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Understanding Adjusted Moral Vision and Activism in the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General

Hubert M. Kalinowski

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The Master's Thesis:
Understanding Adjusted Moral Vision and Activism in the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General
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March 12, 2002

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Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Successful Completion of the Course The Master’s Thesis
For My Loving Mother, Zofia Kalinowska, and Her Continued Health and Happiness

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Abstract

Understanding Adjusted Moral Vision and Rational Activism in the Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations is a study of leadership effectiveness. Robert W. Cox and Ernst Haas’s theories of leadership as an adaptive function are challenged by the creation of an “adjusted moral vision” and a “rational activism” measure constructed mostly from broad scholarship about the American Presidency. Effective United Nations Secretary-Generals are believed to have a list of competencies in diplomatic, administrative, and coordinative areas better accounted for in the new criteria. The adjusted moral vision measure is comprised primarily of Olasky’s (1999) “moral vision,” Florig’s (1992) “ideology,” and Kanninen’s (1995) “integrity” as he applies it to Javier Perez de Cuellar, as well as some of the author’s own modifications of those concepts. The second measure of rational activism is composed from a self-evident idea that leaders should act in leading, originally expounded on by Richard Neustadt (1958) in his work about the US Presidency. Incorporated into it are the recent criticisms of Presidential scholars W. Muir (1988) and K. Muir (1992), who emphasize that Neustadt’s definition is ideologically biased. The two new measures endeavor to explain leadership in international organization using more traditional legal basis, personal styles and ethical norms. The first new measure, adjusted moral vision, endeavors to explain the process of personal decision-making in the leadership exercise. The study’s second new measure of rational activism controls for irrational or risky action, and declares constitutional disintegrative and retrenchment programs like downsizing reforms as rational activism and therefore effective action. As case studies, the paper selects the tenures of Dag Hammarskjold, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and Kofi Annan and applies the measure to determine if it creates a more accurate standard than that of older leadership theory in international organization. The study sets forth that with the end of the Cold War the time has come for a revisitation and redefinition of effective leadership on the international stage, and that the abundant scholarship available on leadership and the American Presidency can provide a substantial portion of new ideas needed to understand the office of the UN Secretary-General.
# Understanding Adjusted Moral Vision and Rational Activism in the Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations

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I. Introduction: Leadership and the Secretary-General

In the modern paradigm of ever-increasing globalization, it has become increasingly important to gauge the effectiveness of the United Nations Secretary-General. As concepts of sovereignty are rethought in light of today’s global problems and increasingly universal values, it is likely that the UN will take on a greater role in the foreseeable future. Yet, few scholars have ventured into establishing a comprehensive understanding of what makes one Secretary-General a more effective leader than another. This is where the broad array of scholarship on United States Presidential leadership effectiveness proves indispensable; no leaders on earth have received as much scrutiny as they have.

The issue boils down to the effective use of the office of Secretary-General for the advancement of the United Nations (UN) Charter. The purpose of good Secretary-Generalship is to help in the realization of the goals of the Organization as stated in Article 1 of the Charter of the UN (hereafter referred to as “the Charter”). That leadership must be reached across the economic, social, humanitarian, environmental and administrative sectors. Another hallmark of good leadership is the ability of and the degree to which the Secretary-General can interpret and communicate the relevance of the Charter to his or her times.

The evaluation of leadership in the office of the Secretary-General merits study for three reasons. First, there is a void in scholarship about what makes for comparatively effective Secretary-General leadership. Except for allusions in biographies and some analysis of individual Secretary-Generals, there is relatively little to go on compared to other fields. For example, Urquhart (1972) gives factual background to Hammarskjold’s development, thoughts,
and logic. Others may give a close biographical accounting of how events unfolded, for example during the transition from Boutros Boutros-Ghali to Kofi Annan, that is similar in its focus on a specific leader. Journalistically, many have described the tenure of Boutros-Ghali, or examined the development and background of Kofi Annan. However, the totality of these sources and others leave the leadership question largely untouched since the 1970s.

Second, a comprehensive analysis is vital if the office of the Secretary-General of the UN is to evolve; if Secretary-Generals are endlessly praised and not constructively critiqued, future candidates and constituencies will not have concrete reference points for effective actions, strategies, and behaviors. Third, it appears that the vast amount of scholarship on political leadership in general and American Presidential leadership in particular has not resulted in the amount, quality and clarity of insight that it could have produced for use in this international office.

The study of leadership in international organizations deserves a complete leadership measure that takes into account the three traditional areas of leadership theory. The basis for such a study should encompass a re-visitation and discussion of traditional approaches that include the analysis of personality characteristics, ethical principles, and legal constraints as well as differing ideas of activism. For example, personality traits are vital to the leader’s decision-making process, and a leader may make decisions based largely on personal analysis. Ethical principles, meanwhile, work on the premise that leadership can be moral or immoral, good or bad. Legal constraints reflect the leader’s adherence to the Organization’s governing Charter, or to the larger body of legal and customary norms. Activism, however, may not always be interpreted to mean that action is always better than no action. The scientific trend in this field over the last several decades has been to narrow the discourse and acquiesce in a dominant view
of leadership as a politically adaptive function in one form or another. Rather than renouncing traditional schools of leadership study as secondary in favor of a more parsimonious, but less inclusive and comprehensive theory, it is important to reexamine all of these approaches in light of recent developments and leadership experiences.

II. What is Effective

A. Definition

Before any analysis, it becomes necessary to set forth the measure for effective, or good leadership in the office of the UN Secretary-General. That is, certain duties of the office must be exercised rationally whatever the circumstances, and to the extent that they are accomplished and actually enacted given the difficulties of the time, they are a barometer of the effectiveness of the person occupying the office of UN Secretary-General. Kinninen (1995) defines rationality as decision-making that results in the most benefit for the least cost given the spectrum of options. The broad spectrum of what makes for an effective Secretary-General can be classified in three general headings that include diplomatic, administrative and coordinative-political performance.

The effective Secretary-General should exercise leadership in developing policies and in the conduct of diplomacy. The core goal of leadership in the office of the Secretary-General is to help bring about the actualization of the goals of the Organization as stated in the Charter. His leadership must therefore be comprehensive of political, economic, social, humanitarian, environmental, and administrative matters (Kinninen, 1995). Likewise, the Secretary-General must interpret and communicate the relevance of the Charter to the times, whatever the historical or geopolitical difficulties. The leader is best served in this regard not only by displaying an ideological sensitivity to the time, but by a well balanced rational approach to the negotiation,
delegation, and agenda-setting that the task of international leadership requires in order to be successful.

On matters of policy, the Secretary-General should participate in the process of identifying the main challenges before the international community, by shifting approaches and strategies to meet these challenges and by helping in the determination of policy options to be pursued by the United Nations (Kanninen, 1995). The effective Secretary-General must show leadership in developing policies as well as leadership in the conduct of diplomacy. Leadership in diplomacy requires efforts by the Secretary-General to help build consensus around issues. Moreover, Article 99 of the Charter suggests that the Secretary-General has an important leadership role in functions of early warning, peacekeeping and peacemaking (Kanninen, 1995). To this end, the leader must act to advance Charter principles, but rationally hold off from action when the likelihood of damaging the institution is high. Such an approach includes properly planning and executing retrenchment and other options. Therefore, the Secretary-General must judge the opportunity for rational action that may not always be there because forcing proactive leadership may result in an inefficient or ineffective use of the Organization’s resources and the leader’s leadership skills.

The Secretary-General has a responsibility to lead the Secretariat as an intellectual and service organ (Ameri, 1996). Importantly, this includes the leadership ability of motivating and administering his staff to new heights of efficiency and judgment. The Secretary-General has the overarching role of chief executive officer in that he leads by helping to coordinate and integrate the activities of the United Nations system. The Secretary-General serves to promote a sense of policy orientation, direction and cohesiveness in the UN system. As such, his integrity should
not come into question amongst his colleagues, but a well-crafted agenda tailored to the Organization needs to be set forth if the leader is to lead, not manage.

Kanninen writes (p. 20), “The Secretary-General should organize his Executive Office and make arrangements designed to promote a sense of policy orientation in the Secretariat, a sense of direction in the activities of the Secretariat and a feeling that all parts of the Secretariat are working together.” These factors, taken from Tapio Kanninen (1995) and reinforced and supported by Housang Ameri (1996), are also evident to the student of the UN Charter and of that Charter’s crafting at San Francisco. They are three broad components of leadership effectiveness within the Secretariat.

The degree to which the Secretary-General has fulfilled these responsibilities in all the leadership challenges of his tenure is the measure of whether that leader is great or something less. The focus, therefore, is on the leader’s ability to accomplish effective leadership during a situation, and not a situation’s ability to bring out a leader’s ability to lead. Moreover, the leader’s leadership need not necessarily be integrative or expansive of the organization. Rather, leadership may include disintegrative elements when portions of the Organization are not working reasonably well to fulfill Charter principles. The leader must act to maximize the likelihood that his efforts in these areas will be successful.

Importantly, this approach includes a balance among the factors of effectiveness. That is, a leader cannot be an excellent administrator, for example, while failing at his diplomatic early warning function. At the same time, the notion of a balance entails that a leader will not be, for example, a visionary administrator but an ideological political leader, thus exhibiting an inequity of approach across the sectors of responsibility. While a special focus of energy on an under-utilized sector may be warranted, over the long term such inequities become glaring, and
leadership suffers. In the office of the Secretary-General, this balance is best viewed as a consistency in approach across all sectors of responsibility as well as continued, concentrated focus of a leader’s competencies across the three core areas of responsibility outlined. The personal responsibility of a leader, seen as a balance among responsibilities and in maintaining performance consistency, preempts criticism and negates the need for a substantial reliance on feedback from coalitions and interest groups. The presence of a balance helps to focus and fine-tune a leader’s competencies, inhibiting ill-conceived leadership reactions to events.

At the same time, the larger Secretariat is a political bureaucracy and as such shares certain characteristics that are common to most large governmental and non-governmental organizations. Nevertheless, it is a unique institution and traditional political leadership scholarship may not always apply to it. The broader issue is whether or not in these times of an ever-increasing need for global governance the office of the Secretary-General can learn from its leadership errors.

In 1995, Tapio Kanningen asked whether UN leadership could affect the world politic instead of the environment affecting UN leadership. The answer given here is yes. In fact, in the tradition of individual responsibility and psychological leadership theory, the answer has to be that the leader is ultimately responsible for the quality of his leadership: Outside circumstances can only qualify his rational choices (Kanningen, 1995). Kanningen’s analysis of fiscal decision-making closely outlined how Perez deCuellar, and by extension here all Secretary-Generals, can act individually to optimize their leadership in bleak environmental circumstances.
**B. Operationalization**

This study begins by examining the beginnings of the literature on leadership in international organizations and definitions and explications of effectiveness. This study agrees that the elements of “overt and potential conflict and consensus” (Cox 1969 p. 327 in 1992) offer opportunities for action. That action, however may a) not be feasible b) not be rational c) action may not be called for, or d) any action may endanger the situational context of the organization unnecessarily. Moreover, as discussed in depth, Hass in Cox (1969) commits several fallacies not present in the model that will be used here. Haas assumes that the “rational” [not explicitly defined by Haas in Cox (1969)] or even desirable choice for the executive head, as it relates to the governing Charter or to general geo-political concerns, is to bring about an expansion of the tasks and authority of the Organization.

To operationalize the diplomatic, administrative and coordinative realms of Secretary-General leadership effectiveness, it is key to apply them, as broadly defined above, to the tenures and happenings of particular Secretary-Generals. In this way it is possible to distinguish those leaders who did not completely perform their responsibilities from those that did, based on the historical record. For the purposes of this study, this is done in a very basic way.

Fundamentally, all three realms will be studied across the journalistic/impressionistic and biographical evidence discussed as there is no real mechanism of systematic comparison. The major events, agendas and priorities of each leader’s tenure will serve as the facts used in the study, thus omitting the mundane day-to-day tasks of the office as well as leadership events of negligible impact. Although this leaves some room for interpretation as to which events should be included, especially because no one text or author has systematically studied all the subjects,
it is the only feasible approach considering the infinite amount of instances that may constitute leadership, from saying hello to coworkers and thanking the personal driver to mediating disputes, proposing reforms and warning of possible military and humanitarian emergencies.

The operationalization of the different realms may be understood this way. Diplomatic leadership includes instances of negotiation between and among entities outside the Secretariat or the facilitation of compromise, settlement or treaty brought about by early warning responsibilities. Administrative leadership includes restructuring and reforms within the broader UN Organization, as well as the tone and manner of setting responsibility, chains of command, and delegation of tasks. Political-coordinative leadership includes the advancement of the Secretary-General's personal initiatives and priorities. This may include longer-term treaties that aren't brought about by early-warning responsibilities, such as to stop border conflict. The coordinative aspect partially overlaps with the diplomatic realm because it entails the political coordination of Member States in getting agreement on financing or provision of equipment or personnel for everything from peacekeeping missions to the Secretary-General's personal initiatives. Some issues, like obtaining promised dues from Member States, can be called either political-coordinative or diplomatic. Diplomatic if the issue is a state's perceived grievance with the UN. Political-coordinative if the issue is obtaining or expediting troop commitments for a peacekeeping mission, for example.

The application of these responsibility groupings across biographical and journalistic/impressionistic factual and analytic writings constitutes the operationalization of this measure. The advantage in using this approach is that it largely avoids bureaucratic UN documents unless they are used by these outside writers, thus avoiding any overt Organizational
bias while retaining some analytical opinion, a desirable perspective from the viewpoint of analytical scholarship.

III. The Beginnings of the Study of Leadership in International Organizations

The larger constituency of the Secretary-General needs to resolve these issues and questions of leadership because of the same need that inspired the creation of the United Nations. Everyone wants to prepare a better future. If the central managing role for this endeavor is left to one chief administrative officer in the form of a Secretary-General, Member States should be capable of selecting a candidate that should prove to be effective. To this end, studying the leadership qualities of past leaders will provide an understanding of the successful and unsuccessful leadership strategies of past Secretary-Generals. By studying the specific leadership traits of past and present Secretary-Generals, a pattern can continue to emerge for those leadership traits that lead to the most effective execution of that office.

The study of leadership in international organizations originated with the League of Nations, but declined as the League began to fray (Jordan, 1971). Not until the 1960s did Robert Cox set forth some key categories of executive heads of international organizations in his essay, The Executive Head, by adapting a relative definition of leadership from Ernst Haas and building on it to incorporate a broader understanding of leadership on the international level.

In that essay, Cox praises Ernst Hass and Richard Neustadt for “put[ting] emphasis on the informal rather more than the formal, on process rather more than norm, and on role rather more than idiosyncrasy” (Cox, p. 325, 1969 in 1992). Thus, Cox dismisses the legal basis, personal styles basis, and ethical principles basis as secondary for the analysis of executive leadership. Cox writes of Haas (p. 325), “Haas is thus concerned with executive leadership as a politically
adapted function, not about its legal bases, personal styles, or ethical principles.” Cox adapts Haas's view of leadership as a purely adaptive function and therefore does not favor the legal, personal, and ethical traditions of leadership study, sideling them in favor of defining effective leadership as an adaptive function, and the failure of leadership as a failure to adapt and act. Indeed, Cox extracts the measure from Haas's discussion, and uses it as his basis for further scholarship.

Moreover, chief among early leadership theory was Ernst Haas's discussion of ideology in Cox (1969) because it accepts that a leader needs to do more than simply manage all competing interests: to some degree, the leader has to propose a series of initiatives/priorities that stretch and challenge the expectations of his constituency. Haas put forth some well-known ideas that set the basis for early study of the executive leader in international organizations. According to Cox (1969, p. 326 in 1992), Haas distinguishes “three critical variables in the executive head’s strategy for maximizing opportunities for task expansion. First, the executive head must define an ideology that gives clear goals to the organization and prescribes methods for attaining these goals. This ideology must respond to a wide range of demands and expectations from the constituents.” Haas also believes that the leader must build a bureaucracy amenable to his ideas that will act independently to enact them, and that he must build a coalition among a majority of the constituency. Haas stresses the leader’s ability to create conditions for interaction with his environment.

According to Cox, Hass believes that executive leadership in international organizations comes down to the leader’s ability to select among the pressures put upon him from Member States and from within the organization itself and other actors (he calls all of these “input pressures” p. 325) and to interpret these inputs so that an expansion of the authority and

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functions of the Organization takes place. Haas thus implies that hard work and consistency are important to the process of leadership, but refrains from citing them as among the main criteria for effective leadership in favor of the primacy of responding to influence from the outside environment.

Thus, Cox sets the tone for leadership study in international organizations by accepting Hass’s characterization of leadership and his general line of thinking in the field. With the partial exception of Finkelstein’s (1969, 1988) emphasis on the legal basis for leadership, this scholarly consensus has continued to this day. A key concept in the line of thinking presented by Ernst Haas, discussed by Cox (1969) and elaborated on by Tapio Kanninen (1995) is that the UN is an Organization within a world environment, not an inter-governmental organization, with all the limits that entails. They treat the UN as an autonomous part of the world system—rather than as a sum of its parts, an assumption that would make studying the Organization much more complex by factoring in all the pressures and constraints working on the Organization. While they treat the Organization as an individual, however, Haas and Cox treat leadership, and thus the leader, as a contingent, adaptive function—a sum of adapting to all the pressures placed upon them. They thus exercise some selectivity by treating the UN, technically an inter-governmental organization, as an autonomous individual while treating the leader, an individual, as the adaptive sum of all pressures and inputs.

The pressures on the UN come about from states and other actors within the world. Cox writes about Haas on page 325 (1969), “it is the configuration of these input pressures—the elements of overt and potential conflict and consensus among them—which defines opportunities for action through the organization. The executive head is in the key position to maximize these opportunities, in other words to interpret the input pressures in such a way as to
bring about an expansion of the tasks and of the authority of the organization." The executive head is therefore a kind of manager of political inputs that has the opportunity to favor some inputs more than others, provided that the input pressures are relatively equal.

Cox believes that these inputs produce opportunity for "overt and potential conflict and consensus" (Cox 1969 p. 327 in 1992) and thus opportunities for action. This action in turn results in adaptive, or actual leadership. In as far as that action increases the power and authority of the international organization, it is good, successful and effective. Similarly, Cox assumes that the leader's motivation for leadership is to continually cement himself as top man within the organization among this overt and potential conflict and consensus, and that this yields a mutual benefit of generally increasing Organizational authority.

Broadly, Cox (1969) argues that the study of executive leadership in international organizations is important because it can bring about a new kind of autonomous actor in the international system, the international organization as an influence on world politics in its own right. Cox gives these three categories slightly different names (p. 319, 1969 in 1992): "legal-institutional," "idiosyncratic (personality or leadership style)," and "ethical-normative." Cox defines the "legal-institutional" category as (stress[ing]) the formal constitutional powers of the executive head and how these have been contained or enlarged by practice or interpretation" (Ibid). He defines "idiosyncratic" as "personalities of the executive heads themselves. The implicit assumption here is that it is the man who makes the institution" (p. 321) Lastly, he defines "ethical normative" as "the concept of the international character of the role and responsibilities of the international Secretariat and its executive head" (p. 322).

Cox does acknowledge that an administrative function is another, less important aspect of the Secretary-General's responsibility, and concerns himself less with this than with the office's
political functions because they are more malleable. He contrasts the bureaucratic, technical leader—the administrator, with the charismatic orator—the leader, and points to the drawbacks to effectiveness both entail because of the international nature of the UN and the wide sphere of cultures and challenges the leader must deal with.

For the purpose of understanding the development of international organizations, Robert Cox argues for grouping leadership in international organizations into three different “types”: (Cox and Jacobson, 1973, p. 25-30) “competitive,” “mobilizing,” and “authoritarian” and sets forth that the successful Secretary-General will exercise both considerable “administrative” and “political” leadership (Cox, 1969, p. 321). According to Cox, competitive leaders govern in a way that plays constituencies off against one another. Mobilizing leaders build consensus and energy around an issue. Authoritarian leaders rule like philosopher-kings or pathological dictators, having their way without compromise as much as possible. Cox refers to the inner management of day-to-day issues within the Organization as administration, while classifying the outward interaction with the constituency, formulation and implementation of policies and the general carrying-out of the Charter as political leadership opportunities. However, Cox argues that successful Secretary-Generals strive to continually cement themselves as top men within the Organization, in effect maintaining relevance as the center of attention.

Robert Cox’s (1973) discussion of leadership helps paint the scope of the study here. Cox writes, “There is no scale that can compare the patient negotiation and give-and-take of consensus building with the...expression of inner visions” (Cox, 1974, p. 142-143). He also discusses the importance of the balance between the extremes of consensus building and expression of inner values and the given geo-political situation. If a leader becomes pathological about expressing his inner visions when they run counter to those of the constituency, countries
can merely shift resources away from the international organization he heads. Cox believes that larger socio-economic factors exercise a greater influence on the executive head than factors of individual political leadership.

Couched within a broader discussion, Cox does not see a need for deliberating the independent, rational actions of the unique leader. Cox’s extroverted, outward approach to influences for leadership guides the reader away from the analysis of personality or psychology and toward the outer pressures that play upon the leader. In 1969, Cox wrote that the concept of the UN international Secretariat ought not to be viewed in “moral terms” (p. 324) because “[The argument] will lose [its] absolute character and will be seen as [an ideology] buttressing a particular ideology...[it is a] very inadequate description of actual behavior and is of little use to the analyst.” Rather, Cox appears to believe that classifying the Secretariat in moral terms would open the door for normative conflict over the nature of leadership, the executive head and international organization that would be detrimental to a parsimonious understanding of the political function of the executive head.

A modification of Cox’s ideas came in 1973, when Cox and Jacobson argued that the executive head leads in groups rather than as an individual. Rather than focusing on the leader and his decision-making process, Cox and Jacobson (et al, 1973) discuss elites and decision-making in international organizations, and argue that the Secretary-General is not alone in making Organizational decisions. They argue that the support or non-support of “a plurality of elites” (Cox and Jacobson, p. 5) may influence a Secretary-General to act in one way or another. By this they mean that the weight of the UN bureaucracy, Assistant Secretary-Generals, Directors, and Advisors of the Secretary-General both within the Organization and his outside acquaintances usually exercise sufficient pull with the leader to have a significant, if not decisive
impact on his final decision. They argue that the pattern of this influence will differ with the issue area, although their study did not focus exclusively on outward pressures on the leader.

In 1988, Finkelstein seemed to reinvigorate the legal bases approach as the foundation for the greater prominence of the executive head in international organizations. Finkelstein writes (1988, p. 27), “Starting from constitutional bases that gave them greater prominence and larger roles than had been allotted their prewar predecessors, executive heads have in various ways become significant political actors in the UN system.” Finkelstein underscores the constitutional basis for the powers of the executive head and believes that the role of the executive head in international organizations will remain on the rise. Finkelstein argues that though by no means insusceptible to influence, the sole activism of executive heads has served to expand their importance and decision-making within the international organization. Thus, Finkelstein would argue that it was the executive head, grounded in the founding charter, that has exercised the preponderance of decision-making leadership, not a plurality of elites.

More recently, a former Secretary-General has kept the study of legal basis alive in leadership study within international organizations. Javier Perez de Cuellar (1997) discusses the role of the Secretary-General and gives a good accounting of the inherent and oft-times unique challenges to rational decision-making inherent in the Organization. Indeed, he outlines both how the Executive can under-step and overstep the bounds of the office given an international situation. DeCuellar thus advises that leadership at the international level should tend away from extremes and towards the middle ground because of these institutional constraints: the leader should be neither too modest nor too self-aggrandizing. DeCuellar focuses on the structural legal limitations that leadership encounters and must deal with in the Secretary-Generalship.
The main ideas of executive leadership study in the UN have thus far focused on general groupings of leadership styles, and on leadership as an adaptive function. Though Finkelstein discusses the legal basis for such leadership, personality styles and ethical basis have been largely set aside in favor of viewing leadership at the UN as a politically adaptive function.

