Everyone Agreed on Something: How New Jersey's Teaching Act Puts Testing Before Students, and Firing before Teaching

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EVERYONE AGREED ON SOMETHING: HOW NEW JERSEY’S TEACHNJ ACT
PUTS TESTING BEFORE STUDENTS, AND FIRING BEFORE TEACHING

Daniel T. Paxton*

I. INTRODUCTION

The TEACHNJ Act has never been about New Jersey’s students. But its proponents in Trenton have always made sure to discuss the Act as if it were. Nonetheless, the Act focuses its attention squarely on teachers. Without any particular rationale, the Act makes it more difficult for teachers to attain tenure, and much easier to scrutinize and to fire teachers once they have tenure. However, the Act’s scheme for achieving its actual goals lacks effective evaluation procedures and runs afoul of well-established due process rights. In short, the TEACHNJ Act does not do what it says it does, is not particularly good at what it actually does, and is without adequate procedural safeguards.

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1 Although the stated goal of the TEACHNJ Act is to “raise student achievement by improving instruction,” the statute’s focus is the employment conditions of teachers, including its main goal of tenure reform. Guide to the TEACHNJ Act, NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF EDU., http://www.nj.gov/education/AchieveNJ/intro/TeachNJGuide.pdf (last updated June 2014). The New Jersey Department of Education stated that:

[a]t its core, TEACHNJ reforms the processes of earning and maintaining tenure by improving evaluations and opportunities for professional growth. Specifically:

• Tenure decisions are now based on multiple measures of student achievement and teacher practice as measured by new evaluation procedures.
• Lengthy and costly tenure hearings are shorter, focused on process only, and less expensive.
• Educator feedback and development is more individualized and focused on students.

On May 23, 2011, State Senator Teresa Ruiz, a Democrat from Essex County, told *The Star Ledger* that she would introduce the Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children of New Jersey Act ("the Act") later that week.\(^2\) In its original form, Senator Ruiz’s bill effectively ended tenure in New Jersey.\(^3\) The bill eliminated all due process for tenure removal.\(^4\) It authorized local principals to revoke a teacher’s tenure after two years of ineffective ratings if the principal felt that the teacher was not following an individualized improvement plan.\(^5\) The bill also included a longer probationary period for teachers prior to tenure, a teacher evaluation tool based on student test scores, a two-tier teacher rating system of effective and ineffective, and a professional development piece as well.\(^6\) Despite the bill’s evident focus on firing teachers, Senator Ruiz told the Ledger, “I approached this bill through the lens of supporting and elevating the profession, but most importantly with a vision of the children whose futures are at stake.”\(^7\)

Senator Ruiz was not alone in her zeal to upend the teaching profession. This incarnation of the TEACHNJ Act came fast on the heels of separate, similar education reform legislation introduced by Republican State Senator Joe Kyrillos and supported by Republican Governor Chris Christie.\(^8\) Senator Kyrillos’ bill differed in the main from Senator Ruiz’s bill in its lack of professional development for teachers.\(^9\) Prior to Senator Kyrillos’ bill, the governor himself had


\(^4\) Id.

\(^5\) Id.

\(^6\) Id.

\(^7\) Calefati, *supra* note 2.

\(^8\) Id.

proposed teacher reforms mandating merit pay and ending last-in, first-out job protections.\textsuperscript{10} Echoing Senator Ruiz, a spokesman for Senate Republicans invoked the children: “Reforming tenure is absolutely essential to making sure every student is being taught by an effective educator.”\textsuperscript{11} This rhetoric and the accompanying wave of legislative proposals suggest that New Jersey’s children were in dire straits.

Yet New Jersey’s children were quite well educated at the time.\textsuperscript{12} According to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), in 2011, the year TEACHNJ was first introduced, New Jersey’s fourth graders ranked fourth and second in the nation in mathematics and reading, respectively.\textsuperscript{13} Eighth graders ranked third and second in those subjects.\textsuperscript{14} In 2010, the New Jersey Education Association (NJEA) noted, and Politifact confirmed, that New Jersey’s public high school students achieved the highest average Advanced Placement test score in the entire

\textsuperscript{10} See Matt Bai, \textit{How Chris Christie Did His Homework}, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/magazine/27christie-t.html\textsuperscript{?}r=0. The profile noted:

The war between Christie and the union has two fronts, so closely interrelated that it’s hard to separate them. First there’s the fight over budgeting issues like pensions and benefits. And then there’s the “year of education reform,” as Christie has proclaimed 2011, in which he intends to push his case for merit pay, charter schools and the abolition of teacher tenure — all of which are, of course, anathema to the union.\textsuperscript{11} Calefati, \textit{supra} note 2.

\textsuperscript{12} New Jersey State Profile, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/states/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). In 2013, New Jersey fourth, eighth, and twelfth graders scored higher than the national average on both Math and Reading standardized tests. \textit{Id.}\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Id.}\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Id.} The rankings are based on student scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress. Diane Ravitch described the NAEP scores:

The only test scores that can be used comparatively…because [NAEP] is a no-stakes test. No one knows who will take it, no one knows what will be on the test, no student takes the full test, and the results are not reported for individuals or for schools. There is no way to prepare for NAEP, so there is no test prep. There are no rewards or punishments attached to it, so there is no reason to cheat, to teach to the test, or to game the system.\textsuperscript{DIANE RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR: THE HOAX OF THE PRIVATIZATION MOVEMENT AND THE DANGER TO AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 125 (2013) [hereinafter RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR].}
country.\textsuperscript{15} Without regard for this success, the governor and both parties in the legislature were clamoring for tenure reform.

