Authority Without Borders: The World Wide Web and the Delegalization of Law

Ellie Margolis∗∗

I. INTRODUCTION

We live in an information age. Thanks to the Internet and search engines such as Google,† never before in history has it been so easy to access so much information so quickly. With the advent of wireless technology and smartphones, we are becoming accustomed to finding answers online anywhere, at any time, and are exposed to more information than ever before in history. The Internet is replete

∗ The term “delegalization” was coined by Frederick Schauer and Virginia Wise in their article, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495 (2000).

∗∗ Associate Professor of Law, Temple University, Beasley School of Law. I am grateful for the ongoing support received from Temple Law School, as well as for the excellent feedback from Lee Carpenter, Andrea Monroe, Kristen Murray, and David Thomson. Special thanks to Kari Swenson, Alex Latanision, and Laura Adams for their excellent research assistance.

with websites designed to provide ready answers to questions.\(^2\) Indeed, the Internet has been described by the U.S. Supreme Court as “a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications.”\(^3\) Wikipedia, for example, is one of the largest encyclopedias ever created and is among the ten most-visited websites.\(^4\) Our first instinct when confronted with something we don’t know is to jump online to the “irresistible and indispensable ultimate answer-finder” and search out the answer to our question.\(^5\) For most questions, the answer can be found quickly and easily.

The majority of those individuals born in the United States since approximately 1965 have had this kind of ready access to information for most of their adult lives.\(^6\) Those on the younger end of the spectrum have used computers since childhood.\(^7\) These individuals, collectively members of Generation X\(^8\) and Generation Y (or Millennials),\(^9\) comprise the vast majority of law school graduates in the last fifteen to twenty years. The incoming generations of law students, the “digital natives,” have never known a world without ready access to information via the Internet.\(^10\) It is no surprise, then, that the technological abilities of recent generations of law school graduates have wrought changes at all levels of the legal field, from day-to-day law practice, to legal academic scholarship, to judicial decision-making.\(^11\)


\(^3\) Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).


\(^7\) Id.

\(^8\) Id. at 778 (defining Generation X roughly as those people born between 1965 and 1982).

\(^9\) Id. (defining Millennials as those born between 1977 and 2003).

\(^10\) Camille Broussard, Teaching with Technology: Is the Pedagogical Fulcrum Shifting?, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 903, 912 (2009) (noting that those who have grown up with these technologies since childhood, the “digital natives,” are currently making their way into law schools).

One of the most dramatic changes to legal practice as a result of the rise of the Internet is the transition to online legal research. It is now well documented that practicing lawyers conduct the vast majority of their research on the web. The nature of electronic search technology has brought about many changes in the research process itself. It is not unexpected or surprising that lawyers accustomed to jumping online for the answers to all of their questions of a personal nature prefer to go online for their legal research as well.

What is less clear is the extent to which, if at all, electronic research is changing the nature of the law and legal reasoning itself. While the medium of legal research may have changed, by and large, the source material has been assumed to remain relatively stable. Lawyers’ stock in trade—cases, statutes, and regulations—have long been the primary sources for supporting legal analysis. While there is no doubt that these sources remain the predominant tools for supporting legal analysis, there are signs that their primacy is beginning to weaken and that, increasingly, nontraditional sources are being used to support legal analysis.

This blurring of the line between traditional and nontraditional sources is due in large part to the transition from print-based to online research. The print-based system of legal authority provided legal researchers with a sense of the law as a separate and distinct domain. Today’s researchers, without the print-based frame of reference, do not see the separation and are more likely to turn to the nontraditional sources that provide substantive support for their analysis. These nontraditional sources have become a new form of

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13 See generally Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: A Paradigm Shift?, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 285 (2001) (discussing the effect of computer-assisted legal research on legal thinking); Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305 (2000) (arguing that the changing habits of the new generation of lawyers due to technology changes demonstrate a change in the way we think about the law); see also Kuh, supra note 11, at 224; Margolis, supra note 12, at 107.

14 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 285 n.2 (noting the difficulty of ascertaining the relationship between the organization of legal material and the development of law itself); Kuh, supra note 11, at 226 (noting that little scholarly effort has gone into understanding the consequences of electronic legal research).

15 See Berring, supra note 13, at 306.

16 F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 571 (2002).
authority and are changing the face of judicial opinions and possibly the law itself.

The blurring of the line between legal and nonlegal authority can be seen in recent judicial opinions. A quick look through a multitude of opinions reveals that the majority of citations are to traditional sources such as statutes and cases. While research shows that lawyers are accessing these materials online, citation rules require that the print version be cited in legal documents when a print version exists. Thus, many citations in judicial opinions reference the traditional sources of authority—print codes and reporters that contain statutes and cases, respectively. At the same time, the number of citations to electronic sources has increased significantly. Because the citation rules require print versions to be cited when available, the citations to electronic sources are more than likely something other than traditional legal authority. Thus, there has been a dramatic increase in the citation to nonlegal authority of all kinds, both in print and online. Few scholars have looked at the degree to which the information revolution and changes in the legal research process are contributing to the rise of electronic citation in judicial opinions, but at a minimum, the presence of these citations reinforces the notion that such sources can be used as authority.

This Article will look at the effect of electronic research on the use of authority in legal analysis and suggest that electronic search technology, along with easy access to information (both legal and nonlegal) on the Internet, is contributing to a loosening of the firm boundaries between legal authority and nonlegal information, thus changing our collective understanding of authority. Part II will address the nature of authority and show that our understanding of au-

18 See infra Part III.
20 This article does not purport to attribute the sole responsibility of changing the nature of legal authority to electronic research. That process is too complex to be attributed to a single cause. I do suggest, however, that electronic research plays a significant role in this process.
II. WHAT IS AUTHORITY?

“Authority” is the building block of any legal analysis. The common law system is built on the concept of precedent, used as authority, to develop the law and dictate future legal decisions. Yet “authority” is a complex concept, not easily boiled down to a simple definition. At a very broad level, this paper suggests that authority is anything used as support for legal analysis in writing. This Part will review the different types of authority typically recognized in the literature as they relate to legal research and analysis.

A. Traditional Legal Authority

Law is a field that depends on authority. The common law tradition at the basis of our legal system is “said to be obsessed with the citation of authorities.” From the very beginning of law school, law students are taught about legal authority. Every legal research text begins with an overview of the sources of law and types of authority. In their legal research and writing classes, law students are taught how to find and use authority to analyze issues and form legal arguments. The focus of that instruction is traditional legal authority—statutes, cases, regulations, treatises, law review articles, and legislative history.

21 While the concept of “authority” seems very basic, and the material covered in this section is mastered by even the most inexperienced law students, it is important to clearly lay the groundwork in order to show the ways in which technology is changing these fundamental concepts.


Sources are considered “authority” because of where they come from as much as for what they say. A judicial opinion from a controlling court carries authority because it is the decision of the court, regardless of the strength and logic of the reasoning. This idea, that a source must be honored because of its author or origin, rather than its content, is at the very heart of legal authority. Traditional legal authority is produced by lawyers, primarily judges and legal academics, for use by other lawyers, judges, and legal academics. For much of this country’s history, authority has come from a finite group of authors and has been published in a “stable universe of settled sources,” such as case reporters, code compilations, treatises, and law reviews. Legal authority has been inextricably bound up with the books in which it appears. The combination of the author and the book in which the source is published has traditionally given legal researchers an easy way to identify “authority.”

One of the first things novice lawyers are taught about authority is the difference between primary authority (statutes, cases, regulations, etc.) and secondary authority (treatises, law review articles, legal encyclopedias, etc.). Primary authority “is the law itself.” Secondary authority is generally defined as commentary and analysis on the law, written by expert practitioners and academics. Primary and secondary authority, as traditionally conceived, have two important things in common. First, they are legal in the sense that they are either direct sources of law or expressly about the law. Second, they have been published in books, controlled by the legal publishing market for at least the last century. Both of these factors are intertwined and are important for understanding the ways in which the legal research environment, and authority itself, has changed.