On the foundations of these theoretical works come the biographies and descriptions of the various leaders who have occupied the office. While the theoretical works of Cox, Jacobson, Finkelstein and Kanninen are colored by some analysis of the terms of particular Secretary-Generals, a broader factual background is needed. That is, most of Cox’s examples are of Hammarskjold, many of Finkelstein’s are of Waldheim, and Kanninen focuses exclusively on Perez deCuellar. To the extent that they overlap with the case studies here, their examples may illuminate the discussion, but factual and biographical accounts that will now be described are needed to base any analysis in fact.

Factual and biographical sources can come from co-workers, biographers and reporters. For example, Brian Urquhart’s biography of Dag Hammarkjold seems a reliable source from which to gather facts about that leader. Urquhart (1972) discusses how the different crises and challenges of Hammarskjold’s term evolved, and that leader’s decision-making process. This includes Hammarskjold’s worldview of broad tolerance, his belief in the integrity of the office, and his efforts at neutrality. Urquhart discusses the difficulties of resolving the Suez Canal issue, and of the situation in the Congo, the resulting peacekeeping mission there, and the exact role and nature of the office, which came under attack during those years for new action. At the same time, Urquhart discusses Hammarskjold’s conviction that scientific advancement and economic growth are the only ways to improve the lot of mankind. Thus, according to Urquhart,
Hammarskjold was highly motivated to create and aid such UN organs as the United Nations Development Program.

Shawcross (2001) discusses Boutros-Ghali’s decision-making toward Bosnia and Somalia, and quotes Boutros-Ghali’s more memorable phrases chastising Western interest in Bosnia and reluctance to intervene in Africa. Likewise, Shawcross gives broad background that indicates Boutros-Ghali’s cantankerous nature, and his discomfort in the limitations of the office.

Moreover, Shawcross discusses Annan’s background and asserts that Annan learned from the tenure of Boutros-Ghali. Shawcross’s main proposition is Annan’s “moral vision” (p. 5), his view of problems as issues beyond state borders but not the fault of any particular groups of states, just problems that need resolution to alleviate suffering. Shawcross chronicles Annan’s many peacekeeping trips, including to Baghdad. He speaks of Annan’s opinion that it is the Secretary-General’s duty to avert bloodshed wherever possible. Overall, there is an intimate description of the details from the many trips and peacekeeping missions of the post Cold-War world, and a proposition that it is the responsibility of the UN to address such problems. For Shawcross, to the extent that Annan has addressed or attempted to address these problems, he has been an effective leader. This contrasts with his analysis of Boutros-Ghali, who is deemed to have been simply too difficult to deal with for both insiders and some powerful Member States for an effective amelioration of suffering beyond borders, Shawcross’s proposition of effectiveness.

Similarly, Berdal (1999) discusses what he views as the ambiguous leadership of Boutros-Ghali, especially during the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. In Berdal’s view, Boutros-Ghali was somewhat effective in putting forth an agenda for the growth of peacemaking, the expansion of UN powers, and help for the Third World but was too
abrasive and failed to implement enough of his broader agenda. In peacekeeping operations, Boutros-Ghali failed to maintain clear lines of communications with Member States, and to effectively marshal their resources to these hot spots. Also, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, rather than defining a new world order, were largely failures and created an ambiguous future for the usefulness of the UN, according to Berdal’s analysis. Berdal posits that it was Boutros-Ghali’s difficult leadership style that left such a decidedly more ambiguous legacy.

Ramo et al (2000) discusses Kofi Annan, and gives a personal view of Annan’s leadership. They discuss Annan’s development of core values, and argue that Annan’s leadership values may, as opposed to those of his predecessors, be just what the UN now needs. Ramo et al argue that Annan’s moral vision transcends states, and gives factual background of Annan to argue why this is so. They offer the proposition that Annan leads in a quiet, diplomatic way, rather than through loud or self-righteous rhetoric. To support this, they give factual instances of how Annan has used this approach in Iraq, East Timor and Sierra Leone.

Others, like Giandomenico Picco (1999) and Brian Urquhart (1977), offer some administrative knowledge of the leaders. For example, Picco indicates the easygoing style of Perez deCuellar and the cantankerous, difficult administrative style of Boutros-Ghali. Support for their ideas is also found in some writings on peacekeeping missions, notably Peterson’s (2000) criticisms. Peterson largely condemns Ghal’s administrative decision-making as a key to the failure of peacemaking in Somalia. Both theorize that Boutros-Ghali was administratively difficult, leading to a decline in productivity. At the same time, Urquhart (1972) argues that Hammarskjold’s administrative capacity inspired great confidence in him and others.

The study accepts the factual background offered by Urquhart (1972, 1977), Shawcross (2001), Berdal (1999), Ramo et al (2000), Picco (1999) and other factual sources. Where the
information is opinionated, as it is in Picco (1999) and Berdal (1999), the study takes account of
this and draws its own conclusions from the facts presented within each author’s broader
opinion. The quarrel of the study is therefore not with facts or biographies, and not even with
inherently opinionated pieces of any kind because factual descriptions may embellish the
discussion and conclusions. Rather, the quarrel is that the limited leadership study of
international organizations has adapted some erroneous foundations and theses mentioned
earlier. The study thus embraces previously-held legal, personality, and ethical leadership theory
and accordingly develops a barometer from American Presidential leadership and then uses that
barometer to describe leadership effectiveness in case studies.

IV. Some Criticisms of UN and IO Leadership Study

As mentioned earlier, there is simply not enough analytical scholarship about the
effectiveness of leadership in the office of the Secretary-General. Moreover some key
limitations are present in the limited scholarship that does exist. These include a lack of case
study, only broad categorization of leadership styles in international organizations and
insufficient debate about the commonalities about the theory of leadership as political adaptation
amongst Finkelstein, Cox, Haas, and Kanninen. Further limitations in the scholarship are
described here, and together these limits comprise a very solid reason for turning to scholarship
about the American Presidency to gain a refreshed perspective for analysis.

There is virtually no comparative scholarship or measure for understanding Secretary-
General effectiveness across the different men who have occupied the office. Therefore, it again
becomes necessary to seek other avenues to establish a comparative analysis of Secretary-
General leadership effectiveness. Thus the discussion here centers on refuting the old paradigm presented in the previous section.

While paying due intellectual regard to the scholars of the dominant model, this study respectfully disputes Cox’s sidelong and minimalization of both the administrative, bureaucratic leadership and political, charismatic leadership approaches as inadequate for judging effective leadership. The growth of understanding leadership as a politically adaptive function should not preclude these and other such measures. Quite the contrary, the effective leader will know, or quickly learn, how to use these two schools in tandem and in balance. They prove quite useful for analysis because they are actually easier and less subjective than politically adaptive leadership. This is because the scholar may never truly know all the inputs weighing on a decision maker, and may always find subjective room to criticize. Charismatic leadership is much more evident when the leader speaks and administrative competence is the easiest to document by following a paper trail and balance sheet.

Though Cox (1969) argues that the study of executive leadership in international organizations is important because it can bring about a new kind of autonomous actor, the international organization, into a position of influence on world politics in its own right, this should not be the explicit goal of such an analysis. This may indeed be the path that the UN should take, but it is not integral to successful leadership tenure. Ultimately, the leader will make that decision and if all the factors discussed here are present in good balance, then that leader will be successful whether or not he expands the Organization’s mandate. If Cox’s premise were to be accepted, a Secretary-General would only have to promise an expansive agenda to articulate an Organizational plan, whatever the ideological and personal influence on that plan may be. The leader needs to succeed for the Organization to fulfill or better fulfill its
Charter, but fulfilling the Charter may or may not bring about a new kind of autonomous organization.

Of central importance, Cox (1969) believes in several concepts refuted by the measures in this paper. He groups leaders as "competitive," "mobilizing" and "authoritarian" (Cox, 1973, p. 6). It is not enough to leave leadership analysis with three broad measures without understanding the finer processes that cut across these measures, and the stories that bring these leadership tendencies into practice. A broader understanding of leadership produces more room for analysis, and attempts to more fully explain the complexities of effective leadership. Sticking with Cox's three categories may enable the reader to look at a leader and recognize him as mobilizing, competitive or authoritarian, but none of these classifications is synonymous with leadership effectiveness per se.

Cox did not see a need for discussing leadership in the Secretariat in "moral terms" (1969, p. 324). Cox believes that the use of moral terms will inevitably lead to idiosyncrasy in developing any parsimonious theory of leadership effectiveness. Today, that view of international leadership stands largely discredited by the emphasis on moral international leadership advanced by Berdal (2000) and Shawcross (2001) and many in the news media, and has not been refuted in the literature on the subject. By continuously declaring the moral role of the UN and its leader, these writers implicitly reject Cox's assumption that thinking of leadership at the UN in moral terms will only lead to idiosyncrasy. Rather, they appear to marry Kinninen's assumption of rationality with morality, by declaring that the Organization will be most effective where it can do the most abject, moral good. These writers see the moral nature of effective leadership at the UN as central to its effectiveness and importance in the post-Cold War era. Increasingly, constituencies of all kinds, not just Member States look to the UN's
leader to provide moral leadership, especially as it pertains to the UN itself. The post-Cold War international situation demands that UN leadership be viewed partially in moral terms as the basis for UN power is increasingly found in issues that transcend international borders. In order for these issues to be recognized, the Secretary-General must have a moral vision to be able to distinguish them from the litany of concerns that command his attention. Moreover, today the UN increasingly finds itself making a moral case for action, rather than one built exclusively on the geo-political concerns of Member States.

Specifically, it is therefore believed here that what Cox calls the “idiosyncratic” (1969, p. 325 in 1992) element of leadership is in fact its essence. Cox aims to avoid idiosyncrasy by emphasizing the “role” (p. 325) of the Secretary-General, that is, his role as a leader. He attempts to avoid the analysis of individual Secretary-Generals and any multi-variable characteristics in general (such as legal bases and personality traits) because he perceives such an approach to be too subjective. This study believes that such an “idiosyncratic” element is needed, even if it may result in a less parsimonious theory than some would like. To predict effective decision-making process, an understanding of traditional nuanced characteristics is needed because the theory adaptive leadership leaves out the psychological thinking process and characteristics unique to the individual leader. Some generally valuable guides and patterns can still be drawn from such study, but they cannot be as broad as to declare that adaptive leadership will always be effective or good, as Cox and Haas in Cox (1969) seem to imply.

Also counter to Cox’s (1969) assertions, this study does not set forth that any successful Secretary-General necessarily strives to continually cement himself as top man in Organizational politics. On the contrary, the men who have attempted to do so may well have proved least successful. Moreover, working toward one’s aggrandizement would yield no perceptible or
inherent Organizational benefit except as a way to improve one’s ego, a goal that runs contrary to Organizational goals found in the Charter that serve to promote the Organization’s benefit over that of the leader’s. Those within the Organization who seriously doubt the Secretary-General’s chief executive role loose credibility, and so does the Secretary-General if he needs to explicitly or even consciously counter any such tendencies.

As discussed, Cox and Jacobson believe that the anatomy of influence in a large inter-governmental organization like the UN is built on a “plurality of elites” that carries the day in decision-making. The influence of a plurality of elites, however, does not equal the final Organizational decision because the responsibility is ultimately most pronounced within the office of the Secretary-General itself. By this phrase, Cox and Jacobson apparently intend to let the leader off the hook: that is, justify the Secretary-General’s decision-making by the influence of those around him. Thus, though a plurality of elites may or may not exercise greater or better influence than the Secretary-General himself over decision-making, the degree or measure of their influence in executive leadership is indeed largely up to the office-holder of the Secretary-Generalship. The Secretary-General holds the power to accept or reject the arguments of those around him and to delegate or withhold trust. The “plurality of elites” (p. 5, 1973) assertion by Cox and Jacobson is therefore discarded here in favor of accepting the Secretary-General as the final decision-making power over the purview of what makes his leadership effective or ineffective.

According to Cox (1969, p. 326 in 1992), Haas distinguishes, “three critical variables in the executive head’s strategy for maximizing opportunities for task expansion. First, the executive head must define an ideology that gives clear goals to the Organization and prescribes methods for attaining those goals. This ideology must respond to a wide range of demands and
expectations from the constituents.” However, it is here believed that the leader does not have to construct a bureaucracy committed to his ideology per se, or necessarily construct a “majority coalition” (p. 326 in Cox, 1969) if he exercises balanced leadership and decision-making according to the measures set forth in this paper. Rapidly shifting alliances and opinions make majority coalitions fragile, and a moderate leader well cognizant of the broader history of problems and challenges can rely primarily on personal ideological judgment. Coalitions will follow such leadership, and the leader retains a proactive leadership stance rather than a reactive one. Rather than worry about geo-political factors, coalitions and a staff that is subject to rapid change, focusing inward and exercising balanced leadership according to the measures here better serves the leader. Relying primarily on coalition demands lessens leadership unnecessarily by making it reactive, though this is not to say that international civil service constituents should not have secondary input to the leader’s competencies and initiative.

This study puts forth that it is best not to discard legal bases, personal styles, and ethical principles as cornerstones of leadership analysis. Rather, these areas play the key roles in the leader’s decision-making. The idea of leadership as politically adapted function ignores the individual in the position of leadership and the ultimate power of his decision among inputs or to disregard inputs altogether in order to fulfill the Charter and preserve the Organization in the face of challenge. Instead, it skews in favor of a selfish and exclusive need to politically adapt for personal political survival, which it deems ultimately beneficial to the Organization. Moreover, in non-democratic international organizations political adaptation is not always true to serving the Charter.

By the same token, Robert Cox (1969) sites Neustadt’s discussion of American Presidential scholarship, but does not *prima facia* discuss Neustadt’s theory of Presidential
activism. Neustadt’s discussion of activism is similar to Ernst Hass’s and shares the flawed assertion that the effective/successful Secretary-General will always “bring about an expansion of the tasks and of the authority of the Organization (Cox 1969, p. 325 of 1992).” In international organizations, Kinninen (1995) has written of the ability of a Secretary-General to be effective without expanding the Organization’s powers when the time, geo-political circumstances, financial constraints or Charter principles clearly do not warrant such action.

As well, Cox (1969, p. 325 of 1992) writes, “Neustadt in his Presidential Power has studied the actual extent and limitations of the influence of a political executive in decision-making.” Unfortunately, Cox fails to adapt Neustadt’s measure to a form understandable and analyzable for the office of the UN Secretary-General. It is here believed that the institutional parameters of the respective institutions are different enough that it is not adequate to transcribe leadership theory from one institution to the other without some major stipulation and adaptation, as is given for activism later. Further, the discussion here attempts to neutralize the inherent, though not always intentional or immediately evident, bias for state action evident in the writings of many leadership theorists of the 1960s and 70s, including Neustadt and Cox.

This paper acknowledges and incorporates the concept of activism into what may be a more appropriate discussion. To the degree that Neustadt was central to first articulating the concept and Haas and Cox were responsible for bringing it to the study of international organizations, their work is built upon here by exploring that measure again. Moreover, Cox’s willingness to discuss the ideas of Neustadt, primarily a scholar of the American Presidency, was perhaps the first attempt to bring selective lessons of leadership in the American Presidency to international organization. However, other areas of Cox’s (1969) work and of Haas in Cox (1969) are largely set aside. This study respectfully disagrees with Cox’s assumption that
personality, legal and ethical bases for leadership analysis have become secondary. It rejects Cox’s assumption that in the study of personalities, it is the man who makes the institution and his implication that any such study must therefore be flawed. The theory of personalities and the individual leader as the unit of analysis is valid because, although it may not be the leader who makes the institution, it is the leader who makes the decisions, or at least is responsible and accountable for the decisions made on his watch (Kanninen 1995). The study also disagrees with rejecting the legal-constitutional frame of analysis. Ultimately, the leader is bound by his institution’s Charter, and by disregarding a close analysis of legal principles and their evolution the theorist ignores the reason and goal of the leadership in the first place in favor of always adapting. By the same token, ethical normative principles are key to understanding the United Nations because they are the rationale behind the Charter’s provisions and indeed behind international law. Thus, if for example, the scholar ignored the normative principle of a leader’s integrity, he would be ignoring principles and precepts enshrined in the governing Charter. Such an omission also blurs the lines between good and bad, mobilizing and authoritarian, and all leadership direction and consistency in favor of adaptation to the situation for adaptation’s sake, or the aggrandizement of one’s own power and thus detracts from leadership. Thus, the beginnings of the study of leadership in international organizations leave themselves open to criticism by not addressing these areas.

While this study does not augment Haas’s argument, it stands ready to acknowledge the positive contribution Haas (in Cox, 1969), Cox and Jacobson (1973) and Neustadt (in Cox, 1969) have made to the study of leadership on the international level. Cox, with his use of Haas and Neustadt and partnership with Jacobson in particular stands successful in expanding some chief leadership principles of the day to the study on the international level. Even by discussing and
applying leadership as a politically adaptive function, Cox and Haas made powerful
observations, like grouping leaders into authoritarian, mobilizing and competitive categories that
today serve as starting points from which to begin deeper, fuller study and analysis. As well,
these scholars have discussed the concepts of building “majority coalitions” (Cox 1969, p. 326 in
1992) and a “plurality of elites” (Cox and Jacobson, p. 5, 1973) as tools for effective leadership
tenure, both of which are respected concepts in the broader aspects of the political nature of
democratic leadership. These scholars have served in constructing a logical, parsimonious model
for international leadership and merit review whatever the emerging substantive criticisms of
their approach may be.

With due regard this paper nevertheless rejects the primacy of analyzing leadership as an
adaptive function in international organizations. To approach leadership this way is to
intrinsicis analyze it in a relativist manner that neglects good and bad, successful and
unsuccessful, and replaces such analysis with adaptation rather than institutional conflict, which
is sometimes the wiser choice for preservation of the Organization. The belief here is that the
Organization’s Charter is the best determinant of its interest, and that the leader is effective only
when he does not violate its provisions. The study advocates a more comprehensive theory that,
if taken to its logical ends, should account for the more psychological, rational and moral
elements of executive decision-making at the international level.

Though Finkelstein (1988) and Perez deCuellar (1997) have kept some legal basis
discussion alive in the literature, a purely legal focus is also inadequate. Perez deCuellar in
particular has focused on some of the structural-legal limits to the leader’s power in the post-
Cold War era. DeCuellar’s discussion helps the student understand the institutional peculiarities
of the office, but does less to help the future leader be a great leader because it mostly only
enumerates the powers of the Secretary-General and the historical and institutional context of their development. DeCuellar's only words of leadership analysis are that the Secretary-General should neither be too modest nor too self-aggrandizing, feats both difficult and neglectful of the larger individual forces playing on the office-holder that may make him exhibit one or the other. Whether a leader recognizes the limits outlined by deCuellar as well as other borders inherent in the office depends on the leadership of the person in the office. Indeed, even if the leader is aware of the limits, he may still choose to disregard them by making a value judgment or taking a calculated risk. Thus, focusing on partial elements of the traditional concepts of leadership is similarly insufficient to painting a complete portrait of leadership effectiveness.

Broadly, this study is about the individual occupying the office of UN Secretary-General. Outside factors are understood for what they are, but this study takes an approach similar in principle to the "legal bases" (Cox, 1969 p. 322 in 1992) approach. The rationale here is that even under the most hostile of pretexts, the leader can still choose to pursue the best possible outcome and be successful by the measures of this study. In this way, the potential impacts, stresses and strains of a particular tenure are controlled for. The leader's response given the situation or opportunity is measured.

V. Moving Toward a New Understanding of Leadership at the International Level

The geo-political context of Secretary-General decision-making is a central part of this paper only when it gives an idea of the degree to which an issue is appropriate for activism and an ideology ready for articulation by the individual in the office of the Secretary-General. The two general measures used here account for this possibility because they are modified from the
American original with the understanding that the art of leadership is neither a rational science nor a total disregard for geo-political or socio-economic forces.

The leader must understand the forces at work, though he is ultimately responsible for any decisions. The successful leader has, it is here believed, the moral vision, modified ideology, integrity, and activist background to strike the right decision enough of the time despite the rational, inner-irrational, elite, geo-political, Member State and socio-economic pressures that play on him to different degrees at different times. Indeed, these factors are largely controlled for here by the focus on the individual's leadership capacity. While outside pressures undoubtedly can affect a leader's decision-making, it is hard to measure such pressures at different times. Easier to measure are the leader's essential leadership capabilities and his leadership actions given these pressures, rather than measuring the outside pressure on his actions. This is so because different men react to different pressures differently, but all are ultimately responsible for their decisions. Finkelstein (1988, p. 26) writes that Executive heads of [the] UN [and its agencies] (like Hammarskjold) have unmistakably become major political actors and major issues of international political controversy, beyond the political struggle that accompanies their selection."

In any discussion of leadership, there is no good reason to avoid moral terms if they add to an understanding, and because morality is personal it provides a deep insight into the decision-making and leadership of an individual, more than any adaptive functional analysis. Morality is the key to the kind of moral vision and ideology the leader will display during his tenure. Rationality can be approached from different angles, and the leader may not choose the most adaptive choice-benefit because, for reasons visible to him, the most adaptive choice may not be the most rational. For example, if a large coalition of Member States asks for an action contrary
to the Charter, the adaptive action may be to act with the broadest coalition. The rational and moral action, however, will dictate that a consultation of the Charter forbids the coalition's proposition.

What is still missing is a nuanced and personal analysis that while recognizing certain conditionings and behaviors that yield leadership success takes account of the exercise of these in a rational manner considering the geo-political, socio-economical and Organizational peculiarities and opportunities of a given time. In this paper it is believed that the personal criteria used for good UN Secretary-General leadership do not change—but that they are challenged and emerge via a utility-maximizing balance in effective executive leaders. To this extent, moreover, they are not always present in leaders that purport to have them. The study has little to do with the Secretary-General selection process, though the selection process may benefit from the results included here. Selection is a laudable application of results herein, but selection campaigns and processes are excluded from analyzable data within the context of this study. The study judges these qualities, rather than only action, against the dependent variable of effectiveness defined earlier. Any personal historical analysis of the leaders is intended to underscore how these leaders have developed their personality/normative decision-making skills. How that personal history worked to advantage or disadvantages their election or re-election is not of central importance. However, the strong history of analyzing the legal basis for leadership as a factor in the exercise of leadership does aid and contour the analysis, as leadership is evident in part by the manner in which the leader operated within that legal basis for leadership.

VI. Why Compare the UN Secretary-Generalship to the American Presidency?
A. Important Reasons

As addressed at the beginning of the paper, the UN Secretariat is a unique institution, even among international organizations. Once more, it is different in nature, even if based on, the American Presidency. Thus, adapting the measures discussed here from American leadership theory needs contextualization.

Because there is virtually no comparative scholarship or measure for understanding Secretary-General effectiveness across the different people who have held that office, it is useful to look elsewhere. For this, the study turns to the office of the United States Presidency. Perhaps the most scrutinized leadership position in the world, students of the U.S. Presidency have devised some chief measurements for the understanding of leadership in the Presidential context. It is the contention here that their studies may be partially applicable or provide substantial insight into the office of the UN Secretary-General despite the obvious differences in some aspects of Organizational formal authority.

