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Diplomacy Syllabi

School of Diplomacy and International  
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Spring 2023

## **DIPL 6181 Statecraft: Designing Foreign Policy**

Ann Marie Murphy Ph.D.

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**STATECRAFT: DESIGNING FOREIGN POLICY  
DIPLOMACY 6181  
SPRING 2023**

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& by appointment

**COURSE DESCRIPTION**

This course will introduce students to the study of statecraft: the design of strategies to achieve foreign policy goals; the choice of policy instruments within these strategies; and an assessment of their relative utility in achieving national objectives. This class begins by exploring key theoretical underpinnings of statecraft such as bargaining, power, threats, promises and cost/benefit analysis. It then examines different tools of statecraft, including strategic bombing, economic sanctions, foreign aid and trade, targeted killings, and propaganda. The course analyzes the objectives typically associated with each policy tool, the conditions under which they are most likely to be effective in accomplishing these goals, and debates regarding the proper way to measure effectiveness. Using the conceptual tools studied in class, all students will craft a foreign affairs strategy on a topic of their choice.

**REQUIREMENTS**

All students are expected to come to class having read the assigned material and prepared to discuss it in an authoritative manner. Class participation is an important component of this class and will account for 15% of each student's grade. Student responses to their peer's discussion posts count toward the participation grade. There are five graded discussion posts for classes 2-6, which will account for an additional 25% of your final grade. Students will also write a 20-page strategy paper and present their conclusions to the class. The paper and presentation will account for 50% and 10% respectively. Presentations will be made at the end of the semester and papers are due on May 8th.

This course is roughly divided into two sections. The first half of the class is devoted to studying the foundations and tools of statecraft. The second half of class is devoted to constructing the strategy paper. Particularly during the latter part of the course, you will need to *simultaneously* (1) read the assigned text, (2) conduct research on foreign (and domestic) policy of your chosen case, and (3) gradually design a viable cost-effective strategy. To accomplish the task of designing a strategy we will devote the first part of each class to analyzing the assigned texts. The second part of the class will be devoted to applying the material discussed in that class to your cases. Thus, you will not only have to *closely* read the assigned texts before each class, but you will also have to know whether a specific goal is desirable/viable and whether a specific foreign policy tool is available and useful for achieving your country's specific goal(s).

Case studies must be chosen in consultation with the instructor, so it behooves all of you to begin thinking about the country and issue you want to work on as soon as possible. The paper must include a wide variety of primary and secondary sources and include proper citation of sources and a complete bibliography. The structure of the foreign affairs strategy should follow that laid out in the assigned text for this class, Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2007). The book has been ordered in the SHU bookstore. All other readings are available through blackboard.

In addition to the assigned materials, students should keep abreast of major foreign policy issues by reading the *New York Times* and magazines such as *The Economist*, and *Foreign Policy* on a regular basis. The instructor will reference current policy issues to illustrate analytical readings throughout the semester, and it is imperative that students be up to date. Critical contemporary cases that will be referenced during the spring 2023 semester include the Russian war against Ukraine, the North Korean nuclear case, the Iranian nuclear/containment issue, and the multifaceted competition between the U.S. and China among others.

### **Citation Formats**

Papers should utilize the Chicago Manual of Style citation formats for footnotes and bibliography. The guidelines for these formats are on the course Blackboard page.

### **Academic Integrity**

Plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty will be reported to the administration and will result in a lowered or failing grade for the course and may lead to dismissal from the School of Diplomacy. See university and school standards for academic conduct here:

<http://www.shu.edu/offices/student-life/community-standards/community-standards.cfm>

<http://www.shu.edu/academics/diplomacy/academic-conduct.cfm>.

### **Policy on Incompletes**

Incompletes will be given only in exceptional cases for emergencies. Students wishing to request a grade of Incomplete must provide documentation to support the request to the professor *before* the date of the final examination or paper submission. If the incomplete request is approved, the professor reserves the right to specify the new submission date for all missing coursework. Students who fail to submit the missing course work within this time period will receive a failing grade for all missing coursework and a final grade based on all coursework assigned. Any Incomplete not resolved within one calendar year of receiving the Incomplete or by the time of graduation (whichever comes first) automatically becomes an "FI" (which is equivalent to an F). It is the responsibility of the student to make sure they have completed all course requirements within the timeframe allotted. Please be aware that Incompletes on your transcript will impact financial aid and academic standing.

### **Students with Disabilities**

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Civil Rights Restoration Act, students at Seton Hall University who have a disability may be eligible for accommodations in this course. Should a student require such accommodation, he or she must self-identify at the Office of Disability Support Services (DSS), Room 67, Duffy Hall, provide documentation of said disability, and work with DSS to develop a plan for accommodations. The contact person is Ms. Diane Delorenzo at [\(973\) 313-6003](tel:9733136003).