1. Primary Authority

Primary authority is the term used to describe rules of law that emanate from lawmaking bodies such as courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. Because these bodies are constitutionally em-
powered to “make law,” the documents they produce are automatically authoritative.\footnote{Schauer, supra note 24, at 1936–39.} Even the term “primary authority” suggests that this authority is more important and more authoritative than other kinds of authority. It is authority conferred by the status of its author or origin.\footnote{Id. at 1939.} Primary authority carries the highest status because in our system of precedent and stare decisis, decisions by courts, as well as legislative enactments, carry automatic weight regardless of the strength of their content.

Court decisions and legislative enactments are authoritative not only because they come from governmental entities with the power to make law but also because of where they are published.\footnote{Berring, supra note 25, at 1692–95.} Judicial opinions published in the National Reporter System and statutes published in official codes are unquestionably accepted as official and accurate sources of law.\footnote{Id. Not coincidentally, these are the publications that must be cited as the source for these primary authorities. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, supra note 17, R. 18.2, at 165, 215 tbl.T.10; ALWD CITATION MANUAL: A PROFESSIONAL SYSTEM OF CITATION, supra note 17, R. 38.1(a)(1) at 291.} A legal reader who encounters a citation to a case in the United States Reports will understand that the source is a Supreme Court opinion and will not question the validity or authenticity of that source. Likewise, legal researchers implicitly understand that cases published in reporters and statutes published in code compilations, or accessed through their online equivalents on Westlaw and Lexis, are primary authority. It is the combination of the source of information and its location that gives the document its authority without regard for its content.

In addition to learning that primary authority is “the law,” novice legal researchers are also introduced to the concept of “weight of authority”—the degree to which an authority controls the answer to a legal question.\footnote{Id.} Primary authority is typically divided into mandatory (or binding) authority and persuasive authority.\footnote{SLOAN, supra note 23, at 5.} One of the central features of the common law system is the doctrine of stare decisis, which dictates that the rule of law from a case is binding in subsequent cases on courts from the same jurisdiction.\footnote{Id. See generally BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).} Similarly, a lower court is bound by judicial opinions from a court higher up the chain of command.\footnote{SLOAN, supra note 23, at 6.}
Pennsylvania is required to follow decisions issued by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court but is not obligated to follow a decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Authority that is not binding but is relied upon to give credence to a point is called persuasive authority. Thus, the Second Circuit decision is persuasive, non-binding authority for the Third Circuit.

A judge faced with persuasive authority has discretion over whether to follow the authority or how much credence to give it. Thus, the strength of persuasive authority depends on the reader’s perception of its value. Texts are not binding, but still authoritative, when, although coming from outside the jurisdiction, the sources command respect, either through position or expertise. The status of the author or origin again comes in to play in traditional notions of what is considered to be authoritative. For example, a judge from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, when faced with an issue of administrative law, may turn to opinions from the D.C. Circuit, a court noted for its expertise in administrative matters, even though the Eastern District is not bound by cases from that court. Likewise, the Second Circuit’s reputation for expertise in securities law increases the likelihood that it will be cited in other jurisdictions dealing with securities issues.

Even if a court does not have particular substantive expertise, the mere fact that another court has already considered an issue facing a judge gives that earlier opinion some level of authority. Simply being “the law” gives primary authority a certain degree of respect, irrespective of its content, though the source of that law may have an effect on how valuable the authority is perceived to be. Because of

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39 Schauer, supra note 24, at 1948–49. Professor Schauer suggests that “persuasive authority” is a misnomer, and that this kind of authority should really be called “optional authority” since it is being cited not for its persuasive content but for the authority of its source. Id. at 1946.
40 See Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Peevey, 413 F.3d 1069, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005) (Bea, J., concurring) (remarking that “[t]he D.C. Circuit . . . has particular expertise in administrative law”).
41 Schauer, supra note 24, at 1958.
42 Id. at 1945.
43 One type of primary, persuasive authority that has generated a great deal of controversy recently, is the use of foreign authority. See generally Austin L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (2007). Technically, foreign authority is primary authority from another country and thus persuasive in a U.S. court. There has been much misunderstanding about the way courts use foreign authority. See Howard Wasserman, Misunderstanding Judging Foreign Law, PRAWFBLAWG (July 16, 2009, 4:20 PM), http://prawfsblawgblogs.com/prawfsblawg/2009/07/misunderstanding-judging-foreign-law.html.
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the status of the author (judge or legislator), as signaled in the citation by the publication (reporter or code), primary authority, even when “merely persuasive” or “optional,” has traditionally been considered preferable to secondary legal authority as support for legal analysis. 44

2. Secondary Authority

Secondary authority is the other major type of authority new law students are introduced to during their initial legal research instruction. While there is no official definition, secondary authority is generally considered to be commentary and analysis on the law. 45 The most typical types of secondary authority include legal encyclopedias, 46 annotations, 47 legal periodicals, 48 and treatises. 49 A simple way of understanding traditional secondary sources is that they are addressed to a legal audience. 50 New legal researchers are taught that these sources are useful for gaining general background about the law, but should rarely be cited directly in support of legal analysis. Secondary sources are never binding on any court, but like nonbinding legal authority, they command a certain level of respect as authority either because of the breadth of coverage or the expertise of the authors.

Like primary authority, secondary authority has traditionally been limited to writing about the law, published in a limited universe of sources controlled by the legal publishing industry. 52 A legal reader who sees a citation to an article in the Harvard Law Review or

44 SLOAN, supra note 23, at 4–5; THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, supra note 17, R.1.4, at 56.
45 SLOAN, supra note 23, at 12.
46 Legal encyclopedias provide general information about a wide variety of legal subjects. They include the national publications Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence, as well as several state-specific encyclopedias.
47 Annotations such as American Law Reports collect summaries of cases from a variety of jurisdictions to provide an overview of the law on a topic. See SLOAN, supra note 23, at 40.
48 Most commonly, these are articles written by legal academics, published in law reviews or journals based at law schools. See SLOAN, supra note 23, at 36.
49 Treatises generally provide an in-depth treatment of a particular area of law. Well known treatises include books such as W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS (5th ed. 1984) and JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (McNaughton ed., 1961).
50 Wes Daniels, “Far Beyond the Law Reports”: Secondary Source Citation in United States Supreme Court Opinions October Terms 1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 3 (1983).
51 SLOAN, supra note 23, at 29–30.
52 Berring, supra note 25, at 1680–81; Hanson, supra note 16, at 566–69.
Moore’s Federal Practice will understand the nature of the publication and make assumptions about the validity of its content and thus perceive the source as authority supporting the point for which it is cited. The greater the status of the publication, the more likely the secondary source will be recognized as authority; a treatise by a well-regarded author or a journal article from a highly-ranked law review is likely to be viewed as more valuable secondary authority than that from a lesser-known source. Thus, like primary authority, secondary authority gains its authoritativeness in large part based on the books in which it is published.

Secondary sources were not always clearly recognized as a form of legal authority. It used to be the rule in England that secondary source material could only be cited if the author were dead. Prior to the twentieth century in the United States, secondary sources were rarely cited in judicial opinions. By the later part of the twentieth century, however, citations to secondary sources became quite prevalent. There are likely several reasons for this. First, many common secondary sources such as law reviews and the Restatements were not developed and widely available before the twentieth century. Second, the very citation of secondary sources validated their use as authority. Once one judge cited a secondary source, other judges and lawyers became less hesitant to do so, and the effect snowballed until the reliance on secondary sources as authority became common. In any case, today, secondary sources are viewed as a valid form of legal authority, as evidenced by their widespread citation in judicial opinions.

