Forum by Coin Flip: A Random Allocation Model for Jurisdictional Overlap

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INTRODUCTION

Forum shopping—the exercise of strategic choice between multiple jurisdictions in the pursuit of legal action—endures as a vexing institutional feature of the American court system, as well as a conceptual and normative challenge to judges and commentators alike. While courts and scholars have been lamenting for generations the inefficiencies and inequities of forum shopping,\(^1\) the problem remains as germane as ever. *Shady Grove v. Allstate*,\(^2\) in which the Supreme Court recently applied the *Erie* doctrine\(^3\) to the effect of allowing, in federal court, diversity-based class actions that cannot proceed in New York state courts, invoked concerns of vertical forum shopping between state and federal forums. A plurality of the Court’s justices acknowledged that forum shopping would be an objectionable but inevitable result of the Court’s decision;\(^4\) and initial empirical

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\(^3\) *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

\(^4\) In *Shady Grove*, 559 U.S. at 415–16, the court wrote: We must acknowledge the reality that keeping the federal-court door open to class actions that cannot proceed in state court will produce forum shopping. That is unacceptable when it comes as the consequence of judge-made rules . . . . But divergence from state law, with the attendant consequence of forum shopping, is the inevitable (indeed, one might say the intended) result of a uniform system of federal procedure.
evidence seems to corroborate this prediction. Concerns over horizontal forum shopping (between the courts of different states or federal districts) also remain a recurring challenge for the legal system, with the most recent example being *Walden v. Fiore*, in which the Supreme Court denied the attempt of two plaintiffs from Nevada to file suit in their home state against a Georgia-based federal agent.

This Article suggests a novel solution to the problem of forum shopping, which many have come to see as an inescapable characteristic of the American court system with its considerable share of overlapping jurisdictions. Rather than proposing rules or doctrines that would mitigate the social costs of forum shopping or that seek to align strategic litigation practices with public interests, the Article explores the possibility of altering the very institutional foundations of forum selection. It suggests replacing the initiator’s choice model, which normally lets the party instigating the litigation to choose — shop—the forum of her preference, with a system of random case allocation among forums with overlapping jurisdictions.

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6 *Walden* concerned the fate of a *Bivens* action filed in Nevada federal court by two professional gamblers whose gambling proceeds were allegedly unlawfully seized by a DEA agent during a flight stopover in Atlanta. Reversing the Las Vegas district court’s dismissal of the suit, the Ninth Circuit found Nevada had personal jurisdiction over the case. The Ninth Circuit held that the Atlanta-located actions of the Atlanta-based agent providing for the seizure and supporting a subsequent forfeiture of the Nevada-heading plaintiffs’ cash money had qualified as the minimum contacts necessary to establish jurisdiction (and venue) in Nevada. *Fiore v. Walden*, 688 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the defendant had no contacts with Nevada; “the mere fact” that his Georgia-based actions “affected plaintiffs with connections to the forum State [did] not suffice to authorize jurisdiction.” *Walden v. Fiore*, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014).


8 Removal from state to federal court is formally an exception to the initiator’s choice model since it grants the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, the right to determine the ultimate forum of litigation in applicable cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Substantively, however, most of the familiar critiques of forum shopping hold in the removal context, but with respect to the uneven power of defendants. See, e.g., Neal Miller, *An Empirical Study of Forum Choices in Removal Cases under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction*, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369 (1992). For purposes of this Article, removal is hereon included in the “initiator’s choice” category.
Instead of forum shopping, the Article proposes a shift to a Random Allocation Model, which requires holding an ad hoc lottery at the point of filing that would determine which court of the available jurisdictions will hear the case. In the *Shady Grove* context this would mean, for example, that rather than incentivizing class-action diversity plaintiffs seeking statutory damages under New York law to file in federal court, all such suits would be randomly allocated to either a state or federal forum,\(^9\) with obviously varying outcomes due to the divergence in applicable class action laws. Similarly, in cases of ostensible horizontal overlap like *Walden*, a lottery would determine which state (or federal district) gets to apply its personal jurisdiction to the case;\(^10\) here, too, the costs of litigating away from home, as well as localist divergences, might affect case outcomes.

The Random Allocation Model may seem at first blush as an affront to deeply ingrained principles of fairness and equality; it appears to elevate luck over reason as a determinant of the nature of litigation and sometimes of case outcomes as well. The Article seeks, however, to show that while randomizing choice of forum might have some drawbacks, under specified conditions it is a superior institutional design strategy to the initiator’s choice model, which currently dominates the American system of overlapping jurisdictions.

Randomizing choice of forum makes it more difficult for sophisticated parties to plan, prepare, and strategize in order to reach sympathetic courts. It also makes it more difficult for courts that compete with other forums to strategically attract more valued litigants. Random allocation can therefore save socially wasteful costs invested in shopping for forums or for parties. At the same time, it supports the ideal of equal access to justice, insofar as better-off parties lose an opportunity to invest in advantageous forum shopping strategies. Random allocation can thus be normatively defended by both efficiency-based and distributive-justice accounts.

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\(^9\) This does not necessarily mean an equal distribution of cases to each forum, as lotteries can be weighted in favor of one alternative or another while maintaining their random qualities. See *infra* text following note 48.

\(^10\) In *Walden*, the Supreme Court eventually found that only one of the two applicable forums had personal jurisdiction; the Ninth Circuit, however, did determine this to be a case of jurisdictional concurrence. See *infra* note 6. According the model suggested in this Article, the result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision would have been a jurisdictional lottery between the District of Nevada and the Northern District of Georgia.
Beyond mitigating the familiar efficiency and distribution concerns of forum shopping, the Random Allocation Model also ensures that the socially redeeming potential of jurisdictional concurrence gets tapped. Randomizing forum selection means that, over time and given a sequence of random allocations, similar questions and similar fact patterns will reach divergent forums and be treated differently, thus producing a pluralism of judicial output, as well as an information-generating dynamic reminiscent of randomized-experiment methods. These ends are supported by a political-pluralist normative account of a legal order that reflects and respects the varied beliefs and expectations of members and communities in a diverse democracy. At the same time, they enable comparison, experimentation, and learning between forums dealing with similar questions—in the tradition of the “jurisdictional laboratory” familiar from federalism discourse.  

Persistent randomization thus ensures that over time no alternative from among the concurrent jurisdictions will defeat the others, so to speak; it replaces the natural-selection dynamics of forum shopping with an insistence on the preservation of multiple institutional and normative options, embodied in the diverse forums available under jurisdictional overlap. The determination of the optimal degrees of jurisdictional diversity and concurrence is thus handed back to the deliberative processes of democratic policymaking, rather than to sophisticated, self-interested forum shoppers.

Granted, the commitment to the rule of law—with its insistence on a rational and reasoned legal decision-making process—makes us inclined to regard randomization in judicial practices as an improper (normative) aberration (descriptive). Yet, as several authors have lately explored, randomization is in fact prevalent in certain legal contexts, and particularly in the assigning of cases to judges and judges to panels—a procedure that essentially leaves a significant determinant of judicial outcome to sheer luck. The Article builds on this existing accommodation of case-dispositive randomization in the management of single courts in order to support its broader claim for the virtues of randomized case allocation throughout the system in conditions of jurisdictional concurrence.

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12 See Adam Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 47–49 (2009) (“[T]he process of assigning cases to judges is pervaded with lotteries.”); Jeremy Waldron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 183, 186 (2008) (“One might get lucky or unlucky in one’s judge.”).
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly presents the forum shopping structure of jurisdictional concurrence and identifies several socially undesirable effects that result from letting the initiator of the litigation determine the forum and thereby affect the outcome. The following two parts set the conceptual and institutional frameworks for the Random Allocation Model. Part II unpacks the complex notion of randomness. The discussion concentrates on the idea of equal procedural randomness, which entails the use of an ad hoc random choice mechanism (i.e., a lottery) to break distributive ties. Part III examines the central occurrences of randomness in the American legal system. The prevalent use of randomness in allocating cases among judges and assigning judges to panels is shown to reflect an acceptance of the integral role of random choice mechanisms in the process of producing judicial decisions.

Part IV presents the positive normative argument for employing the Random Allocation Model in cases of jurisdictional overlap. I argue that distributive justice, value pluralism, and better knowledge, as well as certain efficiency-related concerns, will all be better served by replacing forum shopping with randomized allocation. This part also considers the central challenges to the Model and offers responses.

