HOW TO GET AWAY WITH MURDER: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL IMMUNITY PROVISIONS IN “STAND YOUR GROUND” LEGISLATION

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I. INTRODUCTION

At approximately 7:00 p.m. on February 26, 2012, neighborhood watch leader George Zimmerman shot and killed seventeen-year-old Trayvon Martin in an Orlando-area neighborhood.¹ While the events that triggered the shooting are clouded in controversy, it remains uncontested that Martin was unarmed and on his return from the local convenience store.² Though Zimmerman admitted to firing the shot that killed Martin, he asserted that it was done in self-defense.³ Authorities did not arrest or charge Zimmerman immediately after the


³ Dahl, supra note 1.
incident. In the months that followed, the case gained national attention and placed Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law under scrutiny.

In particular, the initial decision by police not to arrest Zimmerman sparked protest from both the public and the Martin family. Sanford Police Chief Bill Lee stated in a press conference on March 12, 2012: “[i]n this case Mr. Zimmerman has made the statement of self-defense . . . . Until we can establish probable cause to dispute that, we don’t have the grounds to arrest him.” This statement reflects the implications of an immunity provision passed in 2005 as a part of Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law. Since 2005, upwards of twenty states have passed similar “Stand Your Ground” statutes containing provisions for criminal immunity, civil immunity, or both, for persons “justified” in using force.

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4 Id.
5 In April of 2012, 30% of Americans indicated they were following the Trayvon Martin case more than any other story. Timeline, supra note 2.
7 See Timeline, supra note 2.
9 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2013).
This Comment does not begin with the story of Trayvon Martin to incite discussion on the outcome of the case, or to proffer an opinion regarding the veracity of Zimmerman’s defense, but to serve as an instructive starting point for demonstrating the harmful effects of one type of immunity now accorded to many defendants asserting a claim of self-defense. A typical “Stand Your Ground” law is a doctrine of self-defense that allows a person to meet force, including deadly force, with corresponding force. These laws traditionally eliminate any existing duty to retreat and provide for some form of criminal or tort immunity. They are premised on, and justified by, the idea that law-abiding citizens should be permitted to “protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders and attackers without fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of themselves and others.” The goals of this Comment are to explore the various types of immunity granted by recent “Stand Your Ground” laws, to highlight the problematic aspects of these provisions, and to recommend changes for these statutes.

Part II of this Comment provides a background to self-defense law and examples of how previous immunity provisions functioned. Part III discusses the new “Stand Your Ground” laws and how the addition of civil and criminal immunity changed traditional self-defense procedures and law. Part IV focuses on laws granting criminal immunity and highlights problematic aspects of their implementation. Part V focuses on statutes granting civil immunity and their possible implications. Then, Part VI recommends changes to these statutes. Part VII concludes.

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12 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).

II. SELF-DEFENSE AND IMMUNITY PROVISIONS BEFORE 2005

A. Self-Defense: Substance, Procedure, and Theory

An American court considered one of the first self-defense cases in 1806. In Commonwealth v. Selfridge, the defendant, Selfridge, was charged with manslaughter for the death of Charles Austin, a young Harvard student. In his jury instruction, Judge Parker articulated the basic concept of self-defense: “[w]hen . . . there is reasonable ground to believe that there is a design to destroy his life . . . then killing the assailant will be excusable . . . although it should afterwards appear that no felony was intended . . .” Judge Parker went on to proffer a hypothetical in which the defendant (“A”) is faced with an opponent/victim waving a gun. In the hypothetical, the defendant kills the victim only to later find out that the gun contained blanks instead of bullets. Judge Parker questioned: “[w]ill any reasonable man say that A is more criminal than he would have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol?” Though both the instruction and the hypothetical offered by Judge Parker have been criticized as “off-point” in the context of the Selfridge fact-pattern, the ideas represented by this decision remain a part of American self-defense law.

Today, “[e]very state in the United States recognizes a defense for the use of force, including deadly force, in self-protection.”

Traditionally, a person is justified in his or her use of force if he

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14 Ross, supra note 10, at 6.
15 Id. Selfridge, a lawyer and aspiring politician, had squabbled with the victim’s father, Benjamin Austin, over the posting of slanderous comments about him in the local newspaper. Id. Following these comments, the situation intensified and Selfridge armed himself. Id. Selfridge met with the younger Austin on the street; an altercation ensued resulting in the death of Charles Austin by the gun of Selfridge. Id. at 7.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Singer opines that because Selfridge’s indictment was for manslaughter, not murder, and his shot was unlikely to have been the result of a “mistake” as to the amount of force necessary, the fact-pattern of Selfridge is not ideal for a discussion of self-defense. See id.
21 See State v. Light, 664 S.E.2d 465, 469 (S.C. 2008) (holding that a defendant was entitled to an instruction of self-defense when he was approached with a firearm); Koritta v. State, 438 S.E.2d 68, 69–70 (Ga. 1994) (holding that the defendant was entitled to a self-defense instruction in an altercation involving a gun).
22 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 223 (5th ed. 2009).
or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to prevent the im-
minent use of unlawful force against him or her by another. With
this standard, a person need not experience actual harm so long as
he possesses a reasonable belief that such harm is imminent. Deadly
force is permitted only in situations where the actor has a reasonable
belief that he is facing the imminent use of unlawful deadly force. In
both instances, the defense is qualified by a requirement that the per-
son asserting the defense be a “non-aggressor” in the altercation that
gave rise to the use of force.

For the most part, there was no substantive difference between
the assertion of self-defense in a criminal matter and a civil or tort
matter. In either context, a claim of self-defense is generally raised
as an affirmative defense. The most critical procedural difference is
in the allocations of burdens in either situation. In a criminal mat-
ter, the prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and states differ on the burden of
proof that is placed on the defendant with respect to an affirmative

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23 Id.
24 See Lydia Zbrazenj, Note, Florida’s Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting
Citizens to Arm Themselves and Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13 F.
25 DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 223.
26 Id. at 226 (defining aggressor as “one who threatens unlawfully to commit a
battery upon another or who provokes a physical conflict by words or actions calcu-
lated to bring about an assault”).
27 Caroline Forell, Symposium, Who is the Reasonable Person? What’s Reasonable?:
Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1403
(2010); see also Privileged Use of Force in Self-Defense, 33 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts § 1
(2012) [hereinafter Privileged Use of Force] (“There are few, if any, substantive distinc-
tions between civil and criminal law with regard to the prerequisites to justification of
a claim of self-defense, and, with the exception of the rule of evidence which gives to
a person accused of a crime the benefit of a reasonable doubt the law of self-defense
is the same in both criminal and civil cases.”); infra text accompanying notes 47–67
(describing the substance of self-defense law).
statute it provides that “[i]n any prosecution based on conduct which is justifiable
under sections 28-1406 to 28-1416, justification is an affirmative defense.” Id. at § 28-
1416(1). In subsection (2) of the statute, it acknowledges the same range of sections and
provides that they serve as an affirmative defense to a civil action as well. Id. at §
28-1416(2). Within the range of applicable sections is the justification for the use of
force. See id. at § 28-1409.
29 See Privileged Use of Force, supra note 27, at § 1.
30 See id. at § 7; Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Inno-
cence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989) (“In the criminal trial setting, the presump-
tion of innocence is given vitality primarily through the requirement that the gov-
ernment prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
defense.\textsuperscript{31} Comparatively, in a civil matter, the burden of both pleading and proving self-defense is on the defendant who seeks to justify his or her actions.\textsuperscript{32} Defendant must prove this by a preponderance of the evidence.\textsuperscript{33} No matter with whom the burden lies in various states, however, the ultimate decision rests in the hands of the judge or jury deciding the matter at trial.\textsuperscript{34}

