National Security Deserves Better: “Odd” Recidivism Numbers Undermine the Guantánamo Policy Debate

Mark Denbeaux* & Paul W. Taylor

Sean Camoni, Edward Dabek, Bahadir Ekiz, Sean Kennedy, Eric Miller, Kelly Ross, Nicholas Stratton, Kelly Ann Taddonio, Philip Taylor & Lauren Winchester**

“Someone on the ‘Suspected’ list could very possibly NOT be engaged in activities that are counter to our national security interests.”

I. INTRODUCTION

The government has consistently used the detention and alleged recidivism of Guantánamo Bay (GTMO) detainees for political purposes since the opening of the detention facility in 2002. Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense at the time, framed the government’s narrative of GTMO as a holding place for the world’s “worst of the worst.” Despite Secretary Rumsfeld’s simultaneous acknowledgement that GTMO was filled with low-level detainees who had little intelligence value, the government has continued to use

* Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; Director, Seton Hall Law Center for Policy and Research.
** Co-Authors & Research Fellows. Special thanks to our Contributors & Research Fellows: Sara Ben-David, Christopher Fox, Erin Hendrix, Chrystal Loyer, and Emma Mintz.

1 Email from Todd Breasseale, Pub. Affairs Officer, Office of the Assistant Sec’y of Def., to Jason Leopold (Mar. 5, 2012, 4:47 PM) (on file with author).
3 Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander, U.S. Central Command (Apr. 21, 2003)
GTMO as a political talking point to garner public support for the War on Terror and conceal its detainment of mostly innocent and harmless detainees.

The Seton Hall Law Center for Policy and Research ("the Center"), through its review of government documents, has shown the inconsistencies in the government’s data on detainees and continued rhetorical abuse of the rates of recidivism. Although the Center attempts to take government documents at face value, the government has been wildly inconsistent with its claims of recidivism. Indeed, the government’s own public statements make clear that it is only superficially concerned with GTMO detainees during and after their detainment. As the government’s definition of “recidivism” becomes increasingly elaborate, the number of recidivists necessarily increases, and further distorts the public’s perception of GTMO. As a perfect illustration of this point, although the number of unidentified recidivists continues to rise, the list of those confirmed and suspected recidivists who have been named has remained stagnant.4

The government’s inconsistent claims of recidivism show that the government is either incapable of accurately identifying recidivists or not interested in being accurate. The fact that only two new recidivists have been identified in the past three years5 reflects the recycling of past incidents of recidivism to create a façade that recidivism is an ongoing, significant problem. The government, by focusing only on the stories of detainee reengagement, makes no effort to characterize the true nature of former detainees. Just as Secretary Rumsfeld knowingly fabricated the false notion that GTMO was home to the worst of the worst, the government continues to paint that same picture despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

The government’s outright disregard of the success stories of past detainees further exacerbates the ill effects of the government’s inaccurate reporting of recidivism. For the first time, the Center has identified past detainees who have emerged from GTMO and become successful businessmen, students, translators, and diplomats, working to improve the world around them.6 These success stories, when compared to the government’s claims of recidivism, paint a more balanced perspective with respect to the nature of the people

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4 See infra apps. A.1–A.8, D.
5 See app. A.5.
6 See infra Section III.
who were actually detained.

Had the government actually believed that GTMO was home to dangerous criminals, the process of releasing detainees would reflect those concerns. Its actions, however, reveal exactly the opposite. For years, the release of detainees was linked directly to the detainees' nationality, rather than to any risk-based assessment.\(^7\) This reaffirms two common trends: first, GTMO recidivism has been mischaracterized from the very beginning; and second, the government was never seriously concerned with the risk of recidivism.

The government took a step in the right direction in March 2012, however, when the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) released a new Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.\(^8\) In this new summary, the DNI begins to disaggregate its previously reported recidivism numbers. By dividing the reengagement numbers by date (before and after January 22, 2009), the DNI elucidates differences between the Bush and Obama Administrations.\(^9\) Further, the new DNI summary details the number of detainees characterized as “confirmed” or “suspected” recidivists and divides those categories into former detainees who have died, are in custody, or are not in custody.\(^10\) This new summary informs us that fifty-five confirmed recidivists are not currently in custody, while forty-four suspected recidivists are not in custody.\(^11\) Though this summary is a step in the right direction towards greater

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\(^7\) See infra Section VI.C.

\(^8\) App. A.8. Since the completion of this report, the DNI has released two additional summaries of detainee reengagement, in September 2012 and March 2013. There is very little difference between these two summaries and the March 2012 summary, with the definitions of “terrorist,” “insurgent activities,” “confirmed,” and “suspected” remaining the same. In the September 2012 summary, the number of total detainees transferred increased to 602 from 599 and the number of suspected of reengaging post-January 22, 2009 fell from 2 to 1. In the March 2013 summary, the number of total detainees transferred increased to 603 and the number of suspected of reengaging post-January 22, 2009 returned to 2. See JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (September 2012), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/Reports%20and%20Pubs%202012/Summary%20of%20the%20Reengagement%20of%20Detainees%20Formerly%20Held%20at%20GTMO.pdf; JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA (March 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/March%202013%20GTMO%20Reengagement%20Release.pdf.

\(^9\) See infra Section VI.C.3.

\(^10\) See app. A.8.

\(^11\) Id. at 1.
transparency, it leaves much to be desired, including the release of
the names of recidivists, the countries to which they were released,
why they were released, and the acts of recidivism they are alleged to
have committed.

The Department of Defense (DoD) has also taken a step in the
right direction by publicly announcing its opposition to the
prevailing practice of conflating “confirmed” and “suspected”
recidivists into a single “recidivist” category, since a former detainee
“suspected” of reengagement may in fact be perfectly peaceable.12
Based on the government’s own intelligence, a public affairs officer
admitted that combining the “confirmed” and “suspected” recidivism
rates to reach a sum total of 27% is not appropriate because someone
on the “suspected” list could “very possibly NOT be engaged in
activities that are counter to our national security interests.”13

The issue of the post-release conduct of GTMO detainees is a
matter of policy and political significance. If the released GTMO
detainees transitioned into peaceful private lives, it would say a great
deal about our judgment of who is dangerous and who is not.
Furthermore, it would strongly suggest that GTMO never housed the
worst of the worst. Perhaps most importantly, placing political
considerations ahead of honest review of the facts sabotages any
ttempt to create effective policy.

II. METHODOLOGY AND OPEN SOURCE DATABASE

The Center’s standard practice is to utilize data gathered from
public government documents under the assumption that they are
accurate. Because the government has not produced any documents
related to non-recidivist former detainees, however, and because the
government itself relies upon press reports for information about
former detainees, this Report broadens the scope of available sources
by examining various “open-source” resources as well as relying on
public government reports. The Center designed a database to

12 See Email from Todd Breasseale, supra note 1.
13 Id. (“[T]his document makes a distinction between ‘Confirmed’ v.
‘Suspected.’ This is particularly relevant because there was confusion in some early
media reports conflating the two, coming up with this odd 27-28% number. To be
sure, ‘Confirmed’ is more consistent with our actual intelligence data and
‘Suspected’ is a much lower bar, triggering an additional review that is really more
akin to a sort of ‘early watch’ system. Someone on the ‘Suspected’ list could very
possibly NOT be engaged in activities that are counter to our national security
interests.”).
compile, organize, and analyze the data regarding each of the individuals detained in GTMO.

For the foundation of this database, the Center utilized The New York Times’ “Guantánamo Docket” database of all 779 individuals known to have been detained at GTMO since 2002. The Center’s database collected each detainee’s name, Internment Serial Number (ISN), citizenship, custody status, place of birth, date of birth, date transferred from GTMO, and country to which the detainee was transferred from the “Guantánamo Docket.” The Center also used the government’s list of GTMO detainees. It then added the public government information regarding twenty-nine named recidivists from the government’s “Return to the Fight Fact Sheet,” including whether, in the government’s view, the detainee was a suspected or confirmed recidivist. Finally, it supplemented the database by using open source information gathered from the Internet. In doing so, the database collected comments from various sources, coded them as positive, negative, or neutral, and made a determination on the quality of the source.

In order to gather anecdotes about released GTMO detainees, the Center conducted an Internet search of public sources. Research fellows utilized the Center’s detainee database, which contains the names of all detainees ever held in GTMO. The search of Internet sources yielded public information for 208 of the 600 released detainees. This Report is not a comprehensive list of all public anecdotes about released detainees. For some detainees, there is an abundance of information regarding their lives after GTMO, not all of which has been included. Because there is public information on approximately one-third of all released detainees, the sample size is significant. Of course, however, the missing two-thirds may raise questions about its representativeness.

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14 Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantanamo Docket, N.Y. Times, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). Note that throughout this Report, the Center relied upon the spellings of names of detainees as they exist in the N.Y. Times database, rather than the spellings in the sources, to maintain uniformity.


16 See app. A.5.
III. POSITIVE POST-RELEASE DETAINEE STORIES

As detainees have been released from GTMO, many have made public statements. For various reasons, news outlets have reported on approximately one-third of all detainees released from GTMO.17 Many released detainees have been able to put their experiences in GTMO behind them and go on to live productive lives. Some have gone on to careers and studies which include: author, spokesman for Amnesty International, student, construction worker, researcher, call center worker, real estate agent, landlord, lawyer, utilities company controller, electrician, golf groundskeeper, radio commentator, translator, and singer/rapper. Despite this reality, government-released information, including the recent House Armed Services Committee Report released by the House Majority, has focused solely on detainees that have reengaged in terrorist activities post-release.18 This leaves the public with an incomplete picture, as a full inquiry into released GTMO detainees requires attention to the many success stories. No government report has addressed the success of these former GTMO detainees.

Many of the released detainees have been able to successfully transition from “enemy combatant” to productive member of society. Former detainee Khalid Sulaymanjaydi Javdh al Hubayshi (ISN 155), for example, has described his life in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia as “comfortably routine. On most days, he wakes before dawn, drinks an espresso made by his wife and takes a 90-minute bus ride to his job as a controller at a utilities company.”19 He credits his successful post-release life to the Saudi Arabian government’s assistance in helping him marry and get his job back.20

One need only pause for a moment to realize how extraordinary these accomplishments are. In a time where even the most qualified applicants have difficulties finding work in many parts of the world, these individuals have succeeded in the face of such a negative past. For some former GTMO detainees, this status—“Former

17 This figure is based on research and analysis of the Center’s aforementioned detainee database.
20 Id.
Guantánamo Detainee”—is likely a disqualification in the eyes of many employers. For example, three different employers terminated Munir Bin Naseer (ISN 85) upon discovering that he had previously been in GTMO. Rather than accept the futility of his position and return to the war, Naseer persevered and found a position as a call center worker in Karachi for a Chicago mortgage broker. As released detainees return to and around the war zones, some have chosen to work for peace and security, rather than against it. Taj Mohammed (ISN 902), who was already fluent in four languages prior to his detention, learned both Spanish and English during his time at GTMO. Mohammed now works with American soldiers in Afghanistan as a translator. When questioned about his lack of support for the Taliban, Mohammed responded “The PRT guy [American Provincial Reconstruction Team] makes the building, the school, everything.” He continued, “The Taliban doesn’t make anything for us. Stupid guy, the Taliban.” Another released detainee, Abdul Salam Zaeef (ISN 306), is a former Afghan ambassador to Pakistan and has been a key figure in peace talks with the Taliban calling for a unity government.

Unlike Mohammed, most released detainees did not leave GTMO with a newly gained, marketable skill. Therefore, upon their release, some chose to pursue further training and education. Feroz Ali Abbassi (ISN 24) earned a Bachelor of Arts degree with honors in Social Policy from the London School of Economics. Hafice Leqat

21 Tom Lasseter, Guantanam0 Inmate Database: Munir Naseer, McClatchy Newspapers (2008), http://detainees.m McClatchydc.com/detainees/12.
22 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. (bracketed language inserted by reporter).
26 Id.
Manzu (ISN 139) chose to attend law school as a result of his time in GTMO. Others, like Ali Mohsen Salih (ISN 221), have studied trades. Upon his release from GTMO, Salih studied to become an electrician, although he has noted that it has been extremely difficult for him to find a job as a former GTMO detainee.

Others have chosen more creative outlets. Martin John Mubanga (ISN 10007) has acknowledged that time in GTMO “made me what I am—even if I’m not quite sure yet who that person is.” Mubanga has channeled his experiences into music and hopes to release his Guantánamo-inspired rap compositions. Murat Kurnaz (ISN 61) has written a book on his experiences in GTMO, entitled *Five Years of My Life: An Innocent Man in Guantánamo*, and works as a city researcher in Bremen, Germany. David Hicks (ISN 2) has also written a book on his time in GTMO, entitled *Guantanamo: My Journey*. Most notably, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, and Ruhel Ahmed (ISNs 86, 87, and 110, respectively), commonly known as the “Tipton Three,” have released a documentary entitled *The Road to Guantánamo*.

Many released detainees have stated a desire to forget their experiences in GTMO and move on with their lives.