I. THE FORUM SHOPPING CHALLENGE

A. The Normative Pluralism of Diverse Jurisdictions

The American court system—like any other common law system—is a complex network of institutional entities with diverse jurisdictional purviews and interaction arrangements. As such, it can be understood as an extrapolation of a single court with multiple judges—with the system as a whole constituting the court and with the individual judges constituting the various jurisdictional units. Just as it is customary to evaluate individual judges in terms of diversity (of identity group (e.g., gender, race, or religion), political affiliation (e.g., conservative or liberal), and professional background (e.g., prosecutor, defender, academic, tax expert, or intellectual property

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specialist), it is common to assess the work of a court system—that is characterized by institutional diffusion—according to the different outcomes its multiple forums produce. Indeed, regardless of whether the diffuse structure is an intentional design, a constructive exploration of the institutional foundations of adjudication must take into account the diversity of judicial forums as well as, importantly, the diversity of judicial results.

For example, the establishment of family courts or locally-based community or neighborhood courts is often intended to create a distinctive institutional atmosphere for the disposition of certain legal matters, for instance through unique litigation structures or a relaxation of procedural or evidentiary norms. Military forums, which adhere to an institutional culture that combines the legal and the martial, similarly reflect a separate vision of adjudication, designed to render the process more sensitive to the unique context of military normativity (e.g., by appointing commissioned officers as judge and jury). Courts that deal intensively with administrative law issues might develop a government-oriented bias even in non-related cases. Additionally, entrusting federal courts with diversity jurisdiction based


15 See Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Courts 205–10, 220–26 (2011) (specialized courts are usually created with the purpose of impacting judicial policy in a given field, which is certainly the typical result of such institutional innovations).


18 See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1489–91 (2012) (reviewing claims that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has developed a pro-government bias).
on the expectation of lesser local bias\textsuperscript{19} reflects an assumption of an inherent divergence in judicial output between state and federal forums.

Even the spatial diffusion of courts among towns, counties, districts, and states can be and often is explained as a mechanism for generating \textit{difference} among distinct loci of adjudication. Location-based diffusion does not only make access to courts more feasible in large countries; it also allows for the enhancement of localizing qualities of adjudication, ensuring the sensitivity of judges and juries (and parole officers, attorneys, and court personnel) to the idiosyncrasies of their communities as well as the reflection of their varying sensibilities in procedural dynamics and judicial outcomes.\textsuperscript{20}

The diffuse judicial system is designed, then, as the producer of consequential normative pluralism: even if most legal norms are produced in fairly centralized processes (legislation and precedent-setting), their interpretation and application are entrusted to multiple judicial units that are diverse across personal, institutional, and cultural dimensions. This is a significant point, especially given that all these units are regularly required to come up with answers to very similar questions, such as the meaning of constitutional norms (e.g., due process and equal treatment), of general statutory or common-law standards (e.g., reasonableness and good faith), and of procedural norms (e.g., preclusion and venue). Of course, at the apex of the judicial system is a single centralizing entity, the Supreme Court, which has the power to unify judicial output by way of appellate review that is backed by a regime of binding precedent. But the reality is that the vast majority of judicial decisions that the system produces do not reach its highest courts,\textsuperscript{21} and for most litigants and for most issues, the diverse outcomes of these multiple (inferior) forums are the final expressions of judicial action.


The institutionalization of normative pluralism in judicial output mandates creating a mechanism for allocating disputes among the system’s units in a way that complies with its ideals of fairness and rationality. This is the role of the rules of jurisdiction. These rules usually follow some objective criterion that is supposed to rationally attach types of cases to measures of expertise, geographic proximity, forum interest, or other institutional markers of relevant courts. Thus, subject-matter jurisdiction relates to the legal or factual foundations of a case or its subject, whereas personal jurisdiction has to do with the geographical elements of a case and the affiliations of the parties. But under the current regime, the allocation process is not exhausted by the rules of jurisdiction. In some circumstances, significant power rests with the parties themselves.

B. Forum Shopping and Initiator’s Choice

“[S]trategic manipulation of procedural rules is an inherent and permanent feature of our system.” The rules of jurisdiction enable sophisticated parties—those capable of planning for the contingency of litigation and of allocating the resources to prepare for that possibility—to plan their behavior in order to direct potential litigation to a preferred forum, with varying degrees of probability. Such strategic behavior becomes relevant at two distinct periods in time: prior to dispute (during the creation and conduct of legal relations) and upon the initiation of litigation (after the dispute has already occurred).

Thus, at the preliminary stage, a sophisticated player can either situate her behavior in a certain location (country, state, district) in order to secure an advantage regarding the litigation forum or else, as is currently customary, contractually set a certain forum for future litigation. Similarly, she can plan her activities to affect the application of subject-matter jurisdiction rules and bring future litigation to a favorable forum (e.g., cap the value of her transactions at the statutory minimum amount for keeping diversity litigation in state rather than

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federal court, or arrange her economic activities so that any disputes are channeled to a particular specialized forum).

Yet not only are the jurisdiction rules susceptible to manipulation by sophisticated parties ex-ante, the very activation of the jurisdictional mechanism once litigation has been initiated is also susceptible, at least partially, to strategic behavior. Thus, although the rules of jurisdiction were ostensibly designed to ensure an efficient and rational process of matching cases with forums, the system has, interestingly, not opted for a centralized allocation mechanism for filed cases. One could easily imagine an administrative unit that receives all filed cases and distributes them to the appropriate forum—which is, in effect, what happens with the allocation of cases to judges within a single court. Instead, the typical adversarial system incorporates the agency of the case’s initiator into the initial choice of forum.\(^\text{26}\) The effective subjects of jurisdictional rules are the claimants, plaintiffs, and prosecutors who choose where to initiate proceedings from amongst the alternatives they believe to be available under law. Only after this initial action can the system intervene and redirect the litigation if jurisdiction is lacking; and moreover, even that power is sometimes contingent on (timely) action by the opposing party.\(^\text{27}\)

Giving the initial choice of forum to the initiator of the litigation can be justified in efficiency-based terms by the premise that she has the best information (at this stage, at least) as to the most appropriate forum. It can also reflect an appeal to moral notions of autonomy and choice within a system that is deeply rigid in structure.\(^\text{28}\) Regardless, it is noteworthy that whenever the system or opposing party fails to act to correct a jurisdictional flaw (or, in civil actions in the state-federal context, to use the right of removal),\(^\text{29}\) the initiator of the case in essence holds the exclusive power to determine the forum of litigation.

The case in which the initiator’s advantage is most conspicuous is when the jurisdiction rules allow for the litigation of a given case in more than one forum. This is the not uncommon state of jurisdictional overlap or, in Robert Cover’s terms, jurisdictional

\(^{26}\) See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) ("[T]he plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.").

\(^{27}\) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).

\(^{28}\) See Lahav, supra note 23, at 2376.

\(^{29}\) The behavioral status quo bias—the tendency to regard an existing state of affairs as the baseline from which divergence is costly—likely inhibits such corrections at least in some of the cases. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625–30 (1998); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
“redundancy.” In such instances, the initiator’s agency is clear and obvious. The law has deferred to her on choice of forum from among the jurisdictionally available alternatives. There are several familiar examples in U.S. law such as the following: when personal jurisdiction laws permit a case to be litigated in more than one state; when venue laws allow for a case to be litigated in more than one federal district in a given state; and when subject-matter jurisdiction laws allow for a case to be litigated in either state or federal court. In countries where terrorism suspects can be indicted in military forums, such as the U.S. (military commissions) or Israel (military courts), it is essentially left to the prosecutor to decide whether to indict in a military or civilian forum.

In such conditions of concurrent jurisdiction, the initiator legitimately exercises her power to determine the institutional setting of the litigation and, hence, also to affect its outcome, without investing any preparatory resources at the pre-litigation stage or risking a jurisdictional challenge in the post-filing stage (state-federal removal notwithstanding). The centrality of parties’ agency in forum choice is particularly striking when we consider the suggested analogy between multiple judges within a single court and a diffuse network of forums within a court system. On the one hand, within a given court, litigants have nearly no control over the identity of the judge or panel that will hear their case (though they do have limited control over the identity of jurors), and as demonstrated below, even the system itself gave up much of its control over this when it opted for random assignment of cases to judges. On the other hand, when it comes to choice among several forums, the law has developed a set of jurisdictional norms that inform parties in advance of the alternative forums for litigation and encourage them to make post strategic choices, which typically work to the advantage of litigation initiators and sophisticated players and, sometimes, to the detriment of the general public interest.

