The Way We Remember It: The Popular Memory of the Battle of Gettysburg

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The Way We Remember It: 
The Popular Memory of the Battle of Gettysburg

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Masters of Arts in History 
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Abstract:
The relationship between history and memory is an essential and complicated concept that significantly affects how the public remembers the past. A prime example of this complex relationship between history and memory is true in the most famous battle of the Civil War. Gettysburg is one of the most critical events in American history, for which thousands of books and countless historians have retold this momentous battle. In the case of the popular memory of Gettysburg, I argue that the significant amount of academic historiography, popular media, and American history textbooks have established a reconciliationist memory. This memory focuses more on the courage and bravery of the soldiers on both the Union and Confederate lines while omitting the importance of slavery, emancipation, and the period of reconstruction to preserve an incredible event in American history without damaging the legacy of General Robert E. Lee and the Confederacy.

Key Words:
Battle of Gettysburg, Civil War, Reconciliation, Popular Memory, Lost Cause, Gettysburg Address, Historiography
The Way We Remember It:
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Glenn Dietrich

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Introduction

Thomas Desjardin has taught me, rather abrasively, that the truth of Gettysburg is impossible to ever know. Whether this claim is true or not, it has provoked me to at least understand what popular memory remembers of this Battle and why it is remembered.¹

For nearly 160 years the Battle of Gettysburg has been renowned as one of the most famous and most important battles of the Civil War. However, what is being argued still about this battle is the question of what is remembered about it and why? Depending on the source, whether it be historical scholarship, textbooks, media, or popular culture Gettysburg is viewed and remembered in different ways. Hundreds of historians have written about it, each of them giving their own views and focusing on certain aspects of the struggle or simply bringing their own creative spin to the narrative. Because of the overwhelming interest in the battle, throughout its historiography there are key questions of the battle that are repeatedly debated and interpreted by historians and the public. Each of their perceptions provide an important insight into how and why the battle is remembered. The questions that are continually repeated are, “How did the battle begin?”, “Was there more to Lee’s plan on July 3rd?”, “Was Little Round Top actually the key position of the Union line?”, and finally, “How much should General Robert E. Lee be blamed for the defeat at Gettysburg?” In addition, I will address how a reconciliationist popular memory of the Battle of Gettysburg contributed to a nationalist reunification of the post-Civil War era.

The Gettysburg campaign and the memory of the battle is collided with myths and misconceptions that include but are not limited to how and why the battle started, the main

objectives of both commanders, the importance of Little Round Top, the romanticism of “Pickett’s Charge” and the lack of blame put on General Robert E. Lee. All of these will be addressed and analyzed. From the beginning, it is important to confront Lee’s initial aims to invade Pennsylvania. After a decisive victory at Chancellorsville in the Spring of 1863 Lee wanted to use his momentum and invade the Union again, less than a year after the inconclusive Battle of Antietam (the Battle of Sharpsburg as viewed by the Confederacy) where Lee with only half the men as the Union forces had held McClellan and the Army of Northern Virginia to a tactical stalemate.

Popular memory seems to accept that Lee and his men were confused and without a plan from the start. Memory also contends that Meade’s leadership was poor, and it was the heroism and quick thinking of Union officers at Gettysburg that proved vital in leading the Army of the Potomac to victory. The main aims of the battle must also be analyzed. Many historians tend to believe that Little Round Top was the key to the Union line. Harman’s thesis, on the other hand, asserts that Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill, the salient of the line, was the pivotal safeguard at Gettysburg. Addressing this amended understanding of the Union line can transform the way one thinks of the battle and most importantly, Lee’s plan at Gettysburg, which Harman declares was exclusively aimed to target Cemetery Hill on all three days of the battle, July 1-3, 1863. Harman’s *Lee’s Real Plan At Gettysburg* makes it necessary to revisit the primary sources to find the truth at Gettysburg.

The Battle of Gettysburg has produced many memories for different reasons. Yet, five months after it, another key influence on popular memory occurred with Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. This memorial service would revolutionize the way one would think about

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the battle. In a mere two minutes, Lincoln’s speech, without mentioning the battle itself, put the nation’s struggle within a higher order of understanding. He declared Americans had been given a “new birth of freedom”, implying that the war and the battle had given the nation an opportunity to seize, in his words, a new lease on the Declaration of Independence. Even before people could digest the battle, Lincoln’s speech gave a new significance to it. Lincoln had blended an entirely new element into how one should think and remember Gettysburg, and its significance it had on the Civil War and the principles of the nation.

Troy Harman’s, Lee’s Real Plan At Gettysburg, and Tom Carhart’s, Lost Triumph: Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg-and Why It Failed, have asked how one of nation’s most famous battles is remembered.³ Harman argues that Lee’s target at Gettysburg was the salient of Cemetery and Culps’ Hills. Carhart asserts that Lee devised a three-pronged attack led by Jeb Stuart from the rear of the Union line on July 3rd. The two historians have reconfigured how we remember the nearly cemented narrative of the battle. In fact, Harman and Carhart’s memory shattering studies coming decades after the battle’s memory has been hardened, warrant a renewed investigation of not just the historiography of the battle, but this memory has affected the way the public has remembered the battle. Their work has provoked me to not only address an investigation of historiography, but specifically addressing the issue of how “we”, as in the laity, remember Gettysburg.

In this study, I am shifting the focus towards the popular, as opposed to professional, memory of Gettysburg. That memory is a reconciliationist version that focuses on the blood,

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³ Troy Harman’s Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg argues that Robert E. Lee had the same plan on all three days at Gettysburg, to attack the key position to the Union line, the salient made up of Cemetery and Culp’s Hill. Tom Carhart’s Lost Triumph: Lee’s Real Plan At Gettysburg- and Why It Failed argues that Lee had a three-pronged attack developed for the July 3rd that would use Jeb Stuart’s cavalry as the key component to break the flank of the Union’s line allowing for the frontal assault of Pickett and the rest of Longstreet’s Corps to break through the center of the Union Line.
valor, and comradery, instead of the causes and effects of the War and the role of Lee and his defeat at Gettysburg. Popular memory is heavily influenced by not only historiography, but also film, culture, and education. I will address the differences between historiography and popular memory, which compound the misunderstandings often associated with the battle. Based on this analysis, I will attempt to show the significant influence that memory has on history; and, on the Battle of Gettysburg in particular.

Memory serves as a valuable purpose in the study of history. It can be argued that it is the depository of the past, for without it, how would “history” persist? To quote Edmund Burke, “the so-called laws of history, which attempt to subordinate the future to some kind of historical determinism are but the combinations of the human mind”. Burke believed that history can be held at the will of our own minds and, thus, memory. The human mind can control “history” by the way we remember the past. Since our memory is individual, one’s memory of the past may not be the same as another’s memory of the past. In this case, we must address the differences in the memories and then investigate why there are differences. Is there a motive to manipulate the memory? Is it simply a different perspective? And can popular memory have forgotten and/or misunderstood an event? These are scenarios that occur when recording history.

While historiography exclusively affects academia’s memory, popular memory encompasses the laity. I find this is an important facet of historical memory that needs more attention because historiography is an isolated study of historical writing and a piece of the puzzle when it comes to popular memory. It is the job of the historian to be aware of these possible faults to get to the truth of the history, while also attempting to understand how and why memories changed. Although the historian is aware of this, the laity is not.

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In this section, I will use the scholarship of David Blight, Thomas Desjardin, and Gary Gallagher, to understand how Gettysburg is popularly remembered. This first chapter will formally show the importance of popular memory for writing history. It will help us understand the process of the Gettysburg’s representation in collective memory, while revealing the complexities of the relationship between history and memory.

While popular memory is not historiography, historiography plays a vital role in influencing how the people remember an event. The Battle of Gettysburg is no exception. In Chapter 2, explaining the historiography will give us a strong base as to how the current memory of the battle has been shaped into what it is today.

The fact that Gettysburg is one of the most written about events in American history makes it daunting to incorporate its historiography. For this study however, the historiography will not only be a key component of how the popular memory is shaped. These historians also have laid the foundation of What is remembered. Since my research is focusing on the Why and the How the popular memory came to be, the work historians have done has laid the foundation for the laities understanding. It will be appropriate to break down the historiography within four key eras: 1860s-1900, 1900-1950, 1950-1970, 1970-Present. As the dust settled on the battlefield and the soldier’s graves were still being dug, accounts from historians such as Horace Greeley, Abner Doubleday, Jacob Hoke, and John Batchelder (who would become the leading historian on the subject until his death 1894) were all publishing their interpretations of the battle.\(^5\) However, these historians lacked published primary material. As a result, their interpretations produced sketchy details of the battle, which were unfortunately compounded as the foundation of the memory of the battle.

The next era of historians (1900 through 1950) included Cecil Battine, Jesse Bowman Young, and Henry Burrage. As the 20th century memory of the battle began to settle in, World War I now had taken the attention of most Americans. Most importantly during this era, the Battle of Gettysburg celebrated its 40th and 50th anniversary reunions. Gaining massive popularity and exposure from veterans and the media brought a new resurgence and a renewed memory that was compounded by a second resurgence of the KKK and the rise of Jim Crow. This evolution was evident by a renewed romanticism, which seemingly wiped away the blame for losing the battle from General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia and was replaced with valor and courage for their fight in a losing effort.

The next era of historical work covered (the 1950s through the 1970s) encompassed the 100th anniversary of the battle and reinvigorated interest in Gettysburg. Historians such as Glenn Tucker, Bruce Catton, Edwin Coddington, and Shelby Foote produced some of the best written narratives of the battle and of the Civil War. These writings and accounts from this group of historians provided an opportunity for historians and the casual history buff alike, to become engaged with one of the most significant events the United States had ever experienced since its birth as a nation.

The final era, covering the 1970s through the present, has also produced a rich and bountiful historiography. As the history profession itself began to be thought of from a revisionist, social, and racial perspective, as well as being cognizant of the effects of memory, in this era we began now to see a new side of Gettysburg. As if a breath of fresh of air was breathed into the conflict, this group of historians, took a closer look at specific aspects of the battle, or using new perspectives and including soldier narratives and myths in their work. This group of
historians, such as James McPherson, Allen Guelzo, Harry Pfanz, and Noah Trudeau, all contributed to this new historiography.

In chapter 3, I will investigate how historiography is not the only influence on the Battle of Gettysburg’s popular memory. It has an especially strong and popular influence from film and culture, as argued by several historians such as Gary Gallagher, Bruce Chadwick, and Jim Cullen. Gallagher’s analyzes the film Ron Maxwell directed film, Gettysburg (1993), in his book, Causes Won, Lost, & Forgotten, in explaining the influence it had on the public’s perception of the battle. He also explores the audience’s reactions during the showing at the White House, of the film. Chadwick’s The Reel Civil War: Mythmaking in American Film, looks at the influence of film on popular memory. Chadwick’s study is essential in understanding the effects of popular memory and the creation and interpretation of myths. Cullen argues in (The Civil War in Popular Culture) that not only has popular culture and films about the war and the battle significantly influence popular memory, but he also argues that these influences are not always considered in historical analysis.⁶

In chapter 4 arguably the most important component to memory and collective memory will be addressed: Education. Education is often overlooked in its impact to the historiographical process. Education is what influences the memory of most of the populace. Collective memory is mostly impacted by the textbooks used in history curricula taught in schools. Unfortunately, they are not always good. My research will attempt to argue that public school textbooks have produced a Reconciliationist perspective when discussing the Battle of Gettysburg. Assmann, a German professor of English and literary studies, points out, “There is a close alliance between the nation-state and the history textbook. Education is an important factor in the building of the

nation-state because it was by learning their history that the heterogenous minds transform into a collective “homogenous” memory”.\textsuperscript{7} She continues: “In the realm of school curricula and textbooks, history automatically becomes applied history”.\textsuperscript{8} It is important to take a keen look at the textbooks in our nation’s school systems and analyze how the Battle of Gettysburg has been taught to the average student. This will not only provide a more accurate understanding of the historiography, but it can also help explain misunderstandings of the battle have permeated the collective memory.

Lastly, in chapter 5, I will put all the pieces together to argue how the popular memory of the battle is a reconciliationist memory. In this chapter I will analyze how the memories that have been established by the historiography, popular media and culture, and textbooks have instilled a reconciliationist memory. Revisiting Harman and Carhart’s theories, which question the current perception of Gettysburg, allows us to see how the popular ideas hide the true intentions of Lee, which if understood would tarnish his legacy. This point reveals a key part of a reconciliationist memory that attempts to appease confederate and union memory by focusing more on the courage and valor of the soldiers instead of focusing on the causes of the war and Battle. By the conclusion of this chapter, I will also address how the public remembers the Gettysburg Address is also placed in a reconciliationist category despite Lincoln’s goal of using the speech to put the crisis of the Nation into perspective and identify the opportunity it has presented. This analysis will lay the foundation that has allowed the reconciliationist narrative to prosper.

\textsuperscript{7} Assmann, Aledia. Pg. 64.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid. Pg. 65.
Chapter 1
The Significance of Memory

“Memory motivates historical activity; historical research utilizes memory”.9 - Charles Mauer

History is the study of the past. Memory, however, allows one to remember the past and therefore, provide history with the context it needs to form its story. When studying a historical event such as the Battle of Gettysburg memory is just as important as the history, if not more important. When we think of Gettysburg our understanding has been influenced from more than just history books. The laity remembers Gettysburg from education, popular culture, Reunions, society, and media. These other influences have allowed for myths, misinterpretations, exaggerations, and flat-out falsehoods to blossom into what people think to be the truth of what happened at Gettysburg in July of 1863. It is not just the academic history that provides the only source for the laity to remember the past.