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32 *Id.*


(ISN 278), Abdulla Abdulqadure (ISN 285), Salahidin Abdulahat (ISN 295), and Ablikim Turahun (ISN 320)—released detainees who now work as groundskeepers at a golf course in Bermuda—have insisted that they are not bitter about their time spent in GTMO and no longer want to think about the past.\footnote{37}

The story for the detainees released in Kuwait has been very positive. Only Abdallah Saleh Ali al Ajmi (ISN 220) does not fall into this category.\footnote{38} According to Khaled al Odah, founder of the Kuwaiti Family Committee, the remaining nine released Kuwaiti detainees are married and he believes all have children.\footnote{39} These released detainees are: Omar Rajab Amin (ISN 65), Nasser Najiri Amtiri (ISN 205), Saad Madi Saad al Azmi (ISN 571), Mohammed Finaytal al Dehani (ISN 229), Abdullah Kamel Abdullah Kamal (ISN 228), Khalid Abdullah Mishal al Mutairi (ISN 213), Fouad Mahmoud al Rabiah (ISN 551), Abdulaziz Sayer Owain al Shammar (ISN 217), and Adel Zamal Abd al Mahsen al Zamel (ISN 568).\footnote{40}

Alif Khan (ISN 673) most poignantly states the difficulties faced by released detainees choosing not to reengage upon their return. After refusing an offer to join the Taliban upon his release from GTMO, Khan stated, “[t]hey said if they got the opportunity, they would kill me.”\footnote{41} As a result, Khan has been unable to rebuild his life in Afghanistan and has been forced to relocate away from his home and his family.\footnote{42} In the face of these types of threats and hardships, it is impressive that so many detainees have been able to resist engagement or reengagement.

It is remarkable to see how many former GTMO detainees have


\footnote{38} See infra Part VI.A.

\footnote{39} E-mail from Jenifer Fenton, Freelance Journalist, to Mark Denbeaux (Feb. 11, 2012, 9:41 AM EST) (on file with author). Khaled al Odah is the father of Fouzi Khalid Adbullah al Awda (aka Fawzi al Odah) (ISN 232). According to Ms. Fenton, Fawzi al Odah remains held in GTMO as does one other Kuwaiti, Fayiz Al Kandari (aka Fayiz Mohammed Ahmed al Kandari).

\footnote{40} Id.


\footnote{42} Id.
not allowed their pasts to dictate their futures. Unfortunately, these stories have been conspicuously absent from government-released information. Although far less exciting than reports of reengagement by released detainees, these positive stories are no less revealing. A picture of detainee reengagement will never be complete until the recidivists are contrasted with the success stories.

IV. DEFINING RECIDIVISM

A. The Changing Government Definition of Recidivism

The changing definition of detainee recidivism is just one way in which the government masks the true picture of post-release detainees. In a DoD news release from July 2007, “recidivism” included those that “have returned to militant activities, participated in anti-U.S. propaganda or other activities through intelligence gathering and media reports.”\(^{43}\) In this release, the government noted that it was aware of a number of recidivists despite “not generally track[ing] ex-GTMO detainees after repatriation or resettlement.”\(^{44}\) The most recent government definition of recidivism from the March 2012 DNI Summary is more elaborate:

Definition of “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities. Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO detainees—on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing over shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements.\(^{45}\)

To be a “confirmed” case of recidivism requires “[a] preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities.”\(^{45}\)

\(^{43}\) See infra app. A.2.
\(^{44}\) See infra app. A.2.
\(^{45}\) See app. A.8, at 2 (emphasis added to highlight changes from previous definitions). The 2012 definition closely resembles the definition from 2010. See infra app. A.6.
activities." To be considered a “suspected” recidivist requires “[p]lausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities.”

The newer definitions expand the scope of recidivism to include “insurgent” activities. The 2010 and 2012 definitions also include for the first time language involving insurgent activities that have been alleged to have been conducted against “Coalition or host-nation forces.” This appears to refer to the situation in Afghanistan, though it is unclear whether the elements following this in the definition (suicide bombings, financing terrorist operations, etc.) are also in reference to Afghanistan. If so, this would contradict previous reports of recidivism, which included actions carried out in other countries, such as Russia, and which were not attacks against the United States, the Coalition, or Afghan forces. The evolution of the standard by which recidivism is defined is discussed below in Part IV.B.

The 2012 summary also asserts, consistent with the government’s April 2009 statement, that the definition of recidivism does not consider “mere communications” or “writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements” to be recidivist acts. This contradicts past reports on recidivism, which expressly included anti-U.S. propaganda in the definition. In fact, the 2007 report cited as examples of anti-American behavior the “Tipton

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46 See app. A.8. On its face, this would seem to be no different from “direct participation in hostilities” in non-international armed conflict. See generally Nils Melzer, Int’l Review of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-872-reports-documents.pdf. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, has stated, however, that the United States is in compliance with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) interpretive guidance, which excludes mere “recruiters, trainers, financiers and propagandists” who have no direct nexus to hostilities, as would planning or commanding. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, The Obama Administration and International Law, Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Soc’y of Int’l Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (“[O]ur general approach of looking at ‘functional’ membership in an armed group has been endorsed not only by the federal courts, but also is consistent with the approach taken in the targeting context by the ICRC in its recent study on Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH).”). Koh’s statements seem to be in conflict with the DNI definition of “confirmed” recidivist, as the DNI defines “directly involved” to include recruiters, trainers, and financiers.

47 App. A.8.


49 See infra app. A.
Three” and their discussions of their experiences in GTMO for Michael Winterbottom’s commercial film, *The Road to Guantánamo*. Because of the government’s failure to identify individuals, however, it remains unclear whether the government has retroactively accounted for the change in definition and subtracted those who did not engage in terrorist attacks, but participated only in propaganda.

In stark contrast to previous DNI summaries, the 2012 summary attempts to break down the recidivism numbers in table form. Specifically, the table lists the reengagement numbers before and after January 22, 2009 (to coincide with an Executive Order issued by President Obama). This date also coincides with President Obama entering into office, providing a clearer view of reengagement numbers during the Bush and Obama Administrations. Thus, since President Obama took office, of the 67 total releases, three detainees are confirmed recidivists (4.5%) while 2 are suspected (3%). Under President Bush’s tenure, 532 detainees were released, 92 of which are confirmed recidivists (17.3%), while 70 are suspected (13.2%). In addition, the table shows that the DNI considers deceased former detainees when compiling the recidivist numbers. In total, of the 599 detainees released from GTMO, 95 are listed as confirmed recidivists (15.9%), while 72 are suspected recidivists (12%).

Finally, and notably, the 2010 and 2012 DNI summaries differed from previous summaries because they offered an assessment of the likelihood that detainees will “engage in terrorism” and “communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.” The DNI concluded that if additional detainees are transferred without specific conditions met, “some will reengage.” The DNI also noted that transfers to countries with instability and ongoing conflicts pose “a particular problem.” Further, the DNI acknowledged that former GTMO detainees “routinely communicate with each other” but the

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50 See infra app. A.1.
51 See app. A.8, at 1.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 The December 2010 summary contains similar language, though there are a number of differences in the wording of the March 2012 summary. Compare app. A.7, with app. A.8.
58 See app. A.8, at 2.
59 Id. (emphasis added).
60 Id.
reasons “span from the mundane . . . to the nefarious.” In assessing whether or not a detainee has reengaged, the DNI explains that “the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account.”

B. Expansive by Definition

The language used by the government and other officials in recent years described alleged recidivists as “returning to the battlefield.” Alternatively, the issue had been framed as recidivists “return[ing] to militant activities.” Beginning with the June 2008 report, the DoD started using the more general phrase “reengaging in terrorism” for recidivism. In contrast, the 2010 summary considers activities against Coalition or host-nation forces to be acts of recidivism. This language of “reengagement,” “terrorism,” “insurgent,” and “host-nation” retreats from the obvious earlier implication that a detainee had to have engaged in acts against the United States or Coalition forces for the DoD to consider him a recidivist. This category change may have increased the number of those qualifying recidivists. The shift also indicates that the government has moved away from limiting “return to the fight” in terms of Afghanistan and Iraq. For instance, when Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell discussed with reporters detainees “returning to the fight” he stated, “[t]his is [sic] acts of terrorism. It could be Iraq, Afghanistan, it could be acts of terrorism around the world.” Whatever the legitimacy of this classification system in the abstract, it does not address the public’s concern that detainees released from GTMO might return to the battlefield against U.S. soldiers.

According to the current definition, a detainee has “reengaged” if he is directly involved in any terrorist or insurgent activities against host nation or Coalition forces. It is unclear how “host nation”

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61 Id.
62 Id.
64 See infra app. A.2.
65 See app. A.4.
68 App. A.8, supra note 4, at 2.
should be interpreted. If it means Afghanistan, then it is redundant, since Afghanistan is listed as a member of the Coalition. If it means the place of release or transfer, then it is extraordinarily expansive.

For example, applying this definition to the five Russian recidivists highlights several critical flaws. First, by allowing actions by foreign citizens against their own governments to fall under the insurgent activities against a host country definition, the government is greatly expanding the concept of recidivism. The Russian recidivists were Russian citizens that the United States returned to the Russian government, who then refused to detain or prosecute them for actions related to the reason for their holding in GTMO. The former detainees then committed acts against the Russian government (in connection with the Chechnya conflict). It is difficult to comprehend why this scenario concerns the U.S. government enough to qualify it as recidivism in the context of the Coalition’s fight against al Qaeda. Though there is a supposed link between Chechen rebels and al Qaeda, the in-fighting between Russia and Chechnya is arguably unrelated to U.S. and Coalition fears of recidivism. Further, Russia has only supplied minimal support for the Coalition, so it cannot be argued that the actions of the Russian recidivists are directed at the Coalition or United States.

Including acts against host-nations allows recidivism to encompass much more conduct than a U.S. or Coalition-specific definition and supports a conclusion that the government’s actual goal is to report increasingly higher recidivism numbers. Earlier reports were always framed as acts against the United States. This is confirmed by the fact that the scope of conduct the DoD included in

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69 See app. A.4.

70 See id.


73 See infra apps. A.1 (returned to terrorism focused on harming U.S. or allied interests.”), A.2 (“each returned to combat against the U.S. and its allies . . . ”); app. A.4 (“reengaged in local, tactical-level, anti-coalition activity” and “no indication he was a member of any terrorist organization or posed a risk to U.S. or Allied interests”).
“returning to the fight” once extended to those former detainees who had merely “spoken critically of the Government’s detention policy.”

This expansive notion of recidivism serves only to confuse policy debates and inflame political rhetoric. Given the history of inflated and politically-driven reporting of recidivism, as discussed below, it is fair to ask whether the most recent definition is also politically motivated.

V. CLAIMS OF RECIDIVISM

As detainees have been released from GTMO, government officials have made upwards of fifty public statements regarding the behavior of these released detainees. Senior administration officials and members of Congress, including members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, made many of these statements orally. In addition, the Department of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence have produced a series of written reports about released-detainee recidivism. This multitude of information has provided the public with a confusing and conflicting picture. In early consecutive reports, the number of recidivists varied from two to ten, then to twelve, back down to six, and then back to two, only to rise again. Taken together, it is clear that these statements were presented for political advantage.

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75 See infra app. B.
The government first released a formal statement regarding alleged recidivists in 2006 and received little attention.\textsuperscript{76} It made its next written report in July 2007—a formal statement that admitted that the DoD had not bothered to keep track of released detainees up until that point.\textsuperscript{77} Another statement followed the breathtaking July 2007 statement. It indicated that the evidence that government relied upon was almost exclusively open source intelligence—the media.\textsuperscript{78} Instead of keeping track of the “worst of the worst,” the government sat back and left this role to the media.

With respect to its previous numbers of claimed recidivist detainees, the DoD has alleged variously: one, several, some, a couple, a few, five, seven, ten, twelve to twenty-four, twenty-five, twenty-nine, and thirty—not in that order.\textsuperscript{79} More recently, the DoD has claimed that sixty-one former detainees have “return[ed] to the fight.”\textsuperscript{80} In April 2009, the DoD claimed seventy-four had reengaged.\textsuperscript{81} As interpreted by the House Armed Services Committee

\textsuperscript{76} See infra app. A.1.
\textsuperscript{77} See infra app. A.2 (although the U.S. government does not generally track ex-GTMO detainees after repatriation or resettlement, the Center is aware of dozens of cases where they have returned to militant activities, participated in anti-U.S. propaganda, or other activities through intelligence gathering and media reports).
\textsuperscript{78} See app. A.4 (all information regarding individual released detainees is listed under the heading “Open-Source Reporting Identifies Detainees Reengaging in Terrorism”).
\textsuperscript{79} See infra app. B.
\textsuperscript{80} See Morgan, \textit{supra} note 67 (“Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said 18 former detainees are confirmed as ‘returning to the fight.’”).
\textsuperscript{81} See app. A.5 (“Of the more than 530 Guantanamo detainees transferred from Department of Defense custody at Guantanamo Bay, 27 were confirmed and 47 were suspected of reengaging in terrorist activity.”).
(HASC), the December 2010 summary stated that 150 detainees have reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities. A more recent statement claimed that 161 of the 599 released detainees have reengaged, amounting to 27%. The HASC then published a report reiterating this claim. A DoD spokesman, however, recently characterized this as an “odd” conflation of two distinct categories, and indicated that the most recent trustworthy rate is 15.9%. Furthermore, a timeline of publicly cited numbers reveals sudden, unexplained spikes and decreases, as well as a large and persistent discrepancy between the number cited by public officials and actual names of those detainees “confirmed” as having committed post-release terrorist acts.

A. The Government Can Only Name Fifteen “Confirmed” Recidivists, but Not All Were Detained At GTMO and Not All Engaged in Post-Detention Attacks Against the United States or Coalition Forces

The various DoD statements regarding the number of recidivist detainees consistently fail to identify the overwhelming majority of alleged recidivists, and these statements have proven particularly unreliable in the past. For example, in the July 12, 2007 DoD press release, the recidivist figure reported by the DoD in April 2007 of thirty was reduced to five. Specifically, in that report, the DoD identified seven prisoners by name, but two of those seven were never in GTMO.