The recognition of self-defense as an affirmative defense rests on the premise that certain actions are “justified” by their circumstances.\textsuperscript{35} “Justification” defenses typically provide protection for actions that are considered warranted by the situation.\textsuperscript{36} For example, a driver of a fire engine may speed en route to an emergency in violation of local traffic laws, but the driver’s behavior would be considered warranted, because the risk of harm associated with the fire is greater than the traffic risk created by the truck’s speed.\textsuperscript{37} Members of society would not only accept the fire engine driver’s actions, but they would hope that similarly situated fire engine drivers would take the same action.\textsuperscript{38}

By contrast, defenses such as insanity are considered “excuse” defenses.\textsuperscript{39} “Excuse” defenses relieve the individual actor of blame for their actions even if the same actions would not be excused for other persons.\textsuperscript{40} For example, an employee experiencing extreme mental and emotional issues who flies into a fit of rage and hits a co-worker may be wholly or partially excused from liability because of his

\textsuperscript{31} See Privileged Use of Force, supra note 27, at § 7. In some states, the defendant is required to prove that he acted in self-defense “either by a preponderance of the evidence, by the greater weight of the evidence, by convincing evidence, by proof to the satisfaction of the jury, or by proof raising a reasonable doubt.” \textit{Id.} Other states leave the burden on the prosecutor to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not acting in self-defense. \textit{Id.} States may also require that the defendant produce evidence that he or she acted in self-defense and leave the burden of persuasion on the prosecution. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{32} Id. at § 8.

\textsuperscript{33} Id.

\textsuperscript{34} Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Elizabeth Cateforis, \textit{Self-Defense, What’s a Jury Got To Do With It?}, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (2009). This is one aspect of self-defense law that is altered significantly by the new legislation. \textit{See infra} Part III.

\textsuperscript{35} See Marcia Baron, \textit{Justifications and Excuses}, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 387, 388–89 (2005); Zbrzeznj, supra note 24, at 234.


\textsuperscript{37} Id. at 1899.

\textsuperscript{38} Id.

\textsuperscript{39} Baron, \textit{supra} note 35, at 388–89 (noting also that “some defenses are difficult to classify”).

\textsuperscript{40} Greenawalt, \textit{supra} note 36, at 1900.
or her diminished mental state.\textsuperscript{41} The same attack by any other person, however, would not receive protection.\textsuperscript{42}

This categorization not only draws distinction by title, it reflects a distinction in moral principles as well.\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{[T]}o say that an action is justified is to say . . . that though the action is of a type that is usually wrong, in these circumstances it was not wrong. To say that an action is excused, by contrast, is to say that it was indeed wrong . . . but the agent is not blameworthy.\textsuperscript{44}

Taking this one step further, one scholar opines that the policy justifying self-defense is the very same that underlies the creation of the crimes to which it serves as a defense—offenses against the person such as murder, battery, or rape.\textsuperscript{45} Specifically, it is the societal interest in life and bodily integrity that is paramount to the justification of self-defense and to the creation of crimes which intend to prohibit harmful use of force.\textsuperscript{46} Unfortunately, new “Stand Your Ground” laws that permit complete immunity from criminal or civil action diminish this respect for human life.

\textbf{B. Self-Defense: Deadly Force and the Duty to Retreat}

Recognizing the value of human life, English common law embraced a duty to retreat “as far as he conveniently or safely can” when in the face of deadly force.\textsuperscript{47} This duty reflected a historical reluctance to legitimize the right of self-defense when it involved defensive killing.\textsuperscript{48} An exception to the duty to retreat existed, however, when a man was attacked in his own home.\textsuperscript{49} Reflecting the conviction that “a man’s home is his castle,” this exception became known as the Castle Doctrine.\textsuperscript{50} Therefore, a man faced with deadly force in his own home had no duty to retreat to safety before responding with force,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Id. at 1899–1900.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Id. at 1900.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Baron, \textit{supra} note 35, at 389. Baron acknowledges that most persons would prefer to have an action deemed justified versus excused. \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{44} See id. at 388–90.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Janine Young Kim, \textit{Rule and Exception in Criminal Law (Or, Are Criminal Defenses Necessary?)}, 82 TUL. L. REV. 247, 278 (2007).
\item \textsuperscript{46} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{47} See Bobo, \textit{supra} note 11, at 362; Benjamin Levin, Note, \textit{A Defensible Defense?: Reexamining Castle Doctrine Statutes}, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 523, 528 (2010) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 423).
\item \textsuperscript{48} See Levin, \textit{supra} note 47, at 528.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Id. at 530.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Id.
\end{itemize}
including deadly force.\(^{51}\)

Beginning in the nineteenth century, there was a dramatic movement in the United States to abandon the duty to retreat in the face of deadly force.\(^{52}\) Resentment toward the duty to retreat grew as a result of the view that to require such a duty was to require cowardice.\(^{53}\) Thus, a majority of modern American self-defense statutes utilize a “no retreat” rule that permits a non-aggressor to utilize deadly force in the face of an unlawful deadly attack, even if retreat to safety is possible.\(^{54}\) The minority of states that maintain the duty to retreat in the face of deadly force, however, continue to embrace the English common law Castle Doctrine exception.\(^{55}\) The Model Penal Code, for example, states that an “actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by another person whose place of work the actor knows it to be.”\(^{56}\)

Abrogation of the duty to retreat began in the state supreme courts.\(^{57}\) In \textit{Erwin v. State}, for example, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a “true man” should not be required to retreat from an “assailant, who . . . maliciously seeks to take his life.”\(^{58}\) Similarly, in \textit{Runyan v. State}, the Indiana Supreme Court found that the “American mind” weighed against imposing a duty to retreat.\(^{59}\) The United States Supreme Court followed suit, essentially rejecting the duty to retreat in

\(^{51}\text{Id.}\)

\(^{52}\text{Id. at 529.}\)

\(^{53}\text{Bobo, supra note 11, at 343; see also Christine Catalfamo, \textit{Stand Your Ground: Florida’s Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century}, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 504, 507 (2007) (“The American ideals of bravery and honor suited themselves to frontier life in a way that the English duty to retreat could not.”).}\)

\(^{54}\text{Bobo, supra note 11, at 343; DRESSLER, supra note 22, at 229.}\)

\(^{55}\text{Dressler, supra note 22, at 531; see also People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914) (“It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling is bound to retreat.”); State v. Middleham, 17 N.W. 446, 448 (Iowa 1883) (stating that there is no duty to retreat in one’s home).}\)

