Property without Personhood

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This Article is dedicated to the memory of Marc Poirier, an inspiring author and a generous human being.

The property as personhood theory provides a dominant justification for legal theory and has shaped numerous legal doctrines. Although the theory has been criticized by many scholars, one important concern has escaped scholars thus far. Property as personhood limits identity and confines growth. The concept allows little room for experimenting with personality and testing one’s lifestyle. Access, a rising form of property use in the sharing economy, provides an important alternative. It allows for property use without personhood, emphasizing choice, flexibility and mobility. This Article presents this alternative and explains its significance to property legal theory contra the property as personhood theory. It also details the benefits and costs associated with property without personhood, and sketches out possible legal implications.

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INTRODUCTION

Property and personhood are intimately linked in modern legal thinking. Controlling property through possession manifests individuality. Possession contributes to self-development and manifests identity. Ownership connotes stability. Property is often justified based on its role in connecting a person to her past and future and communicating her identity. Our home, car, books, furniture, and even toys reflect who we are to our friends and neighbors.

Yet, alongside this description, property as shaping or reflecting identity comes at a price. We stand the risk of fetishizing property and reducing our identity to mere items. We risk being judged by what we have rather than who we are. To these familiar critiques, this Article adds a neglected risk: property as personhood limits our options and


3 Radin, supra note 1.


See supra note 1.


6 Radin, supra note 1, at 961 (“Property is damnation as well as salvation, object-fetishism as well as moral groundwork.”).

7 Compare the role of property as conveying relative status in Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 757, 768 (2008) (internal quotations omitted) (citing William James, The Principles of Psychology 291–92 (1890)) (“[I]t is clear that between what a man calls me and what he simply calls mine the line is difficult to draw. We feel and act about certain things that are ours very much as we feel and act about ourselves . . . .”).
confines our growth. The concept allows little room for experimenting with our personality and testing our lifestyle. This Article further argues that the sharing economy, and the access revolution it has inspired, create an alternative property use: property without personhood.

Access allows consumers to use assets on a casual basis instead of purchasing unnecessary objects. People choose to access cars casually on an as-needed basis rather than own or lease a vehicle. Some users would rather borrow or rent a drill and not buy one, only to use it twice a year. Indeed, among the reported advantages of access are saving costs and promoting sustainability. Moreover, consumer researchers have suggested that access symbolizes flexibility, mobility, and openness to change. Much like property as personhood, we may conclude, access is a choice that communicates the identity of the user. People who choose access do not seek stability, but prefer a more casual lifestyle. However, we should proceed with caution. It is easy to attribute personality traits to consumer choices. This view tends to

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9 See infra Part I.B.4.
16 See, e.g., Russell Belk, You are what you can access: Sharing and collaborative consumption online, 67 J. BUS. RES. 1595 (2014) [hereinafter Belk, You are what you can
be reductionist. The argument in this Article is more nuanced, namely that access allows users to experiment and push the boundaries of their engagements with property. When someone chooses to buy or lease an asset, s/he might consider the reflection of this choice on his/her identity or its perception by the community. On the other hand, if one only accesses this asset, there is no financial commitment, and there is more room to experiment. Toy lending libraries make a good example. When children do not buy a toy, but instead exchange toys frequently, boys are willing to try toys normally associated with girls. There is more openness to experimenting with property. Ownership’s stability is limiting, while access has a liberating component.

This aspect of ownership and possession has yet to be considered by property legal theory. The claim is not an attack on ownership or the vision of property as personhood per se. The goal is to highlight alternatives. The existence of alternatives, facilitated by the rise of the sharing economy, allows users to evaluate their choices and question the role of property as personhood in their lives. Moreover, stability and attachment become more meaningful when there is also an opportunity to experiment. For this reason, this Article argues that the law should protect access as an option, and the ability to choose it. At certain points in one’s life, access will be the most effective lifestyle choice. People may desire flexibility and mobility when they are younger and prefer stability as they get older. In addition, some individuals will combine attachment and stability with a certain level of flexibility. The law should support these choices.

The Article proceeds as follows: Part I presents the importance of personhood and stability in property legal theory and its influence on legal doctrines. It will then consider the various critiques of the property as personhood approach. Part II depicts the rise of access, and considers the economic and cultural factors leading to its newfound prominence. It will also consider the role of access in allowing people to experiment with their identity and push the

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access]; Russell Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139 (1988) [hereinafter Belk, Extended Self].

17 See Davidson, supra note 8.
18 See infra notes 194–197 and accompanying text.
20 Id.
21 See infra Part II.B.1.
22 See infra Part I.
23 See infra Part II.
boundaries of their personhood, as well as the normative difficulties of choosing access. Part III introduces general recommendations for legal reform and explicates, in very broad strokes, the importance of legal support of property without personhood. Finally, Part IV offers concluding remarks.

I. PROPERTY, PERSONHOOD AND STABILITY

A. The Approach

The role of property in supporting, shaping or recognizing personhood begins with Hegel’s theory of person.\textsuperscript{24} Hegel’s person starts as an abstract unit of will, which becomes a concrete individual by controlling an external object.\textsuperscript{25} It is not property in itself but the control of property by a person that makes one an individual.\textsuperscript{26} This argument does not distinguish among types of property: it is the control of an asset, recognized by the community, that supports personhood.\textsuperscript{27} It is through the recognition of others that one recognizes herself.\textsuperscript{28} The right-holder is understood as a sovereign, exerting power, and is thus constituted as a concrete being.\textsuperscript{29} Moreover, according to Jeremy Waldron, engaging with property has an important temporal aspect, as “the actions that an individual performs on or with the object now may constrain or determine the actions that he can perform on or with it later.”\textsuperscript{30} Property embodies will by forcing the individual to become consistent and stable over time.\textsuperscript{31}

The general concept of property’s role in the achievement of personhood is twofold. First, people define themselves at least partly by what they have.\textsuperscript{32} When a person changes an object, structures or uses it, according to the claim, she cements her identity in the object. She has to acknowledge her responsibility when she changes the property, since the process is irreversible.\textsuperscript{33} Second, objects tell us something about their owner: they reveal her likes and dislikes, her

\textsuperscript{24} See Hegel, supra note 2.
\textsuperscript{25} BRUDNER, supra note 1.
\textsuperscript{26} WALDRON, supra note 1.
\textsuperscript{27} Id.
\textsuperscript{28} See Knowles, supra note 2.
\textsuperscript{29} See WALDRON, supra note 1, at 377–78.
\textsuperscript{30} Id. at 373.
\textsuperscript{31} Id.
\textsuperscript{32} Cf. Davidson, supra note 8.
\textsuperscript{33} See WALDRON, supra note 1, at 364–65.
tastes and preferences,\textsuperscript{34} her status in life,\textsuperscript{35} or the choices she has made. Our property says something about us to the world and, at the same time, helps us shape an image of ourselves. For example, consider personal possessions, such as clothes, books, and furniture. These objects allow owners to project personality outwards and structure their own experiences inwards.

