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Effectiveness of Joint International Organization Operations in Latin America: Case Studies of Peru, Guatemala, and Haiti

Seung-Ok Ryu
Seton Hall University

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Seung-ok Ryu
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Abstract

In spite of the general consensus concerning the effectiveness of regional organizations in enabling democracy consolidation, there remain concerns about single international organizations facilitating democracy. Those who doubt the effectiveness of a single international organization's intervention believe that it is a burden due to the cost and expertise that is required. This paper tests the usefulness of a joint operation between regional and world organizations compared to a single regional and a single world organization. Three case studies, on Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Haiti (1991), suggest that the OAS/UN joint mission in Haiti increased the level of democracy the most according to the Polity score.
I. Introduction

It is evident from the works by scholars such as Pevehouse and Mansfield that regional organizations are relatively more effective than world organizations in implementing and consolidating democracy. However, while there are thorough studies on regional and world organizations, in-depth research on joint international organization practice is lacking. On January 30, 1995, Resolution 975 favoring positive outcomes in Haiti was agreed to by the UN Security Council. The Resolution described the joint venture of the OAS and the UN in their International Civil Mission to Haiti OAS/UN (MICIVIH) as valuable and acknowledged its importance in developing a favorable environment in Haiti. The UN Secretary General emphasized to "bear in mind the expertise and potential of the OAS, consult with the Secretary General of the OAS regarding other appropriate measures which might be taken by both organizations consistent with this resolution." The recent joint forum by the UN and the OAS held in Mexico in October 2010 supports this trend in recognizing the importance of cooperation between these international organizations.

Cooperation between the organizations is increasingly desired as the issues have become complicated and require mixed sets of expertise and skills. For example, it is now evident that democracy consolidation cannot be solved through political intervention alone but that societal and cultural change is also required. This raises the cost and expertise required by the international organizations to deal with

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the issue. The rising costs and requirements for more complex knowledge to solve this issue has become a burden to some international organizations that do not have the necessary experience or are not funded well. Therefore, it is now important to seek cooperation between different types of international organizations to secure more effective democracy consolidation.

For this reason, this study discusses the effectiveness of joint operations by international organizations. It argues that when regional organizations and world organizations cooperate, there is a greater possibility to increase the level of democracy in a country than when an international organization works alone. This paper focuses on the joint operation between regional organizations and world organizations and its effectiveness in democracy consolidation, especially in Latin America. The paper is structured in seven parts. First, the literature review examines scholars' views of international organizations and their capability in democracy consolidation. Then, I define democracy in this paper. Third, three independent variables are explained. After defining regional organizations, world organizations, and the joint operation between the two, I move on to three case studies: Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Haiti (1991). In the fifth part, I discuss the effectiveness of the joint form of international organizations between the UN and the OAS, before concluding. I am expecting to earn support for the argument that joint operations can be an effective tool in promoting democracy consolidation.
II. Literature Review

Many efforts to discover a reason for the consolidation of democracy range from the internal and external political environment, multilateral institutions, to individuals. However, most widely studied is the effect of economic development on democracy consolidation. Like Lipset and Aristotle\(^2\), there are groups of scholars who argue that the increase in economic development has a positive impact on democracy. There are also scholars such as Barro\(^3\) who claim that when a country reaches a certain level of economic development, its influence on democracy terminates.

However, still other scholars, such as Pevehouse\(^4\) argue that regional organizations are effective in aiding democratic consolidation. This is because such organizations can influence the behavior of major domestic actors in regime change such as military elites and business actors, especially due to their uncertainty about regime change. These actors believe that the new regime can defend their interests and therefore they support the regime change. Regional organizations are capable of protecting an already existing regime, yet at the same time they are most prone to act against it. Also, “homogenous” organizations are more capable of pressuring non-democratic or democracy consolidating countries to catalyze the process because democratic countries tend to have higher expectations in accepting a member. In addition, Pevehouse suggests that if a country does not succeed in democracy


\(^3\) Barro, 158-9.

consolidation, then there is a chance of the country collapsing. Therefore, the process relates to a country's "survival."⁵

Pevehouse⁶ argues that regional organizations need to be most examined. This is because Pevehouse believes that regional organizations are the most often found organizations in the international system and that this allows researchers to find unique results. He also earns support from Whitehead's comment that a regional organization is more capable in defining clear results. Therefore, Pevehouse especially tests the effectiveness of domestic actors joining regional organizations. This idea is also supported by the study from Mansfield and Pevehouse, who believe that democratic consolidation accelerates when a country becomes a member of an international organization. As they explain, a state that is under democratization tends to join international organizations.⁷ By obtaining membership in an international organization, a state is able to gain information about democracy and earn prestige in international society.

It is widely believed in international organizations theory that membership in international organizations can bring democracy consolidation. This is because most scholars, including Pevehouse,⁸ argue that a "homogenous" organization, an international organization that is constituted with highly democratic states, are more likely to pressure non-democratic states or states in the transition to democracy. Although democracy in Latin America has improved in the last few decades, democracy is still fragile in some parts of Latin American countries. Thus, it is

⁵ Pevehouse, Democracy from Above, 29
⁸ Pevehouse, Democracy from Above 47
difficult to expect for Latin American regional organizations to consolidate
democracy to the level that the world organizations might anticipate.