### **CAPS:**

As part of our commitment to the health and well-being of all students, Seton Hall University's Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS) offers initial assessments, counseling, crisis intervention, consultation, and referral services to the SHU community. The CAPS office is located on the second floor of Mooney Hall, room 27. Appointments can be made in-person or by calling 973-761-9500 during regular business hours, Monday-Friday, 8:45 a.m. - 4:45 p.m. In case of a psychological emergency, call CAPS (973-761-9500) at any time to speak to a crisis counselor. For more information, please visit: <https://www.shu.edu/counseling-psychological-services/index.cfm>

## **JAN. 24 CLASS 1 INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS STATECRAFT AND HOW WILL IT BE STUDIED IN THIS COURSE?**

David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 3-28.

**Key Questions:** What is statecraft and why should we study it? Influence attempts are central to statecraft. Explain what an influence attempt is, and why Baldwin argues that it is critical for policymakers and analysts to specify the scope and domain of their influence attempts? What are the four key types of statecraft discussed by Baldwin? What is power, and why is it so central to the study of foreign policy? What is the distinction between power resources and influence?

## **JAN. 31 CLASS 2 FOUNDATIONS OF STATECRAFT: POLICY ENGINEERING, THREATS AND PROMISES**

Philip Zeilkow, "Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again" *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring, 1994) pp. 143-171. Focus on his 7 components of foreign policymaking, which begins on p. 155.

David A. Baldwin, "Thinking About Threats" and "The Power of Positive Sanctions" in *Paradoxes of Power* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989) pp. 45-57, and 58-81.

Case: Iranian Nuclear Chess: After the Deal, Robert Litwak, available on blackboard and at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/irans-nuclear-chess-after-the-deal>

**Key Questions:** Under what conditions are threats/promises more costly? Are positive or negative sanctions necessarily more effective than the other? What type of information would Baldwin contend a policymaker needs to know in order to attempt to exert influence in a given situation? Do we need different conceptual frameworks to analyze military and economic statecraft? What three types of knowledge does Zeilkow contend good policymaking requires? What are the seven components of his policy policy-making process?

Case: Iranian Nuclear Chess: After the Deal, Robert Litwak. This is a long, 130 page report, albeit with lots of charts, footnotes etc. Read the following, although the entire report is very useful. Executive Summary p. 7- 11 and the Introduction p. 13-19. As you read the case, apply the readings to it. Zeilkow makes a distinction between policy objectives and policy preferences—identify them in this case. What tools of statecraft were used to achieve the nuclear deal? Identify the threats and promises used in this case to arrive at the deal from both the U.S. and Iranian perspective.

## **FEB. 7 CLASS 3 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT I: THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DEBATE**

Stefanie Ann Lenway, "Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Statecraft," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 2, (Spring 1988) pp. 397-426. NO need to read the Megarian Case.

Risa A. Brooks, "Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?" *Security Studies* 11, No 4, (Summer 2002) p. 1-50.

Arne Tostensen, Beate Bull, "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?" *World Politics*, Vol 54, No. 3, April 2002, pp. 373-403.

John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "The Sanctions of Mass Destruction?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1999. pp. 43-53.

Articles on sanctions on Russia TBA, sanctions on Iran

**Key Questions:** What is the precise logic of the process by which sanctions are designed to achieve the goals of the sender country? How do HSE define and measure state goals and the success of sanctions episodes? Lenway compares the frameworks employed by HSE and Baldwin, particularly the criteria used to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions. Which one do you find more compelling for policymakers? Brooks calls for a more nuanced approach to sanctions, focusing on targeted sanctions designed to impose costs on politically influential groups. How does a country's regime type affect the likelihood that different types of sanctions will be effective? What are smart sanctions? What are some of the difficulties of implementing smart sanctions? What costs do sanctions impose on the sending country? There is a tendency in the literature to view economic sanctions as a more "humane" tool of statecraft than military force. Do Mueller and Mueller agree?

## **FEB. 14. CLASS 4 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT II: FOREIGN AID, TRADE, AND FINANCE**

David A. Baldwin, "Foreign Trade" and "Foreign Aid" in *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 206-222. and pp. 290-310. NOTE THAT YOU ARE ONLY ASSIGNED PARTS OF BALDWIN'S CHAPTERS ON TRADE AND AID

Michael Froman, "The Strategic Logic of Trade: New Rules of the Road for the Global Market," *Foreign Affairs*, 93, 6, Nov-Dec, 2014. The USTR making a case for the TPP, what are its goals?