The office of the UN Secretary-General is similar to the US Presidency in key ways. First, both are executive heads that do not divide executive power. Parliamentary systems often divide executive power between the President and Prime Minister (like in France, Germany). Otherwise, they sweep in entire party governments with governing bureaucracies that have already sworn allegiance to the executive head, reducing their independent opposition and thus the leader’s prerogative for sole executive leadership (like in Great Britain). In the United States, the President is ultimately responsible for executive decisions and general leadership, and part of that leadership is the ability to control a highly independently minded legislative branch that can easily turn against the executive head.
Similarly, the UN Secretary-General is an executive head with relatively little control over the actions of either those in the Security Council or General Assembly. He is an executive head unto himself, sharing the limited but pronounced powers of his office with no governing party or other governing branch for the Secretariat and larger UN system. Member States can challenge his leadership like voters through protests to the General Assembly or even the Security Council, but just like in the US they have little formal opportunity to throw the incumbent out of power before the end of his term. In parliamentary systems, a no confidence vote by the parliament will automatically dissolve the executive head. Secretary-Generals are appointed for five-year terms to insulate them in the same way US Presidents are insulated for 4 years. Only in extraordinary circumstances can either the President of the United States or the Secretary-General of the United Nations be removed. Both offices are also largely bully pulpits because while Prime Ministers have to take strict care to tow the party line their names often don’t even appear on election ballots.

The structure of accountability and informal powers of the American President and the UN Secretary-General are therefore similar in important ways. Formal influence over the respective assemblies of the two entities also bears some resemblance because the Secretary-General, like the President, can call the attention of the Security Council to matters he regards as vital (the only substantial difference is that the Secretary-General cannot actually veto resolutions). Compared to other democratic political systems, the two offices of the US Presidency and UN Secretary-General are most alike. Though the broader civil service system of the United Nations was structured with more European influence, the executive head of the UN is decidedly of American input (Ameri, 1995).
Though the American federation reduces the level of constituent analysis to the individual voter while the UN Secretary-General is beholden to a constituency of Member States, the chaotic influences that play on the international system make both leaders hard to remove during their respective terms. The specific powers of the American Presidency are admittedly more formal than those enumerated at the beginning here. In reality, however, what limits the Secretary-General from exercising even some of the formal powers of the US Presidency on the international level is not the lack of authority but the lack of resources. For example, while the American President can create a Cabinet level position, he needs funding from Congress. The Secretary-General can create a post for Undersecretary-General with relatively no problems, but needs to be able to fund that new office from a limited budget.

The Secretary-General can very well create a new UN Department, but he may not have the resources in the UN budget to do so. Moreover, the Charter for a new UN agency outside the Secretariat would require a ratification by a majority of Member States. Similarly, the American President can propose a new federal department, which will need majority approval from the Congress representing individuals and states. Constitutional changes in both the US and the UN require a much higher, super-majority threshold.

The American Presidency and the office of UN Secretary-General are relatively the closest comparison, barring international organizations that are even newer and less developed for study. This is magnified by the fact that both America and the UN retain an indispensable day-to-day role in the international environment, and by the fact that leadership literature is much more developed on the American Presidency than it is on the office of the UN Secretary-General, where only a handful of writers have made any comprehensive mark of effectiveness.
The two offices face similar constraints on leadership, and thus require similar leadership analysis.

Indeed, some chief scholars of the UN today propose that the office is moving, or indeed will soon be moving to stronger executive leadership (Childers & Urquhart 1994, Hoffman 1991) that will continue to appear more and more like the US. They believe that the UN system should become less of an environment of competition among Bretton-Woods institutions, specialized agencies and other international organizations and bodies via a “cabinet led by the leading international servant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations” (Childers and Urquhart 1994, p. 66). The analysis of Childers and Urquhart (1994) appears similar to that of Hoffman’s (1991): That the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations is most effective when it is lead more like the US Presidency and less like the loose European Commission. Therefore, the office of UN Secretary-General was founded with some influence from the model of the US executive, has evolved with that influence present, and is likely, according to these authors, to continue to resemble the US Presidency in some degree. Thus, comparison between the two roles is not as out of place as it may seem, despite the sovereign institutional nature of one and the inter-governmental nature of the other.

B. Some Secondary and Normative Reasons

According to Dag Hammarskjold’s 1961 speech at Oxford University, the office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations was meant, via American influence, to closely resemble the powers of the American President (Urquhart, 1977). It is thus most appropriate to apply and discuss United States Presidential leadership, as opposed to parliamentary or religious leadership, when analyzing the effectiveness of the office holders of the Secretary-Generalship.
The major general influences at the 1946 founding and crafting of the professional civil service positions at the UN were the British, and to a lesser extent the French systems of civil service, where the executive head was less emphasized than in the US (Ameri, 1996). Given the administrative preference of these nations for a strong parliamentary structure and emphasis on bureaucratic power over a strong executive head, the belief that the office of the Secretary-General is comparable in terms of executive power can legitimately be questioned. Thus, Hammarskjold’s words were somewhat surprising, though there is support for his idea in the sheer number of US civil servants and executive officials present at the founding conference in San Francisco. Nevertheless, in the modern media-driven political cycle, the executive head of the UN commands a power not unlike that of the American President, excluding the legislative formalities of proposing and signing legislation.

Moreover, Childers and Urquhart (1994) also appear to concur with the assumption of this study that the men who have occupied the office of the Secretary-Generals have been of varying leadership capacities, “The UN Secretariat is not well organized to support the leadership of the Secretary-General in recommending ...options to governments. The ability to do this has long been in decline, partly because of the mediocrity of some incumbents nominated by governments... (p. 67).”

In these ways and others, international scholars from those affiliated with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to former UN officials to scholars of international organization all see an evolution in executive function of the Secretary-General (Hoffman 1990, Urskine & Childers 1992 and 1994). Though they recommend a further centralization of the Secretary-General’s powers based on the leadership of past Secretary-Generals, they concur that a strong Secretary-General was originally the initiative of the US. They further believe that prior
to a strong European Community, the US was the best and most influential democratic model for
the UN. Proposals from the USSR for a strong undersecretary and later for a ‘troika’ were
rejected as roundly as was possible in a Cold War atmosphere. In the early years, the
resemblance of the executive head of the UN to the Executive Branch of the US seemed quite
evident, and it is only equaled today by the growing mutual study of the UN and EU. In its early
years, the founders of the UN skirted the idea of a more consociational approach to international
organization and today, rather than looking to base the office on the Presidency of the EU, they
aim to make it yet stronger.

VII. Looking for Answers in the American Presidency

Good leadership is inherently personal. Moreover, good leadership at the international
level does not necessarily have to be integrative, as Cox (1969) believes. It can be merely
surviving, as it was toward the end of deCuellar’s term. Moreover and somewhat paradoxically,
good executive leadership at both the national and international level can be disintegrative if it is
tru to the governing Charter given the situation faced by the Organization. The US constitution
provides just such a clause, and provides a foundation for the discussion here.

The explanation of what makes for generally effective leadership is easier using the
American model of leadership in the Presidency, and therefore an overview is in order. The
dialectic among American liberal and conservative scholars had largely, though not totally,
resolved the issue by the mid-1990s as it became apparent that action for action’s sake as well as
expansion of the government’s powers for the sake of expansion did not make for good
leadership (Burns 1999). Fred Greenstein (1996) does a good job of surveying the different
strains in American thought, and acknowledges that ideology, vision, consistency and action
represent key aspects of analysis in a plurality of scholarship. By the same token James MacGregor Burns has discussed American Presidential leadership theory for nearly 50 years, and has come to similar conclusions among the more liberal and conservative scholars. Barbara Kellerman (1984) also cites ideology and action as important leadership traits in her survey of political leadership and accompanying case studies. Kellerman and MacGregor Burns discuss the importance of consensus building and general leadership consistency as well as the different challenges faced by the office-holder because of the various responsibilities the office entails.

The Presidency of Jimmy Carter during the late 1970s contrasted with Ronald Reagan’s in the 1980s indicated that activism defined as pure action is not always the best measure of Presidential leadership (Rockman 1995), at least as the theory related to the institutional parameters of the American Presidency. The eminent scholar James MacGregor Burns (1999) accepts that activism can at times lessen, not increase Presidential success. That realization had not come about in international organizational leadership study in the heyday of Haas and Cox, and to this day has not met with analysis.

Although Richard Neustadt (1960) in his study of the Presidency originally described effective American Presidential leadership as entailing action for action’s sake, that proposition had been seriously challenged by the works of W. Muir (1988) and K. Muir (1992). Here, to be effective, it is believed that activism must include organizational retrenchment and inaction when action is imprudent or can only come at disproportionate risk to the organization. Thus, although Cox accepted Neustadt’s measure in 1969, the scholarship on activism in the American Presidency has since changed. A new definition of rational action is used here for the American Presidency.
The findings and surveys of the authors here are among the most pervasive and well-respected in the study of leadership and the American Presidency. Thus, they generally merit this discussion whatever the findings of this study about the usefulness of the American Presidential experience to leadership at the international level, and specifically merit the discussion because the most recognized and pervasive conceptions about leadership and this institution may be important to understand for the study of leadership at the international level.

VIII. Two Leadership Lessons from the American Presidential Experience

A. Introduction

The two ideas of adjusted moral vision and activism are here deemed as very important to the study of US Presidential effectiveness as it has evolved over the last two centuries. The office of the Secretary-General faces similar leadership issues without the benefit of the same historical analysis of its leadership history. The ability to aid future leadership, it is believed here, comes from two general measures derived from American Presidential leadership.

By a broad survey of American Presidential leadership scholarship, it becomes apparent that ideology, integrity, moral vision and activism dominate the discussion of the individual’s ability to lead, a conclusion evident in large part from literary editions and surveys conducted by Kellerman (1984) and Greenstein (1994) as well as from a general, informed review of the topic. From James Macgregor Burns (1966, 1979 and best developed in 1999) to Marvin Olasky (1999), scholars have chosen to discuss Presidential leadership largely in these terms. While ideas of activism in the Presidency go back to Richard Neustadt’s 1960 work, they have been expounded on by Heifetz (1994) and modified by a slew of scholars from K. Muir (1988) to Fred Greenstein (1994) to incorporate retrenchment and protective policies. By the same token, most
every book on the topic from Barbara Kellerman (1984) to James MacGregor Burns (1999) contains a section on the ideology of American Presidents, and Florig (1992) has chosen to explore this topic further. Analysis of moral vision also finds a home across a broad range of scholars from Neustadt (1990) to Olasky 1999, and is written on extensively by Olasky. Similarly, Presidential integrity remains a favorite of these scholars (most especially Olasky [1999], MacGregor Burns [1999], and Kellerman [1984]) and, while the definition quoted here is from Kanninen’s UN study, the same concept abounds in analysis of the American Presidency by Honenberg (1997) and James MacGregor Burns (1999). The ideas selected here find credibility in discussions by a broad range of scholars ranging from across the American political spectrum. They seem to have become a sine quo non for scholarly analysis of Presidential leadership and remain within the mainstream of thought and current debate on the subject of leadership.

Before the establishment of the specific definitions of “adjusted moral vision” and “rational activism” used here, any potential overlap needs to be discussed. The discussion of similar concepts in the literature on leadership in international organizations has de-emphasized them, and often has treated each as more or less the same as the other. For example, one view of Haas’s “ideology” (in Cox, p. 326) can be confused with elements of “moral vision,” which Cox renounces earlier as counterproductive to the study of the executive head. “Moral vision” and “ideology” as modified here into a moral ideological vision are substantially different from Haas’s proposition. Moral vision, for example, includes a philosophical, social, and religious-like understanding of the intimate association between the leader and his vision and policies.

Moreover, the thesis here disagrees with Haas when he states (in Cox) that effective executive leadership is not limited to a few key priorities; subgoals are important. Chief among
the objections posed here is that the leader may be flexible, and effective leadership is not limited to carrying a set of identical goals throughout a Secretary-General’s tenure. The balance of the moral vision, ideological, and integrity measures used here should guide the leader to openly adjusting his vision as needed in the best interests of the governing Charter. This does not mean that it is here believed that the effective leader should waver. Applied to American Presidents, this proposition would indict the Presidency of Jimmy Carter as weak because of just such a perception, and such an oversimplification would be incorrectly applied to either office.

The aim here is to emphasize that a holistic balance, here called an adjusted moral vision, enables the effective leader to make the most rational choice, which includes the ability to be flexible, and as a last resort to change priorities as a Organizational legitimacy-saving gesture. It is assumed in the measure that a rational choice will contain a degree of consistency, because showing ideological inconsistency hurts moral vision and possibly integrity, and is likely to be counterproductive to past action, thus reversing earlier leadership effectiveness. Thus, for a leader to substantially waver is deemed to be ineffective in all but the most exceptional circumstances.

**B. Adjusted Moral Vision**

Perez deCuellar (1997) has briefly discussed the good and bad influences on the individual within the Secretary Generalship, and has more broadly discussed the institutional limits that constrain the individual’s leadership and the necessity that the leader recognize them. Most American Presidential scholars of leadership, including those who believe in the legal, personality, and ethical foundations of leadership analysis (including Barbara Kellerman, 1986, and Edwards & Wayne, 1985) view this ability to recognize the limits of the office as central to
any effective leadership, because it is almost impossible to quantify in-process decision-making and the unique information and perceptions available to the leader. Thus, to the outside viewer rational leadership does not automatically equal mathematical rationality in a leader’s decision-making. Only the leader can bring about an effective leadership decision via his unique understanding of the situation. That understanding encompasses the leader’s personal traits, like intelligence.

Invariably in American Presidential leadership theory the words “vision” (Olasky [1999], MacGregor Burns [1999]), “integrity” (Kellerman, [1984], Renshon [1995]) and “ideology” (Florig, [1992], Greenstein [1994]) emerge. They run mainstream through American Presidential scholarship. Given the similarities between that office and the office of UN Secretary-General, it is to some degree natural to assume the same of the UN.

An analysis of this literature is helpful because no one has yet satisfactorily addressed these factors of leadership in the office of UN Secretary-General. Because the elements resulting from the earlier critique (all administrative, motivational, and guidance factors) are an integral part of political executive leadership theory, they are a specific way of understanding good leadership in that office. Such an approach does not come through in the early writings of Robert Cox (1973), and has not been addressed using these key aspects of US Presidential leadership theory. In so far as rationalism is integral in the exercise of these traits, they are a building block on the rational exercise of power and rational choice theory.

The merit of this approach is also evident by a lack of comparative study. Students of leadership have discussed the questions of how a particular Secretary-General is viewed and understood and some, like Tapio Kanninen (1995) and William Shawcross (2000), have even broadly compared any two Secretary-Generals, or discussed the leadership of one in particular.
Moreover, as a broader set of leadership factors in this office is better studied and understood by accurately applying some theories and concepts originating outside the UN, future leaders will be able to understand how to better lead according to the UN's founding Charter.

A comprehensive overview of the personal leadership analysis from the American Presidency leads to the measure developed here. Scholarship on the American Presidency has wide theoretical inspiration. Fred Greenstein (1996) does a good job of surveying the different strains in American thought, and acknowledges that ideology, vision, consistency and action represent key aspects of analysis in a plurality of scholarship. Meanwhile, James MacGregor Burns has discussed American Presidential leadership theory for nearly 50 years, and has come to similar conclusions among the more liberal and conservative scholars. Barbara Kellerman (1984) also cites ideology as an important leadership trait in her survey of political leadership and accompanying case studies. A broad reading and survey of American Presidential leadership theory turns up these terms again and again: ideology, vision and integrity.

To begin the explication of these three central concepts, ideology is very visible in discussions of the American Presidency and ideological direction is here often equated with good leadership. Similarly, integrity and character have broadly been discussed with every President, and seem to be the basis, except for constitutional constraints, for Presidential decision-making. Vision has also been widely talked about in the Presidency, and it has been thought important to providing consistent and effective leadership in the American Presidential tradition. With Olasky's (1999) moral vision concept, vision now implies that leadership must have a moral purpose. These schools of thought have largely gone uncontested, though others, like Neustadt (1960), prefer to lay effectiveness with action by the President. Still others, while discussing the
importance of these traits, also discuss the importance of consensus-building (Kellerman, 1984 and James MacGregor Burns, 1966, 1979, 1999).

While elements such as ideology, vision, action, and integrity are proactive causes for leadership, consensus-building is reactive to the stretch these elements may cause. James MacGregor Burns (1966, 1979, 1999) has written on centrist Presidents and has largely concluded that ideology and vision, as opposed to the appearance of indecision, inconsistency, or political moderation produces the Presidents who have led across some of the most intractable problems the US has faced to a satisfactory conclusion. In this way, Burns defines Roosevelt as leading through the intractable problem of World War II in an optimally rational manner. He also praises Reagan for leading through the Cold War, in a way that would not have seemed rational to an outside observer at the time (Mutually Assured Destruction was worsened by an arms buildup but lead to the most rationally beneficial outcome, namely the end of the Soviet Union without averse transnational consequences). Burns would argue that because Reagan was privy to the leadership complexities and knowledge of the office, he led well through what appeared to be an intractable problem to most. The gamble of incurring a heavy national debt to defeat the enemy was thus a good one, and therefore an example of good leadership.

In the meantime, Barbara Kellerman (1984, 1986) stressed the importance of being inclusive, of formulating a vision that will bring people of different ideologies together. Greenstein (1995) and Heifetz (1994) agree with this proposition, but all stress that vision is key to good Presidential leadership. Kellerman, Greenstein, and Florig (1992) believe that ideology and vision are critical to good Presidential leadership. Olasky (1988) and Kellerman (1994), as well as Burns all stress that Presidential integrity is key. Honenberg (1997) applies this to the Presidency of Bill Clinton. But integrity coupled with vision have long been favorites of
scholars of the American Presidency. Already in 1985, Edwards and Wayne discussed the necessity of a Presidential vision that possesses integrity.

In American Presidential scholarship, the analysis of Olasky (1988), Kellerman (1994), Honenberg (1997) and Edwards and Wayne (1985) all declare that integrity is critical, and moreover believe that their broader analysis of Presidential scholarship indicates the same. By the same token, Kellerman (1984), Greenstein (1995), and Florig (1992) all believe that ideology shapes leadership, and that by most accounts in its democratic form it has been the defining story of the American Presidential leadership experience. Leadership analysis and surveys conducted by Kellerman (1984), Greenstein (1995) and by Olasky (1998, 1999) all believe that vision is vital in the American Presidency, and that inconsistency has led to the fall of many occupants of that office. A broad survey of American Presidential leadership theory thus indicates that the factors in adjusted moral vision are keys to effective leadership.

The phrase “moral vision” (Olasky, 1999, p. 3) connotes a twist on the age-old term vision. While vision is a direction for the organization that will result from the sum of the leader’s planned actions, moral vision insists that that direction be inherently good, or for the perceived greatest social benefit rather than profit, or personal gain. Thus, moral vision may contradict the personal aspirations of the leader, and is easy to detect when it contradicts the leader’s rational personal interests. Another way to understand the perceived greatest social benefit is the strength, or bias for, the leader’s agenda for change to alleviate perceived mass suffering. If that agenda is consistent, detailed, expansive, and realistic, it is perfectly positioned to be an effective moral vision.

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1 For definitions of organizational vision, see Snyder, Dowd, and Houghton’s 1994 Vision, values, and courage: Leadership for Quality Management. This volume defines “vision” and “values” separately with the aim of improving corporate performance.
Thus, a for-profit entity may regularly articulate a vision with the goal of maximizing profits and include peripheral elements of moral vision, like donations to charitable organizations that articulate a moral vision, for public image reasons. A non-profit or government organization is more obligated to work for the social good and will in turn articulate a moral vision for its intended purpose, rather than just a vision for its own success or expansion. This is so because the organization is not accountable for the profit margin, but rather for accomplishing its goals or mission statement. Those goals are presumed to be motivated by a socially altruistic inspiration and enumerated in the organization’s constitution (for example, the UN Charter does not provide for the UN to endlessly expand or provide ever-greater benefit to Member States, but rather to provide universally idealistic benefits like freedom from aggressive war or discrimination in a realistic environment of Member State pressures and concerns). Importantly in such an organization, a leader’s moral vision must compromise and adjust to the constitutional goals of the organization and rally around those goals as a basis for leadership. This is so because the leader’s objective should be to use the organization to increase social good rather than use it to his advantage or lead to a deadlock of wills between the organization and the leader. Thus, part of the moral vision element articulated by Olasky is the ability to produce a good (flexible enough to produce social good) moral vision.

Having clarified moral vision, it is important to move to a discussion of integrity. The two are linked because it is proposed that a dishonest moral vision and ideology are a substantial counterweight to good leadership (barring exceptions for national security). This is put forward by Honenberg (1997) and many others, and accepted here despite Heifetz (1994) assertions otherwise because the principle of integrity for the Secretary-General is indisputably asserted within the UN Charter.
Honenberg (1997) believed that William Clinton was an ineffective leader because of various personal scandals that he believed affected overall leadership as well as because of an inconsistency in policy articulation and implementation. Honenberg (1997) drew out his criticisms as acceptable in analysis of all American Presidents. Meanwhile, Heifetz (1994) believed the opposite: that leadership is purely an adaptive function and thus that consistency in policy and personal integrity don’t matter, as long as the leader articulates a vision that stretches expectations and adjusts to developments in order to alleviate social problems.

Two US political scholars have offered some deep insight into political leadership. Marvin Olasky (1999) has formulated a general understanding that dissuades the reader from the belief that the public lives of American Presidents can be separated from elements of personal integrity. This form of integrity is included within the broader definition of integrity that, according to Kinninen (1995), is the personal and professional honesty, uprightness, loyalty to the governing charter, and hard work of an individual in political office. This is how Kinninen (1995) sees integrity in international organizations and elsewhere.

By Olasky's (1999) reasoning, the effective executive leader lives, believes, and articulates the moral vision of the political organization as it was defined earlier for his entire term in office. Through the various qualities of integrity such as uprightness and honesty, the effective leader is uncompromising on the general direction he intends the political entity, and its constituency, to take. In Olasky's (1999) words, “The proposition of this book is that assessing beliefs is crucial to understanding motivations and actions of American Presidents…and that [scholarship] that ignores a moral vision misses the point” (p. xv). Olasky makes it clear that by "belief" he means the personal moral beliefs of the leader, rather than policy articulation per se, though he believes the two to be intimately related. If a US President does not have an adequate
moral vision as Olasky defines it, for example if he is motivated by power rather than public service or idealism to the governing principles, he acts to aggrandize that power and may overlook the public good. If this is the case, it becomes evident sooner or later as developments warrant, and it undermines public confidence and any benefit to the country and thus leadership effectiveness.

Though Olasky (1999) speaks of the general moral vision of US Presidents, he identifies through his examples three distinct elements within the broad definition of a moral vision. Olasky (1999) intends to emphasize the need for an understanding of the religious, philosophical, and social drive of the individual. Olasky believes that the religious, philosophical, and social drive of an individual is key to understanding how that individual behaves as a political leader. For the analysis of Secretary-Generals, this is less useful because they are not as clearly accountable to the public at large, whose sensibilities, if not intellects, may be affected by the “wrong” philosophical, social, or religious drive. But Olasky goes deeper. He believes that the moral vision a leader articulates for the organization inevitably comes down to those three factors, and that they are most indicative of the moral vision the leader will articulate for the organization. Here, in the adjusted moral vision barometer, it is set forth that these elements of a leader’s personality do play a role in determining the UN’s moral vision. It is, however, ultimately up to the incumbent whether he does or does not choose to act rationally. The annals of history are full of national and international leaders who chose not to act rationally.