“Memory complements history, history ‘corrects’ memory”.10 Charles Mauer presents us with not only the foundational understanding of this research, but also reminds us of the value of historical consciousness. It is important to recognize that Mauer uses the words “complement” and “correct” when referring to the relationship between memory and history. History needs memory to provide content and context. However, as Thomas Desjardin reveals, with events such as war, and with the Battle of Gettysburg in particular, memory is riddled with inaccuracies, myths, and misunderstandings.11 Therefore, while history is derived from memory, it is the job of the historian to analyze memory and to see how it can be influenced to reveal the truth.

10 Ibid., Pg. 63.
To understand the popular memory of an event, it is important to understand how memory works and the unique relationship it associates with history. Jorn Rusen reminds us that memory is not only the link between consciousness and the past, but that it also helps to explain how the past is perceived. Memory is the key in “restoring the link between the work of the historian and historical consciousness”. Jorn adds that “memory asserts its priority over history… because it ensures a consciousness of continuity between the past and present while also maintaining a dialectical connection between space experience and horizon of expectation”. Memory not only lays the foundation for history, but it also constantly influences how the past is perceived over time. Our memory is continually influenced by our present and our past, and therefore, historical consciousness will always be fluid.

Understanding memory’s influence is important as we attempt to comprehend popular views of the Battle of Gettysburg. The memory of the laity is naturally influenced by memories from others, whether those memories are presented through historical scholarship, media, film, or education. Aledia Assmann points out, “the idea of the collective consciousness is a working rather than as a substantive concept”. “Collective memory is not remembered, it’s memorized”. Collective memory is exactly that, a collection of memories ingrained into the historical consciousness of people over a period.

Because of the natural fallacies of memory, we may never know the exact truth of what occurred in July 1863, in south central Pennsylvania. However, history has presented us with a narrative derived from the memories of those fateful days. History will provide “what” we will

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13 Ibid., Pg. 14.
14 Ibid., Pg. 11.
15 Assmann, Aledia. Pg. 52.
remember. However, analyzing memory will help us understand the “why” and “how” we remember history and the way we still do today. Just as historiography is the historian’s fluid and ever-changing perceptions of history, so is popular memory. Just like historiography, memory contains biases, different perspectives and viewpoints, and forgetfulness. Jorn reminds us that what cannot be told cannot be remembered. One of the first things many veterans of war wanted to do was forget, and veterans of Gettysburg were no different.\textsuperscript{16} However, the story of this war was eventually told. After decades of suppressed and forgotten events they were resurrected by how these veterans wanted, the past to be remembered. Jorn takes this concept a step further by addressing the significance of forgetting. He shares that there is passive forgetting and active forgetting. The former, a way of strategically avoiding, or as he puts it, “a guided obscurity to not know”. The latter he described as actively omitting and neglecting memories that do not wish to be remembered.\textsuperscript{17} It is the job of the historian to recognize and analyze the contextual evidence to reveal these possible fallacies.

Historiography and popular memory can easily be mistaken for each other. Pierre Nora, a French historian with a focus on memory and identity studies, tells us that, “History and memory are opposite, not synonymous”.\textsuperscript{18} Popular memory is influenced by historiography, but popular memory contains many other influences. Historiography “compares sources, weighs arguments and engages in an open-ended discourse of experts, who continuously correct each other to come closer to the truth”.\textsuperscript{19} Popular memory persists through influences and interpretations without the luxury of experts continually correcting it. The experts certainly influence popular memory and provide a foundation of information; however, popular memory is the collective ideology of the

\textsuperscript{16} Rusen, Jorn. Pg. 173.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., Pg. 16.
\textsuperscript{18} Assmann, Aledia. Pg. 60
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., Pg. 53.
laity that takes from inaccurate sources, media, stories, and perceptions. To appreciate and understand popular memory we must look to its influences and question the *How* and the *Why* of *What* is remembered. Popular memory derives from both semantic memories, learned knowledge, episodic memory, and personal experience, which includes both communicated and exchanged experiences. Susan Sontag claims that popular memory is “not remembered, but rather specified by groups who choose what they value and what is important to them”. Historiography does not have that luxury to pick and choose, yet memory is what controls the popular consciousness.

Stuart McConnel believes that, “Historiography tends to acknowledge only the arguments made by professional historians in books, consigning the rest to the realm of myth and popular culture”. For professionals, this understanding can make it easy to focus on the historiography when it comes to the truth. However, when focusing on memory, the truth is not the only thing that is remembered, and a historian must not lose sight of this. As McConnel reminds us, “more people have seen a single fictional Civil War film than have read the works of all professional Civil War historians combined”. It is the common laity who control most of the popular memory. It is therefore paramount to recognize how the public remembers, acknowledging that despite historical accuracies and truths, the popular memory will be different from historiography.

The period of the Civil War and especially the Battle of Gettysburg are some of the most sought-after events in American history. The Battle of Gettysburg has provided popular memory with an abundance of material. In addition, historians have written about the Civil War more

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20 Ibid., Pg. 52.
22 Ibid., Pg. 259.
than any other American event. While the history of the war has been the focus of historians for the past century, it is not until recently that popular memory has been addressed. David Blight, Gary Gallagher, and Thomas Desjardin are recognized as the pioneers of the study of Civil War and popular memory, which focuses on how the American people remember our nation’s most storied event.

David Blight introduced the academic community with *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* in 2001. This landmark study would become one of the first and still best sources of the memory of the Civil War. Two others written about the memory of the Civil War, *Beyond the Battlefield: Race, Memory, and the American Civil War*, written in 2002, and *American Oracle: The Civil War in the Civil Rights Era*, written in 2011, have also provided a solid foundation.

Blight focuses on the impact that the 50th reunion of the Battle of Gettysburg had on how Americans remember not only the battle but the war itself. In one account, he shares the sentiments of a Confederate soldier, James Kemper, wounded at Gettysburg, to show how recollection was difficult for soldiers. However, once stimulated their memory flowed “like it was the present”. “You ask me what I recollect of Gettysburg, the request is hard to meet… it is like getting out of my existence to go back to Gettysburg”. This alludes to the dilemma that memory and history are plagued with regarding Gettysburg. The soldier’s inability to recollect the battle, whether clearly or not at all, did not stop them from producing narratives for the sake of history. Blight explains how a Union Colonel, William Brooke-Rawl, concerned that Confederates were dominating debates over how the war was to be remembered, wrote, “We

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begin to distrust the memory of those days, and almost question the general belief that the battle of Gettysburg was a victory for the union arms”.24 This new fight is now on how the war would be remembered and influence our history. Soldiers, decades after the conflict, would begin to flood newspapers and journals in hopes to share their heroism and memories.

Beyond academic studies, and articles in history journals, Blight also found a strong influence of how the Civil War was remembered through the Blue-Gray reunions, most importantly the 50th anniversary reunion of Gettysburg. Beyond the Battlefield, he argues, “If social memory on the broadest scale is best forged and transmitted by performed ritual commemorations as many anthropologists have argued, then the memory of the Civil War as it was viewed in American culture in the early 20th century never saw a more fully orchestrated, nor more highly organized expression than in Gettysburg at the battle’s semi-centennial”.25 The anniversary has been best remembered notably for what President Woodrow Wilson, the first southern born president elected to the White House since the Civil War, said and what he did not say. Wilson did not speak upon the reasons for the Civil War even what it was fought for. No mention of slavery, nor any of its abolition or the War’s fight for freedom. What he did say, only 50 years after the final day of the battle of Gettysburg in 1863, was this, “How wholesome and healing the peace has been! We have found one another again as brothers and comrades, in arms, enemies no longer, generous friends rather, our battles long past the quarrel forgotten-except that we shall not forget the splendid valor, the manly devotion of the men then arrayed against one another, now grasping hands and smiling into each other’s eyes”.26 What is most intriguing about the reunion was not only its impact on memory, but how the memory provided would be

24 Ibid., Pg. 167.
26 Blight, David. Pg. 11.
remembered. Blight explains that the reunion’s omission of what happened at the battle of Gettysburg and its focus on reconciliation, bravery and honor that was present on both sides of the battlefield is what is remembered in popular memory.


Gallagher addresses how academic and lay interests of the Civil War are different, which creates a divide in how it is remembered. Criticizing both parties for their failures to meet each other in the middle, he insists that “popular and academic worlds remain largely insulated from each other. Lay readers typically avoid academic studies that appeal to a limited professional audience, while academics often deplore the kind of military narratives and biographies that achieve a commercial success and garner reviews”.27 Gallagher stresses that memory, despite its myth filled inaccuracies, will “often trump reality because people act on what they perceive to be the truth, however flawed that perception”.28 For example, he addresses that a strong focus of the memory of the Battle of Gettysburg is that it was the turning point of the war. However, he reveals that this memory was not believed until after the war.

Gallagher provides us with a fresh but critical understanding that the memory of Gettysburg is packed with myths and exaggerations that have “become entrenched in the popular imagination as the war’s greatest turning point, the bloodiest battle, the last invasion, and an

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28 Ibid., Pg. 20.
opportunity for Lincoln to tribute to the Union dead”. In reality, Gettysburg was viewed as a missed opportunity by the Union leadership and that Vicksburg was more important at the time. Gettysburg was not viewed as the “last invasion” or the “turning point” until after the war because the war continued to rage for another two years after Gettysburg and Lee aspired to invade again, he just never had the opportunity. However, it was these narratives that developed after the war which allowed for the legend of Gettysburg to grow in public memory. As for Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, it was overshadowed by the keynote speaker, Edward Everett, the nation’s most renowned orator at the time who gave a two-hour speech that wove a description of battle into a Greek history-like narration. Yet, despite these claims this is how the Battle of Gettysburg is remembered. Gallagher reminds us how history and memory can be easily conflated from his example of the glorification of Little Round Top influenced by the very soldiers who fought it decades afterwards. This is a reminder that no matter how hard one attempts to get to the truth, about the Battle of Gettysburg, film, photos, articles, society and even the very individuals that were present will create a memory that is not true.

Gallagher, Thomas Desjardin was very critical to what is remembered and how soldiers and early historians have influenced a narrative of the Battle of Gettysburg that is not accurate. Desjardin’s book, *These Honored Dead: How the Story of Gettysburg Shaped American Memory* (2003), begins by asserting “the truth about Gettysburg is buried beneath layer upon layer of flawed human memory and our attempts to fashion our past into something that makes our present a little easier to live in”. Desjardin highlights how flawed human memory has created what we want to remember, which includes an enormous amount of ideas, causes and principles

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29 Gallagher, Gary. Pg. 21.
that have produced “hyperbolic contradictions”.\textsuperscript{31} The romanticism of Little Round Top, the idolization of General Robert E. Lee, and the emergence of the Lost Cause have all influenced popular memory and have allowed these myths and inaccuracies to endure.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., Pg. 6 and 7.
Chapter 2
The Historiography of the Battle of Gettysburg

Historiography has provided the core understanding that media, popular culture, and education from which derive their information. Generally, the story of the battle has remained unchanged since its inception. However, each new historian has provided their own narrative with unique interpretations and anecdotes. How did the Battle begin? Was Little Round Top the key position of the Union line? Was there more to Lee’s Plan on July 3rd? How much blame is there to be placed on General Robert E. Lee for the defeat at Gettysburg? These are the questions historians have tended to ask.

Every historian that I have analyzed has provided answers that have influenced how we have remembered and viewed Gettysburg. Some of them focus on certain questions while others promote myths that others debunk. Romanticism is the key theme of the historiography becoming a stronger focus in each passing era as to supplement a lack of primary sources and draws attention away from the failures of the Confederate forces. To begin this chapter, an understanding of each historiographical era’s influence and context will precede the comparative analysis of the debated questions. Having this understanding will help create a better contextual analysis of the debated questions from the historiography of the Battle of Gettysburg.

From the conclusion of the battle until the turn of the century, Gettysburg was a popular topic for historians. However, with not many published primary documents available, early published historians provided few citations or source materials at all. Most information on the battle was gathered from official war reports that came from Union commanding officers. Naturally, they focused on the Union perspective. Most historians were Northerners and confederate reports from the battle were either hard to obtain or never even published. It was not until the mid to late 1880s that Confederate veterans or former citizens were finally comfortable
or willing to think of the Civil War, let alone write on it. Nonetheless, they hoped that their story would be recorded as a part of the history of the Battle, which is why many of them sought out historians such as Johnathan Bachelder, the leading Gettysburg historian of the era. This has led many historians to be skeptical of these reports believing many have been embellished or purposely written in a way that the writer wished they would have happened.\(^{32}\) By the end of this era, historians had already established several core beliefs that will be debated including the idea that Gettysburg was the turning point of the war, the “High Water Mark of the Rebellion” (coined by Johnathan Bachelder), Little Round Top was the “Key” to the Union line and that Pickett’s Charge was the “culmination of the of the supreme crisis in our nation’s history”.\(^{33}\)

The following era in the historiography, ranging from 1900-1950, produced important distinctions that have helped evolve the understanding of Gettysburg. Historians began to utilize more source materials other than Official War Reports and to incorporate Confederate perspectives and source materials in their research. Up until this point, Confederate source materials were still hard to find. However, the emergence of Blue and Grey reunions and the promotion of reconciliation brought new perspectives from Confederate veterans eager to share their side of the story. Historians were better equipped to address and analyze controversies formerly only debated by veterans. While the core ideas that were established in the previous era remained relatively unchanged, this era established an emphasis towards analyzing and questioning what truly happened and why it happened. These controversies included but are not limited to Ewell’s decision not to attack up Cemetery Hill on July 1, Meade’s orders concerning marches toward Pipe Creek and Gettysburg on July 1, Meade’s retreat plan on July 2, The


Meade-Sickles controversy, Longstreet’s orders on July 2, and the Council of War by Union officers on July 2.

