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2022

**A New World Order: Amidst the Russo-Ukrainian War and an Evolving
International Order, the United States Must Utilize Multilateralism to
Reassert Itself as the Global Leader**

Andrew McAlister

Introduction

“Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked the re-emergence of war on the European continent, and an ultimate attempt to correct the Western-led system prevailing since the end of the Cold War.”¹

The world is on the verge of a new international order. The international order that the U.S. has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War no longer exists.² Challengers to the U.S.’ previous global leadership have emerged on the international stage, and seek the implementation of a new international order.³ Witnessing a weakening Western-led world order, Russia is eager to capitalize on the opportunity to free itself from the binding Cold War era arrangements and foster a new, Russian-favorable world order.⁴ Evidence of the Russian desire for a new world order can be found in acts before the invasion of Ukraine; as Russian President Vladimir Putin engaged in increased relations with Chinese President Xi Jinping.⁵ In a February meeting, Putin and Xi united their opposition of NATO, and called for a halt of NATO expansion.⁶ As a result of this meeting, Putin announced a “new era” of relations in a letter released in China’s state media.⁷ Following this announcement of a “new era,” Russia invaded Ukraine, marking the first

¹ Interview with Fyodor A. Lukyanov, Ed. in Chief, Russia in Global Aff. (October 13, 2022),

<https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/ukraine-russia-and-new-world-order>.

² Paul D. Miller, *Leading the Free World: How America benefits*, Atlantic Counsel (December 20, 2019), <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/leading-the-free-world-how-america-benefits/>; See also Joe Biden, *National Security Strategy Address*, The White House at 2 (October 12, 2022) (“We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order.”).

³ Jutta Brunnée, *Multilateralism in Crisis*, American Society of International Law at 337 (2018) (“We are witnessing the rise of major regional or even global powers outside of the West – China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey...”).

⁴ Note 1.

⁵ CNN’s Beijing Bureau & Ann Chernova, *Putin and Xi call for halt to NATO expansion during show of unity at Beijing Olympics*, CNN (February 4, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/04/world/china-russia-xi-putin-meeting-nato-intl/index.html>.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.*

steps towards removing itself from the post-World War II and post-Cold War international order.⁸

President Trump’s renunciation of multilateralism, coupled with the emergence of new world powers have shaken the previous global order.⁹ Though not the global superpower that it once was, the U.S. remains a leading world power; the evolving world order presents the U.S. with an opportunity to reassert itself as the dominant world power that it became in the post-Cold War era.¹⁰ In order to reaffirm itself as a major power in a developing world order, the U.S. must lead the world in its opposition against Russian aggression through multilateral coordination, using diplomacy to build the strong international relationships.

The U.S. has a vested interest in becoming a global power capable of directing the international order. President Biden is aware of the shifting global order.¹¹ In his National Security Strategy address, he outlines the goals and vision of the U.S. moving forward during the changing global landscape. President Biden commits the U.S. to developing a “world that is free, open, secure, and prosperous.”¹² Ensuring U.S. support for the “foundational principles of self-determination, territorial integrity, and political independence.”¹³ President Biden goes on to state that the U.S. will strive to see that international institutions are strengthened, and that universal human rights are defended.¹⁴ These statements by President Biden form the U.S.’ world vision. Ultimately, through the implementation of the U.S., it will be better suited to

⁸ Nectar Gan, *Xi and Putin want to create a new world order. Russia’s setback in Ukraine could spoil their plans*, CNN (September 15, 2022), <https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/14/china/xi-putin-meeting-sco-summit-analysis-intl-hnk>.

⁹ Joe Biden, *National Security Strategy*, The White House (“...the U.S. remains the world’s leading power.”).

¹⁰ Note 9, at 2 (“We are now in the early years of a decisive decade for America and the world. The terms of geopolitical competition between major powers will be set.”).

¹¹ Note 9, at 2 (“We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order.”).

¹² Note 9, at 2.

¹³ Note 9, at 6.

¹⁴ Note 9, at 6.

protect its own interests; the security of the American people and their prosperity, and to defend and support democracies around the world.¹⁵

Of course, not every nation will benefit from an international order headed by the U.S. Nations that are pushing for a change in the current world order, such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea will oppose such leadership. If the U.S. is to return to a level of global leadership it once enjoyed, it will be able to combat adversarial values that other nations may support. However, this paper focuses on the interests of the U.S. and what it should do to remain atop the shifting global order, and not the states that will oppose U.S. global leadership.¹⁶

This paper will establish that through U.S.-led multilateralism as a response to the Russo-Ukrainian War, the U.S. will be able to return as a powerful global leader in an evolving international order. The U.S.-led multilateralism should (1) continue to employ sanctions upon Russia, and (2) continue to provide military aid to Ukraine.¹⁷ Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and Ukraine's sustained success in staving off Russia shows that multilateral cooperation is effective in providing aid and can effectively support a state that is a victim of the aggression of another state. Part I discusses the foundations of multilateralism and the relevant international law principles. Part II examines the history of multilateralism in the context of the U.S., and the departure from multilateral principles by the Trump administration. Part III outlines the timeline of events that led up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent multilateral coordination of Ukrainian support. Lastly, Part IV establishes which actions by the Biden

¹⁵ Note 9, at 7.

¹⁶ Dmitri Trenin, *Ask Judy: Can the U.S. Regain Its Global Leadership?*, Carnegie Europe (October 15, 2020), <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/82962> (“In Russia, few people would vote for U.S. global leadership.”).

¹⁷ Note 9, at 1 (“Around the world, the need for American leadership is as great as it has ever been. We are in the midst of a strategic competition to shape the future of the international order.”).

administration have proved successful in aiding Ukraine, and how the Biden administration should proceed to support Ukraine with the goal of increasing multilateral coordination in mind.