Richard Katz, "Mutually Assured Production: Why Trade Will Limit Conflict Between China and Japan" *Foreign Affairs*, 2013.

Shiro Armstrong, "Australia's Trade War with China is Unwinnable for Both Countries" *East Asia Forum*, December 1, 2020.

CSIS China Power Project, "How Will the BRI Advance Chinese Interests?"  
<https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative>

The Asia Society Policy Institute, “Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative” September 8, 2020.  
<https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/weaponizing-belt-and-road-initiative>.

“China Wanted to Show Off its Vaccines, its Backfiring” *The New York Times*, January 29, 2021.

Articles on U.S. trade restrictions on China’s tech imports

Articles on Russian use of oil/gas as a tool of statecraft

Recommended:

Mark Strauss, “How China’s Rare Earth Weapon Went from Boom to Bust”

**Key Questions:** What are supply and influence effects of international trade and the logic by which they exert influence? What are strategic goods? How should one conceptualize the role of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy? How should the effectiveness of foreign aid be measured? Conditionality in foreign aid is a controversial topic. What are the arguments made by each side in this debate and which ones do you find more persuasive? What are the mechanisms through which USTR Michael Froman believes strategic trade will achieve U.S. objectives? Are the mechanisms the same as Chinese aims for the BRI? Why does Katz claim that trade will limit conflict between China and Japan? Does Russia have an oil and gas weapon, and how should one measure the cost of using it, and assess its relative success? What are the goals of the BRI, and to what extent have they been successful? How has China used the dependence of its trading partners as a tool of statecraft?

## **FEB. 21 CLASS 5 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT III: STRATEGIC BOMBING**

Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 12-86, and the 1991 Iraq case, pp. 211 to 254.

Angela Stent, “Putin’s Power Play in Syria” *Foreign Affairs*, 2016.

Articles on Russia and airpower in Ukraine TBD

CFR, Backgrounder on Target Killings.

Zachary Keck, “Why North Korea is So Scared of America” *The National Interest*,

Victor Cha, “Giving North Korea a “Blood Nose” is Risky” *The Washington Post*, February 28, 2018.

John Bolton, “Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran” *The New York Times*, March 26, 2015.

“The Killing of General Sulcimani: What We Know” *The New York Times*, January 4, 2020.

“Iran Warns of Crushing Response if Trump Targets Nuclear Sites” *The Guardian* November 17, 2020.

“US Airstrikes Kill Top ISIS Leader in Iraq” *The New York Times*, January 30, 2021.

**Key Questions:** Pape argues that coercive airpower primarily takes two different forms: punishment and denial. What is the difference in logic underlying these two strategies and which one does he contend is more effective? Why? What is the logic of decapitation? One of the key difficulties in evaluating the relative effectiveness of air power as an instrument of statecraft is isolating its influence from the threat of conventional war. How does Pape contend this can be done? Why does Cha argue that airpower against North Korea is risky? Are drones strikes and targeted killings of individuals effective tools of statecraft? If not, why are they increasingly used by sending states?

**FEB. 28 CLASS 6 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT IV: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY & PROPAGANDA**

Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (CA: Sage Publications, 2012). Chapter 1 Introduction, pp. 1-50; Chapter 5, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, only pp. 264-288 on Gulf of Tonkin Incident through Public Diplomacy; Chapter 6, How to Analyze Propaganda, pp. 289-306; Chapter 7 Four Cases, only read the Pentagon Pundits for Hire case, pp. 353-358; and Chapter 8, How Propaganda Works in Modern Society, pp. 359-368.  
212-228.

Russia Propaganda in Crimea: How does it Work? *The Guardian*,  
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda-media>.

David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push.” *Foreign Affairs* 2015.

Jessica Brandt and Bret Schafer, “How China’s Wolf Warrior Diplomats Use and Abuse Twitter”  
Brookings Institutions, October 2020.

Laura Rosenberger, “Making Cyberspace Safe for Democracy: the New Landscape of Information Competition” *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2020.

Brian Raymond, “Forget Counterterrorism: United States Needs a Counter-Disinformation Strategy”  
*Foreign Affairs* October 30, 2020.

Russian propaganda on Ukraine TBA

**MARCH 14 CLASS 7 NO NEW READING: INDIVIDUAL MEETINGS ON PAPERS**

**MARCH 21 CLASS 8 STRATEGY: ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT**

Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapters 1 & 2.