Margaret Radin has stressed in her seminal work the attachment of subject to an object. Possession of certain objects contributes to achieving self-development.\textsuperscript{36} She distinguishes between fungible assets that do not warrant special protection and personhood property, which suggests “a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”\textsuperscript{37} However, the subjective assessment is accompanied by a normative judgment. A fully developed theory of property as personhood embodies a normative evaluation that separates the fetish from attachments. Indeed, Radin is well aware of the duality that lies in property relations. She explains:

Property is damnation as well as salvation, object-fetishism as well as moral groundwork. In this view, the relationship between the shoe fetishist and his shoe will not be respected like that between the spouse and her wedding ring. At the extreme, anyone who lives only for material objects is considered not to be a well-developed person, but rather to be lacking some important attribute of humanity.\textsuperscript{38}

The Radinian approach is not abstract; it engages with particular types of property that contribute to self-development. A key example is the home. According to Radin, the home is closely connected to personhood because it is the “scene of one’s history and future, one’s life and growth.”\textsuperscript{39} The car is also part of the same list, as cars are “the repository of personal effects, and cars form the backdrop for carrying on private thoughts or intimate relationships, just as homes do.”\textsuperscript{40}

Radin’s perception of property is non-formalist. Her argument highlights the value of continuing possession as the foundation for personhood. She does not focus on formal property rights, but on people’s engagement with property. Personhood is not attributable to

\textsuperscript{34} See Knowles, supra note 2, at 56–57.
\textsuperscript{35} See Pollack, supra note 1, at 1397–1406.
\textsuperscript{36} Radin, supra note 1.
\textsuperscript{37} Id. at 986.
\textsuperscript{38} Id. at 961.
\textsuperscript{39} Id. at 992.
\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 1001.
ownership *per se*, but to people’s attachment to objects. Accordingly, she argues that housing should not be treated as an ordinary market commodity. Occupational rights of tenants are to be characterized as personhood property, and the ownership rights of landlords are fungible property.

The property as personhood approach has proven remarkably influential in American property law. It is not only central to the study of modern property theory, but has also played a leading role in shaping legal doctrines. Based on the personhood interest in the home, Radin and others argue for strong protection of privacy rights in residential property, and in favor of rent control protection. In addition, different scholars advocate for the protection of the home from involuntary dislocation, relying on the role of the home in building identity and well-being. The personhood approach has been supported by empirical work. The home, according to these studies, creates a sense of belonging, permanence, and continuity. It allows the individual to know where she is located. Alongside its individual meanings, the home is also a locus of relationships. It

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42 *Id.* at 960, 995.


functions as a social and cultural unit of interaction. The home enables interactions with others, either as guests, neighbors, the people one lives with, or even pets.

Furthermore, intellectual property scholars have also relied on personhood theories to justify the protection of intellectual property as a property institution, and to support the moral standing of copyright. For example, Roberta Kwall argues that artistic work reflects the author’s meaning and "an embodiment of her message." Other notable examples include the ongoing discussion regarding property interests in the human body, and the conceptualization of inheritance and succession that stresses the importance of preserving intergenerational connections.

To sum up, personhood theory has played a key role in the analysis of various legal problems. Its influence on American legal thought is significant. Yet property’s role in supporting long-term goals for individuals reaches beyond attachment to possessions. Property connotes stability. Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky argue that property is a mechanism for protecting stable ownership value. Owner’s control and the right to exclude preserve the owner’s idiosyncratic values and bargaining position. Property law achieves

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50 Smith, supra note 49, at 37.
52 Ilhyung Lee, *Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright*, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795, 845 (2001) (“Conceptually, the dignity-based right of integrity is a personal right, one that demands respect for the author’s person (and the person’s artist), her personhood, and inviolate personality, as reflected in her creation. All of these interests must be said to terminate with the death of the author.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, *Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property*, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2012) (“Another group of scholars reasons instead that creators deserve moral rights in their works . . . because the works are important components of creators’ personhoods (the aspects of creators’ personalities infused into and bound up in their works).”).
56 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4.
57 Id.
stability for owners and for third parties. To conclude, then, property connects people to their community by providing a means for self-identification, growth and stability. However, as we shall see, this important role limits the possibility of changing, experimenting and living a flexible lifestyle.

B. Personhood’s Critiques

Although the property as personhood approach is undoubtedly central, it has also drawn significant criticism. These critiques are diverse and range from disputing its core rationale to concerns over its social implications. This section reviews the most notable objections and then adds a new concern regarding the growth and development of identity.

1. Psychological Validity

Stephanie Stern questions the validity of the personhood claim and challenges the endorsement of its insights. She claims there is a panoply of laws designed to protect or increase the likelihood “that an owner can retain her residential real estate despite creditor claims, government eminent domain action, or market fluctuations.” She critically refers to this array of protections as “residential protectionism.” Stern disputes the moral status of these protections, forcefully arguing that there is little evidence from psychological research to support the argument that the home constructs identity. According to her survey, evidence show that personality traits, values, social role and the body are more connected to the self than possessions. Moreover, she reclassifies property and maintains that the home is less connected to the self than diaries, pictures, old letters and heirlooms. This finding does not disprove the relevance of the approach, but deflects attention away from the home. In addition, Stern argues that people do not always prefer personhood property to

58 Id. See also Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 4 (arguing that property law achieves stability but highlighting the role of lawbreakers in undermining stability and fostering the evolution of property).
59 See infra Part II.B.1.
62 Stern, Residential Protectionism, supra note 46.
63 Id. at 1100.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1110.
67 Id. at 1111.
fungible property such as money. Finally, Stern argues that property does not construct identity but rather expresses identity and even maintains it. Indeed, “[h]omes and other possessions express attitudes, values, personal history, ethnic identity, and self-perceived status, or bolster an image of self we wish to convey to others.” Yet this reflective function does not justify legal protection. Considering the social costs, Stern concludes that ongoing control over the home is not a prerequisite for psychological flourishing.

This argument does not negate the personhood approach altogether, but stresses the dynamic nature of attachment. It seeks to overturn the claims against displacement. It maintains that people change and replace property frequently and the home cannot be seen as a rigid and sacred category. Jeffery Douglas Jones reinforces this conclusion from a different perspective. He argues that attachment to possession is so abundant that there is no need of legal possession. Everything is personal property, and things kept and things lost are part of the circle of life.

2. Pragmatism and Values

Stephen Schnably criticizes Radin’s pragmatist focus on consensus as the foundation for property as personhood. He makes two important claims. First, he argues that there is never any true consensus. A search for consensus merely obscures relevant controversies. Radin’s assertion that the home allows for self-constitution ignores the historical context of the home as a middle-class suburban artifact. According to Schnably, this perception rejects the importance of the public sphere in favor of private life, constitutes women’s role as homemakers, and excludes non-nuclear

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68 Stern, Residential Protectionism, supra note 46, at 1112.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1113.
71 Id. at 1095.
72 Id. at 1096.
73 Id. at 1114.
75 Id.
77 Schnably, supra note 76, at 363.
78 Id. at 365.
His second claim is that it is impossible to follow a consensus without constituting it at the same time. Indeed, “what we as a society choose to recognize and protect as personal inevitably affects subsequent choices by individuals of how and where to embody themselves.” For this reason

[the ideal of the home is not one simply constructed by individuals, but is one that has been actively fostered by the state and other ‘private’ actors wielding significant social power . . . since the law itself often shapes consensus, purporting to rely on consensus to shape the law is a dangerous exercise in circularity.]

While Stern’s critique focused on the validity of Radin’s argument, Schnably is more concerned with its normative strength. It is a meta-critique about legal theory’s struggle to grapple with social conventions and ideals. More importantly, it provides a skeptical take on pragmatism and universalism. His argument directs our attention to the power embedded in social structures, and to the winners and losers of current property regimes.