I. Contemporary Multilateralism and Relevant International Law

“[M]ultilateralism is an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of “generalized” principles of conduct—that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to particularistic interests of parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.”¹⁸

The U.S. has enjoyed heavy influence on the international agenda since the end of World War II.¹⁹ A driving force in the U.S.’ strategy has been multilateralism as seen in the U.S.’ contribution to the creation of multiple international institutions, like the United Nations (U.N.) and the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO).²⁰ Since its inception in 1945, the U.N. has grown from fifty-one original member states to one hundred ninety-three member states.²¹ While NATO has grown from its originating twelve member states in 1949, to its current number of thirty member states, with multiple states awaiting admission.²²

Former President Donald Trump halted decades of U.S. involvement in international institutions, treaties, and agreements. The foreign policies implemented during the Trump presidency threatened the exact multilateralist ideals that the U.S. championed for nearly a century. President Trump championed an “America first” foreign policy, withdrawing the U.S.

¹⁸ John Ruggie, *Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution*, 46 Int’l Org. at 562, 572 (1992).

¹⁹ Note 3, at 336 (2018).

²⁰ See note 9, at 32 (“Since 1945, the U.S. has led the creation of institutions, norms, and standards to govern international trade and investment, economic policy, and technology. These mechanisms advanced America’s economic and geopolitical aims and benefited people around the world by shaping how governments and economies interacted—and did so in ways that aligned with U.S interests and values.”).

²¹ *About Us*, The United Nations (2022), <https://www.un.org/en/about-us#:~:text=Member-States,members%20of%20the%20General%20Assembly>.

²² *Member Countries*, NATO (October 4, 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm#:~:text=At%20present%2C%20NATO%20has%2030,Kingdom%20and%20the%20United%20States.

from multiple international treaties and institutions.²³ Trump’s withdrawals included a number of multilateral treaties; namely the United Nations Human Rights Council, the Paris Agreement, and the World Health Organization.²⁴ The Trump administration’s rejection of international cooperation represented an exceptional renunciation of multilateralism in the post-war era.²⁵

In response to the isolationism employed by the Trump administration, President Biden campaigned on the premise of returning to multilateralism and restoring faith in the international institutions that the U.S. devoted decades of energy and resources to establish.²⁶ President Biden began his presidency by reentering the U.S. in multiple international agreements.²⁷ President Biden stressed the importance of strengthening the alliances the U.S. had built over the previous decades.²⁸ While President Biden had already demonstrated his willingness to recommit the U.S. to multilateral coordination, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced the issue of recommitment to multilateralism upon President Biden.

A. *Foundations of Multilateralism*

Multilateralism can be defined as “the coordination of relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles.”²⁹ The “principles” specify which conduct is

²³ Oona Hathaway, *Reengaging on Treaties and Other International Agreements (Part 1): President Donald Trump’s Rejection of International Law*, Just Security (October 2, 2020), <https://www.justsecurity.org/72656/reengaging-on-treaties-and-other-international-agreements-part-i-president-donald-trumps-rejection-of-international-law/>.

²⁴ *Id.*

²⁵ *Id.*

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ Lindsay Maizland, *Biden’s First Foreign Policy Move: Reentering International Agreements*, Council on Foreign Relations (January 21, 2021), <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/bidens-first-foreign-policy-move-reentering-international-agreements>; See also *Biden Administration Reengages with International Institutions and Agreements*, 115 *American Journal of International Law*, 323-329 (2001) (reporting the Biden Administration has rejoined the Paris Climate Agreement, stopped the U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization, and announced the U.S. participation in the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility).

²⁸ Note 9, at 1 (“We have reinvigorated America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships to uphold and strengthen the principles and institutions that have enabled so much stability, prosperity, and growth for the last 75 years.”).

²⁹ Note 18, at 568.

appropriate for a class of actions, regardless of the states involved and their interests, or any extrinsic circumstances.³⁰ During the twentieth-century, multilateralism evolved into what we know it as today, the world witnessed the rise of “institutions” within the international sphere.³¹

The addition of institutions complicated the relatively simple world order that had previously existed, creating new problems.³² International institutions hold great power as they possess the ability to impact international agenda-setting; they have created legal and procedural norms that shape the international conduct of states.³³

A goal of multilateralism, relevant to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, is the promotion of peace through institutional arrangements that aim to create collective security.³⁴ Collective security promotes peace by discouraging acts of aggression towards members of the collective security apparatus.³⁵ In principle, an act of aggression towards one member state of the collective security apparatus, constitutes an act of aggression towards all member states, and warrants a response from all member states of the collective security apparatus.³⁶ Due to the expected collective response from multiple states, the would-be aggressor is deterred; thus, decreasing acts of aggression and subsequently decreasing wars.³⁷ The U.N. and NATO are both collective security institutions relevant to this case.

³⁰ *Id.* at 571.

³¹ Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, University of California Press at 157 (2002).

³² Note 18, at 584.

³³ Note 31, at 42 (explaining the United Nations preamble aims to prevent war, reaffirm human rights, promote social progress, procure the social and economic advancements for all people).

³⁴ Note 18, at 569.

³⁵ *Id.* at 569.

³⁶ Roland N. Stromberg, *The Idea of Collective Security*, University of Pennsylvania Press Vol. 17, No. 2 at 256 (April 1956)

³⁷ *Id.* at 256.

Multilateralism is not a new phenomenon, and it is not stagnant. In the hyper-globalized world that exists today, multilateralism is as robust as ever. Multilateral institutions exist in every corner of the international arena, it is nearly impossible for states to avoid multilateralism.

B. Relevant International Law

International Law refers to rules of conduct that are binding on states and other international actors in relations, transactions, and problems that cross national borders or implicate core human values.³⁸ International law aims to establish and maintain order, enhance reliable expectations, and protect persons and states, their property, and their interests.³⁹ Within the framework of international law exists customary international law. Customary international law refers to “international customs, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”⁴⁰ Customary international law establishes the foundation of restrictions that may apply to state actions.

An important subsection of international law is *jus cogens* (peremptory norms). *Jus cogens* establishes that some customary norms are of a higher legal rank than other norms; in fact, the norms are so fundamental that derogation from them can never be allowed.⁴¹ *Jus cogens* can be identified as norms that are “accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole.”⁴² A number of the largely agreed upon norms that are considered to be *jus cogens* are relevant to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; (a) the prohibition of aggressive use of force; (b) the right to self-defense; (c) the prohibition of torture; (d) crimes against humanity; and (e) the prohibition of hostilities directed at civilian populations.⁴³

³⁸ Louis Hengin, *International Law: Politics and Value*, Springer at 4-5 (1995).