The next era, ranging from 1950-1970, despite its narrow time frame, includes some of the most influential work on Gettysburg. Historians had nearly one hundred years of sources, debates, and understanding to work with. They questioned the idea of the Battle’s inevitability and the notion that the significance of battle was not recognized immediately after it concluded. The most important aspect of this historical era, though, is that historians made a concerted effort to appeal to a popular audience. Bruce Catton, Shelby Foote, Glenn Tucker, and Edwin Coddington paved a path for future historians to develop work that non specialist could understand and enjoy. Catton and Foote continued a focus of romanticizing the valor and courage of soldiers from both sides that fought at Gettysburg while including invigorating analysis that explain the controversies, debates, and myths that the Battle has produced.

The final era in the historiography for the Battle of Gettysburg, ranging from the 1970 to the present, is the most important regarding the effects on the popular memory because it is the most recent and fresh in the mind. Just as the previous era was privileged with over one hundred years of sources and analysis to work with, this era continues to revel from the same benefit. Noah Trudeau, author of the National Bestseller, *Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage*, argues that since Coddington’s The *Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command* the study of the battle has shifted towards more of a “micro-specialist”\(^3\). This shift comes from deeper investigation, research, and discovery of thousands of memoirs, journals, and other primary source materials by historians who seek a better understanding of the smaller pictures that make up the grand story of Gettysburg. These mini histories include moments such as the Bloody Angle, forgotten cavalry

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engagements of the Campaign, action on Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill, and the gallantry performed in the Valley of Death below Little Round Top. Mini histories also brought a better understanding of the role’s significant regiments, divisions, and corps played such as the 20th Maine, the 1st Minnesota, Pickett’s Virginians, and the Iron Brigade. The shift towards micro-specialist study helped to affirm or debunk hardened myths and misunderstandings such as the idea that both sides came together to chat and joke while retrieving water on the night of July 2nd at Spangler’s Spring; the problem of why Longstreet’s attack was late on July 2nd, and revealing that Meade conducted himself as cautious instead of rash at Gettysburg. Most importantly, the historians began to address what has influenced the popular memory of the Battle of Gettysburg and what exactly Gettysburg is remembered for.

1865-1900: How did the battle begin?

Throughout the historiography of the Battle of Gettysburg, historians have grappled with describing and understanding how the Battle of Gettysburg truly began. Whether the battle was an accident or inevitable and the validity of the myth that Gettysburg became the battlegrounds because Heth’s division ran into Buford’s cavalry in their attempts to find shoes at Gettysburg are the primary debates of the question of how the Battle began. General Lee having his men spread across central Pennsylvania groping for the Union Army without the aid of his cavalry, learned as early as the 28th of June that the Army of the Potomac had crossed into Maryland. This news forced Lee to consolidate his army towards Cashtown or Gettysburg, the closest point that his forces could gather in the shortest period. The first era of historiography sets a brief but clear foundation of how the battle began. Horace Greely, a prolific newspaper editor of the mid-19th century, described in his book *The American Conflict* (1866), that John Buford’s Union cavalry, “moved directly on Gettysburg where he encountered the van of the Rebel Army led by
General Heth”.\(^{35}\) Jacob Hoke provides more details that explain that Heth was given instructions to report immediately if he found a force at Gettysburg and not to force an engagement. Hoke further explained that Heth ended up forming his line upon finding Buford’s cavalry without knowing the Union 1\(^{st}\) Corp infantry was nearby.\(^{36}\)

1900-1950: How did the battle begin?

The following era produced more details on how this encounter occurred. *The Crisis of The Confederacy History* written in 1905 by Captain 15\(^{th}\) The King’s Hussars, Cecil Battine reveals why Heth’s division was sent into Buford’s men without the rest of the army. Battine argues that Lee saw Gettysburg as an important rallying point, so he had Hill and Ewell sent to take the town. Heth’s division, part of Hill’s Corps was ordered to seize shoes at Gettysburg that Early had missed when he passed through on his way to York four days earlier.\(^{37}\) Jesse Bowman Young, claimed that General Trimble claimed that Lee’s plan “was to fall on the Union advance whenever, wherever he encountered it and press it against the main body before Meade could reach the field”.\(^{38}\) If Hill and Heth were aware of this plan, it explains why Heth would have felt it necessary to risk an engagement despite orders not to.

1950-1970: How did the battle begin?

By 1950-1970, more information and details contributed to the understanding of how the battle began, shifting a focus towards its inevitability while also providing context about the

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\(^{36}\) Hoke, Jacob. Pg. 257.


belief that Heth went to Gettysburg in search of shoes. Bruce Catton, the premier Civil War historian of his time, described in his Pulitzer Prize winning book, *This Hallowed Ground*, that Gettysburg was an act of fate, coming inevitably. Nearly 20 years later, he would expand on this inevitability in *The Final Fury* when he explained that Gettysburg was brought by a combination of forces that included geography, military logic, and human miscalculation. “The Battle’s fate grew out of what the war had been the past two years”.

In 1968, Edwin Coddington provided a deeper explanation in declaring the battle inevitable can only be stated in hindsight. However, he admits, “Lee and Meade presumed by June 30th it was possible they would meet in the vicinity of Gettysburg”. Coddington would further explains that there was no assurance of this presumption because each commander was feeling his way because neither knew exactly where the other was. In 1963, Shelby Foote provided more details towards how the battle began. He wrote that Ewell was ordered to avoid general engagement if encountering a large force only to continue to explain that Heth, a member of Hill’s corps, sent a brigade to Gettysburg in search of a shoe supply on June 30th. Upon this initial search, J. Johnston Pettigrew’s brigade warned Heth that he found Union cavalry guarding the town. However, Foote explains how Heth wanting the shoes and believing it was only a cavalry guard went after the shoes the next morning anyway. Edwin Coddington, on the other hand, argued in 1968, that Heth should have known that this mission for shoes was a waste since Early’s men had wiped Gettysburg clean four days earlier. However, Heth and Hill disregarded Pettigrew’s warnings and were determined to retrieve the shoes at Gettysburg on July 1st.

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42 Coddington, Edwin, B. Pg. 263 and 264
1970-Present: How did the battle begin?

In the current era, (1970 to the present) the historiography continues to provide more details and explanation. In 1988, in his Pulitzer Prize winning book *Battle Cry of Freedom*, James McPherson contends that shoes are what drew Hill’s forces towards Gettysburg. He adds, however, that Buford was there waiting for him knowing that he would arrive the morning of July 1st. The latter statement by McPherson defends the idea of the inevitability of the battle, which was further compounded by Alan Guelzo in 2013. Guelzo, professor at Gettysburg College, thinks that Lee announced to his staff on June 29th, “We will not move on Harrisburg as expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade is after”. He contends that Gettysburg was a target, and disputes the belief that Lee had a better idea of Meade’s whereabouts than previously understood. However, Noah Trudeau, writing in 2003, strongly disagreed with the inevitability of the battle. Aligning more towards Coddington’s interpretation, he stated that nowhere was it “written in stone that the two sides would fight at Gettysburg, nor was the slow escalation inevitable once the combat began”. He claimed that July 1st was a battle between brigades and regiments, not armies, insisting that the actions on the first day occurred because no one at the field was in position to see the bigger picture and end the engagement.

While there were certainly new details, the historiography’s core understanding remains consistent regarding how the battle began. Each era addressed the ideas of the Battle’s inevitability and the mission for shoes by contending with the former narrative or by providing new details that help us better understand the circumstances of how the battle began. Each contribution is important because it provides a new perspective that may impact how the public

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45 Trudeau, Noah Andre. Pg. 271.
remembers the battle. However, when the historiography remains consistent, whether it is factual or not, it has more importance on the popular memory.

1865-1900: Was Little Round Top the key position of the Union line?

The action at Little Round Top on July 2, has survived in a romanticized lore throughout the popular memory. However, what plagues the memory is how the historiography has wavered on the importance of the Hill itself. The romantic narrative that has been perpetuated by the few survivors of this encounter at Little Round Top has swayed public memory in to believing the hill was more important than it really was. The earliest era of the historiography establishes Little Round Top as a significant point on the Union line. Greely states that General Meade, “regarded the hill as vital to the maintenance of our position”. The hill became endangered when General Daniel Sickles moved his 3rd Corps out towards the Peach Orchard and Meade ordered General George Sykes to save it.46 However, while Hoke and Doubleday would describe Little Round Top as the key to the Union line, Hoke, went as far as to say that the “destiny of the government depended on its occupation”47, while Greely insisted that Cemetery Hill was the key to the Union position.48 Hoke’s interpretation is self-contradictory, though. He gives considerable importance to Little Round Top and its defense by Vincent Strong and Joshua Chamberlain, believing that if it were taken, it would have reduced the rest of the Union line as untenable.49 If Rebel forces were to overrun the Little Round Top, they could have placed artillery directed towards Cemetery Hill. However, this has been heavily debated in the historiography. Despite Hoke’s claims, one of his footnotes shows that Confederate soldiers and commanders did not view Little

46 Greely, Horace. Pg. 302.
47 Hoke, Jacob. Pg. 351.
49 Hoke, Jacob. Pg. 328-329.
Round Top as a tactical advantage for their position. But then almost in the same breath says that Confederates believed that Little Round Top was the key to the Union line.  

1900-1950: Was Little Round Top the key position of the Union line?  

The next era would continue to repeat the significance while adding to wrinkles to the romanticized lore of heroics. By the early 20th century, General Gouverneur Warren began to emerge as a hero at Little Round Top, thanks to his survival that gave him the ability to tell the story how he pleased. Battine, Burrage and Young all note that Warren was first to recognize that Little Round Top was in grave danger and immediately called for reinforcements. Each historian also claimed Warren, suspecting enemy forces hiding behind the tree line behind Devil Den to the left of Little Round Top, ordered artillery shells fired in that direction. Warren was able to assure his discovery when the shells revealed flashes of light coming from the gun barrels and bayonets of Rebel soldiers that were indeed hiding in the woods. However, Young, argued that Hoke’s footnote admitted that Lee’s plan was never to assail Little Round Top. Lee’s focus was to attack Cemetery Hill, what he believed to be the strongest part of the line. Battine would further discredit the significance of Little Round Top by admitting the importance of the Confederate attack on Little Round Top was exaggerated. He insisted that Law’s brigade would have done nothing with the Hill and therefore, Warren’s actions should not be praiseworthy.  

1950-1970: Was Little Round Top the key position of the Union line?  

By the third era of the historiography, the romanticization of Little Round Top highlighting the heroics of Warren, Strong, Chamberlain and Patrick O’Rourke were getting stronger. Catton stressed the importance of Little Round Top by stating that the Union  

50 Ibid. Pg. 329 and Pg. 344.  
52 Young, Jesse Bowman. Pg. 246.  
53 Battine, Cecil. Pg. 229.
reinforcement effort saved the day. Both Foote and Tucker mentioned Warren spotting the enemy line in the woods and ordering shells in that direction that revealed flashes of light off their guns. Tucker, justifying the importance of Little Round Top, believed that artillery could have been placed and aimed at the Union line. Each historian focused on the roles of Vincent, Chamberlain, and Warren. However each credited a different hero of the day; Tucker thought that Longstreet, after the war, claimed that Vincent’s heroics at Little Round Top saved the Hill and the Federal Army. Foote acknowledged that Warren was the hero of the day for recognizing the hill was in danger and for quickly gathering reinforcements, and Coddington thought while Warren has been accorded the glory for his role at Little Round Top, General Sykes deserved more credited for getting his Corps in position to save Sickles’ Third Corps and Little Round Top.

1970-Present: Was Little Round Top the key position of the Union line?

The latest era continues to cement the established romanticized narrative while continuing the debate. Harry Pfanz, former Chief historian of the National Park Services, and Guelzo, refer to Warren’s discovery of the hidden rebel line in the woods. However, each slightly changes the narrative. Guelzo says that instead of artillery shells producing the glint of light, it was just the sun. Pfanz claims that the rebel position was already acknowledged, and that Warren was not the first to discover it. Pfanz and Trudeau both state that Warren had identified Little Round top as the “key to the whole Union position” upon being ordered to attend to the Hill by General Meade when Sickles abandoned it. Guelzo goes further by claiming that the

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54 Catton, Bruce. Pg. 253.
55 Foote, Shelby. Pg. 137. Tucker, Glenn Pg. 258.
56 Tucker, Glenn. Pg. 248.
“battle for Little Round Top, especially after 1890, assumed a stature almost equal to the entire balance of the battle”. 59 This bold statement certainly attests to the considerable attention on the romanticization of the action that occurred on the Hill. Trudeau and Guelzo give considerable attention to the roles played by Joshua Chamberlain and the 20th Maine infantry. Guelzo provides peculiar attention to the fact that both Warren and Chamberlain have been revered as the heroes of Little Round Top while also being the two main commanders of the Hill that survived the battle and lived longest, Warren dying in 1882 and Chamberlain dying in 1913. 60

Again, while many new perspectives and details are provided throughout the historiography. The main concepts, while questioned, continue to be addressed as focal points in the narrative. Romanticism is a key theme that has been produced with a stronger focus in each passing era. It has a significant effect in drawing attention towards a Reconciliationist popular memory that puts more attention on the valor and heroism of both sides while the true significance of the battle and the actions on the field fade. Just as this theme has plagued the actions at Little Round Top it has even more so on the final day of the battle. A singular division, in an assault by two of Lee’s Corps has become immortalized, aiding to the popular memory’s ignorance of the rest of Lee’s plan.

Pickett’s Charge has remained as the most revered and memorable moment of the Battle of Gettysburg in public memory. However, the historiography has struggled to convey a consistent narrative of it. The focus has been on Pickett’s dismal frontal charge. However, to convey that this assault was the sole focus and significance of Lee’s plan on July 3rd is to misunderstand the reality of the situation.

1865-1900: Was there more to General Lee’s plan on July 3rd?