3. Relative Status

The role of property as reflecting and shaping identity is intricate. If property communicates a vision of the self, then it becomes a vehicle for communicating messages of status, and in particular relative status. Attachment to material possessions draws, at least partly, on comparison to others. Property thus marks and reinforces economic, social and cultural hierarchies. A comparison to other people “may over-incentivize the production of, or investment in, status-related resources.” This potential interrelation between personhood and possessions may fuel competitive consumption. Although it does not fall within the category of property fetish, communicating status is

79 Id. at 365–66.
80 Id. at 363.
81 Id. at 371–72.
82 Id. at 374–75.
84 See Davidson, supra note 8.
85 See id.
86 Id. at 760–61.
87 Id. at 762.
88 Id. at 799–800.
89 Radin, supra note 1, at 961.
reductionist. Instead of bolstering self-development, it has the potential to distort identity and personality. The identity-signaling function of property has given rise to a countermovement, supporting ecological and anti-consumerist motivations that steer away from ownership as a source of personal meaning. Because relative status is tied up with consumption, it drives an anti-consumerist rebuttal, which manifests itself in, among other things, the rise of access.

4. Growth and Change

This Article identifies an additional risk that the conflation of property and identity creates. Attachment to possessions is inherently restrictive. It connects the individual to a particular setting, geographically and personally, making it harder for the individual to move and change environments. The more property people have, the more tied down they are to a particular time, place and community. Because ownership is associated with stability and security, it might result in limiting choices.

The ability to change one’s life story, to develop goals and adapt new points of view is an essential component of the liberal understanding of autonomy. Property as personhood and stability creates barriers to change. In order to move, one needs to sell property and buy new things. Of course, property can be sold and bought, as exchange is the foundation of our economic system. Yet transactions are costly and cumbersome, and offer less flexibility than

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90 Davidson, supra note 8, at 762.
91 See Kim Humphery, Excess: Anti-consumerism in the West (2013).
92 See id.
96 Compare Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & Econ. 11 (1964); Gary D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights (1989), with Brudner, supra note 1, at 56 (explaining that according to Hegel, exchange involves the recognition of the other’s personhood).
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nonmaterial assets. Financial means are different from material possession because they are culturally understood as representing liquidity and choice.

This critique will be at the focus of this Article, along with the rise of access in the sharing economy. However, the Article does not challenge the cultural, social and economic validity of property as personhood. On the contrary, it is because property is understood as an expression of the self that it becomes limiting. Recognizing access as a form of property use will allow individuals to experiment with their preferences and narrow the role of property in constructing or projecting their identity.

Moreover, stability and coherence are important traits of property, but they contribute to a certain lifestyle and relational choices. Mobility and flexibility are alternative choices that require a different mode of property engagement. These two forms of use can—and should—coexist to provide an array of choices for individuals.

II. THE RISE OF ACCESS

A. Access: Definition and Background

Access is a form of casual use that is detached from the asset itself. Access breaks the connection between use and possession. The use value of property, its function, is produced without committing to continued use of one particular article. This definition of access is different from two kindred uses of the term. First, Jeremey Rifkin uses access to refer to the structure of a new business model in his influential book, The Age of Access. Rifkin argues that ownership of market goods

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101 JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CULTURE OF HYPERCAPITALISM,
has become outdated in the new network economy: “markets are making ways for networks and ownership is steadily being replaced by access.” Exchange of ownership cannot adapt to rapid technological advances, information flows and human creativity. Short-term access through lease, rent, subscriptions, or memberships is flexible but also creates attachments to commercial brands. When a dealer sells a car to a buyer, their relationship is limited; it often ends with the sale. If the client gains access to the car in the form of a lease, the relationship is ongoing. It becomes what Rifkin terms “a commodifying relationship.” Consequently, “[w]hen everyone is embedded in commercial networks of one sort or another and in continuous association by way of paid leases, partnerships, subscriptions and retainer fees, all time is commercial time.”

Nonetheless, Rifkin discusses a possibly perpetual relationship between a commercial company and a consumer. In many ways, access as identified by Rifkin almost fifteen years ago essentially takes the form of long-term engagement with assets and brands that lacks a formal ownership component. This access also lacks the consumer’s control over the asset, making consumers more vulnerable and less powerful. Access as depicted in this Article relates to more casual and detached relations to property. It mostly concerns individuals seeking either to lower the costs of consumption or to make use of excess capacity.

Second, this definition of access is also distinguishable from the familiar understanding of open-access resources. Open-access concerns resources that can be claimed and used by everyone. Open-access resources have important social and environmental value.

Where All of Life Is a Paid-For Experience (2000).

102 Id. at 4.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 10.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Rifkin, supra note 101, at 10.
108 Id. at 98 (discussing the new economy’s goal, which is not to sell the product to many clients but to sell many products to one client).
111 Daniel Mishori, Reclaiming Commons Rights: Resources, Public Ownership and the
Certain resources, such as beaches and open spaces, are “inherently public.” Open-access to public resources is very different from the option of access that this Article analyzes. Access allows individuals to constantly replace assets, use them casually, and move on to the next object. In contrast, open-access concerns the use of one common pool of resources which typically are not easily distributed to private individuals, such as beaches, open spaces, water, and so on. The literature references public access to public or quasi-public resources, not everyday goods. Access as a form of flexibility and choice, as portrayed in this Article, is not about regulating public resources. Rather, it is about the individual’s use and enjoyment of personal assets.

Access as a distinct form of casual use is rooted in two important developments: the sharing economy and global nomadism. The sharing economy is a modern form of consumption based on collaboration in the use, production, or creation of products and services. Rauch & Schleicher define it as a “stark reduction in transaction costs that allows for radically disaggregated consumption.” The sharing economy is actually an umbrella term that covers a wide range of transactions, some of them directly associated with access. Other sharing economy transactions are not about access, but serve as a background to changing consumption modes.


For the sharing economy see infra notes 118–134 and accompanying text; for global nomadism see infra notes 138–140 and accompanying text.


Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 10.
First, the sharing economy allows people to make better use of their own property. There are certain types of goods that are designed for private consumption but hold an unutilized excess capacity. Cars, bikes, personal possessions, and even a spare room in the home are good examples. The sharing economy allows owners, using new forms of peer-to-peer markets, to rent out assets such as a car, their home, a bicycle, or even pets to strangers. Second, the sharing economy also includes cooperative projects such as bike-sharing and car-sharing. Bike-sharing is becoming increasingly popular worldwide, as a healthy way to travel that does not require owning a bike. Providers of bikes for access include governments, quasi-governmental transport agencies, universities, non-profits, and for-

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120 Benkler, supra note 110.
124 There have been several attempts at bike sharing since the 1960s, but most have proven unsuccessful in the long-run, until the new “third generation” bike sharing. See Paul DeMaio, Bike-sharing: History, Impacts, Models of Provision, and Future, 12 J. PUB. TRANSR. 41 (2009).
126 Id. at 262.
profits. Users include commuters, leisure users who bicycle for fun and exercise, and tourists. A third type of sharing economy transactions includes lending, bartering, and swapping. These transactions do not include access but instead are about an exchange of ownership. Fourth, the sharing economy involves neighborhood-based cooperative endeavors designed to foster trust and cooperation. These include, for example, tool, toy, and clothing libraries and community gardens. Fifth, many companies now offer services that are based on use and access rather than ownership and possession. A sixth example of the sharing economy includes people who share their time, skills, and expertise.

