TILA: THE TEXTUALIST-INTENTIONALIST LITMUS ACT?

Caroline Hatton*

Statutory interpretation is the Cinderella of legal scholarship. Once scorned and neglected, confined to the kitchen, it now dances in the ballroom.¹

I. INTRODUCTION

The Truth in Lending Act (TILA)² is a broad, consumer-protective statute that requires lenders to disclose their terms to consumers and governs the manner and timing of this disclosure in a range of commercial transactions. TILA’s rescission provision³ allows consumers to annul contracts made without the disclosure TILA requires, and its codification as Regulation Z⁴ prescribes the manner in which rescission may be accomplished.

Courts have found Regulation Z’s prescription unclear and have employed different interpretive methodologies to decipher exactly what steps consumers must take to rescind. The Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits determined via an intentionalist analysis that consumers must file a complaint with the court to effectuate rescission.⁵ The Third and Fourth Circuits, on the other hand,

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5. Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013); McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Homes, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012); Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit has also held that a borrower must file a complaint to rescind in a very recent unpublished decision. See Lumpkin v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., No. 12-2317, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16576, at *7–8 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 2013). The Lumpkin Court, however, states that “[o]ther circuits have uniformly interpreted Beach to preclude the precise argument Lumpkin makes here” and supports this proposition by citing only Rosenfield, McOmie, and an unpublished case from the Third Circuit that has been superseded by Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services, 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013). See id.; see also infra note 135 (discussing the now-superseded, non-precedential Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 410 F. App’x 495 (3d Cir. 2011)). The Lumpkin Court then declares on the basis of this perceived uniformity that “Lumpkin must not only give notice of his intent to rescind—which he failed to do—but also prove in a court of law that he
concluded from textualist readings of the statute that borrowers can rescind by notifying lenders. As district courts around the country enter decisions on the matter, the rift created by adherence to these two interpretive schools is growing ever deeper. The Supreme Court will undoubtedly determine the procedural requirement for rescission under TILA, and will likely address the true nature of the Circuit split surrounding the rescission requirement as well.

That does not mean, however, that the provision is headed for a textualist-intentionalist showdown: As this comment argues, this methodological conflict masks two less conspicuous but potentially dispositive questions whose resolution could obviate the need to favor one interpretive school over another. First, should lower courts be bound by conjectural Court dicta; second, should the Court defer to the agency that now holds regulatory authority over TILA, although that agency did not exist when TILA was codified? To see how an apparent textualist-intentionalist clash holds dramatic consequences both for the scope of precedent and for administrative law, it is necessary to trace the history of TILA and recent TILA litigation.

Congress enacted TILA in 1968 to combat deceptive practices by predatory lenders that left consumers unaware of the nature of the credit obligations they undertook and unable to conduct meaningful comparison of offers. “[S]uch blind economic activity,” then-Under Secretary of the Treasury Joseph Barr explained, “is inconsistent with the efficient functioning of a free economic system such as ours.”

TILA, an intended remedy for these commercial ills, is accordingly broad in scope. As Senator Paul Douglas announced in proposing TILA, “this bill does not provide for judgment solely on the basis of the ... annual interest rate or the total finance charges. It also provides that there shall be a statement of the cash price or delivery price of the property or service to be acquired.”

has a right to rescind. His right to bring such a suit has now expired.” Lumpkin, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16576, at *8 (citing Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1998)). As this Comment demonstrates, however, there is no uniformity among circuits regarding this issue, nor is it a given that Beach is applicable. See infra Parts II.B and III.

6 See generally Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012); Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services, 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013). Several Judges of the Eighth Circuit have filed dissents or concurrences that side with the Third and Fourth Circuit; for details, see infra notes 163–182 and accompanying text.


8 Id. (quoting Hearings on H. R. 11601 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 76 (1967).

9 Id. at 367–68 (quoting Hearings on S. 1740 Before the Subcomm. on Production and
requiring lenders to disclose both total price and finance charges, “the judgment of the consumer can be on the basis of both of these factors, not merely on one alone.”

TILA’s introductory provision adopts these broad goals of enhanced economic stabilization and strengthened “competition among the various financial institutions . . . engaged in the extension of consumer credit.” TILA aims “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him.” This “awareness of the cost” of credit will lead to “the informed use of credit” by consumers, which, in turn, will strengthen the American economy.

Congress framed TILA in general terms to leave room for the Federal Reserve Board (the “Board”) to adapt TILA enforcement to creditor schemes. “Congress was clearly aware that merchants could evade the reporting requirements of the Act by concealing credit charges. In delegating rulemaking authority to the Board, Congress emphasized the Board’s authority to prevent such evasion.” The Board exercised its sweeping power “by promulgating Regulation Z, 12 [C.F.R.] Part 226 (1979), which at least partly fills the statutory gaps.”

Although Regulation Z addresses many modes of consumer manipulation, “[e]ven Regulation Z . . . cannot speak explicitly to every credit disclosure issue.” The Court issued an interpretive directive for when neither TILA itself, nor Regulation Z, speaks directly to a new strain of consumer deception: “consider the implicit character of the statutory scheme.” In construing TILA-derived causes of action, in other words, courts must be guided by TILA’s


10 Id. at 368 (quoting Hearings on S. 1740 (statement of Sen. Douglas)).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Mourning v. Family Publ’ns Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 371 (1973). In fact, the Court observed: “[t]o hold that Congress did not intend the Board to take action against this type of manipulation would require us to believe that, despite this emphasis, Congress intended the obligations established by the Act to be open to evasion by subterfuges of which it was fully aware.” Id. The Court then firmly rejected this possibility: “the language of the enabling provision precludes us from accepting so narrow an interpretation of the Board’s power.” Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
consumer-protective purpose.

In furtherance of its consumer-protective purpose, TILA gives borrowers the right to rescind non-compliant loan agreements and provides that “[a]n obligor’s right of rescission shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the transaction or upon the sale of the property, whichever occurs first.”\(^\text{18}\) Regulation Z, in turn, sets forth specific manners in which borrowers may notify lenders of their intent to rescind:

(2) To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram, or other means of written communication. Notice is considered given when mailed, or when filed for telegraphic transmission, or, if sent by other means, when delivered to the creditor’s designated place of business. (3) . . . If the required notice and material disclosures are not delivered, the right to rescind shall expire 3 years after the occurrence giving rise to the right of rescission, or upon transfer of all of the consumer’s interest in the property, or upon sale of the property, whichever occurs first.\(^\text{19}\)

As detailed as this provision appears, courts are now grappling with its scope with some frequency. In order to trigger rescission within the three year limit, what must a consumer do?\(^\text{20}\)

Neither TILA nor Regulation Z answers this question directly. Indeed, a key sentence in 12 C.F.R. § 15(a)(2)—“To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram, or other means of written communication.”—is subject to two irreconcilable interpretations: either notice is a sufficient condition (as soon as the consumer notifies the creditor, the right to rescind has been exercised), or it is merely a necessary one (the right to rescind cannot be exercised without providing notice to the creditor).

Courts have tied the necessary-or-sufficient-condition determination to a choice of interpretive methodologies, with the intentionalists reading the notice as necessary and the textualists reading it to be sufficient.\(^\text{20}\) Curiously, those courts that stress congressional intent are the same courts that limit consumer rescission to preserve clarity of title,\(^\text{21}\) a stance seemingly at odds with


\(^{20}\) See infra Part III.

\(^{21}\) This can be seen in recent decisions from the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. See infra Part III.
TILA’s self-proclaimed pro-consumer purpose. The textualists, on the other hand, who strive to apply Congress’s words without heed to what Congress might have meant to say, read the regulation as requiring only notice.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has filed multiple amicus briefs urging a strict textualist interpretation of this statute and regulation, such as the approach adopted by the conservative Fourth Circuit. Created in 2010 and operational as of 2011, the CFPB was not even a gleam in the eye of the executive branch when the Board promulgated Regulation Z back in 1969. Now, however, the CFPB has taken over the reins of TILA; indeed, “the newly formed Consumer Financial Protection Bureau . . . assume[d] primary regulatory authority over the mortgage industry and exclusive rulemaking authority under TILA. Consequently, the CFPB’s interpretation of TILA regulations warrants judicial deference, and its strong policy arguments support the notice-as-

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22 See supra text accompanying notes 7–13.
23 See infra Part III. It is tempting to look for a reflection of politics in this split, but it has become increasingly difficult to associate interpretive methodologies with political leanings. See infra notes 24, 29. For an excellent discussion of the correlation between political affiliation and panel voting, see Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman & Andres Sawicki, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary, 17–40 (2006).
26 See Wally Adeyemo, September 2010: Transfer Date Announced, CFPB Blog (Sept. 9, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/2011/02/ (“Less than two months after President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act into law, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner announced that the one-year anniversary of the law—July 21, 2011—will serve as the ‘designated transfer date’ . . . . when consumer financial protection functions of seven federal agencies will transfer to the CFPB.”).
sufficient reading of TILA’s rescission provision.

Although it is somewhat surprising that the CFPB, the product of a liberal administration, advocates a textualist construction of section 1635(f), it comes as no surprise that TILA rescission has become a textualist-intentionalist battleground: TILA has hosted such wars in the past. In *Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Incorporated v. Nigh*, a divided Court explored both the meaning and the proper manner of interpreting TILA’s Damages-Ceiling Provision. In *Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank*, a unanimous Court held that TILA’s rescission provision fully extinguishes the right to rescind unlike a statute of limitations, which would extinguish only the right to file a cause of action. Though the Court employed a textual analysis in reaching this decision, its conclusion stressed the importance of legislative intent.

Courts involved in the current circuit split have been deciding not only whether notice suffices to trigger TILA rescission, but also the relevance of the Court’s decision in *Beach*. Because *Beach* is not exactly on point, it would govern only to the extent that the interpretive mechanism it employs should be extended to other TILA provisions. The question thus becomes whether methodological precedent can be set, and, if so, what exactly such precedent would impose upon lower courts. The applicability of *Beach* is polarizing, with the intentionalists declaring *Beach* to control and the textualists rejecting *Beach* as unrelated.