A third element to the adjusted moral vision measure proposed here which adds to Olasky’s “moral vision” (social, religious and philosophical uprightness) and Kanninen’s “personal integrity” (p. 183) and is the third component of the measure, is Florig’s (1992) concept of “ideology” (p. 5). Florig (1992) believes that the successful political leader, in his
case studies the various men who have been the President of the United States, must exhibit some ideological direction to governance. By ideological direction Florig means that the political vision or direction a political leader expresses must in some ways unsettle, in a healthy way, his constituency, not directly regurgitate the majority opinion. Thus, the American President must challenge the dominant political paradigm ever so slightly to be effective.

Of course, being a purely ideological leader would be detrimental, though admittedly it is likely that such a course would lead to more success in the US Presidency than in the Secretary-Generalship. According to Kellerman (1986), purely ideological leaders are slaves to an established ideology, and may have problems adapting to new situations. Also, purely ideological leaders tend to be heavy-handed (Ibid). In the American Presidency, where there is a less narrow spectrum of political discourse, a conservative or liberal disposition can still yield the President a substantial base of support. In the Secretary-Generalship, a more unanimous consensus is needed in a much broader ideological field. Thus, if a Secretary-General exhibits a tendency to favor sovereignty over international regime or any ideological camp, it can substantially undermine his credibility and thus his leadership effectiveness. Nevertheless, in the “adjusted moral vision” measure, an element of this ideological direction is necessary if the studied officeholder does indeed possess the first two elements (moral vision and integrity) discussed. Ideology paints a general direction for a tenure, without which a Secretary-General may be perceived as waffling.

There is a substantial difference between the two offices that lowers the importance of pure ideology in the office of the Secretary-General. Though a major line of discussion in American Presidential scholarship, ideology is not as applicable to this office because it is often divisive. Nevertheless, it is the contention here that some element of ideology in the role of the
Secretary-General, whether managerial (in closely following the wishes of Member States) or idealistic/globalizing (in globalizing specific concerns brought to the UN) enters into the office (Finkelstein, 1988). For example, innately managerial leaders would like to conserve the basic status quo of state sovereignty and influence as a means of addressing and resolving all problems. Secretary-Generals who prefer or rely heavily on negotiation, ad hoc problem resolution and listen closely to the grievances of Member States would fall into this category. Meanwhile, Secretary-Generals who stress expanding international regimes, empowering the General Assembly and NGOs, and addressing “global problems” over particular disputes or problems among nations or groups of nations would demonstrate an idealistic/globalizing ideology.

Idealistic/globalizing Secretary-Generals want to change the status quo paradigm of international relations in any way possible, while managerial-style leaders believe that the way the UN structure functions is sufficient for the time being. The definition of ideology as a political-philosophical direction for an entity is expressed in whether the Secretary-General listens closely to the wishes of Member States and their interests, thus exhibiting a more managerial or at least regional ideology for the UN, or whether the Secretary-General, despite pressing Member State concerns, exhibits a belief that only internationalization or international action will remedy the problem at hand (idealistic/globalizing ideology).

Fiorig (1992) believes that “at the intersection of the president’s roles as media politician and as policy-maker is political philosophy or ideology” (p. 5). That is, the Presidents who have widely and consistently articulated that ideology in the public sphere were more successful than those who tried to avoid “ideological labels and commitments” (Fiorig, p. 5). Fiorig discusses this by citing historical events and the way each leader chose to resolve them. The public

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perceived those leaders who changed their public position too greatly as the situation changed as ineffective, and the results of their wavering caused a less desirable outcome for United States interests in zero-sum terms. The American leadership scholarship experience seems to counter the claim that leadership can be analyzed as largely pure adaptive function.

To support the contention that there is a link between the development of personal integrity and the articulation of a grander ideology in the American Presidency, Kanninen (1995) has studied leadership and reform. He believes that there is a definite link between quick decision-making, rationality, and cognitive ability and that the leader's personal integrity inevitably affects the leader's grander ideology or moral vision.² Kanninen's (1995) link between psychological theory and the study of leadership supports Olasky's (1999) contention that personal integrity and morality will seep into Presidential decision-making and articulation and therefore affect the President's moral vision in a very fundamental way. Kanninen's (1995) integrity definition and measure is thus taken into the adjusted moral vision barometer because integrity is an integral part of the other two measures. It also in itself leads to greater leadership effectiveness if for no other reason than that it is enumerated in the Charter. Also, acting with integrity conserves the leader's energy from elaborate schemes or lying in general. Acting with integrity leaves the leader's mind free and clear to deal rationally with the problems at hand rather than constantly craft updated versions of actions and speeches tailored solely to keeping that leader in power.

In sum, adjusted moral vision consists of a) social, religious, and philosophical uprightness, or moral vision (from Olasky, 1999), b) ideological direction/leadership (from

²Kanninen's 1995 study directly applies psychological theory to the tenure of Javier Perez deCuellar and other political leaders. Kanninen discusses how the degree of personal psychological integrity becomes evident in decision-making, and how the more integrity a leader possesses the better decisions that leader will make according to cognitive theory. For all purposes here, only his strict definition of integrity is used but his contextual theory is given to accurately represent how he had intended that definition to be used in his study.
Florig, 1992), c) and personal integrity (from Kanninen, 1995). These elements, largely coming from the study of the American Presidency, are adjusted where necessary to the office of the UN Secretary-General and their combined definitions comprise the dimensions of adjusted moral vision. Adjusted moral vision is measured via an analysis of the social, religious, and philosophical background of the leader and the exercise of those features over the leader’s governing tenure. In combination, the parts of this measure amount to a good moral vision if they articulate the easiest way to the most benefit and are consistent with the Charter.

First, ideological direction can be seen in the leader’s tone in his goals, agenda, and rhetoric and measured by its appropriateness in the evolution of the organization, appropriateness according to the Charter/mandate, likelihood/success in an accomplished agenda, lack of impediment to the leader’s moral vision and integrity, and appropriateness in the geo-political context of constraints at a given time. An ideology should not directly oppose or antagonize any large part of the Secretary-General’s constituency of Member States, Member Organizations, and staff. The ideology must be rational and carefully thought-out while not conflicting with the leader’s strategy or values. Operationalizing ideology involves an application of the definition used here to the publicly reported statements, declarations, and agenda of different leaders to see how they diverge from the most rational path or simply diverge from a path of least resistance. If a leader is making a concerted effort to somewhat consistently lead the organization in a manner divergent from these two paths and the path of his predecessor, it is an indication of ideology. A bad example of this approach was Boutros-Ghali’s antagonism of the United States by insisting on disarmament of the militias in Somalia. The move put him at odds with a major constituency, while at the same time taking away valuable political capital from his personal value priority of development for the Third World. The strategy was not well thought-out
because it staked a broader ideological agenda on the success of one mission, with that mission being badly planned, thought-out and executed.

Second, integrity is measured by transparency, full-disclosure, dealing in good faith, and the complete absence of impropriety and as much independence as possible in order to implement the moral vision. Operationalizing integrity involves an examination of the leader’s rationality in decision-making, his loyalty to the Organization in statement and action and the absence of any appearance of impropriety that would lead to the conclusion that the leader has professional priorities other than those that would likely result in the most rational benefit for the Organization as evident in news and biographical accounts. A good example of integrity is Javier Perez deCuellar’s handling of the hostage crisis of the late 1980s. According to Giandomenico Picco’s (1999) first hand account, Perez deCuellar engaged in a practice of transparency and full disclosure between himself and his negotiators, and the crisis achieved its moral vision of bringing the hostages home by dealing in good faith with no overt deception of the parties or the news media.

Lastly, moral vision sets an impersonal direction, a higher goal for the Organization, and an ethical continuance or reinterpretation of the Organization’s purpose. It is goal and ethics oriented and deals in broader terms than a leader’s ideology, which easily translates into strategy and agenda. Operationalizing moral vision involves an examination of the leader’s statements, declarations and agenda to discern a broader pattern and approach to the task of reinventing leadership to make the goals of the UN Charter relevant, palatable and action-ready in the continually evolving international environment. Thus, operationalization involves a greater element of interpretation than the other independent variables, but still relies on factual accounts from which it draws whether and to what extent a leader has transcended the role of a mere task-
manager of states' interests to that of making the UN more directly relevant to the general publics of the world in general and those who would benefit from action on the part of the UN in particular. Though both ideology and moral vision can lead to personal priorities, ideology concerns a pattern and approach for a leader's administration, agenda and leadership. Moral vision entails an interpretation of the Organization's goals or identifies new problems, often perpetuating an Organizational myth of sorts.

An extensive example of moral vision is Kofi Annan's liberal-universalist approach to the AIDS problem. By emphasizing the need for a transnational fund and a cooperative public/private approach to the problem, Annan articulates a broader moral vision that the UN, through cooperation with states and corporations, must ultimately strive to improve the lives of the individual rather than focus exclusively on international diplomacy. This is a different moral vision than was articulated for the UN by other leaders during the Cold War that called for the avoidance of superpower conflict at all costs. This doesn't make Annan's moral vision any better, but is a good exercise of leadership if it is right for the time and ultimately measurably remedies the problem. It is essential to provide an analysis of the geo-political context to ultimately measure whether a leader exercised an effective moral vision. It is crucial, however, that a leader's moral vision is in agreement with the constitutional framework of the organization and is overall ethically desirable.

Together, these three factors act in balance. Strong ideology may inhibit integrity if it means the leader will conspire for the support of a block of nations over the concerns of others because it fits with his ideology. Moral vision may affect a leader's ability to articulate an ideology as not to offend absolutely anybody through an overt agenda that may compromise his broader moral vision. Integrity may inhibit both through an unwillingness to engage in
bargaining to see an agenda through in order not to appear deferential to one side. Such an array of potential compromises must be made. There is ultimately no mathematical formula advanced here to precisely determine the desired balance. Moreover, the desired balance may vary with time and geo-political context. What is believed, however, is that in retrospect on each leader's tenure, the success toward such a balance can be deduced through some rational thinking. Balance can appear as consistency, because a leader who pays attention to the advancement of all responsibilities will get continuous results, and is more likely to follow a consistent and coordinated agenda when consistently interested in all his responsibilities. With this in mind, however, the importance of balance shouldn't overshadow the robust exercise of all these factors that in themselves are believed to lead to relatively effective leadership; a balance has a fine-tuning effect on the leadership these specific factors produce.

Undoubtedly, in any such analysis among the balance within this measure it is vital to keep in mind the constitutional principles and limits embodied in the governing Charter. Otherwise, the analysis becomes another study of leadership as an adaptive function. Therefore, the UN Charter here serves a secondary purpose to any explicit analysis of leadership effectiveness. The discernment of the extent to which these measures are present and in what balance is evident in the statements, backgrounds, and circumstances of leaders, but is best seen in the exercise of activism, a point taken up later.

This total measure, as it is here defined and will be understood in context of the different nature of the office of the Secretary-General, is better than taking each of the measure's component parts separately and applying them directly from the American Presidential experience. Taking just integrity, for example, is inadequate because close scrutiny of all candidacies for the office of Secretary-General by international diplomats who influence and
determine the decision-making assures that the final candidate will always retain a somewhat high, if not always the highest, level of integrity. Measuring ideology across the Secretary-Generals would measure an attribute that is mostly marginalized in any overt, expressed form in that office. Likewise, judging the philosophical, social and religious element alone would not present a complete picture and would invariably lead to a purely psychological analysis. Few measures are perfect, however, and some analysis will require that the measure be again broken down into any combination of the three components to better understand a particular instance or comparison of leadership.

Studying each leader’s pre-accession development and background, then his governing tenure can operationalize this measure best. For example, the leader articulates a vision when he lays down his goals or priorities for his tenure. If that vision is aimed to better enact the Charter’s exercise, or is aimed to reduce human suffering (whether via the state system or in any other way), it becomes a moral vision. When those goals are well planned and realistic, and if a relatively large share of them become enacted, then the leader has articulated a relatively successful moral vision. If that vision is ultimately aimed at the leader’s self-aggrandizement or to the overt or secret detriment of the Charter, the vision is not moral, though it is still a vision and the leader may still be an effective leader in implementing it, he is not an effective leader of the governed institution. A vision can be good or bad and exercised effectively or ineffectively; a moral vision is meant to connote the intended benefit to the UN Charter and working toward the alleviation of suffering that is that document’s general foundation.

An ideology can be glimpsed by a leader’s remarks, but becomes more apparent through his everyday dealings. The ideology is the general direction the leader advances in his agenda and leadership pattern. For example, whether the leader’s goals and priorities entail a greater
role for the UN, or whether he will merely negotiate with states and ad hoc groups to accomplish those goals. It can also be understood by the topics and areas the leader focuses on. For example, if the leader focuses on health issues as the preponderance of his vision, it evidences an ideology that health is the most important issue facing Member States or mankind. If the leader has correctly judged that his energies will accomplish the most via this issue concentration and a relationship that, for example, stresses what Member States (through treaties, etc) rather than what a new UN body can do, he has articulated a successful ideology. That ideology can only be measured in relation to the governing Charter and to a lesser extent to the geo-political circumstances of the given time. The leader may ask himself whether his ideology is compatible with the Organization, and may choose to modify it on that basis.

Integrity is composed of two elements. The UN Charter asks that the Organization’s civil servants exhibit the highest degree of integrity. In reality, this is neither possible, nor has it always been the case. The degree to which a leader has exhibited integrity can be measured in hindsight, though such evidence is often incomplete. Facts and circumstances in combination with the leader’s background often point to less than high integrity in one or more instances, and this can be contrasted among leaders who show different quantities of questionable dealings/decision-making.

The second element of integrity stresses that the leader should do everything possible to, as is often said in the American executive system, avoid even the appearance of impropriety. For example, if a leader has used an advisory and early warning role (under the diplomatic umbrella of responsibilities enumerated on p. 4) to draw undue attention to a conflict of relative unimportance, and then has managed any peacekeeping or assistance operation in a way clearly benefiting one side, he has not led successfully according to the integrity measure. Moreover,
even if the leader has provided, say, disproportionate, if partially justifiable assistance to a side
with which he has had a clear relationship prior to his tenure, the leader’s integrity is rightly
questioned and is hard to fully exonerate because partial action may entail some kind of *quid pro
quo* for the leader himself, especially when it appears less than fully rational.

Although partiality does not entail a lack of integrity or a personal *quid pro quo* per se, it
brings the leader closer to such an appearance and he thus becomes less effective on an integrity
measure than a leader who successfully avoids such an appearance of impropriety in the exercise
of strictly official responsibilities. The leader who possesses the highest integrity will avoid such
circumstances. For our analysis, such leaders complicate the measure of integrity stated above
exactly because it is hard to analyze integrity when facts surrounding decision-making are
incomplete, as is usually the case with any appearance of impropriety. A lack of transparency
that is in some degree inherent in executive bureaucratic office makes it hard to judge this
accurately. In the measure, while such circumstances cannot be acutely measured, they are
judged to make a leader inferior in integrity effectiveness to leaders who exhibited no
questionable behavior or decision-making. Such leaders are not judged below leaders who
exhibited a relatively unquestionable lack of integrity, however.

C. Rational Activism

Finally, the ideological direction measure finds its real and full expression in the activism
of the Secretary-General described as the second general measure of this paper. Adjusted moral
vision ideally results in moving the political organization in an expansive direction, toward
retrenchment, or in some other active way, including in a direction that maintains the status quo
if that status quo is under attack from outside the Organization. These measures are closely
related with some possible overlap. However, it is here believed that the absence or underdevelopment of just one of these elements to the adjusted moral vision measure is enough to result in noticeable differentiations in leadership effectiveness. A leader that is all moral vision but no action will not actually lead. A leader that is all ideology may be constantly stymied by the opposition, not available for problems requiring individual attention because of broader concerns, or perceived as arrogant because of an intellectual aloofness. Thus, a functional description and application of activism is necessary to add another dimension to the discussion of adjusted moral vision.

A discussion of activism is essential to measure the exercise of adjusted moral vision. Moreover, the kind, choice and frequency of action are the ultimate expression of leadership. Though a brief overview of what activism means was given in the effectiveness discussion, it is helpful here to more precisely trace the growth of the term in the American Presidency in order to illustrate how its definition has changed and why it was erroneously adapted in an unmodified state to the study in international organizations. While adjusted moral vision is a composite measure of several parts, the activism measure can conceivably consist of several definitions and needs further refinement and explication to be clear enough for application to case studies.

Not surprisingly, therefore, despite this desirability of activism to the other traits that make for successful leadership there has been disagreement over what it actually means. There has emerged a debate between two schools in recent years: those who see the Presidency as in itself necessitating elite action for success (Neustadt 1960, 1990 and Heifetz, 1994) and those who see the President as acting rationally or not acting at all when expansive action can rationally only cause damage or entail such a possibility at unacceptably high risk (W. Muir 1988, K. Muir 1992). This debate has not been fully settled and retains strong partisan
allegiances in the United States. Thus, today there is no absolute definition to adapt to the Secretary-General as there is with the elements of adjusted moral vision. The rational activism definition developed here to fit the effectiveness criteria stated at the outset, independently of either the American or international school of executive leadership, therefore deserves some contextualization.

The original key assumption of activist analysis in American Presidential politics, first articulated by Richard Neustadt in 1960 (according to K. Muir, 1992) and rearticulated in Neustadt’s 1990 work, has been that of Presidential “Action making for enlightenment.” Neustadt describes the phenomenon, inspired by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency, this way, “The enemy of [each US President’s] prestige is unreality: the groundless hopes, the unexpected happenings, the unaccepted outcomes that members of the public feel in daily life and relate, somehow, anyhow, to That Man in the White House” (p. 89). Thus, what Neustadt refers to as “Action making for enlightenment” (p. 89) (re-described as “enlightened action” [p. 8] by K. Muir, 1992), endeavors to effectively teach this yearning public by assuaging their fears through action, any action. To the extent that this creates the public image that the President is doing something about the public’s feelings, the President is an effective leader.

For example, using Neustadt’s definition and Cox’s (1969) argument would lead to a conclusion that Boutros Boutros-Ghali was the most effective Secretary-General ever because he so profusely attempted action. At the same time, Javier Perez deCuellar would be relatively ineffective because he did not broadly act, and would be a victim of the geo-political circumstances of the 1980s. This approach, rejected here as an effectiveness measure for the Presidency, is likewise rejected as a description of activism for the office of the Secretary-General independently of the effectiveness measure of Secretary-General leadership.
Therefore, Neustadt's measure is modified here to incorporate these criticisms and is referred to as rational activism. As described with relation to the American Presidency, this modification endeavors to use Neustadt's original measure but to factor in the recent criticism of K. Muir (1992) and W. Muir (1988), who suggest that acting for action's sake does not make for good activism, including when such activism is rational to a leader's self-aggrandizement. With regards to the American Presidency, they argue that retrenchment or not acting in circumstances generally unfavorable to action may be a valid alternative to action. This valid alternative is here accepted as an essential, as opposed to possible, element of any activism discussion.

Rational activism applied can mean stopping the organizational propensity for acting in unfavorable times, and in stemming any constituency demand for such action in the line of thought put forward by these scholars. In the same way, activism must be rationally calculated not to carry a disproportionate risk of counter-productivity, and the leader may choose to use it sparingly to calculate it for maximum effect. The discussion is conceptually unlike a simple effectiveness criteria because it is independent of previous activism discussions in international organizations and sets a modified theory with relation to the study in the Presidency, and also because a wider discussion is needed to understand the full ramifications of this applied measure.

This criticism wasn't completely explored until after the Reagan administration and has turned up in the writings of many Presidential scholars since the 1980s, including MacGregor Burns (1999). Activism here includes a leader's proactive work to protect the status quo position of the institution. Further examples can include acting to secure funds or to prevent the erosion of the organization's present ability to act for the public good. In the case of the Secretary-General, such action could intend to prevent changes to the Charter or other impending change deemed detrimental by the leader. To a substantial extent, the Secretary-General needs only to
be active without regard to ideological direction. Whether active in changing or modifying that within his power or simply active in protecting the country or world organization from change, the redefinition of activism presented here endeavors to control for the ideological element of activism and open it to rational applications of leadership in the international arena.

However, the totality of rational activism should be measured after the fact because only then does an opportunity for comprehensive analysis emerge, based on the documentation that comprises the specific act of leadership in question as well as the totality of the leader's plan. Before the action occurs and while it is occurring, it is only a vision or plan of what is to come—only later does it emerge as an act worthy of analysis, though it is generally alright to measure the action while it is being accomplished or when only some of the leader's possible acts during his tenure have been completed. The aim of the specific measure here is not to necessarily discover a new way of viewing activist leadership effectiveness in process, a feat that has not thus far been satisfactorily accomplished. Rather, the measure here is to gauge acts in a rational context and a wider view of the leader's tenure, and thus to give a more complete accounting of rational activism and its successful exercise. Any similarity to previously used activist leadership measures that engaged a strictly post-process approach is incidental, because the totality of action cannot be gauged before or even while it is happening. The specific approach of the measure here is to analyze comprehensively rational activism after the fact, though in the analysis of Kofi Annan that cannot completely be the case at this time.

Otherwise, by judging a leader's actions before completion, only an educated guess could be made about a leader's rational activism. Discussions of activism by Neustadt (1960, 1990), K. Muir (1988) and W. Muir (1992) have implied, but not explicitly stated, that success in activism is meant to refer to actual accomplishment of policy, versus partial compromise (which
can be adequately successful) or no action at all on a given initiative for action by the leader (unsuccessful activism). In the end, rational activism may include any exercise of authority or prerogative as well as of basic responsibility on the part of the leader, but must result in a tangible end-goal.

Before any discussion of activism as an adaptive leadership function existed, a self-evident rationale of activism as action that is at the discretion of the leader could be inferred. It is helpful to think of the discussion here in such a context, before Neustadt’s original adaptation. The self-evident rationale of this activism measure is that a leader who proposed change but in actuality was able to accomplish little is not regarded as more activist than a leader who proposed somewhat less, but was able to enact a much greater proportion of what he proposed (Kellerman, 1984, Greenstein 1994). To the extent that Neustadt implies otherwise, his measure is further discarded and the self-evident measure along with the discussed criticisms of Neustadt is further modified here. Here, proposing acts or reforms is not synonymous with activism. Only enacting substantive initiatives, whether new policies, reforms, or operations is understood as rational activism. The description is by simple definition self-evident; action and thus activism cannot take place without the act. Nevertheless, it needs to be stated explicitly.

This rational activism measure can be operationalized in several ways. For example, by studying the leader’s proposed plans over the first three months, the “honeymoon,” it can become evident what that leader’s plans and style for enacting those plans are. Then, over the course of his term, the leader can be studied via the proportion of actions taken that are consistent with those first three months. While distinctly different from the first measure of this paper, it builds on the conceptions and energy of a leader found in his adjusted moral vision.
Moreover, the proportion of successful, or enacted initiatives over the course of a leader's tenure, as accorded via the powers of the office within the Charter may be a way of gauging leadership effectiveness. For example, if a leader takes a bold step to expand the powers of the office, that action must incorporate two elements to be a rational activist success. First, it must advance the goals and ideals set forth within the Charter or constitutional framework. This is different than a purely dependent variable of the UN Charter as a source of leadership because it leaves room for an interpretation of those ideals while necessitating a sound grounding in legal basis.

Constitutional/legal bases are an undeniable source of traditional leadership theory in the American Presidency and emphasized in Kellerman's (1986) broader description of democratic leadership, while Finkelstein (1988) emphasizes its importance to international organizations. That fact is accepted in this analysis. Part of what makes this analysis different than the simple rule outlined earlier that Secretary-Generals should always adhere to the Charter is that adhering to the constitutional Charter is no guarantee of leadership effectiveness or success, but not adhering to Charter principles in any substantial form, whether technically or in spirit, will lead to unsuccessful leadership in all but the most extraordinary of rational activist circumstances, perhaps not faced by any office holder over the last few decades. Therefore, the study accepts the critical role of legal bases to good leadership that Cox (1969) de-emphasizes, but stresses that ethical and personality factors are what makes this possible, and that these factors can honestly or dishonestly adapt or revise the Charter to given situations or simply make for a leader that is by their virtue not very competent at the administrative, coordinative and political functions of the office. Thus, this first point includes the legal bases but does not rely on the generally
acknowledged statement discussed at the beginning that a good Secretary-General should adhere to Charter principles in, crucially, his activism.