All these transactions are becoming prevalent in everyday life. Notable consumer researchers argue that the rise of collaborative consumption has led to a decline in the symbolic significance of ownership, and that access-based consumption allows flexibility and adaptability, creating a different relationship with possession that is

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127 DeMaio, supra note 124, at 45.
128 O’Brien et al., supra note 125, at 262, 267, 269.
131 Johnson, supra note 130 (“[N]o longer just places to get a drill when you need one . . . [but rather] neighborhood hubs offering classes, community building spaces, workshops and a variety of tools ranging from belt sanders to lawnmowers and more.”).
133 Belk, You are what you can access, supra note 16. This is particularly common in the car-sharing business. Automobile manufacturers are buying or starting car-sharing enterprises such as Zipcar (Avis) and Car2Go (Benz). See also Jörg Firknorn & Martin Müller, Selling Mobility Instead of Cars: New Business Strategies of Automakers and the Impact on Private Vehicle Holding, 21 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 264 (2012) (indicating that the number of private vehicles is dropping due to consumer preferences).
135 Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14; Belk, You are what you can access, supra note 16.
termed “liquid.”

Global nomadism, the voluntary mobility of elite workers that is “characterized by serial relocations, frequent short-term international travel, and deterritorialization,” has also contributed to the decline of ownership and attachment to possessions. Global mobility has become a common phenomenon in a globalized world, which builds on the demand for skilled labor in the global economy. Fleura Bardhi, Giana Eckhardt, and Eric Arnould found global nomads to have a liquid relationship to possessions that is detached, flexible, temporal, and situational.

Globalization and changing consumption modes serve as the background to the rise of access. This Article focuses on three performances of access in contemporary society: peer-to-peer access, community lending libraries, and a mobility-based flexible lifestyle.

Peer-to-peer markets allow owners to rent out personal property to casual users. Users choose to access instead of own. Many types of property are being rented out, from personal vehicles to bikes, ladders, and lawnmowers. One can even casually spend time with a dog via BorrowMyDoggy, users can therefore choose to use John’s car today and Jane’s car next week.

A more communal form of access to property is found in community lending libraries. For example, toy lending libraries allow children and their parents to borrow toys, games, and puzzles. Instead of buying toys, a child exchanges toys every few weeks. Parents typically assist the librarian and enjoy joint activities.

Tool libraries allow people to borrow various tools, and occasionally serve as a common working space. Clothing libraries

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136 Bardhi et al., supra note 15.
137 Bardhi et al., supra note 15, at 2.
138 Id.
139 Aihwa Ong, Please Stay: Pied-a-Terre Subjects in the Megacity, 11 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 83 (2007); JOHN URRY, MOBILITIES (2007).
140 Bardhi et al., supra note 15, at 2.
141 See Ghose, supra note 123.
145 Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19, at 488.
146 Id.
148 Johnson, supra note 130.
allow members to borrow clothes for free or for a membership fee, and satisfy the desire for diversity and novelty in fashion without overspending and overconsuming.\footnote{On clothing libraries, see Vedra Korobar, The Interconnection of Sustainability and Collaborative Consumption: A Case Study of Clothing Libraries (Spring 2013) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Lund University) (on file with Lund University library system), http://lup.lub.lu.se/lup/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=3800323&fileOId=3800324.}

Finally, access as a lifestyle choice is manifested in a new urban-planning modality. WeWork, a company that provides a collaborative workplace, has recently launched a housing project that supports a flexible lifestyle.\footnote{See Katherine Clarke, “Dorm” Is the New Norm: Communal Living Spaces Offer Short-term Deals for Young Professionals, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 19, 2015, 4:33 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/real-estate/nyc-commune-style-micro-apartment-communities-article-1.2148150; WE LIVE, https://www.welive.com (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).} These projects, simply termed “WeLive,” provide micro-housing units that are completely furnished, including kitchenware and dishes, linens and bedding, and offer month-to-month leases.\footnote{See Clarke, supra note 150. See also David Friedlander, WeLive Marries Micro-Apartments, Coworking, Magic, LIFE EDITED (July 28, 2014), http://lifeedited.com/welive-marriges-micro-apartments-coworking-magic; Daniel J. Sernovitz, Work Where You Live? For WeWork Fans, There’s a Place for that in Crystal City, WASHINGTON BUS. J. (Mar. 16, 2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/breaking_ground/2015/03/work-where-you-live-for-wework-fans-theres-a-place.html.} The units are small but there are common areas and common activities.\footnote{Clarke, supra note 150.}

Developers of micro-units generally assume that the people who use them will spend considerable time outside the home.\footnote{Id. at 7.} In particular, developers assume that dwellers will not own cars but instead depend on a sharing mechanism.\footnote{Id.} According to John Infranca, “[a] few recent micro-unit developments have successfully negotiated substantial reductions to the required on-site parking in exchange for providing car and bike sharing.”\footnote{Id. at 17.} Micro-units in general and the month-to-month lease offered by WeLive in particular accommodate a flexible lifestyle. Dwellers are not attached to their home, do not own a car, and can easily relocate. Access supports and accommodates this lifestyle.

Finally, although access is a rising phenomenon, even users who enthusiastically participate in the sharing economy have a strong
preference for ownership in some cases. The tendency towards ownership is strong in four categories: (1) intimate possessions, such as a toothbrush; (2) frequently used objects—for example, a television; (3) objects with emotional attachment, such as heirlooms; and (4) the home. It is therefore important to note that no paradigm change has occurred overthrowing ownership, and with it personhood and stability; instead, we are witnessing the gradual and important emergence of a more nuanced set of consumer choices.

B. Motivations for Access

A number of empirical studies have examined the motivations for participation in the sharing economy. These studies often refer to access as a primary example of collaborative consumption.

A prominent study explored four motivations of online participants in the sharing economy: sustainability, enjoyment, economic benefits, and reputation. The study links motivations to perception of the sharing economy and to intentions of use. It found that although sustainability and enjoyment affect the attitude towards the sharing economy, the economic benefits of saving time and money are most likely to affect use intentions.

Cait Lamberton and Randell Rose study access from a marketing perspective, presenting a case of companies offering access services such as commercial car sharing. They look into the costs and benefits of access. Costs include membership fees, learning to use new vehicles, and search costs. In addition, there is risk of consumer rivalry over a limited supply of assets. The benefits include the value of use, flexibility, saving on storage costs, and the psychological

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157 Id. at 29–30.
158 See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14; Hamari et al., supra note 129; Lamberton & Rose, supra note 15; Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19; Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 156.
159 See supra note 158.
160 Hamari et al., supra note 129.
161 Id. at 2047. Sustainability did not affect use intentions, but enjoyment did have some effect. Id. On the other hand, economic benefits had no effect on attitudes towards the sharing economy. Id.
162 Lamberton & Rose, supra note 13.
163 Id. at 111.
164 Id. at 109.
benefits of pursuing an anti-industry agenda.\textsuperscript{165} Studies on lending libraries show a more diverse set of motivations.\textsuperscript{166} They point to advantages that are specific to more communal forms of access. A qualitative study of clothing libraries in Sweden found that users identify with specific garments even if they do not own them.\textsuperscript{167} In addition, they identify with the project itself.\textsuperscript{168} They feel that borrowing clothes from a library specializing in quality clothes makes them unique, unlike more traditional shoppers.\textsuperscript{169} Furthermore, users strive to be sophisticated consumers and ecologically conscious.\textsuperscript{170}

Lucie Ozanne and Paul Ballantine examined the social and communal function of community-based toy libraries.\textsuperscript{171} They identified four types of participants: the socialites who value the social and communal benefits of toy libraries, market avoiders, anticonsumers, and passive members.\textsuperscript{172} To conclude, motivations for access include not only saving costs but also flexibility and sociability.