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82 LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18 at 10 (“It was reported as 25 percent (150 detainees) [had reengaged] as of October 2010.”)
83 See app. A.7.
84 LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18.
85 Todd Breascale, supra note 1; app. A.8, at 1.
86 See infra app. B.
88 Id.
The April 2009 “Fact Sheet” from the DoD reviewed “specific cases” which were identified in the May 2008 DoD report. This list is notable for several reasons, all of which raise concerns regarding the consistency, strength, and accuracy of the DoD’s recidivism claims. The April 2009 DoD report, using data from May 2008, asserted that twenty-seven former GTMO detainees had been confirmed as “reengaging in terrorist activities” and an additional forty-seven were “suspected” of reengaging in terrorist activity. Of the seventy-four alleged recidivists, however, the DoD provided names for only twenty-nine detainees. Of those twenty-nine names, only fifteen were “confirmed” as recidivists, at least according to the government. Of the fifteen “confirmed,” one does not appear on the list of detainees in GTMO. Further, two were Russian nationals whose post-detention activities occurred in Russia with no ostensible connection the United States. After the May 2008 data, the government has not identified by name or ISN any additional alleged recidivists until the HASC Report released by the House Majority.

89 See app. A.5.
90 See id.
91 Compare id., with List of Individuals Detained, supra note 15.
92 See app. A.4. The nationalities of named “confirmed” detainees who can be verified as former GTMO detainees are: Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia (3); Morocco, Russia (2); Kuwait (1), Turkey (1), Bahrain (1), Pakistan (1). List of Individuals Detained, supra note 15.
95 Leaving Guantanamo, supra note 18. See also apps. A.4–A.8.
B. A Pattern of Errors

The U.S. government has been releasing names of former GTMO detainees deemed to be recidivists since 2006. While a total of thirty-one detainees have been identified as recidivists, only two additional names (Medhi Mohammad Ghezali (ISN 166) and Othman Ahmed Othman al Omairah (ISN 184)) have been identified since 2009. The remaining lists of detainees (released in 2006, 2007, May 2008, June 2008, and 2009) are highly repetitive. While each time the government presents its information as new, it has failed or refused to identify most of the claimed recidivists, thus frustrating any efforts at independent verification of the claims.


While the 2007 list identified seven alleged recidivists, only two men (Noor and Odijev) had not appeared on previous lists. At the same time, two others previously identified were omitted. Similarly, the May 2008 list included a dozen names, yet only five had not appeared on earlier lists, and one of the 2007 additions was omitted.

In June 2008 the government released a list of thirteen alleged recidivists. None of these thirteen men were newly identified recidivists. In fact, seven of them were included on the first list released in 2006.

A subsequent list of alleged recidivists was released in April 2009, which identified twenty-nine former detainees who had reengaged in terrorism. This was the most significant step forward since fifteen were newly identified and had not appeared on earlier lists. Nevertheless, it remains true that the vast majority of claimed...
Recidivists have not been named and therefore their statuses cannot be verified. The government claims there are high numbers of GTMO detainees who have reengaged in terrorism, yet it continues to release inconsistent lists of recidivists using old data and stale information.

The use of stale data is troubling for a number of reasons. First, the reliance on stale recidivism data to assert that recidivism is an ongoing problem mischaracterizes the perceived threat. Including past recidivists on a list of current recidivists conflates two distinctly different problems—one a past problem of recidivism, the other a current recidivism problem. In this regard, rather than assessing the total number of recidivists, the appropriate inquiry should focus on how many new recidivists there are. After all, policy reflects perceived future threat. If the government discovered the bulk of recidivists years ago, then the threat of recidivism looks relatively minor. If the government discovers new recidivists but does not announce them, then the threat is that much greater.

The DNI has hinted at this point on several occasions by noting the fact that the overall recidivism rate (whether suspected or confirmed) includes those who are dead or captured. These hints have apparently been insufficient to affect policymakers’ views of the risk involved in releasing GTMO detainees, as demonstrated by the HASC report’s aggregation of all confirmed and suspected recidivists into a single recidivism rate. The DNI’s failure to parse in full the recidivist data leads to the overestimation of risk. This problem could be solved by an indication of the estimated future risk, though no government agency has attempted to do this to date.

Second, the use of stale data reaffirms the notion that the government is superficially concerned about the post-release behavior of detainees. The cumulative effect of recycling old data distorts the public’s perception of how bad the recidivism rate actually is. The exaggeration of the recidivism problem, accomplished through the use of stale data, is consistent with the government’s exploitation of information for political gain. In short, claiming a high rate of recidivism is a continuation of the government’s assertion that GTMO housed the “worst of the worst.”

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102 App. A.8 (DNI is tasked with providing an unclassified summary of: “an assessment of the likelihood that [current or formerly held] detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.”) (emphasis added).

103 See, e.g., app. A.7; see also app. A.8.

104 See LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18.
Also troubling are the internal inconsistencies of the lists provided. Each of the DoD’s four lists of names differs widely from the others in ways that cannot be explained by the passage of time. In terms of “confirmed” names, the number of names has remained within the range of seven to fifteen, while the alleged total, mostly comprised of unnamed individuals, has grown disproportionately.\(^\text{105}\) Often, individual names are spelled inconsistently. Only five of the detainees appear on all five lists,\(^\text{106}\) and of those five, two (Mohammed Nayim Farouq and Ruslan Odijev (aka Ruslan Anatolivich Odijev)) are among the three detainees downgraded to “suspected” status in the April 2009 report.\(^\text{107}\) Thus, only three of the seven originally “confirmed” recidivists are consistently “confirmed.” These status changes call into question the accuracy of every previous list, since they directly contradict them all.

Three of the cases discussed in the April 2009 DoD report reflect a major reversal from its previous report. Specifically, the statuses of at least three former detainees were changed from “confirmed reengagement” to “suspected reengagement.” This is significant because “unverified or single-source . . . reporting” is sufficient to classify a person as “suspected” of “reengaging in terrorist activities.”\(^\text{108}\)

**Ruslan Anatolivich Odijev (aka “Ruslan Odizhev”):** Ruslan Odijev, a Russian, was reportedly killed in a June 2007 battle with Russia’s federal Security Service. Russian authorities stated that Odijev participated in several terrorist acts, including an attack in October 2005 in the Caucasus region. His status as “returned to the fight” has been changed, without explanation, to “suspected reengagement.”\(^\text{109}\)

**Shai Jahn Abdul Ghafoor (aka “Maulvi Abdul Ghaffar”):** Ghaffar was reportedly “killed in a raid by Afghan security forces” in September 2004. The DoD reports that Ghaffar became the Taliban’s regional commander in the Uruzgan and Helmand provinces and carried out attacks against U.S. and Afghan forces. As of the April 2009 DoD report, however, Ghaffar’s status has been changed from “returned to the fight” to “suspected.”\(^\text{110}\) In addition, as previously

\(^{105}\) Compare infra apps. A.1–A.8, with infra app. B.

\(^{106}\) See app. C.

\(^{107}\) App. A.5.

\(^{108}\) See app. A.4; app. A.5.

\(^{109}\) Compare app. A.2, with app. A.5.

\(^{110}\) Compare app. A.2, with app. A.5.
reported by the Center, his name does not appear on the list of detainees in GTMO. While there are two detainees with similar names, both were still imprisoned when Ghaffar was allegedly killed.111

Mohammed Nayim Farouq: According to the Department of Defense, Farouq, who was released from GTMO before the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRT) were convened, “has since become re-involved in anti-coalition militant activity,” but has neither been recaptured nor killed.112

These former detainees were changed from “confirmed” to “suspected” without comment. It is unclear why, considering that a July 2007 news release from the DoD listed each of the above three detainees as examples of those who “returned to combat against the U.S. and its allies after being released from [GTMO].”113 Presumably, these individuals are included in the total of seventy-four reported in the April 2009 DoD report and in the December 2010 summary. Given this fact, the flux between these two categories of recidivism and the public concern of the overall number asserted by the DoD creates a serious question as to the consistency of reporting on recidivism.

Indeed, this change in status can only reflect one of two possibilities: (1) either these detainees were always merely “suspected” recidivists previously reported as “confirmed,” or (2) the DoD has found cause to doubt its own previous evidence upon which the “confirmed” status was based. An additional detainee, Abdul Rahman Noor, appeared in the first list in July 2007:

Abdul Rahman Noor: The DoD previously claimed that Noor participated in fighting against U.S. forces near Kandahar. The DoD described Noor as participating in a video interview with al-Jazeera television, wherein he was identified as the “deputy defense minister of the Taliban.”114

As of the April 7, 2009 report, Noor is no longer listed as a recidivist—neither confirmed nor suspected.115 This may indicate that the DoD agrees with earlier assertions that Mr. Noor was not

111 List of Individuals Detained, supra note 15.
112 See app. A.5. Those that are dead or captured are noted as such under “Activity”; because Farouq’s activity indicates neither, it can be presumed that the government believes he is not dead or captured.
113 See infra app. A.2.
114 See app. A.4.
115 See app. A.5.
“ever officially detained at Guantánamo.” In any event, this additional DoD shift further raised serious questions regarding the consistency and accuracy of the DoD allegations, and has not been explained in the most recent summary.

In addition, the DoD maintained another inconsistency described in earlier reports:

Mohammed Yusif Yaqub (aka Mullah Shazada): According to the Department of Defense, Mullah Shazada “was killed on 7 May 2004 fighting against U.S. forces.” The name Mullah Shazada, however, does not appear on the official list of detainees.

It is not at all clear that Shazada is actually a former GTMO detainee. After Shazada’s death, the government announced that he had been previously detained in GTMO under the name “Mohamed Yusif Yaqub.”

In the July 2007 DoD news release, the five Uighurs—ethnic Chinese who practice Islam—relocated to Albania were listed as examples of former detainees engaging in recidivist activity. No press release from the DoD since has retracted that earlier assertion. However, first-hand accounts dispute this allegation. Hidajet Cera, director of the refugee camp to which the Uighers were sent, described the former detainees as “the best guys in the place” who “have never given us one minute’s problem.”

The five Uighers no longer live in the refugee camp, and local news reports indicate that each one is living relatively normal lives, such as working as a pizza-maker. Further, the U.S. has admitted in open court that none of the Uighurs detained in GTMO are threats to national security, and

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117 See app. A.5.
118 List of Individuals Detained, supra note 15.
119 See Propaganda by the Numbers, supra note 87, at 5.
120 See app. A.5.
121 See infra app. A.2.
all but three have been released. 124

One of the Uighur men, however, did write an opinion piece, published in *The New York Times*, in which he urged American lawmakers to protect habeas corpus. 125 This may be the basis of listing the Uighurs as recidivists since the DoD has sometimes designated political opposition as “anti-coalition militant activity.” 126

Additionally, in November 2010 a former detainee, Jaber Jubran al-Faifi (ISN 188), reportedly tipped off Yemeni officials to a bomb plot involving devices planted in printer cartridges and sent via air cargo. 127 Al-Faifi was incarcerated at GTMO until 2007, when he was repatriated to Saudi Arabia. He reportedly rejoined al Qaeda and made his way to Yemen, before turning himself in November and reporting the bombing plot.

Under the definition of recidivism in the 2012 DNI summary, al-Faifi was likely counted as reengaging in terrorist activities after he was said to have rejoined al Qaeda. The summary does not make clear whether blowing the whistle on a terrorist bombing plot would remove al-Faifi from the ranks of recidivists. Because the summary does not list names of suspected or confirmed recidivists, al-Faifi’s status in this count is unknown.

Hajji Sahib Rohullah Wakil (ISN 798), an Afghani released from GTMO in April 2008, was classified as a recidivist by the government on its 2009 list of recidivist detainees. 128 Wakil’s alleged recidivist act, however, is a mere loose association with al Qaeda as a result of his political activities, not terroristic acts. Wakil is a tribal leader in Afghanistan, who works closely with the Afghani government to advocate for the needs of his home province, Kunar province. 129 He works with the country’s president, Karzai, who has nothing but praise for Wakil. 130

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126 See infra app. A.2.
128 See app. A.5.
130 Id.
Similarly, the government has identified Mehdi Mohammad Ghezali (ISN 166) as a recidivist and Pakistani officials arrested him because of his alleged ties to al Qaeda, claiming that a local police chief had referred to him as “a very dangerous man.”\textsuperscript{131} In late 2009, however, it was reported that Ghezali’s arrest was a misunderstanding, and he had been part of a group making a pilgrimage to celebrate Ramadan, and was arrested with a fellow Swedish couple and their two-year-old son.\textsuperscript{132}

Without speculating as to what conclusions might be drawn from these types of inconsistencies, they are typical of the DoD releases. None is free from error.

VI. GOVERNMENT METHODS OF DETAINEE RELEASE HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO RECIDIVISM

A. The Worst Error

In gaining a fuller picture of the post-release behavior of former GTMO detainees, it is not necessary to diminish the role of those who do in fact reengage in criminal and militant activity hostile to U.S. interests. The dangerous nature of some detainees is a reason for fully informed policy debate. Indeed, lacking such debate, the government’s policy decisions have led to the release of some individuals for whom reengagement seems inevitable. Some of the more compelling cases are included below.

Unsurprisingly, many alleged recidivists are Afghans taking direct part in the civil war in Afghanistan. Abdullah Mehsud (ISN 92) returned to Afghanistan on March 14, 2004.\textsuperscript{133} It is unclear why the U.S. released Mehsud, a known Taliban fighter,\textsuperscript{134} who “quickly took up arms again, leading local and foreign militants in Pakistan’s

\textsuperscript{131} LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18, at 35.


\textsuperscript{134} If the US Administration had Behaved Intelligently, Ex-Guantánamo Inmate who Blew Himself Up Would Never have been Released, ANDY WORTHINGTON (July 24, 2007), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2007/07/24/if-the-us-administration-had-behaved-intelligently-ex-guantanamo-inmate-who-blew-himself-up-would-never-have-been-released/.
South Waziristan[.] According to the government, Mehsud blew himself up with a hand grenade to avoid capture in July 2007.

Mohamed Yusif Yaqub, aka Mullah Shazada (ISN 367), was supposedly released to Afghanistan in May 2003. The government lists him as a confirmed recidivist and Taliban commander in Afghanistan who organized a jailbreak in Kandahar and was killed in May 2004 fighting U.S. forces. Yaqub reportedly used a fake name in GTMO and claimed to be an innocent rug merchant. After his release, he seized control of Taliban operations in south Afghanistan, recruiting fighters by telling tales of mistreatment in GTMO.