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55 See Berring, supra note 25, at 1684–87 (noting that a review of Volume 175 of the United States Reports from 1899 shows that the Court relied on statutes, cases, and the record below, but very little else); Daniels, supra note 50, at 4 (noting a significant increase in the Court’s use of secondary sources over the course of the twentieth century).
56 Daniels, supra note 50, at 4–5.
57 Berring, supra note 25, at 1687.
58 Schauer, supra note 24, at 1957.
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B. Nonlegal Authority

As the term suggests, nonlegal authority is information that is not explicitly “about the law” and not directed at a legal audience but that is nonetheless used as authority in support of legal analysis. Nonlegal sources encapsulate the universe of information outside the traditional legal authority described above, ranging from classical philosophy, to dictionary definitions, to social science data, to daily newspapers.\(^59\) The majority of nonlegal sources provide factual information.\(^60\) Used as authority, these sources support the legal reasoning of the court.

If binding, primary authority is at the top of the hierarchy of traditional legal authority, then nonlegal sources are at the bottom.\(^61\) Under traditional notions of precedent and stare decisis, nonlegal sources carry no weight at all. Yet, like secondary sources, their appearance in judicial opinions has increased over time.\(^62\) Also, like secondary sources, since nonlegal sources have no inherent power to sway the court, the perception of expertise and reputation of the author contributes greatly to the persuasive power of these sources.

Nonlegal sources have long been used in judicial opinions, but very infrequently and, until relatively recently, from a limited number of sources.\(^63\) For example, in 1950, the New Jersey Supreme Court cited to *Life* magazine and the United States Supreme Court cited the *Harvard Business Review*, but there were few other nonlegal citations,

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\(^{59}\) Schauer & Wise, *supra* note 19, at 502–03. In defining the difference between legal and nonlegal information, Schauer and Wise include all government information in the “legal” category. *Id.* at 499. This author, however, considers government information to be classified as legal authority only when it is being used as a form of legislative history. When government information is being used directly by the courts in support of their analysis of the law (as opposed to their analysis of the legislature’s understanding of the law), this author submits that the information plays the role of nonlegal authority.

\(^{60}\) Factual information used by the courts falls into two categories—adjudicative facts and legislative facts. Legislative facts can be recognized and used by a court without the need for judicial notice, or adjudication below. See generally Ellie Margolis, *Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Nonlegal Materials in Appellate Briefs*, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 197 (2000). For purposes of this paper, the term “nonlegal authority” refers to sources used to support the legal analysis, not the adjudicative facts.

\(^{61}\) The use of nonlegal materials by courts has been controversial and often criticized. Nonetheless, the citation of such material continues. This Article does not address the controversy, or wisdom, of courts’ reliance on these materials, but accepts the reality that they are used and explores some of the reasons why.


\(^{63}\) Schauer & Wise, *supra* note 19, at 496.
and most of those were citations to the dictionary. Indeed, a study of the United States Supreme Court citation practices revealed that, with one exception, all of the nonlegal citations cited in the years 1940 and 1978 were to dictionaries.

As several studies have shown, however, the use of nonlegal materials in judicial opinions increased significantly over the course of the twentieth century. For example, one study found that citations to nonlegal sources from 1900 to 1978 increased by 1,429%. Another study of the United States Supreme Court, looking at cases from the October Term 1989 though the October Term 1998, found that nonlegal citations appeared in forty percent of the signed opinions. Since 1990, the citation to nonlegal sources by the Supreme Court has again increased dramatically, even accounting for the number of overall citations, number of clerks, and number of pages produced by the Court. The same trend can also be seen in the lower federal courts and state courts.

In addition to the numbers of nonlegal citations increasing, the variety of sources relied on by the courts has also increased significantly. Daily newspapers have seen an increase, not only in number, but in the variety of papers cited. Recent citation studies show that “virtually every discipline, scientific or not, has become fair game for citation.” More recent cases cite to textbooks and academic journals in the areas of economics, political science, sociology, psychology, medicine, criminology, and pharmacology. In addition, judges have also cited to sources only available on the Internet, such as blogs, Wikipedia, and Mapquest.

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64 Id.
65 Daniels, supra note 50, at 19.
66 Id. at 4.
67 Hasko, supra note 19, at 430.
68 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 497.
69 Id. See generally Robert Timothy Reagan, A Snapshot of Briefs, Opinions and Citations in Federal Appeals, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 321 (2006). For a fuller review of nonlegal, electronic citations in the Supreme Court and Federal Circuits, see infra section IV.
70 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 503.
71 Hasko, supra note 19, at 442.
72 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 503.
74 See Peoples, supra note 22, at 7–11.
The fact that nonlegal citations in opinions are increasing does not necessarily mean that those nonlegal sources are being used as authority, but a review of the cases suggests that many of them are. 

While there is no doubt that judges look first to primary authority in support of their analysis, judicial opinions also include citations to dictionaries, social science data, and materials from a variety of academic disciplines. In cases of first impression, courts cite nonlegal information, particularly in the form of legislative facts, to support the court’s reasoning. When there is no controlling precedent directly on point, courts can, and do, cite other sources in support of their propositions. This is the likely explanation for the relatively larger numbers of nonlegal citations in U.S. Supreme Court opinions, where there are no directly binding cases and the Court is most often dealing with issues of first impression.

The citation conventions of legal writing instruct that some citation is better than no citation. The culture of citation is so entrenched that the mere fact of a citation lends some authority to the statement being cited. In essence, the author is claiming that she was not the first to assert the point, and thus, because someone else said it first, it must be correct. Since there are typically no formal rules setting limits on what is considered a legitimate citation, when

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75 See generally David H. Tennant & Laurie M. Seal, Judicial Ethics and the Internet: May Judges Search the Internet in Evaluating and Deciding a Case?, 16 PROF. LAW. 2 (2005).

76 See infra section IV.

77 Margolis, supra note 60, at 219. Courts must take judicial notice of non-record factual information used to assess the factual situation, but the rules of evidence do not require judicial notice of “legislative facts,” which are facts used to help the court determine what the law is.


79 See id. at 1950 (indicating that “the conventions seem to require that a proposition be supported by a reference to some court (or other source) that has previously reached that conclusion”).

80 Id. at 1957. The chief exception here is the restriction of citation to unpublished opinions, a restriction that has been the subject of much controversy. See Sarah E. Ricks, A Modest Proposal for Regulating Unpublished, Non-Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions While Courts and Litigants Adapt to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 17, 21–22 (2007); Patrick J. Schultz, Much Ado About Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1464–65 (2005). The recent change in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allowing citation means that these restrictions exist now only in some states. See Margolis, supra note 12, at 112–13; Ricks, supra, at 22–24. Other citation practices, such as citation to foreign authority, have been controversial, but there are technically no restrictions on their use, and such authority plays the role of any other secondary or even nonlegal authority when relied on in support of legal
a source is used as authority, it becomes authority. Thus, as nonlegal sources are being cited increasingly, they increasingly take on the mantle of authority.