In addition, Levitsky and Way⁹ argue that more interactions with democratic
countries beyond the region, especially with the West, encourage a state to
democratize. Regional organizations are more prone to have higher concentrations of
members and power to address an issue when they have similar interests. However,
when an international organization lacks democratically mature states, it is difficult
for the democratizing states to earn information or prestige. On the other hand, world
organizations such as the United Nations have sometimes had difficulty in
implementing activities because the member states have various interests.

Nevertheless, world organizations can sometimes be more effective institutions in
actively engaging in democratization and elevating the level of democracy because
they are more likely to have a larger number of democratized countries. In order to
support this argument, case studies will follow.

In addition, this study tries to further the scope of international organizations’
effects from regional organizations to world organizations. This is because many
studies in evaluating the effect of international organizations in Latin America are
highly focused on regional organizations. A concentration on regional organizations
can be understood in the context of the positive theoretical evaluation outlined above:
the regional organizations function more easily as a tool to democratize a country. If
this argument proves to have support, then joint operations by international
organizations with similar objectives could be encouraged so as to further consolidate
democracy in the region.

Democracy 16.3: 20-34
Therefore, this study also tries to support the budding cooperation between the OAS, whose main objective is to promote democracy in the Latin American region, and the UN, a world organization that commits its efforts to better living conditions, which relates to democracy. In the next part, I will discuss how different scholars define democracy.
This study analyzes how different types of international organizations affect the level of democracy in each case. The level of democracy, therefore, is the dependent variable. In this study, I use Huntington’s definition of democracy; he describes democracy as the system in which the “most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.”\textsuperscript{10} Democratization is a “transition from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time.”\textsuperscript{11}

Most countries in Latin America, except for Cuba (which received -7 on the 2007 Polity Score) and Venezuela (which dropped drastically from 5 in 2007 to -4 in 2009\textsuperscript{12}), are considered fairly democratic. According to the Polity scale, the democracy level in the region increased from 0.30 (1981), to 2.74 (1985), to 6.96 (2001) showing general growth. The “region mean state fragility index score” by the Center for Systemic Peace shows it dropped from approximately 10 in 1995 to 6.65 in 2009.\textsuperscript{13} Also, research by the Polity IV Project records Latin America’s fragility index of 2009 as very stable in most of the countries, except for Ecuador, Colombia and

\textsuperscript{11} Huntington, 15
The fragility index scores from 25 to 0 dividing levels of fragility into six indexes. Little or no fragility scores from 0 to 3, low is from 4 to 7, moderate scores from 8 to 11, serious is from 12 to 15, high ranges between 16 and 19, and extreme is from 20 to 25.
Mexico in 2009 for drug trafficking;\textsuperscript{14} most countries scored moderate, low, little or no sudden political or violent incidents. However, it is dubious to conclude that the region is under democratization or consolidation of democracy by only looking at this result alone because this score is focused on states' stability. For this reason, an examination of democratic consolidation should not only include the political system but also the level of infrastructure, freedom, and human rights.

As the democracy level is the dependent variable of this study, I will use the Polity IV Project\textsuperscript{15} and political and civil rights indexes from Freedom House\textsuperscript{16} to measure the democracy level of countries in the region. The Polity score considers that autocracy and democracy can exist simultaneously and this uniqueness allows us to measure the level of democracy more easily of those countries in a transition period.

The Polity Score varies from -10 to 10 and divides these numbers into three regime types. From -10 to -6 is categorized as authoritarian, -5 to 5 as anocracies, and 6 to 10 as democracies. In addition, numeric values are considered because this study tries to analyze different democratic levels. However, relying only on the Polity Score has limitations because the Polity Score highly focuses on political system change. It has limitations in clearly distinguishing since most Latin American countries are in the range of the democracy index in the 2007 Polity score. Also, the reason for relying on the Polity score is that recent international organizations not only focused on political infrastructure as one of the requirements for democracy but also included the domestic political environment, such as the level of respect for human rights, as one

\textsuperscript{14} Marshall, Monty G., Benjamin R. Cole. 5-6
of the important conditions for democracy. Therefore, I will also compare the study with the Freedom House index.

Another reason for selecting this method is because the Freedom House provides an index from the early 1970s, which matches the beginning phase of the third wave in Latin America. Furthermore, the Freedom House index measures democracy with two separate indices, political rights and civil liberties; the former includes rights such as electoral rights and the latter reviews other rights given to people in a country.

The Freedom House index follows three divisions: “free”, “partly free”, and “not free”. Freedom House categorizes full democracy using index scores one (1) and two (2) and labels it as “free”; from levels three (3) to five (5) a country is labeled “partly free”; and levels six (6) and seven (7) as “not free”. This paper will use these numeric scores (from one to seven) to measure democracy. The reason for using the one to seven indicators in measuring democracy is that it allows more variance in testing the hypothesis. According to the Freedom House model, one (1) is the most democratic, the most “free” borrowing the Freedom House term, and seven (7) is the most authoritarian, the most “not free” democratic regime also using the Freedom House terminology.17

It is expected that measuring both the Polity score and the Freedom House score will allow us to better assess the level of democracy in Latin America.