The government released Abdullah Gulam Rasoul (ISN 8) to Afghanistan in December 2007. Rasoul is listed as a suspected recidivist and Taliban military commander for Afghanistan who organized an assault on U.S. military aircraft in Afghanistan. Another source reports that Rasoul, under the name Mullah Abdullah Zakir, is a top operations officer for the Taliban in southern Afghanistan.

Several other alleged recidivists are Saudis who were subject to Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation program but thereafter purportedly traveled to Yemen to join al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”). For example, Othman Ahmed Othman al Omairah (ISN 184), a citizen of Yemen, was repatriated to Saudi Arabia on June 24, 2006, and was put through the Saudi rehabilitation program.

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136 The government document does not say how he killed himself, but this source specifies he killed himself with a hand grenade. Id.
137 See app. A.5.
138 See infra app. A.1.
139 It is still unclear whether Mohammed Yusif Yaqub also went by Mullah Shazada.
140 See app. A.5.
142 Id.
143 See app. A.5.
145 Andy Worthington, Othman Al Ghamdi (ISN 184), CAGEPRISONERS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.cageprisoners.com/cases/guantanamo-bay/item/2526-othman-
soon disappeared, and in February 2009 he was included as one of eleven former GTMO prisoners on the Saudi most wanted militant list.\textsuperscript{146} In May 2010, an al Qaeda video featured al Omairah, describing him as an “operational commander.”\textsuperscript{147} Mazin Salih Musaid al Awfi (ISN 154) and Said Ali al Shihri (ISN 372) are alleged leadership figures in AQAP.\textsuperscript{148} According to one source, Yemeni authorities arrested al Awfi in 2009 after he appeared in a video with al Shihri.\textsuperscript{149} Al Shihri has yet to be captured and is believed to be the deputy leader of AQAP.\textsuperscript{150} He may have been involved in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Yemen in September 2008.\textsuperscript{151}

Among those recidivists not named on the government’s various lists but discovered by the Center from public sources are Saudis Yusef Mohammed Mubarak al Shihri (ISN 114), Fahd Salih Sulayman al Jutayli (ISN 177), and Ibrahim Sulayman Arbaysh (ISN 192).

Yusef al Shihri, brother-in-law of Said al Shihri (ISN 372), was reportedly killed by Saudi forces crossing from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, while disguised as a woman and wearing a suicide bomb belt.\textsuperscript{152} The Saudi Interior Ministry reported that DNA tests had confirmed that al Jutayli, released in 2007, was one of the several militants killed on September 14, 2009,\textsuperscript{153} when a bomb under construction accidentally detonated.\textsuperscript{154} Arbaysh was placed in a reintegration program, but traveled to Yemen and is now reportedly a

\textsuperscript{146} Id.
\textsuperscript{147} Id. See also Thomas Joscelyn, \textit{Former Gitmo Detainee Featured as Commander in al Qaeda Tape}, \textit{LONG WAR J.} (May 28, 2010), \url{http://www.longvarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/former_gitmo_detainee_4.php}.
\textsuperscript{148} See app. A.5.
\textsuperscript{149} Yemen Arrests al Qaeda Member Once Held at Gitmo, CNN WORLD (Feb. 18, 2009), \url{http://articles.cnn.com/2009-02-18/world/al.qaeda.arrest_1_qaeda-saudi-arabia-facility-at-guantanamo-bay}.
\textsuperscript{153} Ministry: 3 Saudi Militants Killed in Blast Abroad, \textit{SEATTLE TIMES} (Jan. 18, 2010), \url{http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2010825549_apmsaudimilitants.html}.
\textsuperscript{154} Biography of Abu Yaqin al-Qassimi (Fahd bin Saleh al-Jutaili), \textit{AL-MALAHEM MEDIA} (June 22, 2011, 8:33 PM), \url{http://aljahad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=8421}.
senior ideologue and theologian for AQAP.\footnote{155}

In addition to the Saudi recidivists, other Arab states have seen recidivists. For example, Abdallah Saleh Ali al Ajmi (ISN 220), was a Kuwaiti released in November 2005. After his repatriation, al Ajmi married and had a child, but within three years conducted a suicide bombing in Mosul, Iraq that resulted in the deaths of numerous Iraqis.\footnote{156}

Two of five Russians listed by the government as either confirmed or suspected recidivists, Ravil Shafeyavich Gumarov (ISN 203) and Timur Ravilch Ishmurat (ISN 674), were alleged to have been involved in the bombing of a natural gas pipeline within one year of their release.\footnote{157} Another, Ruslan Anatolivich Odijev (ISN 211), was reportedly killed while resisting arrest.\footnote{158}

The reengagement of these individuals and others, and the death and damage that resulted, may have been greatly reduced if the government had conducted proper risk assessment and made release contingent upon such assessment. Instead, as described below, most releases appear to have been based upon diplomatic and political expediency.

B. Wishful Thinking: False Hope of Continued Detention or Prosecution

The HASC Report,\footnote{159} while failing to contribute to our knowledge of the recidivism rates or provide new information regarding former GTMO detainees, does point out the failures and the confusion regarding the transfer of detainees out of GTMO. The report outlines the chaotic situation that existed as the U.S. government attempted to rid itself of some detainees and relieve the diplomatic pressure from abroad, and shows how various department


159 See \textit{LEAVING GUANTANAMO}, supra note 18.
and sometimes individuals within those departments were working toward different goals in the transfer of detainees out of GTMO.

While the DoD was focused on minimizing the risk of making the “disastrous mistake” of releasing a detainee with “the potential for killing Americans . . . or who had significant intelligence value yet to be exploited,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was pushing to transfer detainees to other countries for further detention and/or prosecution.

There was a process agreed upon between the State and Defense Departments on how to proceed with detainee transfers. Since some detainees were released with orders from Secretary Rumsfeld, however, each country that received detainees did so under different restrictions and terms, and sometimes over the objections of the CIA, the Pentagon, and the Department of Justice.

After seven detainees were released to Russia, the Defense Intelligence Agency placed five on the confirmed reengagement list. The HASC Report states that “the finalized transfer agreement included three principal clauses: the detainees would be prosecuted in Russian courts; they would remain incarcerated until the end of America’s involvement in Afghanistan; and that American officials could have access to them at any time.” The officials interviewed by the committee reported that Russia was to prioritize prosecution and not mere legal detention—neither happened until after a 2005 attack on a natural gas pipeline.

The HASC Report also ties the release of many detainees without proper screening to the pressure placed on the U.S. from both abroad and domestic sources. It is also stressed that the U.S. released detainees to certain countries in order to improve relations with those countries, specifically Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.K.

The Majority Report stresses pressure from abroad and from within the U.S. as the major reason behind the transfer of the majority of detainees from GTMO. The report, however, glosses over the fact that Secretary Rumsfeld’s goal of transferring detainees in 2003 was to shift detainees out of GTMO to be held or tried by other

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160 See id. at 21.
161 Id. at 30.
162 Id. at 25–26.
163 Id. at 26–40.
164 Id. at 35.
165 See LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18, at 44.
166 See Id. at 44.
167 See Id. at 33.
countries, even though knowledgeable officials in his own department believed that detention of some detainees in GTMO was never warranted.\footnote{See Id. at 28.} While the Secretary of Defense, however, trusted the legal systems of the receiving countries enough to transfer detainees without proper evaluation, the DoD does not trust the legal system of the very same countries enough to exclude detainees they have acquitted from its recidivism lists.

C. Releases Based on Diplomacy or Security?

Because GTMO detainee releases prior to 2006 were made on the basis of nationality rather than factors more appropriate to the estimation of risk, the recidivism rate of this group represents an ideal base-line roughly equivalent to randomized releases. Therefore, a change in release determinations based upon legitimate risk assessments will likely lower the overall recidivism rate. Additionally, risk assessment processes may be used to reduce the incidence of recidivism by providing the law enforcement and intelligence communities with information that aids in the handling of released detainees.

A threshold question to consider is what is meant by a recidivism rate. As is evident from the government’s own “[d]efinition of ‘Terrorist’ or ‘Insurgent’ Activities,” not all reengagement in anti-American activity stands on equal footing.\footnote{See infra app. A.6.} While this definition excludes many lesser forms of reengagement from consideration, it does not draw a distinction between highly damaging activities, such as direct involvement in terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel and interests, and less damaging activities, such as recruitment or propaganda for groups targeting third-party nations. For the purposes of this analysis, “risk” will be defined in line with the

\footnote{See Id. at 28.}

\footnote{See infra app. A.6.}

For the purposes of this assessment, activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations, etc. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO detainees—on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing over shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements.

\textit{Id.}
government’s usage: the likelihood of engagement in a defined set of activities. Risk assessments made along both axes, likelihood and magnitude, will naturally be more useful in improving outcomes and reducing costs in post-detention management.

1. Releases Disregarded Recidivism Risk Until At Least 2007

In August 2008, the Center for Policy & Research published its *Profile of Released Guantánamo Detainees: The Government’s Story Then and Now*, a report analyzing which GTMO detainees were to be released between early 2002 and late 2006.\(^{170}\) That report found that, although the U.S. government kept track of several criteria that it claimed bear on detainee “dangerousness” in one form or another, the actual pattern of releases was based solely upon the nationality of the detainee.\(^{171}\)

It is impossible to know the reason for this pattern of releases from the data that is publicly available.\(^{172}\) It is possible the government believed nationality was the most reasonable measure of future dangerousness, despite its collection of other data. It is more reasonable to assume, however, that this pattern was due in large part to diplomatic pressure and expediency. For example, detainees from traditional U.S. allies were released on average one year earlier than nationals of post-Soviet nations, who were in turn released ten months earlier than Arab nationals were.\(^{173}\) This trend reflects the general levels of influence that each of these groups wields over the U.S., as well as the levels of cooperation in the decade after 9/11.

As another example, Pakistani and Afghani detainees were released much earlier than other nationalities. In the case of Afghanistan, the number of detainees actually released rather than sent home for continued incarceration indicates that this was largely due to mistaken identity—an effect of the fog of war.\(^{174}\) In the case of Pakistan, however, the high rate of continued incarceration\(^{175}\)

\(^{170}\) See generally Mark Denbeaux et al., Ctr. for Policy & Research, Profile of Released Guantánamo Detainees: The Government’s Story Then and Now (2008) [hereinafter Then and Now], available at http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/detainees_then_and_now_final.pdf.

\(^{171}\) Id. at 30.

\(^{172}\) Data published on wikileaks.org is not included in this analysis, due to the Justice Department’s interpretation of a court-issued protective order by which the author is bound.

\(^{173}\) See Then and Now, supra note 170, at 27.

\(^{174}\) Id. at 20.

\(^{175}\) Id. at 21.
indicates that the early releases were likely one of the many bargaining devices used to secure Pakistan’s continued cooperation in the War on Terror.

The cases of Yemeni and Saudi Arabian detainees provide further examples. The early release of Saudi detainees relative to other Arabic-speaking nations\footnote{Id. at 22.} is likely a result of Saudi Arabian oil wealth and the country’s key role in the War on Terror.\footnote{See, e.g., Ahmed Rashid,\footnote{Joseph Felter & Jarret Brachman, Combating Terrorism Ctr., An Assessment of 516 Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Unclassified Summaries 34 (July 25, 2007), available at http://www.pepc.us/archive/Organizations} Taliban 129–34 (2010); Ahmed Rashid, Descent Into Chaos 111, 161, 186, 233 (2008); Sean M. Maloney, Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian in Afghanistan 21 (2005).} Yemen, by contrast, is a poor, weak nation beset by its own Islamist radicals (now AQAP). Thus, it is not surprising that Yemeni detainees have been the group least likely to be released.\footnote{See Then and Now, supra note 170, at 23.}

It is therefore apparent that diplomatic expedience was the primary factor in determining which detainees would be released in the period between GTMO’s opening and the publication of the release data in late 2006.

2. The Government Has at Hand Criteria that More Accurately Estimate Risk of Recidivism than Nationality

There are factors other than nationality known to the government that could have more accurately estimated the risk of recidivism. Indeed, significant differences exist between detainees that are very likely beneficial to estimating this risk with relatively high rates of accuracy, including at a minimum the information obtained during the CSRT process.

With the exception of 201 detainees released prior to the CSRT process, data is available for all detainees regarding their suspected affiliations with terrorist/insurgent groups, how they are connected to that organization, and the number of hostile acts committed individually against the United States prior to detention. This data was originally published by the DoD in the Unclassified Summaries of the Classified Evidence (“R1”), used to support the detention of each detainee during the CSRT process.

In addition, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point published a report in July 2007 that drew even finer distinctions between the types of acts alleged on the R1.\footnote{Joseph Felter & Jarret Brachman, Combating Terrorism Ctr., An Assessment of 516 Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Unclassified Summaries 34 (July 25, 2007), available at http://www.pepc.us/archive/Organizations} The CTC found that
the information on the R1 could be classified into twelve factors in three categories (high, medium, and low risk). Their factors include such information as training camp attendance, combat weapons training, commitment to violent jihad, small arms training, and operationally relevant travel. While the CTC’s analysis of this information is somewhat suspect, such fine granulation is useful in assessing risk in terms of both likelihood and magnitude.

It should be emphasized that the above examples make use only of the publicly available, unclassified data. Further detainee risk-assessment information has reportedly been leaked to the public by the anti-secrecy website Wikileaks. Vast amounts of other data are available to those who will be making the determinations regarding which detainees are released. This information has been collected and made available to policymakers since early 2009.

