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A STRUCTURAL APPROACH

BY

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New Jersey
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction

The end of East-West struggle between Washington and Moscow ushered an era in which both powers would cooperate and no longer block effective UN involvement on peace and security issues. Many observers, thus, predicted there would be more opportunities for cooperation on the issues of prevention and resolution of conflicts. The end of the cold war was also accompanied by enormous upsurge in ethnic, religious and local conflicts. Some of these conflicts occurred in former communist states of East and Central Europe where the collapse of the Soviet Union has left a power vacuum. Most of the conflicts that elicited UN involvement, however, took place in the failed states of the Third World. Post-colonial states that lacked economic resources and political institutions necessary to enjoy self-rule survived during cold war only because of the financial and political support they received from the two superpowers. With the end of cold war, however, the two superpowers lost their interest in the Third World and reduced their support and involvement. The external support withdrawn, many of those states collapsed from within. Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia are cases in point.

This shift from inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts caught the United Nations system as well its member states unprepared. As a result, inadequately trained, poorly commanded and under-financed UN forces were deployed. Some operations the UN was involved suffered from lack of clear mandates and insufficient political willingness of the member states to intervene in these costly and complex situations.
When and how to intervene, and how to make an exit has become a fundamental issue for many academics and statesmen.

In response to the surge of inter-communal conflict that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and UN’s failure to address these issues competently, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, requested a panel of luminaries around the world to make a comprehensive review of UN peace operations. Their review entitled, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* – also known as the Brahimi Report – represented the first far-reaching attempt to assess the evolution of peacekeeping operations before and after the cold war. The main objective of the Report was to make specific recommendations both for member states in their peacekeeping policies and strategies, and for the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) to improve its ability to carry out Security Council decisions. The conclusion of the Report is clear: “The key conditions for the success of future complex operations are political support, rapid deployment with robust posture and a sound peace building strategy” (2000, p. 1).

To ensure that these three conditions are met, the Report made several recommendations as outlined below:

1) Enhance headquarter’s capacity to plan and support peace operations (paras.170-197),

2) Establish Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMFTs) for mission planning and support (paras.198-245),

3) Implications for preventive action and peace-building, the need for strategy and support (paras. 29-47),
4) Implications for peacekeeping: the need for robust doctrine and realistic mandates (paras. 48-64),

5) New headquarter's capacity for information management and strategic analysis (paras. 65-75),

6) Improved mission guidance and leadership (paras. 92-101),

7) Rapid deployment standards and "on-call" expertise (paras. 86-91 and 102-169),

8) Adapting peace operations to the information age (paras. 246-264),

9) Challenges to implementation (paras. 265-280).

The Brahimi Report targets two groups in presenting its recommendations for reform: member states and the UN Secretariat. In its section on challenges to implementation, the Report emphasizes administrative and managerial challenges the Secretariat will face through the implementation process. These include the human resources management capacity of UN and the quality of the DPKO staff. The Brahimi Report recognizes that reform will not occur unless member states provide the necessary political and financial support. Therefore, the question of political and financial support of member states is crucial if the UN is to succeed in future peace operations. This study examines how political support is determined at the domestic level in the United States and makes recommendations for the United States on how to enhance its support for future peace operations. The findings of this study suggest that U.S. foreign policy in Somalia and Rwanda was a product of a domestic political process. However, contrary to the common belief the decisions were not based on careful calculations of U.S. national
interest. Rwanda, strategically and economically, was not less important to the United States, and the interests at stake were not more significant in Somalia than Rwanda. Nevertheless, United States intervened in Somalia but not in Rwanda. United States did not intervene in Rwanda not because it didn’t serve its national interest, but because it was constrained by the structure of the political process. Congress and the Military became more involved in foreign policy decisions compound to the Executive Branch and the representatives of the people manipulated public opinion to advance their own agenda.

The Problem and Its Significance

Many studies on peacekeeping, and the Brahimi Report in particular, concede lack of political support of member states as the fundamental challenge to its implementation. For example, the United Institute of Peace (USIP), in a study on Peacekeeping on Africa, concluded that technical and administrative improvements recommended in Brahimi wouldn’t have made a difference in the way the United Nations and the West responded to recent conflicts in Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda, or Democratic Republic of Congo, because in each of these crises the West lacked the will to act (USIP, February 13, 2001). Yet this study did not suggest ways to enhance the will of member states to participate timely and effectively in peace operations.

States often determine their political support for involvement in UN operations depending on their national interest in a given situation and many observers would agree that there is a direct correlation between political will and national interest. It is expected that the more important the interest at stake, the more a state will be willing to invest in
international involvement (in the context of peacekeeping). Some might perceive political will as courage to take a course of action despite of the possible negative political consequences. For the purpose of this study, "political will" represents the command of a state on a given foreign policy issue, assuming that this command will be more strong and present if there is a significant national issue at stake.

The concept of national interest has repeatedly been referred to as a guide and rationale for action in foreign affairs. "No statesman, no publicist, no scholar would seriously argue that foreign policy ought to be conducted in opposition to, or in disregard of, the national interest" (Cook & Moos, 1953, p. 28). The problem, therefore, is to discover what, at a given moment or in a meaningful period of time, the national interest is. Indeed, as Cook and Moos (1953) have pointed out, a major difficulty is to identify the relevant time span in the life of a nation whose interest is to be assessed, and to decide on appropriate policy accordingly.

In today’s age of information, the narrow focus of realist-based conceptions of national interest has been significantly challenged but, as Liotta (2000) has pointed out, the bottom line, after all, remains unchanged: "what a nation wants and what its citizens are willing to go to war over – and to die for – remained unchanged as fundamental interests" (2000, p. 46). What has been changing is whether or not the notion of military security – protecting the country from external threats - matters the most. With the changing world order, environmental protection, economic growth and human security have become the primary focus of states those with already secure borders and stable governments.
Weiss and Collins (1997) suggest two approaches in explaining state participation in peace operations. Traditional realist approach and structural institutionalism. Traditional realist approach argues that a state participates in peace operations when it is in its perceived national interest to do so. Scholars who adopt this approach often assume that states can articulate their national interests (Weiss & Collins, 1997). But given rapid and complex changes that occur in the international system, it is hard for statesmen to foresee clearly how involvement in military operations under UN auspices may advance or endanger specific state interests.

The second approach, which is far less common in the literature is, structural institutionalism. According to this:

There are structure and process barriers that prevent or facilitate state participation, even if a particular head of state or an important bureaucratic actor believes that active involvement is the best course of action either for strict national interests or international solidarity. Withholding supplemental appropriations for peacekeeping by the U.S. Congress and limiting the use of military force abroad, codified in the German and Japanese constitutions, are examples of structural barriers (Weiss & Collins, 1997, p. 78).

Realist approach therefore fails to recognize the importance of administrative barriers to the will of the state. Instead, realists assume the state is a rational, autonomous, and unitary actor capable of making decisions out of self-interest, regardless of bureaucratic restraints or the preferences of civil society. Realists then either suppose civil society, the media and the elite involved decisions-making can completely pursue
what is in the interest of the state and its people, or, they see the state as able to win over all the forces that disagrees with it on what the national interest is at a given time.

Democratic political thought observe bureaucracy as part of the system as checks and balances which prevents a certain branch of government from monopolizing decision making. Indeed, democratic political thought assumes that state decisions drive their legitimacy from civil support based on public opinion. What shapes public opinion? How much is it formulated by the rational calculations of national interest. To what extend is it shaped by the media, and/or affected by the power politics of the elite who has to guard their own individual interest? Although the role of media, commonly known as the “CNN effect”, has proven itself to be important in state decision making, there are far more influences of interests, structures, processes and identities on state decisions on peace operations that have not been studied in depth. “Lack of political will is the phrase used to explain state inaction; this “black box” is based on a static and simplistic notion of national interest that excludes consideration of structural constrains” (Collins & Weiss, 1997, p. 78).

This study attempts to accommodate a more comprehensive understanding of state decision-making in an attempt to explain national interest. It aims to understand the origins of action by the political elite. For example, why did Colin Powell remain reluctant to accept a new role for the U.S. armed forces as proposed by the political leaders at the time? Did Powell cross the line of proper civil-military relations? What was the role of the military culture and preexisting military framework in leading Powell to his decisions? How significant is “the fact that Powell was an Army not a Marine” and
“the variation in promotional procedures of these two services” in understanding the origins of his actions and preferences?

The study also attempts to understand the role played by the distinct structures of civilian institutions and the distribution of power within them in shaping and financing peace operations. The writer examines the U.S. political system and the organization of the state as well as the state’s position in the international system in an attempt to understand U.S. policy toward peace operations in the post-cold war period. In addition to structural factors, a discussion of distinctive American culture is also included because it informs the structural analysis.

The fundamental theoretical question this study raises is the following: Is it possible to pursue national interest in democracies and rigid bureaucracies? How can one define national interest where the variables of security are in constant change and its parameters are not clear?

The practical questions that deserve attention and which may have policy relevance are:

1) Who favors peace operations? Which domestic organizations or institutions have an interest in peace operations and what is their influence on state decision making?

2) What structural elements and events influence the decisions of state political elite?

3) Which factors impede the United States from supporting the implementation of the Brahimi Report and peacekeeping participation in general?

The purpose of this study is, therefore, to:
i. Identify the elements that determine a member state’s perceived national interest and consequently its political support for participating in UN peace operations and implementing peace operations reforms as recommended in the Brahimi Report;

ii. Point out the problems of relying solely on national interest and implications of pursuing national interest at the international level for international cooperation and peacekeeping;

iii. Make recommendations to enhance political support of member states and dispute the legitimacy of current practice of identification and execution of national interest at the international level.

It is important to study the domestic factors and their relationships to foreign policy on UN peace operations because they will help in providing a comprehensive understanding of the concept of political support, which is absolutely necessary for the success of future peace operations. Moreover, the study is very timely because the recommendations of recently published report on UN peace operations can not be implemented unless the issue of political support is addressed by the member states. A revised version of the Brahimi Report - which can establish clear linkages between a recommendation and the obstacles that stand on the way of implementing that recommendation and presenting member states with bold and honest suggestions of removing obstacles - is needed.
Scope of the Study

This research proposes to investigate the relationship between domestic factors and foreign policy choice in UN peace operations. In particular, the study focuses on the domestic structural factors that influenced the decision making on the domestic level in the United States in early 1990’s. It is not, for example, the intention of the writer to provide an analysis of all the peace operations that took place after the end of the cold.

Dependent and Independent Variables

The dependent variable is the level of political support for UN peace operations by the United States government. The indicators of political support of the United States for peace operations are: Fulfillment of membership obligations such as the payments of peacekeeping assessments and dues for the general budget, voluntary contributions, the personnel contribution to UN Peace Operations on a given mission (including troops, civilian police, and military observers), votes placed in favor of taking action in the Security Council, and the initiatives taken by the United States to strengthen the capabilities of the UN in responding to security threats.

The ways in which the member states have chosen to show political support is commonly based on their level of economic development. For instance, developing countries show their support mainly through troop contributions because their financial contribution (in relations to their GDP) is generally not a significant amount to make an impact on the success of missions. The developing countries also often lack sophisticated military equipment or logistical capabilities and may not contribute as such. This, however, does not imply lack of support for UN operations. The United States and other
developed countries, on the other hand, have the capability to contribute in both ways, and, in some cases, have fallen short in fulfilling any of the requirements for support as identified above.

The independent variable is the domestic structure of the United States and the perception of the national-interest immediately after the cold war. Domestic structure includes the different branches of government, the perceptions of ruling elite, the public and the military, their functions and relationships with one other. Neither the definition of national interest nor the institutions/agents that identify national interest are static, but the actors involved in the decision making remain the same, though the degree of their influences may vary at times.

Nye (1999) defines “national interest” in a democracy as “set of shared priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world” (1999, p. 23). Each state, due to different historical and political make-ups, will share different priorities and will have different interests to identify with but, nevertheless, share similar concerns and follow similar procedures in identifying them. In general, most foreign policy definitions on UN peace operations reflect the calculations of national interest by foreign policy officials and, the domestic environment determines the level of political support allocated to the international environment.

State and Period Selection

The United States is selected as a case because of the prominent role it plays in the international arena and because success of UN peace operations greatly depend on Washington’s active support. The United States as permanent member holds a veto
power can block or initiate UN action in the Security Council. The United States as of August 31, 1997 accounted for (54%) of the peacekeeping debt, which equals approximately $1 billion. Russia owed (12%) $225 million; Ukraine (11%) $207 million; Japan (5%) $102 million; France (2%) $32 million (see annex 1). The United States owed $691 million to the UN peacekeeping accounts as December 2001 (see annex 4).

Rwanda and Somalia were selected as cases to test U.S. foreign policy in response to the international crises these two countries have experienced. Somalia represents crises where the United States intervened along with United Nations to help to resolve an ongoing civil dispute. On the other hand, the United States did not initiate any national or international response to prevent or to stop the genocide that took place in Rwanda. Rwanda and Somali share many similarities, they are both post-colonial states, they are both considered as ‘failed’ states after the end of cold-war, their geographical proximity to the United States is similar, they are both African countries with similar resources. The United States had no less interest in Rwanda than Somalia, yet it only intervened in the later. The only difference was the time period these two countries were in need of international intervention: Somalia collapsed first and Rwanda followed a few years later. These two selected cases of international crises are the immediate test cases of the post-cold war insecurity where the UN has struggled to make a difference. Policy directives drafted during this period (1991-1995) have determined the level of U.S. support for peace operations at present and may also affect U.S. behavior in future peace operations.