On August 6, 2012, Gov. Christie signed the revised TEACHNJ Act into law.\textsuperscript{16} The Act had been passed unanimously in both the Senate and the Assembly.\textsuperscript{17} This version of the bill saw input from both the governor and the NJEA.\textsuperscript{18} Governor Christie went so far as to thank the union he had previously referred to as thugs for the important role they played in the bill’s success.\textsuperscript{19} An NJEA spokesman said, “Everyone agreed that we needed to do something.”\textsuperscript{20} State Senate President Stephen Sweeney, a Democrat from Gloucester County, added, “We can’t have the bad ones in schools anymore. One bad teacher is one bad teacher too many.”\textsuperscript{21} The national media lauded the bill’s passage as an example of Governor Christie’s ability to make tough compromises, even in a state where the teachers’ union is quite strong.\textsuperscript{22} Amidst all the praise, then Mayor of


\textsuperscript{16} 2012 Bill Tracking N.J. S.B. 1455.


\textsuperscript{18} Id.; Press Release, Testimony by NJEA President Barbara Keshishian, Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee S-1455 (June 8, 2012), https://www.njoea.org/news/2012/06/18/testimony%20by%20njea%20president%20barbara%20keshishian. Keshishian mentioned “extensive discussions over the last several months.” \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{19} Renshaw, \textit{supra} note 1, (“The fact of the matter is nothing gets done without their input, support and their help. I know it’s not everything they wanted to have happen, and it wasn’t everything that I wanted to have happen.”). The public thank you of the teachers’ union was much different from 2011 when Gov. Christie stated:

I believe the teachers in New Jersey in the main are wonderful public servants that care deeply. But their union, their union are a group of political thugs. They should have taken the salary freeze. They didn't and now, you know, we had to lay teachers off. They chose to continue to get their salary increases rather than be part of the shared sacrifice.


\textsuperscript{20} Rizzo, \textit{supra} note 17.

\textsuperscript{21} Renshaw, \textit{supra} note 1.

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{See} John Martin, \textit{N.J. Gov. Christie signs bipartisan reform of nation’s oldest teacher tenure law}, \textsc{CNN’s Schools of Thought Blog} (Apr. 18, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://schoolsfothought.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/07/n-j-gov-christie-signs-bipartisan-reform-of-nations-oldest-teacher-tenure-law/ (“Groups that have traditionally been at odds worked together to craft and pass the bill sponsored by both Democratic and Republican lawmakers. Not a single member of New Jersey’s bicameral legislature voted against it.”); Kate Zernike, \textit{Christie Signs Bill Overhauling Job
Newark Cory Booker and Education Commissioner Chris Cerf criticized the bill for not going far enough to reduce teachers’ job protections. In a statement, Senator Ruiz again looked to the children: “By strengthening our professionals, we will ensure that our students have the best teachers in the classroom so that all children—regardless of their background, their ZIP code, or their socio-economic status—will have the opportunities they deserve for educational excellence.”

Despite Senator Ruiz’s public comments focusing on students, and the TEACHNJ Act’s official purpose to “raise student achievement by improving instruction through the adoption of evaluations that provide specific feedback to educators” and “inform personnel decisions,” this legislation’s actual target is teacher job protections. This note will critique the TEACHNJ Act’s changes in teacher evaluations and tenure proceedings, and provide recommendations for solving those issues. Part II will provide a brief history of tenure and teacher evaluation in the United States generally, along with an explanation of its creation in New Jersey. Additionally, Part II will survey recent legislation affecting these topics, including a discussion of Vergara v. California, wherein a California trial court declared that state’s tenure laws unconstitutional. Part III will appraise the likelihood that the Act’s changes in teacher evaluations will meet the Act’s goals. Part IV will analyze the constitutional issues raised by the new tenure removal scheme, along with the Office of Administrative Law’s contrasting procedures.


23 Rizzo, supra note 17; Renshaw, supra note 1.
24 Rizzo, supra note 17.
II. TENURE: PAST, PRESENT, AND NEW JERSEY

A. Tenure’s Past and Present

Tenure began as a result of the recognition that civil service employees needed protection from the vicissitudes of politics. In the late nineteenth century, the National Education Association (NEA) thought of tenure as a means of shielding teachers from parents, administrators, and boards of education. The topic headlined the organization’s first conference, held in Chicago in 1887. By the early twentieth century, the NEA espoused tenure as an essential component of all teachers’ contracts. In 1946, the NEA stated a formal position on tenure embracing both the removal of incompetent teachers and the retention of skilled ones. The implementation of tenure continued across the country, firmly rooting its protections in most school districts by the late 1960s.

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27 Marshall, Baucom & Webb, at 302; M. J. Stephey, A Brief History of Tenure, TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 17, 2008, http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1859505,00.html (“Just as steel and auto workers fought against unsafe working conditions and unlivable wages, teachers too demanded protection from parents and administrators who would try to dictate lesson plans or exclude controversial materials like Huck Finn [sic] from reading lists.”).

28 Stephey, A Brief History of Tenure, supra note 27 (“The start of the tenure movement paralleled similar labor struggles during the late 19th century….In 1887, nearly 10,000 teachers from across the country met in Chicago for the first-ever conference of the National Educator’s Association, now one of the country’s most powerful teachers’ unions.”).


30 Id.

31 Id.
In recent years, education reformers have attacked tenure, characterizing it as intentionally inefficient. They claim that tenure shields incompetent teachers. They say that it is so difficult to remove a teacher that administrators prefer to allow bad teachers to continue working rather than begin the process. Reformers attack the tenure removal process for expense, saying that even if a district begins gathering the information necessary to fire a teacher, the costs are prohibitive, often citing numbers as high as $450,000. The New Jersey Department of Education’s own explanatory material on the TEACHNJ Act calls tenure hearings lengthy and expensive. Since tenure is inefficient, difficult to remove, cumbersome, and expensive, the argument goes, it needs to be scrapped.

These arguments have persuaded some state legislatures to become skeptical of tenure protections. Laws in Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Michigan, and New Hampshire have all drastically weakened tenure. Generally, these laws alter tenure by reducing the amount of process necessary for removal, linking significant portions of evaluations to student test scores, and increasing probationary periods. Florida and Idaho’s laws have explicitly eliminated tenure, while Colorado’s law essentially does so without acknowledging it.