\(^{56}\text{Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) (Official Draft 1985).}\)

\(^{57}\text{Bobo, supra note 11, at 344; see, e.g., Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876).}\)

\(^{58}\text{Erwin, 29 Ohio St. at 199. In Erwin, the defendant and his son-in-law were in a dispute over the possession of a storage shed that was located in between their two homes. The day that the homicide took place, Erwin was in the shed and his son-in-law approached him with an ax in an apparently threatening manner. Erwin responded with a single shot that resulted in the death of his son-in-law. Id. at 192–93.}\)

\(^{59}\text{Runyan, 57 Ind. at 84. Runyan was convicted of manslaughter of Charles Pressnal. The deceased hit him two or three times before Runyan pulled a pistol out of his pocket and shot him. Id. at 81.}\)
the 1921 case *Brown v. United States.* In *Brown,* the defendant was convicted of the murder of Hermis, a man who reportedly attacked the defendant with a knife at the time that Brown fired the fatal shot. Though it was requested by the defense, the lower court refused to give a jury instruction that retreat was unnecessary if the defendant reasonably feared for his life. Instead, the court instructed the jury that the defendant had a duty to retreat. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated:

Many respectable writers agree that if a man reasonably believes that he is in immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm from his assailant he may *stand his ground* and that if he kills him he has not succeeded the bounds of lawful self-defense . . . Detached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife. Therefore in this Court, at least, it is not a condition of *immunity* that one in that situation should pause to consider whether a reasonable man might not think it possible to fly with safety or to disable his assailant rather than to kill him.

Justice Holmes’ opinion not only supports the abolition of the duty to retreat in the face of deadly force in American jurisdictions, but it also highlights the beginnings of the ideas underlying “Stand Your Ground” legislation. The use of the term “immunity” in this opinion, however, does not reflect its use in the new legislation.

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60 256 U.S. 335 (1921); see also Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 563–64 (1895) (holding that there is no duty to retreat when a person is on the premises of his or her dwelling and faced with deadly force).
61 *Brown,* 256 U.S. at 341–42.
62 Id. at 342.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 341.
65 Id. at 343. (emphasis added). It is interesting to highlight within this description the use of “stand his ground” and “immunity.”
66 See generally Cantalfamo, supra note 53, at 510 (noting that an “increased understanding of human nature and the complex moral measurements required by the duty to retreat” lead to the privilege of non-retreat and that this realization was evident in the Holmes opinion). The *Brown* decision serves as persuasive authority for those states dealing with issues of the duty to retreat in self-defense law. See Bobo, supra note 11, at 351. It follows that *Brown* also serves as some persuasive authority for the “Stand Your Ground” laws.
67 See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the Florida law entitled a defendant to a pre-trial hearing regarding immunity from prosecution for lawful use of force, not merely an affirmative defense of self-defense at trial).
C. Immunity: Public Officials and Self-Defense

Immunity, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, is “any exemption from a duty, liability or service of process.”\(^{68}\) Traditionally, immunity for an individual defendant has been based upon his or her status as a public official.\(^{69}\) The recent “Stand Your Ground” legislation, however, grants immunity to defendants who are justified in using force.\(^{70}\) To distinguish between the concept of an affirmative defense, like self-defense, and the concept of “immunity,” it is helpful to examine the conceptual difference between a defense from liability and a defense from suit.\(^{71}\) Affirmative defenses generally come in the form of defenses from liability—a defendant admits to the elements that comprise the claim but desires to “justify, excuse, or mitigate the commission of the act.”\(^{72}\) By contrast, immunity, like that typically granted to public officials, is designed to operate as a defense from

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\(^{68}\) Black’s Law Dictionary 817 (9th ed. 2009).

\(^{69}\) See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (noting that legislators are privileged and immune from arrest or civil process while performing legislative duty); Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 53 (discussing absolute and qualified prosecutorial immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (permitting qualified immunity to shield government officials from actions under § 1983 “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”). As noted by the Supreme Court in Pearson v. Callahan, doctrines such as “qualified immunity” are intended to protect public officers from distraction, harassment, and liability while requiring them to remain accountable for the irresponsible exercise of power. 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349 n.11 (2009) (recognizing that the doctrine of qualified immunity can shield officers from liability).


\(^{71}\) Qualified immunity, for example, is intended to operate before the merits of the case are reached. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (acknowledging that the purpose of qualified immunity is to “avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment”). Affirmative defenses, by contrast, are generally used to justify or excuse certain conduct. See supra text accompanying notes 35–39.

\(^{72}\) People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553, 555 (Colo. 2011).
suit before the merits of a case are reached.\footnote{Maia R. Albrecht, Comment, Defining Qualified Immunity: When is the Law “Clearly Established?”, 40 Washburn L.J. 311, 318 (2001).}

Public officials, such as police officers and prosecutors, are often afforded a “qualified,” not complete, immunity for their actions.\footnote{See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.} The doctrine of qualified immunity grants protection to public officials from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”\footnote{See id.} The doctrine exists to balance the public’s desire to hold officials accountable for their actions and the officials’ desire to be shielded from liability when they perform their duties in a reasonable manner.\footnote{See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).} Qualified immunity acts as immunity from suit, not a defense to liability.\footnote{Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).}

Though immunity provisions contained in, or related to, self-defense laws are relatively new, they are not a completely novel concept. Prior to the outbreak in 2005 of “Stand Your Ground” legislation featuring immunity provisions or statutes, a Colorado statute similarly granted immunity to persons defending their home.\footnote{Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-704.5 (West 2013).} Enacted in 1985, Colorado statute section 18-1-704.5 provides immunity from both civil and criminal prosecution to those utilizing force, including deadly force, in the face of an unlawful intruder.\footnote{Id.} The statute’s purpose, as evident in its text, is to recognize citizens’ “right to expect absolute safety within their own homes.”\footnote{Id.} This justification bears striking similarity to the justification for the Castle Doctrine.\footnote{See supra text accompanying notes 50–57.}

The Supreme Court of Colorado clarified, however, that this immunity is provided only when there is a known unlawful entry into the home.\footnote{People v. McNeese, 892 P.2d 304, 313 (Colo. 1995).} This requirement for unlawful entry makes the Colorado statute slightly more restrictive than the Castle Doctrine, which provides a defense for the use of force in one’s home qualified only by the requirement that the individual is not the initial aggressor.\footnote{See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 3.04(2) (b) (ii) (A) (Official Draft 1985).}

In 1987, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that the language of the statute provided for more than just an affirmative de-
fense to liability. The court held that the statute created the need for a pre-trial determination of a defendant’s immunity from prosecution. In rendering its decision, the court looked at both the plain language of the statute, as well as the definition of immunity provided by Black’s Law Dictionary, and determined that the statute rendered any proceeding against an immune party improper. Procedurally, this required a pre-trial hearing at which the defendant was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she was entitled to immunity under the statute. The pre-trial hearing was to be held contemporaneous with, or immediately following, the preliminary hearing in a criminal trial. Specifically, this required the defendant to prove:

(1) [A]nother person made an unlawful entry into the defendant’s dwelling; (2) the defendant had a reasonable belief that such other person had committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or was committing or intend[ing] to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry; (3) the defendant reasonably believed that such other person might use physical force, no matter [how] slight, against any occupant of the dwelling; and (4) the defendant used force against the person who actually made the unlawful entry into the dwelling.