3. Increased Use of Risk Assessment Leads to Lower Recidivism Rates

Increased use of risk assessment in determining which detainees will be released can lead to reduced recidivism in a variety of ways. First, and most directly, by culling out the detainees who pose the greatest risk of recidivism, the overall incidence of recidivism will decline. Under such a scenario, the review process will determine in each case if the risk of recidivism is too high to warrant release. Therefore, those most likely to reengage in terrorism or insurgency against the United States or its allies will not be given the opportunity to do so. This will lead to a lower incidence of such reengagement overall.

This expected decline in recidivism has been born out so far, according to the official information released about alleged recidivists. The latest DNI summary of recidivism among released GTMO detainees claims that 15.9% of the 599 released detainees are
“confirmed” to have reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activities, and another 12% are suspected of doing so. The DNI summary, however, makes clear that this rate is largely historical. Executive Order 13492, requiring a “comprehensive interagency review” including “full assessment of intelligence and threat information,” was promulgated on January 22, 2009. Those detainees released prior to January 22, 2009 have had a reportedly high recidivism rate with 17.3% confirmed and 13.2% suspected, while the recidivism rate plummeted by more than three quarters for those released after this date to 4.5% confirmed and 3% suspected.

Additionally, the Center’s own study of detainee recidivism shows that 20% of detainees released prior to 2007 warrant a negative assessment compared to only 12.6% of detainees released later. While this measure is crude, and does not take into account the expected lag between release and reengagement, it comports with the findings of the DNI.

Second, and less directly, by particularizing the nature of the risk in each individual case, the risk assessment process can be used to inform the handling of the detainee in the post-detention period. The law enforcement and intelligence community can better allocate resources tracking released detainees. If this information is shared with our foreign partners, then rehabilitation and reintegration programs can be better targeted to the individual detainee in order to further reduce the risk of that detainee rejoining the fight. Lastly, the information produced in the risk assessment process may be used to create or improve other means of reducing the individual or group risk.

184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. The 2009 summary also notes that the average delay between release and recidivism is 2.5 years. This delay may account in part to this low rate, but given that more than 2.5 years have passed since January 22, 2009, this effect cannot be the whole story. Even if this rate doubles over time, the more than 2:1 disparity between pre- and post-January 22, 2009 recidivism is stark. See app. A.5.
187 This percentage most likely overestimates recidivism among those released using risk-based procedures since the interagency review process was only put in place by Executive Order 13492 on January 22, 2009, and the Periodic Review Boards (which only release detainees who do not pose a “significant threat to the security of the United States”) were not put in place until 2011. Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained At the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,4897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force, Exec. Order No. 13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
188 A more complete analysis accounting for these problems will be produced at a later time.
risk of recidivism.

Third, proper risk assessment procedures that estimate the likelihood of engagement in high- and low-damage activities independent of one another will allow further granulation of the targeting noted above. In doing so, it will lower the risk of highly damaging activities, reducing the risk to U.S. interests in the broader sense.

Recidivism rates of detainees released between 2002 and 2006 represent a statistical worst-case scenario. Because risk assessment was not applied in any cognizable form, the effect on recidivism rates was similar to the release of random detainees. With no distinction drawn between high-risk and low-risk detainees, the recidivism rate for this early group will be higher than any subsequent group applying a risk assessment.

Recidivism rates for those released based on some form of risk assessment will be reduced by limiting the number of high-risk releases, as is clear from the stark disparity in recidivism between Bush-era and Obama-era releases. In addition, the risk assessment process can aid in prevention by providing information to law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, and foreign partners who are involved in handling former detainees.

VII. MISSION CREEP: RECIDIVISM BY ENGAGEMENT IN OTHER CONFLICTS

Under any of the various characterizations of recidivism, from “return to the battlefield” to the DNI’s current definition of “reengagement,” only those actions that are hostile to U.S. interests should concern U.S. policymakers. This is evident in the DNI definition, which restricts reengagement to acts against “coalition or host-nation forces or civilians.” Other activity is outside the scope of the War on Terror. Unfortunately, this grouping is vague and prone to expansion, as explained above. Additionally, many of the alleged recidivists reflect this expansive tendency.

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189 See app. A.8.
**Fig. 1: Countries Where Recidivist Detainees Were Released – Government-Alleged**

- Sweden (1) 3%
- Saudi Arabia (7) 29%
- Russia (5) 16%
- Pakistan (2) 6%
- Morocco (2) 7%
- Afghanistan (10) 32%
- Bahrain (1) 3%
- Kuwait (2) 7%
- Turkey (1) 3%

**Fig. 2: Countries Where Recidivist Detainees Were Released – Found by CPR**

- Yemen (2) 13%
- Tajikistan (1) 6%
- Saudi Arabia (6) 38%
- Denmark (1) 6%
- Morocco (1) 6%
- Afghanistan (5) 31%

**Fig. 3: Countries Where Recidivist Detainees Were Released – Combined**

- Tajikistan 2%
- Turkey 2%
- Yemen 4%
- Afghanistan 32%
- Sweden 2%
- Bahrain 2%
- Denmark 2%
- Russia 11%
- Pakistan 4%
- Morocco 7%
- Kuwait 4%
- Saudi Arabia 28%
Figures 1 and 2 show the percentage of alleged recidivists who were transferred or released to various countries, as provided by the government and independently discovered by the Center, respectively. All of the detainees in each chart were citizens of the countries to which they were sent with one exception: a Yemeni citizen listed among the government’s thirty-one was sent to Saudi Arabia following his release from GTMO. Additionally, two Afghans had dual citizenship: one Afghani was also British, and another Afghani was Bangladeshi. Because of the small sample size of the government’s list, the combined list of those alleged by the government and those found by the Center will be used unless stated otherwise (See Figure 3).

The majority of alleged recidivists have been sent to either Afghanistan (32%) or Saudi Arabia (28%) following their release from GTMO. Detainees sent to Russia, however, are statistically the most likely to be recidivists. Five of the seven detainees (71%) sent to Russia appear to have reengaged in hostile acts.

As is clear in Figure 4, not all countries to which detainees were sent contributed equally to the group of alleged recidivists. Afghanistan is a clear contributor with over 30% of alleged recidivists (See Figure 3). But this actually overstates its role in recidivism. In fact, with only fifteen alleged recidivists among its 202 returned detainees, Afghanistan’s recidivism rate is a mere 7% (See Figure 5). Indeed, under the DoD’s understanding of recidivism in which only “confirmed” recidivists should be counted, this rate drops to less than 2% (4 of 202). This is surprising, given that these individuals are returned directly to the state in which the war is being conducted. Following this logic, looking at Pakistan and Afghanistan together results in a “battlefield” recidivism rate of only 1.88% (5 of 266).

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To facilitate comparison this Section will use HASC’s more inclusive understanding of recidivism, combining suspected and confirmed recidivism. See LEAVING GUANTANAMO, supra note 18.
Equally surprising are Saudi Arabia and Russia. Saudi Arabia stands out as another major contributor, comprising 28% of the alleged recidivists. Russia, while not contributing very large numbers, is the third largest, and has the highest rate of alleged recidivism (71%) of the three. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Russia, however, is a recognizable part of the “battlefield.” In fact, all of the Russian recidivists committed their acts of recidivism in Russia against Russians or the Russian state. Many Americans may question how such examples of clearly domestic terrorism fit into the strategic interests of the United States.

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191 Denmark and Sweden have higher recidivism rates, each at 100%. See infra Figure 5. However, only one detainee has been released to each.
192 See app. A.4.
Nor is it clear that the alleged recidivism is in general reengagement with the United States or its Coalition partners. Of the twelve countries from which government-alleged recidivists originate, two (Saudi Arabia and Tajikistan) are not listed as either members of the Coalition (according to CENTCOM) or ISAF. Another two (Yemen and Morocco) have provided no cognizable support to the U.S.-led Coalition at war in Afghanistan.

Of the remaining eight countries from which alleged recidivists originate, two (Russia and Kuwait) provide only minimal support. According to CENTCOM, Russia provided humanitarian support early in the war. For example, it built a pontoon bridge in 2002 to aid in the delivery of supplies from Tajikistan. It also established a

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194 Yemen may be included in this Coalition if it is interpreted to mean the broader, worldwide war on al Qaeda, since it is generally believed that the United States has repeatedly conducted drone strikes in Yemen with its government’s approval. The same logic, however, would include Somalia in the Coalition, since the United States has reportedly conducted several drone strikes in Somalia against al Qaeda-affiliated targets.

195 DoD Fact Sheet, supra note 72.


197 Support to the Global War on Terror, supra note 196.
hospital later in 2002, but has since provided no further support.\textsuperscript{198} Kuwait, meanwhile, has provided only basing and port facilities, and even this is at best only indirectly linked to the war in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{199}

This leaves only five states aside from Afghanistan itself from which recidivists originated: Bahrain, Denmark, Pakistan, Turkey, and Sweden.\textsuperscript{200} Interestingly, of these, only Turkey has contributed ISAF Troops since 2007,\textsuperscript{201} and none of these states has contributed troops to the OEF (non-NATO) mission in Afghanistan since at least 2003.\textsuperscript{202}

Even though a plurality of the states from which recidivists hail were contributing members of the U.S.-led Coalition in Afghanistan, these states contributed only a remarkably small number of the total number of confirmed recidivists. The largest group of recidivists comes from Afghanistan itself, with a total of four recidivists. The next largest group contains those from states that provided little or no contribution to the Coalition. Another three are citizens of the

\textsuperscript{200} See supra Figure 3.
non-coalition member Saudi Arabia. Only three of the confirmed recidivists come from troop-contributing Coalition partners other than Afghanistan. Even including suspected recidivists and those discovered by the Center, only six alleged recidivists come from troop-contributing Coalition partners other than Afghanistan.

The United States clearly should take care to avoid unnecessary burdens to all of its neighbors in the international community. This includes returning to them detainees known to pose a significant risk of engaging in hostilities, the distribution of nationalities of those alleged to have “returned to the fight” or “reengaged” in hostilities in the Global War on Terror. This, therefore, raises the question: How far afield does this war range?

Many Americans believe that, while the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan warrants inclusion within the United States’ war on al Qaeda and the Taliban, situations such as those found in Turkey, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are more appropriately handled by those states’ own law enforcement agencies. The U.S. government has not yet articulated its reasons for implicitly including such a broad array of nations within the ambit of its definition of the Coalition, nor has it explained its inclusion of acts of domestic terrorism or criminality with no apparent connection to Afghanistan or the United States within the definition of “reengagement” in the war. Such a failure leaves policymakers with poorly defined parameters in which to determine how to best guide the nation through this quandary.

VIII. CONCLUSION

It is unclear what value a government report focusing solely on negative behavior of released-detainees has beyond propaganda. If the government wished to engage in an analysis of post-release behavior of detainees, in order to determine future policy, it would require an examination of both recidivists and non-recidivists. As this is not the path the government has taken, it is clear that the identification and reports on recidivisms exist to support the decisions of the government both in GTMO and in the War on Terror. Until the government (1) identifies and examines the recidivists and their characteristics, and (2) acknowledges that there are many detainees who live peaceful, private, non-recidivist lives, the policies applied to the release of current detainees will remain insufficient.
APPENDIX A
The DoD has released eight public statements of recidivism numbers including four lists of allegedly recidivist detainees. Those eight documents are either reproduced or linked to in this Appendix as follows:

A.1—July 10, 2006
A.2—July 7, 2007
A.3—May 20, 2008
A.4—June 13, 2008
A.5—April 7, 2009
A.6—December 7, 2010
A.7—September 13, 2011
A.8—March 5, 2012
APPENDIX A.1

UNCLASSIFIED

Defense Intelligence Agency

U-646-06
0 USC 424
10 July 2006

Transnational: Guantanamo Bay Detainees Returning to Terrorism Update

This paper responds to a DoD GC request for an update on the status and activity of former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainees known/suspected of returning to terrorism after release.

Key Points

- Most detainee transfers/releases from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO), during 2002–2003 were sent back to Afghanistan or Pakistan. Since 2004, a higher percentage of detainees from Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East have been released. Available reporting indicates a corresponding increase in terrorist activity attributed to releases GTMO detainees in those areas.

- As more GTMO detainees are released to even more diverse locations, there will likely be a corresponding geographic growth of post-release terrorist activity. Former detainees who return to terrorism will continue to gravitate to their roots, with those from Afghanistan/Pakistan returning to local anti-coalition activity, and those from Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa plugging back into the transnational terrorist networks they affiliated with prior to capture. Those returning to transnational networks are more likely to be involved in future major acts of terrorism.

- There is generally about a year between release and subsequent indications of post-transfer/release terrorist activity. Upon return, many detainees are held for varying lengths of time ranging from less than 24 hours up to several years. It is likely additional former detainees have been involved in terrorist activities undiscovered to date.

- Within the past year, former GTMO detainees have participated in terrorist activities ranging from small-scale attacks to transnational facilitation and attack planning. However, the former GTMO detainees known or suspected to have returned to terrorism represent a small proportion of the total transferred/released.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED

- Of particular note are the following seven released detainees, each returned to terrorism focused on harming U.S. or allied interests.

  - Mohammed Ismail: Ismail was one of the “juveniles” released from Guantanamo in 2004. During a press interview after his release, he described the Americans saying, “They gave me a good time in Cuba. They were very nice to me, giving me English lessons.” He concluded his interview saying he would have to find work once he finished visiting all his relatives. He was recaptured four months later in May 2004, participating in an attack on U.S. forces near Kandahar. At the time of his recapture, Ismail carried a letter confirming his status as a Taliban member in good standing.

  - Sadi Mohammed Alim Shah AKA Abdullah Mahasud: Following his March 2004 transfer, this former detainee sought interviews with Pakistani media. In October 2004 he kidnapped two Chinese engineers and claimed responsibility for an Islamabad hotel bombing. As recently as May 2006, press reporting referred to Mahasud as the Taliban leader in Waziristan, but Pakistani officials have claimed he died during 2005 raids in South Waziristan.