It should be no surprise that many citations to nonlegal authority are to sources found on the Internet. The number of citations to the Internet has increased steadily over the last two decades.\footnote{See infra Part IV.} Since citation rules generally require citation to print versions of legal materials when such versions exist,\footnote{See The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, supra note 17, R. 18.2, at 165; ALWD: A Professional System of Citation, supra note 17, at app. 2 (reviewing local court rules showing preference for print citation unless not available).} and most primary and secondary legal authority is available in print,\footnote{The only exception is that there are a growing number of local and administrative regulations published only online. See Margolis, supra note 12, at 112–13.} it stands to reason that the majority of electronic citations in judicial opinions are to nonlegal sources. Indeed, part of the reason nonlegal sources are now cited more frequently is that they are more easily available on the Internet than they were through traditional print research.\footnote{Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 510.}

The rise in citation to nonlegal authority signals a loosening of the firm boundaries of primary and secondary legal authority which have been the dominant paradigm for so long. There are two interrelated reasons for this trend. First, changes in legal publishing and electronic search technologies are making it increasingly difficult for the current generation of legal researchers to distinguish easily between types of authority and their relative weight. Second, the increase in nonlegal citations in opinions sends the signal to lawyers that reliance on these sources is acceptable and, in turn, leads to their increased use. The remainder of this paper will address these two factors in more depth.

III. ELECTRONIC RESEARCH AND THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE

The shift to electronic research over the last decade has been well documented.\footnote{See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 12, at 246; Kuh, supra note 11, at 224–26; Margolis, supra note 12, at 107–08.} Less clear, though, is whether the results of electronic research have yielded different results than running the same searches through print media. Some scholars have suggested that “the format change [of legal research] has not truly altered the func-
tional basis of the materials of legal research themselves.\textsuperscript{86} Others have allowed for the possibility that the shift to electronic research will give rise to changes in the development of doctrine as well as the practice of law.\textsuperscript{87} It is becoming increasingly apparent that recent generations of legal researchers are looking at research results very differently, and that this is changing the nature of legal authority itself.

Robert Berring has suggested that the change in the world of legal information has been so significant that it has created a “generation gap” between lawyers who learned legal research before approximately 1995 and those who have learned to research since the online revolution.\textsuperscript{88} The changes in legal research are affected by the changes in technology in two important ways. First, the changes from accessing legal materials in books to accessing them online have created both physical and cognitive barriers to distinguishing between types of legal authority, as well as between legal and nonlegal sources. Second, the search technology itself, combined with changes in the publication of legal information, leads legal researchers to search differently and focus on different results than traditional print research. These two factors combine to have a profound effect on what legal researchers focus on, see as relevant, and use as authority. The external clues which reinforce notions of authority in the print-based world do not exist in the online world. The technology driven changes do more than change the way we access legal materials. Indeed, they make it increasingly difficult to determine just what counts as “law” at all.

A. \textit{On the Internet, Everything Looks the Same}

Legal scholars have long posited that changes in the way that law is communicated have influenced legal analysis and the development of the law.\textsuperscript{89} For example, the shift from oral to written communication helped create and reinforce the notion that texts are authorita-

\textsuperscript{86} Berring, \textit{supra} note 13, at 306.

\textsuperscript{87} Kuh, \textit{supra} note 11, at 228.

\textsuperscript{88} Berring, \textit{supra} note 13, at 305.

tive and laid the groundwork for the concept of binding precedent. Because written decisions allowed readers to point to a concrete source, lawyers were able to argue that earlier decisions of courts should control later decisions. This foundational concept of legal authority could not have existed without the printed text. In addition, Robert Berring has written extensively on how the categorization of the common law, begun in Blackstone’s Commentaries and carried through the West American Digest System, created a kind of “cognitive authority” in the common research tools that shaped the way lawyers think about the law. Although they were not officially sanctioned by any court or legislature, the print volumes of the National Reporter System, West American Digest System, annotated codes, and Shepard’s citators unquestionably carried the weight of legal authority for any legal researcher in the twentieth century.

While some scholars have questioned the relationship between the medium of legal communication and its substance, there can be little doubt that there are some very real consequences of the shift to electronic research.

Because we are still just at the beginning of the shift from print to electronic media, we can only begin to assess the changes that have been wrought. There are two key ways, however, that print-based research reinforces the legal researcher’s understanding of legal authority in ways that electronic media does not. First, the physical reality of print sources created a “bright-line border” between legal information and other kinds of information. Second, the organization and categorization of legal materials contributed to the idea of law as a distinct domain, which reinforced the idea that there is a

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90 Collins & Skover, supra note 89, at 533; Richard J. Ross, Communications Revolutions and Legal Culture: An Elusive Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 637, 641 (2002).
91 Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law, supra note 89, at 33.
92 Berring, supra note 13, at 307–10; see also Katsh, supra note 89, at 658 n.91 (noting that the digests “subtly shaped the attitudes of generations of lawyers and law students about the degree of order and orderliness that existed in the legal system”).
93 Berring, supra note 25, at 1680–81.
94 See, e.g., Nazareth A. M. Pantaloni, III, Legal Databases, Legal Epistemology, and the Legal Order, 86 LAW LIBR. J. 679, 682–84 (1994) (questioning whether changes in printing and other communication technologies have a direct effect on societal and cultural changes); Ross, supra note 90, at 642 (questioning whether there is a causal connection between changes in communication and legal developments).
95 Berring, supra note 13, at 311.
96 Hanson, supra note 16, at 571. This idea of law as a distinct domain is also reflected in the legal academic literature. See, e.g., Jane Baron, The Rhetoric of Law and
firm line between what is law and what is not law. Thus, print resources give the legal researcher clear signals about the nature of authority, signals which are absent in electronic sources.

For most of the last two centuries, legal authority was easily identified and located through a “stable universe of settled sources.” Legal researchers understood that certain books contained reliable legal authority. For example, a legal researcher looking at the statutory text in the *U.S. Code Annotated* would have no doubt that it was a source of primary legal authority that is both reliable and accurate. Similarly, a researcher would understand that what she was looking at in the *Supreme Court Reporter* is a case authored by the Supreme Court, and is thus a source of primary legal authority. Even in series such as the *Federal Reporter* or the *Atlantic Reporter*, where cases from more than one jurisdiction are collected, the contents of the books are made entirely of cases—primary authority produced by courts. Law books even look different from many other types of publications—rows and rows of tan books with red and black stripes or maroon books, all lined up volume after volume. A researcher holding one of these books in hand has no doubt that it contains accurate, reliable primary authority. The mere fact that a case was published and physically exists in a volume of the *National Reporter System* tells the legal researcher that the case is a valid source of authority.

In contrast, when accessing materials electronically, the researcher is viewing a computer screen, the same screen the person would look at to check e-mail, catch up on the latest blogs, check the weather, or shop for shoes. The source is not isolated in a separate location. There is no obvious visual cue to tell the reader that what is being viewed is a source of primary authority, nor are there obvious visual cues that separate legal authority from other authority.

The lack of physical and visual cues is particularly salient for novice legal researchers, who may not fully understand the importance of using the official, primary source as authority to support legal

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97 Berring, *supra* note 25, at 1675.

98 Most legal researchers use this version of the U.S. Code in conducting legal research. See id. at 1680.

99 The National Reporter System books, including the *Supreme Court Reporter, Federal Reporter, Federal Supplement*, and all of the regional reporters.

100 *United States Code Annotated*.

101 Legal research courses have typically focused on how to access and use these books, without questioning the nature of their authority. See Berring, *supra* note 25, at 1681.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the motion of petitioner Celotex Corporation for summary judgment against respondent Catrett because the latter was unable to produce evidence in support of her allegation in her wrongful-death complaint that the decedent had been exposed to petitioner’s asbestos products. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, however, holding that petitioner’s failure to support its motion with evidence tending to negate such exposure precluded the entry of summary judgment in its favor. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 244 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 756 F.2d 181 (1985). This view conflicted with that of the Third Circuit in In re Japanese **2551 Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238 (1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S.Ct. 342, 88 L.Ed.2d 285 (1985), and now reverse the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit.