IV. Independent Variables

This paper examines the effects of different types of international organizations and whether they can contribute to democracy consolidation, especially in the Latin American region. Accordingly, the independent variables are a combination of an intervention by a single international organization and a joint international organizations operation. To examine the efficiency of these international organizations in democracy consolidation, I will study three types of international organizations: world organizations, regional organizations, and joint organizations.

International organizations are described by Pevehouse as "formal institutional bodies with nation-states as decision-making members."\(^\text{18}\) The definition of an international organization which Marshall, Marshall, and Young provide is more detailed than other descriptions; they are "autonomous international governmental… organizations of a non-profit nature. Multinational enterprises are therefore excluded. All such bodies have members in at least 3 countries and do not have their activities or decision-making structured in favour of any particular country.\(^\text{19}\)

Mansfield and Pevehouse put emphasis on its functions, unlike other definitions that focus on membership and structure. They define it as "associations established by governments or their representatives that are sufficiently institutionalized to require regular meetings, rules governing decision making, a


permanent staff, and a headquarters."²⁰

Along with the definition for international organizations, I will follow Marshall, Marshall, and Young’s²¹ description from the “Membership in Conventional International Organizations 1952 – 1997” to measure regional organizations. They define regional organizations while categorizing them as “intercontinental membership organizations”²² as “includ[ing] all international non-profit organizations… whose membership and preoccupations exceed that of a particular continental region, although not to a degree justifying its inclusion in the previous type.”²³ Among the regional organizations in the Latin American region, I will use the intervention by the Organization of American States (OAS) on the self-coup caused by President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in the early 1990s and in the early 2000s.

Next, I will use the definition from the same source for world organizations. They describe the world organizations, or the universal membership organizations, as including “all non-profit international organizations… that have a widespread, geographically-balanced membership, management and policy-control. Although this concept of a ‘universal’ membership organization is much discussed, no generally accepted rule for distinguishing such bodies has been formulated. The rule applied here is that there should be members in at least 60 countries, or else in more than 30 countries provided that the distribution between continents is ‘well-balanced.’”²⁴ Accordingly, the United Nations will be used as a case study for the world

²⁰ Mansfield, and Pevehouse. 138
²¹ Marshall, Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young.
²² Marshall, Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 3
²³ Marshall, Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 3
²⁴ Marshall, Monty G., Donna F. Ramsey Marshall, Sherry Marie Young. 4
organizations since it is one of the largest and one of the most well functioning world organizations. As for the case study, the autogolpe by President Jorge Serrano in 1993 will be studied. In the case of Guatemala, the UN interference was not caused by the action of President Serrano but by Guatemala’s long lasting domestic instability. However, this case study was selected because the initial concern for intervention, human rights and restoring democracy, was similar to the other case studies.

Lastly, the collective action form of these two types of organizations will be defined as joint organizations. The organizations referred to in this part of the paper are the OAS and the UN. The study will focus on the chain of missions exercised in Haiti from 1991 through 1995.

These three case studies were selected because the first two cases, Peru (1992) and Guatemala (1993), concerned domestic insecurity caused by the self-coup by the president and both the OAS and the UN reacted to these issues. Although the case study of Haiti (1991) is not caused by an autogolpe, it was selected because it was caused by a coup d’état and it is one of the first joint missions that was adopted in Latin America.

Before I move on to the case studies, I will discuss three types of international organizations in order to understand their characteristics in more detail.
V. International Organizations

A lot of studies on the effects of international organizations on democracy consolidation focus on states' membership in international organizations rather than how these institutions function to consolidate democracy. Although there may be a basic set protocol within each institution regarding how to deal with democracy backtracking issues, each instance varies greatly and it is difficult to theorize the issue. In this section I will describe the strengths and weaknesses of joining each type of international organizations. Former United Nations Secretary – General Boutros Boutros – Ghali\textsuperscript{25} also recognized this issue and was concerned that the United Nations democracy consolidation efforts should not be determined with one sweeping policy.

Therefore I will start by explaining the functions of the international organizations compared to regional organizations and world organizations to discover which type of international organizations have superior influence in consolidating democracy in the Latin American region. Thus, I will begin with a description of the general characteristics of the international organizations and move on to the distinctive features of the regional organizations and the world organizations. As the joint international organizations operation is a combination of the previous two types of international organizations, it will not be substantially discussed. Followed by the characteristics, I will move on to functional practices that these international organizations perform to consolidate democracy.

As explained earlier, Mansfield and Pevehouse researched what causes states to participate in each type of international organization. The distinctive nature of international organizations varies according to the requirements that the states may need to meet to join them. Some of them vary from requiring no changes in order to become a member in organizations like the United Nations, to grand economic and political changes needed for membership in organizations such as the European Union. Both regional and world organizations fall under "political organizations" because, generally, these types of organizations do not have particular aims that are desired from the member countries.

Unfortunately, differentiating regional and world organizations is difficult when these both fall under the same category. Also, a clear distinction between both organizations is difficult when scholars ambiguously define international organizations. They share characteristics of international organizations. For example, although Pevehouse focuses on the regional organizations in the book Democracy from Above, it is difficult to understand the separation between the two organizations.