59 Guelzo, Allen. Pg. 274.
60 Ibid. Pg. 275.
The first era produces key foundational themes that have persisted throughout the
historiography. Arguably the most significant contribution of the entire historiography, let alone
this era, comes from Johnathan Bachelder who coined the term, the “high water mark” to refer to
the extent of the Rebel charge through the Union line that targeted the “Copse of Trees” (which
he also coined).\textsuperscript{61} Bachelder has defined how popular memory remembers Gettysburg as the
furthest physical marker the Confederacy would reach in the North and also the closest it came to
ending the war. Hoke and Doubleday reveal there was more to Lee’s plan on July 3\textsuperscript{rd}. However,
Bachelder’s contribution would remain an overpowering force in the memory of the day. Hoke
states that Lee’s attack was supposed to begin in the morning, however, Johnson’s forces being
pushed off Culp’s Hill by the Union 12 Corps at daylight spurred the second prong of Lee’s plan.
Hoke admitted that Lee’s 3\textsuperscript{rd} prong, that included a cavalry charge in the rear of the Union line,
could have changed the entire outcome of the battle if Stuart and his forces were not driven from
the field. Hoke found it hard to believe that sending just two divisions in a frontal assault was
Lee’s only plan to ensure victory.\textsuperscript{62} Doubleday thought that Lee’s original plan consisted of a
simultaneous attack between Johnson’s forces on the Union right and Pickett’s forces on the
Union center. However, when Johnson’s men were removed from their positions on the Hill
early in the morning, he only had Pickett’s assault.\textsuperscript{63} Doubleday provided an interesting insight,
when he admitted that, “the trouble with a center attack was not with reaching it but holding it”
was the real problem “since the union horseshoe-line was easy to reinforce.\textsuperscript{64} This point is
interesting because it clearly proves that such a small force could not have been the all that was


\textsuperscript{62} Hoke, Jacob. Pg. 412.

\textsuperscript{63} Doubleday, Abner. Pg. 188.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid. Pg. 199.
expected to achieve victory. Yet, it was not all that was expected or planned. Doubleday claimed that upon Johnson’s failure on Culp’s Hill, Lee sent Stuart and his cavalry to the Union rear to accomplish what Johnson could not. However, Doubleday explains that in Stuart’s reports, he was simply ordered to guard against a retreat if Pickett was successful.  

1900-1950: Was there more to General Lee’s plan on July 3rd?

The following era helped to provide more details to what happened on July 3rd. However, the details prove there was more to Lee’s plan. Battine explained that Lee wanted to pass around the Union right flank and to attack the rear if successful. Lee intended to hurl his cavalry among the retreating troops to turn a defeat into a rout. However, Battine claims that Lee was not himself at Gettysburg and that his orders to his commanders were not clear on the third. Therefore, the center assault effort he envisioned as the main force of his plan was poorly executed. Burrage explains how Lee planned to rely on Pickett’s division with Stuart’s cavalry to attack the rear of the Union line simultaneously. While each historian has slightly different interpretations of Lee’s plan they both addressed the Pickett’s target was the “clump of trees” while Battine would add that Pickett’s charge was the “most thrilling incident of the war and that it signaled the “high water mark” and turned the tide of the war. Young on the other hand argued that, “although the frontal charge has been glorified by history… it by no means stands alone as an example of self-sacrificing heroism”.

1950-1970: Was there more to General Lee’s plan on July 3rd?

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66 Battine, Cecil. Pg. 258 and 250.
67 Burrage, Henry. Pg. 50.
68 Burrage, Henry. Pg. 54. Battine, Cecil. Pg. 278.
69 Young, Jesse Bowman. Pg. 302.
The following era continues by glorifying the narrative of Pickett’s charge, much to the dismay of Young. However, it also contributes some key details that provide new perspectives. For one, Coddington, while still contributing to the term, admits that the “clump of trees” was never used in sources as the target by Lee. Foote, Catton, and Coddington all mention an initial three-pronged plan by Lee that included Johnson on the right, Pickett in center and Stuart’s cavalry in the rear. Catton gave considerable attention to Stuart’s cavalry charge compared to the other historians of this era. He explained how Stuarts cavalry was intended to break through the Union rear in hopes to route the infantry when Pickett’s forces broke through. Foote and Coddington both expressed how Lee’s morning attack, so essential to his plan, was foiled, yet he was determined to continue with a coordinated assault with just Pickett targeting the center with Stuart in the rear. Tucker on the other hand took a much different view of the actions of July 3rd. He was very critical of how July 3rd has been revered throughout history. He states that Lee did not have his plan ready until mid-morning, which is why the rest of his forces were not ready by the time Johnson was pushed off Culp’s Hill. He also criticizes how Pettigrew and Trimble’s divisions of North Carolinians, Tennesseans, and Alabamians are forgotten in the history over Pickett and his Virginians even despite his failure, he was chosen to be the famed identity of the assault.

1970-Present: Was there more to General Lee’s plan on July 3rd?

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70 Coddington, Edwin. Pg. 463.
74 Tucker, Glenn. Pg. viii and 379.
The final era remains consistent with the former era’s narratives but also continues to provide new details that allow for different perspectives. Trudeau and Guelzo claim that Ewell was ordered to assail the Federal right in morning, Guelzo adds that Ewell was notified of this order as early as July 2nd with Longstreet to attack the front simultaneously. However, Pickett’s division of Longstreet’s Corps did not arrive at Gettysburg until 7:00am. Guelzo explains that Lee blamed Longstreet for not completing his disposition as early as expected. Trudeau argues that Stuart was to use his cavalry as a skirmish line as a screen to drive a wedge between the infantry on Cemetery Hill and Culp’s Hill. Guelzo agrees that Stuart’s orders were to screen the rear but insists that the frontal infantry charge was to be the show on the third. McPherson however focuses primarily on Pickett’s Charge, believing that it, “represented the Confederate war effort in a microcosm. It contained matchless valor, apparent initial success and ultimate disaster”.

Pickett’s Charge, while its effectiveness was questioned, remained the focal point throughout the narrative of July 3rd in the historiography of the battle. Every historian mentions it and has something to say about it. It remained consistent throughout the historiography that there certainly was more to Lee’s plan on July 3rd other than Pickett’s charge. Every historian mentions the intention of building upon Johnson’s foothold at Culp’s Hill as well as coordinating a rear objective with Stuart’s cavalry. Yet the prime focus of the narrative is always directed towards a weak and uncoordinated assault that was not possible to succeed without coordinated help. However, despite the understood implications of the next day’s attack Lee was not more

76 Ibid. Pg. 473 Ibid. Pg. 376.
77 McPherson, James. Pg. 662.
prepared to execute his plans that were so vital to be successful. Yet still with this understanding, blame, fallen away from Lee and has been directed towards other Confederate Commanders.

Who is to blame for the outcome at Gettysburg? Some historians have defended General Robert E. Lee figuratively and literally to the grave for his responsibilities and accountabilities at Gettysburg. Ironically however, for what little blame he has been owed, it seemingly has increased his legendary admiration from people past and present.

**1865-1900: How much is General Robert E. Lee to be blamed for the defeat at Gettysburg?**

From the very beginning of the historiography shifted the blame from Lee by putting significant focus on Meade’s failure to return the attack and rout Lee before he was able to escape into Confederate territory. Doubleday was very critical of Meade’s performance at Gettysburg especially that fact that he did not order a counterattack after Pickett was repulsed. He was angry when Meade did not promote him to take over the First Corps after Reynold’s untimely death, despite how well he had commanded the First Corps on the first day the battle. Hoke and Greely both said that immediately after the battle and especially after the war General Longstreet was an easy target to blame for the defeat at Gettysburg since he outspokenly disagreed with nearly every plan Lee ordered during the Battle. With each passing era, the debate as to who is to take the most blame and criticism for the Battle raged on.

**1900-1950: How much is General Robert E. Lee to be blamed for the defeat at Gettysburg?**

The next era began with strict criticism towards Lee but eventually the blame faded more into excuses throughout the analysis. However, it did not come without blame towards Longstreet and other Confederate commanders. For example, Battine declared that Gettysburg was the worst battle of Lee’s career. “His blame and failures are attributed to accidents and the

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mistakes of his subordinates”. Battine put heavy blame on Longstreet for his conduct on July 2\textsuperscript{nd} and July 3\textsuperscript{rd}. Specifically, he criticized him for not allowing Hood to go around the Union left upon Hood’s incessant request on July 2\textsuperscript{nd}.\textsuperscript{80} However, one cannot blame Longstreet for this decision because to allow Hood to take this action would be a direct disobedience of Lee’s orders because Lee had made the very same request to Lee early in the day. This criticism is another reason why history was so quick to shift away from Lee. Burrage was harder on Lee. He stated that, “Lee was the one who gave and executed the orders. Lee had the power to make up for the deficiency of his subordinates” he just chose not to. Burrage would add that while Longstreet received significant blame in the recent years, the criticism of him by Confederate Officers became even stronger after Lee had passed away in 1870.\textsuperscript{81}

1950-1970: How much is General Robert E. Lee to be blamed for the defeat at Gettysburg?

In the following era Catton, Foote, Tucker, and Coddington all blamed the Confederate defeat on Lee’s subordinate officers. Catton placed significant blame on Stuart’s absence that forced Lee to fight at Gettysburg because he was unable to maneuver his forces while also declaring Lee was poorly served by Longstreet, “in the greatest battle”. In a later interpretation, Catton said that the Confederate failure could be attributed to fighting an offensive battle, being on foreign soil, going up against high ground and fighting against a larger force.\textsuperscript{82} Adding to Catton’s excuses, Foote claims that poor circumstances and intelligence contributed to the failure at Gettysburg. The lack of Stonewall Jackson became a popular “what if?” for many historians throughout the historiography which Foote touches upon. Many historians, Foote alike, believe that if Jackson had been at Gettysburg, leading his former Corps that Longstreet took over, he

\textsuperscript{80} Battine, Cecil. Pg. 177.
\textsuperscript{81} Burrage, Henry. Pg. 64.
\textsuperscript{82} Catton, Bruce. \textit{The Civil War}. Pg. 145 and 146. \textit{Gettysburg: The Final Fury}. Pg. 108.
would have obeyed Lee’s orders and ensured a victory. However, this cannot be known. It is pure conjecture.

Tucker is firm in placing blame on Lee. However, it is important to realize that despite clear evidence that Lee has admitted the blame to be placed on himself by his famed quote, “It is all my fault” as he welcomed his repulsed forces back to Seminary Ridge on July 3rd, this confession has only added to the “noble greatness” that he is remembered for. Lastly, Coddington while agreeing with Catton and Foote that subordinate officers served Lee poorly at Gettysburg, added a very interesting point declaring that many leaders in Washington had felt that in the end Lee had won the campaign because while not victorious in battle. Lee achieved several objectives he had set for the campaign that included disrupting union plans of a summer campaign in Virginia, bringing the War back to the North, relieving his citizens from invaders and able to pillage the Pennsylvania countryside. This perspective, is certainly an important point that effects the psyche of popular memory despite a seemingly devasting defeat, Lee was viewed a victor.

1970-Present: How much is General Robert E. Lee to be blamed for the defeat at Gettysburg?

The final era has been more critical of Lee. Pfanz relayed sentiments of Burrage that the death of Lee produced a resurgent blame towards Longstreet. He would also agree with Foote that poor intelligence led Lee to ordering an attack on July 2nd, “did not comport with reality”. Guelzo and Pfanz each say that Lee’s command style played a significant role in the failures of the battle. He was known for giving simple orders with few directions because he trusted his

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83 Foote, Shelby. Pg. 290.
84 Tucker, Glenn. Pg. 377 and 390.
85 Coddington, Edwin. Pg. 573.
officers to do whatever it took to achieve the objective. He also had a habit of not communicating the full plan to all his officers. He only gave the orders that commanders needed to know.\textsuperscript{87} The issue with this strategy though, is if action did not coordinate itself, the entire plan failed. Key examples of this were on July 2 when Longstreet’s attack on the left was to be coordinated with Ewell on the right, however, since Longstreet’s attack was delayed it prevented Ewell from attacking the right in which it was supposed to prevent reinforcement help on the Union left. Trudeau would chime in with this criticism as he claimed Lee, “did not impose his will on his commanders, nor did he convey a sufficient sense of purpose to enable them to operate with any common understanding of the whole plan”.\textsuperscript{88} Despite these criticisms, the historiography remains hardened on shifting blame away from Lee. However, it is important for popular memory that current perspectives that place more blame on Lee’s failure.

Historiography is not only a foundation of information for the popular memory, but it also plays the part of the “control” variable when analyzing how the popular memory is conceived by other influences on memory. They include movies, historical fiction novels, the Gettysburg National Military Park, education, and media sources that can be subjective, inaccurate, or leave out important details. Understanding the historiography of the Battle’s most debated questions will help in being able to identity the different ways the other factors convey the Battle, allowing us to analyze how and why the popular memory remembers it.

\textsuperscript{87} Guelzo, Allen. 344-345. Pfanz, Harry. 426.
\textsuperscript{88} Trudeau, Noah. Pg. 420.
Chapter 3
Popular Memory: Media and Culture

“Memory often trumps reality because people act on what they perceive to be the truth, however flawed that perception, (could be).”

– Gary Gallagher

The enigma that plagues historical memory is that most of it is not influenced by historical scholarship, very least not directly. As Gary Gallagher explains, academic historians and the laity “are largely insulated from each other”. Historians’ target audiences are typically their peers, which only adds to the disconnect from the laity. The laity, when they are interested in history, try to seek an entertainment factor that the academic world does not always provide. Media and culture, on the other hand are modes of influence that are not confined to concrete fact. They can, and do, create narratives that perpetuate myths and agendas that appeal to what their audiences want to see and hear. Popular publications in print and media primarily focus the battles, while avoiding causes. Focusing on the bravery on both sides would instill American unity and discourage national division. Romanticizing the veterans and concentrating only on the military actions of the war has only immortalized these themes, while allowing our popular memory to forget the true meanings, causes, and important facts Gettysburg.