Data Collection
Data on the dependent variables were primarily obtained from the UN web page and web page of the U.S. mission to the United Nations. This includes figures and facts of UN peacekeeping, news releases and statements by the Permanent Representatives. Data on the independent variables was obtained from documented media sources, public statements of state leaders, public opinion surveys undertaken by well-known organizations and U.S. official documents.

Study Organization

The thesis is divided into four chapters. As seen from the previous pages, the first chapter includes the introduction of the issue, goal and the significance of the study, the rationale for selecting dependent and independent variables and data sources.

Chapter two is devoted for literature review. This chapter reviews studies on peace operations and support by nations, with emphasis on the domestic - foreign policy nexus. Chapter three is divided into two parts. The first part gives a brief description and historical background on the United States involvement in UN peacekeeping after the cold war. The second part discusses the role of U.S. branches of government and senior officials in determining the U.S. policy.

Chapter four examines U.S. involvement in two international crises - Somalia and Rwanda. On Somalia, the study reviews the reasons for the failed participation and specifically examines U.S. domestic response during the crises. In case of Rwanda, the study first reviews U.S. initiatives at the United Nations Security Council and examines domestic reasons why the United States did not intervene to stop the genocide.
Chapter five summarizes the research findings and addresses their significance for future policy options. Policy recommendations for future study of peace operations and the concluding remarks is included in this chapter.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The linkage between the domestic sources and the resulting foreign policy behavior of states have been recognized by the scholars and policy makers, long before the UN peace operations became a primary foreign policy issue. Does political support for peace operations depend on political calculations at the domestic level? Forsythe (2000) suggest that “Any state’s foreign policy is the result of a two-level game in which domestic values and pressures combine with international standards and pressures to produce a given situation for a given time” (2000, p. 2). Similarly, Putnam (1988) noted that “state derives its interests from and advocates policies consistent with the international system at all times and under all circumstances and in fact nearly on all important issues central decision makers disagree about what the national interest and the international context demand” (Putnam, 1988, p. 432). Smith (1998) argued that “it is the domestic consequences of international outcomes that drive leaders to select particular policies” (1998, p. 626). In the same vein, Ostrom & Job (1986) and James & Oneal (1991) found that “domestic political factors are more important in explaining foreign policy choice than are international factors” (as quoted in Smith, 1998, p. 625).

The theory of two level games has been applied to international trade negotiations, and some studies have looked at implications of the use of force for the United States before the cold war. Forsythe (2000), in his book Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy, analyzes domestic factors and political culture in the
making of foreign policy in human rights. Forsthye (2000) makes references to UN peace operations as some were deployed based on humanitarian concerns. But yet there has been no comprehensive study conducted specifically on the role of domestic factors in the making of foreign policy on UN peace operations.

The previous studies on the domestic influences in foreign policy making can be categorized into two groups according to the issues and questions they addressed:

1. Actors: What are the governmental and non-governmental players in national political systems? What are their roles and motives?

2. Issue Area and national interest: How is the national interest defined and pursued according to different foreign policy issues?

Each of the above are briefly discussed below to highlight the linkages between domestic and foreign policy with particular reference to the United States.

Actors in the U.S. National System

Cobbledick (1973) identified 5 foreign policy institutions as major actors in foreign policy making on the domestic arena: the Presidency, the Executive Office, the Executive Branch, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United States Information Agency (USIA). The role of the first three institutions has been more visible in the period this study examines. The institutions of the President refers to the President himself, the Executive Office is composed of the White House Staff, the National Security Council and the Bureau of the Budget, and the Executive Branch includes the Department of State, the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
According to the U.S. Constitution, the president is at the center of the foreign policy and is the final source of authority for American foreign policy. He appoints and receives ambassadors and has the authority to recognize or withhold recognition from other governments. The President, as commander-in-chief, has the final word in determining the disposition of American armed forces (Cobbledick, 1973). The President, despite his great authority over American foreign policy, is still an individual and has to rely on others to assist him with his decisions and that is where the Executive Office and Executive Branch come into picture.

Another important actor in foreign policy making is the Congress. Along with Congress, interest groups and the public opinion are also among the domestic actors that influence foreign policy, but they operate on the public arena. Although the Constitution granted the executive branch of government the primary role in foreign affairs, by no means has it granted it a monopoly. "No treaty negotiated by the executive can become a law of the land until two-thirds of the Senate extends its formal advice and consent" (Cobbledick, 1973, p. 37). Executive appointments must be confirmed by the Senate and most importantly the power to declare war is reserved exclusively for the Senate.

Do groups act differently when trying to influence foreign policy decision than they do when trying to influence domestic policy decisions? Milbrath (1967) has addressed the issue of foreign policy and the kind of groups that are likely to have influence. He thinks of the influence process as a subcategory of the communication process. Indeed, he states, "not all communications transmit influence, some transmit only information; but all transmissions of influence constitute some form of message"
(1967, p. 231). In order to think about how influence occurs, Milbrath (1967) argues one must consider these basic principles of message transmission and reception.

Milbrath (1967) reaches two conclusions that carry relevance to this study. First “decisions that involve, direct, visible (usually economic) rewards and/or punishments to different sectors of the society generally tend to be shared by Congress and the President (p. 249). Second they involve many decision-makers rather than few and they stimulate more lobbying activities. It is then important to raise the following questions: What kind of rewards and punishments decisions regarding the involvement of the United States personnel abroad for UN peace operations offer to the different sectors of the society? And what kind of groups lobby for U.S. involvement for or against peace operations and what is level of activity does their lobbying stimulate? For example, Congress requires advance notification by the Secretary of State before a vote in UN Security Council on any peace operation/mission, so that American manufacturers and suppliers can compete for UN contracts. Whether these manufacturers have an influence on U.S. policy on peace operations is not clear but they definitely play a role in determining the time lines of the deployments.

The legislature, the branch that represents the public, plays a very significant role in determining foreign policy in democracies. The role of the public in foreign policy making in democracies may not be insignificant. Waltz (1967) expressed three areas of concerns for democratic public opinion. First, Waltz argues democracies will prefer the easy way. Second, the public’s “feelings whether patriotism or fear, supplant reason and produce a response based on moods rather than on solid sensible analyses” (Waltz, 1967, p. 267). Third, Waltz (1967) observes that in democracies the views of the many over-
ride the wisdom of the experienced. However, it would not be fair to conclude that democracies are less likely to participate in crises where their interests may not be so clear, because, for instance, Canada a well functioning democracy as the United States, is more supportive of peace operations. The most significant variable one should consider when analyzing the democratic effect on peace operations is the awareness of the issues and educational level of the public in a given country.

No doubt, different national systems adopt different strategies to cope with their external environments. Rosenau (1967), in his book *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, has examined the processes through which national systems cope with their external environment and emphasized the importance of societal make up when dealing with the international environment and raises the following question:

Exactly how and under what circumstances are the forces at work of society – the shared values, the unresolved conflicts, the irrational drives, the memoirs of the past, the ever-changing dynamics of group life, the shifting composition of cities and classes, the ups and down and changing structure of production and trade, the profound alterations in work and leisure patterns induced by technology – articulated in the actions of decisions makers? (Rosenau; 1967, p. 5).

Rosenau (1967) states that interaction in the domestic area consist mainly of the legislative process, while issues in the foreign area are handled primarily through the executive branch. He also argues that national or regional leaders devote more time in coping with situations emerging at home than abroad. According to Rosenau (1967) “foreign policy issues focus primarily on resources or relationships that are to be
distributed in the environment, whereas domestic issues involve mainly distribution and
rearrangement among members of the system" (1967, p. 45). Thus, the members of the
system do not run the risk of relinquishing any possessions when they participate in a
foreign policy controversy, since the resources or relationships at issue are located
primarily outside the system. In short, Rosenau (1967) argues that foreign policy
controversies do not require the participants to treat each other as rivals for scarce
resources. In light of Roseau's argument, Americans were not affected by the outcome of
the disputes that took place between the Tutsis and Hutsis, all those whose status and
resources were enhanced or deprived were Rwandans. Some Americans were perhaps
pleased by the choice of U.S. policy during Rwandan genocide and some were
disappointed, but none became poorer or richer as a consequence. The relevance of
Roseau's distinction - between the domestic issues and foreign issues - to our discussion
is obvious: domestic issues constitute the primary concern for the public and the
government; hence the resources, time, energy, money, information reserved for foreign
policy issues are limited. But what is not addressed is the role of the military on
decisions regarding the locations these resources are allocated.

It is also important to note that in the late 1960s - the period Rosenau was
working on his book - the international environment has not yet matured as it is today.
Today, it will be impossible not to recognize an international system operating under the
auspices of the United Nations Charter, with wider state membership and increased
acceptance of its mandate. Consequently, one could argue that U.S. policy in Rwanda
did not effect the American people's immediate security or economic status but it could
have had weakened U.S. negotiation power/position in the international system, where more than ever issues that concern American people are being discussed.

Nevertheless Rosenau (1967) concludes that “the more an issue encompasses a society’s resources and relationships, the more will it be drawn into the society’s domestic political system and the less will it be processed through the society’s foreign political system” (p. 49). We shall see later whether this argument can be applied to the contemporary foreign political system of the United States on issues of UN peace operations, where the U.S. has to interact with other nations on a multilateral setting rather than bilateral. How does the emergence of a more integrated international system affect the role and the motives of the domestic forces of foreign policy? Are the international forces that drive the foreign policy of a nation in constant rivalry, or in confluence with domestic forces?

Issue Area and National Interest

The ambiguous nature of what constitutes a nation and the difficulty of specifying its interests make it difficult for policy analysts to use it as an analytical tool. Rosenau (1971) argues that the increasing interdependence between nations and the emergence of supranational actors are likely to abandon the concept of interest. When it comes to participating in UN peace operations, members of the United Nations seek different interests according to their means of contribution. The United States as the major financial and logistical contributor to peace operations, participates in international peacekeeping because it believes it is in its national security interest. A press release
issued by the U.S. Department of State explains why the U.S. participates in peace operations as follows:

UN Peacekeeping nurtures new democracies, lowers the global tide of refugees, and prevents small wars from growing into larger scale conflicts with higher costs in terms of lives and resources. UN peacekeeping allows us to share the costs and the risks of international security and offers U.S. policy-makers a range of options in the face of emergencies outside U.S. borders. UN peacekeeping operations have also helped resolve long-standing conflicts, such as those in El Salvador and Guatemala. (U.S. Department of State, Press Release, 2000).

According to Presidential Policy Directive-25 – completed in November 1993 and signed by President Clinton in May 1994, 1) U.S. military participation may, at times, be necessary because it encourages others to participate in operations that serve U.S. interests, 2) It may be one way of exercising U.S. influence over an important UN mission, without unilaterally bearing the burden, 3) the U.S. may be called upon and to provide unique capabilities to important operations that other countries can not.

It is no surprise that U.S. has a security interest in peace operations but what matters is how important these peace operations are for the United States when placed in the hierarchy of interests. The Commission on America’s National Interest identifies a hierarchy of U.S. national interest as “vital interests,” “extremely important interests,” “important interest, and “less important or secondary interests” (2000). According to the Report of the Commission, it is extremely important for U.S. to “promote the acceptance of international rules of law and mechanisms for resolving or managing disputes
peacefully”, suppress terrorism (especially state-sponsored terrorism), transnational crime, and drug trafficking; and “prevent genocide” (2000). Important U.S. national interests include those that “discourage massive human rights violation in foreign countries,” prevent and, if possible at low costs, end conflicts in strategically less significant geographic regions; and the less important deals with spreading democracy and “preserving the territorial integrity of particular political constitution of other states everywhere” (2000).

Perry and Carter (1996) identified their own hierarchy of interests in which the “Kosovos, Bosnias, Somalis, Rwandans, and Haitis” are placed in the less important category of interests (as quoted by Joseph Nye, 1999, p. 26). According to Perry and Carter, those with the least impact on U.S. national security include contingencies that directly affect security but not directly threaten U.S. interests (as cited in Nye, 1999). Those with the medium impact include threats to U.S. interests but not to their survival and those with the most impact deal with U.S. survival. As seen from the discussion above, according to the literature, interests that are associated with UN peace operations may vary from extremely important to less important. Peace operations, however, do not meet the criteria to correspond with vital interests.

Then the question of critical importance is whether national interests are fairly and wisely evaluated by the policy makers of a given country. To what extent do the ruling elite manipulate public opinion for their own benefit? Nevertheless, national interest on a state level is determined on the individual level by leaders who has to guard their individual self-interest during the process. As Hans J. Morgenthau expressed it some years ago:
[To understand foreign policy] we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose...and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose. (as quoted in Keohane, 1984, p. 66).

The concept of the national interest has been used both as an analytical tool and a guide to action. Rosenau (1971), in his book *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, identifies the two uses of the concept. He notes: "In its action usage of the concept lacks the structure and content but nevertheless, serves its users, political actors, well. As an analytic tool, the concept is more precise and elaborate but, nevertheless, confounds the efforts of its users, political analysts" (p. 105). However, he doesn't touch upon the use of theory by practitioners and the impact of practice on formulating theory. Rosenau (1971) argues that political actors tend to perceive their goals in terms of national interest and are also inclined to claim that their goals are the national interest, as means of mobilizing support for them.