30 Cover, supra note 7, at 639.
31 In the U.S., the most familiar case of late was that of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, who was initially supposed to be tried in federal court in New York, but was eventually arraigned before a military commission in Guantánamo Bay, thanks to congressional intervention. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 § 1032, GPO.gov, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt491/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt491.pdf (prohibiting the transfer of Mohammed into the United States); Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, The New Yorker, Feb. 15, 2010, at 52.
C. The Undesirable Effects of Forum Shopping

The social ramifications of strategic forum shopping have long been the topic of research and critique, yielding varying normative positions. Without rehashing familiar arguments, I will point out three significant costs associated with the initiator’s choice model. Note that these costs relate specifically to the choice accorded to the initiator of the proceedings and not to the underlying condition of jurisdictional concurrence. As others have argued and as I elaborate below, jurisdictional concurrence can be socially beneficial for various reasons. It is the mechanism used for its activation—party choice—that should raise concern and warrants rethinking.

Wasteful investment. Parties that enjoy the ability to choose among alternative forums—either by strategically designing their transactions pre-dispute or by making the legally sanctioned choice of forum upon instigating litigation—have a rational incentive to invest resources in steering their case to the best forum available. Again, under the pluralist premise of a diffuse court system, regardless of how strongly the different forums strive for uniformity of legal output, they will necessarily diverge to some extent on similar questions. Thus, a rational party is bound to try to predict the possible outcomes of her litigation in the various available forums and work to direct her case to the forum expected to be most favorable to her interests. Factors making a forum favorable can be, for example, greater judicial expertise, lower expected litigation costs, known ideological biases of the bench or jury pool, and a party’s political clout in a certain jurisdictional community or professional circle.

Yet, normally investing resources in this kind of strategic planning—gathering information on beneficial forums followed by strategic forum shopping—is socially wasteful. The different forums, and the jurisdictional rules that allocate cases among them, are usually

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33 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 1.
designed to attach to objective characteristics of genuine human activity, not to influence that activity.\textsuperscript{34} To the extent that jurisdictional concurrence is the product of a deliberate design, a system’s choice of concurrence can only express indifference regarding the forum in which the odd case lands from among the available alternatives. Each forum is as socially desirable as the other; otherwise, concurrence would not be the rule. Investing resources in directing a case to one forum rather than another is, therefore, wasteful; it entails costs but affects only distribution (often detrimentally, as momentarily noted) and not welfare.

In some circumstances, the initiator’s choice model also incentivizes the forums themselves—the “supply side”—to invest resources to draw more cases to their jurisdiction. This competitive dynamic is not necessarily wasteful as forums might be driven to improve the quality of justice they provide.\textsuperscript{35} But in certain market conditions, it can also lead to monopolistic results (e.g., the Delaware chancery court is often viewed in such terms\textsuperscript{36}) or to a self-defeating “race to the bottom.”\textsuperscript{37} Supply-side competition can also be wasteful when forums attempt to attract “valued” litigants or cases, such as those that are more interesting, more famous, more income-generating, or cheaper to resolve (thanks to better evidence, for example). Here, too, the original rationales for the jurisdictional delimitations are subverted for irrelevant purposes.\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{Distributive Outcomes.} The capacity of certain parties to influence ex-ante the future choice of forum and of initiating parties to choose the forum can often empower strong, well-off, and sophisticated parties—Marc Galanter’s “haves.”\textsuperscript{39} Those parties with better information (or the means to invest in information-gathering), with a greater capability for strategic planning and behavior, and with an ability to act quickly upon the initiation of litigation are more likely to

\textsuperscript{34} See, e.g., Note, supra note 32, at 1691–92; Klerman, supra note 25.

\textsuperscript{35} See, e.g., Roberta Romano, \textit{Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle}, 1 J.L. ECON. & Org. 225, 227–32 (1985) (reviewing literature that has “outlined the economic forces that would generate beneficial state competition” in the corporate registration market).


\textsuperscript{38} See, e.g., LOPPUCKI, supra note 1.

make beneficial use of jurisdictional concurrence. 40

It is true that in some classes of cases, the initiator’s choice model seems to benefit the paradigmatically worse-off party. Consider civil rights cases, consumer protection actions, and certain employment-related suits: the initiator of the litigation is normally the weaker party in the dispute in all three classes of cases. It would seem, then, that at least in these contexts, the initiator’s choice model in fact helps to empower the worse-off parties. But there are two qualifications to this point: first, there are significant areas of the law in which the initiator’s choice model inevitably benefits the stronger party, most notably criminal cases and administrative enforcement proceedings; second, the advantage enjoyed by certain weakened parties under the initiator’s choice model usually materializes only once the litigation is initiated. Prior to that, sophisticated parties can affect the choice of available forums even as putative defendants (through choice-of-forum clauses or deliberate business practices) and thereby limit the redistributive potential of forum shopping.

Public-Private Divergence. Although a system of concurrent jurisdictions is assumed to be indifferent as to the eventual placement of any given case among the available alternatives, it may still have a preference regarding the overall distribution of cases among the relevant forums. To the extent that the forum-shopping model is not concerned solely with maximizing party agency, it should be expected to promote other social interests, unrelated to individual autonomy. These may be administrative concerns of caseload mitigation, or more substantive institutional purposes, such as attaching a degree of specialization to specific forums, preventing the over-insularity of forums by diversifying dockets, producing a diverse judicial output by assigning similar cases to different forums, or countering distributive unfairness by constraining the use of forum shopping in “suspect” circumstances.

Interestingly, the forum shopping model offers no assurances of serving any such public-regarding considerations. Parties using their prerogative of choosing a forum of their liking among the overlapping alternatives are expected to make that choice normally according to their own, self-regarding interests. These may coincidentally converge with the public interest in case distribution, but can also often diverge, leading to overall results that contradict the public reasons for

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40 See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 489 & n.36 (2011) (discussing the incentive for gathering information on relevant court generated by a forum shopping system, and noting its specific relevance to repeat litigants).
jurisdictional concurrence.

Consider, for example, the market justifications for forum shopping. These often rest on party choice as a mechanism for comparing forums, which gradually coalesces around a preferred alternative in a natural-selection-like process. While such a dynamic can promote a certain notion of institutional efficiency, it could also conflict with other social goals, such as maintaining the normative diversity of judicial output over time. Under the initiator’s choice model, only public goals that overlap with private interests can be pursued. The system essentially forgoes public interests that are not reliant upon, or that wholly deviate from, the preferences of individual litigants.41

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There is, therefore, ample reason to call for a reconsideration of the initiator’s choice model, given the detrimental effects of forum shopping which include: the wasteful strategic investment; the potential distributive advantage sophisticated parties tend to derive from the practice; and the likely divergence between private and public considerations. Below, I suggest that a random allocation mechanism might allay some of these costs and effects, while also supporting pluralism and knowledge-seeking in the legal system. To set the conceptual stage for my normative argument, I will first unpack the idea of randomness and survey its existing, if somewhat latent, presence in the legal system.

II. THE TURN TO RANDOMNESS

A. What Randomness Means

There are several meanings attributed to the idea of randomness, each with a distinct reference and use. Most notably, randomness can define the process of reaching a decision, but it can also relate to the result of that process. For example, when we describe Jackson Pollock’s paint drippings or John Cage’s tone variations as “random,” we usually do not mean that their works were created without planning or intention, but rather that they were designed to make it difficult to identify an organizing pattern within them. This kind of randomness can be described as consequential. It exists wherever it is impossible to derive an organizing principle from a given set of data or decisions.

41 See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) (presenting a general theory—focused on efficiency-related costs—of the divergence between the private and the public interests in managing the litigation system).
and, therefore, also impossible to predict the next piece of data or decision from those that preceded it. Consequential randomness can be an end in itself, such as when it is intended to make acclimation, reliance, or planning more difficult for those tracking a series of events (as in an agent subject to surprise reviews by a principal). Consequential randomness can also serve as a proxy for randomness in the process leading up to the result, where the process itself is not visible. However, mathematically valid consequential randomness is very difficult to attain and it is a problematic indicator of randomness in the process, in being subject to diverse manipulations.

In this Article, the use of “randomness” will refer to a second central type—that which appears in the process of reaching a decision. Procedural randomness occurs when the decider suspends her own discretion and employs instead a decision mechanism whose outcome she (or anyone else) cannot control. This kind of randomness involves, therefore, two related elements: uncontrollability and unpredictability. A random decision-making process ensures that the outcome of the process cannot be influenced, nor predicted, in advance. Procedural randomness takes two main forms: arbitrary randomness, which is weak randomness, and equal randomness, which is strong randomness.