C. Access: Property Without Personhood

1. Access as Flexibility and Detachment

Access is an alternative to ownership that allows for flexibility and fluidity. It breeds detachment to possession and focuses on functionality. This characteristic should prompt scholars to re-evaluate the role of property as personhood. The intricate relationship between access and property as personhood has yet to be explored.

Times have changed. Personality and self-expression are shaped and communicated in various mediums. Online social networks are a prominent example.\textsuperscript{173} Rachel Botsman and Roo Rogers further explain: “As our online ‘brands’ define ‘who we are’ and ‘what we like,’ actual ownership becomes less important than demonstrating use or use by association. We can now show status, group affiliation, and belonging without necessarily having to buy physical objects.”\textsuperscript{174}

Along with the rise of social networks, there is a change in lifestyle.

\textsuperscript{165} Id. at 111.
\textsuperscript{166} Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19; Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 156.
\textsuperscript{167} Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 156, at 35.
\textsuperscript{168} Id. at 36.
\textsuperscript{169} Id. at 37.
\textsuperscript{170} Id. at 33.
\textsuperscript{171} Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19.
\textsuperscript{172} Id. at 485.
\textsuperscript{173} BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 10, at 98.
\textsuperscript{174} Id.
The Y-generation, or millennials, consists of people born after 1981. Millennials are technologically savvy and frequent technology users from a young age. As a generation, they experienced years of prosperity followed by an era of economic uncertainty and violence. They own less property. In addition, millennials prefer flexibility over security. They prioritize choice and instant availability of customized products. All these factors contribute to this generation’s enthusiastic participation in the sharing economy and the inclination to favor access over ownership.

Access fits well with the tendency towards flexibility and an asset-light lifestyle. As opposed to the vision of property as shaping and reflecting personhood, access is a choice to use without attachment. Its primary function as an alternative to ownership is to allow fluidity and the ability to experiment. Toys may be the perfect example. Toys are usually associated with one’s identity. They foster
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gender\textsuperscript{187} and racial identification,\textsuperscript{188} and reflect personality traits such as a tendency towards activity, imagination, or puzzle solving.\textsuperscript{189} Because toys and identity are perceived as linked, parents may be reluctant to spend money on unconventional toy choices.\textsuperscript{190} Simply put, they are afraid to buy toys their child will ultimately choose not to play with.\textsuperscript{191} Moreover, children may be apprehensive that a certain toy may reflect a different personality that they do not necessarily endorse.\textsuperscript{192} For example, “[w]hen children are given a choice of a variety of gender-typed and non-gender-typed toys, children (especially boys) often choose toys based on gender associations.”\textsuperscript{193}

Access creates a different behavioral pattern. When children exchange toys in a toy lending library, there is no declaration of identification and no financial commitment.\textsuperscript{194} Children are more open to experimentation. As previously mentioned, boys are willing to try toys associated with girls and less active children become more physical in their play.\textsuperscript{195} This point is not purely empirical but rather theoretical. It stresses the potential benefit of decoupling property use from personhood. Once property is understood for its use function\textsuperscript{196} instead of its association with the self,\textsuperscript{197} there is more room for exploration and change.

Adults also need to experiment and push the boundaries of their

\textsuperscript{187} Elizabeth Sweet, Boy Builders and Pink Princesses: Gender, Toys, and Inequality over the Twentieth Century (2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Davis).

\textsuperscript{188} Erika Engstrom, Toys and Games: Racial Stereotypes and Identity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER IN THE MEDIA 395 (Mary Kosut ed., 2012) (critically examining racial representation in dolls).


\textsuperscript{191} Cf. Fisher-Thompson et al., supra note 189.

\textsuperscript{192} Cf. Ball, supra note 186.


\textsuperscript{194} Cf. Bardhi & Eckhart, supra note 14.

\textsuperscript{195} Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19.

\textsuperscript{196} Cf. Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, supra note 100.

\textsuperscript{197} See supra Part I.
identity. Tool libraries allow people who are not skilled to learn and experiment with fixing household appliances or personal vehicles.\textsuperscript{198} The learning environment and the freedom from financial commitment support this type of experimentation.\textsuperscript{199}

Another example is pets. Although the concept of access to pets may seem confusing, BorrowMyDoggy is a game changer. It helps match dog owners and dog lovers who want to spend time with a dog without the long-term commitment.\textsuperscript{200} One can contemplate getting a dog, or just spend time with a dog casually for a day or an evening.\textsuperscript{201} The activity could serve as a hobby or an opportunity to do more exercise.\textsuperscript{202} All these benefits facilitate change with no strings attached.

These benefits potentially involve a variety of personal property, depending on a person’s needs and preferences. Access can support detachment from car models and dis-identification with personal vehicles\textsuperscript{203} or household possessions. However, real property is a different matter. Housing connotes stability and security.\textsuperscript{204} People are less likely to experiment with permanent living arrangements. In the sphere of housing, whether as owners or as lessees, attachment and stability are prominent.\textsuperscript{205}

Nonetheless, as the WeLive project shows, there is some room for

\textsuperscript{199} Cf. Noelia Romero, Interview with Helen, Member #65, EDINBURGH TOOL LIBR. (Mar. 8, 2016), http://edinburghtoollibrary.org.uk/news/.
\textsuperscript{203} Bardhi & Eckhart, supra note 14.
\textsuperscript{204} KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 178, 187 (1944) (land “invests man’s life with stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is a condition of his physical safety; it is the landscape and the seasons”). Fennell, supra note 100; Fox, The Meaning of Home, supra note 46; Fox, Re-Possessing Home, supra note 46; Peñalver, Land Virtues, supra note 93, at 830 (“[L]and is sufficiently stable that human transformations will remain in place almost indefinitely unless human beings actively restore the land to its prior form.”).
\textsuperscript{205} Peñalver, Land Virtues, supra note 93, at 830. Sheila Klebanow, How Much is Enough? A Psychological Overview of Money and the Middle Class, in MONEY AND MIND 3, 6–7 (Sheila Klebanow & Eugene L. Lowenkopf eds., 1991) (“For many, homeownership connotes solidity, stability, self-esteem, putting down roots, and making a commitment to oneself, or to marriage and family.”).
experimentation in housing.\textsuperscript{206} Young, unattached individuals might prefer a flexible living arrangement rather than commit to long-term leases or to homeownership.\textsuperscript{207} Long-term housing is expensive and requires financial stability.\textsuperscript{208} With the economic downturn and rising costs of living, there is a decrease in the ability to own a home.\textsuperscript{209} Moreover, month-to-month leases foster mobility because dwellers are not tied down to a community or to their homes. This alternative is part of a lifestyle choice that includes living in a dense urban environment,\textsuperscript{210} using car-sharing,\textsuperscript{211} spending time outside the home,\textsuperscript{212} and the ability to quickly move from place to place.\textsuperscript{213}