  - Mohammed Yusuf Yaqub AKA Mullah Shazada: After his release from Guantanamo on 8 May 03, Shazada assumed control of Taliban operations in southern Afghanistan. In this role, his activities reportedly included the organization and execution of a jailbreak in Kandahar, and a nearly successful capture of the border town of Spin Boldak. Shazada was killed on 7 May 2004 during fighting with U.S. forces. His memorial in Quetta, Pakistan drew many Taliban leaders wanted by U.S. forces. At the time of his release there was no indication he was a member of any terrorist organization or posed a risk to U.S. or allied interests.

  - Maulavi Abdul Ghaffar: After being captured in early 2002 and held at Guantanamo for eight months, Ghaffar reportedly became the Taliban’s regional commander in Uruzgan and Helmand provinces, carrying out attacks on U.S. and Afghan forces. On 25 September 2004, while planning an attack against Afghan police, Ghaffar and two of his men were killed in a raid by Afghan security forces.

  - Mohammed Naqim Farouq: After his release from US custody in July 2003, Farouq quickly renewed his association with Taliban and al-Qaeda members and has since become involved in anti-Coalition militant activity.

  - Ra’Il Safiyyavich Gunayev: Following his March 2004 transfer and subsequent release, this former detainee was arrested for involvement in a gas
The bombing in Russia in January 2005. In May 2006, a Russian court found him guilty and sentenced him to 13 years in prison.

- Tamur Ravilich Ishmurat: Following his March 2004 transfer and subsequent release, this former detainee was arrested with Ravil Gumarov for involvement in a gas line bombing in Russia in January 2005. In May 2006, a Russian court found him guilty and sentenced him to 11 years in prison.
APPENDIX A.2

The following is an exact reproduction of the Department of Defense news release of July 12, 2007, titled “Former Guantánamo Detainees Who Have Returned to the Fight.” This press release was accessible as of November 26, 2007 at http://defenselink.mil.news/d20070712formergtmo.pdf, but has since been removed without comment.

Former Guantánamo Detainees who have returned to the fight:

Our reports indicate that at least 30 former GTMO detainees have taken part in anti-coalition militant activities after leaving U.S. detention. Some have subsequently been killed in combat in Afghanistan.

These former detainees successfully lied to U.S. officials, sometimes for over three years. Many detainees later identified as having returned to fight against the U.S. with terrorists falsely claimed to be farmers, truck drivers, cooks, small-scale merchants, or low-level combatants.

Other common cover stories include going to Afghanistan to buy medicines, to teach the Koran, or to find a wife. Many of these stories appear so often, and are subsequently proven false that we can only conclude they are part of their terrorist training.

Although the U.S. government does not generally track ex-GTMO detainees after repatriation or resettlement, we are aware of dozens of cases where they have returned to militant activities, participated in anti-U.S. propaganda or other activities through intelligence gathering and media reports. (Examples: Mehsud suicide bombing in Pakistan; Tipton Three and the Road to Guantánamo; Uighurs in Albania)

The following seven former detainees are a few examples of the 30; each returned to combat against the U.S. and its allies after being released from Guantánamo.
Mohamed Yusif Yaqub AKA Mullah Shazada:
After his release from GTMO on May 8, 2003, Shazada assumed control of Taliban operations in Southern Afghanistan. In this role, his activities reportedly included the organization and execution of a jailbreak in Kandahar, and a nearly successful capture of the border town of Spin Boldak. Shazada was killed on May 7, 2004 while fighting against U.S. forces. At the time of his release, the U.S. had no indication that he was a member of any terrorist organization or posed a risk to U.S. or allied interests.

Abdullah Mehsud:
Mehsud was captured in northern Afghanistan in late 2001 and held until March of 2004. After his release he went back to the fight, becoming a militant leader within the Mehsud tribe in southern Waziristan. We have since discovered that he had been associated with the Taliban since his teen years and has been described as an al Qaeda-linked facilitator. In mid-October 2004, Mehsud directed the kidnapping of two Chinese engineers in Pakistan. During rescue operations by Pakistani forces, a kidnapper shot one of the hostages. Five of the kidnappers were killed. Mehsud was not among them. In July 2007, Mehsud carried out a suicide bombing as Pakistani Police closed in on his position. Over 1,000 people are reported to have attended his funeral services.

Maulavi Abdul Ghaffar:
After being captured in early 2002 and held at GTMO for eight months, Ghaffar reportedly became the Taliban’s regional commander in Uruzgan and Helmand provinces, carrying out attacks on U.S. and Afghan forces. On September 25, 2004, while planning an attack against Afghan police, Ghaffar and two of his men were killed in a raid by Afghan security forces.

Mohammed Ismail:
Ismail was released from GTMO in 2004. During a press interview after his release, he described the Americans saying, “they gave me a good time in Cuba. They were very nice to me, giving me English lessons.” He concluded his interview saying he would have to find work once he finished visiting all his relatives. He was recaptured four months later in May 2004, participating in an attack on U.S. forces near Kandahar. At the time of his recapture, Ismail carried a letter confirming his status as a Taliban member.
in good standing.

**Abdul Rahman Noor:**
Noor was released in July of 2003, and has since participated in fighting against U.S. forces near Kandahar. After his release, Noor was identified as the person in an October 7, 2001, video interview with al-Jazeera TV network, wherein he is identified as the “deputy defense minister of the Taliban.” In this interview, he described the defensive position of the mujahideen and claimed they had recently downed an airplane.

**Mohammed Nayim Farouq:**
After his release from U.S. custody in July 2003, Farouq quickly renewed his association with Taliban and al-Qaeda members and has since become re-involved in anti-Coalition militant activity.

**Ruslan Odizhev:**
Killed by Russian forces June 2007, shot along with another man in Nalchik, the capital of the tiny North Caucasus republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. Odizhev, born in 1973, was included in a report earlier this year by the New York-based Human Rights Watch on the alleged abuse in Russia of seven former inmates of the Guantánamo Bay prison after Washington handed them back to Moscow in 2004.

As the facts surrounding the ex-GTMO detainees indicate, there is an implied future risk to U.S. and allied interests with every detainee who is released or transferred.
APPENDIX A.3

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APPENDIX A.4

FACT SHEET

Former GTMO Detainee Terrorism Trends

A DIA report dated May 12, 2008 cites the figure of 36 ex-GTMO men “confirmed or suspected” of having returned to terrorism... with Kuwaiti ex-detainee Aballah Salih Al-Ajmi’s confirmation of suicide bombing in Iraq, the figure is 37.

The number of former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainees confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities is about 7 percent of those transferred from U.S. custody. The identified rate of reengagement over three years of tracing has remained relatively constant between 5 and 8 percent.

General Trends

Of former detainees known or suspected of returning to terrorist activities, those transferred to Afghanistan and Pakistan generally have reengaged in local, tactical-level, anti-coalition activity. Alternately, those former detainees known or suspected of reengaging in terrorism who were transferred to Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa have more often reconnected with terrorist networks associated with transnational terrorism activities, usually the same networks they were associated with prior to capture. Those returning to the transnational networks are assessed as more likely to be involved in future major transnational acts of terrorism.

In most cases, the time lapsed between release and subsequent indication of post-transfer terrorist activity is approximately a year and a half, with reporting of such activity often lagging actual events by months or even years. Upon return, many detainees are held for varying lengths of time ranging from six weeks to several years. Due to the reporting delay and a general lack of information regarding former detainees, additional former GTMO detainees are likely to have been involved in subsequent terrorist activities.

Former detainees have participated in terrorist activities ranging from small-scale attacks to transnational facilitation and attack planning. However, the former GTMO detainees known or suspected to have returned to terrorism represent a small proportion of the total transferred or released.

Open-Source Reporting Identifies Detainees Reengaging in Terrorism

Ibrahim Shafir Seri was transferred to Turkey in November 2003. In January 2008, Seri was arrested in Van, Turkey, and charged as the leader of an al-Qaeda cell.

Ibrahim Bin Shehara and Mohammadi Bin Ahmad Mizan were transferred to Morocco in July 2004. In September 2007, they were convicted for their post-release involvement in a terrorist network recruiting Moroccans to fight for Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Recruits were to receive weapons and explosives training in Algeria from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which has since become al-Qaeda in the Lands of the

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2013] NATIONAL SECURITY DESERVES BETTER  App. A

6/13/2008

Maghtehb, before going to fight in Iraq or returning to Morocco's sleeper cells. The organizers of the group reportedly intended to create an al-Qa'ida-affiliated network in the Maghtehb similar to AQR. According to testimony presented at the trial, Bin Shakann had already recruited other jihadis when Moroccan authorities broke up the plot in November 2005. Bin Shakaran received a 10-year sentence for his role in the plot while Mizouz received a two-year sentence.

Abdallah Mahsud blew himself up to avoid capture by Pakistani forces in July 2007. According to a Pakistani government official, Mahsud directed a suicide attack in April 2007 that killed 31 people. After being transferred to Afghanistan in March 2004, Mahsud sought several media interviews and became well known for his attacks in Pakistan. In October 2004, he kidnapped two Chinese engineers and claimed responsibility for an Islamabad hotel bombing.

Ruslan Anatolyevich Odijev, transferred to Russia in March 2004, was killed in a June 2007 gun battle with Russia's Federal Security Service. Russian authorities stated that Odijev had taken part in several terrorist acts including an October 2005 attack in the Caucasus region that killed and injured several police officers. Odijev was found with pistols, a grenade, and homemade explosive devices in his body.

Ravil Shafayevich Gumarnov and Timur Rustamovich Ishmurat were transferred to Russia in March 2004 and quickly released. Russian authorities arrested them in January 2005 for involvement in a gas line bombing. In May 2006 a Russian court convicted both, sentencing Gumarnov to 13 years in prison and Ishmurat to 11 years.

Mohammed Imai was one of the “juvenile” released from GTMO in 2004. During a press interview after his release, he described the Americans saying, “They gave me a good time in Cuba. They were very nice to me, giving me English lessons.” He concluded his interview saying he would love to find work once he finished visiting all his relatives. He was recaptured four months later in May 2004, participating in an attack on U.S. forces near Kandahar. At the time of his recapture, Imai carried a letter confirming his status as a Taliban member in good standing.

Maulvi Abdul Ghifar was captured in early 2002 and held at GTMO for eight months. After his release, Ghifar reportedly became the Taliban's regional commander in Uruzgan and Helmand provinces, carrying out attacks on U.S. and Afghan forces. On 25 September 2004, while planning an attack against Afghan police, Ghifar and two of his men were killed in a raid by Afghan security forces.

Yousef Mohammed Yangouh, better known as Mullah Shaza, was released from GTMO in May 2003. Shaza quickly rejoined the Taliban as a commander in southern Afghanistan. In this role, his activities reportedly included the organization and execution of a jailbreak in Kandahar, and a nearly successful capture of the border town of Spin Boldak. Shaza was killed on 7 May 2004 fighting U.S. forces. His memorial in Quetta, Pakistan, drew many Taliban leaders wanted by U.S. forces. At the time of his release, there was no indication he was a member of any terrorist organization or posed a risk to U.S. or Allied interests.
Mohammed Nour Farouq: After his release from U.S. custody in July 2001, Farouq quickly renewed his association with Taliban and al-Qaeda members and has since become re-involved in anti-coalition militant activity.

Abdul Rahman Noor: Noor was released in July of 2003, and has since participated in fighting against US forces near Kandahar. After his release, Noor was identified as the person in an October 7, 2001, video interview with Al-Jazeera TV network wherein he is identified as the "deputy-defense minister of the Taliban." In this interview, he described the defensive position of the mujahideen and claimed they had recently downed an airplane.

Abdallah Sadiq al-Ajmi: Was transferred to Kuwait in 2005 and subsequently conducted a suicide bombing attack in Mosul, Iraq in April 2008. Three suicide bomber struck in Mosul on April 26, 2008, killing 7 people. Al-Ajmi had returned to Kuwait following his release from Guantanamo Bay and traveled to Iraq via Syria. He was apparently living a productive life in Kuwait prior to histraveling to Iraq to be a suicide bomber. His unknown what motivated him to leave Kuwait and go to Iraq. His family members were reportedly shocked to hear he had conducted a suicide bombing.

Definitions for Confirmed and Suspected Cases

Definition of "Confirmed" — A preponderance of evidence—fingerprints, DNA, conclusive photographic match, or reliable, verified, or well-corroborated intelligence reporting—identifies a specific former Defense Department detainee as directly involved in terrorist activities.

Definition of "Suspected" — Significant reporting indicates a former Defense Department detainee is involved in terrorist activities and analysis indicates the detainee is most likely associated with a specific former detainee or unverified or single-source, but plausible, reporting indicates a specific former detainee is involved in terrorist activities.
FACT SHEET

Former Guantanamo Detainee Terrorism Trends

Based on a comprehensive review of available information as of mid-March 2009, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported 14 percent as the overall rate of former Guantanamo detainees confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorist activity. Of the more than 300 Guantanamo detainees transferred from Department of Defense custody at Guantanamo Bay, 27 were confirmed and 47 were suspected of reengaging in terrorist activity between December 2003 and March 2009. Some detainees were added to the confirmed list, six of whom were previously on the suspected list.

Various former Guantanamo detainees are known to have reengaged in terrorist activity associated with the al-Qaeda network, and have been arrested for reengaging in terrorist activities including facilitating the travel of terrorists into war zones, providing funds to al-Qaeda, and supporting and associating with known terrorists.

The following summary, based on DIA assessments and analysis, is as comprehensive an possible gives national-security-sensitive, much of the information regarding specific former Guantanamo detainees’ involvement in terrorist activities remains classified.

Definitions for Confirmed and Suspected Cases

Definition of “Confirmed”—A preponderance of evidence—fingerprints, DNA, conclusive photographic match, or reliable, verified, or well-corroborated intelligence reporting—that a specific former Guantanamo detainee is directly involved in terrorist activity. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. propaganda alone does not qualify as terrorist activity.