This comment will argue that, in determining how TILA rescission is accomplished, the Court should also find that *Beach* does not control and should instead defer to the CFPB’s interpretation. Although the circuits present these issues in textualist and intentionalist terms, the Court need not—and should not—name either interpretive methodology victorious. Both schools are fundamentally positivistic. By allowing them to coexist, the Court has created an epistemological friction that transcends the rigidity either

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30 543 U.S. 50 (2004); see infra Part II.A.
31 523 U.S. 410 (1998); see infra Part II.B.
32 See id. at 418–19; see also infra Part II.B (discussing *Beach* at length).
33 See infra Part II.
34 See infra Parts III.A and III.B (discussing the intentionalist and textualist approaches, respectively).
method would impose on its own.

Part II of this comment explores the textualist-intentionalist clash in the Court’s Koons Buick decision. The many opinions written in this case offer a glimpse of what a decision regarding the rescission mechanism might, and should, look like. Part II next explores Beach and its limits. Beach incarnates the other great interpretive clash in TILA’s history.

Part III moves to the current circuit split, which continues to expand as new decisions are handed down. Subpart A focuses on the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits’ intentionalist views of rescission. Subpart B explores the Third and Fourth Circuits’ textualist readings of Regulation Z.

Part IV.A argues that the Court should declare Beach inapposite; Part IV.B, that the Court should defer to the CFPB’s interpretation of Regulation Z. Part V, the conclusion, revisits the background and stakes of the current circuit split. Despite the textualist-intentionalist lines along which the circuits examine TILA rescission, the Court should resolve the issue without favoring either interpretive school.

II. PAST TILA BATTLES

A. A Subparagraph by Any Other Name: The Damages-Ceiling Dispute

Until 1995, the provision that set guidelines for TILA damages awards proclaimed that non-compliant lenders would be liable to borrowers in an amount equal to the sum of— . . . (2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance charge in connection with the transaction, or (ii) in the case of an individual action relating to a consumer lease under part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total monthly payments under the lease, except that the liability under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1000 . . . .

Courts widely held that the $100–$1000 limit applied both to subpart (i) and to subpart (ii), which were viewed as parts of the same “subparagraph.” Thus, the range of $100–$1000 was applied to all

36 See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 55–56 (2004) (“Following the insertion of the consumer lease provision, courts consistently held that the $100/$1,000 limitation remained applicable to all consumer financing transactions, whether lease or loan.”) (citing Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1996); Cowen v. Bank United of Tex., FSB, 70 F.3d 937, 941
damage awards set forth in § 1640(a)(2).

The statute remained unaltered from 1976 to 1995, when obfuscation struck: in its Act of September 30, 1995, Congress amended subsection (a)(2) by “substitut[ing] ‘(ii)’ for ‘or (ii)’ and insert[ing]” a third subpart. As a result, 15 USC § 1640(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) now imposes liability in an amount equal to the sum of— . . . (2)(A)(i) in the case of an individual action twice the amount of any finance charge in connection with the transaction, (ii) in the case of an individual action relating to a consumer lease under part E of this subchapter, 25 per centum of the total monthly payments under the lease, except that the liability under this subparagraph shall not be less than $100 nor greater than $1000, or (iii) in the case of an individual action relating to a credit transaction not under an open end credit plan that is secured by real property or a dwelling, not less than $200 or greater than $2000. . . .

Does “under this subparagraph” still to apply to both parts (i) and (ii) when it manifestly cannot apply to (iii)? Or did the 1995 iteration of the statute effectively detach the first part from the second, such that the ceiling now applies only to part (ii)? Did Congress, without changing the signifier employed, alter that which it signified?

The Seventh Circuit was the first to take aim at the moving target created by Congress’s 1995 amendment. After affirming that the statute was clear and unambiguous until the 1995 addition, the Strange court announced that the addendum “was designed simply to establish a more generous minimum and maximum for certain secured transactions [i.e. those secured by real estate], without changing the rule on minimum and maximum damage awards for the other two parts of § 1640(a)(2)(A).”

With its connotations of draftsmanship seasoned with hints of

(7th Cir. 1995); Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 713 F.2d 65, 67 (4th Cir. 1983); Dryden v. Lou Budke’s Arrow Fin. Co., 661 F.2d 1186, 1191 n.7 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Williams v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 598 F.2d 349, 358, 359 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979)).

38 Id.
39 Strange v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga., 129 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1997).
40 Id. (emphasis added).
41 See THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 459 (2d ed. 2005) (defining “design” as to “decide upon the look and functioning of (a building, garment, or other object), typically by making a detailed drawing of it”).
“designed” is a succinct masterstroke of evasion. Indeed, the court matched the statutory ambiguity of which it complains with an exegetical ambiguity no less notable. The structural aspect of “designed”—design as draftsmanship—evokes textualism; the plan-driven, plotting aspect of the same word implicates intentionalism. Without offering any further insight into its reasoning, the Strange court simply concluded that “the ‘subparagraph’ mentioned in § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii) continues to encompass what is now codified as subparts (A)(i) and (A)(ii), not just subpart (A)(ii).”

The Fourth Circuit took a more direct and explicit approach in Nigh. Judge Gregory’s dissent lauds “the Seventh Circuit’s well-reasoned analysis,” and even the Nigh majority remarked that “[i]t could well be . . . that Congress did not intend to alter the statutory cap applicable under subparagraph (A)(i) when it amended the statute in 1995.” The majority, however, emphatically refused to meander down what-if street, asserting that “the critical point of law—and it is critical—is that we do not know what Congress intended; all that we have before us is the amended statute from which to determine intent.” Noting staunchly that “[i]t is the statute, not any inferential intent, that constitutes the law,” the majority held that “Congress did alter the statutory cap regardless of its intent” and observed that Congress was free to amend the statute if it “enacted into law something different from what it intended.” The majority anchored its textualist approach to the separation of powers, affirming that “[i]n this way, and in this way only, are the constitutional roles of the legislature and the courts respected.”

The Fourth Circuit majority found that, “by striking the ‘or’ preceding (ii), and inserting (iii) after the ‘under this subparagraph’ phrase,” Congress “rendered [the application of the limit set forth in (ii) to the entirety of § 1640(a)(2)(A)] defunct.” Thus, “Congress’s amendment requires that the reference point of the ‘under this subparagraph’ clause be the subparagraph of § 1640 (a)(2)(A)(ii),

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42 See Id. (offering as a second definition: “do or plan (something) with a specific purpose or intention in mind”).
43 Strange, 129 F.3d at 947.
45 Id. at 132 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 128 (majority opinion).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
and not the subparagraph of § 1640 (a)(2)(A)(i). The majority read the word “subparagraph” as having a reduced scope of reference rather than a new meaning.

A divided Supreme Court weighed in to resolve the split that the Fourth Circuit created with respect to the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in its Koons Buick decision. The several concurrences and lone dissenting opinion question this approach. The Court’s fractured response gives some insight into how the current rescission-provision split may fare when it goes up. Koons Buick provides a full spectrum of approaches ranging from extreme intentionalism to radical textualism. In between, the Justices offer possible models of coexistence for the two interpretive methodologies.

The Court ultimately held that the Seventh Circuit had the right of it and, in so doing, adopted a moderately intentionalist approach. Justice Ginsburg notes in her plurality opinion that Congress’s “[l]ess-than-meticulous drafting of the 1995 amendment [(to 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A))] created an ambiguity,” but that the ambiguity was solely textual in nature. The purpose of the 1995 amendment, the Justice stresses, “is not in doubt: Congress meant to raise the minimum and maximum recoveries for closed-end loans secured by real property.”

Guided by this purpose and finding “scant indication that Congress simultaneously sought to remove the $1,000 cap on loans secured by personal property,” the Court declined to interpret the textual ambiguity as requiring removal, determining instead that “common sense suggests, by analogy to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s ‘dog that didn’t bark,’ that an amendment having the effect petitioner ascribes to it would have been differently

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51 Id. at 127.
52 One may wonder at this point whether “subparagraph” should ever have been understood to encompass § (A)(i) as well as (A)(ii). An abundance of circuit decisions applied the ceiling to both provisions. See supra note 36. The lack of legislative backlash in response to these decisions might suggest legislative ratification of this interpretation.
53 Id. at 65–76.
54 Id. at 60–76.
55 Id. at 60–63.
56 Id. at 53.
57 Id.
58 Id.
60 See id. at 63–64 (“[T]he text does not dictate [removing the limit]; the statutory history suggests otherwise; and there is scant indication Congress meant to change the well-established meaning of clause (i).”).
described by its sponsor, and not nearly as readily accepted by the floor manager of the bill."  

Although the plurality attributes great significance to congressional intent, or the absence thereof, it frames its intentionalist inquiry as a "step two" that can only follow a preliminary finding of textual ambiguity. Thus, though Justice Ginsburg applies a strong form of intentionality—the determination of what was meant as a function of what was not said—the Justice simultaneously subordinates intentionalist analysis to an initial textual inquiry. Justice Ginsburg’s textualist-intentionalist compromise garnered the signatures of a plurality of the Justices, and may indicate how the current circuit split will be resolved. The many other opinions proffered in Koons Buick, of course, offer possible alternatives.

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred to assert a stronger form of intentionality. Rather than “only look at legislative history for the purpose of resolving textual ambiguities or to avoid absurdities,” Justice Stevens admonishes, “[i]t would be wiser

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61 Id. at 61 (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. I.R.S., 484 U.S. 9, 17–18 (1987)).

62 Justice Ginsburg makes the secondary nature of the Court’s inquiry into congressional intent clear, observing that “[t]he statutory history resolves any ambiguity whether the $100/$1,000 brackets apply to recoveries under clause (i).” Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 62. Justice Ginsburg’s textualist inquiry is notable in another respect as well: it marks the first time a Justice invoked the legislative drafting manuals used by Congress as interpretive authority. For an excellent discussion of this jurisprudential landmark, see B. J. Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185, 186–89 (2010).

63 In finding significance in Justice Ginsburg’s granting of primacy to the textualist inquiry, I disagree with Jonathan T. Molot, who finds that when “two interpreters use the same interpretive tools to reach the same interpretive result, [it does not] really matter that one (the textualist) purports to use context to decide on a textual meaning while the other (the purposivist) admits that he is adjusting the text’s meaning to reconcile it with the context.” Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).