33 Brill, *supra* note 32; Stephey, *supra* note 27.
35 Stephey, *supra* note 27; *Vergara* at *5. It is difficult to find credible information supporting this figure. It is repeated often on various anti-tenure advocacy websites and by newspapers on that side of the issue as well. But aside from conclusory statements asserting the claim, the author has not been able to find a disinterested and open accounting of the cost of tenure proceedings.
39 McNeal, *supra* note 37, at 496
40 McNeal, *supra* note 37, at 500, 496.
Reformers have not limited their campaign to legislation. Students Matter, a pet project of Silicon Valley entrepreneur David Welch, uses the courts to advance its agenda. Welch’s group recruited nine public school children and paid the law firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher $1.1 million dollars to challenge California’s tenure removal process, two-year probationary period, and seniority rule. The case became Vergara v. California. It ended with a trial court judge declaring California’s tenure laws unconstitutional and calling on the legislature to fix the situation.

In Vergara, the court found that these statutes have a serious and negative effect on students’ fundamental right to equal education, and that they disproportionately affect poor and minority students. As a result, the court applied strict scrutiny to the statutes and the two-year probationary period was struck down for its unfair treatment of both students and teachers. The court held that the tenure removal process was so burdensome in its complexity, length, and cost

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41 Adolfo Guzman-Lopez, *The Lawsuit’s Called Vergara, but the Name You Should Know is Welch*, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/blogs/education/2014/04/25/16461/the-lawsuit-s-called-vergara-but-the-name-you-shou/. Welch made sure to mention the children when discussing his organization, though he declined to discuss the amount of money he had poured into it:

> Despite not having a background in public education, [Welch] said he had no choice but to take on the issue. “About four years ago, I got to the point where there was [sic] too many children that were being harmed in the system,” he said. “If I had the capability of doing the right thing to make life better for someone else or for my society, then I try to do it.” In interviews, Welch wouldn’t say how much money the case has cost him. It’s no doubt been substantial. Tax records for 2012 show he loaned Students Matter nearly $1 million dollars that year alone, half of which was spent on public relations.

*Id.* See also http://studentsmatter.org/.

42 Guzman-Lopez, *supra* note 41; Vergara at *2.

43 *Vergara* at *1.

44 *Vergara* at *7*. Regarding a legislative response, Judge Rolf M. Treu stated:

> Under California’s separation of powers framework, it is not the function of this Court to dictate or even to advise the legislature as to how to replace the Challenged Statutes. All this Court may do is apply constitutional principles of law to the Challenged Statutes as it has done here, and trust the legislature to fulfill its mandated duty to enact legislation on the issues herein discussed that passes constitutional muster, thus providing each child in this state with a basically equal opportunity to achieve a quality education.

*Id.*

45 *Id.* at *4.

46 *Id.* at *5.
as to be unnecessary.\footnote{Id. at *6.} Calling the logic of the “last-in, first-out” seniority statute “unfathomable,” the court stated that this part of California’s tenure statute was unconstitutional as well.\footnote{Vergara at *6.}

United States Secretary of Education Arne Duncan hailed the decision, calling it “an opportunity….to build a new framework for the teaching profession that protects students’ rights to educational opportunities while providing teachers the support, respect and rewarding careers they deserve.”\footnote{Press Release, U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan, Statement from U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan Regarding the Decision in Vergara v. California (June 10, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-us-secretary-education-arne-duncan-regarding-decision-vergara-v-california. Secretary Duncan’s discussion of the decision invalidating teacher tenure laws focused on students: For students in California and every other state, equal opportunities for learning must include the equal opportunity to be taught by a great teacher. The students who brought this lawsuit are, unfortunately, just nine out of millions of young people in America who are disadvantaged by laws, practices and systems that fail to identify and support our best teachers and match them with our neediest students. Today’s court decision is a mandate to fix these problems. Together, we must work to fix public confidence in public education….My hope is that today’s decision moves from the courtroom toward a collaborative process in California that is fair, thoughtful, practical and swift. Every state, every school district needs to have that conversation.} Students Matter is considering similar actions in Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon.\footnote{Jennifer Medina, Judge Rejects Teacher Tenure for California, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/us/california-teacher-tenure-laws-rulled-unconstitutional.html.} As it stands, tenure protections are under attack in both legislatures and the courts.

\textbf{B. Tenure in New Jersey}

In New Jersey, tenure became the law in 1909.\footnote{Id.} As of 2012, New Jersey’s tenure law had not changed significantly over the more than one hundred years of its existence.\footnote{Rizzo, supra note 17; Renshaw, supra note 1.} Teachers earned tenure after a probationary period of three years of consecutive, satisfactory service in the same
school district. During the probationary period, teachers could be fired without cause, that is, without hearings as to the reasonableness of the grounds for their dismissals.

Before TEACHNJ was enacted, once teachers earned tenure, they were afforded due process before districts could fire them. To prevail in an attempt to remove a tenured teacher, the district had to prove one of four reasons for dismissal: inefficiency, incapacity, conduct unbecoming a teaching staff member, or some other just cause. The procedures were as follows: presentation of charges to the local Board of Education (the Board) by the superintendent, certification of charges by the Board, filing of charges with the Commissioner of Education (the Commissioner) by the Board, a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ) from the


The teacher is a professional who has spent years in the course of attaining the necessary education and training. When he is engaged as a teacher he is fully aware that he is serving a probationary period and may or may not ultimately attain tenure. If he not reengaged and tenure is thus precluded he is surely interested in knowing why and every human consideration along with all thoughts elemental fairness and justice suggest that, when he asks, he be told why….The plaintiff does not urge before us that, in addition to a statement of reasons, she was entitled to a formal hearing before the board. For the present purposes, we assume that no such hearing was required although we hasten to suggest that a timely request for informal appearance before the board should ordinarily be granted even though no formal hearing is undertaken.

Id. See also E. GORDON GEE & PHILIP T. K. DANIEL, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 390 (4th ed. 2009);

In fact, the vast majority of employees fall under the ‘at-will doctrine,’ meaning that persons can be terminated for good reason, bad reason, or no reason. This was the ruling in the case of Castro v. New York City Bd. Of Educ., 777 F.Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), where a nontenured teacher challenged his non-renewal of contract, claiming a pre-termination hearing was required. The court concluded that the teacher served ‘at will’ in his non-tenured status and failed to prove that he was dismissed for a constitutionally impermissible purpose.