³⁹ *Id.* at 4.

⁴⁰ I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 38(b)(1).

⁴¹ Koskenniemi, *Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and Expansion of International Law*, Report of the Study Group of the International Law at 361 (2006).

⁴² *Id.* at 375.

⁴³ *Id.* at 374.

A common critique of international law is the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism.⁴⁴ However, means do exist that operate as an enforcement mechanism. Non-forcible collective action by other states can produce effective enforcement measures. These actions include an array of sanctions, differing in severity.⁴⁵ Forcible measures also exist, including self-defense and collective self-defense.⁴⁶

II. Multilateral History in the Context of the U.S.

A. *Multilateral Foundations in the U.S.*

The U.S. has utilized multilateralism has for decades.⁴⁷ As the world has become increasingly interconnected, multilateralism has evolved; specifically, since the end of World War II. Since 1945, multilateralism has exploded through the sheer number of multilateral arrangements that envelope a wide range of areas.⁴⁸ Currently, the U.S. is member to fourteen multilateral trade agreements with twenty different countries.⁴⁹ The most relevant multilateral institutions for the subjects of this paper include the U.N. and the NATO, of which the U.S. is a key member of both.

In its conception, the U.S. was founded on unilateral principles.⁵⁰ The Founding Fathers were adamant in establishing unilateralism as the foreign policy of the U.S., aiming to “steer

⁴⁴ See Lori Damrosch, *Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forcible Measures*, Volume 269 at 19-22, 24 (1997) (explaining the difficulties of multilateral enforcement of sanctions).

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 24.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 24.

⁴⁷ Note 9, at 2 (President Biden acknowledges the alliances and multilateral arrangements the U.S. has been a part of for seventy-five years).

⁴⁸ Note 18, at 584.

⁴⁹ *Outcomes of Current U.S. Trade Agreements*, U.S. Department of State (2022), <https://www.state.gov/trade-agreements/outcomes-of-current-u-s-trade-agreements/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20has%20implemented,a%20total%20of%2020%20countries>.

⁵⁰ Maria Kiani, *US Unilateralism Versus Post-Cold War Multilateralism*, *Strategic Studies* Vol. 23, No. 3, Autumn 2003 at 103 (2003) (explaining President Thomas Jefferson stated the U.S. should have “no entangling alliances” in his inaugural address in 1801, setting the foundation for U.S. unilateralism).

clear of permanent alliance[s] with any portion of the foreign world.”⁵¹ But as technology and the global economy progressed, America’s involvement in the international community was inevitable. The First World War thrust America into the international sphere as a global power.

Under President Woodrow Wilson, following World War I, the U.S. began to implement multilateralism in its foreign policy.⁵² The U.S. spearheaded the establishment of international organizations for the regulation of international relations; resulting in the League of Nations in 1919.⁵³ Despite the U.S.’ increased participation in foreign affairs and the creation of an international organization, the U.S. remained on the outside of increasing multilateralism and failed to join the League of Nations.⁵⁴ It was not until the 1940s and World War II that forced President Franklin Roosevelt to fully commit the U.S. to internationalism.⁵⁵

B. “Post-War” Multilateralism and the U.S.

As the victorious side in World War II, the U.S. was cemented as the world’s most powerful nation.⁵⁶ The U.S. held over half of the world’s industrial capacity, nearly two-thirds of the world’s gold reserves, and boasted the world’s largest and strongest military.⁵⁷ With this new found power, Roosevelt was aware that returning to “fortress America” was not an option.⁵⁸ It was time for America to establish a collective security organization, one that could further the U.S.’ ideal world view.⁵⁹ The U.S. was important to the establishment of the U.N., as it hosted the signing of the United Nations Charter, and, unlike the League of Nations, the U.S. joined the

⁵¹ *Id.* at 104 (reporting the farewell address of President George Washington, to which Thomas Jefferson reaffirmed the unilateral principles in his inaugural address).

⁵² *Id.* at 107.

⁵³ *Id.* at 107.

⁵⁴ *Id.* at 107.

⁵⁵ *Id.* at 108.

⁵⁶ Note 18, at 586.

⁵⁷ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London at 459 (1989).

⁵⁸ Note 18, at 587.

⁵⁹ *Id.* at 587 (the expansion and support of democracy remains an important goal of U.S. foreign policy).

U.N. as a permanent member.⁶⁰ The U.N. was formed as a collective security apparatus in which the members “vowed to rid the world from the ‘scourge of war.’”⁶¹

The U.S.-led multilateral surge was not only concerned with security and maintaining peace; in addition to the U.N., the U.S. was involved in the establishment of a series of economic centered multilateral initiatives.⁶² In an attempt to stabilize the international capitalist economic system, the U.S. hosted the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944.⁶³ This conference fostered the establishment of two major economic international organizations still in operation today, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)and the World Bank.⁶⁴

In the late 1940s, the U.S. again spearheaded the creation of a multilateral institution in NATO.⁶⁵ European and North American countries created NATO as a collective security system in response to the growing threat posed by Soviet Russia.⁶⁶ The members of NATO committed to “share the risks and responsibilities of collective security while upholding their individual rights as well as their obligations according to the U.N. Charter.”⁶⁷ NATO was founded under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which established the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.⁶⁸ NATO’s objective is to deter a potential aggressor through the collective action that it will face from all members of NATO, and not just the single state that is the victim of the act of aggression.

⁶⁰ Note 50, at 108.

⁶¹ *Id.* at 108.

⁶² *Id.* at 108.

⁶³ *Id.* at 108.

⁶⁴ *Id.* at 108. *See also The IMF and World Bank*, International Monetary Fund (2022) (explaining the “IMF and the World Bank share a common goal of raising living standards in their member countries.”).

⁶⁵ Note 50, at 108.

⁶⁶ *Id.* at 108.

⁶⁷ *NATO Handbook*, NATO (2022), www.nato.int/doc/handbook/2001/hb0101.htm.

⁶⁸ Note 18, at 589; *See also* U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess. U.N. Charter, Art. 51, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>.