Looking at the above discussion, one can easily notices that there is a gap in the literature. The previous studies explain U.S. foreign policy decisions based on the concept of national interest. But none has attempted to explain the U.S. participation in peace operations solely through a domestic structural approach, delegating responsibilities of decisions to the specific actors involved in the process, and identifying their political often times personal concerns when making decisions. The fact that
national interests are defined as a result of a political process and sometimes the decisions made did not serve the interest of the United States have been overlooked. This study will attempt to fill a critical gap in the literature on U.S. foreign-domestic policy nexus by appealing to U.S. participation in peace operations. This study is therefore important not only because the United States, as a superpower, is expected to participate in peace operations but also because other countries may be reluctant to participate in those operations if the United States fails to do so. In other words, U.S. attitude towards, peace keeping operations - - and there may be many of them in the future - - will certainly affect other countries attitudes towards those operations.
CHAPTER III
U.S. PEACEKEEPING POLICY

U.S. Post-cold war Policy in Peace Operations: The Executive Branch

The early 1990's witnessed a rapid expansion in the number and the scope of UN operations. During the preceding decade, UN Security Council has been constrained by cold war politics and the frequent use of veto power. With the end of the cold war, however, the five permanent members of the Security Council were expected to be more cooperative and, as the one remaining superpower, the United States found itself as the center focus of UN peace operation discussions.

During the cold war, U.S. domestic political support was characterized by bipartisanship, presidential precedence, and a national interest focused against communism. That is, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by a single issue. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, U.S. foreign policy agenda has been stuffed with multiple issues - at least until the recent terrorist attacks against the United States- and no single issue could claim dominance. As Blasé (1998) has stated "Post- cold war policy has been marked by recriminations over why U.S. leaders have failed to establish a vision of foreign policy and a national interest upon which the nation can agree" (Blasé, 1998, p. 1).

The first initiative to review U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping operations came during the Bush administration. The United States, during a summit meeting of the UN Security Council’s heads of states in January 1992, suggested that the Council should ask the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Boutros-Ghali, to examine ways to strengthen
UN peacekeeping capabilities (Daalder, 1996). As a consequence, The Secretary-General came out with a report titled, *An Agenda for Peace*. The Report urged member states to make military forces available to the Security Council on permanent basis, as called for under Article 43 of the UN Charter.

During the cold war, U.S. participated in UN operations by mainly providing logistical support, transportation (especially airlift), and few observers (Daalder, 1996). The cold war constraints lifted, however, by the summer of 1992, the Bush administration had concluded that the United States would have to participate more actively, if the United Nations was to succeed.

In early August, a small working group established under the direction of the National Security Council (NSC) was asked to review the nature and extent of U.S. participation in peace operations (Daalder, 1996). The results of this review were announced by the President Bush in his speech on 21 September 1992, focused on five areas that required improvement:

better peacekeeping equipment and training at the national level; enhanced interoperability, planning, and training of multinational peacekeeping forces; an improved system for providing logistical support; an enhanced capability for planning, crises management, and intelligence capabilities; and adequate financing of UN operations (Daalder, 1996, p. 37).

In addition President Bush stated that the United States was willing to do its part to strengthen international peacekeeping. The United States would take actions that included:
a new emphasis on peacekeeping operation within the Department of Defense (DoD); providing lift, logistics, communications, and intelligence capabilities in support of UN operations; teaching peacekeeping doctrine in the curriculum of all U.S. military schools; providing U.S. military expertise to the UN; making available U.S. military bases and facilities for joint training; and reviewing how to fund peacekeeping operations to ensure “adequate” financial support (Daalder, 1996, p. 38).

President Bush’s speech focused on developing ways to enhance the effectiveness of peace operations, but did not address the politically more sensitive issues of U.S. military participation in those operations. The latter meant U.S. military participation to be a fundamental element for increased effectiveness.

Although it was generally accepted that the United States could no longer sustain the cold war position of nonparticipation, there was no consensus within the Bush administration on how the United States should participate in UN operations. Members of the National Security Council (NSC) and officials at the State Department supported the view that U.S. credibility in the United Nations demanded full participation. Some middle-ranking military officers in the army also supported full U.S. participation arguing strong U.S. participation will offer solutions to the post-cold war security problems and will establish a new important mission for the U.S. army (Daalder, 1996). Opposition to this position, however, was present within the administration and centered “in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), especially around General Colin Powell, the JCS Chairman, and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), where Defense Secretary
Dick Cheney sided with senior military” (Daalder, 1996, p. 38). They argued the United States should contribute airlift, command, control, communication and intelligence but other countries should provide the ground forces and equipment.

Originally, the president’s January 1993 National Security Strategy of the United States included a statement assuring U.S. military participation fully in peace operations. But as a result of the opposition from the senior military officials, including General Colin Powell and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, this statement was deleted. Instead the document “stated that the United States would take an active role in the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian planning and support” (Daalder, 1996, p. 38).

Officials in the National Security Council also proposed the creation of a “skeletal” peacekeeping force, which would make ready - at least one of the brigade-sized units stationed at U.S. military bases for peacekeeping training purposes – for deployment on a rotating bases, if the Security Council calls upon (Daalder, 1996). This unit would provide the United Nations with a small rapid reaction force for immediate deployment in crises situations. The proposed skeletal peacekeeping force introduced a concept “that went beyond the previous UN practices but would fell short of the UN Secretary-General’s call for negotiating agreements on standing forces” (Daalder, 1996, p. 38). The concept was dropped from consideration because many argued that, given forces directly at its disposal, the UN Security Council will be more likely to authorize operations than if forces were not ready.

Shortly before leaving office President Bush approved National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) - 74, the first policy document drafted exclusively for UN peacekeeping. The document endorsed means to strengthen the UN capability for
peacekeeping but remained very vague on issues relating to U.S. participation. It specifically opposed creating a small rapid reaction force and rejected to provide forces on standby basis under Article 43 of the UN Charter.

Almost the same people involved in the review of NSDD-74, had also conducted presidential review of multilateral peace operations for the Clinton administration. The mandate of the Presidential Review Directive – 13 (PDR-13), signed in early February 1993, covered all aspects and all forms of peacekeeping. The review was chaired by the National Security Council and participants included officials from the State Department, the Pentagon, the JCS, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations (USUN), the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (Daalder, 1996). The idea of having a standing army was rejected, and an alternative idea; “a brigade-sized “on call ready unit”, which, while stationed in its home country, could be deployed within 72 hours” of the UN Security Council authorization was adopted (Daalder, 1996, p. 44). The PRD-13 was approved by all parties except the Joint Chief of Staff General Colin Powell who objected to the issue of UN rapid reaction force from the beginning.

The discussion of the proposed rapid reaction created a major division in the administration. NSC officials supported it because they believed the force fulfilled the President’s campaign commitments. USUN was also in favor of the force because they believed it strengthened the UN’s peacekeeping capabilities. On the other hand, the State Department rejected the idea fearing the creation of such force would challenge its control over U.S. peacekeeping policy (Daalder, 1996). As a result, the endorsement of a
small rapid reaction force was deleted from the draft, even before the working group met to consider the proposed policy.

The Executive Branch, mainly the National Security Councils, during the Bush and Clinton administrations attempted to implement a policy in support of full U.S. participation. During Bush administration it was called “skeletal peace keeping force” to be endorsed with NSDD – 74; Clinton administration called it an “on call ready unit” hoping to endorse it with a Presidential Decision Directive. Both of these initiatives did not translate into policy mainly due to opposition from the military and the Congress.

After NSDD –74 and PRD –13, the last policy paper from the Executive came in mid-November 1993. Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25) was the last inter-agency review to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities of the post-cold war. The participating agencies and offices included the State Department, the office of the Secretary of the Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the Office of Management and Budget, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council. Members of Congress and their staff were extensively consulted during the drafting of the directive. PDD-25 addressed six major issues of reform and improvement in regards to peace operations. First, it affirmed that peacekeeping could be a useful tool for advancing U.S. national interest, but in order to assure that both U.S. and UN are involved it must be selective and effective. Second, it recommended efforts to reduce the U.S. costs for UN peace operations. Third, it underscored the fact the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces. However, as Commander in Chief, the President will continue to have the authority to place U.S. forces under the operational control of a foreign commander as it was done in
Operation Desert Storm. Thus, any large-scale participation of U.S. forces in a major peace enforcement operation that was likely to involve combat waved to be placed under the operational control of foreign commanders. Fourth, the policy recommended improving the UN’s capability to manage peace operations by providing U.S. support for strengthening the UN’s planning, logistics, information and command and control capabilities. Fifth, Department of Defense will take the lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve U.S. combat units and those are likely to involve combat. PDD-25 stated that the State Department, on the other hand, would retain lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units. In all cases, PDD-25 assured that the State Department will remain as the branch responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and U.S. Mission in New York. Finally, the policy directive proposed to create better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and the American public on peace operations.

PDD-25 concluded, “The U.S. can not be the world’s policeman”, although it recognized the need for effective peace operations as stated below:

Nor we can ignore the increase in armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars and the collapse of governmental authority in some states – crises that individually and cumulatively may affect U.S. interests. This policy is designed to impose discipline on both the UN and the U.S. to make peace operations a more effective instrument of collectively security.

Nonetheless, the Policy Directive emphasized the importance of multilateral peacekeeping in U.S. security policy; it also determined very strict guidelines that when
translated into practice would significantly limit U.S. role and participation in peace operations.

It was during Clinton administration the current U.S. position towards peacekeeping formed its final identity. Clinton’s national security advisor Anthony Lake, the new U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Madeline Albright, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were all in support of an active role for the United States in peacekeeping. However, the military was still reluctant to accept a fundamentally different role for U.S. armed forces. U.S. failure in Somalia in 1994 didn’t help the Administration to sell their idea of assertive multilateralism either.

**U.S. Military Hegemony in UN Peace Operations: The role of Chairman of the Chief of Staff**

Both the Bush and Clinton administrations were very supportive of active U.S. participation in UN peace operations. Indeed, although members of the Executive Office, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations supported full participation in UN operations, opposition remained in the figure of General Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Thus, U.S. policy towards peace operations took a different form that the two administrations originally planned.

In September 1993, in a speech on the nature of the armed forces, General Powell said:
Notwithstanding all of the changes that have taken place in the world, notwithstanding the new emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace engagement, preventive diplomacy, we have a value system and a culture system within the armed forces of the United States. We have a mission: to fight and win the nation’s wars...

Because we are able to fight and win the nation’s wars, because we are warriors, we are also uniquely able to do some of these other new missions that are coming along – peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, disaster relief – you name it we can do it...But we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight of why you have armed forces – to fight and win the nation’s wars (as quoted by Daalder, 1996, p. 42).

Two points in Powell’s speech deserve attention. First, Powell made a reference to the culture system of the United States armed forces; he stated that U.S. armed forces were to fight and win wars, not to perform non-warrior peacekeeping tasks. John Millen, defense and foreign policy analyst brought attention to the same issue at a Hearing Before the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives. Quoting a fax he received from an Army officer in Bosnia, Millen (1997) states: “Peacekeeping is an unnatural act. Aggressiveness, ingenuity, and initiative quickly punished while apathy, timidity and bureaucracy are well rewarded. My best men have become disenchanted about the service” (April 9, 1997).

Lt. Col. Michael D. Clay, an instructor at Fort Bragg’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School, argues otherwise. According to him, "There isn't any problem of
soldiers making that mental leap from wartime to peacekeeping missions. That's just gibberish that comes from watching too many Sylvester Stallone movies" (August 6, 1999). The goal is to have trained forces that can fight if necessary but who are also skilled at working with the local population, international organizations, aid groups and the former warring armies. In the process “They end up knowing not only how to set up and operate roadblocks but also how to think and act like practical small-town mayors” (as quoted in Becker, 1999, August 6).

Millen (1997) also made arguments similar to those of Powell at various hearings. The United States, as the only superpower, has security duties that are unique. These duties apply mainly to maintain their ability to conduct combat operations or to deter military attacks and as suggested “excessive involvement in peacekeeping on the part of a greatly shrunken U.S. military will undoubtedly detract from America’s ability to carry out these other missions successfully” (Millen, April 9, 1997).

The nature of training for combat and peacekeeping operations is completely different and personnel trained for peacekeeping may not be used for combat-like operations. On the other hand, they are suitable for peace enforcement operations because they both share the same characteristics. That means U.S. participation in peace enforcement operations would not interfere with their basic military strategy – that is winning two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously (as established in the Bottom up Review) effectively and it would not contradict the warrior culture of the U.S. armed forces.

As seen from the discussion above, combat culture of the U.S. military constituted an important source for Powell’s arguments against U.S. participation in peace
operations. Yet, it is not clear who determines the culture of the military and whether or not it can it adopt to changing security needs of the state? Weiss and Collins (1997) point out the lack of linkage between political decisions and military realities in literature on peacekeeping and argue that there might be strong influence of the current organization and interests of military, on political decisions. For instance, Turkish military perceives peace operations as good training opportunities for their men and domestically justifies participation on that base. Weiss and Collins (1997) provide examples of the differences in military recruitment posters and argue that they can be quick indicators of the military culture and what appeals to public.

Canadian recruitment posters for example, tend to show a soldier engaged in some interaction with local populations abroad. U.S. recruitment posters are dominated by large and expensive equipment - a jet, tank, or aircraft carrier - and little to no human contact. (Weiss & Collins, 1997, p. 87).