A defendant availing himself or herself of the pre-trial immunity proceeding is not later precluded from the assertion of self-defense as an affirmative defense at trial. Further, the decision by the court at the pre-trial is not considered a “final judgment” subject to later appeal.

While the Colorado courts interpreted their statute to provide for a pre-trial determination of immunity, other courts interpreting similar language prior to 2005 declined to find an independent grant

84 People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 978 (Colo. 1987).
85 See id.
86 Id. at 975.
87 Id. at 980.
88 Id. at 978 n.5.
90 See Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Colo. 2011); Montanez v. State, 24 So. 3d 799, 801 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that defendant would still be permitted to assert self-defense even though he was denied immunity).
91 Wood, 255 P.3d at 1141.
of immunity. Like Justice Holmes’s use of “immunity” in the Brown decision, other states have interpreted their statutes to provide for nothing more than the traditional affirmative defense. In Indiana, for example, the self-defense statute provided that no person would be placed in legal jeopardy for “protecting himself or his family by reasonable means necessary.” The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the contention that this statute required a pre-trial hearing to evaluate the legitimacy of a self-defense claim before subjecting a person to the “legal jeopardy” of a trial, holding instead that the language was a mere reflection of public policy of the state. Similarly, in Arizona, a statute originally enacted in 1970 stated: “[n]o person in this state shall be subject to civil liability for engaging in conduct otherwise justified pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.” The statute was challenged in Pfeil v. Smith, in which the defendant argued that her acquittal for justified conduct in a criminal charge was sufficient, under section 13-413 of the Arizona Code, to acquit her of subsequent civil charges filed. The court, however, held that the statute did nothing more than to allow a person to assert the affirmative defense of self-defense in a civil case.

III. THE CHANGE IN SELF-DEFENSE AND THE ADDITION OF IMMUNITY

While the previous section looked at traditional self-defense law and immunity provisions, this section details how immunity provisions in “Stand Your Ground” laws have altered the “traditional” approach both substantively and procedurally. Substantively, the “Stand Your Ground” laws have expanded state self-defense law by both removing the duty to retreat, in those states that had previously retained it, while also adding a presumption of reasonable force when
the force is used in the home or car. Procedurally, the new “Stand Your Ground” laws generally prohibit arrest without probable cause that unlawful force was used, permit pre-trial immunity hearings for persons asserting self-defense, and prevent remedies in the civil courts when a person asserts statutory immunity.

A. Florida: Where it All Began

The movement towards broader self-defense legislation and immunity provisions began in Florida in 2005. Conceived by former National Rifle Association (NRA) President Marion P. Hammer, Florida’s Protection of Persons Bill passed unanimously in the Senate and by overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives. It was promptly signed into law by Governor Jeb Bush on April 26, 2005, and became effective October 1, 2005.

Prior to 2005, self-defense law in Florida combined statutory and common law and included a duty to retreat. The prior version of Florida’s self-defense statute 776.012 permitted the use of force if the defendant reasonably believed he or she faced imminent death or great bodily harm. Criminal prosecution prior to the new legislation permitted a person charged with a crime involving force, including homicide, to raise an affirmative defense of self-defense, but it did not provide for a pre-trial determination of that defense. A prima

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102 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).
104 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012).
105 Ross, supra note 10, at 18.
108 See Michael, supra note 106, at 200.
110 Hernandez v. State, 842 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that Section 776.012 allows for the use of deadly force “only if he or she reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself” and that “[w]hether a person was justified in using deadly force is a question of fact for the jury to decide if the facts are disputed”).
111 See generally Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1049 (articulating Florida self-defense law in 1999).
facie case of self-defense under the old self-defense statute consisted of: (1) a reasonable belief (2) that deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death (3) to himself or herself (4) or another (5) or to prevent the imminent commission of a felony. Once a defendant proved a prima facie case of self-defense, the burden shifted at trial to the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did not act in self-defense. The jury was left with the ultimate decision, to determine whether the defendant subjectively held a belief and whether such a belief was objectively reasonable.

The 2005 “Stand Your Ground” law substantially amended Florida’s pre-existing statutes by eliminating the duty to retreat, establishing a presumption that force was used reasonably where a defendant was faced with an unlawful intruder in the home or occupied vehicle, and expanding the right of an individual to use force, including deadly force, without the possibility of criminal or civil consequences. With respect to this last aspect, immunity, the law stated: “A person who uses force as permitted in § 776.012, § 776.013, or § 776.031 is justified in using such force and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action . . . .” It further defined the term criminal prosecution to include “arresting, detaining in custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.”

Most provocatively, the new law prohibits arrest until there is probable cause to support the belief that the use of force was unlawful. In describing the dramatic change to self-defense law, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State stated:

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112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2004).
115. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012 (West 2012).
117. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.031 (West 2012).
118. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012).
119. Id.; see also id. at § 776.012 (Use of force in defense of person); id. at § 776.013 (Home protection; use of deadly force; presumption of fear of death or great bodily harm); id. at § 776.031 (Use of force in defense of others).
120. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).
121. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012) (“A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for investigating the use of force as described in subsection (1), but the agency may not arrest the person for using force unless it determines that there is probable cause that the force that was used is unlawful.”). Thus, ruling out self-defense becomes part of the statutory requirement for a law enforcement officer to sign a complaint. See Bartlett v. State, 993 So. 2d 157, 159–60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
While Florida law has long recognized that a defendant may argue as an affirmative defense at trial that his or her use of force was legally justified, section 776.032 contemplates that a defendant who establishes entitlement to the statutory immunity will not be subjected to trial . . . . The statute does not merely provide that a defendant cannot be convicted as a result of legally justified force.\footnote{121}

The Florida legislature was the first to pass a comprehensive update of its self-defense law pursuant to NRA lobbying, but it was most certainly not the last.\footnote{122} Due to the success of the legislation in Florida, the NRA increased its efforts to have similar legislation passed across the country.\footnote{123} Since 2005, more than half of the states have enacted or considered similar legislation to Florida’s statute.\footnote{124} This Comment specifically focuses on those statutes containing provisions granting the accused immunity from civil and/or criminal liability for justified use of force.

**B. Criminal and Civil Immunity: Florida and its Followers**

At least five states have enacted statutes that include immunity provisions with the same language as Florida, including: Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.\footnote{125} Although North Carolina enacted a statute containing substantially similar language to Florida’s legislation, it does not specifically prohibit an officer from arresting an individual without probable cause that the force used was unlawful.\footnote{126} All of these statutes, however, broadly immunize a defendant from both criminal and civil liability.\footnote{127} In addition,
though other states have adopted statutes with different language, their effects will likely be similar. For example, a statute enacted in Georgia provides that a person “shall be immune from criminal prosecution” for lawful use of force, but it does not provide the same immunity from civil liability.