64 Not all Justices agree that the text is truly ambiguous. Some suggest, rather, that the Court imputed ambiguity to the text in order to justify extratextual analysis. See infra pp. 15–16 for a discussion of Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion and Justice Scalia’s dissent.

to acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress’[s] true intent when interpreting its work product,”66 because “[c]ommon sense is often more reliable than rote repetition of canons of statutory construction.”67 Decrying “wooden reliance on those canons,”68 the Justice asserts that “an unambiguous text describing a plausible policy decision” is not “a sufficient basis for determining the meaning of a statute.”69 Noting that the Court “cannot escape [the] unambiguous statutory command by proclaiming that it would produce an absurd result,” Justice Stevens notes that it “can, however, escape by using common sense.”70 To apply common sense to the present matter involves contemplating the provision’s history, which reveals that “a busy Congress is fully capable of enacting a scrivener’s error into law.”71 This willingness to find statutory error based on conclusions regarding congressional intent rather than agrammaticality or implausibility is intentionalism at its most extreme.72

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by the Chief Justice, advocates a more guarded form of intentionalism. It approves the consultation of “extratextual sources”73 in the present matter because “the text is not altogether clear. That means that examination of other interpretive resources, including predecessor statutes, is necessary for a full and complete understanding of the congressional intent.”74 Justice Kennedy describes intent as a tie-breaker for determining which of two equally plausible readings of the word “subparagraph” should govern.75 Textualism is the default rule in statutory interpretation; intentionalism, a failsafe to be applied on an as-needed basis, where need is determined not by notions of common

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66 Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 65–66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68 Id. at 66 (Stevens, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 One scholar describes Justice Stevens as “the leader of the intentionalist camp,” holding the pole opposite the one held by Justice Scalia in the “textualist-intentionalist divide.” See Todd Garvey, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41260, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS: THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 9–11 (2012).
74 Id. at 66–67 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75 See id. at 67 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that looking outward when faced with an ambiguous text is “fully consistent with cases in which, because the statutory provision had only one plausible textual reading, we did not rely on such sources”).
sense but by the words of the statute. Whereas Justice Ginsburg’s
tentionalism gets the final word and thus eclipses her textual
analysis, 76 Justice Kennedy establishes a strict text-intent hierarchy. 77

Justice Thomas concurred to voice agreement with the results—
though not with the analytical method—of the majority. Justice
Thomas advocates a textualist approach, 78 noting that “[i]f the text in
this case were clear, resort to anything else would be unwarranted.” 79
Because, however, the statute “is not a model of the best practices in
legislative drafting,” 80 the Justice finds it necessary to look beyond
the letter of the text. Although Justice Thomas does look outward, the
“anything else” that the Justice consults is limited to the fact that parts
(i) and (ii) had been read in a particular way until 1995 and that the
1995 amendment added a part (iii) without altering the extant parts. 81
Absent any affirmative change, suggests Justice Thomas, no
interpretive change should take place. 82

76 In this shift, Justice Ginsburg’s Koons Buick opinion is consonant with what
one scholar has noted to be generally true of the Justice’s “labor and anti-
discrimination opinions—although they begin with textual analysis[, they] rely
heavily on legislative history and purpose as well as on agency deference.” James J.
Brudney, The Supreme Court as Interstitial Actor: Justice Ginsburg’s Eclectic Approach to
Statutory Interpretation, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 889, 892 (2009).

77 See R. Randall Kelso, Statutory Interpretation Doctrine on the Modern Supreme Court
and Four Doctrinal Approaches to Judicial Decision-making, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 37, 39 (1997)
concurring)) (discussing supporters of Justice Scalia’s textualism and quoting Justice
Kennedy’s comment that “it does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to
rummage through unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in
order to discover an alternative interpretation of the statute with which the Court is
more comfortable”).

78 In discussing Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence, one scholar has written that,
“[s]ince his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1991, Justice Thomas[,]s judicial
fidelity to textualism has served, like a lighthouse on the shore, as a powerful beacon
to the Rehnquist Court, constantly returning it safely to the original intent of the
Framers.” Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas: Anchoring the
Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER

concurring).

80 Id. at 68 (Thomas, J., concurring).

81 See id. at 67 (Thomas, J., concurring). This approach is consistent with Justice
Thomas’s usual interpretive practices. See Judge H. Brent McKnight, The Emerging
(quotation marks omitted) (“Assisted by canons and dictionaries, Justice Thomas
asks whether the statutory text admits of plain interpretation, and if so, then judicial
inquiry is complete; or if there is irreducible ambiguity, and if so looks guardedly
beyond.”).

82 Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 69 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The only substantive
Alone in his dissent, Justice Scalia adopts an extreme textualist approach, asserting that Congress did effect an affirmative change in the text when it amended the statute: by adding a part (iii) to which part (ii) could not possibly apply, Justice Scalia argues, Congress rendered it textually impossible for part (ii) to continue to be interpreted to govern part (i). Observing that “[t]he ultimate question here is not the meaning of ‘subparagraph,’ but the scope of the exception which contains that term,” Justice Scalia determines that a corollary of adding part (iii) to § 1640 (a)(2)(A) was to free part (i) of the $100–$1000 window that had been applied to it.

Where the majority finds an accident—an unfortunate side effect that resulted, intention-free, from the one deliberate change Congress made—Justice Scalia finds potential legislative economy, a transformation made by absence of change. Justice Scalia faults the majority for employing the “Canon of Canine Silence” to treat a change wrought by inaction as a non-change and argues that the statute should be construed as it now reads, rather than as it once read. The results of uncapping part (i) would not be catastrophic because the high-amount loans likely to yield large damages are treated in parts (ii) and (iii), which do have fixed limits.

Justice Scalia argues, further, that the Court should respect its limits: “It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think is the preferred result.”

One scholar suggests “deferential textualism” as best suited to describe Justice Scalia’s brand of textualist inquiry in order to distinguish the Justice’s distinct goal of deferring to the legislature from traditional “strict textualism.” See Aprill, supra note 65, at 279–80. For the purposes of highlighting the spectrum of approaches advocated in Koons Buick, this Comment uses “extreme” to mark Justice Scalia’s dissent as the antipode of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.

Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id. at 70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id. at 72, 76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the removal of the word “or” forces a change in the meaning of the statute that reflects a “plausible policy decision” and stressing that “[t]he Court should not fight the current structure of the statute merely to vindicate the suspicion that Congress actually made—but neglected to explain clearly—a different policy decision” (quoting id. at 65 (Stevens, J., concurring))).

Id. at 73 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

See id. at 75–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Id. at 76 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004)).
to the letter of the law “wooden.” Justice Scalia argues it to be a means of avoiding the “ventriloquism” to which the Court falls prey when “[t]he Congressional Record or committee reports are used to make words appear to come from Congress’s mouth which were spoken or written by others.”

Both pure textualism and pure intentionalism yield an unhealthy automatism. The majority’s compromise gives hope that the Court’s determination of the current notice-of-rescission debate will be equally circumspect with respect to interpretive methodology.

B. TILA’s Rescission Provision: A Statute of Limitation or Repose?

The Court’s ruling on another provision may make such circumspection difficult. Whereas the damages-ceiling debate may anticipate the drama to unfold when the Court decides the mechanics of TILA rescission, some circuits argue that the Court’s decision in Beach, which addresses TILA’s rescission provision itself, bears directly upon the current circuit split.

In Beach the Court reviewed a Florida Supreme Court decision that conflicted with decisions other courts had reached in interpreting the three-year limit set by § 1635(f). The Florida

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90 Koons Buick, 543 U.S. at 74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91 The potential for automatism inherent in the monist inquiry of both the textualist and intentionalist schools is concisely encapsulated in Michel Rosenfeld’s discussion of Ronald Dworkin’s legal philosophy:

[S]ince Dworkin is neither a strict textualist (i.e., he does not believe that the meaning of a legal text derives exclusively from the “plain meaning” of the words and phrases contained in it) nor an intentionalist (i.e., he does not believe that the meaning of a text can be established by ascertaining its author’s intention), it follows that he must be able to rely on a hermeneutic approach subject to intersubjective verification or approval.


92 See supra Part II.A.
93 See supra Part III.
94 See infra Part I.B. for text of statute.
Supreme Court held that a borrower could not rescind by affirmative defense in a suit filed after the three years had elapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States considered—but rejected—the possibility that § 1635 is a classic "statute of limitation governing only the institution of suit and accordingly has no effect when a borrower claims a § 1635 right of rescission as a 'defense in recoupment' to a collection action."

The Court agreed that "as a general matter a defendant’s right to plead ‘recoupment’ . . . survives the expiration of the period provided by a statute of limitation . . . ." "So long as the plaintiff’s action is timely," the Court noted, "a defendant may raise a claim in recoupment even if he could no longer bring it independently, absent ‘the clearest congressional language’ to the contrary." Nevertheless, the Court found that "[t]he issue here is not whether limitation statutes affect recoupment rights, but whether § 1635(f) is a statute of limitation."

The Court thus examined "whether [the three-year limit] operates, with the lapse of time, to extinguish the right which is the foundation for the claim,’ or ‘merely to bar the remedy for its enforcement.” The latter interpretation would be consistent with a statute of limitations and would permit borrowers to assert rescission as an affirmative defense; the former interpretation, in keeping with a statute of repose, would eliminate the possibility of rescinding, for any reason, beyond the three-year window. The Court held that TILA’s rescission provision extinguishes the borrower’s right to rescind and makes no allowance for reviving the right once expired.

The Beach Court’s method of analysis is striking: the Court

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96 Beach, 523 U.S. at 414.
97 Id. at 415.
98 Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted).
99 Id. (quotation and citations omitted).
100 Id. at 416.
101 Id. (quoting Midstate Horticultural Co. v. Pa. R.R., 320 U.S. 356, 358–359 (1943)).
102 The Court’s determination that § 1635(f) is not a statute of limitations has been equated by some circuits with a finding that TILA is a statute of repose. See infra Parts III.A. and IV.A. (discussing the circuit decisions). The distinction between statutes of repose and statutes of limitation is a subtle but important one. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4, at 20–21 (1987) (“Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations . . . the period contained in a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.”)).
103 See Beach, 523 U.S. at 414–15.
employs both textualism and intentionalism in a unanimous opinion. The Court begins by noting that, unlike “a typical statute of limitation[,] which provides] that a cause of action may or must be brought within a certain period of time,” § 1635(f) “says nothing in terms of bringing an action.” “[I]nstead,” the Court observes, “[§ 1635(f)] provides that the ‘right of rescission [under the Act] shall expire’ at the end of the time period.” The Court stresses that the rescission provision establishes how long the right to rescind lasts rather than the deadline for filing suit, and in eminently direct terms. Indeed, the Court finds the provision so clear that “[t]here is no reason . . . to resort to the canons of construction that we use to resolve doubtful cases.”