Weiss and Collins (1997) also compare the U.S. military's and public's threshold for taking casualties with other participatory countries. In Mogadishu, the death of 18 U.S. Rangers immediately generated a negative reaction within public. The public and the political discourse reflected that it was unacceptable for American's to sacrifice their lives in operations other than war. But the death of Pakistani casualties, almost twice the numbers of American casualties, had no such impact on Pakistani society. Substantial numbers of British and French soldiers also lost lives in Bosnia but neither government nor public pushed for withdrawal. This difference, according to Weiss and Collins (1997), can be explained by the military identities created by the popular culture. For
example, “Canadian movies depict peacekeepers in the same nostalgic light as American films do cowboys. And at military dinners, the toast is “to peacekeepers”, not to Canadian soldiers in Haiti or Bosnia” (Weiss & Collins, 1997, p.101). Infact, Sweden and Canada are the only countries to have built monument to peacekeepers (Weiss & Collins, 1997).

Another point deserves attention in understanding Colin Powell’s role in peace operations decisions concern the appropriate civil-military relations. Powell stated that regardless of all the changes that have taken place in the world, the mission of U.S. armed forces should remain the same, which is to fight and win wars. How much can the military distance itself from the changes in the political environment? Should the military and civil administration determine U.S. policy in peace operations? Should the U.S. policy be based on the existent strategy, doctrine and the nature of training of the armed forces, or should the armed forces be able to adopt their strategy to the changing security realities? It wouldn't be wrong to conclude that in this case, U.S. policy towards peace operations was based on the existing U.S. military capability, which reflected cold war realities. U.S. military administration in this case made strong political judgments and enforced its judgments, limiting the government’s ability to use U.S. troops for UN peace operations. According to Powell, it is not worth to allocate the U.S. military sources to peace operations because, in his political judgment and vision, the United States has no security interest in maintaining stability in regions for away from the United States. Powell executed his decision and apparently rejected to implement the orders of the Executive Branch.
It is also important to pay more attention to the connections between strategic, operational and tactical issues. Weiss and Collins (1997) have pointed out those tactical lessons from Somalia – communication failures in the field as well as operational lessons became important points of discussion and soon appeared in military journals. Military was quick to incorporate these lessons to the development of peace operations doctrine and training programs. Although training and development has move forward in support of multinational efforts in the military, political action has moved away in the Executive Branch and Congress. This also shows that military, albeit a strong institution, was able to adopt the tactical and operational changes UN peace operations required. On the other hand, as an individual, Powell was not able to adopt a new thinking he had for the U.S. military strategy. Powell’s negative judgments on U.S. participation to peace operations were shaped by his political vision, if not by personnel career concerns. Therefore, the military’s adaptability to the new security environment was a positive development not recognized by the senior military figures and political leaders.

As Weiss and Collin (1997) have stated, one could argue that Powell might have crossed the line of proper civil-military relations, because “the JCS chairman is to give advice but not direct U.S. foreign policy” (1996, p. 89). For instance, both Presidents Bush and Clinton were interested in the establishment of a standing UN army. Powell flatly opposed the skeletal peacekeeping force proposed by the Bush’s National Security Council and the proposal of a UN standing army as prepared by the Clinton study group. General Powell said, “As long as I am the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff I will not agree to commit American men and women to an unknown war, in an unknown land, for an unknown cause, under unknown commander, for an unknown duration” (Daalder,
1996, p. 43). According to a Pentagon official, "that was the end of the idea" (Daalder, 1996, p. 43). As one commander had stated on the role of the military during Powell's leadership, "The military, in all but a technical sense, is no longer ordered anywhere. It is a self-interested bureaucracy with the power of negotiation" (Weiss & Collins, 1997, p. 89).

Weiss and Collins (1997) have also suggested that the major role that Powell played in determining the U.S. role in peace operations in the early 1990s can be understood only by examining the changes in the Department of Defense (DOD) adopted as a result of the Goldwater-Nicholas act of 1986. This act was the most comprehensive legislation related to DOD reform since World War II. President Franklin Roosevelt informally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1942 and five years later the National Security Act institutionalized it. Since the National Security Act of 1947, Secretaries of Defense have struggled to assign roles, missions, and functions among major DOD components, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military services, and unified commands (White, 1996). The Goldwater-Nicholas Act addressed these issues by clearly defining responsibilities and providing authority to perform them. Its purpose was to enhance the legal authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chief and the unified commanders. As one might expect, the implementation has been controversial in terms of shifting power from the Services to the Joint Staff. The Goldwater-Nicholas Act might have improved U.S. war fighting capability but also placed more authority on the military when viewed in the context of civil-military relations.

Weiss and Collins (1997) also point out that the fact that Powell was an Army and not a Marine General is significant. Innovative behavior in a low-intensity environment...
is a key for Marine but not for an Army promotion. This, according to Weiss and Collins (1997), partially explains constant press by the Marines for increased participation in peace operations. Hypothetically, if the promotional procedures of the Army were to encourage taking peacekeeping initiatives, General Powell might have developed a different approach towards peacekeeping. In other words, the behavior of General Powell, as well as the Marines, can be understood by appealing to the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of each service.

Did Colin Powell cross the appropriate civil-military relationship? If that was the case, why then was the Clinton administration highly sensitive to the views of a senior military officer? According to Daalder (1996), the Clinton administration was bound to take the views of the military into account because; 1) Clinton was the first postwar president not have served in uniform and his lack of service during the Vietnam War had been used against him during the presidential campaign, 2) Clinton had been already in disagreement with the military over the issue of homosexuals serving in the nation's armed forces and the administration could not afford another clash with the military on another issue of importance. Hence the administration chose to join its critics once the domestic and congressional cynicism of peace operations mounted during Somalia crises, rather than defending its policy. In doing so, the administration believed it could better protect its domestic political agenda.

In other words, military's ability to adapt to the new security environment, though much improved, was still limited. In the process, Washington was reluctant to move away from the cold war strategies, which required the military to fight and win conflicts. Current U.S. thinking places military functions in two categories; "War" and "Operations
other than War (OOTW)". The latter is used for peace operations and other activities whose essence is the integration of political, military and humanitarian missions. Weiss and Collins (1997) suggest the refusal to create a separate category for peace operations had two ramifications. First, it prevented greater integration of training and preparation for peace operations into the overall preparation regime. Second, it involves how peace operations are financed. The latter will be discussed more in detail later in this chapter.

The Role of Congress and the Public Opinion

Congress certainly plays a very important role in determining the degree of U.S. involvement in many UN peace operations. Congress requires advance notification of at least 15 days before a vote in the UN Security Council on any new or expanded UN peace operations, unless it is an emergency. Along with the notification, Congress must be given estimates of the operation’s costs, length, exit strategy and the vital interest being served, as well as the sources of funding. The Secretary of State is also required to certify that American manufacturers and suppliers are receiving opportunities to compete for United Nations contracts. Congress also plays a significant role in determining how the peace mission will be funded and how much the U.S. contributions will entail.

Considering the premier reason for the failure many peace operations is lack of readiness for deployment and lack of financial resources to run the operations, U.S. Congress plays a very important role. According to the Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitutions, Congress reserves to the right to declare war, but throughout history, the presidents have been able to deploy armed forces for a range of purposes, short of “war”, using their executive authority. Congress has accepted that the president should be free
to deploy force rapidly in cases where national security is endangered. This means, under some circumstances, American forces might be required to engage in hostilities for shorter periods before the president can bring the matter to Congress.

What is the overall position of the U.S. Congress toward peace operations and what influences its decisions? The U.S. Congress has always been critical of United Nations and has often conveyed its criticism by placing restriction on the payments of U.S. dues to UN, both to the regular budget and to the peace-keeping arrears. This study identifies two factors that can explain the U.S. Congress’ reluctance to support UN peace operations. First, Congress’s primary concern revolves around domestic issues as most of them make promises to their constituents on issues that would have a direct effect on the lives of the voters. Second, the Congress itself might be the “passive prisoners of an isolationist population”, as Weiss and Collins (1997) have aptly put it.

Passive Prisoners of an Isolationist Population?

Weiss and Collins (1997) have referred to the policy makers of U.S. government as “passive prisoners of an isolationist population” when analyzing the conservative approach the Congress takes in regards to United Nations and its activities. What is an isolationist population and can it help us understand the U.S. Congress’ tendency to withhold support for U.S. peace operations? It would be wrong to place a direct cause and effect relationship between the isolanist feature of American behavior and the lack of congressional and public support for United Nations, as there are other factors that intervene in the decision making process during crucial policy making moments. But it is still the major determinant of the tone and content of the election campaigns.
Previous writers find it necessary to discriminate the “types” of isolationists. Lippman (1963) distinguishes between the “old” and the “neo-isolationists”. According to Lippman (1963) old isolationists are those “who regard any military commitment outside the boundaries of the two oceans as contrary to America’s vital interest” (as quoted in McClosky, 1967, p. 53). The neo-isolationists, on the other hand, are those “who favor economic assistance, technical assistance, the Peace Corps [and] cultural exchanges, who approve collective military action to defend vital American interests but who oppose unilateral military intervention in places like Africa and Asia, where American interest are not ‘vital’” (McClosky, 1967, p. 53).

In the mid-nineteenth century, many Americans had little reason to be anything else but isolationists. “They were citizens of a vast continental power, safeguarded against military danger by two great oceans, secure against weak neighbors to the north and south, physically and culturally remote from the world’s great centers” (McClosky, 1967, p. 56).

McClosky (1967) argues “American isolationism grew not only from insularity but also from a sense of having created a unique culture that owed little or nothing to Europe” (1967, p. 57). McClosky (1967) points out the contrast between America’s insularity then and it’s vulnerability now. Apart from the forces of globalization, America’s involvement in wars almost in every continent, participation in numerous international organizations and alliances makes it hard to conceive American political culture as it was in the mid-nineteenth century. No doubt, lives of Americans have become entangled with those of other nationals in countless ways.
McClosky (1967) uses psychological, social, intellectual and political elements to understand the holding of isolationist beliefs in the mid-twenties century America. Ironically, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, American political culture is still very much dominated by those beliefs.

Isolationism in its traditional form is, at the present stage of American life, a deviant political orientation...whatever interferes with the learning of political norms – ignorance, political apathy, cultural impoverishment, impaired cognitive functioning, restricted interaction and even personality disorders – will increase the strength and frequency of isolationism (McClosky, 1967, p. 60).

McClosky’s (1967) explanation for isolationism therefore represents in part a failure of the socialization process. He suggests that, non-isolationism requires sophistication, especially when put in a cultural and intellectual context. Although, support for non-isolationism has grown after World War II, Americans tend to be wary of unfiltered engagement in other affairs and evidence suggests that at present Americans have become more isolationists. According to the Chicago Council survey on American public opinion and U.S. foreign Policy in 1995, the Public remained cautious about using U.S. military tools for broad international goals at the time.

Only 24% of the public concur that protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression is ‘very’ important foreign policy goal, down from 57% in 1990. Forty-one percent feels defending our allies’ security is a ‘very’ important goal, down from 61% four years ago...International peacekeeping efforts under the auspices of the United Nations are supported, with agreement from 51% of the
public that the United States should participate in such efforts. Over three-fifths of leaders (62%) feel that we should accept commanders appointed by the United Nations in these efforts, while only 36% of leaders would insist on American commanders. (American Public Opinion Report, 1995, The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995, p. 4).

Moreover, the American public seems unaware of problems that occur outside of their borders. Durch (2000) has aptly observed at a Policy Forum organized by CATO Institute, “I think Americans are largely clueless about all of the wars and things that go around the rest of the world except when land in the headlines. And then they just kind of want it to go away and go to the next headline” (September 6, 2000, Washington D.C.).

Considering American population's isolationist orientation, it is difficult for their Congressmen or Representatives to sell the idea of an active policy for the United Nations, if they are themselves are not isolationists. For example, on March 17, 1999, House of Representatives considered a Bill named “American Sovereignty Restoration Act of 1999”, asking to end U.S. membership to the United Nations. The Bill asked the President to terminate all participation by the United States in the United Nations, and any organ, specialized agency, commission, or other formally affiliated body of the United Nations. If enacted, the Bill would have closed the United States mission to the United Nations.

One could probably argue that American public do not care about the rest of the world because they lack the education and knowledge to care, but what about their very
well educated representatives? Some members of the Congress promote a passive role for the United States on the international arena because and as Henry Kissinger put it, it is easier that way. Kissinger (1961) said Americans have an inclination “for choosing the interpretations of current events which implies the least effort” (Kissinger 1961, p. 7 as quoted in Waltz 1967, p. 266).

**Congress on Use of Force and Collective Security**

The founding fathers of the United States thought that the representatives of the people would take the time and the risk to communicate these complex issues effectively with their constituencies. Certainly it is much easier for a congressman to gather support by appealing to the public’s emotions and even, at times, manipulating it. It is much easier to say, “I will not risk the lives of your sons and daughters to fight and win other people’s war” than to explain them the complexity of the situation and convince them their sons and daughters will serve for a much more noble and global cause.

Congressional critics of U.S. military involvement in United Nation’s operations have persistently questioned whether missions defined at PDD-25 were in America’s interest. During his presidential campaign, Bob Dole wrote that:

Placing American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in harm’s way is the gravest decision a president can make...American lives should not be risked – and interests at stake. Such actions make it more difficult to convince American mothers and fathers to send their sons and daughters to battle when vital interests are [put] at stake. The American people will not tolerate American casualties for irresponsible internationalism. And like over reliance on the United Nations, such
adventures ironically end up reinforcing isolationism and retreat (as quoted by Luck, 1999, p. 171).