As a tenet of the study discussed earlier with regard to Finkelstein, it is impossible to completely de-link the legal-constitutional basis for leadership from any part of a leadership discussion because the legal basis is always valuable in practically limiting a leader's options, yet always remains a central theoretical concept governing the leader's discretionary leadership, impossible to separate from any analysis of his rhetoric or actions. In this way, it is believed here that the UN Charter in the form of a dependent variable at the beginning of this paper cannot be totally yet credibly de-linked in any discussion of the importance of legal basis to leadership, especially when discussing actual action on the part of the leader.

Second and more intricately, it must be accomplished at an opportune moment in history; the geo-political and Organizational climate must at least in part be ripe, ready, or amenable to action, or for retrenchment or in-action for that matter. That ripeness for action or in-action is difficult to measure and can only be truly gauged by the leader, who has better and clearer information provided to him by Organizational and outside channels than any scholar can hope to have. It is fair to say, however, that an issue is ripe for action if there are no formal insurmountable constitutional constraints to action, strong normative reasons to act on the issue within the governing constitution or by a super-majority of Member States, clear and present danger to core, universally accepted human values, a methodologically clear plan for action and a willingness on the part of the leader to act. An issue is not ready for action if it, first and foremost, doesn't directly or substantially threaten or trigger principles found in the governing constitution, doesn't produce overwhelming ethical normative or public/governmental pressure to act, or threatens the credibility or existence of the Organization to an unacceptable degree,
therefore endangering other more overtly pressing programs that appear more mandated by the Organization's constitution. Retrenchment should occur during longer stretches of time when substantial Organizational action is imprudent. An area that is amenable to expansive action must pass this gauntlet of tests to prove preliminarily ripe for action.

These two core criteria should not be equated with effectiveness, but give some basis for effectiveness analysis using this measure. For example, Dag Hammarskjold acted effectively (by this measure) by asking for and organizing peacekeeping forces in the Suez and the Congo not because such action was called for in the Charter (it wasn't) or because the action was without geo-political risk (it did entail risk). It did, however, meet the two above criteria because it entailed a clear and present danger to Charter principles and a broad consensus among Member States and others that the UN's competencies were greatly needed, even before the UN chose to act! The opportunity entailed a challenge to the UN of the first order, and not tackling the issue would arguably have lead to substantially diminished UN credibility and an inability to tackle even the most basic of Charter mandates. By both elements Hammarskjold's actions were successful, apart from a direct application of the rational activism measure.

An example where these elements were not followed was again when Boutros-Ghali exercised leverage on the United States to act in a peace-enforcement, peace-making role in Somalia before such an expansion of the UNOSOM mandate had taken place by Security Council resolution, thus escalating tensions and the reluctance among all involved parties to peacefully negotiate. While humanitarian intervention is not explicitly called for under Chapter VII of the Charter and is therefore a matter of debate, Boutros-Ghali's initiative did not entail a methodologically clear plan, did not attempt to adequately surmount constitutional barriers then present to humanitarian intervention and peace-enforcement, did not adequately exhaust none-
enforcement attempts at peacekeeping such as negotiations then in progress, and ultimately unduly jeopardized his leadership credibility and therefore the UN’s other, more directly pressing initiatives by choosing to stake the Organization’s credibility on a relatively unimpressive test. Because the later-authorized mission’s badly planned methodologies lead to a failure and the mission’s peace-enforcement orientation was not a central Charter prerogative, Boutros-Ghali sloppily jeopardized the Organization and its other initiatives and therefore did not meet the criteria above.

Based on this, therefore, a leader should not attempt to act on his adjusted moral vision of a problem that is not ready for action. For example, a leader cannot act to eliminate state sovereignty completely—he would not be successful in the current climate because such a broad move is not ripe for action. A leader may act to establish or strengthen the mandates for institutions that monitor human rights abuses in different nations, and may seek additional powers to remedy the situation. In the post-Cold War world, such propositions are more ripe, or ready for action, because the notion of sovereignty has undergone some contextualization with relation to human rights because of the collapse of a bi-hegemony that reinforced state boundaries. Meanwhile, an issue like greater international dialogue may be completely ripe for action, though by the same token may happen without the leader because the time has come. In any of these three instances, if the leader convinces or directs his Organization to take action, he has attempted action. If the Organization acts in any degree, it is to that degree that the leader can be measured as having acted relative to other leaders.

To this extent, leadership + some ripeness will = the second element of activism success as operationalized here through application to different leaders based on secondary accounts from journalistic and biographical sources. The exact amount of ripeness is hard to determine,
but the issue need not, indeed should not, be begging for action in order to provoke consideration by the leader. Neither should it attempt to challenge an entire hostile international system.

**IX. Case Selection**

The criteria for case selection are several fold. First, in relation to historical events, it would be inappropriate to compare the first Secretary-General to his successors and vice versa because of the novelty of the then-new endeavor. Then, the different case selections are based on differing geo-political circumstances faced by the leaders. Ideally, the geo-political circumstances of the three different cases selected should be different to contrast leadership effectiveness across a range of circumstances. Thus, the first Secretary-General is not selected.

More importantly, the men are selected from the different biographical and analytical evidence that has been produced about them. That is, from a review of the works described in earlier sections, leaders must have lead in substantially different ways from each other by the previous international organizations leadership criteria used by many. This enables a test of the measures across different leaders and makes contrast easy. Contrasting leads to an easier test of the two measures here. At the same time any contrasting must take place in a mix that is appropriate. Given a sample size of seven leaders, the case selections must be understood in relation to each other. A leader who, by Cox’s standard of leadership as an adaptive function, might be judged as most successful relative to others should be selected. The leader who was more prone to leading according to an established leadership criterion should be selected to contrast with the previous standard. And a leader who exercised the previous standard only sometimes should also be selected. In the comparative realm, it is a criterion here to analyze those Secretary-Generals who have most tried to reshape the mission of the United Nations.
because such a criterion can most challenge or vindicate the concept of elite action making
rejected here. This main criterion still leaves room for several combinations of interesting case
studies, so it is appropriate to articulate some secondary reasons for precisely why certain leaders
were chosen over other feasible combinations.

Among these secondary criteria, it is worth mentioning that these leaders presided at
some historically significant chokepoints, and are analyzed in longitudinal order. The main
criterion here takes into account those leaders who were best positioned for action historically.
The heightening of the Cold War in the 1950s and its end in the 1990s along with the emergence
of a new international order put exceptional stress on leadership effectiveness in the office of the
UN Secretary-General. Analyzing the leaders longitudinally helps the reader keep abreast of
historical context, and has a side benefit of evidencing how these leaders may have learned from
earlier mistakes and how that ability to learn impacted their individual leadership.

Finally, perhaps the end of the Cold War can partially explain the necessity for a broader
understanding of leadership on the international level. Yet, this does not mean that international
leadership study divides into two groups: those during the Cold War and those after. What it
does mean is that the parameters of successful leadership may have changed and evolved
longitudinally, thus necessitating longitudinal study and contextualization. Today, it is harder to
imagine the Secretary-General caught between two immovable blocks of nations. North/South
coalitions are economically and politically asymmetrical, and international alliances, treaties, and
globalization in general provide much more flexibility between North/South nations than was the
case with the more equal and stalemated blocks of the Cold War. Though regional pressures on
the Secretary-General still exist, they are undoubtedly of lesser magnitude than at any time since
the beginning of formal international organizations. Nevertheless, it is also important to in some
degree look forward in the study of the office of Secretary-General in order to account for its evolution as well as to make any analysis more relevant to the immediate future, a thought taken into account in selecting the final candidates for the case studies.

In sum, the leaders analyzed should come from a variety of effectiveness levels by the previous standard. The case selections should come from a variety of geo-political contexts, especially from after and before the Cold War. Analysis should take place of leaders who lead at challenging times because it is presumed that such times bring out the best contrast of leadership, but should keep an eye toward the future. The following discussion gives an accounting of the contextual reasoning of how the case studies presented here were selected in relation to the different possible combinations. In the final analysis, the criteria are most evident in the discussion of how the case selection process was conducted.

Based on these criteria and on the comparative discussion below, it appears appropriate that the study include Dag Hammarskjold, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan. However, it is acknowledged that the study would not be aversely affected by the replacement of, for example, Kofi Annan by Javier Perez deCuellar or Boutros-Ghali by Kurt Waldheim because these leaders represent largely the same confluence of criteria described here.

Specifically, Javier Perez deCuellar acted during similar geo-political constraints on UN actions in the late 1980s to those faced by Annan during his first term. At first glance this pairing of leaders also share similar rational activist tendencies across the political, coordinative and administrative sectors. Similarly, though they may differ in some respects, no substantial differences are evident in integrity or ideological strength. While activist, deCuellar’s broader vision was subservient to the retrenchment rational activism of the late 1980s. With some
explanation, therefore, the two leaders both seem to approximate a similar position on the effectiveness/ineffectiveness curve of the explicated measures.

Meanwhile, Boutros-Ghali and Kurt Waldheim were similar because of a lack of rational activist accomplishment, if for different reasons. Both appeared to tilt to a political side and both exhibited some appearance of questionable integrity. While Boutros-Ghali was relatively strong ideologically as compared to Waldheim, both exhibited a largely impractical moral vision for their time, failed to adjust, and their rational activism thus suffered accordingly. Explanation would be needed to account for wide discrepancies in the respective popularity of the two men, but again both appear likely to land in approximately the same place along any hypothetically visualized effectiveness/ineffectiveness curve. Thus, the goal of this paper, to draw clear lines of leadership effectiveness and ineffectiveness for this office, would be similarly if differently served by such substitution. What is more certain is that a study that incorporated all of these leaders instead of any three would yield more nuanced insights, perhaps that Waldheim was not rationally activist and deCuellar was, or that Waldheim articulated a somewhat more practical moral vision than Boutros-Ghali. Taken together, these conclusions may very well yield better cross-comparison and analysis in the case study and conclusion sections because each leader is somewhat different. Nevertheless, the totality of the reasoning in this section indicates that it can reasonably be deemed enough to test the independent variables sufficiently and make the case for or against them based on the case selection as it stands.

The selection of case studies is not exclusively individual or in process but relative to others because it involves the analysis of historical data with hindsight. Based on the dependent variable of effectiveness, the selection of case studies can go in several ways. It is relatively easy to select Dag Hammarskjold as adhering to high levels of integrity, administrative
competence, and relatively effective political function if Urquhart (1978) and Cox (1969) as well as a plethora of other biographical and leadership scholars are to be believed. Based on this as well as some other methodological considerations discussed above, Hammarskjold is selected as a case study.

The reason that Trygve Lie is not selected, while mentioned at the beginning of this section, is nonetheless complex enough to merit a further discussion. Though Trygve Lie is in fact longitudinally first among the Secretary-Generals, the early formative years during which he lead provided less room for leadership because so many had a high interest in seeing the Organization succeed before the real, unquestionable start of the Cold War. The position did not have real room to lead in those beginning years. To the degree that Trygve Lie lead, it is difficult to historically judge his decision-making in process, when founding Member States were strongly behind the Organization. Lie did provide some maverick leadership, notably in Korea. In those early days, Lie was really a manager rather than a leader, though to his credit that is what was best for the Organization in those years. Rather than get deeply involved in the unique circumstances that would contextualize leadership analysis for the founding years, the study moves to more stable times with unambiguous potential for leadership over the course of the entire five year term.

Different leadership styles are alternatively selected in that after a maverick Secretary-General, a candidate perceived to be more administrative is selected. U Thant largely built on Hammarskjold's example, but did not represent either the leadership extremes of effectiveness or ineffectiveness. Kurt Waldheim has been thought by many to be a wavering politician, subject to bending with the winds (Finger and Saltzman, 1977). His selection would thus appropriately test both the ineffectiveness measure according to the Charter and the idea of balance among the
leadership theories studied here. However, in the larger scheme of things, Waldheim proved to be extremely popular, and was lobbied for a third term. A discussion of Waldheim would thus prove quite interesting, but is not pursued at this limited stage because it appears that the point made by using Waldheim can be more distinctly made by using one of his successors. Including Waldheim here would lead to an analysis of 4 out of 7 Secretary-Generals, and it would then become appropriate to expand the study to all seven, an option that may be pursued in a further advanced stage and is an important starting point for a further expansion of this study.

Moreover, Waldheim presided at a historically less significant juncture than the other selected candidates, an important part of the secondary criteria here.

By the same token, Javier Perez de Cuellar is deemed quite effective by Kanninen (1995). De Cuellar would also prove an interesting case study for this thesis because he indeed proved rather rational and effective given the geo-political context, but the effectiveness range of the spectrum is for the moment taken up by Hammarskjold. Study of de Cuellar would provide a slightly different analysis of effective leadership, and is also a good lead for further expanding this study. Hammarskjold’s effectiveness is deemed of more value here because his leadership had no precedence in international organizations before the 1950s and, as discussed later, for other methodological reasons. By the secondary criteria here it would seem appropriate to analyze de Cuellar because he presided at the precise ending of the Cold War in 1991. However, as a second term leader near the end of his term, he was drastically disadvantaged in tailoring his leadership to take advantage of these events. His successor, meanwhile, was ideally historically suited to just such an endeavor at a longitudinally significant point when the UN’s mission was more open to questioning or re-articulation than perhaps at any other time since its founding.
Boutros Boutros-Ghali has been deemed somewhat ineffective, especially in administrative functions, by Berdal (1999), Shawcross (2001) and to a certain extent by Picco (1999). By the discussion of effectiveness here, he also proved difficult in matters of everyday leadership across the general areas of responsibility that his office entailed, though he certainly articulated some grand principles for the future. Both are key for such measures of effectiveness as early warning and working with Member States/the Security Council. Thus, he indeed presents an “ambiguous” (Berdal, title page, 1999) instance of ineffectiveness and a closer analysis may delineate why this is so, especially when he is viewed relative to Hammarskjold.

Though representing some elements of ineffectiveness, Boutros-Ghali is viewed differently than Waldheim. Waldheim may have left something to be desired in early warning and in shifting policies to meet real challenges substantively, but proved popular, unlike Boutros-Ghali, among the superpowers and his colleagues even when they perceived him as somewhat challenging their interest (the rise of the New World Economic Order, for example). Thus, Boutros-Ghali is deemed a slightly more interesting case for the study because of popular perceptions and analysis after his tenure. This is by no means to be confused with the time-sensitive analysis of in-process effectiveness in this study (decision-making given certain rational variables that are never the same), but creates a tension in the understanding of ineffectiveness that is worth pursuing more than the popular, if also somewhat ineffective, leadership of Waldheim.

Finally, Kofi Annan is selected, although only his first term and four months of his second term can be analyzed. This is done for several reasons. Annan is the first to exercise relatively effective leadership since the end of the Cold War, and thus exercises effectiveness at a time when that concept becomes more prone to question. Childers and Urquhart (1994) have
questioned the effectiveness of the UN as a whole in the new environment. Ramo et al (2000) discuss the reason for what they see as Annan’s successful leadership ability as his diplomatic style and quiet, measured approach to leadership, concepts often argued to be important to the process of effective leadership (Dubrin, 2000). Kofi Annan represents an interesting midpoint in leadership effectiveness. Though not as politically waverling to states’ needs as Waldheim, he is not as challenging in his rhetoric, priorities, and action as Boutros-Ghali was. Thus, the secret of Annan’s relative effectiveness at a time when that concept is challenged by some new realities (posited by Childers and Urquhart, 1994) may be an ability to calibrate and coordinate the different demands of leadership effectiveness and the leadership they require. Likewise, Annan is of comparative interest because he has tried to redefine the role of the United Nations.

Annan, as a relatively effective leader, faces some similar tests to Hammarskjold (the 1950s saw the growth of the Cold War, a historical chokepoint) in applying Charter concepts to the post-Cold War environment without becoming somewhat ineffective because of new realities. That is to say that Annan has adapted to a new environment without changing the principles of effectiveness, but still acting effectively. To study Annan is to accept that expanding the Organization’s formal authority is not synonymous with effective leadership but rather, that an understanding of the demands for effectiveness comes close. DeCuellar exhibited similar strengths, but it can be argued that Annan brought something more by at once dealing with difficult financial circumstances and problems while considerably exercising the leadership requirement of bringing problems and future concerns to the attention (early-warning) of the UN and others.

By again adapting Cox’s measures, for example, it would seem adequate to advance a case study thesis of, say, that the UN of Boutros-Ghali was relatively authoritarian, or the UN of
Hammarskjold was somewhat mobilizing, and Annan as a mix of both competitive and
mobilizing. Of course, this would not be an adequate understanding because understanding
leaders relative to one another and the principles of effectiveness needs deeper distinctions, as
seen from the discussion of case selection.

The opportunity/reward and risks of action are today much greater, necessitating a higher
responsibility on the individual for his own leadership decisions and choices. No longer are
there ready-made propaganda and diplomatic machines that, while offering the potential for
diplomatic turmoil, offered a semblance of stability and hierarchy of intelligence, military and
personnel resources. Today, the Secretary-General indeed has much more room to make his own
successes and mistakes, owing partly to the new environment and partly to the successes of his
predecessors.

The following case study analysis begins to separately address the leadership
effectiveness of each of the three Secretary-Generals discussed. In accordance with the above
discussion, the tenures of Dag Hammarskjold, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan are
discussed. Historically, longitudinally, and relative to each other, they present at the very least
an adequate basis for the discussion of leadership effectiveness across a range of experiences and
challenges.

X. Analysis: Dag Hammarskjold

A. Adjusted Moral Vision

Dag Hammarskjold, the Swedish diplomat who became the Organization’s second leader
after the initial tenure of Trygve Lie, appears to have come closest to measuring up to the full
potential of the Secretary-Generalship in the eyes of many. A moral leader, Hammarskjold led a
personal life of considerable integrity, and believed strongly in criteria posited by Olasky (1999). Hammarskjold wrote, “Politics and diplomacy are no play of will and skill where results are independent of the character of those engaging in the game. Results are determined not by superficial ability, but by the consistency of the actors in their efforts and by the validity of their ideals.” (Urquhart, 1977, p. 134)

As an individualistic man, Hammarskjold was quick to defend his private and public principles, even succumbing to defeat as Swedish Prime Minister partly because of an unwillingness to bend to public opinion. As Secretary-General, Hammarskjold believed strongly that the office demanded a strong ability to provide moral vision, but only from a base of personal responsibility. Hammarskjold believed that whatever advisors advise, the ultimate consequences of any action will rest with the Secretary-General, a concept at odds with Cox and Jacobson’s (1973) “plurality of elites.” Thus, Hammarskjold demonstrated that a moral vision must be well thought-out and backed up by a Secretary-General of the utmost integrity, even in the face of untested circumstances.

Hammarskjold had no problem in tangling with the British, French, and Russians over peacekeeping in the Congo, where he demonstrated his adjusted moral vision in preventive diplomacy. He was criticized for the move because he seemed to side with the West, but his articulate rationalization of the decision showed the move to be consistent with his adjusted moral vision for the United Nations because in the end it averted war despite diplomatic protests on the part of the USSR.

In reality, the situation provided little wiggle room but did provide a moral imperative to act in the diplomatic sphere. Not acting entailed consequences more severe, including a wider war. Such an outcome might have been to the UN what World War II was to the League of
Nations. Hammarskjold led beyond the calling of the Organization, a feat that required integrity and a moral vision over a purely administrative and politically adaptive function of the office. It required a moral vision that in the spirit of the Charter required the Organization to act beyond its explicit powers.

Throughout his life, Hammarskjold’s fascination with the ability of science to resolve mankind’s problems developed into an active adjusted moral vision in the Secretariat. Hammarskjold initiated programs of economic research into the field operations of the United Nations. Hammarskjold indulged his adjusted moral vision by travel to the Third World and by learning about technical cooperation and expanding the work of UN regional economic commissions, thus developing and nurturing philosophical background knowledge for the position. Hammarskjold further envisioned that, while the United Nations could intervene in political conflicts in ways that could only have temporary effects, in economic and social matters the United Nations’ contribution could be lasting in the construction of a new type of international society. In plain words, Hammarskjold had envisioned the need for a rapid globalization to make broadly possible the enacting of Charter ideals. Therefore, he had a moral vision for his ideological agenda and for the future of the Organization, rather than acting in an adaptive, knee-jerk way to problems without an overall end-goal.

Hammarskjold had always believed that the path to be taken lay across improved multilateral institutions and through a flexible use of these institutions. Hammarskjold’s introverted philosophical and religious interest showed through his “dialectic rationalization,” where he demonstrated innovation of new ways of dealing with intractable diplomatic problems (Urquhart, p. 47, 1977). Put simply, Hammarskjold would not run against a wall and stay there, but would find a way around the wall through the dialectic of diplomacy. Hammarskjold
appropriately exhibited a high reliance on diplomacy but exercised a balance among his ideological impulses, knowing that an exercise of moral vision, rather than authoritarian will or simple management, required integrity to be flexible for the Organization’s, not his own, sake. Semi-arbitrating groups, conciliation groups, high-level emissaries, and all the resources of multilateral diplomacy were part of his broad and moderate vision of dialectic negotiation to bring advancement to the Third World through economic, social, and scientific growth and interchange. The key was that Hammarskjold’s adjusted moral vision for the office was the right one to produce the most from the Organization at that time, and his moral vision gave him the ability to produce it.

Rivlin (1995) has suggested that the infancy of the UN system 50 years ago gave Hammarskjold an opportunity. Admittedly Hammarskjold was positioned in a unique time that gave him some extraordinary opportunity to exercise adjusted moral vision, but it was not easy to exercise it in balance and to its near potential. If, however, his adjusted moral vision package was not as balanced in terms of providing the right amount of ideological direction, the philosophical training to move around and resolve problems in a productive way consistent with his ideological direction, and the integrity to withstand the questions, pressures, and tests of his loyalty (because of the Cold War), the fact remains that the Organization could have traveled in a radically different direction. The possible results of some forms of adaptive leadership are easy to imagine. In the end, if not for a moral vision that the Organization was indispensable, the ideological knowledge of immediate and long-term problems, pressures and trends, the rational analysis of options, and the integrity to always act selflessly in the interest of the Organization’s goals, a similar peaceful net result of leadership is hard to envision, at least with the UN playing as critical a role as it did.
In those first decades of the UN, the world was full of ideological conflict. Hammarskjold succeeded in articulating a moral vision that dealt with those same social and economic factors that caused so many to turn to this or that ideology in a fair and balanced way. Hammarskjold succeeded because the Organization expanded its competency to further the Charter in a socially useful way at a time when it seemed nearly impossible to do so. Hammarskjold had articulated and exercised the beginnings of an adjusted moral vision that was in fact a pan-ideology (a moral vision over Cold War ideological divisions). By incorporating rational scientific and cognitive dialectic approaches to the office, Hammarskjold articulated a moral vision that successfully set forth a more objective ideological approach than the competing philosophies of the time, successfully overshadowing the specter of capitalist/communist nuclear war with a legitimate political force for global peace. This adjusted moral vision of the Organization began to produce noticeable leadership results while he was still in office via the peace produced by his peacekeeping efforts and numerous mediations.