The power the U.S. held after World War II enabled it to impose a great deal of influence on the international order. The U.S. implemented multilateralism in its foreign policy to fulfill its “vision as to what constitutes a desirable world order.”⁶⁹

C. Cold War Multilateralism

The multilateral dominance enjoyed by the U.S. was shaken in the 1960s as decolonization surged and more countries entered the world stage.⁷⁰ As the standoff between the US and the USSR intensified, the U.S. stood by multilateralism as a means to achieve its goals; establishing the U.N. as an important tool for furthering geo-strategic interest.⁷¹

Nearly forty years after World War II, the U.S. again found itself at the helm of the international order after the Cold War.⁷² The Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the U.S. was once again in a position to influence the multilateral structure.⁷³

In the White House’s “Biden-Harris Administration’s National Security Strategy,” President Biden announces the end of the post-Cold War era.⁷⁴ The U.S. is in a similar position as that of the end of the Cold War, as there is an opportunity for the U.S. to establish itself as an international leader.⁷⁵ President Biden states, “No nation is better positioned to succeed in this competition than the U.S., as long as we work in common cause with those who share our vision of a world that is free, open, secure, and prosperous.”⁷⁶ President Biden is aware of the similarities between multilateralism now and multilateralism at the end of the Cold War; that is

⁶⁹ John Ruggie, *Third Try at World Order? America and Multilateralism after the Cold War*, Political Science Quarterly Vol 109, No. 4 at 560 (1994).

⁷⁰ Note 50, at 110.

⁷¹ *Id.* at 110-111.

⁷² *Id.* at 103.

⁷³ *Id.* at 103.

⁷⁴ Note 9, at 6 (“...the post-Cold War era is definitively over and a competition is underway between the major powers to shape what comes next.”).

⁷⁵ Note 9, at 6.

⁷⁶ Note 9, at 6.

the opportunity that exists for the U.S. to impose its influence on the world order that is to come.⁷⁷

D. American Multilateralism Since 2016

President Donald Trump advocated for “America first” policies, and repeatedly spoke ill of multilateral organizations.⁷⁸ The Trump administration withdrew the U.S. from numerous multilateral agreements, including the U.N. Human Rights Council, the Paris Agreement, and the World Health Organization.⁷⁹ The U.S.’ renunciation of multilateralism under the Trump administration marked the first time since World War II that a major state challenged the foundations of international rule of law.⁸⁰ Under President Trump, the U.S., once “the primary architect of a system of norms and rules across global economics, health, and security in the aftermath of World War II...[was] a disrupter.”⁸¹

President Biden’s proposed foreign policy agenda was to reengage the U.S. in the multilateral sphere and to rejoin the multiple multilateral agreements the Trump administration withdrew America from.⁸² President Biden agreed to rejoin the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization, and the Iran Nuclear Deal.⁸³ Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced President Biden to make good on his promises and required America to reengage in the multilateral sphere. The invasion of Ukraine triggered a resurgence of American multilateralism

⁷⁷ Note 9, at 6

⁷⁸ Note 23 (reporting that Trump’s rhetoric throughout his presidency turned to action as he withdrew the U.S. from multiple international treaties and organizations and halted any processes for joining new agreements).

⁷⁹ *Id.*

⁸⁰ Note 3, at 338.

⁸¹ Rudra Chaudhuri, *Judy Asks: Can the U.S. Regain Its Global Leadership?*, Carnegie Europe (October 15, 2020), <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/82962>.

⁸² Note 9, at 2 (“We have also reinvigorated America’s unmatched network of alliances and partnerships to uphold and strengthen the principles and institutions that have enabled so much stability, prosperity, and growth for the last 75 years.”).

⁸³ Note 81.

and a resurgence of multilateralism institutions as a whole.⁸⁴ International aid provided to Ukraine by the international community has been historic; as of May 17, 2022, Ukraine had received nearly twenty-five billion dollars worth of foreign aid, of which nearly half has been provided by the U.S..⁸⁵

III. Timeline of Russian Aggression

A. *The Russian Annexation of Crimea*

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not Russia's first act of aggression in recent years. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, a peninsula that is internationally recognized as Ukrainian territory.⁸⁶ Russia's unlawful annexation constituted the largest taking of land in Europe since World War II.⁸⁷ The Ukrainian President at the time, Viktor Yanukovich, had been turning Ukraine away from the European Union, and had increased connections with Russia and its President, Vladimir Putin.⁸⁸ On February 27, 2014, a group of armed men seized the Crimean parliament and raised the Russian flag.⁸⁹ Viktor Yanukovich was forced out as president of Ukraine, and new leadership was implemented in Ukraine.⁹⁰ The new leadership warned Moscow to keep troops within its own naval base on the peninsula, but on February 28, armed men overtook two airports in Crimea.⁹¹ Although not a member of NATO, upon the invasion, Ukraine immediately called to NATO for help.⁹² Refraining from any immediate and direct

⁸⁴ Andrew Cheatham, *Rethinking U.S. Engagement with U.N. in Context of Ukraine: Part One*, (March 21, 2022), <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/03/rethinking-us-engagement-un-context-ukraine-part-one>.

⁸⁵ *Adding Up Aid to Ukraine from the U.S. and the Rest of the World*, Committee for Responsible Federal Budget (May 17, 2022), <https://www.crfb.org/blogs/adding-aid-ukraine-us-and-rest-world>.

⁸⁶ Reuters, *Timeline: Political Crisis in Ukraine and Russia's occupation of Crimea*, Reuters (March 8, 2014), <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-timeline/timeline-political-crisis-in-ukraine-and-russias-occupation-of-crimea-idUSBREA270PO20140308>.

⁸⁷ Steven Pifer, *Crimea: Six years after illegal annexation*, Brookings (2020), <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/17/crimea-six-years-after-illegal-annexation/>.

⁸⁸ Note 86.