Arbitrary procedural randomness characterizes decision mechanisms in which the choice is made based on a criterion that is irrelevant to the issue being decided and cannot be controlled by the decider at the time of the decision. Thus, for example, a rule that divides students into two classes according to date of birth (e.g., January-June into group A, July-December into group B) is an arbitrary random rule. It is arbitrary because date of birth is irrelevant to any rational student placement policy. It is random because students’ dates of birth are determined before the time of allocation and

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43 DEBORAH J. BENNETT, RANDOMNESS 132–51 (1998). The most familiar metaphoric example of this challenge is mathematician Émile Borel’s prediction of the typing monkey who would eventually reproduce the works of Shakespeare. See Émile Borel, La Mécanique Statique et L’irréversibilité [Static Mechanics and Irreversibility], 3 JOURNAL DE PHYSIQUE THÉORIQUE ET APPLIQUÉE [J. PHYS.] 189 (1913) (Fr.).
44 See JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS 40–43 (1989) (the producer of a series can design it in a way that will make it seem random, relying on people’s tendency to assume randomness based on an insufficient sample).
45 See BENNETT, supra note 43, at 152–73.
irrespective of it. The decider therefore cannot control which student will be assigned to which class, and the rule-maker cannot know in advance which students will have which dates of birth. What we get is a combination of arbitrariness, reflected in the lack of rational connection between the criterion and the purpose, and randomness, deriving from the predetermination of membership in the group defined by the criterion.

Such arbitrary random decision mechanisms raise complex issues of fairness. They decide a person’s fate based on an immutable characteristic that she cannot control (her date of birth, in our example) and thus recall practices of gender or racial discrimination. Indeed, over time, such decision mechanisms may lead to discrimination if they preserve differential treatment of members of different groups (even if the preliminary distinction between the groups appeared to be arbitrary, such as a person’s date of birth). Moreover, arbitrary decision rules may be susceptible to manipulation (which removes their arbitrariness), and as such, they may benefit those who can plan ahead and act strategically (e.g., a rule for the inspection of every fifth person going through airport security seems arbitrary, but can in fact be used by strategic actors planning ahead to enable them to avoid inspection). The more manipulable the mechanism, the less uncertain its outcomes, and it thus loses its random qualities.

Equal procedural randomness adds another requirement, beyond the arbitrariness of the result. In order to be equal, the randomness has to renew in each and every decision, so it cannot rely on a fixed choice criterion. Equal procedural randomness therefore requires an ad hoc lottery in the choice from among given alternatives in each and every instance. In our example, an equal random decision mechanism would entail a lottery among all cohort members to assign them to the two available classes. Such a rule is equal because at any given time—until the point of decision—each member of the relevant group has a genuinely equal chance of ending up with any of the results (regardless of her date of birth, last name, or place in a line). Pure equal procedural randomness requires equal probabilities of arriving at any of the possible results. Such a lottery ensures equal treatment of those subject to it, in both its disregard for any immutable characteristics as well as its lack of bias toward any one outcome over another for each of the group members.47 The coin flip is the paradigmatic example of pure equal procedural randomness; the roll of a die is another (the

47 This is also known as a “fair” lottery (see Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 46, at 485) or “statistical” one (see Samaha, supra note 12, at 9–10).
difference between the mechanisms is the number of alternatives from which they can choose—two compared with six). Equal randomness that is based on an ad hoc lottery fully complies with the uncertainty criterion, and as such, it allows those subject to it to prepare, at the very most, for the relevant probabilities of ending up with each result.  

As we will see below, there may be conditions in which it is justified to intentionally bias the lottery, so that certain outcomes are more likely than others. It is important to note, however, that a biased lottery retains all of the procedural elements of equal randomness, both in that the fates of those subject to the lottery are determined ad hoc (regardless of preexisting characteristics) and in that the biased probability applies equally to all participants (thus, in a 90/10 bias, every participant has a 90 percent chance of ending up with option A and a 10 percent chance of ending up with option B).

B. Some Features of Procedural Randomness

There are several remarkable features to decision-making mechanisms that employ procedural randomness. Significantly, they are relatively cheap to operate, they “sterilize” the decision-making process by eliminating human discretion, and they ensure a plurality of outcomes over a sequence of decisions. Each of these features is considered in a little more detail below. Note, however, that these are not (yet) presented as necessary advantages of randomness, but rather as features that might prove useful to further certain normative visions—as will be argued in following sections.

Cost. Perhaps the most prominent feature of a random decision mechanism is its relatively low cost. A random rule will normally be cheaper than its alternatives, since it requires devising only a single mechanism that is used repeatedly, thus averting the costs related to case-specific discretion. Accordingly, when cost effectiveness dominates all other considerations, randomness is often the reasonable decision-making method, at least from the perspective of the institution with the decision-making authority.

48 Samaha, supra note 12, at 17.

49 See infra Part IV.A.

50 Of course, creating a mechanism that would ensure a truly random (“50/50”) series of coin flips is a considerable scientific challenge: one would need to control, e.g., for type of coin, erosion of metal, angle of spin, stability of flipping mechanism, degree of air resistance, and landing surface. See Persi Diaconis et al., Dynamical Bias in the Coin Toss, 49 SOC. INDUS. APPLIED MATH. REV. 211 (2007); Joseph B. Keller, The Probability of Heads, 93 AM. MATH. MONTHLY 191 (1986).

51 This may not be the case from the perspective of those subject to the lottery: they might in fact incur new costs due to the shift from reason to randomness,
is the line at the post office or bus stop. In these contexts, it is usually accepted that, assuming all customers will eventually be served, investing resources in weighing the comparative urgency of each person’s needs (a question that some moral principle can certainly apply to) is a waste that is best saved by relying on random sorting based on a “first come first served” heuristic.\[^{52}\]

But its low cost is not the only appealing feature of a random decision-making process. Such a process—especially in its equal form—has additional unique qualities that may be relevant in selecting a choice mechanism and may justify the choice of randomness regardless of procedural efficiency. Two such noteworthy qualities are sterility and multiplicity.

**Sterility.** A significant characteristic of randomness is the “sterile” nature of the process.\[^{53}\] A truly random mechanism eliminates the resort to any and all reasons—both good and bad, and relevant and irrelevant—in the decision-making process. This means that a decision-maker using a random choice mechanism is exempt from considering reasons and, therefore, also from the responsibility entailed by reason-based decisions. If you take account of reasons, you might go wrong; if you flip a coin, you are free of the burden of error.

In addition, randomizing also renders the decider “untouchable.” It is very difficult to corrupt a random choice mechanism, especially one that is publicly visible. In this respect, randomness can operate as a defense mechanism against undue pressures in the decision-making process. At the price of giving up relevant reasons, we secure the absence of irrelevant ones, and thus the decider is completely neutral.\[^{54}\]

Finally, the sterility of the process is the foundation of its formal equality. Because no other factors are involved in the decision-making process beyond the random mechanism, it necessarily treats all those subject to it as complete and formal equals and eliminates all personal especially if they are risk averse. I return to these concerns further on *infra* Part IV.B(2)

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\[^{52}\] See Richard A. Epstein, *Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property*, 64 Wash. U.L.Q. 667, 670 (1986) (“Time offers a unique measuring rod, sufficient in principle to resolve two or two thousand competing claims for priority. Whoever got there first, wins . . . . [A]n enormous decision-making capability is contained in a single variable.”). Still, not every line is random: in conditions that allow for planning, a person may invest (socially wasteful) resources in getting to line early in the morning, for example. A genuinely random line is a group of patients in the ER, who usually do not time their accidents to align with the hospital’s slow hours. *See Elster, supra* note 44, at 70–72.

\[^{53}\] See Kornhauser & Sager, *supra* note 46, at 489 (discussing the “sanitary” quality of procedural randomness).

\[^{54}\] See Perez, *supra* note 42, at 138.
or systemic preferences or biases, conscious or otherwise.

*Plurality.* Another noteworthy, though often overlooked, quality of the random process is the multiplicity of results it ensures over a sequence of decisions. As with any heuristic, random choice mechanisms come into play when a decider has to choose among multiple alternatives. In this context, randomness is normally understood to serve as a tie-breaker when the decider has exhausted all rational reasons to choose one alternative over the others. Randomness thus emerges from conditions of multiplicity. But what makes it a unique kind of heuristic is that it also ensures multiplicity as a consequence, given a series of decisions over time. One of the qualities of reason-based decision rules is that they produce uniform decisions over time, so that in repeated instances of choice between similar alternatives, the same choice is likely to be made each time around. A random decision mechanism, in contrast, guarantees that over a series of decisions, all of the available alternatives will eventually be chosen and represented in the choice sequence. Randomness thus begins from multiplicity, but also ends (over time) in multiplicity. A random decision rule means indifference (ex-ante) with respect to different alternatives; but equally as important, it reflects (ex-post) willingness—indeed, interest—that all of the alternatives will remain available as a result of the rule’s use.