Luck (1999) suggests that Capital Hill’s worry about open-ended commitments and about the incompatibility of UN and U.S. interests should be understood in the historic context of congressional concerns about the loss of control over the deployment and employment of American forces overseas. Members of the Congress are understandably cautious of being held responsible by their constituencies for decisions over which they have no voice, but which they are held accountable. Luck (1999) points out those complaints that international organizations would strip Congress of its war-making authority have been part of the content of American political discourse since the League of Nations. Indeed, the issue of which branch of government should hold the war powers has remained one of the most important contentious issues in the U.S. Checks and Balances system of governance. The simple answer is that the powers are distributed in such a way that the Executive can not abuse its power yet must have the flexibility in its authority to deploy force in a short period of time when necessary.

The Clinton administration sought to address these issues midway through its term. As a response to the mounting congressional criticism of its handling of the U.S. led international intervention in Somalia, PDD-25 has recognized that traditionally the Executive branch has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to peace operations. The Administration with this review, assured Congress that it would regularly consult with bipartisan congressional leaders on foreign policy engagements that might involve U.S. forces in peace operations. As a result, the
administration initiated monthly staff briefings, and informed Congress on new or expanded peace operations as soon as possible.

Luck (1999) suggests that partisanship is another factor that explains congressional hostility to UN military operations in the mid-1990. In January 1995, the Republicans assumed control of both Houses when a Democrat was in the White House for the first time since 1947-49. Hence, the mid-1990's proved to be a period of intense contention between the Republican Congress and Democratic White House on wide range of public policy issues. Luck (1999) makes a very interesting argument: “The real target, in many cases, appears to have been the president’s handling of foreign policy more than the United Nations itself” (p. 178).

Three factors - partisanship, isolationist identity of the American population and complexity of the new security environment - influenced Congress’ approach toward peace operations during the mid-1990’s. Among these factors, partisanship in the Congress fulfills the elements of a structural institutionalist approach, because it represented a structure and a process barrier, which prevented Congress from supporting peace operations. Distribution of power between the Congress and the Executive on the use of force is another structural element. Democratic political thought sees the bureaucracy as an essential element in the systems of checks and balances that prevent a certain branch from monopolizing decision-making. In this context, Congress fighting over authority on the use of force with the Executive Branch only proves that U.S. checks and balances is a well functioning component of democracy. Democratic political thought also assumes that state decisions drive their legitimacy from civil support based on public opinion. Regardless of whether or not it was in the in the interest of the United States, if
the American public does not support full participation of the United States in peace operations the matter is closed and that is what really should matter in democracies. One, then, must look into the factors that shaped the mood and the opinion of the public. Certainly, the media played big role during the intervention in Somalia and the fact that the intervention was not a success furthered the negative mood of the public towards the peacekeeping, including in Rwanda, where killings of genocidal proportions were taking place.

Democracy's tendency to allow uneducated public opinion to have an impact on complex foreign policy issues is also another structural explanation for the lack of support for peace operations by the Congress. As indicated earlier, in democracies, the views of the many over-ride the wisdom of the experienced, and the prevailing public opinion can be dangerously wrong and impose veto upon the judgments of the informed officials (Waltz, 1967). Isolationist tendency of the American population and the complexity of the post-cold war world, on the other hand, can not be used as structural examples, because they are judgment calls. So the Congress and the military didn't see peace operations serving the national interest of the United States. But the fact is military would risk their credibility and the members of the Congress would risk their public support if they were to seek active U.S. participation, can make a convincing argument. Did they truly believe that they were guarding U.S. national interest with positions they took or, was their position influenced more by structural barriers and personal concerns? What about the role of Congressmen and congresswomen in their personal background? More studies should focus on identifying the representatives who support peace operations and those who don't and compare their age, education, and region, gender and
on other personal matters. This could bring a wider understanding of these influences on peace operations other than the perceived national-interest alone. The bottom line for a congressman or congresswoman, as well as to the senior military leaders, is that major concern must be the national-interest of the United States. But because of the mentioned structural barriers they and end up pursuing their personal interest rather than that of the United States'.

Was the administration able to alter all the forces that disagree with it on what the national interest was at the time? Due to constrains from the Congress and the military, both the Bush and Clinton administrations weren’t able to agree to a UN standby force, which they perceived would serves the interest of the United States. The government was often times divided within themselves about what would serve U.S. self-interest. For example, during the drafting of PDD-25, the Executive Office - mainly National Security Council and the White House Staff - favored active U.S. participation, while the Executive Branch - mostly the Department of State and Department of Defense - perceived no U.S. interest in full participation.

The next chapter will analyze these structural factors and their influence on U.S. decision to intervene in Somalia but not in Rwanda and will conclude with implications these factors will have on future policy decisions on peace operations.
CHAPTER IV-

RWANDA and SOMALIA

Somalia: The shortcomings of U.S. and UN involvement

On January 27, 1991, a popular uprising led to the exile of Somali President Siad Barre (United Nations Department of Public Information (UNDPI), 1997). But there was no agreement as to who will take the reign of power in Somalia. Although there were many contenders for power all over Somalia, Mogadishu the capital city, became the center of fighting between General Mohamed Aidid and Mohamed Mahdi. Other notable centers of conflict were Kismayo, south of Mogadishu, and in the northwest, where local leaders were pushing to create an independent “Somaliland.” According to the United Nations Department of Public Information, the country as a whole was without any form of central government and, by 1992, almost 4.5 million people, more than half of the total population of Somalia, were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition and related diseases. Some 2 million people were violently displaced from their home areas. (UNDPI, 1997). Because of this, member states found it impossible not to intervene in Somalia.

Mohamed Sahnoun (1994), the Special Representative for Somalia appointed by Boutros Boutros-Ghali on April 28, 1992, arrived in Mogadishu in March 1992 on a fact-finding mission and described the situation in the region as tragic. The city was nearly deserted, and according to Sahnoun (1994), “at least 300,000 people had died of hunger and hunger-related diseases and thousands were more casualties of the repression...
Some 500,000 people were in camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. More than 3,000 - mostly women, children, and old men - were dying daily from starvation” (p. 16).

Because of the massive pressure brought upon them by the UN, the rival parties in Mogadishu agreed on a cease-fire in March 1992. They signed agreements for the deployment of United Nations observers to monitor cease-fire and the deployment of UN security personnel to protect the UN personnel and humanitarian assistance activities (UNDPI, 1997). On April 24, 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 751 (1992) and established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), comprising 50 military observers to monitor the cease-fire, and a 500 infantry unit to provide UN convoys of relief supplies and deter attack (UNDPI, 1997). This unit was authorized to use force only in self-defense. The Secretary-General submitted a 90- Day Plan of Action in which the main objectives were: (1) massive infusion of food aid; (2) provision of basic health services and mass measles immunization; urgent provision of clean water, sanitation and hygiene; (3) provision of shelter materials, blankets and clothes; (4) prevention of further refugee outflows and the promotion of returnee programs; and (5) institution-building and rehabilitation of civil society (UNDPI, 1997).

UNOSOM I was designed as a multidimensional peace keeping operation, in which the main objective was to bring humanitarian aid to those in need. However, continuing disagreements among Somali factions on the role of the UN, proved implementing the program almost impossible. On December 3, 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 794 (1992) which authorized the United States, under Chapter VII, to use of “all necessary means” to create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia (UNDPI, 1997). Following the Security Council Resolution,
President George Bush initiated *Operation Restore Hope* and on December 9, 1992 the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), commanded by the United States and with military units from 24 countries, started operating in Somalia (UNDPI, 1997).

Both of these missions, UNUSOM and UNITAF reached their goal to a certain extent but failed to accomplish their overall objectives of ending the conflict and humanitarian disasters. There are several factors associated with the failure of these operations. These can be categorized as legal, operational and political factors.

From a legal standpoint, the problems associated with the limitation of UN authority, and its sensitivity to the issue of sovereignty and legal uncertainties in the UN Charter hindered UN from addressing humanitarian crises more effectively. Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter acknowledges that internal matters are beyond the reach of the organization. However, there are exceptions where the principle of nonintervention as stated in Article 2(7), should not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII (Sahnoun, 1994, p. 46). The first exception to non-intervention is failure to uphold international treaty commitments such as regional human rights treaties including the Conventions against genocide. A second exception is the presence of anarchy or absence of central authority. A third exception, and probably the most important one, is systematic violation of human rights or large groups of people within borders (Sheffer, 1994, as cited by Sahnoun, 1994, p. 47).

All these exceptions are applicable to the operation of UNUSOM I. According to Article 1 of the UN Charter, all member states of the UN have international obligations "to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" (UN Charter, Article 1, Paragraph 3). Second, there was no legitimate authority in Somalia. Third, a systematic violation of human rights of large group of people occurred in Somalia. These examples constitute the necessary conditions of exceptions to the Article 2(7). The United States and the United Nations, therefore, were able to justify their actions under the auspices of international law, though the principle of sovereignty limited their flexibility of movement. Same legal conditions were also applicable to the humanitarian crises in Rwanda, but we shall see why the United States acted antithetically.

There were also operational problems in the Somalia missions, which are mainly originated from the administrative shortcomings within the United Nations. Three operational reasons can be summarized for the failure of UNUSOM I. First, although UN had secured a consensual agreement with the two major parties to the conflict, it didn’t secure the armed elements that were effectively controlling the seaport and airport areas where UNUSOM was to be mainly deployed. Thus, the safety of the peacekeeping body wasn’t secured. Second, the peacekeeping objective was to provide relief supplies with a sufficiently strong military escort to deter attack, and if the deterrence should fail, fire in self-defense. However, 500 troops were not enough either to deter any attacks or to fire in self-defense. Because of the bureaucratic restraints at the UN, the 500 troops that were to be deployed immediately after the Security Council resolution reached the region very late. But the main reason for UNUSOM I’s failure was the loss of cooperation and communication between the parties of Mogadishu and UN (Lande 1995, as cited in Warner, 1995). Certainly, the UN secretariat failed to appreciate the important work of
Mr. Sahnoun, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia. He had been very successful in recognizing the critical role the local culture played in reaching agreements between the disputed parties and UN. He has worked very closely with the people of Somalia, the leaders of the parties in Somalia, and of the neighboring countries, whose trust of the United Nations had been severely damaged. Hence, when Mr. Sahnoun was forced to resign, General Aidid’s faction interpreted this incident as an indicator of the UN’s intention to occupy the country. On November 12, 1992, General Aidid demanded the withdrawal of UNUSOM I but the Secretary-General refused to withdraw, and on November 13, the airport where the UN peacekeeping was deployed came under heavy fire by General Aidid’s faction (Lande, 1995).

The same mistakes were repeated in the U.S. led operation UNITAF. Urquhart (1999) argues that from the start there was a misunderstanding, which soon developed into a disagreement between the U.S. government and the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali about the objectives and the tasks of the mission. The Secretary-General was convinced that disarming the Somali factions and setting up a civil administration were important in establishing a secure environment, which was the fundamental aim of the mission. The Bush administration was first skeptical of anything that hinted at “nation building.” Nonetheless, with Governor Clinton’s campaign for the presidency and his push for a UN rapid reaction force as a part of a more assertive multilateral style in US foreign policy, the United States finally agreed to include “nation building” to the mission’s objective in Spring 1993. (Urquhart, 1999).

A Quick Reaction Force (QFR) of 1,300 Marines were deployed with 4,000 logistical support, all in U.S. command (Urquhart, 1999). Jonathan Howe, a retired
American admiral, was appointed as the Secretary-General’s representative (Urquhart 1999). He put a price of $25,000 on General Mohammed Farrah Aidid’s head, which he held responsible for the killing of 24 Pakistani UN soldiers (Urquhart, 1999). Howe also refused to talk to Aidid or his representatives. Eventually, the Pentagon sent a special force of U.S. Rangers and Delta Force personnel to arrest Aidid. This group was not under UN command either. It took orders from U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida and the UN headquarters in Mogadishu had no contact with the Ranger Force and no authority over them. However, before taking off for an operation, the Rangers were supposed to notify the American deputy UN commander, General Thomas Montgomery, in situation where they might interfere with UN peacekeeping activities (Urquhart, 1999). But the Rangers didn’t communicate with the UN headquarters in Mogadishu and this lack of coordination, of course, led them to false targets. On one occasion, they had arrested a group of UN workers by mistake and, on another, they had blown the house of a Somali General, whom the UN had accepted to lead the new Somali police (Urquhart, 1999).

Urquhart (1999) suggests that most Somalis had at first welcomed *Operation Restore Hope*, particularly in regard to protecting and distributing food supplies. But when the mission shifted to the “restoration of the entire country”, they became puzzled and anxious. Of course, there were several other reasons for the anxiety of the Somalis. Urquhart (1999) argues that the young men of the Ranger Task Force hated Mogadishu and its people whom they have defined as “garbage”. They called them “skinnies” or “sammies” and had no idea of the Somali courage and fighting tradition (Urquhart, 1999). Brian also defines American boys of the Ranger Task Force “trigger happy
teenagers" who were equipped with the most advanced combat weapons, military technology and communications. Their helicopters, Urquhart (1999) argues, sometimes fly over the city so low that they blew the tiny roofs off houses, created dust storms, and humiliated inhabitants (Urquhart, 1999). And when the people complained, they were told nothing could be done because the Rangers were not under UN command. Urquhart (1999) suggests that "some of the armed groups had come to the conclusion that the best way to hurt Americans would be to shoot down a helicopter, the symbol of American power and Somali helplessness" (Urquhart, 1999). So the Somalis shot down two helicopters in which eighteen Rangers were killed and body of an U.S. soldier was later dragged through the streets. After this incident, the United States sat down with Aidid for peaceful negotiations and secured the release of captured helicopter pilots. Thus, the problems and unresolved issues in UN (and U.S.) intervention led to the collapse of the mission and quick withdrawal by the Americans.