That having been said, regional and world organizations may show similar behavior when they require the member states to maintain their status as democratic states or consolidate their democracy levels. The international organizations, both regional and world, can urge the member state that is backtracking from its process to consolidate democracy through political (diplomatic) and economic pressure. Doing so can have positive effects, especially on newly recognized democracies and those that are in the positive process of consolidation. Pressuring the states that fail to

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27 Mansfield, Edward D, Jon C. Pevehouse. 2008. 52. 274
28 Mansfield, Edward D, Jon C. Pevehouse. 272-4
consolidate democracy can differentiate pressuring states from those of failing ones and can elevate one’s standing in international organizations.29

Also, the pressure by the democratic countries to backtracking countries not only drives member countries from an international organization’s dedication to proliferate democracy, but also widens their trade and political partners. This is because of the general understanding that democracy has positive political and economic effects and these countries are highly favorable to economic relationships in both private and public sectors with international partners.30 These attributes of international organizations catalyze the member states in international organizations to propagate democracy both within the international organizations and outside as well.

Moreover, another important factor is that states join certain international organizations to show their commitment to introduce or strengthen democracy domestically. Showing a commitment though joining international organizations can give the impression to domestic actors that the government has the strong will to consolidate democracy. This intention can be seen through domestic reforms of government systems, electoral processes, and human rights.31 The cost of changing the domestic rules are high and sometimes the government has to deal with the domestic elites in contrary positions, especially of those in business and the military.32

Therefore, it is generally thought that the pressure democratizing states or states that are under a process of consolidating democracy comes from a membership requirement that international organizations ask for when joining them. This is

30 Pevehouse Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In? 523
31 Pevehouse, Jon C., 2005. Democracy from Above
32 Pevehouse, Jon C., 2005. Democracy from Above
because after meeting the condition, especially those states which have a high commitment to consolidate democracy or democratization do not attempt to go against the process.

However, the most distinctive difference between the regional and world organizations is how much the members states’ voice can influence the organization. As the regional organizations tend to have fewer members due to their geographical limits, small or less powerful countries have a higher chance to be opinionated. Pevehouse also writes that the “forum provides states of all sizes with a low-cost ‘voice’ opportunity.”

Furthermore, these international organizations have a systematic similarity in helping countries to consolidate democracy. Especially in this part of the paper, I focus on two international organizations, the OAS and the UN, because the case studies undertaken later focus on these two organizations. It is interesting that democracy promotion in both the UN and the OAS stem from human rights protection. It is not surprising that the UN is concerned about human rights; however, it is odd to see the OAS initiatives for protecting human rights in the region. This is because recently the OAS is widely understood as a democracy proliferating organization in the region than protecting human rights; still, the organization began to concentrate on democracy consolidation after 1985 at the General Assembly Meeting in Cartagena where “delegates to this session amended the preamble of the OAS charter [Article 2 of the Chapter I] to state that ‘representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, peace and development of the region.’”

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33 Pevehouse Jon C. 2002. Democracy from the Outside-In
34 Adams, 88
35 Adams. 88
Nonetheless, these organizations initiated democracy promotion from human rights concerns. They also share similar functional mechanisms. Three functional similarities can be found between the OAS and the UN: electoral support, help for local governments to build institutional systems, and sharing information.36

The highest objective of supporting electoral systems is to encourage countries to have periodic and fair elections. This assistance can range from building institutional infrastructure to generating "civil registries"37 through monitoring and education. For example, the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) is organized under the Department of Political Affairs in the UN to assist states that are in need of planning clean and fair elections.38 The second objective is to help central and local governments build basic institutional systems to strengthen the local governments and decentralize from the central governments.39 Decentralization from the central governments is also associated with consolidating democracy because it can reduce the ability of a dominant leader monopolizing the country as autocratic governments do. Compared to the central government, local governments lack knowledge of maintaining resources and finance. More importantly, these organizations help local governments to strengthen legislative systems by offering expertise in endorsing legislation and developing local policies.40 Lastly, the organizations facilitate as an information sharing site for transparent government. However, while the UN collects information on government functions and its ability to support the domestic system,

36 Adams, 49, 97
37 Adams, 97
38 Adams, 49, 97
39 Adams, 52, 98
40 Adams, 52, 98
the OAS focuses its data collection efforts on democracy proliferation.\textsuperscript{41}

In the next part of the paper I will discuss three case studies in which, respectively, the OAS, UN, and a joint UN/OAS mission intervened in Latin American countries.

\textsuperscript{41} Adams, 54, 99
VI. Case Studies

A. The OAS: Peru in 1992

I begin the case studies of the two organizations with the role of the OAS in Peru during the Fujimori government from 1990 to 2000. The initial phase of democratization was driven in the late 1970s by the military. This is because the military regime was incapable of resolving the economic crisis and the divided military understandings. Additional processes such as elections to return the country to civilian rule were taken between 1977 and 1980, with financial relief from foreign countries to some of the parties in Peru. By the 1980s, Peru had democratized.