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As an example, in addition to fee-paid sites such as Lexis and Westlaw, multiple free websites now provide access to Supreme Court cases. A legal researcher, hoping to contain costs, may go first to one of the free sites. A case viewed on a free site looks much like a case accessed on Westlaw. For example, the opening paragraph of the case Celotex Corp. v. Catrett accessed from Westlaw looks like this:

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted the motion of petitioner Celotex Corporation for summary judgment against respondent Catrett because the latter was unable to produce evidence in support of her allegation in her wrongful-death complaint that the decedent had been exposed to petitioner’s asbestos products. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, however, holding that petitioner’s failure to support its motion with evidence tending to negate such exposure precluded the entry of summary judgment in its favor. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 244 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 756 F.2d 181 (1985). This view conflicted with that of the Third Circuit in In re Japanese **2551 Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238 (1983), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 474 U.S. 944, 106 S.Ct. 342, 88 L.Ed.2d 285 (1985), and now reverse the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit.

Greenberg, supra note 12, at 247–49; Margolis, supra note 12, at 108.


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The two cases look virtually identical, including the hypertext links to the citations. A careful review, however, shows that the Westlaw version contains parallel citations, while the Google version does not. This suggests that the two versions were culled from different sources. The Westlaw version carries the cognitive authority of the West name, while it is impossible to determine (at least on the website itself) the source of the Google version. To the modern legal researcher, for whom one source looks much like another, this distinction is likely to go unnoticed. \[106\] Without the physical presence of the book, today’s researcher is likely to be less attuned to that cognitive authority, contributing to the blurring of the boundaries of traditional authority.

Another example of this dichotomy can be seen in the controversy over “unpublished” \[107\] judicial opinions. Prior to the mid-1980s, unpublished judicial opinions were not widely available because they existed only at the courthouse or in the hands of the parties them-
Now, however, they are easily accessible online through a variety of sources, including commercial legal research sites and courts’ own websites. When viewed online, there is no visible difference between an unpublished and a published opinion, thus giving the reader no clear signal about the difference in the weight of authority.

Similarly, there may be very little difference, other than content and writing style, between a social science article and a judicial opinion. For example, in the recent case of *Abbott v. Abbott*, the Supreme Court cited to a report posted on a private website to support the proposition that child abduction can cause psychological problems. Viewed on the website, the opening paragraph of the report that the Court cites looks like this:

> Because of the harmful effects on children, parental kidnapping has been characterized as a form of child abuse reports Patricia Hoff, Legal Director for the Parental Abduction Training and Dissemination Project, American Bar Association on Children and the Law. Hoff explains:

> "Abducted children suffer emotionally and sometimes physically at the hands of abductor-parents. Many children are told the other parent is dead or no longer loves them. Uprooted from family and friends, abducted children often are given new names by their abductor-parents and instructed not to reveal their real names or where they lived before." (Hoff, 1997)

The text of the report on the screen looks very much like any other online text. It could just as easily be the text of a judicial opinion or a news article. On the Internet, virtually all text on a screen looks alike. Untethered from the physical reality of books, there is no clear delineation between legal authority and other kinds of information.

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109 Mills, *supra* note 106, at 930–31 (documenting the history of unpublished opinions made available on commercial websites). In addition, the E-Government Act of 2002, codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006), mandated that all federal courts maintain websites to provide access to all their written opinions, including those that had not been designated for publication.
111 This paragraph was cut-and-pasted from the Pandora’s Box website. PANDORA’S BOX, http://www.prevent-abuse-now.com/unreport.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). See Faulkner, *supra* note 110.
B. Legal Research Technology: A Paradigm Shift

The transition to online legal research has fundamentally changed the relationship between the legal researcher and the sources. While early forms of electronic research may have involved the transplanting of print research techniques into the electronic format, more recent technologies, combined with major transformations in the provision of legal information, have wrought fundamental changes in the way researchers seek and evaluate relevant information. This, too, affects the way that authority is viewed.

There are several ways in which the online research process contributes to a blurring of the traditional conception of authority. These include the loss of the West’s Digests and other indexing systems as the point of access into primary authority; the development of the search engine pulling from multiple sources and databases; the ease of accessing volumes of information and the relative ease of moving from source to source; and the code architecture of search technology, resulting in a greater focus on factual similarity rather than legal concepts. The result of all of these factors is that the researcher focuses less on the source of the material and more on the content. Thus, the focus of authority is no longer on who wrote it and where it is published, but instead on the factual content of the material. This is a very different view of authority than has traditionally been held.

1. The Death of the Digest

First, and most discussed in the literature, is the loss of structure provided by the indexing and digest systems in the print resources. Just as the physicality of books reinforces the boundaries of traditional authorities, so too do the finding tools most typically used when conducting legal research.

For at least the last century, legal researchers were taught to locate primary legal authority through West’s American Digest System or other subject indexes tied directly to the print resources they in-

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113 See supra notes 89–110 and accompanying text.

114 Berring, supra note 25, at 1693–94; Berring, Form Molds Substance, supra note 89, at 24–27; Berring, supra note 13, at 312–14; Kuh, supra note 11, at 236; Mills, supra note 106, at 920–28.
The print indexes most typically list subjects alphabetically, and the listings contain references, such as citations, leading the researcher to the information. Like the books to which they refer, these indexes reinforce the notion of primary authority by filtering the information through the lens of “the law.” The subject categorization, particularly in the digests, replicates traditional legal categories originated in Blackstone’s Commentaries. These categories, maintained and modified by the editorial staff of the publications, give the researcher some understanding that the source is part of the primary authority that makes up “the law.” This implicit reinforcement of legal categories helps to maintain a clear boundary between legal and nonlegal authority.

Second, the various indexes generally lead only to legal authority. For example, the Descriptive Word Index to the U.S. Code leads the researcher directly to the statutory provisions of the U.S. Code. The key numbers in West’s Federal Practice Digest lead the researcher directly to cases decided by the federal courts. The Index to Legal Periodicals leads the researcher to law review articles, which while not primary authority, are classic sources of secondary legal authority. A researcher using these research tools is only going to find sources of legal authority and will thus not even entertain the possibility of using nonlegal authority to support legal analysis. Because they reflect “the law” and lead directly to “the law,” the legal indexing systems implicitly reinforce traditional understanding of authority.

In contrast, electronic research has the potential to lead to nonlegal sources and blur the line between legal and nonlegal sources. In the early days of computer-based research, Lexis and Westlaw were primarily designed to replicate the National Reporter System.
law did not initially have full-text search capability, but instead provided only an online version of the Digest System. Thus, early computer researchers tended to use the same research process they were familiar with using to search the books, even when searching on the computer. The newer generations of researchers, however, are less likely to be familiar with the indexing systems and less likely to replicate the print research in an online format. Now, instead of subject indexes, the point of access in electronic research is the search engine.

The search engine is the vehicle through which material in online databases is accessed. While there are individual differences in search engines, the basic function is the same. The researcher enters search terms into a search box, which then uses an algorithm to retrieve results matching those search terms. In recent years, Westlaw and Lexis have moved to appear and function more like search engines on the Internet such as Google, first through natural language searches, and more recently through WestlawNext and Lexis for Microsoft Office. Thus, whether using a fee-paid service or free online website, the legal researcher is likely to conduct research without the filter provided by the traditional print legal-indexing systems.