As the battle grew in debate and memory, narratives, and phrases such as, “the turning point of the war”, “the High-Water Mark of the Confederacy”, “the bloodiest battle” and “the Last Invasion”, entrenched themselves into the popular mind. While historians have used these terms, it is the media and culture that have focused on them creating romanticized vision of valor.

90 Ibid. Pg. 4.
and heroism among “brothers” on the hills and fields of central Pennsylvania. Gallagher claims that these remembered narratives allow our us to be influenced by what we want to believe, instead of focusing on the truth of the battle and the true meaning of Gettysburg.93 Which is the fight against slavery and to provide a “new birth of freedom” for the nation.

In today’s popular memory, culture and media dominate how people think and perceive information, especially how one thinks about our past. Cullen reminds us that popular culture has a significant ability to explain “why things are the way that they are”. He adds that if one combines this concept with the power of history, which explains how things came to be the way they are, influencing millions of people on how to perceive the past becomes relatively easy.94

The film industry was founded on Civil War motion pictures with blockbuster titles such as, Birth of a Nation (1915), Gettysburg (1913), and Gone With the Wind, that firmly established a theme of reconciliation and honor between Union and Confederate soldiers that has reverberated in popular media throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. After World War II westerns introduced storylines of Civil War veterans which lasted through the 1970s and revived the narratives of honor, reconciliation, and the Lost Cause. However, it would be a Pulitzer Prize winning novel, The Killer Angels, written in 1974 that inspired the film and television document series, Gettysburg (1993) and Ken Burns’ The Civil War, that influenced the resurgence of the Civil War and Gettysburg interest, inspired by James McPherson’s Pulitzer prize winning book Battle Cry of Freedom, and the 125th Anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg in 1988.

The popular memory of Gettysburg has been influenced in many ways through media and culture. The key media influences that will be addressed are The Killer Angels by Michael Shaara, Gettysburg (1993) directed by Ron Maxwell, The Civil War the documentary series

93 Chadwick, Bruce. Pg. 20-21.
94 Ibid. Pg. 14.
directed by Ken Burns, and the paintings by Dale Gallon, Don Troiani, and Mort Kunstler. The key cultural influences are the Gettysburg National Military Park, the prominent 50th and 75th Gettysburg Anniversary celebrations, and the plethora of popular myths that have been embraced by popular memory.

Michael Shaara’s novel, *The Killer Angels* (1974) is one of the most popular books on Gettysburg, with nearly 6,000,000 copies printed, according to D. Scott Hartwig.\(^{95}\) *Battle Cry of Freedom* written by James McPherson, on the other hand, arguably the greatest Civil War narrative written and credited with increasing the interest in the Civil War in the modern era, has only had a fraction of mainly academic readers. *The Killer Angels* guides the reader in a chronological narrative of the battle from the perspective of several commanders that participated. He focuses on Robert E. Lee, James Longstreet, and Joshua Chamberlain.

The novel, while being fairly accurate, focuses on a few key moments which obviously gives only a fragment of the entire battle. Shaara focused only on Colonel Joshua Chamberlain’s 20th Maine Regiment’s position on the far-left flank of the Union line on July 2nd and Pickett’s Charge on the center of the Union line on July 3rd as the culmination of valor and bravery. In addition, he blended ideas that appealed to the readers on both sides. For example, he incorporated the “causes” of each side of the battle, while portraying each side of the conflict made of honest, God-loving men, fighting for what they believed was right. These portrayals influenced *The Killer Angels* which later became the direct inspiration for Ken Burns’ *The Civil War* documentary series aired on PBS in 1990, and the movie adaption of the novel, *Gettysburg*, directed by Ron Maxwell in 1993.\(^{96}\)

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96 Ibid. Pg. 189 “The Killer Angels “Literally changed my life,” (Burns) writes in an essay about his documentary... “And for all intents and purposes, it was the life of Chamberlain which convinced me to embark on the most difficult and satisfying experience of my life”. 
Both works have had an even larger influence on the popular memory. Ken Burns’ documentary was seen by an estimated 14 million people when it aired on PBS in 1990, while millions more have viewed it since as a staple in school classrooms nationwide.\(^97\) Robert Toplin’s edited book of critical articles on Burns’ documentary argued that an American generation has become uninterested in its past and more consumed with digital content. However, with the release of the Burns’ film, it has met this audience on common ground and has since become a major contribution as to how the public view and understand the Civil War and Gettysburg, in particular.\(^98\) As a part of the documentary series, Gettysburg was discussed in “Episode Five: the Universe of Battle”. Gettysburg received forty-five minutes of attention in the fifty-six-minute episode, portraying how pivotal it was by stating that the third day proved to be the most crucial day of the war.\(^99\) Like Maxwell and Shaara, Burns continued the theme of placing a large focus on the second and third days of the battle and continued the romanization of the engagements at Little Round Top and Pickett’s Charge. He also claimed that the first day of the battle was “but a skirmish compared to the days that followed”.\(^100\) The Burns’ narrative focused on more details than Maxwell and Shaara. However, his interpretation has been heavily criticized by historians for its perpetuation of myths such as declaring that the “greatest battle ever fought in the western hemisphere was fought over shoes”.\(^101\)

\(^{97}\) Cullen, James. Pg. 9.
\(^{98}\) Toplin, Robert Brent. 1996. Ken Burns’ The Civil War: Historians Respond. Oxford University Press. Pg. 84-85. This citation was taken from historian Gabor S. Borits, who contributed his article, “Lincoln and Gettysburg: The Hero and the Heroic Place”, that discussed the Burns’ episode on the Battle of Gettysburg in his Civil War Documentary series.
\(^{100}\) Ibid.
\(^{101}\) Ibid.
Maxwell’s movie had millions of viewers, as became a staple in America’s public-school classrooms, like the Burns documentary. While Gettysburg was inspired by The Killer Angels, the movie propelled most of the novel’s commercial success, by landing it a spot on the New York Time’s Bestseller List in 1993. Nearly verbatim to Shaara’s book, it focused on the same events as the novel. Gettysburg focused on valor and courage and conveyed a strong emphasis on the battle’s implications at ending the Civil War. Gettysburg conveyed a heavy southern perspective with a short compelling scene that featured Robert E. Lee, riding along a sea of frantically cheering and lauding Confederate soldiers. This scene, which had no dialogue, lasted for nearly five minutes.

These products of Shaara’s novel helped to create a modern awareness of Gettysburg and renewed an appetite for artworks depicting the battle from renowned Civil War artists Dale Gallon, Don Troiani, and Mort Kunstler. Each of these artists harnessed the themes and focal points portrayed in Gettysburg and The Civil War, all with an overwhelming Confederate focus and strong Lost Cause themes. Launching his career just before the bicentennial, Don Troiani had amassed a Civil War collection that included most Confederate subjects, with Gettysburg his most frequently painted and popular topic. Dale Gallon, a resident of Gettysburg, also began his career during the peak of renewed interest in the 1980s. Since then, he has created over three hundred paintings with his primary focus being the Battle of Gettysburg. Gallon’s work also featured mainly Confederate subjects, especially of Longstreet. In addition, his paintings portray strong themes of “Lost Cause” and “Reconciliation”. As for artist Mort Kunstler, described as “the most widely collected Civil War artist”, he was inspired by the 125th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg, for which he created, “The High-Water Mark”, depicting Pickett’s Charge.

103 Gallagher, Gary. 2008. Pg. 11 and 142.
Many of Kunstler’s paintings have a striking resemblance to the actors portrayed in the *Gettysburg* film, which provides more evidence of the influence of Shaara and Maxwell.\textsuperscript{104} Gallagher argues that Kunstler’s work, which focuses heavily on Lee, Longstreet, and Chamberlain, has sold over 200,000 copies. By all comparisons, this is more commercial success than most, if not all nonfiction books on the topic except for the book, *Battle Cry of Freedom*.\textsuperscript{105}

The cultural factors to Gettysburg are equally significant. Gettysburg is visited by millions of Americans, who every year tour the battlefield where they can find thousands of monuments and placards that help to describe and commemorate what happened in Central Pennsylvania in 1863. It has become a hub of cultural influence. One highlight includes the iconic cyclorama painting that depicts the “High Water Mark” by Paul Philippeaux that spans 377 feet long and 42 feet wide. This enormous artwork was made public at Gettysburg just before the 1913 commemoration of the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the battle.

Anniversary commemorations of the battle have been remembered with the reconciliationist theme in its 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary celebration in 1913. David Blight, the leading historian on Civil War memory, insists that this Blue and Gray reunion presented a “public avowal of the deeply laid mythology that glorifies the fight that led to a greater national unity”.

Before a vast reenactment of the final assault of Gettysburg, the veterans in attendance culminated the celebration with a handshake across the wall located along Cemetery Ridge that did not include any African American veterans. Woodrow Wilson, the first Southern born President to be elected since the Civil War, maintained that the theme of reconciliation echoed what the nation had experienced since the battle ended fifty years prior stated, “They have meant peace and union and vigor, and the maturity and might of a great nation. How wholesome and

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid. Pg. 143.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid. Pg. 142.
healing the peace has been! We have found one another again as brothers and comrades, in arms, enemies no longer, generous friends rather, our battles long past the quarrel forgotten…”¹⁰⁶

These themes of reconciliation would reverberate across decades and generations, further cementing the public memory. At the 75th anniversary of the battle, a remarkable 1,800 Gettysburg veterans were in attendance for the last Blue and Gray Reunion. President Franklin D. Roosevelt continued messages of reconciliation by consecrating the point where McPherson Ridge and Seminary Ridge come together with the Eternal Light Peace Memorial declaring “Peace eternal in a Nation United”.¹⁰⁷

The Gettysburg Battlefield is also where the most common myths of the battle have become so perpetuated that they have become a part of the popular memory. Arguably the most popular myth, that a search for shoes started the engagement at Gettysburg, has been perpetuated in many popular media sources such as The Killer Angels, Ken Burns Civil War, and in what has been considered as “Gettysburg lore” ever since its inception. Historians have discovered that there are several reasons why this account is just a myth. For one, there was no shoe factories or warehouses in Gettysburg at that time and if there were any shoes, Jubal Early’s division would have already taken them, as he and his men marched through Gettysburg emptying it of all useful supplies on their way to York several days earlier. McPherson also shows that the myth began as a cover up to explain General Heath’s disastrous strategic mistake of defying Lee’s order’s not to initiate a full engagement until their forces were concentrated.¹⁰⁸

Another myth initiated by General Meade’s own men, Dan Sickles and Daniel Butterfield, was perpetuated over many decades to evoke a stronger case for the valor and

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. Pg. 35.
courage of Lee and his men. This was the myth that Meade had actively made plans to retreat from Gettysburg. McPherson shares that Butterfield, Meade’s Chief of Staff, claimed that Meade had ordered plans of a retreat to be drawn up on July 2\textsuperscript{nd}. However, as McPherson asserts, Meade had asked to draw a map of possible routes for the Union rear as a contingency plan in case a withdrawal became necessary.\textsuperscript{109} The third myth also evokes the ideas of reconciliation. It is believed that on the night of July 2\textsuperscript{nd}, along the right flank of the Union line on Culp’s Hill, while filling up their canteens at Spanglers Spring located near the base of the hill, Confederate and Union forces supposedly struck up a truce in which they joked and talked with each other. McPherson emphatically declares that this is nothing but a myth, as this story had not surfaced until the 1880s when the themes of reconciliation began to grow among Blue and Gray reconciliations. There is no evidence or documentation that confirms it. In fact, the true story involved a Captain of the 46\textsuperscript{th} Pennsylvania regiment who, when he noticed rebel soldiers escaped the scene and silently returned to his line without being seen.\textsuperscript{110} By all of these accounts the framing of the Battle of Gettysburg for untold Americans, and the influence of popular media and culture has prioritized the focus on the battle as being the “High Water Mark of the Rebellion”, Reconciliation, General Lee, Chamberlain, and the valor and bravery of both sides at Little Round Top and Pickett’s Charge. This has created a limited understanding that the laity now almost exclusively remembers about the Battle of Gettysburg.

The Union victory at Gettysburg has been viewed as a strong moral boost, but it was by no means a dominant success let alone deemed the “Turning Point of the War”. In fact, following the battle President Abraham Lincoln, for one, was upset with Meade for allowing Lee to escape to Virginia unscathed. In truth, Gettysburg would be the last time Lee, or any Confederate forces

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. Pg. 95.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. Pg. 89.
would invade Northern soil. However, many Confederate citizens and soldiers they did not view
this loss as devastating towards their chances of overall victory. Nevertheless, it was not until
the 1880s, thanks to Jonathan Batchelder, that the phrase and idea of the “High Water Mark” was
born. Batchelder had become the prime source for veteran soldiers in the 1880’s to send their
personal versions of the Battle of Gettysburg, when he was commissioned by the United States
Government to produce the history of the battle from the perspectives of its participants. While
conducting his research, Batchelder identified the “Copse of Trees” more formally known now as
the “Clump of Trees” as General Lee’s target for Pickett’s charge. Today, this landmark on the
Gettysburg Battlefield has become legend in all forms of media and culture, as it is identified in
the *Killer Angels, Gettysburg, The Civil War* documentaries, the reenactments at the
anniversaries, and more importantly, it remains as one of the most popular and glorified
monuments at the National Military Park as the “High Water Mark”. This memory is central to
how the rest of the battle is remembered and has justified the idea that Gettysburg was the
“Turning Point of the War”. Identifying the “High Water Mark of the Rebellion” draws the focus
towards the Confederacy, which has generated a memory that aligns with Lost Cause ideology
and Reconciliationist themes.