At this point, the Court’s logic begins to shift. Until now, the decision clung to the statute’s actual words. After finding § 1635’s words clear, however, the Court looks elsewhere in TILA and finds that Congress did insert words to mark other TILA provisions as statutes of limitation. Thus, the Court reasons, Congress chose not to include similar limitations language in § 1635(f). Applying what Justice Scalia has branded the “Canon of Canine Silence,” the Court remarks: “Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”

The Court then moves further from the text of § 1635, suggesting that, “[s]ince a statutory right of rescission could cloud a bank’s title on foreclosure, Congress may well have chosen to circumscribe that risk, while permitting recoupment damages

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104 Id. at 416.
105 Id. at 417.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See supra Part I.A. Interpreting absence, though common to moderate textualist inquiries, marks a deviation from the pure textualism with which the Court begins. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia and Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts xi–xvii (2012) (listing the fifty-seven canons of interpretation, which do not include the analysis of unused words).
110 See id. at 417–18.
111 See supra Part I.A. Interpreting absence, though common to moderate textualist inquiries, marks a deviation from the pure textualism with which the Court begins. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia and Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts xi–xvii (2012) (listing the fifty-seven canons of interpretation, which do not include the analysis of unused words).
112 Beach, 523 U.S. at 418 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
regardless of the date a collection action may be brought.”

The Court thus posits a guess—suitably adorned in the conditional mood—as to what congressional aim might underlie § 1635(f)’s structure and function.

In closing, the Court declares that it has chosen to “respect Congress’s manifest intent by concluding that the Act permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year period of § 1635(f) has run. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida.” This emphatic conclusion is slippery, because congressional intent is linked in the opinion both to the absence of limitations language and to the choice to circumscribe the risk of clouding title.

The first of these reflects analytical inquiry; the second, clearly speculative dicta.

As we turn to the rescission-mechanism split, we will see courts clash over the weight due the Beach dicta. In theory, Beach is off-topic: whether § 1635(f) extinguishes a right or a cause of action is not germane to whether notice must be sent or a suit must be filed. The Beach conclusion, however, is broad enough to suggest that timely notice coupled with late filing would subvert Congress’s “manifest intent” to render the three-year period a sacrosanct outer limit. Is the Court’s hypothesis regarding congressional intent binding precedent upon lower courts?

III. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT: HOW DOES ONE RESCIND UNDER TILA?

When the Court interprets the rescission provision, it will

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113 Id. at 418–19 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
114 Id. at 418 (emphasis added).
115 The Court’s Beach conclusion thus risks participating in a phenomenon that Judge Pierre N. Laval laments, namely the fact that “more and more, dicta flex muscle to which . . . they are not entitled by constitutional right.” Pierre N. Laval, James Madison Lecture: Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1250 (2006). Laval explains the danger posed by overstated dicta:
We judges regularly undertake to promulgate law through utterance of dictum made to look like a holding-in disguise, so to speak. When we do so, we seek to exercise a lawmaking power that we do not rightfully possess. Also, we accept dictum uttered in a previous opinion as if it were binding law, which governs our subsequent adjudication. When we do so, we fail to discharge our responsibility to deliberate on and decide the question which needs to be decided.

116 See id. at 1258–59 (noting that though it can be difficult to distinguish dicta from holdings, this distinction is vial in a system of stare decisis).
necessarily either apply or decline to apply *Beach*. If the Court finds *Beach* inapplicable, we may expect a fiery array of interpretations similar to those we analyzed in *Koons Buick.* If the Court holds that *Beach* applies, however, the conclusion that it is Congress’s “manifest intent” to terminate the right to rescind after three years would force a finding that a complaint is necessary to trigger rescission. To anticipate which way the Court may hold—and to assess whether the answer is bound to a choice between textualism and intentionalism—we turn to the relevant circuit decisions.

A. Intentionalist Decisions

In *McOmie* the Ninth Circuit declares itself bound to treat § 1635(f) as a statute of repose. “Were we writing on a blank slate,” the court proclaims, “we might consider whether notification within three years of the transaction could extend the time limit imposed by § 1635(f).” The circuit promptly adds a big “but,” stating that, “under the case law of this court and the Supreme Court, rescission suits must be brought within three years from the consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice of rescission is delivered within that three-year period.” Wistfully, the *McOmie* court bows before what it deems to be precedent and blames *stare decisis* for its holding that a formal filing is necessary to trigger TILA rescission.

The Ninth Circuit’s reading of the *Beach* holding, however, is overly expansive: *Beach* did not state the rule that the *McOmie* court attributes to it. The circuit court extrapolates the *Beach* “rule” from the Court’s conclusion that “[t]he plain meaning of the Act . . . ‘permits no federal right to rescind, defensively or otherwise, after the 3-year period of 1635(f) has run.’” The Ninth Circuit’s focus on “or otherwise”—which it over-reads—causes it to lose sight of the question before it, namely whether notice constitutes an exercise of

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118 See *supra* Part II.A.
119 McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 2012).
120 *Id.*
121 The case law to which the court refers was set forth in Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002). See *infra* note 125.
122 This is a reference to the *Beach* decision, discussed *supra* Part II.B.
123 *McOmie*, 667 F.3d at 1328.
124 *Id.* (alteration in the original) (quoting *Beach* v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 532 U.S. 410, 419 (1998)).
the right to rescind. By treating *Beach* as precedent, the Ninth Circuit adopts the Court’s divination of congressional intent as binding. Because the Court’s position is not exactly on point, however, taking its divination as an unassailable starting point is a second degree of abstraction. This second level of removal, in turn, leads the Ninth Circuit to use intent to change the meaning of clear language, not just to construe unclear language.\(^{125}\)

In *Rosenfield*,\(^{126}\) the Tenth Circuit agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s holding that consumers must file a complaint in order to trigger TILA’s rescission provision\(^{127}\) and that *Beach* controls.\(^{128}\) The *Rosenfield* court begins by noting that “an examination of the structure of the right conferred in this case—that is, rescission—supports [its] conclusion.”\(^{129}\) The court stresses that the equitable remedy of rescission “is not . . . appropriate . . . in circumstances where its application would lead to prohibitively difficult (or impossible) enforcement.”\(^{130}\) The muddying of title that would flow from accepting notice as sufficient to trigger rescission rises to the level of prohibitive difficulty.\(^{131}\) Accordingly, the *Rosenfield* court states, “we ascertain no basis for concluding that the TILA rescission remedy differs in any material respect from the general form of rescission available in . . . analogous contexts.”\(^{132}\) The *Rosenfield* court acknowledges the CFPB’s contrary position but dismisses the CFPB’s evidence as “mostly concerning matters of state law.”\(^{133}\) The Tenth Circuit affirms that, as a statute of repose, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) “operates to completely extinguish the right being claimed after it lapses.”\(^{134}\) The *Rosenfield* court, in other words, treats *Beach* as

\(^{125}\) The circuit performs a similarly flag-raising abstraction with respect to its earlier decision in *Miguel*. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the borrowers had failed to exercise their right to rescind in a timely manner when they notified and filed suit against the wrong party during the three-year period and attempted to initiate action against the proper party only after the three years had passed. *See id.* at 1329 (discussing *Miguel*, 309 F.3d at 1162–63).

\(^{126}\) *Rosenfield* v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012).

\(^{127}\) *See id.* at 1187.

\(^{128}\) *See id.* at 1188.

\(^{129}\) *Id.* at 1183.

\(^{130}\) *Id.* at 1184.

\(^{131}\) *See id.* at 1185 (chronicling a number of difficulties and burdens that would flow from allowing rescission-by-notice).

\(^{132}\) *Rosenfield* v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d at 1184 (10th Cir. 2012).

\(^{133}\) *Id.* at 1186 n.10. *See infra* Parts III.B and IV.B for a discussion of the CFPB’s amicus brief.

\(^{134}\) *Id.* at 1182 (alteration in the original).
controlling.\textsuperscript{135} In \textit{Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc.},\textsuperscript{136} the Eighth Circuit majority\textsuperscript{137} explicitly adopts the Tenth Circuit’s analysis: “[W]e agree with the Tenth Circuit’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion in \textit{Rosenfield} and hold that a plaintiff seeking rescission must file suit, as opposed to merely giving the bank notice, within three years in order to preserve that right pursuant to § 1635(f).”\textsuperscript{138} Like the Tenth Circuit, two judges of the Eighth Circuit find \textit{Beach} dispositive: “Extrapolating from \textit{Beach}, we hold that to accomplish rescission within the meaning of § 1635(f), the obligor must file a rescission action in court.”\textsuperscript{139}

The \textit{Keiran} majority stresses that it has not abandoned the text: We are not unmindful of the language of Regulation Z or the interpretation of that regulation—that notice, as opposed to filing suit, is enough to preserve the right—that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), amicus in this case, has advanced in favor of the plaintiffs. However, we agree with \textit{Rosenfield} that the text of the statute, as explicated in \textit{Beach}, establishes that filing suit is required.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{135} In an unpublished opinion carrying no precedential weight, the Third Circuit similarly held \textit{Beach} to control and, consequently, also held that rescission requires the plaintiff to file a complaint within the three-year window. The \textit{Williams} court framed its holding in an interesting way, observing that: [i]t may be that an obligor may invoke the right to rescission by mere notice. Mere invocation without more, however, will not preserve the right beyond the three-year period. Rather, consistent with § 1635(f), a legal action to enforce the right must be filed within the three-year period or the right will be “completely extinguish[ed].”\textsuperscript{141}

\textit{Williams v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc.}, 410 F. App’x 495, 499 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting \textit{Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank}, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998)). The Third Circuit’s opinion creates a distinction between “invocation of the right to rescind” with non-extinguishment of that right, presumably by exercising it. \textit{See id.} It is not clear what it might mean to “invoke” a right when such invocation is not tantamount to exercising a right. \textit{See id.}

In its precedential decision of February 5, 2013, however, the Third Circuit arrived at the opposite conclusion concerning both the applicability of \textit{Beach} and the requirements for rescission. \textit{See generally Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs.}, 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013); \textit{infra} Part III.B.