Despite the strengthen and resourcefulness of the U.S. led Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the United States insisted to keep the mandate limited and non-political. Hence lack of military and political pressure, commitments to neutrality are among the political factors of that lead to the failure of the operation. Nonetheless, the United States intervened in Somalia, despite the problems associated with the mission as discussed above. This is because U.S. leaders had to act due to the changed international political environment and the overwhelming support for intervention by the American public. The next section will address the issues why the United States despite these factors intervened in Somalia.
United States intervention in Somalia: Why Somalia?

U.S. intervention in Somalia sets an example of a case where the domestic political support, was present. During the crises in Somalia, the United States accepted to launch an independent mission to spearhead the UN mission. It took initiatives at the Security Council demonstrating active interest on the issue. Somalia was the first example of a case where the United States has supported a humanitarian enforcement operation. Until the administration started to lose the support of the public, the United States remained actively involved. The interests at stake remained constant, the only changing variable was the political support at home on the face changing external conflict environment in Somalia, which eventually led to the American withdrawal.

Somalia was one of the first countries that failed to function as a state following the end of the cold war. The United States and the United Nations were caught unprepared and neither of them was aware of the unfamiliar security environment in the collapsed states. The United States, as the victor of the cold war, emerged as the only superpower in the world. The public and the leaders had high confidence in its political and economic vision and military strength, but were not sure how exactly to make use of it.

The fact that Somalia was one of the very first countries to experience civil-strive after the cold war is very significant in understanding why the United States was able to intervene. With the cold war won, President Bush had enjoyed an unprecedented support and, perhaps as a consequence, Congress was equally supportive of the President’s policies around the world, including those that may involve the use of force. With no potential enemy to fight, and with so much support at home, both from the Congress and
the general public, the Bush Administration focused on turning its proposal to improve peace keeping into actual policy. At the same time, his opponent running for the President, Governor Clinton called for the United States to take leadership role and do something about the tragedy taking place in Somalia. Governor Clinton succeeded in appealing to public emotions, as the public became increasingly incensed at the situation in Somalia through extensive media coverage. Durch (1996) points out, presidents have always been wary of committing the U.S. forces in election years; if they win they may well be a hero, if not they will be accused of risking American lives to advance their own political career. Moreover, the public was very supportive of the United States sending troops to Somalia. In a New York Times/CBS poll, taken few days after Bush’s televised address announcing the Operations Restore Hope, 81 percent of those who have interviewed agreed that the United States was doing the right thing in sending troops, while 70 percent agreed that the task was even worth possible loss of American lives (Durch, 1996, p. 320). The public was aware of the situation and confident about the U.S. military ability to establish the task. Apparently, national interest was not a major issue for the Executive, Congress and the public in their decision.

Though, President Bush agreed to intervene, at each stage of intervention, he limited the mandates of the mission deployed in Somalia to the minimal, avoiding risk. The Mission in Somalia started as a humanitarian affair and, in the face of deteriorating crises, turned into an enforcement operation in a security environment where the operating parties had no clear understanding. Operation Restore Hope was only to open the supply routes to get the food moving and preparing ways for UN peacekeeping to take over. The Clinton administration realized that the United States was the only power
willing and able to provide UN with logistical and intelligence support it desperately needed. Resolution 814, which established UNUSOM II, was a demonstration of the administration support for "assertive multilateralism", a phrased coined by its UN representative, Ambassador Madeleine Albright (Durch, 1996). U.S. actions in Somalia can be better understood in terms of this concept, "which argued for continued, active U.S. engagement in foreign affairs with maximum efforts to share the burden with others, especially through multilateral institutions" (Durch, 1996, p. 327). At the same time, Ambassador Albright did not shy away from openly criticizing the Pentagon doctrine developed by General Colin Powell, which holds the view that U.S. troops should be deployed overseas only in circumstances where an overwhelming military advantage exists, which, in most cases, do not apply in humanitarian operations. Colin Powell in his book recounted Albright's view as "What's the point in having this superb military if we can't use it?" (as quoted in Financial Times, December 7, 1996). According to Financial Times report on December 7, 1996, Albright's origin was an important factor in shaping her vision for the United States in the United Nations. Albright's family escaped Prague when the Nazis invaded in 1938, spent war years in London, returned home years later but was then forced to flee again with the communist take over in 1948.

In mid October 1993, the newly elected U.S. President had agreed to send specialized US Rangers and Delta Force to capture Aidid. Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral David Jeremiah stated, "if you think US forces are needed, we can do the job" (as quoted in Durch, 1996, p. 319). As it was made clear by Admiral Jeremiah, the United States intervened in Somalia because they believed they could do the job and the United States will have an added prestige commensurate with its sole superpower status.
Thus, prestige was seen as an important element to further U.S. national interest in the new international environment.

Rwanda: Overview to 1994 Genocide

Approximately 800,000 people were killed in a Hutu-led campaign of genocide against Tutsi and moderate Hutu from April to July 1994. Over the course of about 100 days, hundreds of thousands of men, women and children were systematically slaughtered and the killings set off a chain reaction that led the war in Congo in 1999, which involved more than half a dozen African nations. The international community did not prevent the genocide nor did it stop the killing once the genocide had begun. The Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda concluded that the fundamental failure was the lack of resources and the political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda. According to the Report:

There was a lack of political will to act, or to act with enough assertiveness. This lack of political will affected the response by the Secretariat and decision-making by the Security Council, but also evident in the recurrent difficulties to get the necessary troops for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (Report of the Independent Inquiry, 15 December 1999).

The Report of the Independent Inquiry is a product of an investigation commissioned by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan and led by Ingvar Carlsson, a former Swedish prime minister. According to a report of Barbara Crossette of the New York
Times, Carlsson said that no high ranking American officials involved in policy making at the time agreed to meet the panel of the investigation and made available the official documents which "effectively blocked the Security Council in 1993 and 1994 from authorizing significant action in Rwanda" (The New York Times, December 17, 1999). The State Department explanation was that the United States has a policy of not releasing classified documents to the United Nations. According to Crosette (1999) of the New York Times, Belgium and France, whose peacekeepers were on the ground in Rwanda, have conducted their own investigations, but the United States has not.

The genocide in Rwanda represented one of the worst human rights violations the world has witnessed since World War II. President Clinton acknowledged years after the crises that he "did not do as much as we could have and should have" (The New York Times, December 17, 1999). Much evidence suggests that shaken by the killing of American peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993, Washington blocked effective UN action in Rwanda. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who was then the head of the peacekeeping department, also acknowledged the UN's failure to act effectively in Rwanda, calling the events in Rwanda "genocide in its purest and most evil form" (as quoted in Crosette of The New York Times, December 17, 1999). This part of the chapter will provide a brief review of the events prior to and during genocide and searches for domestic reasons for U.S. failure to respond effectively and timely.

United States in the Security Council

From October 1990 until August 1993, the government of Rwanda and a rebel group the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) engaged in fickle civil war and irregular peace
negotiations. On August 4, 1993, following three years of negotiations, the Government of Rwanda and RPF signed the Arusha Peace Agreement, which called for a neutral peacekeeping force to help implement a transitional period of power-sharing and subsequent free elections. The Agreement framed a broad role for the United Nations through what the agreement termed the Neutral International Force (NIF). The agreement assigned the NIF wide range of security tasks:

- to guarantee the overall security of the country and verify the maintenance of law and order,
- ensure the security of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to assist in catering to the security of civilians,
- assist in tracking arms caches, neutralizing of armed gangs throughout the country,
- undertake mine clearance operations,
- assist in the recovery of all weapons distributed to or illegally acquired by civilians,
- track down the perpetrators of any violations of the cease-fire,
- Determine security parameters for Kigali.

The parties of the agreement notified the Secretary-General that it was essential for the success of the NIF to be deployed within a month, otherwise there was a likelihood that the peace process could collapse.

According to the Report of the Independent Inquiry, the Government of Rwanda, which had delayed the signing of the agreement, pressed the United Nations to begin planning deployment before the accords had been signed. The United Nations notified the Rwandan government that unless the parties showed their commitment to the peace
process by signing it planning of a peacekeeping operation could not begin and, even if the planing started, the United Nations will not be able to deploy the necessary force within a month.

The joint Government-RPF delegation also expressed the necessity for a force numbering 4,260. "The Secretary-General told the delegation that even if the [Security] Council were to approve a force of that size, it would take at least 2-3 months for it to be deployed" (The Report of the Independent Inquiry, 1998, p. 4). It is important to point out that, at the time there was an enormous demand for UN troops, particularly in Somalia and Bosnia, and the United Nations was going through financial crises.

On October 5, 1993, the Security Council authorized the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) but it did not approve all the elements of the mandate recommended by the Secretary-General. Its mandate were manifold:

- monitor the overall security situation until national elections,
- monitor observance of the cease-fire and the formation of a new integrated army,
- investigate alleged noncompliance with the Peace accords,
- train local people to remove land mines,
- monitor the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons to verify that is carried out in a safe and orderly manner;
- Assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance in conjunction with relief operations.

The operation authorized up to 2,548 military personnel and 60 civilian police. The use of force was limited only to self-defense. The resolution decided that UNAMIR should contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, that is, within a weapons-secure
area established by the parties instead of assisting the recovery of arms as the Secretary-General originally suggested it.

However, the mandate and the resources provided by the Security Council proved to be ineffective even to secure the safety of the UN personnel on the ground. The brutal killing of Belgian peacekeepers is a case in point. On April 6, President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down and everyone on board was killed. Most observers attributed this act to the Rwandan army. Three of the thirteen Belgian soldiers, who were dispatched from the airport to protect the Tutsi Prime Minister, Uwilingiyimana, were murdered along with the Prime Minister. The remaining seven Belgian soldiers around the Prime Minister laid down their weapons, given the rules of engagement requiring them to avoid combat. They too were murdered by the militia after being terribly tortured. Immediately after the killings, Belgian delegates at the United Nations started a campaign for evacuating the UNAMIR force, because they did not want to withdraw alone. Within a couple of days of the incident, along with Belgium, France, Italy and the United States, who were also a part to the Force, mounted the evacuations of their civilians. These evacuations themselves brought instability to an already unstable and insecure situation (The Report of the Independent Inquiry, 1998, p. 13).

In the face of these developments, Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) of the UN drafted two options. The first option suggested keeping UNAMIR, minus the Belgian contingent, under the condition that the parties accept the responsibility for law and order and the security of civilians in areas under their control. The second option was to immediately reduce UNAMIR and maintain only a small political presence. On April 14, Belgium withdrew its contingent and Secretary-General
mentioned a combination of the two options as a possibility as his own preferred option. Nigeria argued in favor of the first option, which was to keep UNAMIR without the Belgian contingent, the United Kingdom and Russia supported the second option and lobbied for the reduction of UNAMIR. The United States stated, “if a decision were to be taken, it would only accept a withdrawal of UNAMIR” (The Report of the Independent Inquiry, 1998, p. 5). The United Kingdom stated that keeping UNAMIR was not a feasible option “because of the lesson drawn from Somalia that conditions on the ground could evolve rapidly and dangerously” (The Report of the Independent Inquiry, 1998, p. 16).

On May 3, the United States suggested sending a Security Council team to the region to seek information about the situation, but the United Kingdom objected and the initiative was not pursued. Few days later, on May 11, the United States proposed “to explore the possibility of creating a protective zone along the Rwandan border with an international force to provide security to populations” (The Report of the Independent Inquiry, 1998, p. 17) assuming that such operation could require fewer troops and less complex situations than some of the other proposals discussed. This proposition was not supported by the Force Commander of UNAMIR, Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire of Canada, who has been pressing to strengthen the mandate and the capability of the UNAMIR from the beginning.

On May 13, the Secretary-General formalized his recommendations in a report to the Security Council, which outlined the phased deployment of a second mission, UNAMIR II, up to strength of 5,500. Before the recommendations was adopted as a resolution, the United States proposals made explicit reference to the need for the parties’
consent and asked to deploy only a small number of military observers and one infantry battalion and delaying the rest of the deployment. New Zealand was concerned about the U.S. proposals.

On May 17, the Security Council adopted resolution 918 (1994), which asked to increase the number of troops in UNAMIR II, and imposed arms embargo on Rwanda. By July 25, over two months after the resolution 918 (1994) was adopted, UNAMIR still only had 550 troops, a tenth of the authorized strength.

Most sources indicate that the genocide began, immediately after the crash of the President Habyarimana’s plane on April 6 and only three weeks later almost all large-scale massacres had ended. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, half of the Tutsi population of Rwanda, about two thirds of the ultimate Tutsi victim, already had been exterminated (Kuperman, 2000). The “Killing of the remaining Tutsi continued at a slower pace for another two and a half months until halted by the rebels’ military victory and a belated French-led intervention” (Kuperman, 2000, p. 100).

Why did the United States stay passive?