## III. RANDOMNESS IN LAW

The rule of law, which guides contemporary liberal democracies, mandates a measure of stability and coherence in a legal system’s norms, so that its subjects can predict the legal results of their actions to a reasonable degree of certainty. At the same time, the rule of law also requires equal treatment—the law should apply uniformly to all its subjects, in the absence of a rational differentiating factor that justifies disparate treatment. Under the rule of law paradigm, any change to the normative field must be accompanied by a reasoned justification expressed through a legitimate decision-making procedure. This is the case, for example, with parliamentary debate on a draft bill, judicial reasoning, and the administrative consultation

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process. These are all institutional procedures aimed at making decision-makers rely on rational arguments.

Under this paradigm then, a random decision rule—that is, a rule that subjects the application of a norm, or the discretion of its interpreter, to an uncontrollable and unpredictable process like a coin flip or dice roll—contradicts both the certainty and equality principles at the base of the rule of law. Randomness undermines certainty because the person subject to the norm does not know whether the norm will actually apply to her and, therefore, has difficulty planning her behavior. Randomness undermines equality because without control over the application of the norm, two people who are similar in all relevant respects might still have different outcomes. In addition, randomness entails arbitrariness in that the application of a norm is not contingent on intelligible reasons, but on fate. At least some of the liberal notions of human dignity will deem this an affront to a person’s right not to be subject to treatment that is grounded on irrational decision-making processes.

Yet, in certain circumstances, common law legal systems do employ random decision rules. In many systems, like the U.S., legal randomness arises primarily in two typical situations: (1) at the substantive rights level, with respect to the ultimate allocation of indivisible resources; and (2) in the procedural context, with respect to the allocation of cases among judges and assignment of judges to judicial panels. Systematic thought on randomness in law has therefore been devoted mostly to explaining and critiquing these two contexts—the first as a rare anomaly in the rational field of substantive legal norms and the second as a prevalent phenomenon in judicial administration. I discuss each of these contexts separately, followed by an assessment of what these instances teach us about the limits and

57 Randomness does not eliminate all certainty. In fact, it introduces an element of risk, which we can take into account given our degree of risk aversion and the availability of means for protecting against it (i.e., insurance). Of course, in order to properly deal with risk, we need information—primarily, the probability of risk embodied in the random norm.


59 See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE 44–45 (1999) (enumerating examples of random allocation mechanisms in these two kinds of cases in the U.S., the U.K., New Zealand, Israel, and the European community, among others).

60 See, most notably, Samaha, supra note 12, a seminal survey of the use of randomness in law in general and in intra-court case assignment procedures in particular. Our contributions however diverge: unlike Samaha’s, this Article asserts an overly normative claim, which leads to distinct emphases in the conceptual groundwork as well.
possibilities of irrationality in a judicial system committed to the ideal of the rule of law.

A. Allocation of Indivisible Resources

The most common lottery context in rational legal systems is when there are multiple justified claims of equal legal weight to an indivisible good or resource.\(^\text{61}\) Consider, for example, the allocation of a chattel inheritance, an organ for transplant, or a public housing apartment among claimants with equally strong entitlements. Another set of cases in this category is when a good is divisible but the divided parts will be necessarily different, so the dispute among the claimants will transform into a competition over the better part. Division of real property is the classic example here.

In such disputes, it is possible that the available heuristics of substantive law will be exhausted, without pointing to a rational preference of one claimant over the others. Moreover, the market mechanisms of allocation might also be unavailable due to a lack of bargaining resources or information, prohibitive transaction costs, difficulties in translating distinct preferences into exchangeable terms, or a deontological aversion to certain kinds of barters. One of two results is then possible: either the allocation is canceled so that no one receives the good, and consequential equality is maintained; or else the good is allocated only to some members of the claimant group, based on a criterion that is irrelevant to the moral foundation of the claimants’ initial eligibility.

In its general reluctance to refrain from allocations—an option that is viewed as both wasteful (and thus inefficient) and status-quo-preserving (and thus potentially distributively unjust)—the legal system sometimes resorts to a decision rule that is arbitrary but still fair. Such a rule must determine who will receive the indivisible good, but without taking into account differentiating factors that were excluded in the initial allocation process. As we have seen, an ad hoc lottery satisfies these conditions, while guaranteeing all justified claimants equal chances of receiving the good or resource.\(^\text{62}\) And, indeed, many legal systems sanction the use of a lottery as a tie-breaking means among parties with an equal claim to a finite, indivisible resource.\(^\text{63}\)

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\(^{61}\) See Samaha, supra note 12, at 33–34.


\(^{63}\) See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 12, at 33 (applying a lottery system for tie-breakers regarding land partition claims); Carol Necole Brown, Casting Lots: The Illusion of Justice and Accountability in Property Allocation, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 65, 114–24 (2005) (applying a
Legal scholars have suggested extending the use of random allocation mechanisms to even more complex contexts. For example, Akil Amar famously explored the idea of an election mechanism whereby the ballot count is followed by a lottery among candidates that is biased relative to the share of votes each earned in the election (e.g., a candidate who won 60 percent of the votes will have a 60 percent chance of winning the contested seat, rather than a 100 percent chance as is the case today). Such an arrangement treats the power of government like an indivisible resource, to which potential access ought to be guaranteed for all groups, including minorities. Several authors have invoked the possibility of a lottery to allocate child custody between separated parents (at least where joint custody is unavailable). Such a rule represents a practicable solution for a judge who lacks a rational reason for preferring one parent over the other; but it also has an expressive quality with respect to the child, who is spared the experience of a judge assessing the parenting skills of her mother and father. In a different context, a random distribution of small-claims class action proceeds was recently suggested, proposing that a few plaintiffs be randomly selected from the plaintiffs’ class and paid sums larger than their individual claims. In this case, the resource up for allocation (the proceeds fund) is in fact divisible, but the costs of distribution among all class members would be prohibitively high.

It is noteworthy, despite scholarly suggestions, that random distribution mechanisms are not, in fact, usually used in socially crucial contexts. We usually do not decide child custody by coin flip; we do not elect our leaders by a roll of the dice. This reality reflects a deeply

lottery system for tie-breakers regarding education rights).

64 Akil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale L.J. 1283 (1984). On the frequent use of lotteries in election procedures from ancient Greece to the Renaissance, see Duxbury, supra note 59, at 26–32.


67 See id. at 1071–73.

68 See In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 2003), where a judge was reprimanded for flipping a coin to decide whether a divorced couple’s children would spend Christmas Eve with the father or the mother’s parents. As part of the disciplinary proceedings, the judge promised to “[r]efrain from resolving any disputed issue by the flip of a coin.” Id. at 737. See also Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n of Va. v. Shull, 651 S.E.2d 648 (Va. 2007) (disciplining a judge who flipped a coin in order to decide where the children would spend the better part of a holiday vacation, after the parents had failed to reach an agreement).
entrenched aversion, documented in behavioral research, to random determination of “substantive” distributive questions—ethical, legal, or political. This aversion is particularly striking given the conspicuous willingness to employ such mechanisms in central aspects of judicial administration. To that the Article now turns.

B. Case Allocation and Panel Assignment

The second instance of procedural randomness in law is ostensibly unrelated to the determination of contests of rights, but rather concerns the management of the judicial process itself. Common law court systems often resort to random mechanisms in allocating cases among judges, as well as in assigning judges to panels, within a single court. Although this institutional phenomenon is significantly more widespread and entrenched than the unique cases of indivisible resource allocation, it is fairly obscured and does not normally draw much concern.

Why do legal systems employ random mechanisms to allocate cases and assign judicial panels? This could reflect a systemic presumption that all judges are similar enough in all relevant respects, and so random distribution is merely the cheapest mechanism for assigning cases when the court is indifferent to the allocation results; but this is an unconvincing explanation. It seems reasonable that if pure institutional efficiency were the objective, then allocation policies would be pulled toward specialization rather than randomness. Sending similar kinds of cases to the same judge (and joining groups of judges in fixed panels) would ensure, over time, greater specialization and thus, cheaper disposition.


See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 178–84 (1986) (random application of a legal norm violates the integrity requirement of a just legal system); see also Brown, supra note 63, at 114 (“Lotteries, by their nature, are fundamentally unreasoned and unexplained because of their randomness. Therefore, their use in making decisions with legal consequences offends generally recognized notions of distributive justice.”).

Contrary examples do, however, exist: for years, the U.S. drafted its soldiers into wartime service by lottery, when life and death were literally on the line. See GEORGE Q. FLYNN, CONScription and DemocraCy: The Draft in FRance, Great Britain and the United States 38 (2002).

See, e.g., Samaha, supra note 12; Ashenfelter et al., supra note 14, at 266–70 (concluding empirically that three surveyed federal district courts assign cases mostly randomly); Matthew Hall, Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 574 (2010).