\textsuperscript{136} \textit{Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc.}, 720 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2013). Both the \textit{Keiran} majority and the \textit{Keiran} dissent find echo in the Eighth Circuit’s subsequent decision in Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752 (2013).

\textsuperscript{137} For a discussion of the dissenting Judge’s textualist interpretation of § 1635, \textit{see infra} Part III.B.

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Keiran}, 720 F.3d at 728.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Id.}
By treating *Beach* as not only having resolved the issue presented therein, but also having established a guide to the textual interpretation of TILA, however, the Eighth Circuit subordinates the statute’s actual text to *Beach*’s explication of that text and, in so doing, adopts the intentionalist interpretation that the Supreme Court decision expounds in relation to another issue.\(^{141}\)

**B. Textualist Decisions**

In *Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC*,\(^{142}\) the Fourth Circuit arrives at the opposite result. The *Gilbert* court first considers “the plain meaning of the statute,” because “‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.’”\(^{143}\) The Fourth Circuit finds the grail of “plain meaning” within the actual words of § 1635(f) and therefore declines to supplant or even gloss those words: “Simply stated, neither 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) nor Regulation Z says anything about the filing of a lawsuit, and we refuse to graft such a requirement upon them.”\(^{144}\)

After confining itself to reading the lines—rather than between the lines—of § 1635(f), the *Gilbert* court warns that “[w]e must not conflate the issue of whether a borrower has exercised her right to rescind with the issue of whether the rescission has, in fact, been completed and the contract voided.”\(^{145}\) The Fourth Circuit thus draws a practical distinction between exercising a right to rescind and actual rescission.\(^{146}\) “The former,” the *Gilbert* court insists, “is the concern of § 1635(f) and Regulation Z, and a borrower exercises her right of rescission by merely communicating in writing to her creditor her intention to rescind,”\(^{147}\) even though the borrower must then take additional steps “[t]o complete the rescission and void the contract.”\(^{148}\) Like its sister circuits, the Fourth Circuit requires either

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\(^{141}\) See *id.* The Eighth Circuit reiterated its reliance on *Rosenfield* and, by extension, on *Beach* in Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 759–60 (8th Cir. 2013).

\(^{142}\) *Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC*, 678 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2012).


\(^{144}\) *Id.* at 277.

\(^{145}\) *Id.*

\(^{146}\) The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning stands in contrast to the Third Circuit’s invoke-exercise dichotomy in its unpublished *Williams* opinion. See *supra* note 135.

\(^{147}\) *Gilbert*, 678 F.3d at 277.

\(^{148}\) *Id.*
that “the creditor . . . acknowledge that the right of rescission is available and the parties . . . unwind the transaction amongst themselves, or [that] the borrower . . . file a lawsuit so that the court may enforce the right to rescind.” The Gilbert court applies § 1635(f)’s three-year limit to the right to rescind, which can be exercised by notice, rather than to rescission itself.

The Fourth Circuit was able to strike out on its own largely because it shrugged off the interpretive shackles of Beach. Gilbert holds that Beach carries no precedential weight vis-à-vis the rescission deadline. “Appellees’ reliance on [Beach] is misplaced,” the Gilbert court holds, because “[t]he Beach Court did not address the proper method of exercising a right to rescind or the timely exercise of that right.” Just as the Fourth Circuit adheres to the letter of the statute, it also adheres to the letter of Beach, refusing to embroider meaning upon the Court’s words.

The Third Circuit took a similar stance in February 2013, with its Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage Services decision, announcing that, “[i]n resolving the question at issue here, we rely on the statutory language, not on the debatable implications of dicta.” In determining what is required to trigger rescission under TILA, the Third Circuit stressed that “nowhere in Beach does the Court address how an obligor must exercise his right of rescission within that three-year period,” which the circuit described as the key question raised by the appeal. Though the Sherzer court does note that “Beach is consistent with [its] view” that notice suffices to rescind, its more definitive assertions concerning the inapplicability of Beach dicta make it clear that “consistency” was not the court’s paramount analytical objective.

Nor does the Third Circuit rely on legislative history in its analysis. The Sherzer court refers in passing to a 1980 addition to TILA but otherwise steers clear of the inquiry into congressional

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149 Id.
150 Id. at 278.
152 Id. at 262 (emphasis in the original).
153 Id. at 257 (“The question presented by this appeal is simple: does an obligor exercise his right to rescind a loan subject to TILA by so notifying the creditor in writing, or must the obligor file suit before the three-year period expires?”).
154 Id. at 258. A more felicitous choice of phrase, given the Sherzer court’s adamant rejection of Beach dicta quoted above, would have been to say that Beach is not inconsistent with the court’s view of TILA rescission.
155 Id. at 260.
intent that informs the decisions of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Though the Third Circuit never explicitly rejects intentionalism, it cements its textualist stance by relegating the policy concerns raised by the lenders—concerns similar to those raised by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits in expounding congressional intent—to for-the-sake-of-completion analysis, observing that, “[w]hile the Lenders and their amici raise several concerns worthy of our careful attention, we find them unpersuasive for the reasons that follow.”

This statement establishes a clear line between the textual analysis that led to the court’s decision and the policy-rich analysis that simply bolsters it.

Indeed, the Third Circuit frames its decision in purely textualist terms. The Sherzer court “begin[s] with the statutory text,” and, after scrutinizing § 1635 as a whole, states that “the answer to the question presented by this appeal is not pellucid, although we do think it is controlled by the statutory language.” The circuit musters both affirmative evidence indicating that notice constitutes rescission and negative evidence that “nothing in the text of the statute supports the view that [filing a complaint is necessary]” to bolster its determination that “the text of § 1635 and its implementing regulation . . . supports the view that to timely rescind a loan agreement, an obligor need only send a valid notice of rescission.” Ultimately, the Third Circuit rejects the view that rescission is triggered only by filing a complaint because that view “would require us to infer that the statute contains additional, unwritten requirements with which obligors must comply—an inference that seems particularly inappropriate in light of the fact that TILA is a remedial statute that we must construe liberally.”

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156 Id. at 261.
157 Id. at 258.
158 See id. at 258–61.
159 Id. at 261. Curiously, despite noting a lack of pellucidity, the Third Circuit did not discuss the possibility of deferring to the CFPB’s interpretation of Regulation Z. See infra Part IV.B.
160 Id. at 260.
162 Id. at 261. This focus on the statute’s remedial purpose may seem more purposivist than textualist. Indeed, Scalia and Garner fault the remedial purpose canon for precisely such reasons: The other problem with the remedial-statute rule is that identifying what a “liberal construction” consists of is impossible—which means that it is an open invitation to engage in “purposive” rather than textual interpretation, and generally to engage in judicial improvisation. Of course, “liberal construction” does have an identifiable meaning if it means (as we suspect it originally did mean)
The Third Circuit thus finds support for its strict, text-based analysis in the consumer-protective purpose of the statute.

Judge Murphy similarly finds harmony of text and purpose in § 1635 in her elegant Kieran dissent: “The plain language of TILA, its implementing regulations, and its supporting policy rationales all support reading § 1635 to mean what it says: that rescission is exercised when a consumer provides written notice to the lender.” Murphy considers the entirety of the statute and observes that “[n]owhere in the TILA statute is there any requirement that a consumer must file a lawsuit in order to exercise a right of rescission.” Nor, Judge Murphy argues, can such an imperative be imputed from the off-topic Beach or the non-germane distinction between a statute of limitation and a statute of repose.

Judge Murphy bolsters this text-based determination by weighing the policy goals undergirding TILA. Murphy concedes that “borrowers may sometimes make rescission claims without any valid basis,” but notes that “lenders may also deny them without legal right or might take advantage of uninformed consumers.” Murphy nothing more than rejection of “strict construction” and insistence on fair meaning. The canon is therefore today either incomprehensible or superfluous.

Scalia & Garner, supra note 111, at 365–66. Nevertheless, the rule that “a statute . . . considered remedial . . . should be given a liberal interpretation and should be construed to give the terms used the most extensive meaning to which they are readily susceptible,” id. at 364 n.1 (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 60:2, at 268 (7th ed. 2007)), has been one of the classic canons of interpretation since its invocation by John Jay, the first Chief Justice, in 1793, id. at 364. Like the other canons of interpretation, the remedial purpose canon concentrates on the proper way to draw meaning from the language of a statute, a text-centric inquiry. See, e.g., Elliot M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory Interpretation, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 983, 1002–03 (2007) (including the canons of interpretation among the tools in the “textualist’s toolbox”).

Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 736 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Id. at 731 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Id. at 732 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

See Keiran, 720 F.3d at 734–36 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (offering a detailed analysis of policy arguments made by the majority as well as the parties and their amici). Although Judge Melloy makes a strong textualist argument as noted infra in the text accompanying note 172, it is important to recall that he first adopts Murphy’s reasoning: “Were we writing on a clean slate . . . I would hold for the reasons stated by Judge Murphy in her dissent in Keiran that sending notice within three years of consummating a loan is sufficient to ‘exercise’ the right to rescind.” Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., concurring).

Keiran, 720 F.3d at 734 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
faults her judicial brethren’s choice as to which of these two potential wrongdoers should receive the benefit of the legislative doubt: “The majority expresses much concern about the former issue and very little about the latter, yet TILA’s status as ‘remedial legislation, to be construed broadly in favor of consumers,’ dictates which problem takes precedence.”

Judge Murphy concludes by rejecting the extratextual filing requirement under which “TILA would become a broad shield for lenders in spite of Congress’ manifest goal of ensuring that consumers receive an effective rescission right against both original and assignee lenders.”