**Key Questions:**

How does Deibel define foreign affairs strategy? Identify the seven characteristics that Deibel contends differentiate a foreign affairs strategy from other forms of strategic thinking, and briefly explain why these characteristics are important? The first step in designing a foreign affairs strategy is to assess the nature of the international environment in which your strategy will unfold. Deibel discusses how erroneous assumptions about the nature of the internal environment ensured the failure of certain U.S. strategies. Analyze the key actors and the nature of the international system as it relates to your strategy, using the factors Deibel discusses in the chapter as a guide. Students developing strategies for Western Europe will face a different environment from those working in the Middle East, so address the factors of importance for your specific strategy.

### **MARCH 28 CLASS 9 STRATEGY: ASSESSING THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT**

Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 3.

#### **Key Questions:**

The Deibel volume focuses on the United States and discusses different intellectual traditions that have influenced U.S. foreign policy throughout history, however his key variables can be applied to any state. Students should assess the extent to which the following variables influence foreign affairs strategy in their sending and target country(s).

1. Who are the key foreign policy actors in the executive branch in the sending state that have influence over the issue involved in your strategy? To what extent do they share the same interests and ideological views on this issue and to what extent do differences exist that could negatively impact the strategy?
2. To what extent does Congress/Parliament play a role in this issue, and if it has the authority to influence the strategy, explain the legislative viewpoints on this issue, and the extent to which they are likely to support or constrain the strategy.
3. To what extent is support from key social actors—the broad citizenry, key interest groups, political parties, the media—necessary for the success of your strategy? To what extent do social groups support/oppose your strategy?
4. Identify the key actors in the target country that your strategy is designed to influence and analyze their domestic power base. How dependent are key decision-makers on legislative and social actors, and to what extent are political views on this issue united and to what extent are they divided?

### **APRIL 4 CLASS 10 STRATEGY: INTERESTS, THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES & POWER**

Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 4&5, pp. 123-206.

**Key Questions:** As Deibel notes, the relationship between interests on the one hand and threats and opportunities on the other is one of the most critical in strategic thought. As a key step in your strategy, do the following:



1. Identify and prioritize the national interests of the country for which you are devising a strategy, using the criteria Deibel outlines in the book.
2. Identify the threats and opportunities that the international environment poses to these interests, using the criteria Deibel outlines for assessing threats.
3. Determine whether your proposed strategy is an opportunity-based strategy or a threat-based strategy, and clearly identify its objective.

Once a policymaker has determined a state's objectives, she must determine whether the state has means to achieve these objectives at an acceptable cost. To assess the extent to which your state has the necessary power to feasibly pursue the objectives outlined above, please do the following:

1. Identify the power resources that your state possesses that could be mobilized to achieve the objectives in your strategy, making sure to distinguish between tangible and intangible factors.
2. To what extent does your country have sufficient latent or actual power to achieve the objectives laid out above?

#### **APRIL 11 CLASS 11 STRATEGIC PLANNING: INSTRUMENTS OF STATE POWER**

Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 6, pp. 207-280.

**Key Questions:** As Deibel notes, objectives are that subset of national interests that statesmen decide to protect or promote. List the objective (s) of your strategy and analyze their desirability in terms of the national interest, and their feasibility in terms of the availability of instruments of statecraft and the assumed characteristics of the international and domestic environments.

Select the tools of statecraft that your strategy will use employ, and identify the broad generic strategy—persuasion, cooption, coercion or force—through which your strategy is seeking to influence the target state. If multiple instruments are being used, determine the order that the instruments will be used if they are not being employed simultaneously. Specify the extent to which the instruments will be used overtly or covertly, and whether conditions will be attached.

#### **APRIL 18 CLASS 12 LINKING ENDS AND MEANS & EVALUATING STRATEGY**

Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapters 7&8, pp. 281-359.

**Key Questions:** Explain the logic through which the strategy is designed to influence the target state to comply with the demands of the sender state. What is the likely impact of the strategy on your target state, and how is the target likely to respond?

1. As Deibel observes repeatedly in his book, all strategy is about ends and means, therefore even “successful” strategies must be evaluated in terms of their costs. Assess the costs directly involved in your strategy and as well as the opportunity costs of using national resources to implement the proposed strategy. To what extent is the likelihood of success worth the costs?
2. All strategies involve the risk that things will not go as planned. Risk, as Deibel notes, involves two components: the probability that things will go wrong, and the chance of loss if things do go wrong. Assess the risk inherent in your strategy. What is anything can be done to mitigate these risks?
3. Analyze your proposed strategy for coherence between its ends, means and ways. To what extent is your strategy compatible with other strategies the state is currently pursuing?

**APRIL 25      CLASS 13      STUDENT PRESENTATIONS**

**MAY 2            CLASS 14      STUDENT PRESENTATIONS**