Not all of these statutes have been interpreted by their respective state courts; the supreme courts of at least three states have acknowledged, however, that the statute provides for a pre-trial immunity hearing. For example, the Florida Supreme Court in Dennis v. State held that the “plain language of section 776.032 grants defendants a substantive right to assert immunity from prosecution and to avoid being subjected to a trial.” This right, though similar to the pre-trial immunity determination granted to residents of Colorado, is potentially more encompassing as it applies to self-defense claims as well as defenses of habitation. The pre-trial determination of immunity affords a defendant a right that is substantially similar to the one provided to public officials. It reflects the notion that any further procedure against an “immune” party would be improper. Interestingly, Kansas has addressed the state’s immunity provision under a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In McCracken v. Kohl, the defendant alleged that he was immune from the underlying battery prosecution and thus was unlawfully detained. Though the court rejected the defendant’s habeas petition, finding that his use of force was unjustified, the defendant’s argument highlights the similarity between this new construct of immunity and a defense to suit.

Since 2005, approximately thirteen states have enacted statutes

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128 See Alaska Stat. Ann. § 09.65.330 (West 2012) (stating that a person is “not liable for the death of or injury to” a person against whom they have utilized lawful force); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-24.2 (West 2012) (immunizing a defendant from criminal prosecution for force used in self-defense and defense of habitation).
131 Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 462.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 84–91.
133 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.032 (West 2012). The “defense of habitation is primarily based on the protection of one’s dwelling or abode.” Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 653, 665 (2003). “[T]he defense provides that the use of deadly force may be justified to prevent the commission of a felony in one’s dwelling.” Id.
134 See supra text accompanying notes 68–77.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 319–20; see also supra text accompanying notes 23–26.
providing for civil immunity for those who utilize force lawfully.\textsuperscript{138} Though the language of these statutes is not entirely consistent, most of these statutes exist as stand-alone grants of immunity from civil action.\textsuperscript{139} Idaho, for example, entitles its statute, section 6-808, “Civil immunity for self-defense.”\textsuperscript{140} Similarly, Tennessee entitles its statute “Use of force; civil immunity; costs and fees.”\textsuperscript{141} Texas simply entitles its section 83.001 “Civil Immunity.”\textsuperscript{142}

These titles seem to reflect the notion that they provide some form of immunity greater than the affirmative defense traditionally offered defendants faced with claims of civil liability. Unfortunately, judicial interpretation of the function of these statutes is limited. Although it has yet to be conclusively decided by the courts, it seems safe to assume that they function to prevent the assertion of claims against a defendant justified in his or her use of force the same way that immunity in the criminal setting protects a defendant from arrest, detention, charging, and prosecution.\textsuperscript{143}

IV. PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF IMMUNITY IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT

In these new “Stand Your Ground” regimes, immunity from criminal “prosecution” generally prohibits arresting, detaining, charging, or prosecuting anyone falling under the statute’s shield.\textsuperscript{144} Such a broad definition necessarily implicates the actions of government actors in all phases of the criminal justice process. This section examines the law with respect to each aspect of the “prosecution” from which a person becomes immune if they use force lawfully.

\textsuperscript{138} IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.19 (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922b (West 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(5)(b) (West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.074 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:1-a (West 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07.2 (West 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.60(2)(B)(c) (West 2011); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8340.2 (West 2012); TAJN. CODE. ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-22(d) (West 2012); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.62(2) (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-204 (West 2012). At the time of this writing, proposed legislation in New Hampshire seeks to remove the civil immunity provision from the state statute. H.B. 135, 163rd Leg., Sess. of the Gen. Court (N.H. 2013).

\textsuperscript{139} See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012).

\textsuperscript{140} IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-808 (West 2012).

\textsuperscript{141} TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-622 (West 2012).

\textsuperscript{142} TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 83.001 (West 2012).


\textsuperscript{144} Id.
A. Problems for Law Enforcement

The Florida statute and other similar laws include “arrest” and “detaining in custody” in the definition of prosecution from which a defendant is immune. The statutes go further to specifically prohibit law enforcement from initiating an arrest until probable cause is established that force was not used lawfully, that is, in self-defense, defense of others, or defense of home.146 While probable cause is the constitutional standard by which police effectuate a lawful arrest,147 the law now requires that law enforcement obtain not only probable cause that a crime has occurred, but also probable cause that refutes the person’s probable affirmative defense.148 Therefore, a law enforcement officer, in the earliest stages of criminal prosecution, is tasked with evaluating the affirmative defense of the accused, on scene, if they desire to arrest the individual.149

1. The Potential for Inconsistency and Abuse

Due to the lack of legislative clarity regarding the application of the immunity statute, there is a great potential for inconsistent application and possible abuse of this statute by law enforcement. Notably, the law received significant opposition from the law enforcement community prior to its original passage in Florida. Several urban police chiefs spoke out against the law, calling it “unnecessary and dangerous” and publicly opposing its passage.150

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145 Id. The Oklahoma statute, however, includes only charging and prosecuting in the definition of “criminal prosecution.” Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1289.25F (West 2012). Interestingly, it does include the same requirement that a law enforcement agency refrain from arrest until it determines that probable cause exists to prove the force used was unlawful. See id. at § 1289.25G.
147 See U.S. Const. amend. IV (requiring that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (stating that, in the absence of a search warrant, “[w]hether [an] arrest [is] constitutionally valid depends . . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officer['] had probable cause to make it”).
150 Id. at 119.
152 Id.
With respect to its application, no statute provides clear instructions as to the required procedures. Section two of the Florida self-defense law,\footnote{FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012). In the Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and South Carolina statutes, this same language is reflected in the following subsections: ALA. CODE § 13A-5-23(c) (2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5231(b) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.085(2) (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.25G (West 2012); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-450(B) (2006).} for example, permits law enforcement to use “standard procedures for investigating” to determine the existence of probable cause;\footnote{FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012).} however, it does not clearly establish what those procedures entail for law enforcement agencies across the state.\footnote{FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012); see also Patricia Wallace, Stand Your Ground: New Challenges for Forensic Psychologists, 2006 THE FORENSIC EXAMINER 37, 39 (noting that law enforcement agencies are trained to handle crime scenes but not necessarily trained to evaluate reasonableness with respect to reasonable use of force and deadly force).} The Eleventh Circuit in \textit{Reagan v. Mallory} recognized this lack of clarity stating, “[u]nder Florida law, law enforcement officers have a duty to assess the validity of this defense, but they are provided minimal, if any, guidance on how to make this assessment.”\footnote{Reagan v. Mallory, 429 Fed. App’x 918, 920 (11th Cir. 2011). The circuit court reversed the district court finding that a reasonable officer could not have thought there was probable cause to establish a crime of aggravated assault and granted the officer qualified immunity. \textit{Id.} at 922.} While it may be true that law enforcement agencies receive training in arrest procedures, the statute now requires them to evaluate more than just the existence of a crime.\footnote{See \textit{id.}; Weaver, supra note 107, at 419.} They are charged with both understanding the self-defense law \textit{and} evaluating whether there is probable cause to believe that such a defense would fail.\footnote{See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(2) (West 2012); see also Wallace, supra note 155, at 39.} Law enforcement officers are not trained in this type of legal analysis.\footnote{See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).}

Complicating the decision further is the requirement that the officer prove a negative.\footnote{STEVEN JANSEN & M. ELAINE NUGENT-BORAKOVE, EXPANSIONS TO THE CASTLE DOCTRINE: IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 9 (2007), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Castle%20Doctrine.pdf (noting that the attitude of a law enforcement officer might affect their performance).} The statute requires that police officers ascertain probable cause that “the force that was used is unlawful.”\footnote{FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012).} Therefore, not only must an officer have an understanding of the reasonableness and proportionality requirements that render use of
force “unlawful,” but they must also have evidence supporting the absence of lawful use of force before they arrest. Without probable cause proving that negative, law enforcement is prohibited from arresting.  