Shortly after it decided Keiran, it again confronted the question of what borrowers must do to rescind in Hartman v. Smith. Bound by Keiran, Judge Melloy concurred with the Hartman court’s holding that filing a complaint is required, but wrote separately to express his disagreement with this determination. Judge Melloy approves Judge Murphy’s Keiran dissent and pushes her argument even further, stressing that the absence of a textual mandate to read §1635 as requiring borrowers to file suit should suffice to preclude reading such a requirement into the statute:

That Congress provided a statute of limitations governing suits for damages demonstrates that it knew how to impose such a limitation and would have done the same regarding suits for rescission if it so desired; instead, however, the provision governing rescission states only that “the obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction . . . by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau, of his intention to do so.”

Whereas Judge Murphy bolstered her reading of the statute with policy considerations, Judge Melloy remains anchored to the text of §1635. Judge Melloy also adheres to the text of Miguel v. Country
Funding Corp., which the Ninth Circuit relied on in deciding McOmie and which Judge Melloy asserts is off-topic. Judge Melloy thus offers a more purely textualist rationale for finding that notice is sufficient to rescind; indeed, Judge Melloy faults the majority’s focus on the practical consequences that might flow from this decision because the statute’s language is plain.

The unrest with respect to TILA’s rescission requirements is growing in the Eighth Circuit: Since Keiran and Hartman, this circuit has published yet another opinion on § 1635’s requirements. The very short per curiam opinion in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. holds, as do the prior cases, that filing a complaint is necessary to rescind. The two concurrences in this three-judge decision, one by Judge Melloy—citing his Hartman concurrence—and one by Judge Colloton—citing Judge Murphy’s Keiran dissent as well as the Third Circuit’s opinion in Sherzer—lament the fact that they are bound by Keiran.

When the losing party petitioned for rehearing in Jesinoski, the Eighth Circuit denied the petitions in much more dramatic fashion than it did in Hartman: 4 judges—Judge Murphy and three others—dissented, and Judge Colloton concurred because, “[n]o matter how this court decides this case, there will remain a well-developed conflict in the circuits on the question of how a consumer may exercise his or her right to rescind under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f).” Judge Colloton then explains why the circuit split cautions against a rehearing:

It appears that none of these cases was presented to the Supreme Court by way of petition for writ of certiorari, so it cannot be said that the Court has resolved to leave the issue

173 309 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2002).
174 Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 763 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., concurring) (discussing McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 2012)).
175 Id. (Melloy, J., concurring) (“I do not believe that requiring lenders to initiate declaratory-judgment actions—rather than defend in rescission actions—is so undesirable that it reaches a level of absurdity such that this Court should ignore the plain language of the statute and Regulation Z.”).
176 729 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 2013).
177 Id. (Melloy, J. concurring).
178 Id. at 1094 (Colloton, J., concurring).
179 See supra note 170.
181 Id. at *1–2 (Colloton, J., concurring) (collecting cases).
to individual circuits despite a conflict in authority. Therefore, I conclude that the resources of a rehearing en banc are not warranted at this time simply to move this court from one side to the other in what may prove to be a short-lived conflict in the circuits.

Judge Colloton thus anticipates that the Supreme Court of the United States will weigh in to resolve the split that has divided the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits from the Third and Fourth Circuits, a division that the fractured decisions of the Eighth Circuit echo in microcosm.

IV. HOW SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVE THE SPLIT?

Like the Third Circuit and Judge Murphy, the Court should heed TILA’s stated purpose—to inform and protect consumers—before honing in on the text of § 1635 itself when it resolves the present split. The Act’s umbrella introduction states that TILA aims “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing.” The Court should choose an interpretation that best reflects the goals set forth by TILA’s introductory provision.

Here, the textualist interpretation appears more in keeping with TILA objectives. The Third and Fourth Circuits hold that borrowers may exercise their right to rescind by notifying the lender of their intent to do so within that three-year window. The Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, require that borrowers sue their lenders within three years of entering into a loan agreement or forever lose the right to rescind. This intentionalist position demands a level of awareness on the part of borrowers that seems incongruous with TILA’s objectives. As Judge Murphy’s dissenting

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182 Id. at *2 (Colloton, J., concurring).
183 No petitions for certiorari have been filed as of the time this Comment went to press.
185 See supra text accompanying note 17.
186 See supra Part III.A.
opinion stressed, the decision of the Eighth Circuit majority, like those of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, “is contrary to the plain language of TILA, the congressional intent behind it, and the position of the agency responsible for enforcing it. TILA is ‘remedial legislation to be construed broadly in favor of consumers,’ yet the majority construes its provisions broadly in favor of lenders.”

Nevertheless, it is not impossible that an intentionalist interpretation will carry the day, given the Supreme Court’s past decisions. The Court reached a textualist-intentionalist compromise in *Koons Buick* and concluded *Beach* with a discussion of Congress’s “manifest intent,” even if only in dicta. The very active circuit split at the center of this Comment reveals that the intentionalist position is not without support.

Whatever its conclusion, the Court should begin by declaring *Beach* inapposite. Relevant only through its dicta, *Beach* should not be stretched to apply to rescission mechanics. Rather than expand the influence of its reasoning, the Court should defer to the CFPB, the agency now charged with TILA regulation. Deference is important in an abstract sense as a means of maintaining the boundaries of the different branches of government. With respect

1074082, at *18–19.
189 Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 731 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (quoting Rand Corp. v. Yer Song Moua, 559 F.3d 842, 845 (8th Cir. 2009).
190 Note that, with respect to its emphasis on legislative intent, the limited TILA jurisprudence explored in Part II of this Comment stands at odds with a statistically-confirmed Court trend: “[The Court’s] practice after 1986 (when Scalia joined the Court) has reflected the influence of new textualism . . . . The Court has been somewhat more willing to find statutory plain meaning and less willing to consult legislative history, either to confirm or rebut that plain meaning . . . .” ESKRIDGE, supra note 1, at 227.
191 See supra Parts II.A and III.
192 See supra Part II.B.
193 See supra Part II.
194 See CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at 15 (“*Beach* is not directly on point . . . .”).
195 “When [courts] make law in dictum, the likelihood is high that it will be bad law.” Laval, supra note 115, at 1260. See generally id. at 1258–62 (stressing that overreading dicta is particularly pernicious in a system based on *stare decisis*).
to TILA rescission, moreover, the CFPB’s analysis is compelling and appropriately consumer-protective.\(^{198}\)

What the Court should not do is resolve the textualist-intentionalist debate that has colored TILA litigation in general and the rescission-provision split in particular.\(^{199}\) The manner in which the circuits have articulated their decisions invites the Court to choose a victorious methodology.\(^{200}\) By resolving the less conspicuous issues surrounding dicta and deference, however, the Court can reach a decision without accepting the circuits’ implicit invitations to side with a particular interpretive school.\(^{201}\)

### A. The Scope and Applicability of Beach

The holdings of the Supreme Court are binding upon all the courts of the land. Dicta, however, are not considered binding.\(^{202}\) The two can be difficult to distinguish, as the pragmatic Judge Posner has noted:\(^{203}\) “A dictum is a statement in a judicial opinion that could have been deleted without seriously impairing the analytical

agency determinations as a means of making sure that the agency is not taking an impermissible amount of legislative power, not as an opportunity for the Court to substitute its own judgment for that of the political branch when that political branch is acting within the scope of its authority).

\(^{198}\) The CFPB’s fidelity to TILA’s purposes, see supra Part I, weighs strongly in favor of granting deference, because it is precisely “[w]here an agency’s decision or interpretation of a statute violates a canon of statutory construction, or where the agency’s interpretation is inconsistent with the public interest patina of the original statute, or where a court deems the agency’s action ‘unreasonable’ [that] the agency’s decisions will be accorded no deference.” Jonathan R. Macey, *Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies*, 80 Geo. L.J. 671, 684 (1992).

\(^{199}\) See supra Parts II and III.

\(^{200}\) See generally Jonathan R. Siegel, *The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism*, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 117, 119–31 (arguing that textualism can brook no compromise with intentionalist or purposivist interpretive imperatives, such that any choice other than pure textualism is a choice against textualism).

\(^{201}\) See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.

\(^{202}\) See, e.g., Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1187 (2012) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)) (noting that “[i]n [the] context [of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to AEDPA,] ‘clearly established law’ signifies ‘the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions’”).

\(^{203}\) Posner is far from the only dicta-theorist, but a full exploration of the hazy, even fluid, dictum-holding boundary is beyond the scope of the present study. As a notable counterpart to Posner’s proposed workmanlike explanation of dicta is the gemologist-inspired approach that its creators “call the ‘Judicial Four Cs.’” Jewlers evaluate carat, cut, color, and clarity in assessing diamonds; we evaluate constraint, consideration, clarity, and candor in forming understandings of what to treat as holding and dicta within judicial opinions.” Michael Abramovicz & Maxwell Stearns, *Defining Dicta*, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1017 (2005).
foundations of the holding.”²⁰⁴ It stands apart from the opinion’s binding core because it “may not have received the full and careful consideration of the court that uttered it.”²⁰⁵ For Judge Posner—and the Seventh Circuit—”[w]hat is at stake in distinguishing holding from dictum is that a dictum is not authoritative. It is the part of an opinion that a later court, even if it is an inferior court, is free to reject.”²⁰⁶ Posner thus invites us to “ask what reasons there are against a court’s giving weight to a passage found in a previous opinion.”²⁰⁷

As Judge Posner notes, there are many potential reasons for disregarding dicta, “reasons for thinking that a particular passage was not a fully measured judicial pronouncement, that it was not likely to be relied on by readers, and indeed that it may not have been part of the decision that resolved the case or controversy on which [a federal] court’s jurisdiction depended.”²⁰⁸ Posner’s know-a-dictum-by-its-stakes argument ties “dictumitude,” for lack of a better word, to reader response.