Despite being defeated at the Battle of Gettysburg, Robert E. Lee has been revered as one
of the central figures in the memory of the historic battle in American history. Beginning as early
as the 1870s Confederate veterans began producing a mythology on the battle by blaming Lee’s
subordinates for the defeat to prevent tarnishing Lee’s legacy. This persistent promotion of the
mythology from the late 19th century was absorbed by historians and popular memory throughout

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111 Desjardin, Thomas. 2003. *These Honored Dead: How the Story of Gettysburg Shaped American Memory.* Da Capo Press. Pg. 199. Desjardin points out that the “nation in 1864 did not see Gettysburg as the pivotal event. This perception grew after the war ended”.

the 20th century. Since then, however, Lee has been adored for his humility, which is well documented in the historiography and popular culture, for his own acceptance of blame that he placed on himself after the failed assault on July 3rd. This admission by General Lee has only increased his respectability and legend in popular memory. He remains one of the most popular subjects of Civil War artists. In fact, he has become Don Troiani and Mort Kunstler’s most popular subject and Dale Gallon’s second most painted behind General Longstreet. In addition, Lee is the one of the main characters in Shaara’s Killer Angels, and the movie adaption Gettysburg, where both paint him as a beloved figure who puts all his trust in God, is fighting solely for his state of Virginia. Also, aligning with the Lost Cause ideology, Lee was portrayed as a man with the utmost trust and confidence in his men to do anything, even against larger numbers and stronger positions. This ideology would continue to influence the public memory with its focus of courage, valor, and bravery which has epitomized the significance and focus on Gettysburg’s most memorable moments of Little Round Top and Pickett’s Charge.

In today’s public memory, Little Round Top and the “Clump of Trees”, are two of the most popular locations at the Gettysburg Battlefield. This is due partly to the popularity of the novel The Killer Angels and the film Gettysburg, which focused almost entirely on these two engagements. Before the 20th Century, Cemetery and Culp’s Hill were the most popular sites on the Battlefield. However, Gouverneur Warren and Joshua Chamberlain, who would become the heroes of Little Round Top, were the only two commanders that survived the battle. Thanks to The Killer Angels, Gettysburg, and The Civil War Chamberlain has become a legendary hero

112 Desjardin, Thomas. Pg. 42. Desjardin quotes Gary Gallagher from his 135th Anniversary Historians Roundtable, in The Unknown Civil War home video series when Gallagher discusses how the Lost Cause myth was created.

113 McPherson, James. Pg. 88.
of the battle. He was able to produce his story as one of the last surviving commanders of Little Round Top, which has made him an original American Hero in popular memory.

Little Round Top is remembered as the most important part of the Union line in the Battle of Gettysburg. So much so, that if it fell to the Confederate Army, the battle would be lost for the Union. This importance compounded by the idea that the battle had implications for winning the war for the Confederacy, an idea repeated throughout The Killer Angels and Gettysburg, which depicted Chamberlain and his outnumbered 20th Maine Volunteer regiment against a far more numerous enemy, who pressed against his men a valent five times before Chamberlain’s bayonet charge finally repulsed the Rebels from the hill, and saved the Union line at Little Round Top and ultimately the Battle of Gettysburg.¹¹⁴

As for Pickett’s Charge, it remains as one of the most romanticized actions in the entire Civil War. Confederate veterans propagated this memory of Gettysburg, as they debated the significance of their role in the battle and specifically the assault on July 3rd.¹¹⁵ Pickett’s Charge, has become a phrase invented by the Virginian soldiers that made up General George Pickett’s division of General Longstreet’s first Corps despite including Texan, Alabamian, and North Carolina soldiers, the latter being the most critical of the excluding phrase. Nevertheless, the rebel assault on July 3rd has been remembered as an admirable and courageous charge that was decimated by artillery fire with only a fraction of the 13,000-troop attacking force breaching the Union line, only to be quickly surrounded and defeated. The latter description has been overshadowed by the ideas of the Lost Cause, where there is more focus on the fact that against

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¹¹⁴ Gallagher, Gary. 2008. Quoting Ken Burn’s when he is referring to Chamberlain’s role at Little Round Top. Burns says, (The Killer Angels) introduced me to Chamberlain for the first time. Chamberlain’s maneuvers on Little Round Top saved the Union army and quite possibly the Union itself”.

all odds, 13,000 men went running into the heap of Union fire because of their bravery and courage, and because they were too proud of their cause to give up without a fight.\textsuperscript{116}

“Pickett’s Charge has been remembered in “Confederate lore” as one of the most courageous and bravest military attacks in American history.”\textsuperscript{117} All fifteen of General Pickett’s commanders were either killed or wounded. Twenty-eight of the forty-two attacking regiments lost their colors, the highest total in any action in the war. Despite this, the assault has been revered as the South’s finest hour because memory has focused on the brave men that died for their cause even though they were running into the heart of the Union line in a mile-long wide-open charge with only 13,000 men. James McPherson explains that “Pickett’s Charge is oddly like General Grant’s Cold Harbor attack, which faced similar odds and results. However, in Grant’s case, he has been branded a butcher and Cold Harbor has become a symbol of mole headed futility.”\textsuperscript{118} This comparison shows how the Lost Cause memory has invented a positive spin on one of the most devastating and costly actions for the Confederate Army of the war, by solely focusing on the bravery and courage of the confederate soldiers.

Popular media is evidently a strong factor in how Americans remember the Battle of Gettysburg. Using the foundation established from historiography, it has taken what it wants to remember and how it wants to remember to convey a narrative that has focused on the valor, bravery, and reconciliation. It has accomplished this by focusing on such actions like; Joshua Chamberlain’s valiant defense of Little Round Top, which has been portrayed as saving the Union army and the courageous Pickett’s Charge, which culminated the “High-Water Mark of the Rebellion”. All the while, focusing more on the defeated General Lee, as compared to any

\textsuperscript{116} Gallagher, Gary. 2008. Pg. 23.
\textsuperscript{117} McPherson, James. Pg. 124.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid. Pg. 124.
Union commander except for Joshua Chamberlain, let alone the victorious Commander who handed General Lee his second defeat by the Army of the Potomac after only taking command less than a week earlier. Desjardin reminds us that post-war literature curated the narrative that popular media has adopted today. The Battle of Gettysburg has become a pivotal moment in the Civil War, which has proved disastrous for the Confederacy’s efforts in winning the war due to several errors. Confederate veterans had elevated Gettysburg to mythical proportions so that they could come to terms with their defeat. The narrative they invented that focused on valor and courage was adopted by popular media and culture as in the novel, The Killer Angels, the films, Gettysburg and The Civil War, modern artwork paintings, and the Battle of Gettysburg Anniversary Commemorations. These myths combined have contributed to emulate these principles of valor and courage and by doing so have significantly influenced today’s popular memory.

\[119\] Desjardin, Thomas. Pg. 43 and 115.
Chapter 4

The Textbook’s Influence on Popular Memory

“The nation was willing to sacrifice its historical memory in the name of reconciliation”.\(^{120}\)
- David Blight

Education is the most important influence because most of the American public has experienced some form of education. History education is used as a tool to provide specific information and “memory texts” that society, or governmental entities deem should be passed on to future generations. “History textbooks are a form of mass media for the dissemination of officially approved images of history and, at the same time, mirrors of societal controversies surrounding sensitive issues”.\(^{121}\)

The emergence of the publications of American history textbooks originated at the turn of the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century. Historian, James McPherson reminds us how important this fact is when understanding the influence textbooks have made on public memory. With the emergence of public-school education during American Reconstruction after the Civil War, the South desperately feared that their interpretation of their culture and the memory of the Civil War would be manipulated by Northern textbook manufactures, who at the time dominated the industry. In response, to those fears the United Daughters of the Confederacy and the United Confederate Veterans, both Confederate hereditary associations, would embark on a crusade to preserve their interpretation of Confederate history and soldier memory through textbooks and education. These groups, who would become powerful lobbyists, formed “censorship

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committees” that selected and designated pre-approved textbooks that provided the Confederate perspective of the “truth of the history of the United States”.\textsuperscript{122}

Even before the Civil War, southern society had invented a distinct culture that focused on romanticism and classicism when identifying themselves and their way of life.\textsuperscript{123} Ideals such as southern hospitality, gentlemanly planters, lovely ladies, and gallant deeds would become the foundational principles of the Lost Cause myth,\textsuperscript{124} which was born amongst southern textbooks in the recollections of the Civil War. These would become known as “mint julep” textbooks, after the popular southern beverage, for its “refreshing” southern perspective that camouflaged the negative aspects of Confederate culture and the failure to win the Civil War. Ways in which these “mint julep” textbooks conveyed this narrative included portraying slaves as happy and contented as well as declaring the South fought for state’s rights. It was this portrayal of northern aggressors, overwhelming number of Union soldiers, and their better access to resources that ultimately defeated the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{125} By the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, complete censorship became the norm in Southern schools. Compared to northern public schools’ systems who were free to choose what textbooks to use in their classrooms, nearly all southern states had established their textbook commissions that prescribed which textbooks were to be used for all public schools.\textsuperscript{126}

Southerners had recognized the importance of education on future generations and how history would be remembered. Therefore, textbooks became prioritized by Southern elites and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} Bohan, Chara Haeussler, Lauren Yarnell Bradshaw, and Jr. Wade Hampton Morris. Pg. 139.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Fahs, Alice, and Joan Waugh. Pg. 70.
\end{itemize}
politicians to preserve and protect their romanticized and classical versions of their culture and history. Quickly, the creation of an “unbiased” Southern education through the production of Southern approved textbooks became synonymous with the national integrity of the Confederacy.127

While textbooks became the means by which the Lost Cause heritage was portrayed to future generations, Southern historians, writers, and politicians of the late 19th century ensured that the textbooks were approved with the “appropriate” view of Southern culture and history, which highlighted the Confederacy’s role and bravery during the Civil War.128 Textbooks stressed that southerners took up arms in the name of chivalry. School children were taught that southern soldiers fought to protect the defenseless women, to be “noble and brave”, and to “fear God and honor their country and be generous to their enemies”.129 As public education increased in the South after the Civil War, almost all school children were exposed to the history prescribed by the Southern elites that censored how they wanted the Confederacy to be remembered by future generations. The textbooks of the South were used to provide “historical justification for the South and Confederacy’s social and political ways of life before and during the Civil War”.130

While the Lost Cause has become legend after the Civil War as the confederate Veterans used it to control their memorial heritage, it was established before the war began. Foremost, the cornerstone of the Lost Cause legend and the cultural memory of the South is that slavery was a benign institution that God had ordained.131 The legend of the Old South, romanticized

127 Curtis, Robert I. Pg. 436 and 437.
128 Bohan, Chara Haeussler, Lauren Yarnell Bradshaw, and Jr. Wade Hampton Morris. Pg. 140.
130 Ibid. Pg. 528.
gentlemanly splendor and delicacy of a cavalier aristocratic society.\textsuperscript{132} By the 19\textsuperscript{th} century when the sectionalism between the North and the South became more rigid, Southerners felt the need to justify its aristocratic plantation society to themselves and to the world. They achieved this justification through romanticizing their way of life.\textsuperscript{133} By the Civil War and its conclusion, the South transformed their romanticized society of nostalgic aristocratic planters into honorable, God fearing, and brave men that fought and persevered against all odds to preserve and protect their home and rights. This idea became hardened as the confederacy memory was molded with armies comprised of men from all over the South for four long years that would transcend to future generations to know the hardships the Confederacy endured and sacrificed for their “heritage”.\textsuperscript{134}

But the South was not the only region that was influenced by the textbook crusade. Since northern schools did not have pre-approved textbooks, they became susceptible to the “biased” textbooks that were mandatory in the South. As early as the 1930’s, northern textbooks had been influenced by the Southern romanticized, white-washed version of the South and the Civil War. Many Northern textbooks sacrificed the African American narrative which condemned, but correctly identified the truth of the Confederacy. David Blight argues, “the nation was willing to sacrifice its historical memory in the name of reconciliation. American historians chose reconciliation reunion, and alleged historical “objectivity” in the place of careful, divergent, oppositional historical discord”.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid. Pg. ix.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid. Pg. 61.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. Pg. 124.
\textsuperscript{135} Bohan, Chara Haeussler, Lauren Yarnell Bradshaw, and Jr. Wade Hampton Morris. Referenced from David Blight’s Race and Reunion. Pg. 147-148.
Sentimental Unionist and reconciliationist whites across the North experienced a “generous forgetfulness” of the true causes of the Civil War. The forgetfulness would soon evolve into a focus on heroism from both sides and ultimately gloss over the distinction between “those who fought for liberty and those who fought for slavery; between those who fought to save the republic and those who fought to destroy it”.\textsuperscript{136} Despite the Confederacy losing the war, they still had the opportunity to control how that war, and its battles would be remembered. The war for memory was ignited with the Southern textbook crusade by the 1890s. And still today, its influences are visible in modern textbooks which have continued to perpetuate a theme of Reconciliation and Lost Cause symbolism that has affected the public memory of the Civil War and the Battle of Gettysburg, specifically.

Throughout the past two centuries of American education, Gettysburg has been remembered as one of the most recognizable events in American history. Textbooks have made a point to highlight it in all chapters that discuss the Civil War. Reviewing a select number of textbooks from the 20\textsuperscript{th} and 21\textsuperscript{st} century it will be evident the importance given to the Battle of Gettysburg. These have portrayed the themes of Reconciliation and the Lost Cause that were instilled by Confederate preservers of the late 19\textsuperscript{th} Century.

*The Essentials of American History*, written in 1905 by Albert Bushnell Hart, reveals evidence of Southern influence even though Hart was a Professor at the northern university, Harvard. Highlighting the significance of Gettysburg, Hart focused on the third day of the battle, claiming it to be “the greatest battle of the Civil War”. Hart goes on to share that the Pickett-led attack on July 3\textsuperscript{rd} was the most critical moment of the war. He argued, that if the few rebels that did make it over Cemetery Ridge were able to maintain their threat by creating disorder, they

might have been able to take Philadelphia, Baltimore, or Washington.\textsuperscript{137} To claim that the few rebels - realistically it was only fractions of Armistead’s regiment who at the time were leaderless as General Armistead was struck by cannon fire upon reaching the line, is an exaggeration. It has nothing but conjecture and subjective belief to support it. Nevertheless, it plays significantly into the reconciliationist narrative that the Civil War hung in the balance at the Battle of Gettysburg.