In 1990 Alberto Fujimori was elected. He became a beloved figure in the country and America for his efforts in dealing with the Shining Path and in settling the economic crisis even as he was also suspect because of his political attitude toward human rights. Two years after the election, on April 5 1992, President Fujimori announced Plan Verde with military assistance. This plan resulted in limiting Congress, banning the constitution, dismissing the judiciary, and suspending the media. Plan Verde was an outline from Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori’s self-coup advisor, which gave emergency authority to the president when necessary.

This action taken by Fujimori was especially welcomed by military and

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42 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 2006. *Intervention without Intervening? The OAS Defense and Promotion of Democracy in the Americas.* Palgrave Macmillan:45-9
43 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 49
business actors who had lost faith in democracy after the economy had worsened.\(^45\)

Two estimations about Fujimori’s self-coup can be discussed. One is that Fujimori had concerns over the economic crisis in Peru and these worries caused him to control the legislative system. Another analysis, which is more believed by scholars, is that he was obsessed with maintaining the Presidency.\(^46\) Fujimori’s behavior was condemned by many countries such as the United States. However, while controversial, elections that took place in 1995 were assessed by scholars such as Levitsky\(^47\) and Arceneaux and Pion-Berlin\(^48\) as Fujimori’s regime going back to democracy.

To the OAS, Peru was one of the first interventions for democratization in the early 1990s.\(^49\) Soon after the self-coup, the Permanent Council issued Resolution 579, stating that Fujimori had violated Resolution 1080, and decided to hold an immediate ad hoc meeting. The meeting held in November agreed to send a “high-level fact finding mission.”\(^50\) They also agreed to elect a group—called the Democratic Constitutional Congress—and observe them write a new Constitution that would serve until the new presidential election of 1995.\(^51\)

Although the OAS made progress on gaining consent from Fujimori to hold a legislative election in 1995, the institution was also marked by its lack of consensus and its feeble monitoring mission. Members such as the United States on the one hand and Mexico—Brazil on the other had the most conflicting suggestions. Countries had

\(^{45}\) Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 50
\(^{46}\) Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 49
\(^{49}\) Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 45-6
\(^{50}\) Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 51
\(^{51}\) Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 51
different perspectives on the strength of the reaction towards the self-coup. Further, uncertainty about the mission's effectiveness had risen when the observer missions to two 1995 elections were unsuccessful. The elections were questioned in their transparency. In one of the elections, the national election, almost 6,000 ballots perished. Nearly forty percent of the ballots were abrogated during the legislative election. Failings of the monitoring body were critical because they were present at the country with a visit arranged by President Fujimori himself.

Unlike what the OAS expected, the organization was not able to make significant progress as the public popularity of Fujimori grew. Even if the OAS did not make much progress with the autogolpe in the early 1990s, it demonstrated continuous influence in some parts of the electoral system. Enacted by the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the club created an education system for the observer group called the “Transparencia” in the mid 1990s and this group served for the 2000 presidential election. This observer body constituted of civilians was to support democratic election: the system was established for transparent vote counting.

Since the 2000 election, the OAS and particularly the Unit for the Protection of Democracy, especially pursued by César Gaviria, showed an effort “to expend an external validation power of the organization” to contribute in a more political manner. The organization passed its constitutional limits in challenging states' sovereignty and implemented a mission in Peru. This action taken by the OAS encouraged the institution to move further as a multilateral organization, according to

52 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 52-3
53 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 55
54 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 57
55 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 57
56 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 58, 70
Cooper and Legler, but they should not be satisfied with the success in Peru. They argue that although the organization was blessed in terms of its mission to Peru, the OAS still has flaws that need to be overcome, such as interfering with sovereignty and defining democracy within the group.57

As a result, the second OAS intervention in Peru was very successful, escalating the democracy level from −3 (1992) to 5 (2000), according to the Polity score. The Polity score reached 1 in 1995 when the OAS made great effort such as creating domestic observers, although it was not successful failing to meet transparency of the process, in supporting electoral process. The Freedom House score also shows a general increase of their democracy level. However, while the political rights score dropped from 6 (1992) to 3 (2000), the civil rights score only dropped two levels from 5 (1992) to 3 (2000). The results resemble the OAS emphasis on the electoral system during the intervention.

57 Cooper, Andrew. Thomas Legler. 62-4
B. United Nations: Guatemala in 1993

A year after President Fujimori's self-coup, Guatemala also experienced an autogolpe by President Jorge Serrano. He decided to suspend Congress and the Supreme Court and to ban part of the Constitution. The self-coup in Guatemala is easily compared to that of Peru's because of its similarity in process. However, unlike the success of President Fujimori, President Serrano had to resign his presidency after nearly two years of his autocratic regime. One big difference between President Serrano's action from the autogolpe by President Fujimori is that the self-coup in 1993 did not receive severe counter action by international organizations, although some organizations did voice concerns. This may be because, during that time, there already had been UN interference in Guatemala to broker peace talks to end the civil war. The UN took an active role as a mediator to bring about a cease fire between the Guatemalan government and an opposition group. However, in 1995, the UN declared a humanitarian mission because it was concerned about the human rights violations occurring in Guatemala.