Definition of “Suspected”—Significant reporting indicates an individual is involved in terrorist activities and analysis of that reporting indicates the individual’s identity matches that of a specific former Guantanamo detainee. Or, unverified or single-source, but plausible, reporting indicates a specific former detainee is involved in terrorist activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. propaganda alone does not qualify as terrorist activity.

Review of Specific Cases Identified is May 2008

Confirmed Reengagement:


APPENDIX A.5


Ibrahim Elia Shamaan and Mohammad Bin Ahmad Mirrouz - repatriated to Morocco in July 2004. In September 2007, they were convicted for their post-release involvement in a terrorist network recruiting Moroccans to fight for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI). Recruits were to receive weapons and explosives training in Algeria from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which has since merged al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, before going to fight in Iraq or returning to Morocco as sleeper cells. The argument of the case repeatedly intended to create an al-Qa'ida-affiliated network in the Maghreb similar to AQI. According to testimony presented at the trial, Bin Shamaan had already recruited other Moroccans when Moroccan authorities broke up the plot in November 2005. For their roles in this plot, Bin Shamaan received a 16-year sentence and Mirrouz received a two-year sentence.

Ibrahim Shaha Sen - repatriated to Turkey in November 2001. In January 2008, Sen was arrested in Van, Turkey, and indicted in June 2008 as a leader of al-Qa'ida cells in Van. In addition, Sen also recruited and trained new members, provided illegal weapons to the group, and facilitated the movement of jihadists.

Ravil Shafiguyevich Gumarov and Timur Raviliq Musaev - repatriated to Russia in March 2004. Russian authorities arrested them in January 2008 for involvement in a gasoline bombing. A Russian court convicted both in May 2008 sentencing Gumarov to 13 years in prison and Musaev to 11 years.

Sa'id Mohammed Alim Shah, also known as Abdallah Mansal - repatriated to Afghanistan in March 2004. Alim Shah blew himself up to avoid capture by Pakistani forces in July 2007. According to a Pakistani government official, Manalad directed a suicide attack in April 2007 that killed 81 people. After his release out of Guantanamo, Mansal sought several media interviews and became well known for his attacks in Pakistan. In October 2004, he kidnapped two Chinese engineers, and chaired responsibility for an伊斯兰istic hotel bombing.

Mohammed Ibraheem repatriated to Afghanistan in 2004, repatriation confirmed. During a press interview after his release, he described the Americans saying, "They gave me a good time in Cuba. They were very nice to me, giving me English lessons." He was recaptured four months later in May 2004, participating in attacks against U.S. forces near Kandahar. At the time of his recapture, Ibraheem carried a letter confirming his status as a Taliban member in good standing.

Yousef Muhammad Yusupah, better known as Mullah Shazada - repatriated to Afghanistan in May 2003. Shazada quickly rejoined the Taliban as a commander in southern Afghanistan. His activities reportedly included recruiting and executing a jailbreak in Lashkar Gah, and a nearly successful capture of a border town of Syni
Boldak, Shazadi was killed on 7 May 2004 fighting U.S. forces. His memorial in Quetta, Pakistan, drew many Taliban leaders wanted by U.S. forces.

Suspended Engagement:

Raslan Aanorlivik: Odijev, repatriated to Russia in March 2004. Odijev was killed in a June 2007 battle with Russia’s Federal Security Service. Russian authorities stated Odijev participated in several terrorist acts including an October 2005 attack in the Caucasian region that killed and injured several police officers. Odijev was found with pistols, a grenade, and homemade explosive devices on his body.

Saif John Abdul Ghaffar, also known as Maulvi Abdul Ghaffar – repatriated to Afghanistan in March 2003. After his repatriation, Ghaffar reportedly became the Taliban’s regional commander in Uruzgan and Helmand provinces, carrying out attacks against U.S. and Afghan forces. On 21 September 2004, while planning an attack against Afghan police, Ghaffar and two of his men were killed in a raid by Afghan security forces.

Mohammed Nayim Farouq – repatriated to Afghanistan in July 2003. Farouq quickly reasserted his association with Taliban and Al-Qaeda members and has since become re-involved in anti-coalition militant activity.
## Appendix A: Partial Listing of Former GTMO Detainees Who Have Reengaged in Terrorism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Restrained</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salih, Abu, Ghulam Shaheen</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>Killed fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Suspected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>Taliban commander, killed on 7 May 2001 Enemy U.S. forces</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yousef Mohammad</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>Taliban commander in Afghanistan, killed on 7 May 2001 Enemy U.S. forces</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yousef Mohammad</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>Associated with Taliban and al-Qaeda, involved in anti-coalition activity</td>
<td>Suspected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Sheik</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>November 2006</td>
<td>Leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen, travelled and trained members, provided financial support</td>
<td>Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosaad Khan</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>January 2004</td>
<td>Participated in attack against U.S. forces, Taliban leader</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdallah D. Farh</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>Suspected involvement in an attack against a tribally protected base</td>
<td>Suspected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmazan Rehman</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>Association with terrorist group, Harbin-Taiwan</td>
<td>Suspected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaman Rehman</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>Involved in a suicide bombing</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustam Anvarovich</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>Participated in several terrorist attacks, including one in October 2005</td>
<td>Suspected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umar Mohammad</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>Scampered with finance engineers, involved in funding for the Nusairi</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musideh, Abdul</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>Scampered with finance engineers, involved in funding for the Nusairi</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustam Anvarovich</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>Participated in several terrorist attacks, including one in October 2005</td>
<td>Suspected</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## UNCLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Allegations</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Ghafoor</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>Taliban commander; planning attacks on U.S. and Afghan troops; killed in a raid by Afghan security forces.</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Bin Abdul Muzin</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td>Recruiter for al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhalati Bin Shekhon</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>July 2006</td>
<td>Recruiter for al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iqbal Khan</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>Association with Taliban</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullah Chargha</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>Association with the Taliban</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Sadiq Ali al Ajid</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>Association with al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad al-Nuaimi</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>November 2007</td>
<td>Association with al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saeed Maktub Sand Masoodah</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>November 2007</td>
<td>Association with al-Qaeda</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mubarak Abdullah Labib al Mas'ud</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>Ties to terrorism.</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamid Al-Mulla</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>Association with known al-Qaeda terrorist network</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saeed al-Mulla</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>Leader/figure in al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Razzaq Abdul al-Salih</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>Arrested in November 2006 for supporting terrorist network.</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdul Halid Abdul al Salih</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>Arrested in September 2006 for association with terrorist network; supporting terrorists.</td>
<td>Suspended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zalib Shah</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>November 2007</td>
<td>Participation in terrorist financing</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Mohammed al Salih</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>November 2007</td>
<td>Leadership figure in al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula</td>
<td>Confirmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNCLASSIFIED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Taliban activity</th>
<th>Suspected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdullah Rauf</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>Taliban military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>commando for</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>operations of US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>military aircraft in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haji Salih</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>Afghanistan anti</td>
<td>suspected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islamist groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX A.6

DNI SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
DECEMBER 7, 2010

SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF DETAINEES FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, P.L. 111-259, Section 334, which states:

“The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of -

(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and

(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.”

(1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense

As of 1 October 2010, 598 detainees have been transferred out of Department of Defense (DoD) custody at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) detention facility. The Intelligence Community assesses that 81 (13.5 percent) are confirmed and 69 (11.5 percent) are suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities after transfer. Of the 150 former GTMO detainees assessed as confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities, the Intelligence Community assesses that 13 are dead, 54 are in custody, and 83 remain at large.

On 22 January 2009, the President signed Executive Order 13492, calling for a comprehensive interagency review of the status of all individuals currently detained at Guantanamo Bay. Every decision to transfer a detainee to a

foreign country under this review was made after a full assessment of intelligence and threat information. Since the implementation of Executive Order 13492 and under the enhanced interagency review process, 66 of the 598 detainees noted above have been transferred. Of those 66 individuals transferred since January 2009, 2 are confirmed and 3 are suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities.

(2a) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism

The Intelligence Community assesses that the number of former detainees identified as reengaged in terrorist or insurgent activity will increase. A February 2010 review of GTMO detainees’ release dates compared to first reporting of confirmed or suspected reengagement shows about 2.5 years between leaving GTMO and the first identified reengagement reports. Based on trends identified during the past 6 years, the Intelligence Community further assesses that if additional detainees are transferred from GTMO, some of them will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities.

(2b) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations

It is not unusual for former GTMO detainees to communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. The reasons for communication span from the mundane (reminiscing about shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning future terrorist operations). Correspondingly, the Intelligence Community assesses that additional former GTMO detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. Based on trends identified during the past 6 years, the Intelligence Community further assesses that if additional detainees are transferred from GTMO, some of them will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

Definition of “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities

For the purposes of this assessment, activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations, etc. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO detainees—on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing over shared experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious activities, writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements.
Reporting Qualifications for “Confirmed”
A preponderance of information identifying a specific former GTMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.

Reporting Qualifications for “Suspected”
Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GTMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.
APPENDIX A.7

At a joint hearing of the House and Senate Intelligence committees last Tuesday, September 13, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told the panel the recidivism rate for transferred Guantanamo detainees continues to rise, now up to 27%. He said that of the 599 detainees who have been repatriated from Guantanamo, there are 161 either confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities.

The Director of National Intelligence published a report in December 2010 assessing the recidivism rate at that time to be 25%. In April 2009, the Department of Defense assessed the recidivism rate of Guantanamo detainees to be 14%.

In January 2010, the Attorney General found that over half of the Guantanamo detainees at the facility as of the date President Obama took office would be transferred out of the facility. Since that time, Congress, reflecting the will of the American people, has barred the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the United States, and required numerous conditions to be met in cases where the President wishes to transfer a detainee out of Guantanamo. Reflecting his policy to close the Guantanamo facility both by emptying it of its current detainees and bringing to the United States instead of taking to Guantanamo senior al Qaeda terrorists recently captured overseas, President Obama has vowed to seek the repeal of these provisions.

Clipped below is the relevant excerpt from the testimony.

Thank you very much. You both expressed concerns about the rising recidivism rate among former Gitmo -- Gitmo detainees.

---

which is now even higher than the last-released figure of 25 percent. Yet the administration is sticking with its policy to close Guantanamo and refuses to send newly captured terrorists there.

Does it really make sense to foreclose the option of bringing terrorists to Gitmo, when prohibitions on bringing Gitmo detainees to the United States and on transferring detainees to Yemen make it impossible to close Gitmo anytime in the near future? And what can the intelligence community be doing to stop the recidivism rate from going up?

CLAPPER:

Well, sir, the -- as you know, the administration policy expressed in the executive order that President Obama signed almost immediately after taking office was a commitment to close Guantanamo. Lots of reasons for that, not the least of which is the symbol which Guantanamo has -- has become.

So that's the administration policy. I think what we've tried to do, or the administration has tried to do is to treat each case on a case-by-case basis, depending on the circumstances of capture, the importance of it, is there sufficient evidence for prosecution, et cetera.

In the end, sir, this is really not an intelligence issue. I think our concern is the ability to interrogate and to glean information from these detainees regardless of where they're incarcerated and regardless of whether they're attended to through a military commission or through a civil court system.

So our interest -- my interest -- and whether they're mirrored or not, it's getting the intelligence from them, rather than where -- where they are incarcerated.

And you're quite right about the recidivism rate. It's on the order of 27 percent. There are, I think, some 161 -- there have been 999 detainees that have been repatriated from Guantanamo; some 181 of them either confirmed or suspected to be recidivists. I should point out, many of them have been taken off the battlefield through kinetic encounters, if you will. So that is a concern.

As to what the intelligence community can do to stem the recidivist rate since, you know, one is one too many, is to ensure that in the interagency deliberations that are conducted to make judgments about whether or not to repatriate someone and where, to ensure that we have provided the maximum accurate and current information on the potential threat posed by such repatriation.
APPENDIX A.8

Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees:
Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the
Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states:

"The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall make publicly
available an unclassified summary of:

1. intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention
Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense;

and

2. an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or
communicate with persons in terrorist organizations."

(1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the
Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reengagement of Former GTMO Detainees: n = 29 December 2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Derived From: Proposed Rule 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detainees Transferred: Total: 599*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confirmed of Reengaging: Dead - 12 of 9; 92 of 531 (17.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In custody - 28 of 531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net in custody - 52 of 531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspected of Reengaging: Dead - 2 of 72; 72 of 531 (12.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In custody - 26 of 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net in custody - 42 of 72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*An additional eight detainees died while at GTMO, and one was transferred to New York for trial, was
convicted, and is now imprisoned in Coleman.

1 Executive Order 13460 was signed on January 22, 2009, to determine the disposition of the 240 detainees then
remaining at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

208 JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF
DETAINES FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA 1 (2012), available at
(2) (a) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism.

Based on trends identified during the past 9 years, we assess that if additional detainees are transferred without conditions from GITMO, some will reengage in terrorist or insurgent activities. Posing a particular problem are transfers to countries with ongoing conflicts and internal instability as well as active recruitment by insurgent and terrorist organizations.

(2) (b) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.

Former GITMO detainees routinely communicate with each other, families of other former detainees, and previous associates who are members of terrorist organizations. The reasons for communications span from the mundane (recalling shared experiences) to the nefarious (planning terrorist operations). We assess that some GITMO detainees transferred in the future also will communicate with other former GITMO detainees and persons in terrorist organizations. We do not consider mere communication with individuals or organizations — including other former GITMO detainees — as an indicator of reengagement. Rather, the motives, intentions, and purposes of each communication are taken into account when assessing whether the individual has reengaged.