Id.; Teachers’ Rights: Tenure and Dismissal, FINDLAW (May 12, 2015, 7:14 PM), http://education.findlaw.com/teachers-rights/teachers-rights-tenure-and-dismissal.html:

Prior to attaining tenure, a probationary teacher may be dismissed at the discretion of the school district, subject to contractual and constitutional restrictions. Laws other than those governing tenure will apply to determine whether a discharge of a teacher is wrongful. If a probationary teacher’s dismissal does not involve discrimination or does not violate terms of the teacher’s contract, the school district most likely does not need to provide notice, summary of charges, or a hearing to the teacher.

Id.
Office of Administrative Law (the OAL), and a final decision on the ALJ’s ruling by the Commissioner.  

C. TEACHNJ’s Changes to Tenure

The TEACHNJ Act makes significant changes to tenure. The Act increases the probationary period leading up to receiving tenure from three years to four. Administrators may base up to fifty percent of teachers’ evaluations on student test performance. This rule is satisfied through the creation of student growth objectives (“SGOs”) by individual teachers. The Act mandates that summative evaluations include four ratings: highly effective, effective, partially effective, and ineffective. When a teacher receives two consecutive ratings of ineffective, or a rating of partially effective followed by ineffective, the superintendent must file tenure charges. This requirement relieves the superintendent of the discretion to decide whether to file charges that she possessed under the old law. In the case of a teacher who receives ratings of ineffective followed by partially effective, or partially effective in two consecutive years, the superintendent retains that discretionary power. When faced with a teacher receiving those ratings, the superintendent may file charges or may defer by filing written evidence of exceptional circumstances. Thereafter, the Board may file the charges with the Commissioner within thirty days, unless the Board decides that the evaluation process was not followed.

The Act completely removes the OAL from the tenure hearing process. In its stead, the Act places compulsory, binding arbitration. Once the Commissioner has the charges, the teacher has fifteen days to file a response. The Commissioner has ten days to submit the charges to an arbitrator. A hearing with the arbitrator will then take place within forty-five days of the assignment of an arbitrator. The arbitrator then has forty-five days from the start of the hearing to issue a decision. The arbitrator may consider only the following four issues: if the evaluation failed to substantially follow the evaluation process, if there is a mistake of fact in the evaluation, if the charges were brought only as a result of discrimination, nepotism, political affiliation, union activity or other conduct prohibited by state or federal law, and if the district’s actions were arbitrary and capricious. The costs of the arbitration are capped at $7,500 and are borne by the state.

The Act received the support of the Democratic legislature, the Republican governor, and the state’s major teachers’ union, the New Jersey Education Association. The legislative and executive branches in Trenton had not seen this level of accord at any time since Governor Christie’s election.

70 See Rizzo, supra note 17.

Last week’s war of words between Republican Gov. Chris Christie and the Democrats didn’t move the two sides closer to harmony. The Democrats criticized Christie for using a state police helicopter to fly to his son’s baseball game and then to a political dinner. The governor, in turn, called one assemblywoman [sic] a ‘jerk’ over the issue and the Democrats said Christie ‘is unable to discuss things like a grown-up.’”

III. EVALUATIONS AND TESTS, DUE PROCESS AND HEARINGS

A. Teacher Effectiveness and Student Testing

The TEACHNJ Act compels schools to use teacher evaluations that mandate reliance on student test scores. This requirement ignores the primary role socio-economic status plays in student achievement, fails to provide specific feedback to teachers about instructional practice, and allows teachers to game an easily circumvented system.72 Additionally, high stakes tests (such as the one New Jersey will use, the Partnership for Assessment of Readiness for Colleges and Careers (PARCC)) are prone to statistical errors that make them unsuitable for evaluating teachers.73

Student test scores do not measure teacher effectiveness. According to the Act, up to fifty percent of a teacher’s evaluation must reflect student performance on standardized tests.74

Governor Chris Christie called a New Jersey Senate Democrat and ‘arrogant S.O.B.’ over the failure to guarantee a tax cut in the Legislature’s $31.7 billion spending plan, without saying whether he’ll veto it. Christie’s comment referred to Senator Paul Sarlo, who heads the budget panel. The Republican said he ‘got fooled’ in swapping his income-levy rollback for property-tax rebates, citing a six-month delay and conditions set by lawmakers.

Id.

72 See ANYA KAMENETZ, THE TEST: WHY OUR SCHOOLS ARE OBSESSED WITH STANDARDIZED TESTING—BUT YOU DON’T HAVE TO BE 65 (2015). Kamenetz explains the multiple ways economic struggle affects student achievement as follows:

Poor kids may not get the same quality sleep because they share a bed or sleep on a couch. They may come to school without breakfast. Their vision goes uncorrected. They are likely to have less educated parents who own fewer books and talk to them less from the time they are infants—a gap that’s been estimated at 30 million words by the time they start kindergarten. They are more likely to suffer from ‘toxic stress’—a parent in jail, abuse, trauma, or risk of homelessness—that interferes with their ability to concentrate day to day and can distort their brain development over time.

Id. Kamenetz goes on to quote the findings of Dr. Michael Freemark, a professor of pediatrics at Duke University, whose review of state test scores for students in Chapel Hill and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina demonstrated that “‘85 percent of variability in school performance is explained by the economic well-being of a child’s family, as measured by eligibility for subsidized lunches.’” Id. See also DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 258 (rev. and expanded ed., 2010) [hereinafter RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE] (“‘Teachers can have a profound influence on their students, but on average, what families do or don’t do influences academic outcomes even more.’”).