While Hart’s explanation of the Battle of Gettysburg was brief, its focus on the Confederate effort in the Battle, while omitting any reference of any commander other than Lee or Pickett shows the influence of how Reconciliation was established early in remembering the Battle of Gettysburg.

By 1960, things had not changed much. Ruth Gavian and William Hamm, \textit{United States History}, focuses on the efforts of Lee while highlighting the failures of Meade to prevent him from escaping the battlefield. Gavian and Hamm describe how “Lee risked everything by ordering Pickett to head the charge against the Union center”. Consistent with Southern rhetoric, Gavian and Hamm have devoted focus to the popularity and legend of Robert E. Lee while sprinkling themes of the Lost Cause and explaining how “Gettysburg was the High Tide of the Confederate hopes”.\textsuperscript{138} Gavian and Hamm describe Pickett’s Charge thus, “Lee risked everything by ordering Pickett to head charge against the Union center”, “With only 15,000 men charging across a mile wide plain, less than 100 would reach the crest”.\textsuperscript{139} This narrative invokes Lost Cause themes of Lee and his army choosing courage and bravery against sizeable odds in the name of their cause by flipping the thought process that would normally conceive as a brutal failure into a honorable and valiant attempt at victory.


\textsuperscript{139} Ibid. Pg. 381.
Approaching the 21st Century, textbooks continued to concentrate on the battle’s third day. Jason Silverman’s *American History Before 1877* (1989) also highlighted Pickett’s Charge. “The battle was indecisive until the last day, until the Confederates launched ten thousand men under General George Pickett against the Union line in a daring ploy that almost worked”. Consistent with themes of Reconciliation and the Lost Cause Silverman’s focus on Pickett’s Charge influences the public’s memory by only sharing events that paint a picture of valor and courage on the part of the Confederacy while omitting any other details about the battle, including any information about the Union Army of the Potomac except for criticizing Meade for not counter attacking Lee’s Confederate forces after Pickett’s attack.\(^{140}\)

The final textbook example from the 20th century, illustrates not only the common themes of Reconciliation and the Lost Cause, but it also perpetuates myths that have become popular throughout popular media and culture. *American History* written by Donald Ritchie and Albert Broussard in 1997, introduces Gettysburg as the most celebrated battle of the war begun as “an accidental clash that turned into the bloodiest battle that marked the turning point of the war”. They would go on to explain that the battle initially occurred when a Confederate brigade was searching for supplies. While Ritchie and Broussard provide details of the battle other than what happened on July 3rd, simply stating that Lee ordered flanking attacks on July 2nd, the focus remained on the Confederate forces and their attack on July 3rd. Like other textbooks, Ritchie and Broussard also use reconciliation and Lost Cause imagery in their interpretation of the Battle. It was an “Accidental clash at Gettysburg that developed into the bloodiest battle that marked the turning point of the war”.

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This interpretation is false in its attempts to create excuses for Lee’s defeat at Gettysburg by claiming it to be accident by subordinate officers in search for supplies. Lee’s inability to direct or lead his men is downplayed. This interpretation also falsely claims it was the bloodiest battle of the war because, in fact, Antietam, Lee’s first strategical defeat at the hands of General George McClellan, was even more deadly.

Textbooks by the 21st Century continued the themes provided by the 20th century textbooks. However, more recent textbooks devote several pages and sections on the battles compared to the previous sources of just one to two paragraphs. *The Brief American Pageant* (2004), a popular American history textbook highlights the Battle of Gettysburg under the title, “Lee’s Last Lunge at Gettysburg”. Again, as will be a consistent trend of 21st Century textbooks, Kennedy et al., details that the battle occurred by accident. The section then jumps right to the battle’s third day in which Kennedy et al., describe the “outcome of the battle was in doubt until the last day when General George Pickett’s magnificent but futile charge failed, in what would become the high tide of the Confederacy”.

*United States History: Independence to 1914* written by William Deverell and Deborah Gray White (2006), *United States History*, by Emma Lapsansky-Werner, Peter Levy, Randy Roberts, and Alan Taylor (2013), *United States History and Geography: Modern Time*, was written by Joyce Appleby, Alan Brinkley, Albert Broussard, James McPherson, and Donald Ritchie (2014), and *Discovering Our Past: A History of the United States*, was written by Joyce Appleby, Alan Brinkley, Albert Broussard, James McPherson, and Donald Ritchie (2018), all highlight similar ideas and moments of the Battle of Gettysburg that provide evidence of a consistent memory that rests on themes of Reconciliation and the Lost Cause.

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In popular memory and textbooks, especially, the Battle of Gettysburg is the key event that has defined the memory of The Civil War. Because of this, it has only made the Battle even more significant and revered in reconciliationist popular memory. While Gettysburg is portrayed as a defining moment in the Civil War in modern textbooks, it is important to see how the textbooks have addressed the key aspects of the Civil War that include slavery, secession, and emancipation. Each textbook takes a unique approach to slavery. For most textbooks there were dedicated sections. However, some textbooks took an approach that failed to show the cruel and factual realities of slavery. *United States History and Geography* showed how many enslaved people found ways to resist the “dreadful lifestyle forced on them”. While this addresses that slavery was cruel it dances around the issue by only expressing what slaves did to resist. In the very next sentence stated that “some turned to violence, killing their owners or planning revolts”.\(^{142}\)

On the other hand, secession had varying approaches that consisted of a threat to slavery which *United States History* referenced, “outrage that a president whose opinions and purposed are hostile to slavery could be elected without a single southern vote, left them no choice but to secede”.\(^{143}\) *United States History and Geography Modern Times* explained that “many southerners viewed Lincoln’s election as a threat to their society and culture. Secession was a necessary course of action to uphold the people’s rights”.\(^{144}\) These approaches only briefly touch on slavery with the latter textbook completely omits slavery altogether. These are clear examples of how textbooks have aligned with a narrative that lightly brushes on slavery as a definitive

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\(^{142}\) Appleby, Joyce; Brinkley, Alan; Broussard, Albert S.; McPherson, James M.; Ritchie, Donald. 2014. *United States History & Geography: Modern Times*. McGraw Hill Education. Pg. 54.


cause of the Civil War by maintaining a reconciliationist memory of not only the Battle of Gettysburg, but when addressing the Civil War as well.

As for Emancipation, each textbook took similar approaches by explaining how the Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation freed the slaves in only in states of rebellion in hopes that the rebellious states would return to the Union. However, approaches on the effect of the proclamation varied. *United States History: Independence to 1914* argued that the words of the proclamation were powerful, but the document was merely symbolic since the Federal government could not enforce it in areas that they did not control.¹⁴⁵ *United States History* and *United States History and Geography Modern Times* each explained that despite the Emancipation Proclamation receiving varying degrees of approval it formally designated the Union cause as against slavery.¹⁴⁶

Each of these textbooks has given the Battle of Gettysburg significant attention compared to earlier textbooks. However, each emphasizes several key memories that have been solidified throughout the former factors of influence. These include that the Battle of Gettysburg was the turning point of the war, that the commencement of the battle was an accident when a Confederate brigade was searching for supplies in Gettysburg and bringing attention to Pickett’s Charge as a romantic and valiant last-ditch effort for Confederate victory. However, there are a few important points that some textbooks left out that others had mentioned regarding the memory of the battle. Each textbook except for *United States History and Geography: Modern Time*, discusses the events of the second day of the battle. Each is brief, simply referencing that Lee ordered flanking attacks on the Union line. However, each textbook only described the


action on Little Round Top, with only *United States History*, bringing attention to Union Colonel Joshua Chamberlain and his brigade’s defense of the hill.\textsuperscript{147}

A key difference between these 21\textsuperscript{st} Century textbooks is that they provided reasons for the significance of the battle. Aside from *United States History and Geography: Modern Time*, the other textbooks brought significant attention to Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address and its importance. Each highlights President Lincoln’s Address and states how famous the speech is in American History. However, beyond this point, there is very little information that explains why Lincoln’s speech was so important, and when there is an explanation, it is incorrect. For example, *United States History: Independence to 1914*, state that Lincoln “preached the bravery of Union soldiers and renewed his commitment to winning the Civil War”.\textsuperscript{148}

However, Garry Wills, leading expert on Lincoln’s *Gettysburg Address*, explains that Lincoln did not mourn a single soldier in his speech and that he purposely omitted soldiers and the Civil War itself.\textsuperscript{149} *United States History* explains that Lincoln’s “immortal” address motivated the Union to connect the massive human sacrifice to a “new birth of freedom”.\textsuperscript{150}

While this statement is more aligned to the purpose of Lincoln’s speech, it fails to provide any context as to what Lincoln meant by a “new birth of freedom”. Lincoln viewed his speech as an opportunity to convey that the nation had an opportunity to finish what the Founding Fathers intended when they wrote the Declaration of Independence. To create a “free and equal” self-governing state. By failing to abolish slavery Lincoln sees that the United States have failed this goal that ultimately represents the government. What Lincoln meant by “A new birth of

\textsuperscript{147} Lapsansky-Werner, et al., Pg. 383.

\textsuperscript{148} Deverell, William, et al., Pg. 500.  
It is important to mention, that Deborah Gray White, author of *Ar’n’t I A Woman*, is a known critic of the romanticized view of Southern History and id not a proponent of the reconciliationist view of the Civil War.


\textsuperscript{150} Lapsansky-Werner, et al., Pg. 385.
freedom” was that the United States now has an opportunity to get right what the Declaration intended and create a new birth of freedom for the enslaved and the Nation. *Discovering Our Past: A History of the United States*, explains that Lincoln “honored the soldiers and their cause and stated his vision for the country”. The addition of the Gettysburg Address in modern textbooks as a part of the memory of the battle is important. However, textbooks have failed to educate the public to Lincoln’s purpose because it conflicts with the Reconciliationist memory that purposely omits any mention of slavery and emancipation.

To conclude, it is important to understand not only the influence that textbooks have on the American public, but also to recognize how textbooks have been influenced by Confederate rhetoric even to this day. However, understanding how textbooks originated and how education systems have been influenced to accept a more reconciled view of the Civil War and Gettysburg shows underlying evidence of reconciliationist and Lost Cause themes that have perpetuated the public memory.

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Conclusion

A Reconciliationist Popular Memory

“Gettysburg is married in contradictions from both sides yet equally revered. From decades of struggle among those who held decidedly vested interests in shaping the story in one fashion or another, intent on ensuring that those who followed would see Gettysburg in a particle way”.

– Thomas Desjardin

The Battle of Gettysburg is the most recognizable in United States history. Historians have exhausted it, popular media has mass produced it, culture has instilled it, and textbooks have cemented it. All these influences together have generated a reconciliationist popular memory of Gettysburg. While each influence has approached it in different ways, all have presented the same general focal points that highlight a Southern perspective that focuses on the courage, camaraderie, and heroism of both sides. Even though the Battle of Gettysburg has been discussed significantly in the academic sphere, the overall popularity of the Battle of Gettysburg has created immense exposure to the general population. The public’s memory of the Battle of Gettysburg has also been heavily influenced by popular media and culture as well as textbooks which has created a reconciliationist memory of the Battle.

Despite the academic community having the capability to remember and understand the causes, effects, and actions of the battle insightfully and in its entirety, they are only a tiny fraction of how the entire population understands it. The public, on the other hand, is not exposed to the resources and scholarship that academic historians utilize in their writing. Since Gettysburg has become so popular among the media and culture, the public has been exposed to different narratives and perspectives. These narratives have been exposed to misleading reports or have purposely excluded or included certain aspects of the battle to produce a particular

narrative. That memory, influenced by popular media and culture derived from a southern oriented historiography and then compounded in the textbooks to which nearly every member of the public has been introduced to, has created a this reconciliationist memory.

This reconciliationist memory neglects the realities of what each side was fighting for in favor of mending the severed relationship between Northern and Southern sentiments by focusing on the bravery, courage, and heroism of both armies. When thinking of Gettysburg, the public does not remember why the battle was fought. Even though it was a devastating defeat for the Confederate army, they do not remember it for the disastrous failures of Lee’s army. The public does, however, remember it for the romanticized courage and bravery. They remember that the battle started as an accident because one of Lee’s regiments were looking for shoes in Gettysburg. They remember it for Joshua Chamberlain’s 20th Maine regiment, saving the battle at Little Round Top’s base. They do remember it for the bloody and valiant effort of Pickett and his Virginia soldiers that almost defeated the Union army as they ran towards the “Clump of Trees” and they do remember it as the “High Tide of The Confederacy” and the “Turning Point of the War”. While these memories seem innocent and tend to portray a positive light on American history emblematic of masculinity, patriotism, and honor, these actions and themes that are remembered have been pushed by a reconciliationist plan; that was meant to honor both sides and uplift the legacy of Lee and his Confederate army while ignoring the real principles and goals of the Confederacy.

According to historians Carhart and Harman, they argue that the narrative that historians have conveyed for the last two centuries is incorrect. Carhart claims that Lee had devised an integral 3-pronged attack destined to defeat the Union army on July 3rd. However, since the first two prongs of the attack failed before they could even come to fruition, they have been forgotten
in history’s memory. Harman argues that Lee kept his eyes on Cemetery Hill each day of the battle as his target. However, even historians have promulgated a narrative that believes that Lee’s plan changed on each day of the fight. Carhart and Harman’s arguments are monumental not only because they are questioning a cemented “affirmed memory” of the most storied battle in American History, but by making these claims they have inadvertently revealed that the current narrative of Gettysburg is a reconciliationist memory that has been influenced by Lost Cause themes which preserve the legend Lee and defended the failures of his Confederate Army of Northern Virginia.153

The most in-depth influence of the memory, Gettysburg’s historiography, has instilled a strong romanticism theme within the narrative. Throughout the historiography, four battle questions were repeatedly addressed; 1) How did the battle begin? 2) Was Little Round Top the key position to the Union line? 3) What happened on July 3rd? And 4) Who was to be blamed for the defeat? The histories have all highlighted these questions as core focal points in their narrative, and they remained relatively consistent in their portrayals.