All these examples point to a function of property that has yet to be fully theorized and analyzed,\textsuperscript{214} namely the role of property as flexibility. This is a counterintuitive argument. Because property often means attachment and connections,\textsuperscript{215} it seems implausible to associate it with flexibility and mobility. Against the background of property as stability,\textsuperscript{216} access as a form of property use allows detachment and fluidity. It is important to note, however, that access is not a typical property form: traditional property rights are secured by title.\textsuperscript{217} Even the non-formalist and progressive accounts that promote a more malleable understanding of property focus on

\begin{itemize}
\item See Clarke, supra note 150.
\item Cf. id; Eisner, supra note 177; Hayek, supra note 178.
\item Cf. Fennell, supra note 100, at 1051 ("[H]ouseholds that lack the financial wherewithal or risk tolerance to take on such a large investment simply cannot become homeowners.").
\item Cf. Christopher L. Foote, Just the Facts: An Initial Analysis of Subprime’s Role in the Housing Crisis, 17 J. HOUSING ECON. 291 (2008).
\item Emily Compton, Could Micro-Apartments Help Ease Austin’s Housing Crunch?, REPORTING TEX. (May 9, 2014), http://reportingtexas.com/could-micro-apartments-help-case-austins-housing-crunch/ (quoting a developer who declared that micro-unit residents have few belongings, “are part of the sharing economy,” and are “willing to have less space in order to live in a cool neighborhood and have access to the amenities of the city”). See also Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2016).
\item Infranca, supra note 152.
\item Darcy Wintonyk & Lynda Steele, A 226 Sq. Ft. Solution to Living Large in Vancouver, CTV BRITISH COLUMBIA (Aug. 17, 2012), http://bc.ctvnews.ca/a-226-sq-ft-solution-to-living-large-in-vancouver-1.917039 ("The city is your living room. The city is your dining room. You don’t need to use your own resources to recreate all that when you can just step out your door and enjoy a park, a beach, a restaurant, a café.").
\item Bardhi et al., supra note 15.
\item See Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99.
\item See supra Part I.
\item See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4; Peñalver, Land Virtues, supra note 93.
\end{itemize}
attachment. Joseph William Singer, for example, supports recognizing informal property rights based on the reliance interest. This vision of property as attachment to a place and a community is further explained in his work:

Property gives us freedom and stability, provides a source of wealth and well-being, the bases for creative work and useful investment. Property provides a place to create a family life, to nurture friendships, to rest, and to have fun. Property allows us to be good neighbors and good citizens, and it promotes various human values, including privacy, the freedom to associate with others, religious liberty, tranquility, and peace of mind.

In order to decouple property from attachment, so ingrained in our legal thinking, one should direct attention to property use. Access is an alternative form of use, and not of property rights. Once we accept use as the relevant prism for property as personhood, we can begin to unpack the important role of property without personhood.

The role of flexibility is intricate. It is not the same as freedom. Flexibility derives from access as an alternative to ownership. As such, it allows choice as opposed to stability. Flexibility is not simply the ability to use a variety of assets. The argument is not an essentialist view of consumer choices. People are not necessarily defined by their choice to access; the claim is more nuanced. Flexibility concerns the detachment from property and the focus on use instead of continuing possession.

The choice of detachment is a relational choice as well. Property provides a place for social interaction with family and friends.

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221 Dyal-Chand, Useless Property, supra note 100.
223 On identity and consumption, see Alan Warde, Consumption, Identity-Formation and Uncertainty, 28 SOC. 877 (1994).
224 Cf. Belk, You are what you can access, supra note 16.
225 Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 220.
stable location is important for sustaining relationships. If property is less about personhood and stability, then ties might be looser. Yet, access can support a broader spectrum of more casual networks.

Of course, one could argue that access can be classified as fungible property—as per Radin’s taxonomy—and therefore does not present a true challenge to contemporary property theory. However, according to Radin, both categories—fungible and personhood property—refer to property owned or leased for long periods. Even fungible property can evoke stability and security. More importantly, access is a choice that rejects at least partially the limiting function of property as personhood. It represents resistance to traditional notions of property.

Nonetheless, flexibility is not for everyone. Young people, especially Gen-Yers, are more inclined toward property fluidity than previous generations. Not everyone is looking for mobility. Access as a general lifestyle choice fits the unattached. People with strong ties to the community, who have caretaking responsibilities, are likely to prefer stability. Nonetheless, more nuanced choices will fit a variety of people. Flexibility with personal, as opposed to real, property might be more easily integrated into people’s lives. At the end of the day, most people would prefer a mixture of personhood and flexibility, embracing both models of property use.

2. Critiques of Property without Personhood

Access, or property without personhood, creates vulnerabilities. The Kantian notion of property focuses on independence both from other people and from the state. Access epitomizes the opposite: it

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227 Id.
228 See Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 6, at 88.
229 Radin, supra note 1, at 960.
230 Cf. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4 (discussing stability without limiting it to a particular type of property).
231 Piiparinen et al., supra note 179.
232 Singer, Democratic Estates, supra note 220, at 1054 (explaining the pluralist values of property, including stability and community).
234 See Katz, supra note 222, at 126 (“For Kant, all private rights are derived from our basic right to independence, which for Kant means the capacity to set and pursue our own purposes, and so the freedom not to be subject to the choices of others.”); RIPSTEIN, supra note 222, at 91 (“[I]f someone interferes with your property, they thereby interfere with your purposiveness.”). Others stress dependency or interdependency as a core feature of property. See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 37–57 (2011); Gregory Alexander & Eduardo Peñalver, Properties of Communities, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 127 (2009). Relational accounts insist that
is profoundly dependent. It is dependent on a pool of resources provided by owners, the state or the community. Some access-based enterprises rely on an online platform to mediate transactions. These platforms gather information and might compromise privacy.

In addition, access as a way of life is risky. Once the accessor becomes ill, old or in need of care, stability and long-term relations trump flexibility and mobility.

For this reason, access is mostly chosen as one component in an overall choice of property use. It showcases the direction of new engagements with property, but it is unlikely to subsume the entire property project.

A different critique is that access is never fully detached. When people use an asset casually for a number of times, they become accustomed to it. They tend to prefer it, and ultimately get attached to this preferred possession. If one borrows her neighbor’s drill, she will be inclined to use it again provided she had a good experience. If this is true, access will eventually morph into a more familiar form of property use that builds on ongoing attachment, yet lacks the security of formal ownership or a lease.

Although complete flexibility and fluidity are perhaps unattainable, access provides the greatest potential for unattached property constructs relationships and does not just set boundaries. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1991).

Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 27.

Id.

Id.

Cf. Einat Albin, Required Intimacies: What Airbnb and Domestic Work Share in Common 7 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (“[I]ndeed, technological development has enabled the progression of online platforms that promote sharing and collaboration.”); Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing, supra note 10.


Cf. Martha Alberston Fineman, Elderly as Vulnerable: Rethinking The Nature of Individual and Social Responsibility, 20 ELDER L.J. 71, 85 (2012) (“If someone is very young, profoundly ill or disabled, or very old, we may not be comfortable demanding they conform to the mandates of self-sufficiency and independence.”).


This is especially true considering the costs of learning to use new possessions. See Lamberton & Rose, supra note 13, at 111.

Id. It is costly to scout for new products whenever accessors decide to use property again (“[S]earch costs’ are created through the money or effort needed to determine which product to purchase or which sharing program to enter.”). Id.

This is because of the human tendency to favor repetition. Henk Aart et al.,
property use. Transitions and change are less complicated and easier with access, as compared with ownership or long-term possession.\textsuperscript{244} It also creates more potential for experimentation, depending on the personality of the accessor and his or her motivations for using access.

Finally, the lack of attachment might mean disregard for the property, including lack of proper maintenance and neglect.\textsuperscript{245} In other words, if the property is not mine, I do not have sufficient incentives to care for it. A study of Zipcar users supports this claim.\textsuperscript{246} Yet unlike the access offered by business companies who own the property,\textsuperscript{247} communal access and peer-to-peer access create a reduced risk. In lending libraries, people feel a commitment to take care of the property for the good of the community.\textsuperscript{248} In peer-to-peer markets, the reciprocal reputation system creates an incentive for cautious and attentive behavior.\textsuperscript{249}

To conclude, access provides an alternative property form that emphasizes flexibility and mobility. This attribute has benefits and costs, but it ultimately represents a choice of being detached from property. Alongside property as personhood, there is also reason to recognize property without personhood.