Not all circuits are as willing to risk jettisoning a holding along with the bathwater of dicta as is the Seventh Circuit.²¹⁰ The Third Circuit explained that “[e]ven if what we read as the holdings . . . could be characterized as dicta and therefore not binding on us, such

²⁰⁵ Id.
²⁰⁶ United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1988).
²⁰⁷ Id.
²⁰⁸ Id. at 293.
²⁰⁹ Fascinatingly, the Ninth Circuit glossed Posner’s stakes-based definition in a parenthetical citation as one that “adopt[s] a pragmatic definition of dictum based upon whether the previous panel fully considered the issue and intended for future interpreters to rely on it.” United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 916 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). This is a mischaracterization and, as subtle a misstatement as it may seem, it is significant inasmuch as it paints Posner’s statement with an intentionalist brush when, in fact, his working definition of dicta corresponds to a textualist approach. See Morrell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, Not Rules: The Heuristic Nature of Statutory Interpretation, 30 J. LEGIS. 1, 20 (2003) (“[T]extualism . . . employs a reader-centered strategy . . . for attributing meaning to a statutory text . . . . Intentionalism . . . employs a writer-centered strategy for attributing meaning to statutory text, emphasizing ‘meaning(s)’ ‘intended’ by the writer . . . .”). Here, as with respect to the TILA rescission provision, the Ninth Circuit focuses on intent. See infra Part IV.
²¹⁰ The Seventh Circuit has a strong—and generalized—predilection for straight-shooting and has stated its preference for streamlining in eminently quotable terms. See, e.g., DeShields v. Int’l Resort Props., 463 Fed. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”)); see also Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Comm’r, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982) (“We deprecate decision by metaphor.”).
dicta are highly persuasive. Indeed, with regard to statements made by the Supreme Court in dicta, ‘we do not view [them] lightly.’\textsuperscript{211} Indeed, the circuit noted, “[b]ecause the Supreme Court uses dicta to help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide because of its limited docket . . . [t]o ignore what we perceive as persuasive statements by the Supreme Court is to place our rulings, and the analysis that underlies them, in peril.”\textsuperscript{212} The Ninth Circuit has also noted the predictive potential and resultant premium borne by Court dicta, remarking that “dicta of the Supreme Court have a weight that is greater than ordinary judicial dicta as prophecy of what that Court might hold. We should not blandly shrug them off because they were not a holding.”\textsuperscript{213} The Tenth Circuit has adopted an even more deferential posture with respect to Supreme Court dicta: “we are bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta [are] recent and not enfeebled by later statements.”\textsuperscript{214}

Here, however—even for those who favor expansive readings of, and who accord considerable deference to, Supreme Court dicta—it is problematic to find authoritative the \textit{Beach} Court’s hypothesis as to Congressional intent. Although the \textit{Beach} Court did declare that it was respecting the “manifest intent” of Congress, it was less confident about congressional intent just a few lines earlier, where it discussed what “Congress may well have chosen.”\textsuperscript{215} The Court had already reached its holding based on a textual analysis before offering intentionalist “evidence” as supplementary support for its decision;\textsuperscript{216} the intentionalist argument is a tack-on. Having reached its decision on other grounds, the Court indulges in somewhat conflicted speculation regarding Congress’s intent, creating dicta.\textsuperscript{217} And,

\textsuperscript{211} Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’ns, 490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003)).
\textsuperscript{212} Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
\textsuperscript{213} Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
\textsuperscript{214} United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{216} The Court even marks this supplement with a revelatory introductory sentence: “The Act, however, has left even less to chance (if that is possible) than its ‘expire’ provision would allow, standing alone.” \textsc{id.} at 417. Though the provision is enough “standing alone,” in other words, the Court will offer even more support of its conclusion. \textsc{See id.}
\textsuperscript{217} Why the dicta are present is an interesting question. They could have been included by compromise, to accommodate the Justices’ different perspectives. They could also serve the function of keeping the textualist-intentionalist debate alive and
because the Court’s first statement impugns the confidence of its second, these dicta should be treated with caution.\textsuperscript{218}

The Tenth Circuit—and, by extension, the Eighth Circuit majority, which explicitly approves and adopts the Tenth Circuit’s reading of \textit{Beach}\textsuperscript{219}—does not display the requisite caution with respect to \textit{Beach} dicta. Although the \textit{Rosenfield} court purports to reach a conclusion “consistent with \textit{Beach},”\textsuperscript{220} and although the \textit{Keiran} court suggests that it is reading TILA through the lens of \textit{Beach},\textsuperscript{221} the \textit{Rosenfield} court’s holding that “TILA establishes a right of action that is generally redressable only when a party seeks recognition of it by invoking the power of the courts”\textsuperscript{222} is clearly beyond the scope of the \textit{Beach} court’s discussion of affirmative defenses.

The Ninth Circuit similarly distorted dicta in reading \textit{Beach} to hold that “rescission suits must be brought within three years from the consummation of the loan, regardless whether notice of rescission is delivered within that three-year period.”\textsuperscript{224} The Ninth Circuit adds one and one and gets three, with the missing addend coming from its assumption that when the Court said “completely extinguish\[ed\]” in one context, it \textit{intended} that the extinguishment be universal because (1) § 1635(f) is a statute of repose and (2) statutes

\textsuperscript{218} Stanley Fish has written that “[f]iguring out what a multiple-authored text means is in principle no different from figuring out what a single-authored text means; both require the same ‘necessary construction’ of an intention that the words alone won’t yield up.” Stanley Fish, \textit{Intention and the Canons of Legal Interpretation}, \textsc{The N.Y. Times Opinionator} (July 16, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/intention-and-the-canons-of-legal-interpretation/. The idea of intention as a construction, of something substantial that is built and that can take on a presence of its own, independent of the words from which it was crafted, is a helpful way to understand how the Ninth and Tenth Circuits are able to arrive at conclusions that exceed the scope of \textit{Beach} while purporting to flow necessarily from \textit{Beach}.

\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Keiran} v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013); \textit{Rosenfield} v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1183 (10th Cir. 2012).

\textsuperscript{220} See \textit{Keiran}, 720 F.3d at 728.

\textsuperscript{221} See \textit{Rosenfield}, 681 F.3d at 1183 (emphasis in the original).

\textsuperscript{222} See, e.g., \textit{Keiran}, 720 at 736 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Beach} . . . did not address how a consumer rescinds a loan.”).

\textsuperscript{223} McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 2012).
of repose mean sue or see the right extinguished. Not only does Beach never mention statutes of repose, but there are many statutes of repose that do not require filing suit. The Ninth Circuit’s syllogism is thus flawed.

The three circuits that have read Beach as controlling have done so by guessing what the Court intended to say and by applying what the Court did say on one topic to a discrete issue. The Court should declare Beach inapposite even if it agrees that borrowers must file to rescind. A determination that filing is necessary should be reached through case-specific analysis; it should not be the child of chance, the results of a fortuitous misapplication of dicta. If the Court holds that Beach applies, it would implicitly condone using perceptions of its own intent as a proxy for legislative intent. As one student commentator notes, “[i]n a dire economic atmosphere where predatory lending has contributed to widespread home foreclosures, courts should not take it upon themselves to speculate on alternative theories of congressional intent, especially when the purpose, history, and letter of the law are so clear.”

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225 See id. at 1329.
226 See the CFPB’s excellent discussion of statutes of repose, CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *20–24. The CFPB’s analysis is discussed infra Part IV.B.
227 Thomas L. Fowler’s astute analysis of the risks posed by overstated dicta in an unrelated case captures general principles of jurisprudence that should guide the Court in its ultimate resolution of TILA rescission: The analysis and the language chosen by the Court in Fly obscure the normal guideposts that lower courts use to make this holding versus dictum determination. As a result, the lower courts will be encouraged to abandon the difficult determination of what the law is and instead substitute the determination of what the law will be based upon the various statements found in the opinion without regard to whether such statements are holding or dictum.
228 See generally id. at 296–302 (discussing why it is important to maintain clear boundaries between dicta and holdings).
B. An Alternative: Look to the CFPB

Even without heeding Sabet’s exhortation to look solely to the letter of the law, however, the Court need not resort to mangling the square Beach peg until it fits into the round hole of TILA rescission mechanics. There is highly persuasive authority available to aid in interpreting § 1635(f) and Regulation Z: the CFPB.

The CFPB’s responsibilities include “[w]riting rules, supervis[ing] companies, and enforc[ing] federal consumer financial protection laws.”231 “Congress granted the [CFPB] the authority to interpret and promulgate rules regarding TILA.”232 “With the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, [it] transferred this authority from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Bureau on July 21, 2011.”233

Aggressively asserting its authority over TILA, the CFPB “welcome[s] . . . suggestions of pending cases that might make good candidates for the amicus program.”234 The Bureau’s amicus program has filed briefs in each rescission case.235 The CFPB’s interventionist policy matches the latitude Congress explicitly granted to the executive branch—the branch it tasked with determining how to enforce the Act.236 Congress has passed the baton of TILA regulation from the Federal Reserve Board to the CFPB and, with it, this regulatory latitude.

232 CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *3 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481(12)(O), 5512(b)(1), 5581(b)(1)).
235 See Robert Bostrom, CFPB Files Amicus Brief in TILA Case, Says More To Come, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 12, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=40012926-2522-457b-99bc-f182dd385d7f (“The Bureau sees the filing of amicus briefs as an important way to ensure that the statutes it oversees are correctly and consistently interpreted by the courts, even in cases in which the CFPB is not itself a named party.”).
236 See supra Part I (discussing how Congress has transferred TILA regulation from the Federal Reserve Board to the CFPB). It is only logical that the same regulatory leeway transfers as well. The question of whether judicial deference passes is more complex. See infra pp. 34–35.
In its amicus briefs, the CFPB argues that “the language of § 1635 is plain: Within three years of loan consummation, consumers must exercise their right of rescission by notifying their lender that they are doing so.” The CFPB adds that, “if there were any ambiguity in that mandate, Regulation Z resolves it by also specifying that consumers exercise the right to rescind by providing written notice to the lender.” Because there is no room for confusion, in other words, inquiry should begin and end with the text.