73 Diane Ravitch, Schools We Can Envy, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/08/schools-we-can-envy/ (citing DANIEL KROESK, MEASURING UP: WHAT EDUCATIONAL TESTING REALLY TELLS US (2008)). Prof. Ravitch mentions the findings of several researchers in this vein: “[E]xperts like Robert L. Linn at the University of Colorado, Linda Darling-Hammond at Stanford, and Helen F. Ladd at Duke, as well as a commission of the National Research Council, have warned about misuse of standardized tests to hold individual teachers accountable with rewards or sanctions.” Id.

Research has long settled that the most important factors that influence a student’s success as measured by testing are socio-economic—family income, health, neighborhood characteristics etc.\textsuperscript{75}  For example, a student born to a wealthy family or to educated parents will usually outperform peers on standardized tests.\textsuperscript{76}  If a student’s family is both wealthy and educated, she is even more certain to excel on such assessments.\textsuperscript{77}  To the extent that a teacher’s effect on a student’s test score is quantifiable, teaching only accounts for between one and fifteen percent of the outcome.\textsuperscript{78}

In this way, the Act substantially evaluates teachers using a metric they do not control. The result of the Act’s focus on testing is a measurement that reflects, for the most part, the student’s socio-economic status, and not her teachers’ effectiveness. Since test scores have little to do with instructional ability, the half of the Act’s new evaluation system that districts may base on them does not provide teachers with worthwhile feedback. Rather, this part of the evaluation only suggests to teachers information to which they are often already privy, i.e., the student’s situation at home.

In addition to this redundancy, the fifty percent testing component of the Act’s teacher evaluation scheme falls short of the Act’s goal of “providing specific feedback.”\textsuperscript{79}  A student’s


\textsuperscript{76}See Kamenetz, \textit{supra} note 72; RAVITCH, \textit{DEATH AND LIFE}, \textit{supra} note 72.

\textsuperscript{77}See Kamenetz, \textit{supra} note 72; RAVITCH, \textit{DEATH AND LIFE}, \textit{supra} note 72.

Unfortunately, every testing program—be it the SAT, the ACT, NAEP, or state scores—shows a tight correlation between family income and scores: Children from affluent families have the highest scores, and children from poverty have the lowest scores. On the SAT for reading, students whose family income is in the lowest bracket (under $20,000) have an average score of 437, while students whose family income is in the highest bracket (over $200,000) have a mean score of 568; the gap is as large as and as regular in mathematics. The same pattern is found on international assessments. \textit{Id.} at 286.

\textsuperscript{78}See \textsc{american statistical ass’n}, ASA \textsc{statement on using value-added models for educational assessment} (2014); Goldstein, \textit{supra} note 75.

\textsuperscript{79}N.J. \textsc{stat. ann.} § 18A:6-118(a) (West 2014).
performance on one test on one day, or even on twelve tests on twelve days over the course of an entire school year, reveals only a snapshot of that student’s performance on those occasions. It offers no explanation regarding what component of the teacher’s practice affected the outcome.

Teachers may employ several different strategies over the course of a single lesson to help students. Test scores do not say which ones work. They cannot discern whether it was a teacher’s cooperative learning activities or her individual conferencing that were effective. Nor do they address why they were so. This silence of test scores regarding the efficacy of particular instructional strategies, frustrates the Act’s stated aim to provide specific feedback. Rather than providing guidance, test scores leave teachers to guess at which aspect of their practice works. For this reason, fully half of the Act’s evaluation scheme fails at its stated purpose.

The above discussion shows that test scores reflect socio-economic factors more than teacher efficacy, and specify nothing in particular regarding teaching strategies. Of equal significance is the indifference of test scores to individual students. The possible reasons in a student’s life for her success or failure on any given day are myriad. An idiosyncratic love of Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s novels, or a sibling’s skilled tutelage in trigonometry might contribute to a fine grade on one occasion, just as an unexpected family upheaval or a twenty-four hour virus may sabotage the grade on another. Tests ignore the impact of the individual student’s emotions,

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80 See Ravitch, Schools We Can Envy, supra note 73.
81 See Ravitch, Death and Life, supra note 72, at 162-63. Prof. Ravitch discusses the problem of student responsibility and test scores, along with that of family responsibility and test scores, with specific reference to testing under the No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”):

One problem with test-based accountability, as currently defined and used, is that it removes all responsibility from students and their families for the students’ academic performance. NCLB neglected to acknowledge that students share in the responsibility for their academic performance and that they are not merely passive recipients of their teachers’ influence. Nowhere in the federal accountability scheme are there measures or indicators of students’ diligence, effort, and motivation. Do they attend school regularly? Do they do their homework? Do they pay attention in class? Are they motivated to succeed? These factors affect their school performance as much as or more than their teachers’ skill.

Id.
her likes and dislikes, and her intrinsic motivation or lack thereof. These facets of a student’s life profoundly influence her ability to learn.\textsuperscript{82} But half of the Act’s evaluation scheme relies on a measurement that is unable to account for such concerns, while at the same time being in part encumbered by them. Just as teachers cannot control the socio-economic status of a student, they cannot alleviate a student’s personal difficulties. Even so, the Act’s testing mandate rates teachers as if a student’s personal obstacles did not exist. The Act has created a teacher evaluation regime based on student performance that ignores the agency of the student. Teachers’ evaluations should not be subject to the accidents of students’ lives.

\textbf{B. TEACHNJ and Cheating}

Since teachers lack the ability to improve the most essential components of a student’s test-taking ability (i.e., her socio-economic status, her personal motivation, etc.), and because under the Act that ability constitutes half of teachers’ evaluations, teachers will find other ways to survive this threat. In short, high-stakes testing often leads to widespread cheating by teachers and administrators.\textsuperscript{83} Major district-wide cheating scandals have come to light in Georgia, Nevada, and Washington D.C.\textsuperscript{84} In each case, the district tied the evaluation of teachers to the performance

\textsuperscript{82}RAVITCH, DEATH AND LIFE, \textit{supra} note 72, at 162-63.