⁸⁹ *Id.*

⁹⁰ *Id.*

⁹¹ *Id.*

⁹² *Id.*

military response, the U.S. publicly condemned Russia, and warned Russia of economic and political isolation via economic sanctions.⁹³ In addition, the E.U. and the U.S. created “Crimean packages” of sanctions against Russia.⁹⁴

Since the illegal occupation began, over 140,000 ethnic Ukrainians have fled Crimea.⁹⁵ Currently, there is active work within the international courts to hold Russia accountable for its act of aggression.⁹⁶ Russia violated multiple international treaties; including the non-intervention provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the 1990 Paris Charter, the 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine, and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances.⁹⁷ Despite the collective international recognition of Russia’s crimes, Russia continues to illegally occupy Crimea.⁹⁸

The multilateral response from the U.S. and the international community to the Russian annexation of Crimea was much different than the reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The extent of multilateral intervention during Russia’s annexation of Crimea was the implementation of a few uncoordinated sanctions. For the most part, the U.S. acted independently while it aided Ukraine. From the time of annexation of Crimea in February 2014 through December 2019, the U.S. had provided \$1.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine.⁹⁹ This aid included military technology, such as lethal weaponry like Javelin antitank missiles.¹⁰⁰

⁹³ *Id.*

⁹⁴ United Nations, *International Response*, Crimea Platform (2021), <https://crimea-platform.org/en/news/international-response>.

⁹⁵ Note 87.

⁹⁶ Note 86.

⁹⁷ Katya Kruk, *The Crimean Factor: How the European Union Reacted to Russia’s Annexation of Crimea*, The Warsaw Institute (May 7, 2019), <https://warsawinstitute.org/crimean-factor-european-union-reacted-russias-annexation-crimea/>.

⁹⁸ Note 86.

⁹⁹ Lucian Kim, *How U.S. Military Aid has Helped Ukraine Since 2014*, NPR (December 18, 2019), <https://www.npr.org/2019/12/18/788874844/how-u-s-military-aid-has-helped-ukraine-since-2014>.

¹⁰⁰ *Id.*

Through 2019, the U.S. accounted for ninety percent of Ukraine's foreign military aid.¹⁰¹

Indicating that prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, support provided to Ukraine was largely unilateral on behalf of the U.S.

In addition to the aid provided to Ukraine by the U.S., sanctions had also been implemented on Russia by President Obama and continued under President Trump.¹⁰² However, the round of sanctions were not very effective. Only fifteen percent of Russians thought that the U.S. economic sanctions against their country were a critical threat.¹⁰³ The Russian public placed other threats to their country above the threat of U.S. sanctions; including but not limited to international terrorism, North Korea's nuclear program, climate change, and Islamic fundamentalism.¹⁰⁴ The lack of multilateral coordination on the Crimean sanctions rendered them relatively ineffective.

B. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine

On February 21, 2022, the world witnessed the most severe invasion of a sovereign state in recent history as Vladimir Putin sent Russian forces into eastern Ukraine.¹⁰⁵ By the next day, the U.S., Britain, and their allies sanctioned Russian parliament members and banks, and Germany halted the Norm Stream 2 gas pipeline project.¹⁰⁶ Despite the swift response from the international community, Putin escalated the invasion. Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine and authorized missile and artillery attacks on Kiev and other major Ukrainian cities on

¹⁰¹ *Id.*

¹⁰² Dina Smeltz Et al., *American and Russian Opinion at a Standoff on Crimea Sanctions*, Chicago Council on Global Affairs (January 1, 2018).

¹⁰³ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁰⁴ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁰⁵ Reuters, *Timeline: The events leading up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine*, (March 1, 2022), <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/events-leading-up-russias-invasion-ukraine-2022-02-28/>.

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*

February 24th.¹⁰⁷ Rapid multilateral action was again deployed as new sanctions were announced, some of which cut off Russian banks from the global payments system.¹⁰⁸

After months of fighting, on October 5, 2022, Putin annexed four more Ukrainian Regions.¹⁰⁹ Again, the international community responded without hesitation and instituted additional sanctions on over 1,000 Russian individuals and companies.¹¹⁰ While the war rages on, the U.S. and its allies have provided unprecedented amounts of foreign military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Aside from the U.S., Ukraine has received a total of \$23.6 billion of aid from thirty-one foreign countries.¹¹¹

IV. How the Biden Administration Must Move Forward with Russia

Russian victory in Ukraine would be a disastrous result for the U.S., NATO, and its allies. Russian seizure of Ukraine would expand Moscow's influence in the region and tip power in Europe towards Russia.¹¹² Any justifications offered for the invasion by Russia were quickly exposed; Russia's cited security concerns were not credible, and instead the war is an attempt to expand Russian power and influence.¹¹³

The world has reacted with unprecedented levels of multilateral coordination led by the U.S. Swift and effective action has been taken by dozens of states in efforts to support Ukraine.

¹⁰⁷ *Id.*

¹⁰⁸ *Id.*

¹⁰⁹ Madeline Fitzgerald, *Russia Invades Ukraine: A Timeline of the Crisis*, U.S. News & World Report (October 5, 2022), <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/slideshows/a-timeline-of-the-russia-ukraine-conflict?slide=14>.

¹¹⁰ Matthew Lee, et al. *Biden Vows Russia Won't 'Get Away With' Ukraine Annexation*, Associated Press (September 30, 2022), <https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2022-09-30/us-hits-russia-with-sanctions-for-annexing-ukrainian-regions>.

¹¹¹ Note 85.

¹¹² Note 8.

¹¹³ James E. Cronin, *A New World Order? On the world after Ukraine*, Boston College Magazine (Summer 2022), <https://www.bc.edu/content/bc-web/sites/bc-magazine/summer-2022/features/new-world-order-/on-the-world-after-ukraine.html>.

More than fifty countries are actively supporting Ukraine’s defense.¹¹⁴ As of September 8, 2022, the Biden administration and the U.S. had provided \$15.2 billion in military assistance for Ukraine.¹¹⁵

On February 25, 2022, one day after the invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. introduced a U.N. resolution that was cosponsored by eighty fellow U.N. member states.¹¹⁶ The resolution demanded an end to the invasion and established that Russia is solely responsible for the violence.¹¹⁷ Shortly thereafter, an Emergency Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly was called for by the Security Council.¹¹⁸ The Special Session produced historical repudiation of Russia’s aggression; one hundred forty-one U.N. member states voted in support of condemning Russia’s aggression and called for an end to the invasion.¹¹⁹ The international community further isolated Russia through U.N. Human Rights Council’s establishment of a “Commission of Inquiry,” which is the highest degree of scrutiny the Council can create.¹²⁰ The immediate response by countless nations to Russia’s invasion is an example of multilateral coordination at its peak.