Whether the deployment of United Nations missions to Rwanda saved any lives or facilitated more losses are debatable. Many civilians were gathered in areas where UN soldiers were present, which, in some cases, made them worse targets because the UN soldiers did not have the arms to protect the civilians or themselves. Moreover they did not have the authority to use force unless they were being shot at. Many, however, agree that the French led operation Turquoise was successful and save many Tutsis.
Many observers have claimed that timely intervention would have prevented the genocide. Kuperman (2000) suggests that the United States did have three levels of potential intervention; maximum, moderate, and minimal. According to his analysis:

Maximum intervention would have used all feasible force to halt large-scale killing and military conflict throughout Rwanda. Moderate intervention would have sought to halt some large-scale killing without deploying troops to areas of ongoing civil war, in order to reduce U.S. casualties. Minimal intervention would have required air power alone. (Kuperman, 2000, p.105).

Kuperman (2000) argues that maximum intervention would have required deployment of a force roughly the size of one U.S. division -- three brigades and supporting units, comprising about 15,000 troops and their equipment. According to his calculations maximum intervention would have saved 125,000 Tutsi lives. Moderate intervention, comprising 6,000 troops would have saved 100,000 and a minimum intervention with 2,500 troops deployed on the neighboring countries of Rwanda, would have saved about 75,000 Tutsi lives.

The United States instead, participated only with what it called “unique capabilities.” According to the summary of the Report to Congress on U.S. military activities in Rwanda, prepared by the Defense Department, the United States deployed a total of 2100 military personnel in the region as a part of Joint Task Force Support Hope (JTFSH). At the height of the operation, there were about 200 JTFSH U.S. military personnel in Kigali including Civil-military Operation Center (CMOC), a large U.S. Air force tactical Airlift Liaison and Control Element (TALCE), other staff logistical
personnel, and a military police detachment for protection of U.S. military personnel. JTFSH began drawing down Kigali operations in late August and terminated operations on September 30, 1994.

During the crises United States had acted like a "normal" country in the Security Council, that is, it didn't commit any financial, military or political support, as one would expect from a superpower. Why was the United States not quick to stop the genocide? What were the domestic influences on U.S. decision to limit its participation?

By May 1994, when genocide in Rwanda began, President Clinton had enacted PDD-25, which has been referred as the Powell Doctrine by The New York Times (November 17, 1996). The famous directive drafted after the Somalia experience placed strict conditions on U.S. support for United Nations peace operations. Rwanda did not smoothly meet the requirements of PDD-25, which, among other things, was the furtherance of U.S. national interest. Moreover, Washington imposed its own parameter for peace operation on other countries. PDD-25, according to Bulkhalter (1999), hurt an effective UN initiative to respond in Rwanda by withholding any American support for any initiative that did not meet the standard that the United States had adopted for its own troops. Ambassador Albright's staff defended this approach on the grounds that it would be inappropriate for the United States to approve the deployment of others in situations America itself find unacceptable. The Pentagon also sought to limit the all UN operations, with or without American participation, because it feared that if an operation went badly - as it did on the early days in Somalia - the United States would inevitably be called in to bail out the UN forces (Bulkhalter, 1996). In this regard, the legacy Somalia left on American public, military, Congress and the executive, was of particular
importance in determining the U.S. role in Rwanda. In other words, the U.S. was not prepared for yet another loss of prestige.

According to the American Public Report (1995) only 32% of the American public thought that the United States had a vital interest in Rwanda in 1995. Sixty-nine percent of the public and 92% of the leaders opposes the use of American troops if civil war broke out in South Africa. Eighteen percent of the American public would favor sending troops, as would 6% of the leaders (American Public Report, 1995, Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs). This statistics is a clear indicator of the disapproval of the public and the leaders regarding peace operations after the failure in Somalia. One only needs to compare the high rate of support for U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1991.

Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, referring to conflicts that occur within states said:

[T]hese kind of conflicts is particularly hard to come to grasps with and to have an effect on from outside, because basically, of course, their origins are in political turmoil within these nations. And that political turmoil may not be susceptible to the efforts of the international community. So, neither the international community nor we have either the mandate or the resources or the possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind (as quoted by J. Matthew Vacarro, 1996, p. 375).

After the UNUSOM I and UNITAF, the United States came to realize that the UN's peace operation capabilities were not suitable for an emergency situation requiring the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance in a country experiencing an ongoing civil
war. Though the Clinton administration attempted to strengthen the UN’s peace operations capability by proposing a stand by unit ready for deployment, he changed his position due to the mounting criticism by the Congress, and the Military.

The Clinton administration, represented at the United Nations by Madeleine Albright, clearly downplayed the crises diplomatically and this impeded effective intervention by UN forces to stop the killing. The refusal to call the killings a “genocide” by the State Department officials is a striking case in point. For example, David Rawson, U.S. ambassador to Rwanda, stated that “as a responsible government, you don’t just go around hollering ‘genocide’. You say that acts of genocide may have occurred and they need to be investigated” (as quoted by Burkhalter, 1994, p. 44). In April, when the killings of civilians became so widespread, President Clinton, called for all sides to stop the violence, suggesting the killings were a result of civil war rather than a calculated systematic execution of genocide (Burkhalter, 1994). It was in Mid-June when Secretary of State Warren Christopher has invoked the term faced with intense criticism by the press. Reluctance by the United States to use the term genocide was motivated by lack of will to act. The United States wasn’t prepared to identify situations as such and to assume the responsibility to act that accompanies that definition. Does that mean the United States had no vital interest in stopping genocide? Perhaps, yes, because there is no evidence to suggest today that Americans are worse off because U.S. has failed to intervene. Traditional realists would argue that Unites States should have intervened in Rwanda only if American security or economic interests were at stake. And United Stated did not have any economic or security interests at stake that warrants preventing or stopping the genocide in Rwanda.
Perhaps more remarkable is that there were signs that the problem was in the making and many have argued that the international community, especially the big powers, failed in preventing genocide. One only needs to review events since 1990 to find those warning signals that Rwanda was moving into an abyss.

The plans of Aïdèed to abort peace process after the signing of the Arusha Accords, and exterminate their political opponents, were not a secret. On February 21, 1994, a moderate Hutu cabinet minister, Emmanuelle Gatabazi, was murdered by government soldiers who also killed some 40 Tutsi. (Burkhalter, 1996). Human Rights Watch consultant, Alison Des Forges, noted that “When they saw they could get away with that kind of violence in Kigali with no reaction from the U.N. troops who were supposed to be responsible for security, it encouraged them to go ahead with larger operation” (as quoted in Burkhalter, 1996, p. 45). On January 11, 1994, Dallaire sent the military advisor to the Secretary-General, Major-General Maurice Baril, a cable entitled “Request for Protection for Informant”, which has become a prominent evidence in the discussions about what information was available to the United Nations regarding the risk of genocide (The Report of the Independent Inquiry on UN actions during Rwanda, 1999). The telegram informed the United Nations, in advance, the militia’s plans to provoke the killings of Belgian troops, leading the latter to use force, get killed, and then in return would guarantee the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent from Rwanda. The cable also stated that the militia had trained 1,700 men scattered in-groups of 40 throughout Kigali to register all Tutsi in Kigali. It was suspected that this act was for the exterminations of the Tutsi. The informant mentioned in the January 11 cable also said that the trained men were able to kill up to 1,000 Tutsi in 20 minutes.
Holly Burkhalter (1996), Washington Director of Human Right Watch, argues that the UNAMIR reduction was the single most important decision made with respect to Rwanda. According to Burkhalter (1996), the State Department’s Africa Bureau, headed by George Moose, was in favor of a more potent UNAMIR presence in Rwanda. Moose’s deputies, Prudence Bushnell and Arlene Render, had argued earnestly at interagency meetings within the executive branch for a stronger mandate and troop increase for UNAMIR. But the Africa Bureau did not receive the support of higher-ups at the State Department. “The under secretary for political affairs, Peter Tarnoff (to whom all regional bureaus report), apparently had no interest in Rwanda” (Burkhalter, 1996, p. 47). Similarly, the Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Tim With seemingly made a decision to exclude issue of human rights from his agenda. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, likewise, in his encounters with Arlene Render, did not actively discuss the issue either.

Pentagon officials too opposed an enhanced UN presence in Rwanda. According to Burkhalter (1996), the “disastrous American experience” in Somalia was present at every discussion of Rwanda, and was overwhelmingly the most important factor in military’s opposition to international engagement elsewhere on the African continent. Burkhalter (1999) noted that Africa’s Bureau Moose had no chance to gather support when Under-Secretary of Defence John Deutch was making case against UN humanitarian intervention.

The State Department wasn’t united on the issue either. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs shared Pentagon’s distrust of a peace enforcement mission in Rwanda and undercut the Africa Bureau efforts to promote it. Burkhalter
(1996) argues that Secretary of State Warren Christopher appears to have this lack of consensus within the Department as an excuse to avoid the issue altogether, instead of settling the issue.

U.S. policy during Rwanda crises is a clear case where the domestic political support was not present. Hence, the United States failed to give the necessary political support for UN intervention. The United States was not willing to contribute its troops, nor it was willing to equip the countries who were willing to provide the troops. It also took every initiative to limit mandate of UNAMIR at each stage. The Executive Branch perceived the Rwanda genocide as a peacekeeping headache to be avoided rather than human right violations to be addressed, and the formative experience of Somalia can be held accountable for that approach.
CHAPTER -V-

CONCLUSION

Summary of Research Findings

This study examined the domestic sources of foreign policy decisions of the United States on peace operations immediately after the cold war, between 1991 and 1995. This time frame proved to be very significant in United Nations peace operations history because most of the policies of U.S. participation in peace keeping were determined during this period.

The purpose of this study was to identify the actors and processes that influenced and at times determined a state’s policy (more specifically the support of the U.S.) for peace operations. During the crises in Somalia, the United States intervened but lacked the experience and knowledge on conducting a multidimensional peace operation. In Rwanda United States came to realize a successful operation to stop a genocide would be highly costly and risk American lives, and decided not to intervene. What role does national interest play in determining the U.S. decisions? By all accounts, Somalia was not more important to the United States than Rwanda. Why then did the public, the Congress, and the military support the first and not the second?

Most of the existing literature seeks answers to this question by appealing to the national interest. National interest was a very useful analytical concept for determining how much political resources the United States would allocate for a crisis situation. During cold war, U.S. interests were clear-cut: it had a vital interest in containing communism and Soviet influence. After the cold war, the policy makers and researchers
continued to base their calculations on national interest. However, because of the absence of a clear-cut enemy, the national interest became increasingly nebulous. Greater interdependence between the United States and other nations and increasing number of supranational actors made it more difficult for national interest to be an effective analytical tool.

Did the United States served its self-interest by pulling out of Somalia after the killing of the American soldiers? The United States perhaps saved the potential loss of more American lives but U.S. military reputation, and international prestige was badly damaged. What message did this behavior transmit about the United States to the rest of the world? Some observers already predict that U.S. failure in Somalia might have encouraged international terrorist recruits. Though United States had no economic and strategic interest in Rwanda, however it was genocide, thousands of Africans were systematically killed. The United States, the only superpower with vested interest in international peace and the pioneer spokesperson for human rights, did nothing.

Considering the weaknesses of analyzing state involvement in peace operations based on national interest, this study focused more on the role of specific actors and processes to understand what facilitated early participation in Somalia and what prevented it in Rwanda. The actors especially the members of the Congress and senior leaders in the military and the State Department, would argue that they based their positions on the issues according to their perceptions of national interest.

The voting public is not as important as many suggests in determining foreign policy options because public opinion can easily be shaped by the political leaders through the use of media, if the leaders choose to do so. The support of the voting public
is the source of legitimacy for state decisions but, on foreign policy issues are more complex, the ruling elite do not base their decisions solely on public opinion. This is due to the fact that unless people are really informed and educated about the issue, they will develop an emotional perspective on the issue rather than based on reason. Americans are not as informed about foreign policy issues as they are about domestic issues because they see foreign issues marginally affecting their lives. Thus, the public and the Congress, see foreign policy as more executive prerogative. The public opinion and civil society provides legitimacy but not rationality to foreign decision-making, as well as other bureaucratic checks and balances.

The study identified several significant developments during the period between 1991 and 1995 in the U.S. domestic politics. Before the cold war, it was common that issues in the foreign area were handled primarily through the executive branch. National and regional leaders would devote more time in coping with situations emerging at home than abroad. Congress always kept the Executive Branch in check on the issue of use of force on foreign soils, but provided bipartisan support for the Executive during cold war. This was no longer the case during the Clinton’s administration, because President Clinton was a democratic president versus republicans who hold the majority of seats in both houses. President Clinton supported an active role for the United States, but gave up soon on his vision due to the opposition from the military and the republican Congress. The Clinton administration’s peacekeeping policy therefore, underwent significant changes. One of the first changes occurred when the United States shifted its support to unique capabilities from participation through full spectrum of military. Second, PDD-25 stated that U.S. contributions, even combat forces could be subject to operational control
of UN commanders. This was not a new practice for the United States since U.S. forces have been subjected to foreign commanders in NATO operations previously. However, PDD-25 also assured that under no circumstances will command of the U.S. forces be taken away from the President, who is also the Commander-in-Chief, and this killed the possibility for a UN standing army. Third, a new formula was drawn in PDD-25, distributing the funding responsibilities between the State and Defense Department, which could possibly increase the available financing for UN operations. But this proved not to be the case because Congress rejected the concept of shared responsibility by refusing to appropriate any DOD funds for peacekeeping.