Ironically, if the CFPB is correct that the regulation is unambiguous, there is less reason for the Court to defer to it: If the regulation is clear, the Court will apply it without consulting the regulatory agency. If, on the other hand, the Court finds Regulation Z unclear, it will have to address whether and to what extent administrative deference has shifted from the Board to the Bureau, just as it will need to discuss the deference due to a position expounded in an amicus brief. These complicated treks

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237 The CFPB’s amicus briefs feature identical standards sections and differ only in applying the standards to the particular facts of each case. See Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/amicus/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2013) (collecting the CFPB amicus briefs).
238 CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *10.
239 Id.
240 See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588, 120 S. Ct. 1655, 1663, 146 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2000) (Noting, with respect to Auer deference, but in terms general enough to apply to agency deference in general: “[D]eference is warranted only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous . . . . To defer to the agency’s position [with respect to an unambiguous regulation] would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.”).
241 See Troutman Sanders, http://www.troutmansanders.com/judicial-deference-to-agencies-interpretations-of-tila-reaches-new-high-water-mark-02-01-2011/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2012) (“When authority over TILA interpretation transfers to the new CFPB, presumably this judicial deference to the agency interpretation will follow. For this and other reasons, there should be no wonder why the struggle over the creation of, and the new leadership for, and the role of Congressional over[sight] over, the CFPB was and is such a hot topic in Washington.”). See also Melanie E. Walker, Comment, Congressional Intent and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1341, 1361–66 (1999) (exploring the implications for judicial deference when Congress transfers authority from one agency to another).
242 Particularly relevant to determining the level of deference due the CFPB in this matter is “Skidmore deference,” which recognizes that “the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the [relevant federal agency], while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). “The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
through the murky waters of deference rules will only be necessary if the Court determines that the regulation is ambiguous.\textsuperscript{243}

Even without the benefit of formal deference, however, the CFPB’s arguments are persuasive because they advance both TILA’s consumer-protective purpose and public policy. “Congress enacted § 1635,” the Bureau notes, “in response to fraudulent home-improvement schemes in which ‘homeowners, particularly the poor,’ were ‘trick[ed] . . . into signing contracts at exorbitant rates, which turn out to be liens on the family residences.’\textsuperscript{244}” To require that borrowers sue “is contrary to the plain language of the provision and contravenes the purpose of the statutory scheme to provide consumers a private, non-judicial mechanism to rescind mortgage loans.”\textsuperscript{245} Indeed, the CFPB regards rescission as a means of avoiding litigation and conserving “valuable judicial resources.”\textsuperscript{246} If a lender wishes to challenge a borrower’s rescission, then the lender can sue to determine “whether rescission was accomplished because the party was entitled to rescind in the first instance.”\textsuperscript{247} The CFPB’s interpretation places the onus of filing a complaint on the lender, who is presumably more sophisticated and better able to assess the wisdom of litigation than the borrower. This is a more socially responsible position than the suit requirement, which would reward inaction on the part of lenders and force borrowers into court.

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{243} As the Court recently stated, \textit{[w]e need not decide which party’s interpretation is more persuasive, however; both are plausible, and the text alone does not permit a more definitive reading. Accordingly, we find Regulation Z to be ambiguous as to the question presented, and must therefore look to the Board’s own interpretation of the regulation for guidance in deciding this case.} Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011). When \textit{Chase} was decided, the CFPB had not yet assumed control of regulating TILA. See, e.g., MARYLAND DEP’T OF LABOR LICENSING AND REGULATION, \url{http://www.dllr.state.md.us/finance/advisories/advisorycfpb.shtml} (last visited Aug. 30, 2013) (noting that the CFPB became operational in the week of July 28, 2011); see also \textit{Chase}, 131 S. Ct. at 871 (providing a decision date of January 24, 2011).


\textsuperscript{245} \textit{Id.} at *25.

\textsuperscript{246} \textit{Id.} at *5.

\textsuperscript{247} \textit{Id.} at *16.

\end{footnotesize}
discouraging private settlement and rendering notice superfluous.\textsuperscript{248} The Court should apply the CFPB’s sound interpretation of TILA’s rescission provision. In this way, the Court would respect both the plain language enacted by the legislature, to which the CFPB adheres, and Congress’s intent to allow the executive branch to fill TILA’s broad outlines with the details of enforcement. As the Hartman concurrence sagely observes, “caution requires attentiveness to the views of the administrative entity appointed to apply and enforce a statute,” and “deference is especially appropriate in the process of interpreting [TILA] and Regulation Z,” unless such deference would lead to “demonstrably irrational” results.\textsuperscript{249} It could well be that the policy advocated by the CFPB will prove disastrous,\textsuperscript{250}

\textsuperscript{248} See Sabet, supra note 230, at 210–11. If the consumers’ right to sue expires after three years, then there is a perverse incentive for lenders to ignore borrowers’ notices of rescission or, perhaps worse, to respond to them in a misleading, string-a-long manner, so that borrowers miss the three-year filing limit. See generally id.; see also CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *19.

\textsuperscript{249} Hartman v. Smith, 734 F.3d 752, 764 (8th Cir. 2013) (Melloy, J., concurring) (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980)). Judge Melloy is alone in advocating agency deference in this case. The CFPB filed its first rescission-provision brief in Rosenfield. The Tenth Circuit’s only reference to the CFPB’s brief is relegated to a footnote and does not address agency deference. See Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.4 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We acknowledge receipt of two amici curiae briefs, one filed by the [CFPB], a federal regulatory agency . . . . Although these briefs largely cover the same terrain as the parties’ arguments, they are helpful. We do exercise appropriate care, however, to keep our primary focus on the parties’ arguments.” (citations omitted)). The Third Circuit barely gave the CFPB a passing nod in Sherzer; it certainly did not raise the question of deference. See Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 257 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The Sherzers and their amicus, the [CFPB] argue that [notice suffices].”). The Keiran majority, Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013), refers to the CFPB’s amicus brief, but does not mention deference; the Keiran dissent does not even mention the brief. To keep track of CFPB amicus filings, see CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, supra note 237.

\textsuperscript{250} The fear of the dangers of cloudy title underlies the Tenth Circuit’s decision, see supra Part IIIA. It is also of great concern to the three vast banking organizations that banded together to file an amicus brief in the Rosenfield case. Brief of the Amici Curiae Am. Bankers Assoc., Consumer Bankers Assoc., and Consumer Mortgage Coalition in Support of Appellees at 9, Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172 (No. 10-1442), 2012 WL 1656043, at *2 (arguing that allowing mere notice to trigger rescission “would cast a long shadow of uncertainty over the housing finance market, a market that depends on certainty and predictability. The price for that uncertainty would fall squarely on the very individuals that TILA was meant to benefit—borrowers.”). The banking associations’ brief also points to potential injustice that rescission-by-notice could work upon lenders: notice-triggered rescission “would allow a borrower to strip a lender who complied with TILA of its security interest instantaneously and unilaterally.” Id. Aaron B. Millar paints the potential consequences to lenders in vivid detail: “Imagine this scenario: Hours before the foreclosure sale, the mortgage lender receives a fax from the defaulting borrower’s
but this is not a foregone conclusion. This politicized matter is best left to the executive and, thus, at least theoretically, to the collective will of the voting public. By respecting the regulatory power that Congress conferred upon the executive, moreover, the Court would satisfy the mandates of both textualism and intentionalism in a way that holding *Beach* to govern would not.

V. CONCLUSION

Resolution of TILA’s rescission requirements is but a cert-seeking petition away. Because (1) TILA’s stated aim is one of consumer protection, (2) Congress built room into TILA to allow the government to adapt Regulation Z to the deceptive practices of creditors, and (3) the plain language of Regulation Z suggests that notice triggers rescission, the Court should hold that borrowers may rescind by notifying lenders of their intent to do so.

In reaching this determination, the Court will not need to defer to the CFPB’s interpretation of the statute. The CFPB’s policy arguments are compelling on their own terms. While the textualist lawyer stating that the borrower rescinds the loan . . . because the finance charge in the loan disclosures was understated by $36.” Aaron B. Millar, *The Mortgage Lender’s Primer on a TILA Rescission Claim*, 25 Utah B. J. 40, 40 (2012).

See CFPB Amicus Brief, supra note 188, at *18–19 & n.4 (countering the objections raised by the Bankers’ Associations—see supra note 250—by stressing that requiring notice within the three-year period alerts the lender to the customer’s rescission and allows the lender to contest the rescission, at which point the borrower would have a finite period of time—that the courts will have to determine—to file suit); see also Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 263–67 (3d Cir. 2013) (analyzing the policy implications of rescission-by-notice at length and concluding that, though this method of rescission could create some complications, these complications did not constitute a “reason to disregard the text of the statute” and that “it is for Congress—not the courts—to determine” such policy matters).

One scholar argues that the judiciary should only make determinations with regard to policy choice in the absence of both statutory clarity and any indicia of legislative and/or political preferences and that, even under those circumstances, “the judiciary should exclude those policy preferences it is confident could not get enacted in the current political process.” Einer Elhauge, *Statutory Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear Legislation* 234 (2008). Given that the CFPB is a creature of the current political regime, the Court should hesitate to adopt an interpretation diametrically opposed to the one that the CFPB proposes. See also Guido Calabresi, *A Common Law for the Age of Statutes* 163–66 (1982) (arguing that the formerly antimajoritarian role formerly played by courts as makers of the common law should be restricted to matters of constitutional adjudication in light of the proliferation of statutes and the resultant change in the nature of law-making in this country).

See Mullins, supra note 209, at 31 (suggesting that modern theoretical approaches to statutory construction “recognize that neither ‘textualism’ nor ‘intentionalism’ provide, by themselves, a satisfactory theory”).
courts, true to the methodology they espouse, declined to season their analyses with sociopolitical considerations, the CFPB showed no such reluctance. The CFPB explained in convincing detail how the notice-only requirement fits both TILA’s stated purpose and the hardships borrowers currently face.

Even if the Court should determine that one must sue to rescind, however, it should decline to massage the boundaries of precedent. The Court should declare *Beach* inapplicable to rescission mechanics. By analyzing the provision independently of its earlier decision, the Court should confirm that its non-binding conjecture as to Congressional intent cannot be substituted for inquiry into Congressional intent.

Although the Court should take the intentionalist Circuits to task for misrepresenting dicta as precedent, the Court should not frame its correction as a condemnation of intentionalism. The current split appears to be a textualist-intentionalist tussle, but victory need not and should not be tied to a mode of analysis. The multiplicity of methodologies that led to the feisty *Koons Buick* opinion keeps statutory construction lively and staves off wooden positivism. Ideally, analytical sparks will fly again when the Court decides the rescission-provision split.