Unlike the digests and other indexes, in which the researcher must use a preexisting legal framework, when using a search engine the parameters of the search are entirely up to the researcher. Even when searching a database limited to primary authority, such as the database of Supreme Court cases on Westlaw, one consequence of this type of searching is that the results are dictated only by matching terms, not by concept or area of law. Searches will yield a broader array of sources, not predetermined to fit into the same category of legal claim by an editorial staff. As a result, researchers are

121 Id.
122 Greenberg, supra note 12, at 259–60; Kuh, supra note 11, at 245.
123 Mills, supra note 106, at 932. See also Berring, supra note 25, at 1706 (predicting that the search engine will replace the National Reporter System as the major filter of information for legal research).
124 See Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 293–95.
127 Mills, supra note 106, at 932 (noting the “growing resistance” to using subject indexes when conducting legal research).
128 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 297–98; Kuh, supra note 11, at 245.
129 Kuh, supra note 11, at 245.
likely to think more broadly about what constitutes relevant authority for analysis of a particular legal problem.\footnote{Id. at 255–60.}

Thus, the loss of the digest and other indexing systems as the point of access into legal research has created a research environment in which researchers are less likely to be steered directly to controlling, primary legal authority. The lack of framing leads researchers to think more broadly about what sources are relevant to support legal analysis and thus blurs the clear lines of traditional legal authority.

2. Multiple Sources, Multiple Databases

Another effect of the search engine as the primary tool of authority is that, unlike the print-research tools, which clearly point to sources of legal authority, search engines generally pull from databases containing multiples sources, and even from multiple databases at once. Because legal and nonlegal sources often come up in the same search, it is less likely that the researcher will be attuned to the differences between primary, secondary, and nonlegal authority.

As noted above, when using the books and their attendant finding tools, the researcher knows exactly which type of source is being viewed. A researcher running a search through a search engine, however, is much less likely to understand how the search engine works, or what databases the search results are drawn from.\footnote{See Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 298–99 (noting that the average attorney does not have the time or patience to learn the research protocols of the research systems and is not likely to use them if they are too complicated).} While the online legal research services tend to focus on legal authority, it can be difficult to discern the scope of the database or where the information comes from. For example, as presented above, the Westlaw and Google Scholar versions of the \textit{Celotex} case appear slightly different, but it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to learn where the cases came from.\footnote{See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text.}

Not only is the database often unclear, but the researcher can use the same strategies, and same search engines, to access both legal and nonlegal materials.\footnote{See Mills, supra note 106, at 934 (“The cases on websites from outside the West paradigm derive from a variety of sources and are compiled and issued through a variety of processes that are not generally identifiable or subject to scrutiny.”).} A researcher no longer needs to go to a law-only database to access legal materials. As a result, a search via a
search engine such as Google will yield primary, secondary, and non-legal sources all in the same search. Even the legal-research sites are moving to platforms that are more likely to yield these multiple results. For example, the new WestlawNext has a search box that looks much like Google, and is preset to draw from multiple databases. While it is possible to select particular databases, the default settings will draw from primary and secondary materials relevant to the search topic. Thus, from the perspective of the researcher, “multiple sources of information merge into one source; one does not even feel that one is consulting multiple sources.”

When information appears to be coming from one source, and there are no physical reminders to the researcher that some sources are traditional forms of authority and others are not, the researcher is much less likely to be attuned to the differences between primary, secondary, and nonlegal authority. Thus, not only the medium of the Internet, but also the multiple database search technology contributes to the blurring of the lines between different types of authority.

3. Low Transaction Costs and Information Overload

One of the most wonderful aspects of computer-assisted legal research, and one of the most challenging, is the sheer ease of accessing information. A researcher need only type a few words into a search engine to receive a voluminous amount of information. The time and energy cost of retrieving information is quite low in compar-

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136 For example, the search “hostile work environment” on WestlawNext, conducted on July 11, 2010, with the database selection of “All Federal,” resulted in Supreme Court cases, federal statutes, regulations, administrative decisions, secondary sources, briefs, pleadings, motions and memoranda, among other search results.


ison to print-based research. Thus, it is likely that the researcher will have a much greater amount of material to sift through in identifying material relevant to the issue being researched.

Unless the researcher has been careful about limiting the database, the volume of material is likely to obscure the clear lines between different kinds of authority. Even a case law search limited to a controlling jurisdiction will retrieve unpublished as well as published opinions. Most searches on Westlaw or Lexis will retrieve a broader array of primary and secondary sources across multiple jurisdictions. Unmediated by the Digest System, the cases retrieved will likely touch on a broader array of subjects than those discovered through print research. Research on the Internet will yield an even greater variety of primary, secondary, and nonlegal authority. The vast array of materials is likely to de-emphasize the importance of traditional primary authority. The researcher is less likely to focus on the source and instead to look more broadly at what is relevant, eroding traditional definitions of usable authority.

In addition to the sheer volume of material facing a researcher, hypertext technology allows the research to move about within the document. For example, the results of a case law search will include the case name and a relevant snippet of the material that matches the researcher’s search terms. Because the researcher is “invited to jump directly into not just the case text, but the section of the case text deemed most responsive to the search terms,” the researcher is less likely to focus on the traditional indicators of authority—which court issued the case, where it was published (if at all), how it is categorized, etc. Once again, the technology leads the researcher to focus more directly on the content of the material.

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140 See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 16, at 576 (noting that what used to take hours of tedious work can now be done in minutes); Kuh, supra note 11, at 247 (asserting that the lower time and energy costs for electronic research will expose researchers to more text during the course of their research); Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 513 (pointing out that what once would have taken two hours can now be done at “the click of a mouse”).

141 Valentine, supra note 139, at 189.

142 Hanson, supra note 16, at 579–80.

143 Valentine, supra note 139, at 194.

144 Kuh, supra note 11, at 249.


146 Kuh, supra note 11, at 246.

147 Id.
Hypertext technology also makes it easy for the researcher to move from document to document in a nonlinear fashion.\textsuperscript{148} For example, a researcher may retrieve a case through Google Scholar, and while reviewing that case, click on a link to a second case, and so on.\textsuperscript{149} Even if a researcher starts in a clearly identified database, as she clicks through from one source to another, she may soon lose track of whether the source is primary, secondary, or nonlegal authority. It is no wonder that hypertext technology, in combination with the sheer volume of material that electronic searching facilitates, has begun to blur the boundaries of authority.

4. Focus on Facts

The final factor contributing to the blurred lines between types of authority is that the electronic search technology pushes the researcher to focus on facts rather than legal concepts, which reinforces a focus on the content of the source material over the authority of the source’s author or origin. This is due in part to the lack of digests or other classification schemes to inform the researcher and in part because of the function of the search technology itself.

In addition to the effects of the abandonment of the digest and similar systems noted above,\textsuperscript{150} another consequence is that, for the researcher, there is no context for the results of an electronic search beyond the words the researcher has chosen.\textsuperscript{151} Word searching “inhibits the searcher’s impetus to seek out overarching legal principles within which to base legal arguments.”\textsuperscript{152} Without an understanding of how the source fits into the broad context of legal analysis, the researcher is likely to focus more on the factual content of the information. As the focus becomes removed from the law to the facts, the understanding of authority as “the law” will also fade.

This is exacerbated by the search technology which leads the researcher to retrieve sources containing factual similarities rather than legal ones. In a typical electronic search, whether on a fee-paid legal database or directly on the Internet, the researcher enters search terms into a search box. The search engine matches those terms against whatever database it is designed for and retrieves the results. The search returns documents containing exact matches to the

\textsuperscript{148} Broussard, \textit{supra} note 145, at 911.
\textsuperscript{149} Kuh, \textit{supra} note 11, at 248.
\textsuperscript{150} See \textit{supra} notes 92–118 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{151} Valentine, \textit{supra} note 139, at 195–96.
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Id.} at 196.
search terms. Because the search engine retrieves results based on matching terms, there is no indication of any relationship between the results, and indeed no relationship may exist beyond the appearance of the search terms. Unless the search has been run through a West’s Key Number, or other classification system, the search is likely to yield a much broader array of results not directly related to the legal principle being researched.