Hammarskjold fits as a success under this proposition because he set into motion and provided direction for some of the great competencies of the UN, today taken for granted. Without this ideological expansion for a long-term moral vision, the Organization would fail to adjust and remain on the right footing to articulate, if not always successfully deal with, global problems. Succeeding Secretary-Generals will have to actually see if the UN can be a bona-fide force on World Politics in its own right. Under Hammarskjold, however, the highly informal executive role of his office did indeed take on some impact on world politics. This is evident in the increased interest the great powers afforded the office as its ever-so-slight decisions began to have a real impact on the international scene.
What made Hammarskjold a great leader according to this measure, however, was that he did not push his leadership imperative to the extent that it deligitimized his office and did not act contrary to the fulfillment of the Charter. If Cox’s premise were to be accepted, a Secretary-General would only have to promise an expansive agenda to articulate a moral vision, whatever the ideological and integrity elements around it. Hammarskjold exercised leadership within safe and rational boundaries while retaining a moral vision of longer-term goals, an approach appropriate for most any geo-political context. At the same time, he acted proportionately in political, administrative and diplomatic spheres, leading to a balanced leadership result.

B. Rational Activism

Dag Hammarskjold had started out believing that an activist role would get him into trouble, and avoided expanding the power of his office. There is no question that Hammarskjold initially saw the Secretary-Generalship as purely secondary to the nation-state (Urquhart, 1977). Then, faced with real problems, Hammarskjold refused to hold to a role of pure moral authority. Nevertheless, even at his peak, he was only as activist as he correctly saw the Organization’s position would permit.

The Suez crisis of 1956 and Hammarskjold’s assembling of a peacekeeping force, considered a veritable UN army at the time, led to the enactment of an adjusted moral vision of preventative peacekeeping diplomacy. Hammarskjold acted independently of outside influence, and his activist leadership of implementing the peacekeeping force plan demonstrated an alternative to Cold War disturbances. Hammarskjold had acted in an expansive role of the authority of the Secretary-General. Similarly, Hammarskjold acted to prevent further bloodshed in Lebanon in 1960. The Congo crisis, though politically tenuous for the young UN, continued
to reaffirm a rational activist and independent imperative for the Secretary-General to act in an early warning role and act successfully to prevent conflict where he could.

Hammarskjold played a key role in the development of the Secretary-Generalship by developing the political capacity of the office. The elements of preventive action and peacekeeping were all a result of conscious choices to act on the part of Hammarskjold, rather than the idea of a group of states. There was no precedent to force his hand in the matter, and the decision to seek a peacekeeping role for the UN was an original action deemed most likely to stem the deteriorating situation, even at a time when such a force was a dramatic international step. Hammarskjold was activist, if not by choice, then by the eventual application of his adjusted moral vision to the geo-political potential for the advancement of the goals of the Charter.

Nevertheless, some still saw the office as retaining little real power to accomplish good. Quoting Barnes in Jordan, "Public political activities, especially unsolicited ones by the Secretaries-General, can never really substitute for accommodation among the powers themselves" (Barnes in Jordan, 1977, p. 34). However, Hammarskjold’s tenure exposed some fallacy in this assessment. By being a rationally active leader, Hammarskjold showed that it was in fact possible for the Secretary-General to act and thus produce an outcome different than what could be expected by simple accommodation among the powers through any uncoordinated multilateral diplomacy. It is possible, in fact likely, that the peacekeeping role Hammarskjold enacted averted further war on several occasions by giving potential combatants a rational choice that averted both war and embarrassment by the possibility of a new international force to keep the peace.
Hammarskjold actively backed up his adjusted moral vision through expansion of peacekeeping, Secretariat independence, regional economic commissions and the inclusion of economic and scientific data into the calculations and policies of all UN agencies. That’s different than using the proverbial bully pulpit of the office to articulate an adjusted moral vision of what should or could be done. The concrete acts Hammarskjold took expanded the role of the Secretary-General precisely because they took Hammarskjold’s adjusted moral vision from unapplied ideal to flexible action on the ground. Of course, his keen understanding via a balanced ideology of the geo-political room available for action was a facet of leadership that enabled him to sense and capitalize on prospects for accommodation. Hammarskjold undoubtedly evolved into an activist leader who enacted change where it was feasible and needed.

Some scholars, including R. J. Barry Jones (1995), believe that the well-calculated action of the Hammarskjold years offered, “a hint of the potentiality of a new, genuinely global political authority” (p. 35). Jones believes that this activism could not be replicated by other Secretary-Generals not because of the lack of a sufficient adjusted moral vision, but because “The restrictions placed upon [Hammarskjold’s] successors marked the re-affirmation of the primacy of states’ interests” (p. 35). In reality, it is fair to say that the actions the office is capable of initiating have progressed with the years not the other way around. This is so because international treaties have made ever-greater inroads into state sovereignty. It was without question Hammarskjold who both proportionately to initiative and relative to other Secretary-Generals did the most within the international constraints imposed on him to evolve the office of the Secretary-General.
Hammarskjold's activism and hands-on leadership to resolve the Congo crisis, the Suez crisis and to strengthen economic committees and other UN organs in anticipation of the growing problems of the Third World led to a "leave it to Dag" (Rivlin, 1995, p. 88) syndrome at the UN. This simply meant that faced with the momentous and sensitive problems of the early days of the Cold War, senior UN diplomats would defer to Hammarskjold to act definitively to solve the problem at hand. In addition, it meant that they had substantial confidence in his actions (it should not be assumed that the relationship of staff and leader is automatically one of confidence in each other). Hammarskjold in turn acted according to the UN Charter\(^3\) and within the parameters set forth for effective action in the office of the Secretary-General.

Robert Cox writes of Hammarskjold (1969, p. 322), “it was Hammarskjold, responding to the opportunities thrown up by world events following his appointment, who gave effective political content to the office of the Secretary-General.” Yet, Hammarskjold acted not in Neustadt’s traditional definition of activism, but by rational activism. Because Hammarskjold responded to the situation at hand, he did not force action, but acted rationally to present a solution, acting proactively when his moral vision indicated the inevitability of problems. Hammarskjold thus refrained from adapting in a self-interested way, but rather acted for the benefit of the Organization. He did not act for action’s sake or in a blunt power-grab for the office. Hammarskjold acted because it was the “right” thing to do by the adjusted moral vision understanding and because, as Cox declares, it was the right time for action. Put simply, Hammarskjold acted in a rational way; he acted with the guide of choosing the best of all possible worlds, as a selfless civil servant rather than a power-hungry elite. That, meanwhile,

\(^3\) The United Nations Charter set forth a wide set of transnational principles, many of which were an indirect response to the atrocities of the Nazis. As Secretary-General, Hammarskjold saw his responsibility to act in the best interest of those ideals, giving him much wider latitude for realistic activism than Boutros Ghali’s declarations of the Secretary-General’s sole responsibility to Member States fifty years later.
fulfilled UN Charter principles, not the other way around. Put simply, in a primary understanding of leadership, it was the man that made the office, not the office or geo-political events that made the man (whatever their secondary contributions to his growth as a leader may have been).

Cox and Haas, however, believe that Hammarskjold acted in the Suez and Congo to expand the UN Organization, and that that was inherently effective leadership. Hammarskjold was a remarkably effective leader because he acted at a time when the interplay of world events (an idea partially in agreement with Haas) was favorable for Organizational success, but would not have acted if the Charter and his moral vision, ideology and thus integrity were not in agreement with the opportunity for rational action.

Indeed, as Trygve Lie predicted, an activist Secretary-General will come under some fire, as Hammarskjold did, for taking any steps in accordance with the Charter rather than in congruence with the dominant views of Member States. To the extent that such activism is firmly rooted in the Charter, as Hammarskjold's was, and is wisely calculated to the geo-political climate and evolution of the office, it is activism exercised with integrity by the office of the Secretary-General. In the end, the soundness and extent of Hammarskjold's rational activism can be seen by the successful resolution of Suez and Congo thanks to his enacted view that the Secretary-General of the United Nations had to act, not observe conflict and social/economic suffering.

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4 It is not implied here that rational activist leadership must always or automatically be judged by the results. The tense international environment of the 1950s and Hammarskjold's resolution of the two most dangerous crises of the decade suggest that his active role in the process can be understood as evidence of rational activism as it can be beneficially manifest in the office of the Secretary-General. It is the contention here that the office of the US Presidency has a wider window for a grand form of activism in that the President's actions need not be as effective or well though out as the Secretary-Generals to be viewed as effective.
XI. Analysis: Boutros Boutros-Ghali

A. Adjusted Moral Vision

At first glance, it would appear that Boutros Boutros-Ghali exhibited some exceptional adjusted moral vision when dealing with diplomatic issues because his writings and speeches suggest he had grand plans for the Organization. Often when exercising a moral vision, some stretch\(^5\) in the constituency is necessary. That is, selfish Member States need to be convinced why the Secretary-General’s moral vision is right, especially when utmost political and diplomatic tact is not exercised among them, sparking some tensions and increasing political stakes.

After all, Hammarskjöld’s successful exercise of adjusted moral vision included butting heads with the Security Council over the Congo. But Hammarskjöld had demonstrated the diplomatic ability to know when and how to create and pursue a moral vision that would produce results. Such ability is part of the adjusted moral vision package. Boutros-Ghali, who articulated a moral vision of grand UN expansion that was often divisive by pitting nations against each other, may have believed he was acting with the proper moral vision in mind and thus exercising adjusted moral vision. His adjusted moral vision, however, provided far too much stretch and too little leadership ability for philosophical dialectic problem solving.

Boutros-Ghali’s philosophical development was very much at the hands of the traditional Egyptian aristocracy, and aristocratic governmental structures are often associated with authoritarian regimes. Though a Coptic Christian, Boutros-Ghali was better known for his academic reasoning, which lends itself to idealism but has rarely been associated with great

\(^5\) For a greater discussion of the concept of stretching the ability of the constituency to produce a willingness to go along with a moral vision (or adjusted moral vision), See Heifetz’ 1994 Leadership Without Easy Answers.
political or administrative leaders.⁶ Boutros-Ghali did not exhibit the same dialectic approach to moral vision that Hammarskjöld was known for. His style of diplomacy, learned from Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, was to conduct all important negotiations with foreign leaders face-to-face (Shawcross, 2001), biasing him against devolving power to surrounding administrative or Organizational-diplomatic sectors. He would never tell any of his colleagues what had been agreed, and consequently undermined the peacemaking efforts of many of his deputies, including the Iranian negotiations of Giandomenico Picco,⁷ an Assistant Secretary-General at the time.

Ghali proved deficient in his ability to produce an adjusted moral vision because he did not have the personal philosophical and social background to articulate an adjusted moral vision that would have stemmed these Organizational problems. In short, Cox’s measure may have termed Boutros-Ghali as tending toward authoritarianism, while the measure here is that he was too ideologically inclined and unbalanced as well as underdeveloped in adjusted moral vision to an ultimately unsuccessful degree.

Thus, Boutros-Ghali articulated an all-or-nothing type of adjusted moral vision that was incompatible to effective leadership at the UN. Though some of the reforms he proposed, like those for a standing UN force and others were broad and visionary, Boutros-Ghali lacked the complete adjusted moral vision to make progress because he too clearly and stubbornly believed in his priorities. Ghali lacked diplomatic tact in his adjusted moral vision when he would repeatedly declare that the UN underserved the Third World and that Bosnia-Herzegovina did not merit the UN attention it received, at least at that point of the Organization’s evolution. This, hopefully not intentionally, was fundamentally incompatible with the Charter because Charter

⁶ For an analysis and comparison of qualities and backgrounds of the world’s most famous historic leaders, see Barbara Kellerman (1986). Kellerman discusses the background and personal development and the relevant impact on leadership in her case studies of world leaders.

⁷ Picco explicitly argues that Boutros-Ghali tended to undermine the diplomatic efforts of others within the Organization.
principles were under attack in Bosnia, and put Boutros-Ghali’s integrity into some question.

Did Boutros-Ghali mean that because other wars were not as aggressively addressed the Bosnian conflict should be ignored? Probably not, but so fond was he of this manner of leadership that it indelibly became a part of his adjusted moral vision for the Organization. In this way, Boutros-Ghali politically and diplomatically mishandled sensitive issues. Such statements undermined the diplomatic efforts of the UN itself and others, while making the political waters murkier and distancing the UN from important allies to no rational end other than a show of Secretary-General independence.

Erskine and Childers (The World in Need of Leadership: Tomorrow’s United Nations, 1990, p. 5) write, “once in position in a large UN body [an incumbent can be exposed] as an arrogant unguided missile...some of the more disastrous appointments made by governments to these posts in the past can clearly be attributed to...straightforward errors in judgment.” And Boutros-Ghali has on occasion been criticized for a similar style, at least by a substantial minority of his constituency. Moreover, Erskine and Childers (1990) argued that once an incumbent is Secretary-General, the system, including the UN bureaucracy, would work hard for his success and reelection. However, numerous accounts of Boutros-Ghali’s tenure indicate quite the opposite despite some broad support for his re-election. By undermining administrative efforts, showing some diplomatic defiance and lack of political coordination Boutros-Ghali simply did not speak or articulate decisions rationally to a degree where he either accomplished a lot or accomplished a large proportion of his agenda. He was too ideologically abrasive in the exercise of the functions of the office and thus postponed or endangered a misinterpretation of his Organizational moral vision of working for greater global equity.
The understanding posited here suggests that any such errors in judgment are remediable by more thorough, holistic analysis of the individual, a counter to a simpler understanding of a leader as mobilizing, competitive or authoritarian. By such more nuanced analysis, Boutros-Ghali’s failings constitute ineffective Secretary-Generalship at the level of international organization. This is evident on an objective scale because of lapses in administrative, diplomatic and political coordination responsibilities. Without going into any great detail, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda and the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) constitute political failings, Iran, Somalia and the United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda (UNAMIR) II and an increasing unwillingness among many Member States to pay dues constitute diplomatic failures, and Organizational discontent constitutes administrative failure.

These are accounted for by lapses in the adjusted moral vision measure. There is a problem with classifying these as due to purely authoritarian leadership. Ideological stubbornness was certainly a major part within them. Also, personal considerations may have entered into the Somalia episode, impairing integrity. Likewise, a moral vision by the leader that somewhat impaired efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina contributed, not to mention an administrative malaise resulting from a lack of trust in the leader. In light of the American leadership experience, it may even be said that no Secretary-General has governed as much as a sovereign President as Boutros-Ghali did, though to do so would only highlight authoritarian impulses.

Before leaving this discussion, it is useful to expound on at least one particular instance of inappropriate leadership. A central element of Boutros-Ghali’s leadership is evident in the Somalia peacekeeping operation. Although falling in the category of activism and discussed later, an element of the action may impinge Ghali’s integrity. Bowden (2000) discusses the Somali Habdr Gidr clan’s belief that Boutros-Ghali carried over his long-time claim against the
clan from his stint as an Egyptian diplomat to the office of Secretary-General. Though many UN scholars dispute that assertion, it creates at least an appearance of impropriety. After all, of all the starving and warring African nations, Somalia received US nation building through Boutros-Ghali’s leadership despite a strong reluctance by the George H.W. Bush administration. The problem here would not necessarily be that Boutros-Ghali lead partially, but that he may have lead according to personal preference rather than Organizational principles and their benefit because an expansion of UNOSOM I was in hindsight so likely to fail.

Boutros-Ghali’s lack of an adjusted moral vision for the UN meant that he did not posses the right blend of diplomatic vision and organizational dialectic skills. While Hammarskjold was able to articulate a moral vision that at once satisfied rational moral development and worked within the confines of the Organization to make it grow narrowly for the fulfillment of its goals, Boutros-Ghali attempted action too broadly in the organizational respect.

There was another key failing in Boutros-Ghali’s articulation and exercise of an adjusted moral vision for the Organization he administered and lead. Boutros-Ghali was fond of saying, “I only receive the mandate and [next] I have to try to find the troops.” (New York Times, 1996) However, the office of the Secretary-General had so evolved by the 1990s that Ghali indeed had wide discretion as to which hot spots to focus his diplomatic attention and moral vision on, and his lukewarm regard for the Bosnian conflict may have partially accounted for its protracted nature. Here again, Boutros-Ghali seemed not to have the moral vision part of adjusted moral vision or the diplomatic ability to make the most with what he could get, a feat accomplished quite well by Hammarskjöld and, in very similar circumstances, by Perez deCuellar.

Boutros-Ghali had demonstrated the validity of Olasky (1999) and Hammarskjöld’s (in Urquhart, 1977) assertions. Personal philosophical development directs a moral vision whatever
the surrounding pressures. Ghali knew that his ideologically weighted strategy was not working, and he knew that he was not satisfactorily articulating an adjusted moral vision for the administrative and diplomatic evolution of the office. Both were central if Ghali's ideologically over-weighted adjusted moral vision was to come true.

While still Secretary-General, Ghali said, “To put it bluntly, I have no power, no independence. You are free to send the troops or not to send the troops. You are free to pay the money or not to pay the money. So unless I obtain your goodwill, I will not be able to do the work.” (Shawcross, 2001, p. 93) Boutros-Ghali did not set forth the moral vision element of adjusted moral vision to solve the impasse he articulated here. Put simply, part of his job was to persuade Member States, and the situation he articulated was partly of his own doing. He adapted an all-or-nothing approach to globalizing ideology and inadvertently picked an ad-hoc approach to diplomatic matters and thus an ideological style in which he felt most uncomfortable as a leader. An adjusted moral vision would have enabled him to overcome his frustration and work within the Organization's geo-political and evolutionary limits at the time to both stretch the Organization’s capability to do more and efficiently use the opportunities it was given in Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere.

Like Woodrow Wilson's 14 points and the League of Nations seventy years earlier, Boutros-Ghali over-stepped. Both men attempted what amounted to a new world order at a time when such a feat appeared possible. The moral vision was too broad, and both men misread what they could accomplish through influence. They exhibited a strong ideology to internationalize in a way that failed to take advantage of the openings that were actually presented to do so. They were different to the extent that Wilson’s integrity had never been questioned.
It was Boutros-Ghali's obligation as Secretary-General to set forth a strategy to work within the impasse or negotiate through it but he did neither in the big challenges of his administration. Instead, he clung to his outdated ideological visions and repeatedly and publicly clashed with some Member States, to the further detriment of the Organization's ability to fulfill the Charter. When faced with critical decisions, Ghali cognitively reverted to an aristocratic training, perhaps because he did not have the time or space required to articulate a new adjusted moral vision, or perhaps because he did not have a moral vision package, only an ideological one. Instead of working through the impasses of his tenure, Ghali's ideological element grew ever more dominant, especially in administrative and early warning matters (Berdal (autumn 1999) leading to a vicious cycle of Organizational frustration.

B. Rational Activism

Like those of Hammarskjold, the defining, though by no means only relevant, actions of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's administration were peacekeeping missions. Boutros-Ghali's expansive activism in Somalia\(^8\) and Bosnia proved to be the wrong type of action for the office of the Secretary-General because it did not prove sufficiently successful in the political, diplomatic and administrative spheres. Boutros Ghali's fundraising ventures and field offices in the Third World also proved unsatisfactory because of overreaching grand activism on his part and a failure to delegate the more mundane activist tasks (Picco, 1999). The one operation that did prove somewhat successful, the Cambodia intervention, resulted mostly from the ripeness of the conflict rather than any leadership (Durch, 1996).

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\(^8\) Ghali had envisaged the mandate that gave rise to the botched operation to capture Somali warlord General Mohammad Farah Aideed.
As discussed at the beginning of this paper, Neustadt had originally asserted that any activism is better than no activism, a fallacy later refuted but not before Cox adapted it to the study of international organizations. While the narrow political spectrum of the American Presidential system accords that Presidential activism, whether expansive or structural (within the status quo) will satisfy the politician’s right or left base and may be enough to give him a plurality of support, the Secretary-Generalship is different. By demanding initiatives in almost every facet of Organizational activity, from Security Council reform to the assessment of dues to the location and structure of field offices, Boutros-Ghali made enemies by appearing to unreasonably, rather than through moral vision, favor one group of states over another. He could have stemmed that tide by diplomatic efforts to act in a more generally palatable manner or not act at all. Activism that stretches the status quo at the United Nations must be well thought-out and planned, because the more consensus and persuasive authority-based role of the office does not permit for actions that put the Secretary-General systematically at odds with large or influential Member States. Boutros-Ghali’s strengths, therefore, did not lie in rationally leading an international organization but rather in constructively critiquing its shortcomings, which he could not remedy by his mis-attempted activism.

An overview of Boutros-Ghali’s recent publications suggests he may have been used as a scapegoat by the United States. There is, of course, truth to the assertion that the United States blocked or stalled many of Boutros-Ghali’s initiatives, but only after the failure of his leadership in Somalia. Boutros-Ghali had stacked his personal reputation on the Somali mission, and had urged the United States to overstep the Security Council’s initial humanitarian mandate in the pursuit of Somali warlord General Mohammed Farah Aideed.⁹ Thus, when the UNOSOM II

⁹ Recent news accounts suggest that because Boutros-Ghali had pressed for the United States to capture Somali warlord Mohammad Farah Aideed. The analysis of Shawcross (p. 87) and recent news accounts on the History
mission, the product of heavy lobbying of Security Council members by Boutros-Ghali, resulted in casualties and public embarrassment for the US, Ghali’s leadership was somewhat accurately\(^{10}\) blamed. Whatever the actions of Member States, the ultimate responsibility for peacekeeping and other UN-mandated or directed action lays with the Secretary-General.

Even upon the collapse of UNOSOM II, Boutros-Ghali could have attempted to make a fresh start, admit responsibility, or negotiate for his social, developmental, or other initiatives. Instead, he frustrated action by engaging in a thinly cloaked\(^{11}\) public relations battle with the United States and its allies. Even if just by remaining quiet, avoiding conflict, and working with what he had in terms of political support, in the way deCuellar lead, Boutros-Ghali could have eventually achieved and enacted more of his adjusted moral vision.

Boutros-Ghali picked the wrong time in the evolution of the Organization to assert or test the activist power of his office. Boutros-Ghali overreached in terms of the vast amount and grand scale of action he wanted (whether by asking for the capture of Aideed, or for increased peacekeeping in the many conflicts of the Third World). It may be argued that in the end Boutros-Ghali’s tenure was marked by some advancement, like that in human resources proposals, development, environment and other areas and that it compares relatively favorably with the earlier Secretary-Generals of the Cold War in terms of effort. Given the mammoth opportunity for a skillful leader to carefully act in the UN of the early 1990s, whatever the difficulties and unexplained frontiers of that period, Boutros-Ghali was ineffective on the

\(^{10}\) Had it not been for Ghali’s view of peace enforcement, the Somali situation would have stalemated or resulted in a negotiated result.

\(^{11}\) Boutros-Ghali oftentimes made statements that indirectly implicated the US. He would argue that he had no power. It was the states that could give the money or not give the money, and so on. But it was ultimately he who was responsible, and indeed retained some power to enact, the principles of the Charter. It is here contended that
rational activism measure because his oft-times unfocused and mal-prepared initiatives resulted in comparatively little successful action. The preponderance of responsibility for this rests with Boutros-Ghali’s grand, ideologically over-weighted activism, rather than the inherently unpredictable nature of the inter-state system.

Relative to other Secretary-Generals, Boutros-Ghali definitely attempted many more acts that never gained serious support or that ultimately failed. As discussed, however, this does not meet the definition for rational activism used here. It is nevertheless worth making a special effort to understand why Boutros-Ghali was unsuccessful in the practice of that definition, and why, indeed, he was unsuccessful by the political, administrative and diplomatic measures presented at the beginning.