\textsuperscript{83}See GOLDSTEIN, \textit{THE TEACHER WARS, supra} note 26, at 227. Goldstein lists several disturbing findings regarding the relationship between high-stakes testing and cheating:

\begin{quote}
Increasingly, there was evidence that a significant number of unscrupulous administrators and teachers nationwide had responded to the higher stakes attached to state-level standardized tests—evaluations, bonus pay, and public release of data—by cheating. [Jack Gilum and Marisol Bello of \textit{USA Today}] studied six…states and found over sixteen hundred examples of probable test score manipulation between 2002 and 2010. (The newspaper would have almost certainly found even more cheating had it not zeroed in on only the most suspicious test score leaps.…For example: At one Gainesville, Florida, elementary school, math proficiency rates jumped from 5 percent to 91 percent in three years.) A subsequent investigation by the \textit{Atlanta Journal- Constitution} discovered 196 school districts across the country with suspicious test score gains.
\end{quote}

\textit{Id. See also} RAVITCH, \textit{REIGN OF ERROR, supra} note 14, at 148-150 (discussing Washington D.C.’s former superintendent, Michelle Rhee, and the “major cheating scandal” caused by Rhee’s “relentless pressure to raise the passing rates on tests”).

of students on tests. These states put teachers in an untenable situation: their ability to pursue a calling was subordinated to the socio-economic and emotional conditions of their students. Faced with these grim odds, teachers and administrators aided students in a variety of unethical ways to keep their own jobs.

The TEACHNJ Act penalizes teachers for student test performance in ways similar to the testing regimes in Georgia, Nevada, and Washington D.C. This correspondence augurs corresponding results for New Jersey. Teachers faced with the possibility of losing their livelihoods may act to protect themselves by resorting to cheating.

One aspect of the design of the TEACHNJ Act makes it rather easy for teachers to manipulate their evaluations. Under the Act, teachers’ evaluations involve Student Growth Objectives. These instruments allow teachers, in consultation with administrators, to determine

85 See Rindels, supra note 84; RAVITCH, REIGN OF ERROR, supra note 14, at 148-150; Blinder, supra note 84.
86 New Jersey has already experienced cheating scandals under the previous testing regime. See Vernal Coleman, Woodbridge school principal encouraged cheating on standardized test, state says, NJ.COM (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.nj.com/middlesex/index.ssf/2015/03/woodbridge_district_elementary_school_principal_ch.html. [The Office of Fiscal Accountability and Compliance’s] investigation alleges that during the 2010 and 2011 NJ ASK examinations, [Woodbridge elementary school principal Cathie] Bedosky encouraged test examiners and proctors to interfere with the independent work of students taking the assessment, failed to properly train examiners and utilized unqualified staff to fulfill test examiner positions,…Previous investigations by DOE Office of Fiscal Accountability and Compliance have implicated other township elementary teachers in testing scandals. In 2012, five Woodbridge administrators [two elementary school principals and three teachers] were accused by state investigators of cheating, or encouraging students to cheat on state standardized tests. Id. Mooney, DOE Releases Two More Reports on School Cheating Scandal, supra note 84 (discussing reports from the New Jersey Department of Education finding that in two East Orange elementary schools “several teachers either breached proper security protocols or may have coached students to change answers”).
which students must improve, how much they must improve, and on what assessments. Teachers may set different goals for different students based on various and multiple starting points. For instance, an SGO might state that eighty percent of students who turned in seventy-five percent of the homework assignments will reach the targeted score on this test. If, for example, only forty percent of the entire class hands in seventy-five percent of the homework assignments, the teacher has just excluded more than half the class from the equation. This SGO has shielded the teacher from their scores because the part of the class that does not turn in enough homework is also likely to be the students in need of the greatest assistance on tests.

In the 2014-15 school year, teacher-created SGOs will account for twenty percent of teachers’ evaluations. Given the draconian penalty of tenure removal for unsatisfactory test scores, teachers have a strong incentive to rig this part of the Act’s evaluation method to their advantage.

C. Tenure Proceedings

As part of its scheme to reduce teachers’ job protections, the Act removed tenure hearings from the OAL and placed them in the hands of appointed arbitrators. This reduction in tenure protections does not address the Act’s stated goal of increasing student achievement through better instruction. In addition, the new plan subjects the tenure hearing process to undue political influence. The Act’s method for the appointment of the Commissioner’s panel of arbitrators hearing tenure charges creates a patronage system that allows interested parties to adjudicate tenure proceedings, as long as they do so according to the wishes of their benefactors.

1. Dismissal, Property Rights, and Interested Arbitrators

In its stated attempt to increase the success of students through better instruction, TEACHNJ’s new evaluation and removal procedures make it easier to dismiss teachers. However, there is no evidence that reducing tenure protections leads to better instruction or improved student achievement. 92 States and districts that have previously made similar changes to their tenure rules have not seen significant increases in student test scores. 93 Moreover, there is no guarantee that qualified replacements will be available to replace dismissed teachers. 94 In fact, firing teachers for inefficacy makes recruiting new teachers more difficult. 95 So the greater ease with which districts can lay off teachers under TEACHNJ will not solve the problems its proponents claim exist. These measures may even cause other problems.

The new removal procedures are not only likely to be ineffective as far as improving instruction goes. By empowering interested parties to hear tenure cases, they also corrupt the independence, and therefore the legitimacy, of the proceedings overall. The New Jersey School Boards Association (NJSBA) and the New Jersey Principals and Supervisors Association (NJPSA) will appoint fourteen of the twenty-five arbitrators on the panel. 96 The state’s two teachers unions,

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92 Ravitch, Reign Of Error, supra note 14, at 129.
93 Howard Blume, Schools’ next test is getting tenure ruling to pay off in class, L.A. TIMES (June 11, 2014, 10:08 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-teacher-decision-lawsuit-20140612-story.html (quoting Jesse Rothstein, associate professor of public policy at the University of California, Berkeley, noting that regarding states’ tenure reform measures, “There’s no evidence yet that these changes have had a beneficial effect”).
   Even if test scores were a flawless reflection of student learning and teacher quality, there is no evidence that the new teachers who replace the bad teachers will be any better—it is practically impossible to predict, via demographic traits, test scores, grades, or pathway into the profession, who will become an effective teacher.
Goldstein, The Teacher Wars, supra note 26, at 230.
95 Jesse Rothstein, Taking On Teacher Tenure Backfires, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/opinion/california-ruling-on-teacher-tenure-is-not-whole-picture.html?hp&ref=opinion&r=1 (“[F]iring bad teachers actually makes it harder to recruit new good ones, since new teachers don’t know which type they will be.”).
the NJEA and the American Federation of teachers (AFT), will appoint the remaining eleven arbitrators. 97 Therefore, most of the arbitrators deciding tenure charges will owe their appointments to organizations whose members file and certify tenure charges, i.e., school boards and administrators. 98 Just as dangerous for impartiality is the prospect of arbitrators with deep ties to the unions who appointed them hearing tenure charges.