Guatemala had long been in unrest due to the civil war with various opposition forces such as the ladino guerrillas, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of the Armed People (ORPA), and the Civil Self-defense Patrols (PACs). In 1984, when the military had mostly defeated the newly established National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unit (URNG), the country elected the

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58 Cameron, 130
first civilian president and entered into a democratic transition. President Serrano, after he was elected in January 1991, began to reform the military structure. Many high military officers were dismissed and charged with crimes. Also, he initiated direct talks with the opposition forces. Despite President Serrano’s achievements, he was accused of corruption. President Serrano bought votes using secret funds called confidenciales, but eventually failed to buy the party’s votes to his favor and declared an autogolpe on May 25, 1993. However, President Serrano himself had dictatorial characteristic which encouraged him to declare self – coup. However, the Guatemalan government, military, civilians, and the international organizations did not welcome the self – coup by President Serrano and eventually forced him to resign.

The UN influence in Guatemala began before the autogolpe in 1993. As an active mediator, the UN helped peace talks to take place in 1990 between the government and the guerrillas. In 1991, several agreements for a cease – fire were reached in meetings such as the Mexico Accord in April, but the process was halted until 1994 because of the self – coup. The Guatemalan government and the opposition force (URNG) acknowledged each other’s commitment to continue the peace negotiation in January 1994. By March, the two parties signed a Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights which led to the creation of the United Nations

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61 Cameron, 130-1
62 Cameron, 131
Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). The MINUGUA was to support the peace–agreements as the accord added more details later as the agreements were finalized in December 1996. Mandates of the MINUGUA also included monitoring human rights issues, such as the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples that occurred because of the ethnic division in Guatemala. This incorporated the education of indigenous people and encouraged them to actively participate in the representative system. Also professional training was held to re-enter the rebels into society. In 1996, a peace agreement was finalized by the Guatemalan government and the UNRG. An agreement on Firm and Lasting Peace included issues such as the cease–fire, demobilization, and no discrimination of opposition forces when they returned to society. The MINUGUA’s task was to monitor and supervise the demobilization process, monitor human rights, and provide support for the rebuilding of the judicial system.

Consequently, intervention by the UN in Guatemala made the least progress. Among three case studies, the UN was able to increase the least polity score level from 3 (1993) to 8 (2000). In addition, result from the UN intervention is not satisfying because escalation of democracy level appeared only once in 1996, when the peace agreement was signed, between the years from 1993 to 2000. In addition, there was no change in the democracy level after 1996. The Freedom House scores also did not make significant changes. The scores decreased by only one point from 4 (political rights) and 5 (civil rights) in 1993.

64 Adams, 46
65 Santino, 167
66 Adams, 46-7
C. Cooperative Form: The OAS-UN mission in Haiti in 1991

This joint venture between the OAS and the UN will be elaborated in more detail because the purpose of this paper is to emphasize the effectiveness of international organizations working together. Gibsons concludes that the cooperation between the OAS and the United Nations was mostly shown in later phase of the intervention in Haiti. Berenson, on the other hand, argues that the cooperation between the two organizations was first led by the OAS, immediately after the coup d’état, and was transferred to the UN in 1993.67

Immediately after the coup d’état, a lot of the reaction taken by the UN and the OAS focused on sanctions. The coup d’état, led by General Michel François on September 29, 1991, overthrew President Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide, who was elected seven months before, was exiled to the United States. The OAS held an ad hoc meeting in response to the coup d’état, which violated Resolution 1080. Decisions made on October 3, 1991 refused to recognize the new government and ceased all economic relations with Haiti, including humanitarian aid. A few days later, the UN came up with similar results about the organization’s concerns about the violent activity in Haiti and urged the members to support the OAS to sanction the new regime. On June 16, 1993 after the UN failed to mediate the issue, the Security Council announced Resolution 841 to embargo all petrol and arms. Before this resolution, the UN took a relatively passive attitude toward the new regime, asking

member states to participate in the sanctions voluntarily.\textsuperscript{68} However, Resolution 841 was taken into account. This reaction, with the UN acting under the Chapter VII and VIII,\textsuperscript{69} was urging cooperation with the regional organization in order to mandatorily bind states to take action against the new government in Haiti.

With the sanctions continuing to put pressure on Haiti, General Raoul Cedras was willing to meet President Aristide. From the meeting, the two parties agreed on the Governors Island Accord and the New York Pact, which included steps that should be taken until Aristide returned to the country and to his position as the president in October. The UN and the OAS, separately but on the same day, lifted the embargo to move toward restoring President Aristide back to his presidential position, although Cedras still did not allow Aristide back into Haiti.\textsuperscript{70}

In spite of all the other measures that took place, the sanctions against the military regime were reinstituted. This was because the Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) force failed to continue its plan due to domestic resistance. In May 6, 1994, mostly driven by the United States, a total sanction towards Haiti was voted on Resolution 917 to increase pressure on the new regime.\textsuperscript{71} Although the agreement failed, this meeting called the UN and the OAS to step up together as coordinators of the meeting in New York to monitor and validate the process. In late September 1994, as the Multinational Force (MNF) entered and negotiations between General Cedras and the United States began, the embargo was suspended as the UN Security Council agreed

\textsuperscript{69} Berenson, 21
\textsuperscript{70} Berenson, 22
\textsuperscript{71} Gibbons. 4-6
on Resolution 948 and asked the OAS to do same.72

As reactions by the UN and the OAS were highly focused on embargoes and sanctions, there were also doubts about the effectiveness of the economic pressure. The concern was especially about the economic effects on low income populations such as inflation and unemployment. Therefore, humanitarian concerns escalated as poor communities suffered from the sanctions.73 For this reason, the UN and the OAS agreed to create an International Civil Mission to Haiti OAS/UN (MICIVIH) on May 6, 1993.