The notable exception is Adam Samaha’s detailed treatment of this topic in Samaha, supra note 12, at 47–81.
A more persuasive explanation seems to be that the random allocation of cases among judges is in fact intended to deal with the reality of judicial heterogeneity: the resort to randomness is not the result of judicial sameness, but rather of judicial divergence. Indeed, the common understanding in the legal-realist world is that reasonable judges may and often do arrive at different answers to similar questions. This understanding might be based on a theory of the indeterminacy of the legal norm, a conception of the strong discretion allowed in hard cases, the limits of human reason in its search for a single correct answer, or the recognition that judges’ doctrinal commitments are sometimes trumped by their ideological ones. Whatever the underlying theory, if we accept that the fate of a case depends on, among other factors, the identity of the judge or panel to which it has been allocated, and if these links of dependency can be identified, then the person in charge of case distribution turns out to have a great deal of influence over the contents of judicial outcomes. A random allocation mechanism removes this influence by preventing the system from allocating cases according to expected results. At the same time, an equal random allocation mechanism ensures every litigant ex-ante equal chances of reaching each and every judge, and it eliminates the capacity of sophisticated parties to steer their cases to a specific judge within a given court.

Random case distribution therefore sanitizes the process by ridding it of two kinds of external influences: the ability of allocating agents to abuse the system, on the one hand, and the strategic advantages of sophisticated parties, on the other. It eliminates intentional (or negligent) discrimination in a corrupted assignment process, as well as distributive discrimination between haves and have-nots. In addition, a random allocation mechanism expresses a systemic indifference to the differences among judges and thereby serves to legitimate courts’ image as forums of impartial adjudication.

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74 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Judgment Calls: Principles and Politics in Constitutional Law 4 (2008) (“Judges do not operate in a vacuum, and their worldviews inevitably—and properly—shape their rulings in hard cases . . . . Especially in important cases, reasonable judges may differ about the correct outcome.”).


77 See Dworkin, supra note 70, at 263–66.

78 See Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication 152–56 (1997); Sunstein et al., supra note 14.
But this, of course, is not the full story. As other commentators have already noted, the solution developed to eliminate discrimination (or the appearance thereof) in the case allocation process raises important concerns of discrimination ex-post facto. For random allocation of cases among judges within a court means embedding in the judicial process a significant irrational element: luck. The severity of a sentence in a criminal case or the probability of winning a (non-jury) civil case is determined by, among other factors, the sheer luck of the case’s allocation to one judge rather than another. From a consequentialist point of view, similar matters regularly receive disparate treatment, in random fashion and without any rational reason for the distinction (not even a bad reason, as lotteries are “sterile”), except for the original interest in preventing manipulation of the allocation process and lowering its cost.

Considering the judicial system’s typical aversion to deciding judicial proceedings by lottery, the commonplace use of randomness in case allocation, as well as the matter-of-factness with which it is accepted, raises questions and, accordingly, attempts at justification and rectification. At the same time, this apparent tolerance could also offer important hints as to the limits of acceptable randomization in the legal system. Randomness in the judicial decision is shunned, whereas randomness in judicial administration is allowed. The judge may not flip a coin, but the court registrar may certainly do so.

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70 See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 12, at 209; Mautner, supra note 75, at 222; Samaha, supra note 12, at 5.
71 But see Perez, supra note 42, at 141–42 (opting for a random choice process necessitates a substantive position in favor of randomness and, as such, cannot be neutral).
72 See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 841 (1984) (“Whether a judge’s internal mental process, when pronouncing a sentence of twenty or thirty days, actually amounts to anything more than a coin flip, the community wishes judicial rulings at least to appear to be the product of contemplative, deliberative, cognitive processes.”). Prominent Israeli Chief Justice Aharon Barak has stated that in choosing among several reasonable interpretive alternatives, “the judge may not flip a coin.” HCJ 547/84 Of Ha’Emek v. Local Council Ramat-Yishai 40(1) PD 113, 141 [1986] (Isr.).
73 See Samaha, supra note 12, at 70–81. Randomized case assignment can be explained as a means of “sensible allocation of indivisible resources [of judicial excellence] across apparently equal claims, and reliable experimentation on judicial behavior.” Id. at 75.
74 See Mautner, supra note 75, at 224–34 (noting that in order to diminish the role of luck in adjudication, the system should be designed such that each individual outcome approximates the average position all of the system’s judges would have taken on a similar question). For a critique of the normative and practical viability of the suggested model, see Daphna Hacker, Lack of Luck in the Courts: A Comment on Menachem Mautner, 9 THEORETICAL INQ. L. FORUM 38 (2007).
C. The Legitimate Lottery Paradox: Between Adjudication and Administration

What is the source of the divide between the legal system’s deep aversion to random judicial decision-making, on the one hand, and the presence of randomness in the case-allocation stage, on the other? A plausible explanation is that this divide, which we might term the legitimate lottery paradox,\(^\text{84}\) reflects the public image of the court and, more specifically, the way legal systems have constructed the judge as the focal core of judicial action. The elusive notion of “public confidence” in the courts, to which judicial systems resort more often with the gradual erosion of their traditional legitimation mechanisms,\(^\text{85}\) focuses mainly on the role of the judge—how she conducts the proceedings and reasons her decisions. Court administration tends to be perceived as a support system for the core judicial function, and as such, it is not measured by the moral standards that the judge and her decision-making process must meet.

It may be, therefore, that our belief in the rationality of judicial discretion, in the firmness of the procedures aimed to ensure it, and in a sufficient level of professional fitness of our judges all affect our willingness to give up rationality—that is, reason-based decision-making—at the case allocation stage. The distance separating the initial random process of case allocation and panel assignment from the eventual moment of “substantive” judicial decision-making seems to be great enough—and, moreover, interrupted by the force of rational adjudication—to blur the impact of the former on the latter. Judicial discretion appears so exceptional in its reasoned rationality that randomness seems its antithesis. Administrative discretion, in contrast, raises suspicion. It is seen as potentially tainted by the biases of bureaucratic culture, skewed incentive regimes, the agency of interest groups, and the pressures of the political ranks.\(^\text{86}\)

\(^{84}\) Samaha discusses a close but distinct feature of this odd reality, which he calls “the case assignment puzzle”: why do courts condone randomization in various governmental decisionmaking contexts (including court management), but exclude merits adjudication? Samaha, supra note 12, at 47. The paradox I discuss here concerns the fact that randomizing case assignment in fact randomizes much of the merits results as well.


\(^{86}\) See, e.g., Kenneth F. Watten, Administrative Discretion, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 35, 38 (Jack Rabin ed., 2003)
incorporating random elements in administrative decision-making processes may actually free the allocating agent from the corrupting potential of her job. The lottery is enabled at the administrative stage of adjudication thanks to—and in order to uphold—the ideal of the rationality of judicial discretion, which, in turn, quells the demand for consequential equality in similar cases.

Therefore, the paradox remains unresolved. But it does nonetheless reveal an important piece of information: we seem to be willing to conduct ourselves as a fairly stable political community—or are at least capable of doing so—even under conditions of institutionalized uncertainty and structural heterogeneity in adjudication results. It is true that the system sometimes employs mechanisms intended to limit the variance of judicial outcomes on certain issues. Appeals are meant to serve this purpose (among others); sentencing guidelines are another familiar example; as is institutional reform of court specialization. But despite such mechanisms, adjudication remains mostly diffuse. Most cases are handled by generalist judges (or juries) and are not subject to effective appellate review.

The next Part builds on this insight about the equilibrium reached by the judicial system in merging diffuse and random elements at the institutional level with rational discretion elements at the consequential level. On this basis, it suggests the usefulness of the random allocation mechanism for the network of jurisdictions comprising the court system as a whole.

IV. THE CASE FOR RANDOM ALLOCATION

A. The Random Allocation Model: Description and Justifications

As discussed in Part I, in conditions of jurisdictional overlap, the choice of forum is effectively in the hands of the initiator of the litigation. Although this may lead to optimal use of the information she holds, and although it may enhance her sense of autonomy and

("Discretionary decision are . . . clouded by administrators past experiences, present environmental demands, politics, and personal values."").

See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 11 (1921) ("Some principle, however unavowed and inarticulate and subconscious, has regulated the infusion . . . . [A] choice there has been, not a submission to the decree of Fate . . . ."); TAMANAH, supra note 55, at 123 (describing the rule of law ideal: "as the judge becomes indoctrinated in the ways of the law and the judicial role, the judge becomes the law personified. In the ideal, the judge is to be unbiased, free of passion, prejudice, and arbitrariness, loyal to the law alone"); PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 19–29 (1998).
agency, her strategic advantage could lead to socially undesirable, sometimes even harmful, results. This risk could be moderated by an ad hoc lottery to determine the forum. Under the Random Allocation Model, cases would be filed with an administrative unit within the court system, which would then randomly assign them to one of the forums with jurisdiction over the case. The allocation mechanism could apply equal randomness, which would assure an equal chance of the case reaching any of the relevant forums; or it could be based on a biased lottery, assigning different probabilities of reaching different forums. As will be demonstrated below, the choice of lottery type will derive from the substantive purposes of the allocation process. The important thing to understand, though, is that this kind of purposive analysis is applicable only absent the premise of the initiator’s control over choice of forum.