Boutros-Ghali published prolifically on ideas to help the Organization in the new millennium. Boutros-Ghali proposed a standing UN army. He was active in putting together, directing, and speaking at the many development conferences of the early 1990s. Boutros-Ghali addressed pressing economic and development issues on an almost unprecedented scale. He was not nearly the most activist Secretary-General precisely because his proposals disappointed in producing concrete solutions to the problems they were to address and resolve. Whatever the academic or theoretical merit of Boutros-Ghali’s ideas, the UN of Boutros-Ghali did not meet new responsibilities and challenges as nimbly or proportionately as that of other Secretary-Generals.

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12 On page 306, Shawcross describes some of Boutros-Ghali’s proposals as grand in nature, a proposal evident in Berdal’s (1999) analysis of Boutros-Ghali. Nevertheless, under Ghali’s watch peacekeeping missions in Srebrenica (Bosnia), Somalia, and Rwanda failed to achieve any significant peace. Boutros-Ghali’s policy on the Lockerbie bombing suspects was also largely seen as not hard enough on terrorism. Boutros-Ghali offers reasoning in his many publications, but the analysis of his actions rather than moral vision seems to indicate serious problems by the rational activist measure used here.
On matters of social and economic importance, Boutros-Ghali did achieve some modest success, but flawed pre-planning and drafts and the exclusion from the diplomatic table of contrary political points of view stumped broader success (Navarro-Valls, 1994). The Rio Conference on the Environment produced the non-binding principles of Agenda 21. The Cairo Conference on Population produced almost endless gridlock and miscommunication and any meaningful parts of the document remain in brackets to this day. The Beijing Conference on Women succeeded mostly in articulating accepted principles without real global advancement or legislation of new initiatives. Contrast this core record with the more successful conferences like those of the Montreal Protocol in 1987, Stockholm in 1972 and the innumerable conferences and treaties that resulted in real action during the Cold War. Like in peacekeeping missions, the Conferences were characterized by inadequate diplomatic planning and problematic political execution, and remained too broad in scope to achieve much other than an increased awareness of problems.

It is likely that Boutros-Ghali overreached in terms of the vast amount and grand scale of action he wanted in the diplomatic, political and administrative realms. It may be argued that in the end Ghali’s tenure was marked by some advancement, like that in human resources proposals and increased awareness of problems affecting development and the environment, and that it compares relatively favorably in terms of effort. It is important to acknowledge this, but to recognize that by Secretary-General leadership effectiveness measures Boutros-Ghali was not a relatively successful or effective leader. Other Secretary-Generals put in Boutros-Ghali’s position would likely have delivered more in terms of rational activist results.
II. Kofi Annan

A. Adjusted Moral Vision

Like Boutros-Boutros Ghali, Kofi Annan came from a family of noble birth but received other philosophical influence that exposed him to different ways of leadership. As a young boy, Annan was familiar with the export-import business where his father worked, part of the Lever Brothers Corporation, and understood the different leadership structure that this American firm used. Annan always saw the importance of bringing the Third World along, but did so in a different, more novel way than most of his predecessors. Annan saw reasons and solutions behind the problems the Third World was facing, and his strong belief in working with free markets and Western institutions\textsuperscript{13} gave him a balanced and complete adjusted moral vision for the office of Secretary-General of the UN\textsuperscript{14} that enabled him to synthesize it with his noble clan upbringing, which to begin with had been largely democratic. Annan chose to articulate an adjusted moral vision that was not directly ideologically threatening to anybody and did so in a way that made it at once powerful and non-threatening. By doing so, his adjusted moral vision at once advanced the Charter’s principles and avoided ideological challenges at the UN. By remaining true to his articulation, Annan exhibited integrity.

Annan’s adjusted moral vision lay in globalizing free markets and Western institutions in concert with the dominant geo-political tide of the time, all the while directing it to benefit all of humanity without borders. Though admittedly the time for such an approach was ripe, Annan’s

\textsuperscript{13} That belief can be seen in his Address to the Annual Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, Harare, 2 June 1997 (Sg/Sm/6245) published in The Quotable Kofi Annan. There, Annan said, “Crucial to the new politics is a redefinition of the role of the State. The State, it is increasingly understood, is not a creator of wealth, but a facilitator and catalyst of development. An essential function of the State is to provide an enabling environment in which investment can take place, wealth can be created, and individuals can prosper and grow. Civil society can then form and express itself, involving individuals in decisions affecting their own lives.”

\textsuperscript{14} For a detailed discussion of Kofi Annan’s upbringing and how it translates into his leadership style today, see Ramo, J., Thompson, M., & Walker, D.’s (September 2000) discussion of his early influences and current beliefs.
upbringing and Western education provided that he was ideologically and morally committed to this approach.

To understand why Annan’s adjusted moral vision was valuable in his governing tenure, it is important to contrast it with his closest opposites. Other Secretary-Generals had articulated an adjusted moral vision that aimed to expressly create transnational institutions and redirect attention to the plight of the Third World (like Boutros-Ghali). Still others, in particular Kurt Waldheim, seemed to tilt to the side that communism and not free markets would be an acceptable, perhaps preferred way to bring greater progress to the Third World. Because of the Cold War and sharp divisions among Member States and within the UN itself, Kurt Waldheim’s adjusted moral vision was constrained by the limits of the office at that point in time. But the political nature of Waldheim’s tenure and a general lack of consistency resulted in an adjusted moral vision that was susceptible to the geo-political context to a fault. Annan, much like Hammarskjold seemed to do before him, exhibited a consistent interest in Western democratic institutions, free markets, and globalization as the ultimate vehicle for progress. Moreover, he did so at a time when such an adjusted moral vision vehicle is most conducive to fulfilling the

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15 It is not the intention here to delve into the Secretary-Generals not explicitly analyzed, but to put Kofi Annan’s adjusted moral vision (ADM) in proper relief against Secretary-Generals who appeared to articulate an ADM somewhat contrary to Annan’s. Waldheim appears to run most counter to the free market elements of Annan’s vision and thus merits a discussion here to resolve the issue. Also, the personal elements (relative integrity, consistency) of ADM should here be differentiated from ideological and moral elements of moral vision. Waldheim’s initial ADM may have been the best moral choice for the time and provided an ideological direction in a degree that was consistent with the UN’s evolution, but because Waldheim as a leader was too quick to compromise his ideological and moral vision to Member States, evidently in an effort to advance his political career rather than exclusively for the Charter, he compromised the ideological, moral, and perhaps even, somewhat like Ghali, the integrity elements of his ADM and thus proved less effective in overall ADM than Annan. Thus, the measure here should not, does not, and is not intended to serve to make the value judgment that because Annan chose to work with free markets, his ADM was inherently better than Waldheim’s or a hypothetical communist Secretary-General during the Cold War. This case poses a problem to this measure because of this additional explanation. Again it is important to note here that it was not because Waldheim’s ADM was more amenable to communism that his vision failed, but the uncertainty of the Cold War, the precarious evolution of the office during the Waldheim years, and most of all Waldheim’s inability to stay consistently true to his ADM played a role in the inferiority of his ADM to that of Annan’s. To gain a better understanding of Waldheim’s inconsistency and the geopolitical climate that hampered the articulation of a consistent ADM, see Finger and Saltzman’s (1977) discussion of Waldheim’s leadership in which they come to similar conclusions about Waldheim’s leadership.

16 Hammarskjold’s economic and scientific adjusted moral vision seemed to be more compatible with free markets.
Charter and expanding the ability of the Organization to evolve into better fulfilling the Charter. Annan set forth an adjusted moral vision that remains true to the Charter and the goals contained within it while not unduly burdening the Member States in the way Boutros-Ghali did. By articulating an adjusted moral vision most conducive to advancing the Charter's principles at this point in time of the Organization's evolution and surrounding geo-political climate, Annan's adjusted moral vision appears the best suited to advancing the Organization and its goals. Annan was thus the architect of one of the best adjusted moral visions relative to (global) outside factors, perhaps rivaled only by Hammarskjold (Annan's tenure is not yet over and the final result is not yet known).

Given this ideological appropriateness of Annan to the diplomatic, political, and administrative demands of the office, it is important to better understand the specific development of his moral vision. Annan was and is admittedly not very religious, but recounts that his parents, and likely his surroundings and educated upbringing, helped him form a moral vision that led him to the UN on the basis of his fervent belief in the goals of the Charter (Ramo, September 2000). Annan's upbringing, therefore, was entirely consistent with the evolution of a post-Cold War UN. The demise of the second Boutros-Ghali candidacy brought into being the tenure of a man with the ideal education, upbringing and background to articulate a good adjusted moral vision for a UN for the new Millennium, and Annan has not so far disappointed by overstretched the limits of his office or by ignoring diplomatic, administrative or political problems. By all accounts, Annan is always quiet and dignified, with a thorough diplomatic willingness to persuade rather than pressure. As the office began to face the challenges of the early and middle 1990s, Annan's integrity served him well in articulating an adjusted moral vision that seemed to take into account some of the best adjusted moral vision qualities the
previous Secretary-Generals had to offer, like the rational activism of DeCuellar and the
diplomatic, administrative and political competence and balance of Hammarskjold.

Annan has learned that one of the keys to success at the UN is acting within a given
tenure’s set of geo-political circumstances. His background was thus suited to dealing with the
multifaceted international inter-state monster where Boutros-Ghali’s was not. Annan has
 refrained from diplomatically imprudent statements that blur a leader’s moral vision and
complicate diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, he has been successful in not exhibiting
authoritarian impulses and has maintained a definite, more rational shift in direction from his
predecessor, in goals large and small. The strongest evidence of this lies in Annan following
through, in a much more consensual manner, on some of the reforms originally proposed by
Boutros-Ghali.

After the polarization that took place between Boutros-Ghali and the United States,
Annan remained to negotiate for back dues. Annan made a point, in the way Hammarskjold
would often visit the Third World, of visiting trouble spots from Baghdad to Washington. His
adjusted moral vision skills in exercising quiet tact and utmost respect with Washington gained
him the same results as a similar strategy did for deCuellar. The more personal aspects of his
adjusted moral vision enabled him to attack the problems in the most cognitively rational way
(by making the choice most likely to yield the greatest results given the situation). Thus, he
gained good results given the almost intractable and frustrating nature of some of the modern
challenges to the office. This rational aspect of Annan’s personal adjusted moral vision is
evident when Annan says, “Screaming and getting bitter and being angry is negative energy, and

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\[17\] Despite strong conservative leadership in the American legislative bodies, Annan’s respectful dialogue with
Washington succeeded in payment of most of the dues owed the UN. Moreover, the US is poised for an increasing
role in the world body, as rhetoric on both sides has cooled during Annan’s tenure. Both of these instances are
successes for Annan’s less threatening vision.
takes a lot out of you, and doesn’t help any” (Shawcross, p. 383). Such an approach to leadership entails a balanced adjusted moral vision that does not sacrifice integrity for ideology and so on, while leading across diplomatic, political and administrative sectors. In such a balance personal frustration is less likely to take place, and irrational action remains curtailed.

Annan brings a personal preference for quiet diplomatic persuasion, an element more suited to the current state of evolution of the office. Annan thus articulated a global vision for the United Nations that aimed at minimizing blame and maximizing responsibility distribution in as egalitarian but non-threatening a manner as possible. For those who thought his free market upbringing and noble background would bias him toward the United States, he found a way to show the independence of his adjusted moral vision by visiting and negotiating with Baghdad on a number of occasions.

Annan’s adjusted moral vision never aimed at the sensitivities of the East, West, North, or South. After returning from Baghdad, he said, “But the entire Security Council said they wanted a diplomatic solution. The UN is not in the business of waging war if it can be avoided. I have already been criticized as being the ‘human shield’ for Saddam, but I have a mandate, I have a conscience, and I fervently believe in the ideals of the UN.” (United Nations, p. 12, 2001\(^8\))

Annan is not weary of attacking the concept of the nation-state itself and articulating an adjusted moral vision of global governance by the UN as appropriate at this stage of human development. By discussing a broad vision of bringing the same freedoms and rights he has always cherished to all humans via the UN, Annan challenges all international actors to protect Charter concepts that often fall prey to geo politics and other forces. Annan does not lay responsibility at the foot of any group of countries, but his emphasis on human rights and dignity

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\(^8\) Remarks among return to UN headquarters following his mission to Iraq, 24 February 1998.
above that of the sovereign state would inevitably aid the Third World’s poor more that Boutros-
Ghali’s polarizing adjusted moral vision that sought immediate amelioration through grand and
very hard to achieve global governance measures.

Annan is known for his quiet consensus style, and likely for parts of his adjusted moral
vision. In the uncertainty that followed the US veto of Ghali’s reelection, the choice of Annan,
based on his background and known beliefs and capabilities was appropriate despite hesitation in
selecting a second consecutive African Secretary-General. Thus, the earlier development of his
adjusted moral vision merits further study.

A good example of Annan’s adjusted moral vision approach to problem solving at the
UN is evident in the following exchange. Annan had offered his services as a mediator and
declared that in Algeria, “The killing has gone on too long” (Shawcross, p. 340, 2001). This had
calicited an Algerian response to the effect that the country’s problems could only be “resolved by
Algerians themselves away from all external interference of whatever source” (Ibid). Annan
had replied to that rebuke by saying, “No one can fight with me for defending the sanctity of life
and the fundamental rights of individuals” (Ibid).

Annan’s vision for the role of the UN was clear. The UN, in accordance with its Charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, must be willing to defend the basic rights of
humanity. He did not go to Algeria and say, as Ghali did in Bosnia and again in Ghana among
others, that he knows several places on Earth worse than this, or that as Secretary-General he
does not have the power or financing to help.

19 Under Boutros-Ghali, Annan had served as Undersecretary for peacekeeping. Annan had a long history at the UN
and was a known quantity to the delegates and Secretariat staff.
20 More so than the Secretary-Generals of the past, Annan defends his vision instead of proposing governance
measures that pit Member States against each other, as Ghali often did. In The Quotable Kofi Annan, (2001), He is
quoted as saying. “There is no alternative to the UN. It is still the last best hope of humanity.” (Address to UN staff,
New York, 9 January 1997 (SG/SM/6140), and “Only a global Organization is capable of meeting global
challenges.” (Address to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., 24 January, 1997 (SG/SM/6218). In this way,
Annan challenges critics, not particular Member States and makes his adjusted moral vision non-threatening.
Likewise, most evidently in the integrity variable of adjusted moral vision, Annan came clean in an honest way about the past failures of UN peacekeeping. His willingness to openly and honestly acknowledge and criticize the system that had allowed for Rwanda and Somalia seemed to evidence an adjusted moral vision element that dictated that past wrongs must be made known no matter what the public image costs. Needless to say, acknowledging the Organization’s errors was not common to the Secretary-Generals of the past, and Annan’s straight talk articulated the correct adjusted moral vision pathway for future Secretary-Generals. This acknowledgement of past errors in which the UN had a part by the Organization’s own head shows truly effective leadership by this measure because it completely fulfills adjusted moral vision parts and does so without any demoralization or polarization.

Annan had the ability to endeavor into quiet and rational diplomacy, as de Cuellar did, while safeguarding Hammarskjold’s belief in scientific and economic advancement of mankind. In a sign of new ideological priority, he assigned the business community a greater role to play in the environmental, educational, cultural, scientific and civil society growth of the global community. Annan thus attempts to evolve the UN into the new and most available ways of fulfilling the Charter, and has proportionately succeeded in following through on his adjusted moral vision because of its none-threatening nature and geo-political timeliness.

**B. Rational Activism**

Kofi Annan, in a quite and diplomatic adjusted moral vision of action, represents the opposite of Ghali in his approach toward activism. Annan proposed less expansive acts, but achieved a higher return on what he proposed.
Administratively, Annan’s balanced adjusted moral vision has enabled steps toward enacting some initiatives begun on Boutros-Ghali’s watch. For example, reforms of several UN specialized agencies continue. Diplomatically, Annan has continued to be a conduit between Baghdad and Washington, D.C., and has made the Security Council and UN organs more responsive to immediate problems, as in the case of small arms. Politically, Annan has succeeded in getting the US to pay back dues and has acted on ideological priorities for a moral vision that entails broad globalization and amelioration of problems at the international level.

While relative complacency in administrative and diplomatic spheres during Annan’s first term has meant that Annan has succeeded in quelling some of the problems of the early 1990s, politically Annan has acted ideologically to transcend the concept of the nation-state as much as possible without rendering harm to the Organization. Mostly, he has done so by articulating a moral vision that plays to the integrity of each individual, while setting forth an ideological agenda rationally calculated to minimize Member State protest while acting to ameliorate problems he believes are most pressing on mankind.

Just as Hammarskjold succeeded in acting to establish the regional economic and social councils and the UN peacekeeping roles that were his central priorities, and just as Boutros-Ghali failed in his priority of giving equal UN peacekeeping attention to every violent conflict, Annan has begun to succeed with one of his priorities, ameliorating AIDS. Annan’s rational activism, in accordance with his priorities, is more narrow and focused than Boutros-Ghali’s was and appears to have yielded better overall results.

Annan has acted in getting drug companies to supply cheap drugs to ameliorate the AIDS epidemic in Africa, and the UN conference on AIDS has brought further funding for concrete steps toward prevention. Though harder to gauge, Annan’s Global Compact initiative has
yielded greater cooperation between international governance and trans-national corporations (TNCs) by coordinating and focusing charitable activities and socially responsible investment. Initially set up to integrate TNCs into better global citizenship and cooperation, the effort has gained the support of corporations like Nestle of Switzerland who have been quick to improve environmental compliance and fund programs like education and other socially responsible endeavors. It is hard to calculate exactly how much of the responsible actions initiated by TNCs happened directly as a result of Annan’s pressure, but thousands had signed up or pledged funds for the effort, not to mention cooperate with the UN on matters where they may be of assistance. The same has been true of his efforts to integrate NGO civil society elements into UN conferences and efforts.21

By no means, however, has Annan’s activism always been successful (and therefore, by the definition used here, rational activism). Annan ultimately failed in his negotiations with Saddam Hussein, and in persuading the Taliban to preserve ancient relics. However, he essentially was obligated to attempt these efforts in good faith by his position as Secretary-General, and thus acted with the legal requirements of the Charter as his central focus, displaying utmost integrity in the face of a hopeful if greatly skeptical Member State body. His personal priorities for action, as well as other initiatives, largely have remained successful, averting collapse, because of a lack of administrative frustration within the Organization and the lack of diplomatic and political frustration and intransigence on the part of the leader’s ideology and moral vision, itself a display of integrity.

21 The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is more open to NGO initiative than ever. The Department of Public Information (DPI) integrates the role of civil society groups in publicizing and enacting UN conference results into all its Communications Group and other meetings. Similarly, all UN field actions now depend on civil society groups more and more to extend the mandate of the UN to the specified area and world in General. Under Annan, civil society groups have gained almost all desired access to UN conferences and the implementation of conference results. They have also been used in peacekeeping and other contexts.
As mentioned, Annan has continued to implement and support efficiency reforms at the UN in key areas. He has backed efforts to dramatically increase the use of short and medium term contract workers and has decreased the hiring of permanent employees, taking some of the first steps toward actualizing deep human resources reforms discussed for some time. Moreover, Annan appointed agency heads that facilitated some actual change. At the United Nations Development Program, for example, long needed reforms have been enacted that will enable the Organization which most prominently carries Hammarskjold’s ideal of Third World advancement through economic growth and social advancement to better perform toward the Charter’s goals. By adjusting the UN structure itself, Annan acted to bring about internal Organizational change.

As was discussed in the introduction with regard to the American Presidential evolution of activism, Neustadt’s concept had up till recently failed to account for those leaders who acted substantially to prevent crisis. With regard to peacekeeping, this is truer in Kofi Annan’s case than in that of any other Secretary-General. Annan’s first term saw no major peacekeeping debacles like those of Somalia, or other missions that proved ineffective at fulfilling their mandate. While chastising past mandates for baring substantial blame for peacekeeping shortcomings, Annan’s term saw a noticeable lack of diplomatic/political peacekeeping crisis at a time when the number of peacekeeping operations is as great as ever. The lack of the regular peacekeeping crisis evident during the tenure of so many past Secretary-Generals indicates rational activism on Annan’s part not only in seeking to create new missions without the flawed mandates of the past, but in managing the flawed mandates of current missions so that they don’t exhibit the problems common to similar missions of the past.
By that standard, the unusually long period of relative peacekeeping success found during Annan’s first term evidences results that must be indicative of rational activism on the part of Annan, a former head of the Department of Peacekeeping. In fact, Annan has been successful in placing peacekeepers in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Haiti and other conflicts and has negotiated and coaxed his way into some sort of active intervention in many more Third World conflicts than Ghali’s attempted activism. In all areas, Annan talks and negotiates with the goal of UN rational action. While action may not always be desirable, Annan’s intense diplomatic and political negotiations make this hard to accept given his philosophical background and past faith in the Charter. Nevertheless, he has demonstrated a balance in acting on the adjusted moral vision measure that has so far not resulted in any substantially broad or unsuccessful grand action.

XIII. Conclusions

A. Articulating and Exercising an Effective Adjusted Moral Vision for the United Nations Secretary-Generalship

Annan’s adjusted moral vision is the most successful since Hammarskjold, and in many ways it incorporates the evolved continuation of his vision for the Secretariat at age 50. Both men refrained from public negativity or demagoguery. While Boutros-Ghali had often referred to the “problem of globalization” (Boutros-Ghali, March/April 1996 p. 389), complained of not enough official power, or of too much scapegoating of the office (Boutros-Ghali, December 1998, p. 6), a more successful adjusted moral vision dictates resolving frustration through prudent action in the diplomatic, political and administrative sectors.
Like Hammarskjold, Annan travels and negotiates readily, and his accommodating style is meant to help in the realization of his adjusted moral vision by making his colleagues and other diplomats feel comfortable. He acts in a manner cognitively/rationally most likely to bring about his adjusted moral vision, and in so doing displays integrity. Annan followed the tenure of a highly public, highly political predecessor and was called on to restore the morale and self-confidence of the Secretariat. The complete adjusted moral vision measure and the related leadership effectiveness and success appears most evident in Hammarskjold and Annan, taking into account Organizational evolution. In fact, this appears truer of Annan and Hammarskjold than of any other Secretary-General(s), most especially Boutros-Ghali and those that approximate him in the analysis of the measure.

Hammarskjold and Annan also appear to be the two most successful officeholders with regards to the articulation and execution of their respective, if somewhat similar adjusted moral visions. Because each articulated the best adjusted moral vision for his time, and was willing to exercise the proper channels for the advancement of that adjusted moral vision (thus reinforcing it by exhibiting integrity), each was among the most successful Secretary-Generals of the UN.

Most remarkable of Annan’s leadership is that after a string of Secretary-Generals who sometimes contradicted the principles of the office by unnecessarily choosing regional political sides or losing sight of the future for the benefit of the present, Annan has been able to reestablish a solid effective leadership that, like Hammarskjold, closely links the Charter to an adjusted moral vision, ready for Organization action.

**B. Rational Activism in the Office of the UN Secretary-General**
Activism in the office of the Secretary-General is more of an art than it is a science because of the evolving nature of the office of Secretary-General. It is believed here that activism, any activism, is not as related to Secretary-General leadership effectiveness as it is to United States Presidential leadership effectiveness because of the differing, many times more intangible elements of the office. However, it is still a considerable indicator of the effectiveness of a Secretary-General, especially when it is exercised rationally according to the redefinition employed here. Finally, it usually serves as the more evident and measurable application of an adjusted moral vision.