Before beginning the aid, the two organizations had conflicting arguments on defining humanitarian aid and whether discrimination of donors was acceptable. Some, such as the OAS and Dante Caputo, the UN/OAS special envoy, were distressed about the idea that the new regime in Haiti would misunderstand the purpose of the aid. Unfortunately, because the member states had different political interests, the UN/OAS Consolidated Humanitarian Plan for Haiti could only earn 19 percent of its aimed donation ($62.7 million).74

Despite the MICIVIH’s obstacles in attracting funds and technical issues, cooperation was successful with regard to the quick response in Haiti. For example, while the UN was not able to deploy observers in Haiti soon enough, the OAS sent observers in advance to rent offices and build infrastructure to deal with the humanitarian issues. By 1994, the observer mission developed into supporting the education system, human rights issues, election efforts, and judicial development.75

One of the missions the MICIVIH requested was for the United Nations

72 Berenson, 26
73 Gibbons, 47-50
74 Gibbons, 51-55
75 Berenson, 32-4
International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) to protect child rights as a part of the project. However, from the beginning, UNICEF faced challenges due to the lack of knowledge about the region and the member states' political interests. Especially, the sanctions that followed discouraged the team from dispersing necessary goods and helping the most needy populations. Moreover, the mission could not facilitate more than as an observer in Haiti.\footnote{Gibsons, 56-62} The Secretary Council's Sanctions Committee—while its effectiveness is controversial—eventually arranged a humanitarian exemption. Later, recognition by the UN/OAS, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) supported with fuel delivery to donating organizations in the region and management in a collective effort.\footnote{Gibsons, 68-70}

The joint mission by the UN and the OAS was one of the first cooperative operations undertaken to defend democracy in Latin America. The mission is assessed as a partial success due to the lack of appropriate support from the military. As described earlier, the UNMIH force had to leave Haiti because of the domestic opposition during the mission. However, the project was successful in that the organizations set a precedent by committing an effort to consolidate democracy.

The result for the UN – OAS joint operation is somewhat controversial. This is because the democracy level increased from $-7$ (1991) to $-2$ (2000) according to the Polity score but there were severe fluctuations. The democracy level jumped to 7 in 1994, from $-7$ the previous year, which could be a result of the joint mission observers' support in educational system, human rights, electoral, and judicial development that began in 1994. However, the democracy level showed a big drop in
2000 to −2 when tension grew in Haiti after the election. The Freedom House score displayed similar results about Haiti. Both scores had 7 in 1991 but the political rights score was able to only drop one point by 2000 while the civil rights score reached 5.

Although the result of Haiti case is controversial because of the fluctuation, joint operations by the UN and OAS in Haiti increased the democracy level from an authoritarian regime to a democracy during the period of 1991 and 1998. In Peru, however, the OAS escalated democracy level from an anocratic regime to democracy. In addition, while the OAS mission to Peru elevated the democracy level by increasing its Polity score by 12 points, the joint OAS/UN operation in Haiti advanced the Policy score by 14 points.
VII. Effectiveness of cooperation by international organizations

Joint operations can face challenges when the international organizations have different decision making systems. The dilemma can escalate when the organizations cannot agree on how to reach a goal. However, as seen in the Haitian case, this opinion gap can increase discussions on how these organizations can better support countries to reach democracy through consensus on methods and ultimate goals. Aside from the politics, the UN Charter puts the main focus on people as the main international actor. This idea brings the UN to promote democracy as the organization believes that democracy consolidation can promote better living standards for the people. Therefore, human rights become more important than increasing specific states’ interest on the region. In addition, although the current OAS puts more emphasis on democracy consolidation, the organization was initiated to protect human rights. This fundamental idea of the two organizations provides good reason for them to cooperate in order to promote and help consolidate democracy.

Collaboration between the UN and the OAS can help the United States to earn trust from the Latin Americans. Some of the Latin American countries still have concerns about the United States’ intention in intervening in their region. This is because, so far, the region possesses a negative impression of the United States’ past intervention during the Cold War in the region while promoting its own democratic policy. The United States’ commitments to democracy in Latin America were not consistent and were dependent on the United States’ interest. In some cases the United

78 Cooper, Andrew, Thomas Legler. 16
States would support non-democratic regimes or an action taken by certain groups or individuals when it had critical links to the United States' security interest. In 1993, the United States actively engaged to counter the autogolpe effort made by the Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano. However, a year before in Peru the United States did not counter President Alberto Fujimori's self-coup in 1992. Also, the fact that the United States has a large influence in the OAS deters the Latin Americans from taking guidance on democracy consolidation because it questions the motives of the United States.

The fact that the United States is a permanent member of the UN adds to Latin America's concern on the effectiveness of the United States in the OAS. In addition, the permanent council does not have a regional power from the Latin American region to discuss the area's issues. However, as the importance of the UN stands on its symbolic image that may empower the member states' behavior, the UN Security Council can be an initiative in beginning missions to the region and announce the organization's support.