Inconsistency is already evidenced by the incongruent treatment of factually similar cases in the state of Florida. While there is no relevant tracking system of law enforcement decision-making in self-defense cases, much of the information demonstrating the effects of immunity from arrest can be deduced from the media. Incidents that took place after the enactment of the “Stand Your Ground” law provide some insight as to the impact of placing an immunity decision on law enforcement. The case that has gained the most significant media attention is the aforementioned Trayvon Martin case. Seventeen-year old Trayvon Martin was fatally shot while returning from the neighborhood convenience store. Martin was unarmed. George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch leader, stated that he shot the boy in self-defense, and he was not immediately arrested. The local police chief reported that the delayed arrest was a result of the absence of probable cause to believe that Zimmerman had used force unlawfully under the Florida law.

The inconsistent application of the law is demonstrated by comparing Zimmerman’s situation to the plight of Jimmy Ray Hair. In Hair v. State, Hair and the victim, Charles Harper, were engaged in a verbal argument at a nightclub. As in the Trayvon Martin case, and many self-defense cases, the facts that follow are somewhat disputed. Hair asserted that Harper reached into the vehicle in which

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162 Id. at § 776.032(2). In Alabama, this prohibition led to a claim of false imprisonment against a law enforcement officer who detained a man alleging that he utilized force in self-defense. Skinner v. Bevans, 116 So. 3d 1147, 1155 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). The court assumed the defendant’s arrest to have “been the result of an investigation that determined there was probable cause to believe” that the force used was unlawful. Id.

163 Zbrzeznj, supra note 24, at 261. The State of Florida seems to acknowledge the absence of this data. Florida proposed legislation that would require that law enforcement officers "collect, process, maintain, and disseminate information and data on all incidents concerning the alleged justifiable use of force" in the state; the bill died in the Senate in May of 2013. H.B. 331, 115th Leg., Regular Sess. (Fla. 2013).

164 Dahl, supra note 1.

165 Id.

166 Timeline, supra note 2.

167 Dahl, supra note 1.


169 Id. at 805.

170 Id.; see also Megale, supra note 149, at 105.
Hair was a passenger, and the two began to struggle. Hair then pulled out his gun and fired a shot at Harper. The police not only arrested Hair, but he sat for two years in jail awaiting a trial on a charge of first degree murder before eventually being granted immunity under Florida statute 776.032.

This lack of clarity could even lead to abuse, whether intentional or unintentional, by law enforcement. Officers draw their own subjective conclusions from a situation. If, for example, an officer feels that the individual “victim” in an altercation where the self-defense is invoked “deserved” what was coming to him, the officer may decline to arrest or to thoroughly investigate the incident. Normally, an officer would be required to arrest if probable cause exists that the crime occurred, regardless of the officer’s subjective assessment of the situation, and the existence of a victim would likely permit him or her to effectuate that arrest. With immunity, however, a single officer has the ability to decline to arrest, and this decision could potentially be influenced by his or her own subjective assessment of the situation. By contrast, if the issue of self-defense were to reach trial, the persuasiveness of the perpetrator’s claim of self-defense would be assessed by a jury comprised of a cross-section of the community. Thus, ostensibly permitting a single officer to render a decision regarding a potential defendant’s immunity detracts from the benefits

171 Hair, 17 So. 3d at 805.
172 Id.
173 Megale, supra note 149, at 105.
174 See id. at 107–08.
175 See id. at 108.
176 See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (“[A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.”); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
177 Trish Oberweis & Michael Musheno, Policing Identities: Cop Decision-Making and the Constitution of Citizens, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 897, 903 (1999) (“In viewing police stories from the perspective of identity, we suggest that what police think ought to be done and what they do in particular situations depends, in part, on who is involved.”).
178 This assumes the right is not waived and that the crime at issue is of sufficient gravity to trigger the right. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III’s Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 376 (2012) (describing the exceptions to the constitutional requirement for a trial by jury in criminal cases).
179 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) (“[S]election of a petit jury from a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”).
of both the multiplicity and the diversity of the decision-maker that is embodied in jury trials.\textsuperscript{180}

This possibility for abuse is highlighted in a story reported in Clearwater, Florida.\textsuperscript{181} Kenneth Allen, a retired police officer, and his neighbor, Jason Rosenbloom, argued on prior occasions due to Rosenbloom’s failure to follow local codes.\textsuperscript{182} On the day of the incident, Rosenbloom visited Allen’s home and threatened to make his life miserable.\textsuperscript{183} Allen closed the door and got a pistol from nearby. Rosenbloom refused to leave and began to rush into the house.\textsuperscript{184} Allen fired a shot.\textsuperscript{185} Police never arrested Allen who claimed that he was trying to stop a potential “home invasion” and to “keep his house safe.”\textsuperscript{186} Among the possible foundations for the decision not to arrest may be the fact Allen was a retired police officer. This type of inconsistency and abuse is severely problematic.

2. Law Enforcement as the Prosecutor, Judge, and Jury

In granting immunity from arrest and detention, Florida statute section 776.032 and those with similar language make law enforcement personnel the initial arbiter in deciding whether a person is exercising a valid self-defense claim.\textsuperscript{187} If a prosecutor decides not to pursue the cases in which police decline to investigate, law enforcement officers become the ultimate decision-makers regarding whether or not a case is adjudicated.\textsuperscript{188} This effectively removes the determination of the perpetrator’s innocence or guilt from the court.\textsuperscript{189} This was recognized by the Eleventh Circuit in Reagan v. Mallory,

\textsuperscript{180} Id. at 530 (“purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power”); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (noting that the “essential feature of a jury obviously lies . . . in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determination of guilt or innocence”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).

\textsuperscript{181} Ashlee Clark, Neighbor: Shooting in Defense of Himself, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 7, 2006), http://www.sptimes.com/2006/06/07/Northpinellas/Neighbor_Shooting_in.shtml.

\textsuperscript{182} Id.

\textsuperscript{183} Id.

\textsuperscript{184} Id.

\textsuperscript{185} Clark, supra note 181.

\textsuperscript{186} Id.

\textsuperscript{187} Id.

\textsuperscript{188} See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032 (West 2012); see also Megale, supra note 149, at 118–20.