**Definition of “Terrorist” or “Insurgent” Activities.** Activities such as the following indicate involvement in terrorist or insurgent activities: planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, and arranging for movement of individuals involved in terrorist operations. It does not include mere communications with individuals or organizations — including other former GITMO detainees — on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing about shared experiences at GITMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-hostile activities, writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements.

**Definition of “Confirmed.”** A preponderance of information which identifies a specific former GITMO detainee as directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.

**Definition of “Suspected.”** Plausible but unverified or single-source reporting indicating a specific former GITMO detainee is directly involved in terrorist or insurgent activities. For the purposes of this definition, engagement in anti-U.S. statements or propaganda does not qualify as terrorist or insurgent activity.
### APPENDIX B
**GUANTÁNAMO BAY DETAINES ALLEGEDLY RELEASED AND SUBSEQUENTLY RE-CAPTURED OR KILLED IN COMBAT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES**

#### TIME LINE OF NUMBERS CITED PUBLICLY BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th># CITED</th>
<th>GOVT. OFFICIAL</th>
<th>QUOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 13, 2011</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence</td>
<td>“There are, I think, some 161—there have been 599 detainees that have been repatriated from Guantanamo; some 161 of them either confirmed or suspected to be recidivists. I should point out, many of them have been taken off the battlefield through kinetic encounters, if you will. So that is a concern.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 2010</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence</td>
<td>“As of 1 October 2010, 598 detainees have been transferred out of Department of Defense (DoD) custody at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) detention facility. The Intelligence Community assesses that 81 (13.5 percent) are confirmed and 69 (11.5 percent) are suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities after transfer. Of the 150 former GTMO detainees assessed as confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorist or insurgent activities, the Intelligence Community assesses that 13 are dead, 54 are in custody, and 83 remain at large.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2010</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>John Brennan, President Obama’s chief counter-terrorism adviser</td>
<td>According to the most recent report to Congress pursuant to section 319 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, the Intelligence Community assesses that 20 percent of detainees transferred from Guantanamo are confirmed or suspected of recidivist activity. This figure includes 9.6 percent of detainees who are confirmed recidivists and 10.4 percent of detainees who the Intelligence Community suspects, but is not certain, may have engaged in recidivist activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Author/Source</td>
<td>Text</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr. 7, 2009</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Defense Department</td>
<td>“Based on a comprehensive review of available information as of mid-March 2009, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that 14 percent of the overall rate of former Guantanamo detainees confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorist activities. Of the more than 530 Guantanamo detainees transferred from Department of Defense custody at Guantanamo Bay, 27 were confirmed and 47 were suspected of reengaging in terrorist activity. Between December 2008 and March 2009, nine detainees were added to the confirmed list, six of whom were previously on the suspected list.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 13, 2009</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Geoff Morrell, Pentagon spokesman</td>
<td>“I can disclose with you the fact that we have a new—we have updated recidivism numbers of people who have been at Guantanamo, and these are the latest numbers we have as of the end of December. And it shows a pretty substantial increase in recidivism. I think prior to this report, I think the rate had been about 7 percent of those who had been held at Guantanamo and released who have been confirmed or suspected of returning to the fight. At that time we suspected that 30—confirmed or suspected that 37 former detainees had returned to the fight. We now believe that that number has increased and that the overall known terrorist reengagement rate has increased to 11 percent. The new numbers are, we believe, 18 confirmed and 43 suspected of returning to the fight. So 61 in all former Guantanamo detainees are confirmed or suspected of returning to the fight.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Defense Department</td>
<td>“A DIA report dated May 12, 2008 cites the figure of 36 ex-GTMO men “confirmed or suspected” of having returned to terrorism... with Kuwaiti ex-detainee Abdallah Salih Al-Ajmi’s confirmation of suicide bombing in Iraq, the figure is 37. The number of former Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) detainees confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities is about 7 percent of those transferred from U.S. custody. The identified rate of</td>
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### SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Quote</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 09, 2007</td>
<td>Rear Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr. (USN), Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo</td>
<td>“Of those detainees transferred or released, we believe approximately 30 have returned to the fight.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 26, 2007</td>
<td>Daniel J. Dell’Orto, Principal Deputy General Counsel Dept. of Def.</td>
<td>“The General number is around—just short of 30, I think. It’s a combination of 30 we believe have either been captured or killed on the battlefield, so some of them have actually died on the battlefield.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 17, 2007</td>
<td>Michael F. Scheuer, Former Chief, Bin Laden Unit, C.I.A.</td>
<td>“But the rub comes with the release, and that is where we are going to eventually have to come down and sit down and do some hard talking, as the Europeans said, because we have had already two dozen of these people come back from Guantanamo Bay and either be killed in action against us or recaptured.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 29, 2007</td>
<td>Patrick F. Philbin, Associate Deputy Attorney, U.S. Dept. of Justice</td>
<td>“The danger that these detainees potentially pose is quite real, as has been demonstrated by the fact that to date at least 29 detainees released from Guantanamo re-engaged in terrorist activities, some by rejoining hostilities in Afghanistan where they were either killed or captured on the battlefield.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 08, 2007</td>
<td>Senator Lindsey Graham (SC)</td>
<td>“Twelve of the people released have gone back to the fight, have gone back to trying to kill Americans and civilians.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 06, 2007</td>
<td>Sr. Defense</td>
<td>“I can tell you that we have confirmed...”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Approx.* indicates the specific language used was an approximation; the specific number cited was used contextually with qualifying language. See “QUOTE” column for actual qualifying language used within the immediate textual area of the number cited.

**At Least** indicates that the phrase “at least” was used in connection with the number provided; the number provided is therefore a baseline, or the lowest number possible.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of Individuals</th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Quote</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 20, 2006</td>
<td>At Least 12</td>
<td>Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Atty. Gen.</td>
<td>&quot;As you may know, there have been over a dozen occasions where a detainee was released but then returned to fight against the United States and our allies again.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 27, 2006</td>
<td>At Least 10</td>
<td>Senator Jon Kyl (AZ)</td>
<td>&quot;According to a October 22, 2004 story in the Washington Post, at least 10 detainees released from Guantanamo have been recaptured or killed fighting U.S. or coalition forces in Afghanistan or Pakistan.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 06, 2006</td>
<td>At Least 12</td>
<td>President George W. Bush</td>
<td>&quot;Other countries have not provided adequate assurances that their nationals will not be mistreated or they will not return to the battlefield, as more than a dozen people released from Guantanamo already have.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 02, 2006</td>
<td>Approx. 25</td>
<td>Senator Arlen Specter (PA)</td>
<td>&quot;[A]s you know, we have several hundred detainees in Guantanamo. A number estimated as high as 25 have been released and returned to the battlefield, so that's not a desirable thing to happen.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 19, 2006</td>
<td>At Least 10</td>
<td>Senator James M. Inhofe</td>
<td>&quot;At least 10 detainees we have documented that were released in Guantanamo, after U.S. officials concluded that they posed no real threat or no significant threat, have been recaptured or killed by the U.S. fighting and coalition forces, mostly in Afghanistan.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 2006</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Senator Jeff Sessions (AL)</td>
<td>&quot;They have released several hundred already, and 15 of those have been rearrested on the battlefield where they are presumably attempting to fight the United States of America and our soldiers and our allies around the world.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 2006</td>
<td>Approx. 12</td>
<td>Senator Lindsey Graham (SC)</td>
<td>&quot;About a dozen of them have gone back to the fight, unfortunately. So there have been mistakes at Guantanamo Bay by putting people in prison that were not properly classified.&quot;</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 25, 2006</td>
<td>John B. Bellinger III, Snr. Legal Adviser, Sec. of St. Condoleezza Rice</td>
<td>“Roughly 10 percent of the hundreds of individuals who have been released from Guantanamo ‘have returned to fighting us in Afghanistan,’ Bellinger said.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21, 2006</td>
<td>Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec. of St.</td>
<td>“[B]ecause the day that we are facing them again on the battlefield— and, by the way, that has happened in a couple of cases that people were released from Guantanamo.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 28, 2006</td>
<td>U.S. Dept. of Def.</td>
<td>“Approximately a dozen of the more than 230 detainees who have been released or transferred since detainee operations started at Guantanamo are known to have returned to the battlefield.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 07, 2006</td>
<td>Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Atty. Gen.</td>
<td>“Unfortunately, despite assurances from those released, the Department of Defense reports that at least 15 have returned to the fight and been recaptured or killed on the battlefield.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 14, 2006</td>
<td>U.S. Embassy in Tirana - Albania</td>
<td>“Unfortunately, of those already released from Guantanamo Bay, approximately fifteen have returned to acts of terror and been recaptured.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 10, 2006</td>
<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary</td>
<td>Twelve detainees who’d been released from Guantanamo had returned to the battlefield and had been re-captured by U.S. forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21, 2005</td>
<td>Matthew Waxman, Dep. Ass. Sec. of Def. for detainee affairs</td>
<td>About a dozen individuals who were released previously, he said, returned to the battlefield “and tried to harm us again.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13, 2005</td>
<td>Gen. Bantz Craddock, Commander, U.S. Southern Command</td>
<td>“We believe the number’s 12 right now—confirmed 12 either recaptured or killed on the battlefield.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 08, 2005</td>
<td>Rear Adm. James McGarrah</td>
<td>“About a dozen of the 254 that have been released since detainee operations started in Gitmo we know have returned to the battlefield—about a dozen.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 06, 2005</td>
<td>Scott McClellan</td>
<td>“I mean, the President talked about how these are dangerous individuals;”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Approx. 10% of “hundreds”  
**At Least 15

*Approx. 12

*Approx. 15

*Approx. 12

*Approx. 12

*Approx. 12
### 2013] NATIONAL SECURITY DESERVES BETTER App. B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 06, 2005</td>
<td><strong>At Least 5</strong> Anonymous Defense Official</td>
<td>&quot;At least five detainees released from Guantanamo have returned to the (Afghan) battlefield,&quot; said the defense official, who requested anonymity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 27, 2005</td>
<td>12 Senator Jim Bunning (KY)</td>
<td>&quot;I could describe many individuals held at Guantanamo and give reasons they need to remain in our custody, but I only will mention a few more, 12, to be exact. That is the number of those we know who have been released from Guantanamo and returned to fight against the coalition troops.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 2005</td>
<td>*Approx. 12 Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec.</td>
<td>&quot;I think that our belief is that about a dozen or so detainees that have been released from Guantanamo Bay have actually returned to the battlefield, and we've either recaptured them or otherwise dealt with them, namely killing them on the battlefield when they were again attacking our forces.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 2005</td>
<td>&quot;Some&quot; President George W. Bush</td>
<td>The president was quick to point out that many of the detainees being held &quot;are dangerous people&quot; who pose a threat to U.S. security. Some of those who have been released have already returned to the battlefield to fight U.S. and coalition troops, he said.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 2005</td>
<td>*Approx. 10 Vice President Dick Cheney</td>
<td>&quot;In some cases, about 10 cases, some of them have then gone back into the battle against our guys. We've had two or three that I know of specifically by name that ended up back on the battlefield in Afghanistan where they were killed by U.S. or Afghan forces.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16, 2005</td>
<td>12 Congressman Bill Shuster (PA)</td>
<td>&quot;In fact, about two-hundred of these detainees have been released and it's been proven that twelve have already returned to the fight.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 14, 2005</td>
<td><strong>At Least 10</strong> Vice President Dick Cheney</td>
<td>He provided new details about what he said had been at least 10 released...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>References</td>
<td>Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 13, 2005</td>
<td>Scott McClellan, White House Press Sec.</td>
<td>“There have been—and Secretary Rumsfeld talked about this recently—at least a dozen or so individuals that were released from Guantanamo Bay, and they have since been caught and picked up on the battlefield seeking to kidnap or kill Americans.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 06, 2005</td>
<td>Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers</td>
<td>“We’ve released 248 detainees, some of whom have come back to the battlefield, some of whom have killed Americans after they have been released.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 01, 2005</td>
<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary</td>
<td>“At least a dozen of the 200 already released from GITMO have already been caught back on the battlefield, involved in efforts to kidnap and kill Americans.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 20, 2004</td>
<td>Gordon England, Secretary of The Navy</td>
<td>“And as you are aware, there’s been at least 12 of the more than 200 detainees that have been previously released or transferred from Guantanamo that have indeed returned to terrorism.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 03, 2004</td>
<td>Charles Douglas “Cully” Stimson, Dep. Ass. Sec. of Def. for Detainee Affairs</td>
<td>Of the roughly 200 detainees the United States has released from its Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, detention facility, intelligence claims that at least 10 returned to terrorist activity, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for detainee affairs said here Nov. 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 19, 2004</td>
<td>Vice President Dick Cheney</td>
<td>“And we have had a couple of instances where people that were released, that were believed not to be dangerous have, in fact, found their way back onto the battlefield in the Middle East.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 17, 2004</td>
<td>U.S. Military Officials (as reported by the Assoc. Press)</td>
<td>“[A]t least seven former prisoners of the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have returned to terrorism, at times with deadly consequences.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 25, 2004</td>
<td>Donald H. Rumsfeld, Defense Secretary</td>
<td>“Now, have we made a mistake? Yeah. I’ve mentioned earlier that I do believe we made a mistake in one case and that one of the people...”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that was released earlier may very well have gone back to being a terrorist.”

| Mar. 16, 2004 | “Several” | U.S. Dept. of Def. | “Releases are not without risk. Even though the threat assessment process is careful and thorough, the U.S. now believes that several detainees released from Guantanamo have returned to the fight against U.S. and coalition forces.” |

APPENDIX C

![Table of DOD Reports by Date]
APPENDIX D: Government Figures for Recidivist Detainees

Number of Detainees Alleged to be Recidivists:
3/16/04 - 9/13/11

Number of Detainees Alleged to be Recidivists:
3/16/04 - 11/20/06
Number of Detainees Alleged to be Recidivists:

3/06/07 - 9/13/11