Cooperation between the regional organizations and the world organizations can be compared to collaboration between domestic actors such as the public sectors and local organizations. The relationship between these two actors can foster facilitating knowledge and resources. Therefore, these actors may seek for assistance simultaneously. On the one hand, the public organizations may request help from local organizations, non-government organization or non-profit organizations or civilian groups. On the other hand, local organizations may seek for relations with the

international organizations to earn support in financial and material resources that these local organizations may lack. Therefore, collaboration can support what other organizations lack, such as in information, technical knowledge, resources, and other possible assistance.

Scholar such as Berenson believe that the OAS can be an active tool for the joint organizations project when the UN cannot be situated at the site fast enough. These differences lie under the different regulations and accessibilities these organizations have. When a country faces a democracy backlash, the OAS can take an immediate action through gathering an ad hoc meeting according to Resolution 1080. However, the decision making process in the UN may take longer than the OAS due to the interest distance between the participating countries. In addition, the OAS members have easier geographical accessibility compared to a multinational force from the UN. The joint mission to Haiti in the early 1990s is a good example of this. Before the UN observers arrived at the site, the OAS sent its observers, approximately 100 observers, and prepared it with office and basic equipment. The UN, although it arrived late at the site, committed with its expertise in the issue.

The regional organizations and world organizations may have similar functional factors in assisting countries. However, because they are different in size, goals, and members that are affiliated in the system, their approach to the situations may differ according to the organization type. For example, on the one hand, the OAS focuses on strengthening and organizing national governments' legislature and judiciaries. On the other hand, the UN puts emphasis on "decentralizing

Berenson, 30

governance83 and increasing civilian participation.84 In addition, during the MICIVIH, the OAS and the UN had faced a contradiction in defining humanitarian aid. Such challenges can be overcome through accumulated joint practice.

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83 Adams, 52
84 Adams, 52-4, 98-9
VIII. Conclusion

Causes of democracy consolidation are discussed by various scholars in many different ways. Scholars such as Lipset and Aristotle believe that economic development will enhance the level of democracy. Nonetheless, there are others who argue that the democracy level will decrease when a country reaches a certain level of economic performance. Others who think that external factors can cause the democracy level to increase put emphasis on international organizations to account for democracy consolidation. Those who focus on using international organizations, such as Pevehouse, usually favor regional organizations. They think the world organizations' effectiveness in democracy consolidation is highly limited. They believe that the regional organizations are more capable in implementing democracy around the world and in Latin America. The power of regional organizations does not only lie in their geographical concentration but also the pressure they can put on other member states. This is because the regional organizations have smaller numbers of member states, and it is relatively efficient for the group to act through consensus.

On the other hand, the world organization can be an adequate tool when a country wants to earn a reputation because there are more members that can recognize others. Therefore, although a consensus is usually difficult to meet, when it is agreed by the member states, the impact is much larger than that of the regional organizations.

The regional organizations and world organizations may have relatively strong factors toward each other such as pressuring other states to act or to recognize them certain way. However, each organization can also be supported in what they lack.
in these characteristics. In 1995, the UN recognized the effectiveness of the OAS. Therefore, the UN Secretary General included in Resolution 975 how the OAS can be supportive to the UN to secure democracy in Haiti.

The cooperation between the organizations does not need to be bound by symbolic meaning that the joint mission can give to the international society. They can support each other through regulations and materials that each alone may lack. Therefore, a joint mission between the regional organizations and the world organizations can embrace better results than working alone. For example, on the one hand, during the mission to Haiti in 1991, the OAS was able to declare a Resolution before the UN could and condemn the military coup d'état. The UN later announced its concern of the issue and joined the OAS by sanctioning the new regime. On the other hand, the OAS was assisted with the expertise and materials from the UN during the observer mission.

There is a possibility that the separate mission to Haiti in 1991 could have eased the tension, bring the military regime down, and restored democracy. Also, the joint mission faced challenges because whenever a new decision was to be made, each organization had to adopt a new resolution of its own. However, as a joint mission, the UN and the OAS showed its collective and consistent support to restore democracy in Haiti and urged member states to participate in the sanctions and embargo. This coinciding joint action against the rough regime encouraged member states to participate and resulted in restoring Haiti to its pre-coup d'état condition.

The importance of cooperative action between the regional organizations and the world organizations should not be minimized. The OAS and the UN recognize their importance and have begun to hold forums to share information regarding this
mater. In addition, the case studies showed that the Haiti mission was more successful in elevating the democracy level than the other two cases (Peru and Guatemala). This result supports the argument that joint operations can be efficient in implementing democracy consolidation. However, the joint operation failed to maintain democracy in Haiti when stability eroded in 2000.

Therefore, a further challenge to this paper and to the cooperative form of international organizations is to discover what necessary conditions or processes are required for these joint operations to be most effectively implemented. Further, one might test whether the short stability in Haiti was due to the domestic conditions or to the limitations of joint operations. This can be researched from past joint practices by not only the OAS and the UN but other world organizations and regional organizations such as the European Union.
References


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