The United Nations is not the only multilateral institution that has been galvanized multilateral coordination in response to Russia’s war. NATO and its allies have been roused by Russia’s attacks, and have responded with decisive, united, and swift action. NATO allies have

¹¹⁴ Anthony J. Blinken, *\$2.8 Billion in Additional U.S. Military Assistance for Ukraine and Its Neighbors* (September 8, 2022), <https://www.state.gov/2-8-billion-in-additional-u-s-military-assistance-for-ukraine-and-its-neighbors/#:~:text=These%20announcements%20will%20bring%20the,countries%20to%20support%20Ukraine%27s%20defense.>

¹¹⁵ *Id.*

¹¹⁶ Ned Price, *U.S. Multilateral Leadership on the Crisis in Ukraine*, U.S. Department of State (March 5, 2022), <https://www.state.gov/u-s-multilateral-leadership-on-the-crisis-in-ukraine/>.

¹¹⁷ *Id.*

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

¹¹⁹ *Id.*

¹²⁰ *Id.*

mobilized tens of thousands of troops and have placed them under direct NATO command.¹²¹ In an effort to strengthen its deterrence and defense NATO has fortified Eastern Europe by adding troops in Germany, Poland, Romania, and the Baltics.¹²²

A. President Biden must continue to lead the international community in implementing sanctions on Russia

Multilateral coordination has surged since Russia invaded Ukraine in February. One of the most important weapons employed by the international community has been the use of sanctions. Sanctions have been the foreign policy tool of choice of the U.S. throughout the twenty-first century. Sanctions allow a state to show official displeasure of a certain behavior, and work to compel the state that has been sanctioned to change its behavior.¹²³ Sanctions allow a state to reprimand another state without involving any military action, which is important in the case of Russia given the nuclear implications involved.

Sanctions are often criticized as an ineffective foreign policy tool.¹²⁴ Unilateral sanctions imposed by the U.S. often times inflict greater costs on American firms and American civilians than the intended targets.¹²⁵ The global economy makes it relatively easy for a state to avoid the effects of sanctions by finding substitutes sources.¹²⁶ However, the sanctions imposed on Russia

¹²¹ Lisa Ferdinando, *NATO Unified, Resolute in Face of Russia's 'Illegal' Ukraine Invasion, Austin Says*, DOD News (October 13, 2022), <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3188194/nato-unified-resolute-in-face-of-russias-illegal-ukraine-invasion-austin-says/>. See Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Strengthening the US and NATO defense postures in Europe after Russia's invasion of Ukraine*, Brookings (June 21, 2022) (reporting the U.S. has sent 20,000 troops to the already 80,000 existing in Europe).

¹²² Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Strengthening the US and NATO defense postures in Europe after Russia's invasion of Ukraine*, Brookings (June 21, 2022).

¹²³ Richard N. Hass, *Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing*, Brookings (June 1, 1998), <https://www.brookings.edu/research/economic-sanctions-too-much-of-a-bad-thing/>.

¹²⁴ *Id.*

¹²⁵ *Id.*

¹²⁶ *Id.*

have been coordinated multilaterally, and have been imposed on a much greater scale than seen during the annexation of Crimea.

On February 26, 2022, the U.S., the European Commission, the United Kingdom, and Canada announced the first multilaterally coordinated sanction imposed on Russia.¹²⁷ Select Russian banks were removed from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), one of the strongest financial penalties.¹²⁸ SWIFT is imperative to smooth and rapid financial transactions across borders.¹²⁹ SWIFT links 11,000 banks and institutions in more than two hundred countries.¹³⁰ SWIFT coordinated with its international partners mentioned above, and officially implemented the ban on selected Russian banks on March 12, 2022.¹³¹

The ban from SWIFT froze the Russian banks' ability to transact with the rest of the world.¹³² The sanctions immediately impacted the Russian economy, the Ruble dropped roughly thirty percent, while the central bank doubled interest rates and imposed controls on payments abroad.¹³³ The SWIFT sanctions resulted in the largest financial disruption in Russia since 1998.¹³⁴ Russian companies have been disrupted as they no longer enjoy the smooth and instant transactions that SWIFT provides.¹³⁵ Russian banks now have to deal directly with each other,

¹²⁷ Alessandro Rebutti, *SWIFT Sanction on Russia: How it Works and Likely Impacts*, EconoFact (March 4, 2022), <https://econofact.org/swift-sanction-on-russia-how-it-works-and-likely-impacts>.

¹²⁸ *Id.*

¹²⁹ Russel Hotten, *Ukraine conflict: What is Swift and why is banning Russia so significant?*, BBC (May 4, 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-60521822>.

¹³⁰ *Id.*

¹³¹ Note 127.

¹³² *Id.*

¹³³ *Id.*

¹³⁴ *Id.*

¹³⁵ Note 129.

which has added delays and costs; interrupting payments for Russian energy and agricultural exports, ultimately cutting off key revenues for the Russian government.¹³⁶

President Biden has ensured that the U.S. is leading the implementation of sanctions on Russia. In addition to the SWIFT sanctions, on March 8, 2022, President Biden announced the U.S.' import ban on all Russian oil, liquefied natural gas, and coal.¹³⁷ President Biden highlighted the importance of multilateral coordination in his speech stating, "a united response to Putin's aggression has been my overriding focus, to keep NATO and all of the E.U. and our allies totally united."¹³⁸ President Biden is aware that in order to work, the sanctions must not be unilateral. Although the U.S. was the only country to fully ban Russian energy imports, President Biden notes that the ban was implemented in conjunction with the European countries, with the goal of developing a long-term strategy in which they could also limit their imports of Russian energy.¹³⁹ Accordingly, even though the ban was unilateral on behalf of the U.S., it is important that the coordination was multilateral with European allies to ensure continued success.

In total, more than thirty countries have imposed sanctions against Russia.¹⁴⁰ And the coordinated international sanctions are working. There are signs that the Russian fiscal budget is on the verge of a deficit.¹⁴¹ Over one-thousand companies have halted operations in Russia,

¹³⁶ *Id.*

¹³⁷ Remarks by President Biden Announcing U.S. Ban on Imports of Russian Oil, Liquefied Natural Gas, and Coal, The White House (March 8, 2022), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/08/remarks-by-president-biden-announcing-u-s-ban-on-imports-of-russian-oil-liquefied-natural-gas-and-coal/>.