*Predicting Behavior From Actions in the Past: Repeated Decision Making or a Matter of Habit?,* 28 *J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.* 1355, 1355 (1998) (“When behavior is repeated and becomes habitual, it is guided by automated cognitive processes, rather than by elaborate decision processes.”).  
\textsuperscript{244}See Cooter, supra note 97; Desan, supra note 98.  
\textsuperscript{245}On physical damages to property, see Christian Witting, *Physical Damage in Negligence,* 61 *CAMBRIDGE L.J.* 189 (2002).  
\textsuperscript{246}Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 889.  
\textsuperscript{247}See id. at 891.  
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

There are three possible legal approaches to the property without personhood phenomenon: to reject flexibility as working against the public policy of stability in property; to reevaluate the property as personhood legal protection; or, to distinguish between the two categories while supporting both when appropriate. This Part explains these possibilities and explores their merit.

The first direction is to insist that stability and property are inseparably linked. It is a governmental interest to foster stability, and property is one important means of achieving this goal. This is especially true regarding the homeownership debate. Homeowners, arguably the epitome of stability, view renters as failing to demonstrate community commitment. The connection of stability and commitment supports the view that flexibility is hazardous. If flexibility as a characteristic of property threatens the notion of stability, then the law must limit the option to engage with property without personhood.

Legally, such a position implies stringent regulation coupled with strong disincentives for access and access-like activities. Regulation today encourages users to choose ownership or other forms of long-term possession because there are strong disincentives working against

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251 Lynda Cheshire et al., The Politics of Housing Consumption: Renters as Flawed Consumers on a Master Planned Estate, 47 URB. STUD. 2597, 2598 (2010) (arguing that renters are seen as failing in three aspects of social life: “aesthetical conduct, ethical values and community commitment”).

252 Id.
Examples include insurance policies, taxes, and business permits. This position supports such rules and would even advocate expanding this approach to more areas of regulation.

The advantages of this approach are clear. It preserves current understandings of the function of property, and supports stability, freedom and familial ties. However, it downplays the role of flexibility, mobility and change in property use, and their potential to promote autonomy for users. More importantly, property without personhood creates an alternative to the traditional view of property. This alternative provides a prism for criticizing and reevaluating the stagnation that afflicts contemporary property visions.

The second direction takes the opposite path. If property as flexibility is a rising phenomenon, it could be taken to mean the demise of property as personhood. Put differently, considering the popularity of access, one could argue that attachment is no longer

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253 See Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99.

254 Ingrid Ballús-Armet et al., Peer-to-Peer Carsharing: Exploring Public Perception and Market Characteristics in the San Francisco Bay Area, California, 2416 J. TRANSP. RES. BOARD 27, 28 (2014) (discussing how personal vehicle insurance policies are generally invalid when the owners give access to users, as this activity would count as commercial activity). See also Ron Lieber, Share a Car, Risk Your Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/your-money/auto-insurance/enthusiastic-about-car-sharing-your-insurer-aint.html?_r=0. Jay MacDonald, Auto Insurance Risks of Car Sharing, BANKRATE (Nov. 23, 2011), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/insurance/auto-insurance-risks-car-sharing-1.aspx#ixzz3kxcDf3Da. But see CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.24 (West 2015) (“No private passenger motor vehicle insured by its owner pursuant to a policy of insurance subject to Section 11580.1 or 11580.2 shall be classified as a commercial vehicle, for-hire vehicle, permissive use vehicle, or livery solely because its owner allows it to be used for personal vehicle sharing . . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. § 742.595 (2015) (“An owner’s insurance policy for a private passenger motor vehicle may not be canceled, voided, terminated, rescinded or nonrenewed solely on the basis that the vehicle has been made available for personal vehicle sharing pursuant to a personal vehicle sharing program that is in compliance with the provisions of ORS 742.585 to 742.600.”).

255 See supra notes 213–219 and accompanying text.


257 See supra notes 213–219 and accompanying text.
important for human flourishing.\textsuperscript{258} The special treatment of personhood property should be scrutinized and reevaluated. This direction finds support in previous studies questioning the validity of property as personhood.\textsuperscript{259} Legal protection of personhood property includes takings law,\textsuperscript{260} eviction rules,\textsuperscript{261} criminal law,\textsuperscript{262} and privacy in the home.\textsuperscript{263} In addition, property tax and bankruptcy rules protect personal-use property.\textsuperscript{264} According to this approach, all these rules will be reconsidered as the elevation of personhood property is

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\textsuperscript{258} Stern, \textit{Residential Protectionism}, supra note 46, at 1106 (“Following Radin’s landmark article, a generation of legal scholars adopted the personhood perspective and focused in particular on the role of the home in human flourishing.”).

\textsuperscript{259} See supra Part I.B.1.

\textsuperscript{260} Following the case Kelo v. The City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)—that upheld a taking of a residential home for a private redevelopment project—several states enacted counter-legislation. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(b) (requiring “acquiring by eminent domain an owner-occupied residence for the purpose of conveying it to a private person” unless it is necessary for public health or safety reasons). Indiana requires a 150\% market value compensation for such a condemnation. Ind. Code § 32-24-4.5-8(2)(A) (2008).


\textsuperscript{262} See Barros, supra note 44, at 262 (noting that the punishment for invasion of a home generally exceeds the penalties “imposed for invasions of other types of property”). In addition, the home as a castle doctrine provides that a person need not retreat if attacked at home. People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (1914) (“It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home. . . . Flight is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home.”).

\textsuperscript{263} Stern, \textit{The Inviolate Home}, supra note 44. See also Arianna Kennedy Kelly, \textit{The Costs of the Fourth Amendment: Home Searches and Takings Law}, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009).

\textsuperscript{264} 2009 US MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE 9, 45–46 (Fred Conklin ed. 2009) [hereinafter MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE], (describing how property tax law in most states distinguishes between personal property used for business purposes and property for personal use, and employs a personal property tax \textit{ad valorem} but exempts personal use property, household goods or furniture). See, e.g. id. at 10–39 (describing the situation in Delaware as including family bible, school books, family library, family pictures, pianos and sewing machines). Yet, “[t]his provision shall not apply to persons who keep sewing machines for sale or hire.” See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4902(c). See also MASTER PROPERTY TAX GUIDE at 10–19, 10–24 (Alabama and Alaska); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 651-121(1) (LexisNexis 1999) (discussing all necessary household furnishings, appliances, clothing and books that are used by the debtor and his family). Federal bankruptcy exemptions include a car, household furniture and goods, and books that are personally used. See 11 U.S.C.S. § 522(d) (LexisNexis 2016); JAMES J. BROWN, \textit{JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT} 10–1, 10–9 (Supp. 2010).
\end{footnotesize}
 obsolete or unnecessary.

The problem with this approach is that the mere existence of an alternative does not negate the role of property as personhood. Property without personhood points to one drawback of the personhood argument: its tendency towards stagnation and the possible restriction of identity. It does not support or undercut the theory on its merits, but suggests an alternative that fits certain people at different points in their lives.