The Act’s delegation of the authority to appoint the officials responsible for tenure adjudication to interested private organizations fails to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. This appointment method, along with the lack of an explicit dismissal mechanism, vitiates the impartiality necessary to make tenure proceedings constitutionally sound. The OAL’s appointment and dismissal procedure for ALJs, on the other hand, demonstrates proper regard to procedural due process standards.

Teachers, in New Jersey and elsewhere, have procedural due process rights with regard to tenure. Procedural due process rights attach when 1) the government acts 2) against an individual 3) to deprive her of life, liberty, or property. 99 Tenure removal meets the first two elements because the government acts through its agents (a superintendent and a board of education) to initiate the

process against a particular teacher. The third element is met because the Supreme Court has said that teachers have a property right in tenure.100

Teachers’ property rights in tenure originate in *Board of Regents v. Roth*. In that case, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]o have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”101 The Court clarified that the Constitution does not create property interests, “[r]ather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.”102

The Court held that the teacher in *Roth* had no property interest entitling him to due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because he had been hired using a series of one-year contracts.103 By contrast, New Jersey’s tenured teachers have the proper independent source of state law that secures their tenure benefits and teachers’ entitlement to them.104 Therefore, they must receive due process when the State seeks to deprive them of tenure.

Procedural due process protections require that an impartial authority carries out adjudications.105 The TEACHNJ Act’s new scheme for adjudication undermines impartiality by allowing the appointment of biased arbitrators. Arbitrators are chosen by the most interested

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100 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
101 Id. at 577.
102 Id. at 572.
103 Id. at 579. See also Perry, supra note 100 (holding that a teacher in the Texas state college system was entitled to a hearing and notice of grounds for his non-renewal if the college had a de facto tenure system and the teacher was entitled to tenure under it).
parties in tenure hearings: school boards (the NJSBA), administrators (the NJPSA), and teachers (the NJEA and the AFT).  

Each one of these organizations has the responsibility to represent its constituents. In order to do so, they will appoint arbitrators sympathetic to the interests of their members. By the time the tenure removal process makes it to an arbitrator, members of both the NJSBA and the NJPSA have recorded their support for removal. It follows that the NJSBA and the NJPSA will appoint arbitrators who are likely to support the decisions of its members to strip teachers of tenure. In the same fashion, NJEA and AFT will both appoint and maintain arbitrators who have demonstrated fealty to their own ranks. So it is possible that some teachers may present their cases before arbitrators who are biased in their favor (however, given the appointment breakdown, it is more probable that teachers will stand before an authority who owes her power to the representative of the other side of the proceeding, i.e., the NJSBA or the NJPSA). The existence of this direct connection between the adjudicator and one side of the dispute renders impartiality unlikely.

Moreover, the Act’s reticence on the removal process for arbitrators suggests an even greater problem for the impartial authority obligation. The Act provides only that the Commissioner may remove an arbitrator if she fails to meet the time constraints for the proceedings without asking for an extension. That is, the Act explains how arbitrators are hired, but not how they are fired. If the Commissioner cannot do it, who can? Both the Act and the regulations are silent on this important issue. The answer may be that the organizations who appoint are the organizations who remove. In that case, school boards and administrators, as well as teachers,

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could dismiss arbitrators who do not rule as they see fit. This scenario forecloses the possibility of disinterested adjudication.

ii. Time and Costs

The TEACHNJ Act’s removal of tenure proceedings from the OAL in favor of binding arbitration might not solve the problems of time and cost efficiency. The findings of New Jersey’s non-partisan Office of Legislative Services (“OLS”) show that one of the major claims reformers make to support the need for the Act’s gutting of tenure protections—that removal costs hundreds of thousands of dollars—is not adequately addressed by the Act. As to the claim that firing a tenured teacher takes too long, the Act’s provisions may not prevent lengthy proceedings.

With regard to expense, OLS has stated that it is possible that costs associated with tenure charges will rise as a result of an expected increase in the number of such cases. The OLS also reported that the new evaluation system used to facilitate the firing of tenured teachers will cost the state fifty-four million dollars to implement, while noting that this number does not include the costs of implementation borne by local school districts.

It is also not clear that the new scheme will make tenure proceedings go faster. The Act allows for extensions at the request of the arbitrator. No restrictions exist regarding the number of extensions that the Commissioner may grant. Furthermore, the Act provides that the arbitrator’s decision must be granted within forty-five days of the start of the proceedings. No language in the Act defines the “start” of the proceedings (do they begin when the parties first discuss dates to appear before the arbitrator, when the parties actually appear before the arbitrator, when testimony is taken, or at some other point?). Whatever the speed of that component of the process, judicial


\[110\] Id.


review of an arbitrator’s decision remains available. In this way, the arbitrator’s decision lacks finality, so the proceedings may continue.

At the least, there is uncertainty as to the ability of the Act to curb the purported inefficiencies of the prior scheme.

IV. THE NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE CENTRAL PANEL

SOLUTION TO TEACHNJ

New Jersey’s OAL provides the best forum to adjudicate tenure proceedings. The OAL’s organization as a central panel allows for judicial independence while inspiring public confidence. Its ALJs have clear appointment and dismissal procedures in place, thus avoiding the due process and impartiality issues created by the TEACHNJ Act.