Several scholars have noted that keyword searching leads the researcher to focus on facts over legal principles. It is much more difficult to search for abstract concepts and legal principles because the search words are likely to yield a much larger number of results. The words used in abstract concepts are more likely to appear in a broader variety of sources and the complex relationship between words cannot easily be captured by the search technology. In contrast, facts tend to be more narrow and concrete, and thus easier to search for. Younger generations of researchers, who expect to be able to plug a few words into a search engine and get answers, are not likely to engage in developing sophisticated search strings to find authority in a more conceptual way.

Because the search technology facilitates a focus on facts, rather than legal concepts, the researcher is more likely to be drawn away from thinking about law in terms of traditional legal categories. Those traditional categories play a significant role in reinforcing traditional categories of authority. A researcher focusing on facts is going to see factual information as relevant before thinking about the source from which it came. An emphasis on facts as opposed to legal doctrine, in addition to the lack of filtering through digests and similar classification systems and the removal of the physical reminders of authority books provide, has resulted in a world of electronic research that lacks the traditional indicators of authority. This leads researchers to consider a broader array of different kinds of materials as relevant support for legal analysis.

153 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 293.
154 Hanson, supra note 16, at 574.
156 Kuh, supra note 11, at 259.
157 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 297; Hanson, supra note 16, at 583.
158 Bast & Pyle, supra note 13, at 293–94.
159 Id.
IV. ELECTRONIC CITATION IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS

In addition to the technology-driven changes in legal research, the second major factor in the blurring of the traditional categories of authority is the example courts set in judicial opinions. In an opinion, an internet citation to a nonlegal source sends the message to the reader that the source is legitimate, and that it provides good support for the proposition being cited. The more that online sources are cited as nonlegal authority, the more accepted they become, and the more accepted they become, the more authoritative they become. From the reader’s perspective, if the court is citing a source, it must be a legitimate authority, and thus the boundary between traditional legal authority and nonlegal authority is blurred. There are now a sufficient number of citations to online authority to send that message clearly to legal readers and researchers.

A number of scholars have documented the rise in both internet citations and citations to nonlegal authority over the last twenty years. The Judicial Conference of the United States has also noted the increasing frequency of judges’ use of internet-based information in their opinions. The increase in citations to internet sources can easily be seen by looking at the number of citations in the federal circuit courts since the mid-1990s, when internet citations first began to appear.

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161 See, e.g., Peoples, supra note 22, at 7 (noting that use of Wikipedia as support for legal analysis lends authority to Wikipedia as a credible source); Schauer, supra note 24, at 1957 (“A citation to a particular source is not only a statement by the citer that this is a good source but also a statement that sources of this type are legitimate.”).

162 Schauer, supra note 24, at 1957–58.

163 See supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text. These numbers do not entirely overlap. The rise in citations to nonlegal authority began before the Internet explosion, and at least some of the citations to nonlegal authority are citations to print sources rather than the Internet. See Hasko, supra note 19, at 430–40, 432 tbl.2.


165 Determined by searching each Westlaw circuit court database (“CTA”) for the term “http” in the opinion.
These numbers represent the individual cases containing internet citations, but not the number of citations themselves. Many of the cases contain more than one citation to online authority, making the total number even higher. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the Circuit Courts of Appeals went from no internet citations in 1996 to citations in the double digits by 2004, eight years later. The number seems to have leveled off somewhat in the last two years, though some of the circuits that initially were slow to include electronic citations, such as the Federal Circuit, still show significant increases. While Figure 1 encompasses a relatively small percentage of the total cases decided by the circuits, the Internet is sufficiently represented in citations to appear to readers as a valid source of authority.

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166 It was beyond the scope of this research project to count individual citations in the thousands of federal court cases containing at least one internet citation.

167 For example, the 441 cases citing internet sources in 2009 represent 1.6% of the 26,828 total cases decided by the circuit courts. Total numbers were derived by searching each CTA for generic terms “court appeal” in the opinion, with dates restricted to each consecutive year.
The Supreme Court serves as an even stronger example that online sources are valid authority. The Court first cited an internet source in 1996, when Justice Souter referenced two internet sources describing cable modem technology.\(^{168}\) Since that time, the Court’s use of the Internet has risen dramatically, and by 2002, all of the justices had used at least one internet citation in an opinion.\(^ {169}\) According to one study, during the 2004 and 2005 terms, over thirty percent of the Court’s opinions contained citations to the Internet.\(^ {170}\) The numbers are similar in the more recent terms. For example, in the Court’s October Term 2009, twenty-eight cases\(^ {171}\) contained internet citations out of the eighty-six cases decided,\(^ {172}\) for a total of thirty-three percent. The highest percentage was for the October Term 2007, in which twenty-nine cases out of seventy-one, or forty-one percent, contained electronic citations.\(^ {173}\) As with the circuit court cases, the actual number of internet citations is even greater than the number of opinions, because several opinions contain multiple internet citations.\(^ {174}\)

Yet the number of citations does not tell the whole story. The numbers alone do not make clear the degree to which courts use nonlegal information as authority to support legal analysis. The numbers do not show to what extent the sources cited are part of the lower court record, or are references to traditional legal authority available online. Although it is still true that citation to traditional legal authority far exceeds citation to nonlegal sources,\(^ {175}\) there are a substantial number of examples of significant reliance on nonlegal sources, demonstrating that nonlegal sources will serve as a model to today’s legal readers.


\(^{170}\) Id. at 326.

\(^{171}\) Determined by searching the Westlaw Supreme Court database for the term “http” in the opinion, with dates restricted between October 2009 and July 2010.


\(^{173}\) Determined by searching the Westlaw Supreme Court database for the term “http” in the opinion with dates restricted between October 2008 and July 2008.

\(^{174}\) Wilkerson, supra note 169, at 326 tbl.1.

\(^{175}\) See, e.g., Reagan, supra note 69, at 328 (noting that citations to published opinions greatly outnumber citations to other sources in a study of federal courts of appeals cases).
In their study of citation to nonlegal sources in the United States and New Jersey Supreme Courts, Federick Schauer and Virginia Wise specifically looked at the use of nonlegal information as authority in judicial opinions and found a significant increase in the use of nonlegal materials at the same time as a decrease in traditional secondary sources. This suggests that nonlegal materials play a similar role to that of traditional secondary sources in supporting legal analysis, and courts are increasingly citing to the Internet for nonlegal sources. A recent study of the citation to Wikipedia in judicial opinions notes a number of instances in which courts use Wikipedia to support reasoning or define legislative facts. While there is no way to know the degree to which courts are relying on nonlegal sources, as opposed to using them as “window dressing,” the fact that nonlegal sources at least appear to play the same role in opinions as traditional sources sets an example for legal readers.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s use of nonlegal materials as authority provides a good snapshot of the different ways these materials can be used. It should be no surprise that a higher number of nonlegal citations appear in Supreme Court opinions, since the Court is more likely to decide the types of cases where traditional legal authority is less helpful. It is also more likely that nonlegal citations will appear in dissents, where judges may be less constrained by traditional legal reasoning. A comprehensive study of the Court’s 1995–2005 terms bears this out.

The study also showed that internet citations are not limited to cases addressing particular issues, but instead are present in a wide range of cases, including criminal procedure, economic activity, First Amendment, civil rights, and judicial power. The majority of internet citations are to government websites of some kind. In addition to state and federal government documents, the Court has cited

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176 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 506–07.
177 Peoples, supra note 22, at 7–11.
178 Schauer & Wise, supra note 19, at 513.
179 See Margolis, supra note 60, at 221–32 (explaining why nonlegal materials are most useful in cases of first impression, cases of statutory interpretation, and constitutional issues).
180 Wilkerson, supra note 169, at 329 (finding that forty-four percent of references appeared in dissenting opinions, thirty-seven percent in majority or plurality opinions, and nineteen percent in concurring opinions).
181 Id. at 329 tbl.3.
182 Id. at 330. In this study, Wilkerson follows the coding categories developed by Schauer and Wise, see supra note 59, and classifies all government information as legal. Wilkerson, supra note 169, at 332.
sources on the Internet for documents from other countries, non-
profit and academic research (both legal and nonlegal), commercial
information, news, and popular culture.