The third direction takes seriously both flexibility and stability as being part of a rich and nuanced property regime. Property as personhood and property without personhood play different roles in promoting autonomy and flourishing. Property law should recognize demographic differences and human diversity. Three implications follow: protection of personal property depending on its actual contribution to self-development and personhood; reconsideration of regulative barriers to access; and evaluation of the institutional design supporting access.

Without adopting property as personhood in full, this direction recognizes the centrality of attachment, personhood and stability in certain types of property. As mentioned above, even passionate adopters of access still prefer to own certain types of property, most notably the home. The vision of the home as a special locus for individual autonomy and dignity, freedom and privacy, is relevant even in an age of access. Moreover, the home is also important as a relational space hosting a variety of intimate interactions.

Nonetheless, the protection of personhood cannot undercut access. A second important implication requires legal regulation to recognize access. The obstacles described earlier in tax, permit and insurance law need to be removed. This is not a call for immediate regulation. In crafting rules, there are many relevant considerations, including positive and negative externalities. However, addressing

\[265\] See supra Part I.B.4.

\[266\] Grimshorn & Jordan, supra note 156, at 29 and accompanying text.


\[268\] Lisa M. Austin, Person, Place or Thing? Property and The Structuring of Social Relations, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 445, 450 (2010).

\[269\] Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 32.

\[270\] See supra notes 251–254 and accompanying text.

\[271\] For example, effects on neighborhoods, the community, and the environment are key elements. See, e.g., Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1579, 1589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that preserving residential character and
these obstacles with the understanding of property as flexibility in mind is crucial.

Access is a general category based on the consumer’s perspective that includes the experience of short-term and uncommitted use. However, the property could be accessed in various institutional settings, each with its own merits and faults. The owner of the property can be a commercial company, a private owner, the state or the community. This Article offers a preliminary account that compares these different institutions according to their contribution to flexibility and mobility.

There are four main institutional settings that provide assets or resources to be accessed by users: commercial companies, city or state-supported services, community resources, and peer-to-peer markets. In the commercial company model, a user chooses a vehicle from a fleet of cars owned by the company. The transaction concerns commercial property and property designed for personal use. Advantages include accessibility of vehicles, variety, a more regulated model, and the usual advantages of access such as saving storage costs and the costs of ownership. On the other hand, commercial access with regard to cars is characterized by a lack of reciprocity. There is no sense of community or commitment between users. Users typically neglect to fill gas tanks for the next user, and they sometimes smoke in the car. Bardhi and Eckhardt conclude that Zipcar does not conform to the vision of collaborative, community stability is a legitimate government interest in regulating the sharing economy); Cope v. City of Cannon Beach, 855 P.2d 1083, 1084 (1993) (upholding a local ordinance and stating there is a legitimate government interest “in securing affordable housing for permanent residents and in preserving the character and integrity of residential neighborhoods”). Cf. Jenny Kassan & Janelle Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 2–3 (2012).

273 See generally supra Part II.
274 See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 886.
275 See Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 6, at 79 (“Because the owner in Zipcar is a commercial company, there is no consumption property involved in the transaction. Their cars are business inventory par excellence. In Turo, at least some of the vehicles available are personal cars rented out by individual owners when they are not using them.”).
276 See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 886 (explaining that Zipcars are located close to a person’s residence or place of work).
277 Id. (“Zipcar has around 30 car models in its fleet, from basic functional models, such as Toyota trucks, to luxury brands such as BMW, to green cars such as the Toyota Prius.”).
278 Lamberton & Rose, supra note 13, at 111.
279 See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 891–92.
280 Id.
281 Id.
altruistic and sustainable consumption. There is a certain level of flexibility that comes from access to a fleet of cars spread out over many locations. However, companies usually tend to encourage a brand community and identification with specific cars. They attempt to foster attachment rather than flexibility.

A different model relies on governmental or nonprofit oversight. Bike sharing is a good example. Providers include governments, quasi-governmental transport agencies, and universities. Paul DeMaio explains the benefits and costs of each provider. In a governmental model, the local government operates the service and gains control over it, but it also maintains the liability and might be less experienced. In the transport agency model, there is a quasi-governmental organization that provides services to the jurisdiction. The jurisdiction benefits from the experience of the provider without bearing the costs. However, the provider is not subject to competition by other qualified operators. The university model expands intra-campus service without relying on outside sources. However, the general population does not benefit from the service and there might be compatibility issues with the locality. The nonprofit model benefits the locality because it removes liability, yet this model often relies on the public sector for most of its funding.

The governmental model today is mostly notable for transportation services. If considered more broadly, the model benefits from an equal distribution of goods and services and overall public planning, but it also creates dependency on the state for supplying the property, and less flexibility.

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282 Id. at 894.
284 See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 886, 888.
285 DeMaio, supra note 124, at 45.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 45–47.
288 Id.
289 Id.
290 Id. at 47.
291 DeMaio, supra note 124, at 47.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 45–47.
294 Cf. Mishori, supra note 112.
295 Cf. Reich, supra note 222, at 273. As Charles Reich explains, "[t]he institution called property guards the troubled boundary between individual man and the state. . . . [I]n a society that chiefly values material well-being, the power to control a particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation of individuality."
A community model operates as a common resource of members. Members pay membership fees and can use the resources as long as they follow specific borrowing rules, and in some cases perform responsibilities shared by members such as “assisting the librarian with issues and returns, helping new members and processing any new toys.” This model builds on detachment from the property and flexibility of use, but it also involves social involvement and participation. For this reason, access to property in the community model avoids the potential commodification of relationships that is sometimes associated with the peer-to-peer model.

In the peer-to-peer model, a private owner rents out his personal property to a user. Both the owner and the user benefit from the excess capacity of the property. This model is often mediated by an online platform that significantly lowers transaction costs. Peer-to-peer access combines a contract between the owner and the user, and the platform that facilitates the transaction and is responsible towards both owners and users. This model avoids the problem of negative reciprocity associated with commercial companies because it directly connects owners and users. Most platforms include a reputation mechanism that offers reviews not only for the owner and the property, but also for the accessor. In addition, such a model provides more flexibility because it offers a plethora of available options without promoting brand association or consumer loyalty to a specific company. However, these markets may replace neighborly assistance with monetary transactions, sparking a concern with regard to

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296 Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19, at 488.
298 See Ozanne & Ballantine, supra note 19.
299 Kreiczer-Levy, Share, Own, Access, supra note 99, at 41.
300 See Benkler, supra note 110. See also Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 6.
301 Id.
303 See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 891–92 and accompanying text.
304 See Ghose, supra note 123.
305 See supra note 248. See also Rachel Botsman, The currency of the new economy is trust, TEDGLOBAL (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the_currency_of_the_new_economy_is_trust (discussing a case where the owner decided to get a cat to avoid a negative review concerning mice on the premises).
306 See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 14, at 893, for Zipcar’s attempts at brand association.
To sum up, the third direction for legal policy seeks a balance between access and ownership to provide both security and flexibility. Yet a property regime requires lawmakers to consider the institutional framework of access, to ensure that flexibility and mobility are achieved.

IV. CONCLUSION

Property as personhood has been incredibly influential in modern legal theory. However, the changing demographics, globalization and the sharing economy have created an alternative form of property use. Possession of property provides attachment, security and stability, but it is also limiting. It constrains identity to a predetermined image. Access as a form of property use represents property without personhood, which allows individuals to experiment and push the boundaries of their identity. As this Article has argued, this alternative function of use has to be seriously considered by property theory. This Article has explained the benefits and detriments of property without personhood and presented its theoretical significance.