A random allocation mechanism would incorporate the following typical advantages of procedural randomness into the choice of forum process: it would enhance social utility, because the process would become shorter and simpler and would also save the wasteful investment in strategic planning; and it would ensure fairness ex-ante among the parties, because they would have equal chances of receiving each of the alternatives. Access to a beneficial forum can be thought of as an indivisible resource; it therefore makes sense to allocate it by lottery, as the system is supposed to be neutral among the parties in the initial stage of the litigation.\footnote{Samaha thinks in similar terms of “the tragically scarce and indivisible resource of judicial excellence,” which justifies random assignment of cases among judges. Samaha, supra note 12, at 66.} Beyond these familiar justifications, however, there are also other social interests that might benefit from the adoption of randomness: it will guarantee greater equality among parties (distributive purpose); sustain over time a multiplicity of normative visions in the institutional field (pluralist purpose); and add information in the process of improving adjudication (epistemic purpose). I will now reflect on each of these three justifications in detail. I will then address several important challenges and counter-arguments to the ideas set out below.

1. Distributive Justice

As previously discussed, creating an opportunity for the initiator to behave strategically at the choice of forum stage gives sophisticated parties an advantage. Such parties have the resources and, hence, the capacity to assess with relative accuracy their chances to succeed in each of the relevant forums (for example, if they are repeat players
who are familiar with the system or if they can consult with a seasoned lawyer). Using their superior information, sophisticated initiators can locate the forum that they expect will yield the best possible results in their litigation. Although a system with concurrent jurisdiction can be assumed to be indifferent regarding which forum is chosen, the parties themselves are clearly not. Thus, there is no reason for one party to be given a distributive advantage over another at this initial stage.

In addition, sophisticated parties can typically better prepare for the possibility of litigation and accordingly, act faster upon dispute and bring it to the forum of their choice before the other party manages to act. The greater the distributive gap between the parties, the lower the chances of counteraction by the adversary (such as raising a forum non conveniens claim, employing the right of removal, or seeking change of venue) once the process has been put into motion. Moreover, repeat players—usually, large corporations and governmental entities—can exploit their initial ability to choose the forum to aggregate achievements over multiple litigations (for example by strategically directing cases of special importance to one forum or another so as to establish (or avoid) a precedent or by maintaining long-term relationships with agents in specific courts).

There are two central types of cases where the potential for strategic manipulation of choice of forum can raise distributive concerns. The first category of cases: disputes in which the party that chooses the forum typically possesses greater strategic resources than her adversary. The criminal process is the most obvious context of this category of cases. Other examples would be civil processes of debt collection by a bank, a national retailer or service-provider, or an administrative entity. A large, well-funded class action against a relatively small defendant would also be included in this category. In such proceedings, the choice of forum can affect their nature and outcome, in a single case or over a series of cases. The second category of cases: the nature of the dispute or available forum makes strategic manipulation distributively concerning. An example would be family disputes, which often implicate gendered or other social biases and distinctions and might, therefore, raise the distributive concern that strategic choice of forum will reproduce existing power structures rather than challenge them. Consider for example disputes over child custody or rearing, in which society has a professed interest in being part of, and introducing public values into, the privately-run litigation.
Cases falling into these two categories—i.e., when there are significant regressive ramifications to a party’s strategic power—require a procedural alternative that will remove her choice of forum advantage. In eliminating the initiator’s ability to secure a familiar court setting and thereby impeding her ability to prepare in advance for the litigation, this will put parties on more equal footing at the start of the proceedings, at least with regard to the litigation forum. A random allocation rule—instituting an ad hoc equal lottery—would support this end. It would save the costs of strategic preparation, allowing the parties to prepare, at best, for the given probabilities of reaching each of the possible forums (assuming these probabilities are publicly known). At the same time, such a rule would also eliminate the capacity of the system itself—that is, of its allocating agents—to prefer one forum over others and thereby bias case outcomes. A random allocation rule is, accordingly, equal ex-ante both among the parties to a given case and among parties across different proceedings because each case has the same probabilities-matrix of reaching each of the jurisdictionally relevant forums. The rule is neutral in the sense that it does not allow for the preference of one forum over others.

Because the distributive justification applies the random allocation rule to only certain categories of cases (and not others, for example where the capacity to choose a forum a remove a case actually empowers weakened parties), we run into the classification problem: how to determine—and more importantly, who will determine—that a certain case belongs to one of the categories of cases in which a distributive concern tends to arise and, therefore, should be randomly assigned. In some contexts, the classification is fairly simple, since they exhibit clearly-identifiable instances of distributive concern, such as criminal prosecutions or tax or immigration proceedings; these could be set out en masse in procedural legislation. In less obvious cases, refined categorization tools are necessary to identify instances that fall in the categories of cases warranting random allocation for distributive reasons. These could be based on types of parties or the subject-matter of the dispute, as previous work on this topic has proposed.

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89 See also Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, *Behind the Veil of Legal Uncertainty*, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2011) (suggesting enhancing uncertainty with regard to the legal consequences of certain practices in order to eliminate the operation of undue reasons).

As noted, the distributive justification for random allocation in cases of concurrent jurisdiction assumes the system’s moral indifference to the competing forums. This is not a necessary premise. Various ideological viewpoints might prefer that certain kinds of cases reach certain kinds of forums, even though the rules of concurrent jurisdiction allow equal access to multiple forums. Thus, for example, in the U.S., civil rights activists have long preferred federal courts over state courts in litigating constitutional claims, while a federalism-centered point of view might support a greater role for state courts in interpreting the Constitution. The Random Allocation Model, which assumes equal chances to reach either forum, reflects, in contrast, respect for the given fact of institutional multiplicity in the judicial system.\textsuperscript{91} Whether this diversity is a planned reality or the result of unintended processes,\textsuperscript{92} the random model promotes a synchronic understanding of the judicial system. It takes account of existing institutional conditions and gives them their utmost effect. If the legal system has generated multiple, concurrent forums to determine certain kinds of cases, then it should arguably embrace an allocation mechanism that will effectuate this choice, without allowing an undue advantage to quick or sophisticated parties. Still, in the discussion of pluralism below, I will seek to show that there are also independent reasons, beyond the effectuation of an existing state of jurisdictional affairs, for an arbitrary equalization of access to overlapping jurisdictions.

At the same time, random allocation could also be used to attain a sort of distributive “affirmative action.” This could be done through a lottery that is biased in favor of a certain forum or through more complex methods of randomization. Thus, for example, assume we prefer that most prosecutions of terrorism suspects are brought before military tribunals, but also want to keep civilian courts in the picture, perhaps in order to monitor interrogation practices by sample. We could create a lottery in which 80 percent (for the sake of the example) of the relevant cases are brought before military commissions and 20 percent are referred to federal district courts. Under such a scheme, all cases have the same probability distributions of reaching each forum, so that in that respect, ex-ante equality among all defendants is maintained. At the same time, the power of the prosecuting authorities to strategically choose their forum of preference for each and every case is eliminated. Consider another example, in the

\textsuperscript{91} See supra Part III.B (on plurality as the outcome of randomization).

\textsuperscript{92} See BAUM, supra note 15, at 5 (characterizing the process leading to the reality of court specialization as mostly “inadvertence rather than design”).
context of family disputes subject to concurrent jurisdiction: to the extent a legal bias exists favoring men over women in heterosexual property distribution decisions,\(^{93}\) we may want to grant women an initial advantage in choice of forum. This can be done by subjecting only men to an allocating lottery. Under such a system, women are still rewarded for acting quickly, whereas men lose the incentive to do so, but without granting complete veto power to women. Of course, these suggestions raise complex problems and issues, some of which are taken up below. It is important to note, however, that we can begin debating them only once we abandon the assumption of initial choice by the litigation initiator and consider, instead, mechanisms that are not dependent on pure party agency.

2. Pluralism

By eliminating the strategic element in choice of forum and replacing it with random allocation, we would be relinquishing a market system of forum competition. The latter system often implies processes of specialization and "natural selection," which leads to the eventual precedence of certain forums over others.\(^{94}\) A lottery at the choice of forum stage would prevent parties from directing their cases to the most efficient or competent forum in a given case. The ramifications would be a certain added cost in terms of the social utility of the judicial system. Some cases would necessarily arrive at a suboptimal forum, while some forums that should have (according to some evaluation criterion) diminished and withered over time are likely to remain in operation and continue to get cases.