¹³⁸ *Id.*

¹³⁹ *Id.*

¹⁴⁰ *International sanctions are working: Russia feels economic pressure*, U.S. Embassy in Georgia (August 16, 2022), <https://ge.usembassy.gov/international-sanctions-are-working-russia-feels-economic-pressure/>.

¹⁴¹ Alina Selyukh, *Are Russian sanctions working?* NPR (August 7, 2022), <https://www.npr.org/2022/08/07/1116218347/are-russian-sanctions-working>.

imports to Russia are down over fifty percent in 2022, and soon Putin will have to choose between financing the war or the Russian economy.¹⁴²

President Biden has called on the world to punish Russia, and the U.S. must continue to lead the charge against Russia.¹⁴³ The U.S. influenced SWIFT to ban Russian banks.¹⁴⁴ The U.S. was the first nation that banned all Russian energy imports, and now other nations are following the lead.¹⁴⁵ The key to the effectiveness of the sanctions is the multilateral coordination that has occurred between the U.S. and its allies. Unilateral sanctions by the U.S. would not be nearly as effective, if effective at all.¹⁴⁶ The sanctions are working because of the quantity of nations that have imposed them on Russia. The more nations that sanction Russia, the fewer avenues there are for Russia to navigate the sanctions in place. Multilateral coordination is essential to the effectiveness of the sanctions throughout the course of the Russo-Ukrainian War. In order for the U.S. to position itself as the global leader, it is imperative that the U.S. continues to foster multilateral cooperation in the form of the sanctions throughout the war.

The more involved the U.S. is in spearheading the sanctions and multilateral coordination, the easier it will be for the U.S. to influence the international order in its favor. If the U.S. is capable of organizing effective sanctions that lead to the end of the Russo-Ukrainian

¹⁴² Note 140.

¹⁴³ Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, *Biden Calls on World to Punish Russia for Attempt to Annex Ukrainian Land*, The New York Times (September 30, 2022), <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/30/us/biden-putin-russia-ukraine.html> (in response to Russia's latest escalation of annexation Ukrainian territory, President Biden urged all members of the international community to reject Russia's illegal annexation).

¹⁴⁴ Note 127.

¹⁴⁵ *What are the sanctions on Russia and are they hurting its economy*, BBC (September 30, 2022), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659> (the E.U. has stopped importing any Russian coal and will ban all imports of refined oil product from Russia in February 2023). *See also Western nations promise more weapons to Ukraine while ban on Russian coal kicks in*, Susie Blann, PBS (August 11, 2022), <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/western-nations-promise-more-weapons-to-ukraine-while-ban-on-russian-coal-kicks-in> (reporting the Ukrainian demand for more weapons from other nations, and the complete ban on Russian coal in European countries, whom are heavily reliant on Russian energy sources).

¹⁴⁶ *See* U.S. Department of State, *Iran Sanctions*, (2022) (reporting the U.S. has imposed restrictions on Iran since 1979); *See also*, Michael Paulson, *US: History of U.S. Sanctions show most haven't worked*, CorpWatch (May 11, 1999) (reporting that numerous studies show that U.S. sanctions on Iran did not change Iran's behavior).

War, the international community will be more willing to follow the lead of the U.S. as the new world order is developed.

B. The U.S. must continue to lead the world in providing military aid to Ukraine and refrain from engaging in actual military confrontation with Russia

Similar to its push for sanctions, the U.S. must continue to lead the world in financial aid for Ukraine in order to help exert influence of its “ideal world view.”¹⁴⁷ Ukraine has received unprecedented amounts of financial aid from the U.S..¹⁴⁸ Since February 24, 2022, the U.S. has provided \$17.6 billion in security assistance to Ukraine.¹⁴⁹ This includes a wide array of weapons and technology.¹⁵⁰ Nearly fifty allies and partner countries have combined to provide over \$13 billion in security assistance, which also includes thousands of ammunitions and missiles and hundreds of vehicles.¹⁵¹

What was predicted to be a relatively swift and easy invasion for Russia, has turned into an eight-month war with no clear end in sight. Ukraine has thus far defended itself from complete collapse in the face of repeated Russian attacks, which can largely be attributed to the foreign military aid it has been provided. Military aid totaling \$17.6 billion from the world’s largest military would provide nearly any nation the ability to defend Russian attacks for months.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ Note 9, at 10 (“Free, open, prosperous, and secure international order.”).

¹⁴⁸ Alice Speri, *U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine Grows to Historic Proportions – Along with Risks*, The Intercept (September 10, 2022), <https://theintercept.com/2022/09/10/ukraine-military-aid-weapons-oversight/> (reporting since the invasion of Ukraine in February, the U.S. has provided more money and weapons to Ukraine “than it sent in 2020 to Afghanistan, Israel, and Egypt combined.”).

¹⁴⁹ *U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine*, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (October 14, 2022), <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/>.

¹⁵⁰ See note 148 (reporting Ukraine has received over 1,400 Stinger anti-air systems; over 8,500 Javelin anti-armor systems; over 32,000 other anti-armor systems; 20 Mi-17 helicopters; protective gear; funding for training, maintenance, and sustainment).

¹⁵¹ *Id.*

¹⁵² The U.S.’ budget for the military is \$1.94 trillion, the largest in the world by a large margin. USA Spending, *Department of Defense*, USASpending.com (August 30, 2022), <https://www.usaspending.gov/agency/department-of-defense?fy=2022>.

The amount of aid provided by the U.S. evidences the U.S.' commitment to Ukraine long-term. As Secretary of Defense for Public Policy Colin Kahl state, the aid is intended not for “today’s fight” but “for years to come.”¹⁵³ The U.S. aid indicates it is prepared to support Ukraine for as long as it takes, until Russia is defeated or ends its invasion.

The unwavering commitment by the U.S. is important signaling to the rest of the world and will help foster multilateral coordination. When a nation witnesses the U.S. commit billions of dollars to another nation, and state the intentions to support Ukraine for years, they will feel safer committing their own resources to the Ukrainian cause. By garnering support, and resources for Ukraine, the U.S. is already placing itself back as a leader of the international community.