The U.S. involvement in Somalia was a critical turning point, it may be wrong to conclusively conclude that the United States failed in Somalia; rather the United States pulled back from Somalia or didn’t fully commit itself to addressing the issues in Somalia in the first place. President Bush was supportive of U.S. involvement but provided the resources only as little as to keep their face in the Security Council.

U.S. military was able to adapt to the lessons learned from Somalia, operationally and tactically, but that did not affect their overall strategy towards peacekeeping. In particular, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Colin Powell, was strictly opposed to U.S. full participation in these new conflicts, and was perhaps, if no more, as influential as the Congress when the U.S. policy in peace operations were formulated. With the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, Congress permitted the President to direct communications pass through Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) and this authority placed CJCS in the communications chain, thus increasing his influence on decisions. The Act also assured the civilian control over the military. The study findings pointed
out that Colin Powell might have crossed the appropriate civil-military relations by strictly opposing the Executive's positions. He certainly has the right to hold different views from the President or the National Security Council but his role is limited to provide technical advice on military matters. This study, indeed, suggest that General Powell might have executed a decision which is, according to the U.S. constitution, reserved for the civil administration.

**Recommendations for the future**

What are the implications of these findings for understanding future role of the United States in peacekeeping? What measures would increase the domestic support for UN peace operations?

The U.S. government must devise ways of effectively using the Media. The media certainly plays an important role in providing information to the public and putting issues on the administration's agenda. The study cannot explain why the United States media sources provide less airtime for the activities of the United Nations compared to European and other media sources, but this is a very important matter that deserves attention if U.S. statesmen want people to have more educated opinions on foreign policy and UN activities.

A second measure that would increase the domestic level of support is to seek ways to foster bipartisanship in Congress on issues of foreign policy. This requires either very well informed or educated public or conscious state leaders who would not manipulate public opinion for the advancement of their personal political career. The latter seems less pragmatic because there will always be those who will choose to appeal
to the emotions of public, especially during election years. A better approach to sustained U.S. involvement in peace operations would be to educate the public, and there are many active civic organizations promoting the activities of United Nations. But still this may not have much influence as long as the media does not cover their activities.

In order to bring more accountability and credibility to the representatives of the people and other state officials, future studies must pay more attention to the role played by particular individuals, rather than institutions. As Weiss and Collins have indicated “whether designing Security Council mandates, peace agreements, or national foreign policy, key decisions appear to be made informally (e.g. by powerful individuals over lunch, or by the influence of charismatic people) than during formal and collective deliberations” (1996, p. 132). Weiss and Collins (1996) also suggest that future research attention should be placed on “blockers.” These are individuals in the peace operations policy chain that withhold information, which does not support their own views and career paths. Identifying these individuals and bringing them to public attention can serve as a deterrent and increase the credibility of future policy makers.

Moreover the government and scholars should recognize the important role of American popular culture, language and discourse on the elements of United Nations, which is not conducive to peace operations. If state and military officials make public recognition of U.S. soldiers serving for peace operations and pay their due respect, the public might develop more positive approach to peace operations. When a soldier risks his/her life for his country he or she is highly respected. Yet American soldiers do not get the same recognition if they do so for the peace operations, or to help those who can not help themselves, or to stop a genocide which may be a more noble cause compared to the
narrow cause of national interest. They do not only receive the respect they deserve here, they are rather perceived as victims of a poor functioning organization, and the United Nations has the distinction of being recognized as such.

This brings us to another measure that could increase the domestic support for peace operations undertaken by the United States and this deals with reform of the United Nations Peace Keeping Department and strengthening the UN’s peace operations capabilities. American Congress is very reluctant to commit American soldiers for UN peace operations because DPKO functions poorly. But if the Congress provides them with the elicited resources, the financial contributions and authority necessary to reform DPKO’s capabilities, future peace missions can be implemented more professionally. The U.S. Congress is not willing to make DPKO function better and they complain they cannot operate through a poor functioning body. As the Brahimi Report (2000) suggested, that the reason why it took so long for the United Nations to fully deploy operations following a Security Council resolution was because the UN did not have a standing army, and it did not have a standing police force designed for field operations.

It is often said UN peace operations resemble an ad-hoc volunteer fire department. “Everytime there is a fire, we have to start again trying to find the firefighters, trying to get the money to pay for the gasoline to run the truck, indeed, trying to find the truck itself and so on” (Paul, April 112, 2001). The Brahimi Report makes recommendations to improve the ad-hoc volunteer fire department, but it does not mention the necessity of a professional fire department, considering this might be too much too ask. Falk (2000) proposes an alternative to standby arrangements as outlined in the Brahimi Report the creation of a volunteer peace force. He argues that “It would
allow the Organization to respond without expecting member states to depoliticize such undertakings, and yet provide the U.N. Security Council with a mechanism to extend rapidly collective security responses to situations of severe humanitarian emergency” (1999, p.32). Furthermore, the Brahimi Report also notes that for UN peace operations to be effective, the mission personnel need equipment and logistics support, cash in hand to procure good and services, training and briefing, and operational strategy.

Some representatives of the Congress express their concerns about United Nations becoming a world government, but yet there is no sensible argument they can make to show how and why the United Nations, especially the Security Council, could make a decision that hurts American interests. And the United States is not the only country with doubts about the United Nations. In general, the policies of western nations create hesitation and worry in the developing countries about United Nations Security Council activities. As James Paul (2001), Executive Director of Global Policy Forum, has stated:

The big, rich countries in the North are often inclined to send their military forces here and there, intervening, for what they claim is in the interest of humanity, but honest observers recognize is in their own state interest. People see the powerful members of the Security Council sitting there and understand that peace operations, whatever they might be called, sometimes are used to reinforce the interests of wealthy and powerful northern countries.

Another reason for the hesitation of the developing countries is rooted in the fact that five permanent members of the Security Council do not send any of their own troops and peacekeeping operations are perceived as a “mercenary activity where rich countries
intervene in poor countries and get poor soldiers to go fight for them” (Paul, 2001). U.S. troops contributions accounted only 5% of the over all UN troops in as of April, 1997, and this number further decreased to 1.5% as of April, 2002 (see Annexes 2 & 3). The United States contributed 203 troops in April 1998, for United Kingdom this number was 404, and for Bangladesh it was 867 (see Annex 5). Democracy deficit within the Security Council also makes it impossible for the South – the major troop contributors – to demonstrate the desired political will to reform peace operations. In the past operations, the troop contributing countries themselves did not have any real say over the nature of the Security Council mandate.

The Brahimi Report sacrifices efficiency and clarity in order to look appealing to member states. Ambiguity is not a stranger to UN bureaucracy: that character in UN language in fact makes it possible for UN resolutions to be endorsed by its member states. But the Report is not a resolution; it is a plan for action. It asks members states for political and financial commitments and recommends that they share authority. Before member states can take action, they need to know what exactly they are committing for, and failing to find that information in the Report, each state proceeds according to its own interpretation. It is very critical, therefore, for future studies of the peace operations to establish clear and specific links between the recommendations made in the Brahimi Report and obstacles that stands on the way to implementation.

Finally, the present study recommends that future studies should look at how the American manufacturers and suppliers competing for UN contracts influence U.S. decision making on peace operations if indeed they do affect it at all. Is there a peace operations industry developing in the United States and did the past manufacturers and
suppliers have any kind of influence on the direction of U.S. policy towards peace operations?

Conclusion

In order to understand why the United States contributes to peace operations, this study paid particular attention to the institutions that implement policy and those that attempt to influence it. The selectivity of American involvement both in economic and security matters will bring forth many problems more serious than the recent terrorists attacks in years to come. Johnson (1996) said that "asserting a sharp divergence between U.S. interests and the interests of the international community, with a clear preference for the former, destroys the symbolic transformation needed to turn a nationally partisan combat situation into a nonpartisan enforcement operation" (1996, p. 320).

The future is not rosy. "A national intelligence council study identified 23 countries with ongoing humanitarian emergencies and cited 9 others were likely to develop crises" (Hirsch, 2000, p. 4). The office of the Secretary-General has submitted necessary paper work and is waiting for member states to take necessary steps. Whether the United States will assume the leadership to initiate the implementation of these steps or not, will determine the faith of predicted 9 conflicts ahead.

Post-cold war security environment has yet to find its final shape and achieve maturity. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon will have significant impact on U.S. involvement abroad and, in particular, will impact its policy on peace operations. A decade after the cold war ended, U.S. government and the public is
once again united against a single enemy - terrorism. However, this time, the enemy is not a single country but is a transitional group, hard to classify and investigate.

The administration of the President George W. Bush has yet to determine its policy towards the UN peace operations and is now considering updating Clinton's presidential directives on peace keeping. Initial assessment suggests the U.S. views participation in peace operations positively. A report released by the administration and based on interviews with more than two dozen top U.S. military leaders, including the commander of U.S. operations in Afghanistan, General Tommy Hanks, concludes that U.S. engagement in peace operations is in U.S. national interest and will be a critical tool in the war against terrorism (Jim Lobe of Asia Times Online, March 19, 2002). Many military commanders were reluctant to engage in peacekeeping operations in the early 1990’s but as they become more involved in such operations during the past decade, according to some military observers, the opinion has changed quite dramatically. Most U.S. military officials now think that peace operations are “leadership laboratories” for officers, and the morale and retention rates are the highest among those serving in peace operations. In his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 5, 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell urged the Committee to:

Continue to try to meet our obligations to international peacekeeping activities.

The Budget request includes $726 million to pay our projected United Nations peacekeeping assessments – all the more important as we seek to avoid increasing even further our U.N. arrearages. U.N. peacekeeping activities allow us to leverage our political, military, and financial assets through the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the participation of other countries in
providing funds and peacekeepers for conflicts worldwide. As we have seen in Afghanistan, it is often best to use American GIs for the heavy lifting of combat and leave the peacekeeping to others (as quoted in Future of Peace Operations Project, Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2002, www.stimson.org).

During his election campaign, Governor Bush cited peacekeeping, and nation building in particular, as a kind of social work in which U.S. soldiers should not be engaged in. The new Secretary of State, Colin Powell, once a stronger opponent of full U.S. participation in peacekeeping, hasn’t taken any officials steps against peace operations. It is hard to predict how he will lead the civil administration on issues of peacekeeping. But it appears that he has abandoned his once strong opposition to U.S. participation in peace operations.

It is quite likely this administration will also suffer from incompatibility between the views of the Pentagon’s civilian leadership and those of the military, but in this case, military officials seems to be more supportive than the civilian leadership. Indeed, the most important source of influence the United States needs in its campaign against terrorism will come from properly conducted U.S. participation in peace operations.
Annex 1

U.S. Debt to UN Peacekeeping Operations
As of August 31, 1997

Project on Peacekeeping and United Nations
A Project of the Council for a Liable World Education Fund

Available on-line
http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/un/pkdebt.html

Debt Chart for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

(measured in U.S. dollars)
### Annex 2
Current United Nations Peace Operations & U.S. Troops Levels
As of April, 1997
Project on Peacekeeping and United Nations
A Project of the Council for a Livable World Education Fund
Available on-line
http://www.cfw.org/pub/cfw/un/troops0499.html

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<th>U.S. Troop Levels</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AFRICA</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0</td>
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**TOTAL: U.N. Troops and U.S. contributions (5% overall)**

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*Mandate ended 26 February 1999; liquidation under way.

Source of data for this chart is the United Nations. Chart excludes North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions and non-United Nations administered peace operations, such as those run by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia and the Multinational Force Organization (MFO) in the Sinai. U.N. peace operations in the former Yugoslavia are separate from the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in that area.
Annex 3
U.S. Personnel Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations
As of April 30, 2002
Future of Peace Operations Project
Henry. L. Stimson Center
Available on-line
http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdfs/april02uscontribunpko.pdf
U.S. PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS TO U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
AS OF 30 APRIL 2002

While the United States participates in peace operations worldwide, it provides few troops to the 15 current United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping operations. U.S. personnel serve primarily as civilian police and military observers in eight U.N. peacekeeping operations, with over three-quarters of them posted in Kosovo. At the end of April, 86 nations were contributing 46,784 personnel to these U.N. operations; less than two percent were U.S. personnel. This chart captures the numbers of personnel volunteered by U.N. member states to serve as troops, civilian police and military observers in U.N. operations; employees of the United Nations are not included in these figures.

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Data provided by the United Nations

1 U.N. peacekeeping operations are those authorized, run, and paid for by the United Nations. These operations are separate from non-U.N. peace operations authorized by a U.N. Security Council resolution but run by an international organization or lead nation, such as the current NATO force in Kosovo or the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This list does not include U.N. peacebuilding missions, such as MINUGUA in Guatemala and UNAMA in Afghanistan.

FUTURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS project, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER • 11 Dupont Circle, NW • Ninth Floor • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.223.5956 • www.stimson.org
Annex 4
Payments Due to the UN for Peacekeeping Accounts: 2001
Global Policy Forum
Sums in $ US Millions Rounded. Top 15 Players.
'Prior' is payments due for previous years.
'Total' includes the amount owing for this year and previous years.

Available on-line

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Annex 5
Top Twenty Peacekeeping Contributors
As of April, 1997
Project on Peacekeeping and United Nations
A Project of the Council for a Livable World Education Fund
Available on-line

as of April 30, 1998

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References


Johnson (1996)