Having discussed the importance of activism, it is worth reiterating here that Hammarskjold himself made some comments indicating the importance of activism. In his 1961 speech at Oxford University, Hammarskjold himself offered some principles for Secretary-General activism. Hammarskjold believed that his office had explicit political functions in addition to the administrative and executive ones. This meant that controversial but calculated (thus the element of art to activism) actions and decisions on occasion had to be taken independently of the wishes of Member Governments, solely on the basis of the principles of the Charter and the Secretary-General’s contextual political judgment (or, here, encompassed within adjusted moral vision). If a Secretary-General’s adjusted moral vision allowed for such diplomatic exercise, yet maintained a visible element of consistency, then the Secretary-General could exercise substantially “rational” (Kanninen, 1995, p. 188) activism in almost every international political climate.

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22 Kanninen examines Perez de Cuellar’s leadership during the financial crisis, and concludes that in the second term de Cuellar succeeded in leading the UN because he focused his energies into the policy areas he rationally calculated were most likely to bring results. Like Hammarskjold, Perez de Cuellar apparently evolved into an activist during his term in office. Kanninen’s rationality hypothesis as he defines it is not necessarily intended at other times when the term rationality is used throughout in the case studies, unless modifying analyzed action, but may be one way to focus adjusted moral vision and activism to the international political climate. The proposition of this paper posits a counter argument, that the leader with Olasky’s moral vision and training as a component of adjusted moral vision
Even before the end of the Cold War, scholars from Hoffman (1991) to Childers and Urquhart et al (1993) as well as many throughout the world, most especially around Europe and the Third World, believed that the UN was the single best hope for humankind. With the increased political leeway of the post-Cold War world, one Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has exhibited more proportional and rational activist success than another, Boutros-Ghali, in the diplomatic, administrative and political spheres. At the same time, it was in the rational activist tradition of Hammarskjold, and later DeCuellar, that Annan has felt most at home. Indeed, many view Kofi Annan in terms similar to Hammarskjold, likely because of the lack of any negative or irrational action on the part of both. Most often, Hammarskjold and Annan are compared in terms of an enactment of very similar long-term moral visions.

The concept of rational activism is best illustrated here by two key factors. First, rational activism is not measured by effort or proclamation but by actual steps taken toward affecting change or maintaining the status quo, and Hammarskjold demonstrated an exceptional ability to do this. Annan, in a much different geo-political environment, has demonstrated a similar ability, especially in effectively choosing his priorities and acting on them. Boutros-Ghali staked his leadership leverage on rationally ill-conceived proposals for broader action, and, relative to the other two Secretary-Generals, proved less effective as a rational activist leader.

Second, leaders who attempt relatively little general activism in office but often are successful in implementing any attempted action may on balance be more rationally activist than those who attempt grand change or policy expansion but are ultimately largely unsuccessful. Hammarskjold was dealt a favorable geo-political hand with an opportunity for action during the Cold War, but had to exercise action in an exceptionally rational, narrow manner to become

will be endowed with the ability to exercise and adjust that vision in order to begin to activate the substantial portion of that vision. At other times when this word is used, it should be understood to connote the scientific, objective meaning of "rationality."
effective. Annan has not demonstrated a propensity to act broadly, but rather to choose his priorities for action carefully and then exercise leadership to get them accomplished, and has thus far been successful by the rational activism measure. Boutros-Ghali was unsuccessful by this measure because, put simply, he failed to rationally choose his leadership battles for maximum success. The leadership of the leaders profiled in the case studies is best evidenced within these parameters, part of the broader rational activism discussion earlier, because they most contrast the fundamental differences among these leaders.

Further, with this explication in mind, it is useful to briefly go over some of the finer points of rational activism that have led to each leader’s assessment here. Hammarskjold, for example, exercised good rational activism because his peacekeeping missions and economic and social initiatives were ultimately mostly successful in the cases to which they were applied, as well as in later growing to encompass major portions of the UN mission. Through diplomatic commitment to make the UN and its ideals relevant during heightened tensions, Hammarskjold used his leadership prerogative of diplomatic intervention in a globalist manner. Administratively, Hammarskjold began to frame the UN in such a way as to position it to deal with some longer-term challenges but retained staff loyalty by concentrating on the importance of the international civil service. Politically, Hammarskjold ended up taking some risk in his peacekeeping initiatives, but that risk proved rational by ultimately ameliorating the problem at hand. To do this, he had to retain a high level of integrity, impartiality and general fairness across the areas of his responsibility.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali was certainly not short on the sheer number and level of acts he would have liked to affect as Secretary-General. However, he did not have considerable success in a relatively high proportion of his political and diplomatic endeavors because his actions
concentrated on expanding or reforming the Organization’s role, rather than remaining focused on Charter ideals and rationally tailoring action for the expressed benefit of all Member States. Administratively, Boutros-Ghali may have used the Organization to achieve his own geopolitical strategies and for some self-aggrandizement, engendering a lack of administrative loyalty. Thus, a strong ideological approach to action jeopardized more immediate Charter goals, where the Organization’s as well as Boutros-Ghali’s own activist energies would have been more wisely used.

Annan has thus far chosen to concentrate his actual efforts within the structural geopolitical tradition of the UN to affect change. This means that Annan has demonstrated a consistent effort not to be over broad in attempting actions that would require drastic, grand reform of the current UN system or geo-political climate. By working within these rules, Annan is pursuing a strategy that should maximize his results in the form of action accomplished. Administratively, Annan’s actions have engendered a sense of commitment by introducing a more open atmosphere toward staff and a more focused Organizational concentration on the end-goal. Politically, Annan has shown an ability to pick his battles and leadership initiatives carefully, and his proposals have garnered support because his action has been seen as relatively narrowly tailored to the Charter in rational benefit versus cost, and has not inappropriately burdened any group of Member States. Diplomatically, Annan has gone about the application of the Charter to conflicts and tensions through a case-by-case approach and a high level of diplomatic commitment to resolving conflicts, employing Organizational resources and leverage rationally toward an end-goal consistent with principles found within the Charter.

It is almost certain that these and other leaders in this office have learned from each other, but the core concept of rational activism remains the same and has varied in its application
among these and other leaders. Rational activism through cost/benefit analysis and acting for Charter ideals varies from event to event and responsibility to responsibility, but the facts of UN Secretary-General leadership prove nonetheless amenable to such analysis.

C. Adjusted Moral Vision and Rational Activism Are Superior in Measuring and Indicating Leadership Effectiveness in the Office of the UN Secretary-General

The ideas of Haas in Cox (1969) and Cox (1969) as well as Neustadt in Cox (1969) account for leadership in international organizations through a view that is pessimistic about human nature, and the leader’s ability to rationally act from an inner, nuanced and complex adjusted moral vision. Others, like Cox and Jacobson (1973) doubt the individual’s real ability, or at least cognizance of ultimate leadership responsibility, to act without a dominant role of a plurality of elites. Still others, like Finkelstein (1988) and Javier Perez DeCuellar partially adapt a more traditional view which preceded the concept of leadership as an adaptive function and put forth that the legal requirements and constraints of an organization exercise a dominant role on the leadership of a leader.

The acceptance, development and application of more traditional legal, personal styles, and ethical (to use Cox’s [1969] words) concepts of leadership from the study of the American Presidency to the study of the office of United Nations Secretary-General is an alternative, largely neglected view that is at the very least just as viable. Florig’s (1992) ideology, Olasky’s (1999) moral vision (in its philosophical, social and religious parts) and Kanninen’s (1995) integrity along with rational (Kanninen’s definition of rationality for international organizations) activism, originally set forth by Neustadt (1960) and later modified by W. Muir (1988) and K. Muir (1992) are all traditional concepts modified and integrated to produce just such an
understanding. Leadership in the office of the UN Secretary-General should be understood primarily as a composite of these concepts, and only secondarily as a politically adapted function, if at all.

The alternative view presented here reveals new information, such as an understanding that some Secretary-Generals can be reasoned to have been less successful than others based on sound theoretical principles. Likewise, by this nuanced measure, it has been pinpointed where personal improvements can take place on all levels, from the leader’s philosophical fit for the office, agenda setting and rational implementation competency to his exercise of action in the diplomatic, administrative and political spheres. The view also demonstrates how the concepts are applicable to very different problems and challenges, and how it can be discerned that success has taken place. This kind of useful information is simply not possible to gauge with the parsimonious nature of leadership as an adaptive political function.

Specifically, the three men analyzed in the case study section, Dag Hammarskjold, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan clearly show different levels of leadership effectiveness. Hammarskjold set the standard, but Annan brought a very similar but more evolved standard of effectiveness into being during similarly difficult circumstances, thus being perhaps the most effective leader by an analysis of leadership responsibilities and functions as well as by the adjusted moral vision and rational activism measures. Importantly, both leaders sought a balance among their responsibilities, thus setting a general benchmark of acceptable leadership effectiveness at the UN. That standard was not as evident in the leadership of others, but was perhaps least evident in the leadership of Boutros-Ghali. Boutros-Ghali was lacking in some way with respect to every measure, being ineffective by his responsibilities as evidenced by his single term while being ineffective by the two measures here because of a lack of
accomplishment, rational vision, and balance in the diplomatic, administrative and coordinative/political spheres. While the preliminary conclusions discuss the reasoning here more broadly, the explicit rankings of Annan as number 1, Hammarskjold as a close number 2, and Boutros-Ghali as a distant number 3 need to be stated here as some definite conclusions of the discussion and study.

Moreover, by the case study analysis, the interrelated nature of adjusted moral vision and rational activism becomes apparent because the men contrast similarly in both measures. Overlap also occurs because, despite sound biographical and historical evidence from many sources, nobody knows more about the decision-making process and any duplication of the classifications here in a given instance of leadership than the leader himself, an important argument for developing more nuanced measures of leadership effectiveness.

Finally, there is room to build on this traditional view of leadership effectiveness in international organizations. Expanding the conclusions here to a more detailed and complete accounting of the daily decision-making of each leader would further solidify them. Analyzing additional UN Secretary-Generals would build a broader footing for the analysis. Neither eventuality is practical under an understanding of leadership as an adaptive function.
Endnotes


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Kalinowski


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Appendix

(All materials available at thesis defense)

A. Flier used to formally advertise the thesis defense through electronic (email) and physical (posting) means

B. Flier description of study

C. Adjusted Moral Vision and Activism Models

D. Pamphlet 1: Description of the study

E. Pamphlet 2: Outlining the measures

F. Pamphlet 3: Case selection, case studies and conclusions
You Are Cordially Invited to

The Master's Thesis Defense

By

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*Entitled*

Understanding Adjusted Moral Vision and Rational Activism in the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General

To Be Held On March 12, 2002, From 4:00pm until 5:30pm
Diplomacy Room, McQuaid Hall

Grading Committee:
Dr. Courtney B. Smith
Dr. Marian Glenn
**1st Model**

Moral vision (Olasky) (philosophical training) altruistic vision for the performance of effective good by the organization.

Integrity
Kanninen (1995)
Uprightness; loyalty to the Charter, lack of appearance of impropriety.

Ideology
(Florig) Agenda setting; globalizing or status quo? general direction for the organization.

**2nd Model**

Activism

Neustadt's (1960) Presidential action-making for public enlightenment (action as effectiveness).

W. Muir's (1988) and K. Muir's (1992) revision; retrenchment or in-action can be activism if proactive choice given circumstances.

Rational action including retrenchment or in-action when action is imprudent. Must be balanced, well-calibrated action, measured by end-goal accomplishments and satisfactorily proportionate to set agenda priorities.
The Study Here Focuses On Leadership In International Organization, Specifically the Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations To Test Out the Proposed Approach. It Focuses on Revamping the Entire Idea of Leadership As An Adaptive Function, An Idea That Has Proved Popular In All Areas of Leadership Study.
VI. WHY COMPARE THE UN- SG TO THE US PRESIDENT?

Because there is little comparative scholarship, it is useful to look elsewhere. Plenty such literature exists in the UN Presidency, and Cox set the President for looking here. The Presidency is perhaps most similar to the UN Secretariat except for other, less developed IOs. The strong central executive makes these two more similar than any comparison with the EU or any NGO. Similar resource constraints exist between the two offices. Moreover, in the future a stronger UN may resemble the US institution even more. Secondarily, early in the UN's history the comparison was made by Hammarskjdokd himself, and today, after the end of the Cold War in offers the most extensive comparative pairing, and there is little doubt that like in the Presidency, large differences in leadership capability exist at the UN.

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Understanding
Adjusted Moral Vision 
and Rational Activism
in the Office of the
United Nations Secretary-General

Part I: Revising Leadership Theory

I. WHAT IS EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP?

The core of leadership at the UN is to best tailor the organization to most rationally fulfill the principles of the Charter. The job of the Secretary-General is complex, but can be put into three groups: administrative (managing and coordinating matters within the UN system), diplomatic (Article 99 responsibilities: early warning,
peacemaking; mediation, prevention), and coordinative-political (develop and propose policies across political, economic, social, humanitarian, environmental and administrative sectors. Importantly, these areas must be addressed consistently.

II. OPERATIONALIZATION

To effectively operationalize this it is vital to study the historical happenings of each studied leader’s tenure. Effectiveness excludes necessarily expanding the organization’s authority through overt and potential conflict and consensus. Rather it is to distinguish those leaders who effectively and completely performed their responsibilities. To study this, biographical and news, or secondary sources, are utilized. In turn, the three key areas of the leader’s responsibility are applied.

III. A STUDY IN LEADERSHIP: THE DOMINANT PARADIGM

As the United Nations and international organization in general begins the 21st century, it is time to revisit the some leadership principles. Robert Cox and Ernst Haas were the first to seriously tackle the question of leadership in international organizations. In 1969, Cox, by discussing the writings of Haas and an American scholar, Richard Neustadt (1960), articulated an idea of leadership that would serve as the dominant paradigm for this study for the years to come. Cox foresaw leadership as an adaptive political function. He grouped international leaders into three basic categories: competitive, authoritarian and mobilizing. Cox saw no need for what he termed the idiosyncrasies of normative leadership, and dismissed traditional concepts that included legal basis, ethical/normative basis and personality traits/characteristics. Haas in Cox chose to focus on political and managerial aspects of leadership, while Neustadt believed that always politically adapting was the one tested path to leadership effectiveness.

Of late, some writers like Larry Finkelstein and Javier Perez de Cuellar have argued for a more legal view of UN leadership.

Similarly, Berdal (1999) discusses the ambiguous nature of recent leadership at the UN, Shawcross (2000) discusses the UN’s mission in the post-Cold War world and recent leadership, and others like Urquhart (1977) offer their own assessment of leadership at the UN. From a purely scholarly perspective, however, leadership as a politically adaptive function remains the dominant idea.

Cox (1969) foresaw all leadership in international organization as politically adaptive function, a view that would come to dominate the field.

IV. CRITICISMS

This approach to leadership in international organization is unnecessarily broad, and lacks comparative application. Insufficient debate and a lack of analytical, critical scholarship comprise a solid reason for turning elsewhere. The study disputes Cox’s minimalization of bureaucratic and charismatic leadership and the necessity that effective leadership must expand authority. It finds Cox’s categories too broad, and sees the value of analyzing morality in leadership as outweighing Cox’s idiosyncrasy argument in the post Cold-War world. It rejects the view that an effective leader continually cements his power, Cox and Jacobson’s (1973) assertion that a “plurality of elites” really controls things and that the leader must continually expand his tasks. It is not adequate to transcribe adaptive function to Int’l organization, as Cox seems to do with Neustadt’s ideas. Whatever the nobility of these scholars, their theory is a relativist, over-parasimonious approach, and more traditional approaches to leadership study are here deemed better.

V. MOVING TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING

The leader is ultimately responsible for his own decisions. The focus here is on the individual and the qualities that give him the ability to lead, not outside pressures. Morality is included because it is the most powerful motivation a leader can have. Rationality from an efficiency and cost-benefit analysis is necessary, but is only fully evident to the leader himself. Personal criteria for good leadership do not change, but are challenged and re-emerge in a utility-maximizing form. A more nuanced understanding, using traditional concepts, is needed.
4. Totality of rational activism is measured after the fact.

5. Rational activism has grades of measurement; specifically it refers to actual accomplishment of a priority, goal or articulated agenda. A compromise end-goal may be effective leadership, but is less so than an appropriate idea carried through to the end by the leader.

6. Rational activism is proportional. That is, a leader who articulates many grand ideas and proposals, but for reasons shown by the adjusted moral vision measure does not accomplish a comparatively high number of those goals, is less effective than a leader who proposes a more rational/realistic if less grand use of his powers, but follows through in accomplishing a greater proportion.

Understanding Adjusted Moral Vision and Rational Activism in the Office of the United Nations Secretary-General

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VII. LOOKING FOR ANSWERS IN US LEADERSHIP
The legal constitutional basis is central to the analysis of leadership in the US Presidency, and it is easy to imagine that effective leadership can be disintegrative or inactive given the right circumstances, a possibility supported by the constitution and by more recent writings explored here.
Central concepts appear in any such overview. Though there are several, the biggest adaptation from the general survey of American Presidential leadership scholarship is that consensus-building is reflected by consistency and balance of approach in the adapted theories used below for the UN office. This is so because this theory is individual-leader-based, with the assumption that the leader is ultimately responsible for any action taken by the organization or staff on his behalf, with his knowledge or due to his delegation.

VIII. THE MEASURES

By a broad survey of American Presidential leadership scholarship, it becomes apparent that ideology, integrity, vision or moral vision and activism dominate the modern scholarly discussion.

Respected writers from Barbara Kellerman (1984) to James MacGregor Burns (1999) to Floding (1992) have classified ideology as a central moving element in agenda articulation and exercise. Tailored to the UN office, it can be seen by whether the leader focuses on using traditional UN tools to resolving conflict, or proposes and follows an agenda to restructure tools at his disposal. However, it also means the appropriateness, rationality, priority and extent of his agenda. Similarly, scholars from Neustadt (1990) to Olasky (1999) touch on moral vision, and the idea has been more developed as of late. Traditionally, scholars of the Presidency have focused simply on vision, a slightly different concept relating to the altruistic nature of a moral vision as it relates to abject good-doing, a concept deemed relevant to the post-Cold World and encouraged by recent coverage (Shawcross 2000, Ramo et al 2000). Likewise, although the definition used here is from Kinninen (1995), American Presidential scholars like MacGregor Burns (1999), Honenberg (1996) and Edwards and Wayne (1985) have focused on integrity as a central concept. Admittedly, Greenstein (1994) stress consistency across these measures, and Kellerman stresses consensus-building. Here, the aggregate of these is accepted as a balanced approach to the first three terms. After some contextualization and revision for the office of UN Secretary-General, they are applied as a holistic adjusted moral vision measure. Important for this measure stresses balance among the discussed terms and accepts Olasky's (1999) recent proposition that philosophical, religious and social training lie at the core of leadership readiness.

In 1960, Richard Neustadt originally set forth the concept of action-making for enlightenment, referred to by him and others later as activism. The concept states that the effective leader must assume a yearning public, and must substantially act, whatever the need for action, to be good or effective. The power of Neustadt's ideas was reiterated in Hefetz's 1994 work. However, the concept came under increasing attack as a form of bias. In 1988 W. Muir and later in 1992 W. Muir wrote that effective leadership need not always lead to an expansion of organizational or governmental powers, and need not entail action. Retrenchment or in-action when action entailed to great a risk or was efficiently irrational toward accomplishing the organization's constitutional goals was not good or effective leadership. That concept has been picked up by a plethora of scholars since, including by Greenstein (1994) and numerous authors that he cites. To accurately reflect this discussion but to acknowledge that the traditional definition of activism entails value bias, the definition accepted here is one of rational activism.

By a broad survey of American Presidential leadership scholarship, it becomes apparent that ideology, integrity, vision or moral vision and activism dominate the modern scholarly discussion.

1. Both adjusted moral vision and rational activism control for geo-political events by focusing on the leader

2. To become operationalized, both rely on factual accounts.

3. All must act in balance, and there is some explicated overlap between the two general measures. However, there are inherent tradeoffs, and the balance in the measures is maintained by the appropriate philosophical, religious and social preparation. Over exercise of one component may damage or neglect others.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS

The totality of the *adjusted moral vision* measure showed that Hammarskjold and Annan used the Secretary-General’s Article 99 and other articulation prerogatives positively and to a high degree rationally, while Boutros-Ghali often used similar powers unwisely or negatively.

Comparatively, Hammarskjold was most successful by his readiness to turn an extraordinary environment to the organization’s success. Annan, given freer circumstances, has *acted rationally* and effectively, while Boutros-Ghali disappointed by overreaching.

The component parts of the measures are rational and largely free of idiosyncrasy because they retain objective definition and operationalization. They are a superior way of understanding leadership in the office.
discussion, the selection of Dag Hammarskjold, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and Kofi Annan is made. Two of these leaders seem to have governed by diurnally opposed styles, thus making them worthy of study here. Furthermore, longitudinal consideration is given, thus the inclusion of an earlier leader to point out criticisms with the dominant paradigm fashioned in that time period. Historical chokepoints are another consideration, namely that those times when the UN and its mission were most vulnerable are analyzed. The first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, is not analyzed because of the groundswell of support at the founding and the unclear geo-political situation. It is nevertheless admitted that a substitution of Javier Perez deCuellar for Kofi Annan or Boutros-Ghali for Kurt Waldheim would be possible without adverse effect because, if for different reasons, both leaders appear to land in similar effectiveness curves on an imaginary line. The construction of the measures is theory-centric, and a comparative application and study could thus be initiated for any two or three.

X. ANALYSIS: DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

Hammarskjold exercised an appropriate, rational and efficient approach to the challenges then facing the UN. Retaining a strong philosophical dialectic background and belief in scientific progress, Hammarskjold began and expanded important economic and scientific programs when other approaches seemed as politically palatable, pressing forward with an effective adjusted moral vision. When his leadership priorities were challenged, Hammarskjold rationally acted, not capitulating to geo-political pressure but rationally, narrowly expanding the UN's role through peacekeeping. In adjusted moral vision, Hammarskjold found the right balance.

XI. ANALYSIS: BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

Overall, it must be said that Boutros-Ghali's adjusted moral vision was a comparative failure. Explicated within the discussion is Boutros-Ghali's questionable moral vision in handling Bosnia and Somalia and questionable integrity and philosophy in regards to Somalia. Boutros-Ghali's approach was also ideologically weighted toward agenda and power expansion, a goal, if accomplished adaptively, that is in line with Cox (1969). Here, it is deemed that Boutros-Ghali did not act efficiently/rationally in exercising his initiative in agenda and priority setting. Boutros-Ghali was over globalization, an approach not in line with the capabilities and deference paid to the office at the time. His background (according to Olasky's criteria) showed he was not well suited to the accomplishment of the responsibilities of the position. His moral vision in helping the Third World, while noble, was not realistic in the situation or with his proposals, and Boutros-Ghali failed to act rationally rather than adaptively to efficiently maximize the opportunities accorded his administration. In terms of rational activism, Boutros-Ghali did not pick his battles wisely to the detriment of his effectiveness.

The construction of the measures is theory-centric, and a comparative application...could thus be initiated...

XII. ANALYSIS: KOFI ANNAN

Annan initiated a different approach to the position, showing an evolution in the office. Annan put forth an adjusted moral vision that set forth achievable priorities given the geo-political situation and the powers of his office. Ideologically, Annan articulated a less threatening moral vision for progress by not singling out any state or group of states for moral blame, thus not affecting the office negatively. Annan's more industrial background and cosmopolitan education brought an approach less ideologically weighted and a less prone to question integrity than others who may have had a more authoritarian philosophical approach to matters, subject to do anything to get their way. Annan tailored rational activist approaches, tailoring his efforts to the post Cold-War world and making the UN more adept at capitalist endeavors by incorporating corporations and non-governmental private entities in addressing environmental, economic and health issues, rather than exclusive waiting for government. Likewise, Annan has proved an adept fundraiser and has resisted peacekeeping projects that were likely to fail.