\textsuperscript{189} See Megale, supra note 149, at 118–20.

\textsuperscript{190} See id.
evaluating Florida’s self-defense law. The court stated that by defining criminal prosecution so broadly, “the statute ‘allows for an immunity determination at any stage of the proceeding.’” Therefore, a decision by law enforcement at the earliest stage of the proceedings bars potentially meritorious claims from evaluation by an objective judge or jury.

Most concerning is that law enforcement must make this decision without the benefit of all of the evidence normally presented to the trier of fact. In many of the situations in which law enforcement officers must now apply the standard, all of the necessary evidence is in the hands of the defendant. In the Trayvon Martin case, for example, the victim of deadly force was no longer available to give his account of the altercation. The only remaining evidence with which law enforcement could have established probable cause needed to come from the very person asserting the defense, Zimmerman. It is highly unlikely that Zimmerman would have said or done anything to undermine his own asserted self-defense, and his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination allowed him to remain silent. Therefore, arrest needed to wait. In fact, Zimmerman’s assertion of self-defense was enough to prevent the police from arresting him for several months. Even if witnesses were available to deliver their interpretation of the altercation, police were still required to assess the reliability of an individual’s testimony or recounting of the events, a role typically left to the jury or the trier of fact.

Further, during the time between the incident and the arrest, assuming the two are not contemporaneous because the police cannot establish the requisite probable cause, the defendant would live

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192 Id. at 920 (quoting Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22, 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)).
194 See supra text accompanying notes 2–4.
196 Though the incident occurred in February of 2012, Zimmerman was not charged with a crime until April of that year. Timeline, supra note 2; see also text accompanying notes 1–8.
amongst the general population. This seems contrary to the purported goal of the legislation to allow “law-abiding people to protect themselves.” Allowing the defendant to live free in society potentially places a law-breaking citizen in a position to threaten the life or body of another law-abiding citizen. It also provides the defendant with an opportunity for escape. The purpose of arrest, and subsequent detention, of an individual, is not only to prevent harm to the community, but also to assure that the arrested individual is available for later proceedings. The Trayvon Martin case exemplifies the possibility for escape. George Zimmerman’s whereabouts in the weeks following the incident were reportedly unknown. The attorney representing Martin’s parents expressed concern that even if the state of Florida decided to file charges against Zimmerman, he would be unavailable to face them. He stated, “[w]e’re concerned that he might be a flight risk, that nobody knows where he’s at.” While police indicated that they were in contact with Zimmerman, there was speculation that Zimmerman had left the jurisdiction of Florida. Police eventually charged and arrested Zimmerman on April 11, 2012, and a jury acquitted him on July 13, 2013.

B. Problems for Prosecutors and Judges

The states granting immunity in the criminal context provide immunity not only from arrest but also from charging and prosecu-

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199 See Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 462 (Fla. 2010) (emphasis added).
200 See Robert Webster Oliver, Bail and the Concept of Preventative Detention, N.Y. St. B.J. 8 (1997) (noting that the New York bail law is focused on risk of flight).
202 Grier, supra note 201.
203 Where is George Zimmerman?, supra note 201.
204 Where is George Zimmerman?, supra note 201. Notably, Zimmerman’s attorneys had discontinued representation “in large part because he was hiding and had stopped responding to their calls,” Grier, supra note 201. Though his former attorneys indicated that they did not believe that Zimmerman intended to flee the country, they had no knowledge of his actual whereabouts. Id.
This grant of immunity necessarily implicates and alters the role of prosecutors and judges in the criminal justice process. Because prosecutorial decisions are not subject to review by the court, however, it would be difficult to identify precisely how a defendant’s assertion of self-defense affected prosecutorial decision-making prior to the enactment of such legislation. After its enactment, one prosecutor stated that “the real impact [of the law] has been that it’s making filing decisions for prosecutors. It’s causing cases to not be filed at all or to be filed with reduced charges.” While this statement is difficult to substantiate because statistics on the number of self-defense claims made are unavailable, it demonstrates at the very least that some prosecutors are concerned with the law’s effect on charging decisions. In Duval County, Florida, the State Attorney indicated that the law has influenced the office’s decision to charge or reduce charges in a handful of cases. Specifically, he cited his office’s decision not to charge electronics store owner Doug Freeman in the shooting of an unarmed man, Vince Hudson, in May of 2006. State Attorney Harry Shorstein, though publicly siding with the wounded individual, declined to prosecute stating that he did not believe he could get a conviction. Similarly, Florida State Attorney Andy Slater cited the “Stand Your Ground” law, as well as conflicting witness testimony, as the reasons for offering a plea agreement to a defendant that stabbed a man at a party.

With the imposition of pre-trial hearings on immunity, judges face an additional task in the criminal justice process. For example,
the Florida Supreme Court in *Dennis v. State* adopted the pre-trial immunity procedure articulated by the First District Court of Appeals in *Peterson*. The *Peterson* court largely followed the Colorado court in *People v. Guenther* and held that the defendant raising an immunity claim has the burden of establishing the factual prerequisites by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, a judge hearing a case in which the defendant asserts immunity under the “Stand Your Ground” legislation must evaluate the defendant’s immunity claim utilizing a preponderance of the evidence standard prior to trial. These additional hearings also constitute an addition to the judge’s caseload that would not otherwise exist in a jurisdiction in which a defendant may assert only an affirmative defense of self-defense. By requiring additional hearings, these legislative hearings may undermine judicial economy.

V. THE PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF IMMUNITY IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT

An increasingly large number of states have established provisions to allow for a defendant’s immunity from civil liability if the defendant used lawful force. Though there is not yet substantial judicial interpretation, a careful analysis reveals a number of potential problems.

Specifically, the laws do not distinguish between liability for injury to the unlawful aggressor and liability for injury to a third party. In fact, North Dakota is among the minority of these states that permits immunity from civil liability but recognizes an exception if a person “recklessly or negligently injures or creates a risk of injury to other persons.” Such an individual would be liable “in a prosecution for such recklessness or negligence.” In statutes that do not carve out this particular exception, a person justified in utilizing force may not be held liable for injuries that result to a third party.

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216 Id.


218 *Dennis*, 51 So. 3d at 462 (noting that Florida law does not recognize that a defendant may argue something more than affirmative defense).