The Court’s October Term 2009 opinions are not only consis-
tent with these findings, but provide some clear examples of the use
of nonlegal authority in support of legal reasoning. In the twenty-
eight cases containing electronic citations, there are a total of sixty-
one electronic citations. These are fairly evenly divided, with twenty
citations in majority opinions, eighteen in concurrences or combined
concurrences and dissents, and twenty-three in dissenting opinions.
Out of the sixty-one citations to internet sources, three are references
to the factual circumstances of the case on review.

Only six of the citations can clearly be classified as references to
traditional primary or secondary legal authority. Fourteen out of
the remaining fifty-two are clearly nonlegal sources, since they are
references to educational, nonprofit, or commercial websites. The

183 Id. at 332 tbl.6.
184 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. See supra note 171 for explanation
of the source of the October 2009 term statistics.
185 Id.
186 See Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 542 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) (citing STATE OF TENN., DEP’T. OF CORR.’S, ADMIN. POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES, INDEX # 506.14(VI)(B)(2) (Sept. 15, 2009), available at
http://www.state.tn.us/correction/pdf/506-14.pdf); Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S.
Courthouses to Offer Remote Viewing of Proposition 8 Trial (Jan. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/01/08/Prop8_Remote_
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Mojave National Preserve
Operating Hours & Seasons, DEP’T OF INTERIOR: NATIONAL PARK SERVICES,
http://www.nps.gov/moja/planyourvisit/hours.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2011)).
187 For example, in Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010), the Court cites
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy to an online source. Id. at 2474 (citing Fed. R. BANKR.
P. 3015(b), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/RuleAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/Overview/BankruptcyRules.aspx) (requiring that a plan be filed
within fourteen days of the filing of a petition). The Court also cites several law
review articles to online, rather than print versions. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi-

cago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3089 n.2 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Philip Ham-
burger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at
(citing Harold Bruff, Bringing the Independent Agencies in from the Cold, 62 VAND. L. REV.
188 Determined by the domain name containing .edu, .org, or .com. See, e.g.,
pdf/StudentLife/StudentAffairs/Handbook/stubb_handbook.pdf); McDonald, 130
remaining citations are to government websites,\footnote{Determined by the domain name .gov, or other identifying information. See, e.g., Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1823 n.9 (citing Available Emblems of Belief for Placement on Government Headstones and Markers, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS’ AFFAIRS, http://www.cem.va.gov/hm/hmemb.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2010)); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 941 n.27 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Electioneering Comm’n’s Summary, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ECSummary.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2011)).} twenty-four of which cite to the federal government.\footnote{See supra note 171.} Thirty-three of the governmental references are to statistical information or other support for factual assertions of the Court.\footnote{The high percentage of citations to factual information is consistent with other studies finding an increase in citations to nonlegal material. See supra notes 17, 60, 169 and accompanying text. The use of legislative facts in this way raises a serious question of whether, and the degree to which, courts are increasingly taking on a legislative role. Those questions are beyond the scope of this article, but well worth considering.}

The remaining citations fall into a gray area. While they are not strictly traditional legal authority, they are much more law-like and are used to support legal rather than factual propositions. For example, in \textit{Schweb v. Reilly},\footnote{130 S. Ct. 2652 (2010). Id. at 2663 (citing DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. TRS., HANDBOOK FOR CHAPTER 7 TRS., 8-1 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/library/chapter07/docs/7handbook1008/Ch7_Handbook.pdf).} the Court cites a Department of Justice \textit{Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees} in support of a statement about the proper role of the bankrupt individual’s estimated market value. Handbooks of this nature, prepared by the Department of Justice to implement the administration of a federal statute, are clearly an interpretation of law much like traditional sources of authority, but do not clearly fall into most lawyers’ understanding of primary authority. Before handbooks like this were made available online, they were not searchable by traditional means of legal research and, if not introduced into the record below, were much less likely to be used as authority. This gray area provides yet another example of a way in which legal authority may be changing.

While many of the internet citations in Supreme Court opinions appear in footnotes and in conjunction with a variety of other cita-
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tions, there are examples of an opinion relying solely on an internet source. For example, in his concurring opinion in John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, Justice Alito cited a report of the nonprofit Initiative and Referendum Institute to make the point that publicly disclosing names on a ballot initiative is not necessary to prevent fraud and mistake. A citation like this shows the reader that information from nonprofit organizations can serve as valid authority for legal analysis.

In some cases, the Court uses factual data to reinforce either the record below or the legal authority the court is citing. For example, in U.S. v. Comstock, the majority, in addressing concerns that its holding was too broad, cited the record below, as well as online statistics from the Department of Justice to show that the statutory provision at issue had not been extensively applied. This type of citation sends the message that an assertion is stronger if backed up by authority beyond the record below, and will send lawyers searching for factual data to back up their legal assertions.

Thus, with the example set at the top by the Supreme Court and carried through to many of the lower courts, lawyers and law students developing an understanding of how authority supports legal analysis will see nonlegal sources being used as authority. In combination with the ease of access to a seemingly limitless amount of information on the Internet and the loss of traditional markers of authority provided by print legal research sources, the move to more and different uses of nonlegal information as authority will likely continue and increase.

V. CONCLUSION

As technology marches forward and the generation of digital natives enters the profession in greater and greater numbers, changes

195 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
197 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (holding that the federal statute allowing a district court to order civil commitment beyond the date that a federal prisoner would be released is constitutional).
to the traditional definitions of authority are likely to continue. If the experiences with unpublished opinions and foreign authority have taught us anything, it is that, whether or not their use is controversial, sources will be cited if a lawyer or judge perceives them to provide support for a proposition. The same can be said of nonlegal authority.

While some courts have balked at the citation of nonlegal authority in support of legal analysis, its use is on the rise, and many courts are clearly accepting and using nonlegal authority. The problems with citation to online materials are legion. There is often no way to authenticate sources, links may become inactive, and website content is subject to change. Despite these drawbacks, for the generations that are used to easy access to legal and nonlegal information of all kinds, there is no going back.

This change is happening gradually—but it is happening. Instead of lamenting the loss of traditional definitions of authority, or trying to figure out ways to train lawyers to recognize authority in the same way they have for the last century, the time has come to find a new way. There is simply too much available information to permit the use of any source for any reason—there must be boundaries and ways to recognize when a source is authoritative.

There is much about the new world of electronic legal research that is not new. Lawyers have long had to comb through large amounts of information to find relevant sources. The law is complex, and even in the print world researchers had to distinguish among different kinds of primary and secondary authority to recognize the most binding and most relevant sources. The difference today is that the way those distinctions were once recognized is not as obvious in the world of electronic research. There is much that is better about the easy availability of information on the Internet. We can find a greater number of sources more quickly and we have access to relevant information that may never have been unearthed in a print-based search. These improvements, however, bring new challenges.

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201 See, e.g., Badasa v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 909, 910 (8th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the use of Wikipedia to establish the meaning of an immigration document).
If law is to remain a separate domain, there must be limits on the way sources are used to support legal analysis. But the limitations can no longer be rooted in the print sources of the twentieth century, and they can no longer be based solely on traditional notions of precedent and stare decisis. If the notion of authority has shifted away from who said it, and where it was said, then it must be replaced by another system. It is time for the profession—lawyers, judges, and legal academics—to formulate a new system. We need a new vocabulary for defining authority, and we need new methodologies for teaching and learning how to identify relevant nonlegal authority. The legal profession should embrace the changes brought about by the online revolution and figure out how to make the technological advances work in the legal analysis of the future.