,902</td>
<td>$573,876</td>
<td>$6,793</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pensation</td>
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<td>$67,273</td>
<td>$59,076</td>
<td>$78,499</td>
<td>$1,968,720</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sports Camp</td>
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<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Facilities, Maintenance</td>
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<td>$95,386</td>
<td>$69,400</td>
<td>$811,260</td>
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<td>Spirit Groups</td>
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<td>$2,100</td>
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<td>$8,833</td>
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<td>Instruct. Institutional</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
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<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>$6,283</td>
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<td>Scholarships</td>
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<td>$6,515</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>$140,470</td>
<td>$109,809</td>
<td>$107,364</td>
<td>$1,930,340</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$10,370,077</td>
<td>$3,619,919</td>
<td>$2,107,976</td>
<td>$10,419,908</td>
<td>$17,075,113</td>
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<td>Expenditure to Revenue</td>
<td>$244,850</td>
<td>$430,343</td>
<td>$1,052,788</td>
<td>$10,097,028</td>
<td>$12,168,846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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1 Per the NCAA guidelines, student-athletes are given a six-year period to complete their studies.

2 Obtained from the NCAA Graduation Rate website located at http://www.ncaa.org/grad_rates/2004/d1di.html

3 Obtained from the NCAA Probability of Competing website located at http://www.ncaa.org/research/prob_of_competing/


5 Fact obtained from ESPN website located at http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=mascot/person&pos=spotlight&did=tab4pos1


7 Obtained from the NCAA website located at http://www.ncaa.org/databases/governance/structure/


9 Obtained from the NCAA website located at http://www.ncaa.org/about/services.html

10 Obtained from http://www.thedrakegroup.org/


12 Obtained from the Chronicle of Higher Education report of Median Salaries of College Administrators by Job Category and Type of Institution website located at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v52/25/25a02802.htm


15 Fatis, S. (2004, March 15). NCAA basketball tournament (A special report): It’s time for money, uh, March Madness. For fans, the NCAA Tournament is everything that’s right about college basketball; for its critics, it’s everything that’s wrong [Electronic version]. Wall Street Journal, P1. Retrieved February 14, 2005 from ProQuest.


19 The final standings rank the Top 100 Division I schools and do not break out Division I-A separately. Therefore, only those institutions in the Top 100 received a numeric ranking and the Division I-A schools that did not finish in the Top 100 were marked No Ranking. Obtained from the National Association of Collegiate Directors of Athletics website located at http://graphics.fansonly.com/photos/schools/nacda/sports/directorscup/auto_pdf/0405D1FinalStand.pdf


21 The UCLA interim chancellor’s compensation was included to contrast it against the previous president’s and was obtained from the press release regarding his appointment on the UCLA website, located at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/2006/pnl15.html.