A. The Central Panel

In twenty-four states and the federal system, administrative law cases are handled by a department within the agency that will also be one of the litigants in those controversies. The agency staffs this department with its own administrative law judges. These ALJs hear and decide contested cases (though their decisions are usually subject to review by the Commissioner). States attempt to ensure the independence of these agency ALJs by implementing various protections, usually concerning salary and removal. At the federal level, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) guards that independence in part by taking the hiring

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114 See STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ABOUT THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, http://www.state.nj.us/oal/about/about/ (last visited May 4, 2015).
116 Id. at 411. See also JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A MERRILL, & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 463 (6th ed. 2009) (noting “This organization is not only controversial, it is a unique compromise between adjudicatory independence and managerial responsibility born of the peculiar history of administrative governance in the United States”).
and firing of administrative law judges completely away from the agencies.\textsuperscript{118} Two separate agencies, the Officer of Personnel Management and the Merit Systems Protection Board, handle these tasks.\textsuperscript{119}

By contrast, New Jersey, along with twenty-five other states as well as the cities of Chicago, New York City, and the District of Columbia, has established stronger protection for judicial impartiality in administrative proceedings.\textsuperscript{120} All of these states and cities have created a free-standing central panel.\textsuperscript{121}

A central panel is an independent office of administrative law.\textsuperscript{122} It has a cadre of ALJs who adjudicate contested cases involving other agencies within the central panel’s jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{123} The purpose of the central panel is to provide both the public and the agencies due process and fair adjudications.\textsuperscript{124} For example, if the state environmental protection agency and a developer have a dispute, it will be heard by an ALJ in the central panel, rather than by one of the agency’s own employees. The separation of both sides from the adjudicator promotes both facial and substantive fairness.\textsuperscript{125} Some central panels have effectively expanded their jurisdiction by taking cases that

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{118}] 5 U.S.C.A. § 5372; 5 U.S.C.A. § 7521.
\item[\textsuperscript{119}] 5 U.S.C.A. § 5362; 5 U.S.C.A. § 7521(a). Removal of federal ALJs under the APA not only involves a separate agency, it also requires “good cause,” a determination on the record, and a hearing.
An action may be taken against an administrative law judge appointed under Section 3105 of this title by the agency in which the administrative law judge is employed only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after an opportunity for hearing before the Board.
\item[\textsuperscript{120}] Id.
\item[\textsuperscript{121}] N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-4 (West 2014).
\item[\textsuperscript{123}] Craddock, supra note 122.
\item[\textsuperscript{124}] Craddock, supra note 122.
\item[\textsuperscript{125}] Craddock, supra note 122.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
agencies voluntarily refer to them. Executive action, rather than legislation, has also increased jurisdiction on the part of central panels.

Central panels support adjudicatory professionalism, decisional independence, and public confidence. They are also more efficient and less costly than their intra-agency counterparts. Most importantly for this Note, the central panel structure is free of the due process and impartiality concerns created by TEACHNJ’s arbitrator appointment method. The way that ALJs are appointed to New Jersey’s OAL demonstrates this crucial difference.

B. New Jersey’s Administrative Law Judges

The appointment and removal of ALJs to New Jersey’s central OAL suffer from none of the due process shortcomings of the arbitrator selections instituted by the TEACHNJ Act. Unlike that Act, New Jersey law openly explains the procedure for hiring ALJs. The OAL’s statutorily created method for these appointments and removals is transparent and subject to democratic controls. For these reasons, New Jersey should return to using the OAL for tenure proceedings.

The appointment of ALJs involves both the executive and the legislature. With the advice and consent of the Senate, the governor appoints the ALJ. The ALJ’s term is set. Her initial employment is for one year, after which the ALJ may be reappointed by the governor to a four year term. Following this period, the governor, again with the advice and consent of the Senate, may reappoint the ALJ to terms of five years.

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127 Id.
128 Felter, supra note 111, at 403.
129 Flanagan, supra note 126.
The mechanisms for disciplining and removing ALJs are clear and independent.135 The Director and Chief Administrative Law Judge ("the Director"), who is also appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate,136 evaluates ALJs focusing on three areas of their performance as judges: competence, productivity, and demeanor.137 The law commands the Director to consider several aspects of those parts of an ALJ’s work, including impartiality.138 Notably, the methods the ALJ uses in arriving at her decisions may be used in her evaluation, but not the results of those methods.139

The differences between the methods of appointment at the OAL and in the TEACHNJ Act could not be more pronounced. ALJs in the central panel are appointed in an open public forum. TEACHNJ’s arbitrators are picked behind closed doors. The OAL’s ALJs are appointed by politically accountable people, i.e., the Senate and the governor. TEACHNJ’s arbitrators are backed by organizations that the public cannot join, lobby, or change. Under the OAL’s method, this open procedure by two politically accountable branches of the government repeats for each ALJ after the first year, and then again after four years, and every five years thereafter. In this way, an ALJ’s appointment is subject to predictable and regular democratic control. There is no democratic control of any kind built into the TEACHNJ Act of the school boards’, the administrators’, and the unions’ arbitrators.

V. CONCLUSION

The TEACHNJ Act’s attack on tenure does not solve the issues attributed to the law as it existed prior to the Act’s passage. The Act imposes testing to evaluate teachers, despite testing’s

137 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 2014).
138 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 2014). Other considerations the Director must take into account include legal skills and knowledge of the law and new legal developments, analytical talents and writing abilities, settlement skills, and conscientiousness. N. J. STAT ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 2014).
139 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14f-5(s) (West 2014).
inability to do so effectively, and in the face of voluminous evidence denouncing the practice. The Act’s evaluation scheme ignores the socio-economic conditions and the diligence of the students it tests. The Act’s harsh punishments for lagging test scores pushes teachers and administrators to cheat. Moreover, the Act infringes on constitutionally protected procedural standards by allowing the parties to tenure proceedings to choose their own adjudicators.

To ensure fair and effective process for teachers, tenure proceedings must be restored to the Office of Administrative Law, examined independently of student achievement considerations, and changed only insofar as such changes comport with the goals of that office.