As for media and culture, several factors have influenced how people remember the battle that include Michael Shaara’s The Killer Angels, Robert Maxwell’s Gettysburg, Ken Burns’ The Civil War, and the Gettysburg National Military Park. Key themes of romanticized courage and heroism are highlighted in the memory conveyed by media and culture. Only a few moments of the battle are touched upon, Chamberlain’s 20th Maine regiment defending Little Round Top and Pickett’s Virginians reaching the “High Water Mark” in their charge on July 3rd.

The influence of textbooks, however, may have the most decisive effect on popular memory because it is the most prevalent influence in the public’s historical experience. It is also

because when textbooks were developed at the end of the 19th Century, they were viewed as a vital component for how the Civil War and the Confederacy would be remembered. Therefore, the narrative that southern hereditary associations had forced through Southern education slowly influenced the rest of its textbooks. While today’s textbooks are not blatantly pro-Confederate, what is remembered prove that the memory has been affected by the Lost Cause and has now become a reconciliationist memory that has assimilated from a southern perspective. Textbooks today scarcely mention any member of the Union army save for Chamberlain, and he is only mentioned occasionally. The main character in most modern textbooks when discussing the Gettysburg is Lee and Pickett. The main action that all history textbooks focus on is the brave and courageous effort of Pickett’s Charge and how it symbolled the “Turning Point” of the war.

The reconciliationist memory of Gettysburg has been constructed into what society has deemed essential and suitable to us. Over the past one hundred and fifty years, we have attached meanings of courage and heroism to the battle instead of understanding why they were fighting and what happened at Gettysburg. Reconciliation has influenced all the memories that have become imprinted on the public’s mind when they think of Gettysburg. Having a stronger focus on Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia compared to the victorious Army of the Potomac is a clear example of a reconciliationist influence. The fact that Pickett’s Charge, one of the greatest military disasters in American history, is remembered as the “South’s finest hour and one of the most courageous and bravest military attacks” is a clear testament that the memory of Gettysburg has been influenced by a Confederate centered memory that has become the most memorable part of the Battle, instead of remembering it for the disaster that it was for Lee and his army.

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154 Ibid. Pg. XVI.
While the myth that the Battle of Gettysburg was started over a Confederate regiment searching for shoes in Gettysburg’s town is false by several historians, this legend has been repeated and reiterated across popular culture and in history textbooks. This shows how false narratives can become a part of the affirmed memory of the public and when remembered, cements a reconciliationist memory. The shoe myth is a form of this memory because it attempts to redirect blame from Lee for not controlling his forces and creates an excuse for not defeating the Union Army at Gettysburg. This narrative has created a memory that Gettysburg was an accident which also makes another excuse for Lee’s defeat at Gettysburg, a vital element of Confederate history that has been appeased by accepting a reconciliationist memory.

As for the narrative of Little Round Top, which has gained significant popularity within the last several decades, is another example of reconciliationist memory. Although the description of Little Round Top is one of the only memories of the battle that focuses on Union successes, its focus is still on the soldier’s heroics and bravery. Harman argument allows us to understand how this event is remembered as a reconciliationist memory. The affirmed memory views Chamberlain’s 20th Maine regiment’s desperate and courageous defense of Little Round Top because popular memory believes that Little Round Top was the key to the Union line and that if lost, so was the battle and, therefore, the war. However, Harman argues that Lee’s actions and battle plans never recognized Little Round Top as a significant position. He specifically told Longstreet before the attack on July 2nd that going to the right of the Union line was not the objective, which is why Longstreet denied General Hood’s request three times to attack the Union right flank.

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However, since Hood was injured and removed from the field before he could lead his men to the Peach Orchard to reinforce Longstreet, his men slipped towards Little Round Top in what would become the fabled struggle that ended in Chamberlain ordering a bayonet charge to repulse the last-ditch effort of Texan and Alabamian rebels. This context reveals that remembering this action follows two critical components of reconciliation memory; it focuses on the brave heroics of the soldiers on both sides of the struggle and that it takes blame away from Robert E. Lee and places it on Longstreet for failing to execute an attack that was believed to be the “key” to the Union line, when in reality it was not viewed in that way by Lee or the Union Meade.157

The reconciliationist memory of the Civil War has been entrenched ever since the 19th Century. Overtime, culture and history have accepted this memory and have compounded it as the battle grew into legend as the most important and significant battle in the war. Gettysburg was not always viewed as this important. However, because Gettysburg is a place of highly debated controversy for both sides the battle and its fighting that could be easily romanticized it became an ideal platform and “poster child” for Civil War memory, marrying how we think about the Civil War with how we think about Gettysburg. As Gary Gallagher argues, in Unionist memory, Gettysburg stands as the great test of democracy, the darkest hour in a national struggle to determine whether ‘any nation conceived in liberty, can long endure’. In Southern memory, Gettysburg stands as the high-water mark and fabled land of what if”.158 These memories continued to compete as each side jockeyed for their memory of the battle to remain supreme.

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When reconciliation became an accepted goal of the nation it allowed for both memories to remain together. Blight argues the generation that followed the Civil War laid the foundation for this reconciled memory. “By the 1890s, the next generation were following their parents lead in constructing an idealized national memory of the war, rooted in celebration of veterans and valor that rarely includes the horrors and reality of war”.159

The Blue and Gray reunions of the early 20th century were pivotal in cementing a reconciliation memory. They were prime events that conjoined the veteran memory to the public sphere where media and culture were able to take hold of the reconciled theme portrayed at the reunions. White Confederate and Union veterans came together to reminisce in the heroism they both displayed at Gettysburg. But more importantly, they omitted all acknowledgment of slavery, emancipation, while excluding African American veterans all together. Blight explains how the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg in 1913 “presented a public avowal of a deeply laid mythology of the Civil War that had captured popular consciousness by the early 20th century”.160 He went on to explain how the Blue and Gray reunion at the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg “became a ritual of national reconciliation” in which “white supremacy and Jim Crow were the silent master of ceremonies” due to the deafening omission of the “black participation in the war, the idea of slavery as a cause and emancipation as a resort of the war”.161

The omissions that plague the memory of Gettysburg are palpable. The influences of the Gettysburg with their focus on reconciliation in attempts to amend the wounds of the war, directly omit and forget the reasons the war and therefore the battle was fought over. Slavery. The crusade for memory at the turn of the century founded a memory in which slavery was purposely omitted. To cement this omission, a memory that everyone could agree upon needed to be established. Thus, reconciliation became the ideal goal in which the bravery and gallantry of soldiers on both sides would be the focus. The public reunions centered on reconciliation created an opportunity for the media and culture to develop a popular memory of reconciliation. Nicholas White, argues, “popular memory emanates from sources that have gained legitimacy through repetition and sophisticated rhetorical strategies”.\textsuperscript{162} The repetition of this memory would continue exponentially from modern popular media. The most significant example being the film \textit{Gettysburg} (1993), Maxwell’s film rendition of the historical fiction novel \textit{Killer Angels}. \textit{The Killer Angels} and subsequently, \textit{Gettysburg} has “represented the Battle for millions of people and may be the most influential archive of memory about [Gettysburg].”\textsuperscript{163} This understanding is important because as Gallagher has argued, “recent films have been a great influence since they affect what battles and generals that the public will see”.\textsuperscript{164} The four-hour epic gave the public a romanticized view of valiant battle scenes of Gettysburg primarily from the Southern perspective and only focused on two events from the battle, Chamberlain defending Little Round Top and Pickett’s Charge. It is important to understand, while \textit{Gettysburg} is based on an historical fiction novel, the main objective of film and media is to entertain and appease its

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid. Pg. 1094.
\textsuperscript{164} Gallagher, Gary W. \textit{Causes Won, Lost & Forgotten: How Hollywood And Popular Art Shape What We Know About The Civil War}. Pg. 142.
audience. Therefore, the film took an overwhelmingly reconciliationist approach that attempted to paint both sides of the conflict in a positive way, but ultimately made Lee the hero of the movie as he was portrayed as an “underdog trying to win against all odds”, a key element of the Lost Cause myth which is conveniently also a historically endorsed role in American culture. Ultimately, the movie was not meant to be a movie that supported either the North or the South, but rather a film portraying the American spirit of bravery, courage, and brotherhood.\textsuperscript{165}

This approach shows how \textit{Gettysburg} was able to influence the popular memory in remembering Gettysburg for Lee and its courageous and romanticized fighting. \textit{Gettysburg} was a perfect example of how the memory of the battle can trump the reality of what happened at the battle and what the war really means. \textit{Gettysburg} gave the people what they wanted and what they have been told their whole lives; Lee is the legend of the battle, heroic and courageous battle scenes, and reconciled brotherhood that painted both sides in a positive way.\textsuperscript{166}

“Gettysburg was embraced as a symbol for reconciliation”.\textsuperscript{167} Each influence that portrays Gettysburg as a reconciliationist memory has been repeated over generations that have allowed for this embrace to persist into an established popular memory. It began with Southern veterans and then their hereditary associations that established a Lost Cause memory. This memory used Lee as their legend and savior that focused on omitting slavery, emancipation, and secession from the narrative by focusing exclusively the courage and bravery displayed by soldiers despite their deficiencies of manpower and resources compared to the Union forces.

This Lost Cause memory would soon evolve into a desire to reconcile between the North and South as reconstruction failed. Driven by the force of publicized Blue and Gray Reunions, a

\begin{footnotes}
\item[167] Blight, David. \textit{Beyond the Battlefield}. Pg. 182.
\end{footnotes}
reconciliationist memory was born as the nation yearned to “forget the quarrel of the Civil War” at the expense of remembering its very cause. Instead of Gettysburg being a symbol of victory for emancipation and a commitment of “a new birth of freedom” as Abraham Lincoln intended, Gettysburg has become a reconciled memory that is more remembered as the symbol of bravery, brotherhood, and Lee.

The Gettysburg Address, on the other hand, appears to be the anomaly in popular memory. In public memory, the Gettysburg Address and Lincoln have been forever intertwined in the memory of the Gettysburg. However, despite its reverence as one of the most prolific speeches in American history, this is where the memory stops. Memory insists on remembering the speech for its simplicity and the myth that Lincoln wrote it on the train on his way to Gettysburg in November of 1863. This is yet another influence by reconciliation and the Lost Cause because it distracts from understanding what the Address was meant to stand for. Lincoln used his Address as an opportunity to make Gettysburg a symbol for an opportunity for the United States to have a second chance to achieve the goals of the Declaration of Independence. However, emancipation and Lincoln’s true goal of equality and restoring the nation in the memory of the Gettysburg Address, all in the name of reconciliation.

Garry Wills has helped us understand the true meaning of the Address and Lincoln’s attempt at putting the Civil War into a larger context of meaning and therefore engineering Gettysburg as the symbol for how one should remember the Civil War. “Gettysburg would become a symbol of national purpose, pride, and ideals”.168 Despite this truth, Gettysburg has become a symbol of pride from Confederate and Union memory that have contradicting ideals all due to the cemented reconciliationist memory. Wills points out how the North and South

jockeyed for control of how the Battle of Gettysburg would be interpreted. Lincoln on the other hand, used his Address to win the interpretation of how the whole war should be understood ideologically and militarily. Lincoln’s speech did not intend to speak directly about Gettysburg. His address was meant to use Gettysburg as a symbol as a part of larger process in the nation’s attempts to correct what Lincoln saw as the Founders not being able to accomplish in the Declaration of Independence, established an equal nation by ending slavery.

A key misinterpretation by public memory is that the Gettysburg Address honors the soldiers that fought at Gettysburg. This is yet another clear attempt at instilling a reconciliationist memory. Wills argues that Lincoln does not mourn a single soldier in his speech but rather focuses on a “new birth of freedom” for the nation. However, what has allowed for this misinterpretation is the fact that Lincoln himself omitted the words slavery. But he also purposely omitted the words war, union, Gettysburg, and Civil War. Wills argues that this was intentional for two reasons: one, to make clear that he was speaking of a larger context of meaning, not directly about the war, but his speech was also call for the betterment of the whole nation and secondly, Lincoln recognized “the spirit of the age, towards slavery, was hostility in principle, and toleration only by necessity”.

The Gettysburg Address was meant to instill a memory that was to recognize the wrongs of the nation and to come together to finish what was started with the Declaration of Independence. Lincoln saw his Address as an opportunity to address the nation publicly outside of proclamations or congressional reports. Lincoln’s goal was to not honor the dead or even condemn the wrongs of the nation. He understood the past cannot be changed. However, he did

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169 Ibid. Pg. 37.
170 Ibid. Pg. 87.
171 Ibid. Pg. 77.
172 Ibid. Pg. 102.
believe that this moment was an opportunity to make things right, as they were intended by the Founding Fathers. The United States was living a false promise of having a self-governing state founded on equality. The Gettysburg Address was meant to acknowledge this unfinished business that formerly establish an equal state and restore the nation once and for all. 173

Lincoln and his Address had the opportunity to instill a memory of the Battle of Gettysburg as a symbol of “a new birth of freedom” for all people of the United States. However, overtaken by the Lost Cause, and repeated over generations that viewed Gettysburg as a place where both sides fought valiantly this quote has become misunderstood to be remembered as a slogan for reconciliation instead of emancipation.

173 Ibid.
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