219 See id.

220 See supra text accompanying notes 138–143.

221 See *Jansen*, supra note 159, at 7.


224 See *Jansen*, supra note 159, at 6.
tion is exemplified by an occurrence in Miami-Dade County, Florida in 2006.225 As a nine-year old girl sat outside her home playing with her dolls, she was shot in the crossfire between two men, both of whom asserted a claim of self-defense.226 If both are successful in a claim of immunity, this eliminates any legal remedy, either civil or criminal, for the innocent girl.227 The Florida statute may justify a deadly defense, even if it was executed negligently or recklessly.228

Though criminal and civil self-defense cases involving the same defendant are rare, the availability of a civil remedy has afforded some individuals or their families a remedy when the criminal justice system did not.229 The case of Bernhard Goetz is arguably the paradigmatic example of the use of self-defense by the same defendant in both a criminal and civil trial.230 In Goetz, Bernhard Goetz boarded a subway train at Fourteenth Street in Manhattan and sat down in the same car as four youths.231 In his possession was an unlicensed .38 caliber pistol.232 One of the youths approached Goetz and stated “give me five dollars.” 233 None of the juveniles displayed a weapon.234 Goetz responded by firing shots at each of the four boys.235 One youth was struck in the chest, another in the back, the third in his left side, and the fourth was initially unscathed.236 Goetz then turned to the fourth youth and stated, “you seem to be all right, here’s another.” 237 He fired a fifth bullet at the fourth youth, severing his spinal cord.238 Goetz fled immediately following the incident.239 However, nine days later Goetz surrendered himself to police.240 Goetz was eventually in-

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225 See id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. At the time of this writing, Florida has proposed legislation providing that “immunity does not apply to injuries to children and bystanders who are not affiliated with an overt act.” H.B. 123, 115th Leg., Regular Sess. (Fla. 2013); see also S.B. 362, 115th Leg., Regular Sess. (Fla. 2013) (reflecting the same exclusion for children and bystanders).
229 See Forell, supra note 27, at 1406.
230 Id. at 1407.
232 Id. at 43.
233 Id. at 43.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 43–44.
237 Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 44.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id.
dicted for attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of a weapon.\textsuperscript{241} Goetz argued that his actions were justified as self-defense.\textsuperscript{242} New York self-defense law at the time of the incident justified the use of deadly force when a person “believed deadly force was necessary to avert the imminent use of deadly force or the commission” of an enumerated felony and, if the District Attorney did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she did not have such beliefs, the jury would determine “if a reasonable person \textit{could} have had such beliefs.”\textsuperscript{243}

On June 16, 1986, a jury acquitted Goetz of attempted murder, assault, and reckless endangerment.\textsuperscript{244} He was convicted only of one count of illegal weapons possession, a felony that carries a maximum penalty of seven years confinement.\textsuperscript{245} Despite this acquittal, Goetz was later subject to civil suit.\textsuperscript{246} Darryl Cabey, the fourth youth who suffered from a severed spinal cord as a result of the shooting, filed a $50 million civil suit in the Bronx Supreme Court alleging that the shots taken at his back were made “deliberately, willfully, and with malice.”\textsuperscript{247} Cabey prevailed in this later civil suit in 1996, receiving a $43 million judgment in his favor.\textsuperscript{248} With the enactment of provisions providing civil immunity, however, such civil suits may no longer be filed. This would result in the denial of a remedy to a person who might otherwise receive an award of damages.

\section*{VI. Recommendations: The Need for Change or Clarification}

The most effective avenue for change is to advocate for administrative alterations or amendments to the existing laws to promote uniformity and to reduce the problematic application highlighted in the previous sections.\textsuperscript{249} The following discussion details those rec-
ommendations.

A. Legislative Recommendation: The Florida Legislature Should Remove “Arrest” and “Detaining in Custody” from the Definition of Criminal Prosecution

The legislature should remove the immunity decision from the purview of law enforcement decision-making by eliminating “arrest” and “detaining in custody” from the definition of criminal prosecution in the statute. These are the areas in which the greatest potential implementation problems exist.250 Overall, the calculation of reasonable force should not be within the scope and duties of law enforcement. Law enforcement training in arrest procedures does not provide the necessary foundation for the complex legal analysis associated with assessing an individual’s unlawful use of force.251 Further, placing this responsibility on the shoulders of law enforcement makes them the initial, and possibly final, decision-maker though they are not equipped with the same volume of evidence that may be available later in the prosecution. This aspect of the immunity provision also runs the risk of allowing the subjective beliefs of an officer to prevent the prosecution of a guilty party.

With these removed, criminal prosecution would include charging and prosecuting the defendant.252 This would place the decision largely in the hand of the prosecutor and reduce the discretion of law enforcement in arrest decisions to the more common requirement of probable cause that the crime has occurred. Allowing “charging” and “prosecution” to remain included in the definition of “criminal prosecution” does not carry the same inherent problems created by the inclusion of “arrest” and “detention.” Providing immunity to criminal defendants simply adds to the considerations a prosecutor may need to make in deciding whether to charge or with what crime to charge a particular defendant.

The only other impact is the addition of a requirement for pretrial determinations of immunity, if the court interprets the statute to function like the courts in Dennis v. State and People v. Guenther.253 Though such proceedings alter the common notion of self-defense as an affirmative defense asserted at trial, they seem to function like ad-

250 See supra Part IV.A.
251 See Wallace, supra note 155, at 39.
252 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.032(1) (West 2012).
253 People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1987); Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010).
ditional pre-trial summary judgment proceedings with likely insubstantial effect. This amendment would still allow the statute to protect the defendant from the fear of prosecution because charges could be dismissed prior to trial. In this way, the defendant would not be subject to complete criminal prosecution.

B. Administrative Recommendation: Alternatively, the State Should Require Law Enforcement to Report Investigative Procedures Regarding Self-Defense Claims

The law should require law enforcement to report the assertion of self-defense claims in order to conduct an adequate assessment of the effects of these laws, particularly the effects of the provision of immunity from arrest.254 Requiring law enforcement to track the manner in which they investigate and to log the cases that they decline to arrest would provide greater clarity regarding the effects of the law. Based upon the data collected, it may be possible to create a uniform procedure for assessing probable cause in self-defense claims. In order to create such a standard, law enforcement officers must report all instances in which they decline to arrest based upon their evaluation of probable cause in a case of self-defense. Law enforcement personnel should report to their own agency. The agency would then compile the data across the state and evaluate it to examine the various practices of law enforcement and their differing interpretations of what the law requires of them. From this compilation the administration would need to create a usable standard for law enforcement officers investigating assertions of self-defense.

In conjunction with a usable standard, all law enforcement officers must undergo additional training regarding the new self-defense law. This training would provide greater knowledge of the intricacies of the “Stand Your Ground” law to allow proper implementation. At the moment, the confusion surrounding the law makes it difficult for anyone to properly understand the situations in which the use of force is, in fact, considered lawful and justified. Due to the enhanced role of law enforcement officers under these statutes, their understanding of the law is imperative.

Further, the law should require prosecutors to report the cases in which they decline to charge or reduce charges based primarily upon the existence of the “Stand Your Ground” law. This would permit a more thorough understanding of the actual effects that the

254 See supra text accompanying notes 163–164.
VII. CONCLUSION

As evidenced by highly-publicized cases, such as that of Trayvon Martin, the inclusion of immunity from criminal and civil liability in recent legislation has significant and potentially dangerous consequences. Particularly, the expansion of the role of law enforcement in many recent statutes provides for both inconsistent application of the statute and unwelcome results in its implementation. While our criminal justice system seeks to promote justice, statutes making law enforcement the initial arbiter of a person’s guilt thwart that end by preventing a case from reaching its factual merits. Based upon this assessment, law enforcement should be required to engage in uniform procedures or the law should be amended to remove law enforcement discretion in arrest. All states considering similar legislation should refrain from including “immunity from arrest” in the statute’s construction.