The U.S. has the opportunity similar to those that occurred after World War II and after the Cold-War. The U.S. is still an undeniable superpower with a massive military. Russia also has one of the world’s largest militaries and the rest of the world will not want to commit to war with Russia without the U.S. on its side. This is an opportunity for the U.S. to steer the direction of international landscape. Once this war ends, Russia could be depleted and again the U.S. will find itself on the victorious side with the ability to shape the new global order in which it will be most favorable towards the U.S.

As the U.S. continues to provide military aid to Ukraine, it must be conscious to not deepen its military involvement beyond this. The U.S. can continue to provide Ukraine with monetary aid and military technology, but it must not engage in actual military conflict with Russia. The exception of course is the U.S.’ obligation to the collective security apparatus of

¹⁵³ Tony Bertuca, *DOD details new \$3B aid package for Ukraine*, Inside Defense (August 24, 2022), <https://insidedefense.com/insider/dod-details-new-3b-aid-package-ukraine>.

NATO supersedes its desire to withhold actual military engagement.¹⁵⁴ However, unless Russia directly attacks the U.S. or a NATO member, the U.S. must refrain from direct military engagement with Russia. Conflict between NATO and Russia would almost certainly lead to disastrous consequences.¹⁵⁵ Putin has not been shy in flexing Russia's nuclear capabilities, having made multiple explicit nuclear threats.¹⁵⁶ Direct conflict with Russia could very well result in nuclear war, and the consequences of this is not something that the U.S. should leave to chance. Putin's track record of aggression and blatant disregard for international norms, indicates he would not hesitate to plunge the world into nuclear war. The use of nuclear weapons would result in instant deaths, environmental destruction, famine, and possibly the end of civilization.¹⁵⁷ This is not to say the U.S. should sit idly by as Putin continues to make nuclear threats, and it has not. The continuation of military aid from the U.S., with a focus on avoiding direct military conflict is the best way to avoid World War III and seemingly inevitable use of nuclear weapons.¹⁵⁸

The ability of the U.S. to lead the resolution of the Russo-Ukrainian War, without the use of force on Russia and through multilateral coordination, would position the U.S. as an undeniable world leader with the opportunity to direct the international order with itself at the helm. The immense amount of aid provided by the U.S. signals to the international community that the U.S. is willing to work together and lead the charge against Russia. The U.S. has

¹⁵⁴ Note 9, at 3 (President Biden addresses the need for American leadership as the world is "...at a significant inflection point in world history.").

¹⁵⁵ Tom Z. Collina, *Why America Should Not Deepen Its Military Involvement in Ukraine*, The New York Times (March 18, 2022) ("Nuclear war is within realm of possibility.").

¹⁵⁶ Note 9.

¹⁵⁷ Note 155; *See also* Kurt L. Becker, *Mutually Assured Destruction*, Scientific American, Vol. 308, No. 4 at 8 (April 2013) (the doctrine of mutually assured destruction poses that the use of nuclear weapons is avoided because the use of nuclear weapons would also result in the destruction of the attacking nation).

¹⁵⁸ Note 155.

committed more aid to Ukraine than the rest of the world combined, reasserting itself as a multilateral leader that it once was. This has shifted attitudes of other countries, who increasingly view the U.S. as a reliable partner.¹⁵⁹

C. Moving beyond the Russo-Ukrainian War: The U.S. must continue to foster multilateralism beyond the context of the Russo-Ukrainian War

In the midst of the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Biden Administration sees an evolving international order, which presents the U.S. an opportunity to reverse the isolationism of the Trump Administration and reassert itself as the global leader. If the U.S. is able to facilitate the end of the war through multilateral means, it must not then retreat from multilateralism. If successful, the U.S.-led multilateral coordination exhibited during the course of the Russo-Ukrainian War must continue beyond the context of the war in order for the U.S. to achieve its vision and combat “shared challenges.”¹⁶⁰ The National Security Strategy specifically states that the U.S. cannot combat the vast “shared challenges” alone.¹⁶¹ The success of ending the Russo-Ukrainian War through U.S.-led multilateralism is evidence that it can work, and must continue to combat shared challenges; like, climate change, food insecurity, and terrorism. The U.S. must strengthen international institutions it helped build throughout the twentieth century and increase partnerships with willing nations.

¹⁵⁹ Richard Wike Et al., *International Attitudes Towards the U.S., NATO and Russia in a Time of Crisis*, Pew Research Center (June 22, 2022), <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/international-attitudes-toward-the-u-s-nato-and-russia-in-a-time-of-crisis/> (reporting the increase in favorable attitudes from certain countries between 2021 and 2022).

¹⁶⁰ See note 9, at 2 (shared challenges are global issues that impact people everywhere); See also note 9 at 6 (examples of shared challenges include climate change, food insecurity, communicable disease, terrorism, energy shortages, and inflation).

¹⁶¹ Note 9, at 10 (“We must work with other nations to address shared challenges to improve the lives of the American people and those of the people around the world.”).

V. Conclusion

President Biden is faced with an opportunity to make the U.S. the principle multilateral coordinator of the world. The opportunity to become the lead multilateral coordinator of the international sphere gives the U.S. an opportunity to position itself as a dominant world power for the future.¹⁶² U.S. led multilateralism has surged since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The U.S. has led the world in a coordinated effort to oppose Russian aggression; the U.S. led U.N. resolutions garnered unprecedented support, the U.S. and its allies influenced SWIFT to ban Russian banks and politicians from its system, the U.S. is the first and only nation to ban Russian oil, natural gas, and coal imports, and the U.S. leads the world in military aid provided to Ukraine. The U.S. has re-announced itself as the multilateral leader it had been for the decades after War World II and the Cold War. U.S. power in the international sphere is more important than ever, new states are rising as global powers, the U.S. will need the ability to influence the international sphere.¹⁶³ By leading the world's resistance against Russia, the U.S. can establish itself once again as the world leader during a changing global order.

¹⁶² Note 9, at 1 (“How we respond to the tremendous challenges and unprecedented opportunities we face today will determine the direction of our world and impact the security and prosperity of the American people for generations to come.”).

¹⁶³ See Brune, *supra* note 2 at 337 (“[W]e are witnessing the rise of major regional or even global powers outside of the West—China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey...”).