Still, this result can at the same time benefit the promotion of the political ideal of value pluralism in adjudication. In ideologically, culturally, religiously, and ethnically diverse political communities—all contemporary democracies, in effect—mainstream liberal theory currently demands equal concern and respect for all competing value systems, or at least the reasonable ones.\(^{95}\) This pluralistic approach requires, at a minimum, making room for competing cultural visions.

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\(^{94}\) See supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text.

in the public sphere, in resource allocation, and in public processes of decision-making. Under more ambitious versions of this view, a pluralistic community should also institutionalize modes of communication, discourse, and education among the groups comprising it, with the purpose of enriching the community's aggregate cultural resources and creating conditions for available exit from and entry into different groups.

A diffuse judicial system can support these pluralist ideals. Because courts are central social institutions in the development and dissemination of public values, institutional heterogeneity in their design can express the cultural and geographic diversity of the political community (a symbolic/educational function); give effective normative presence to the conceptions and demands of different groups (a legal-pluralist function); and facilitate an ongoing exchange among the various groups through judicial discourse on shared normative issues, like the interpretation of constitutional or procedural norms (a deliberative-learning function). Since the institutional idiosyncrasies of each kind of court produce distinct forms of legal experience, and given that very few of the decisions of these forums are subject to homogenizing appellate review, a multiplicity of court forums sustains a diverse character to the legal order. As such, the court system constitutes a field of state power that recognizes, expresses, and facilitates the value-pluralist character of the political community. Of course, this is a limited sort of diversity, since the various forums apply a shared system of rules (or at least a shared constitutional regime), albeit through diverse institutional vehicles. This ensures that pluralism does not turn into complete normative balkanization, and a shared framework of power and discourse—a legal culture, grounded in an overall constitutional structure—is maintained.

The random allocation of cases to diverse forums with concurrent jurisdiction will assist in upholding the consequential pluralism of the legal system, even if individual litigants have no interest in such pluralism. Implementing an equal lottery in a competition between two forums ensures that 50 percent of all relevant cases will reach each of the forums, and so the political community will enjoy the

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97 See Aronson, supra note 13, at 266–67.

98 See Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 839, 856–67 (2011) (surveying theories of judicial behavior and discourse as a "distinct cultural system").
comparable input of each of the institutional alternatives (state A and state B, state and federal, military and civilian, religious and secular). Such a mechanism sacrifices the individual autonomy of the proceeding’s initiator, as well as that of a separatist community or a monopolistic forum-competitor, for the benefit of a consequential institutional ideal of normative diversity and of continuous interaction among members of different knowledge and culture groups.

Significantly, this kind of pluralism does not reflect the communitarian stream in multicultural thought, which calls for the state to use its power to enable groups to maintain separate and exclusive normative frameworks. Rather, this is a model that seeks ongoing interaction (through legal-normative discourse) among groups and group members and, therefore, demands that groups relax their exit and entry barriers, at least as long as they make use of state-sanctioned judicial power. Such “social engineering” is not a rare feat. Incorporation of arbitrary elements into a rule—or, at any rate, elements that do not take into full account the preferences of those subject to the rule—is a familiar (if constitutionally contested) strategy for promoting social and class diversity in various policy contexts, such as university admission or soldier placement in military units.

Of course, a necessary condition for the legitimacy of pluralism-based random allocation is that all of the relevant forums meet minimum standards of procedural fairness. It is justified to force parties to litigate in a forum they have not chosen (given a preferred alternative) only if each of the alternatives is morally tolerable. The degree of tolerability derives from the prevailing legal-procedural ideal in a given society at a given time and so cannot be set out in general terms. It does make sense, however, that a reasonably liberal community would require all available forums to adhere to basic due process tenets and treat all litigants in an equal and respectful manner, even if a particular litigant does not share the normative commitments or cultural biases that characterize the forum to which she was sent. Ostensibly, this should not be too much of a challenge, as all institutional alternatives are the products of the democratic system to begin with. Even within democracies, however, not all forums maintain similar levels of procedural fairness. Military forums raise

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100 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (allowing the inclusion of some considerations of racial diversity in law school admission policies, although a lottery was deemed too arbitrary).
101 See MORRIS J. MACGREGOR, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES 1940–1965 ch. 7 (1985) (the U.S. military resorted to quotas in order to ensure inclusion of black soldiers in “white” units).
constant concerns, as do religious courts where such exist, but so might seemingly innocuous forums of the problem-solving variety, which are often criticized for relaxing due process guarantees in the furtherance of other institutional purposes. For such forums to be included in an essentially coercive system of pluralist allocation, they would have to satisfy general conditions of fairness.

3. Knowledge

Institutional heterogeneity does not only promote the pluralist goal of respecting competing normative worlds. It can also serve another purpose—that of infusing information into political discourse and institutional design processes. There are several aspects to this latter objective. On one level, which is closely related to the pluralist argument rationale, we can construe deep cultural disagreements as complex questions to which we have yet to find conclusive answers. Consider, for example, the profound controversies on gun rights or gay marriage, on which state and federal judiciaries, or the courts of different regions, might genuinely and reasonably disagree. While resolution to the underlying moral dilemmas is possibly out there, it may be that we are simply in need of more time to fully fathom their implications or come up with new data or arguments or theories that would help in reaching resolution. If this is the case, then it is justified to keep multiple alternatives available, side by side, so that we can continue experimenting with them and learning from them and perhaps even agree on the dominance of one or the other at some point in the future. A random allocation mechanism would ensure that strategic litigants would not undermine this social interest in maintaining concurrent alternatives that reflect genuine and as-of-yet irresolvable differences among members of the political community.

On a slightly more practical level, heterogeneous alternatives are a familiar and often necessary means in any experimental process testing the utility of a novel policy idea. Institutional moves toward specialization in adjudication are often devised with this in mind. Decisions to establish new court forums devoted to a unique subject-matter are a commonplace phenomenon, usually based on the predictions of experts and politicians as to the social gains that will result. A responsible decision-making process, however, should be wary of granting such new forums complete and exclusive jurisdiction without first testing the assumptions that led to their creation. One

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way of conducting such an assessment is to attempt (perhaps during a predetermined trial period) concurrent jurisdiction between the new forum and old forum and randomly distribute cases to both. This would reveal the relative benefits of each alternative.

This idea of course draws from the familiar and normal practice of scientists from various disciplines, who regularly divide tested communities into trial and control groups to conduct informed comparisons. Just recently, several prominent legal scholars proposed that legal designers adopt this model, so that new regulatory programs would include an initial stage testing the effectiveness of proposed policy relative to an alternative (the status quo or any other suggested innovation), with trial and control groups to be selected randomly from the relevant population. The random element here is crucial. It is intended to limit the capacity of the experimenter to skew the composition of the trial and control groups (intentionally or unconsciously) and, even more, the possibility of the subjects themselves altering the experiment’s results by joining either of the groups for exogenous reasons. The experimenter’s main objective is to examine the functioning of the relevant alternatives in similar conditions; in our context, this would be the ways in which different court forums treat similar cases. It would require sending similarly-situated parties, who would normally pick the same forum, to different courts. Randomness is the customary way to carry out such an analysis.

Granted, a comparative experiment in the operation of competing court forums with a random allocation of litigants does not qualify as a controlled “lab” experiment. It is an experiment in actual social life, and all the participants are affected by it in real and direct terms (there’s no placebo option), without even consenting to participate (at least not in the regular sense of informed consent, as opposed, perhaps, to the presumed consent of social-contract based democratic legitimation theories). This means that—as with the pluralist justification—all of the alternatives must conform to minimal conditions of procedural tolerability in order to justify their experimental worthiness. Moreover, the compared alternatives are cognizant of one another and thus might behave in a strategic or competitive fashion to gain more acceptance, power, and income. The race among forums for corporate chartering—in the U.S., currently

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being won hands-down by Delaware—exemplifies this. These
dynamics could clearly skew the comparative analysis and should,
therefore, be accounted for as well.

Still, assuming minimum assurances of procedural fairness, the
parallel treatment of similar cases in different forums can teach us a
lot—both on how these forums behave and on the various ways
available for treating similar problems. It is therefore customary to
relate to diffuse court systems as “laboratories” in which the legal
system weighs institutional and doctrinal alternatives, compares them,
and challenges itself to devise possible innovations; this is one of the
traditional justifications for the federal system in the U.S., in which
various states experiment in diverse legal arrangements while other
states learn from their neighbors’ cumulative experience. Indeed,
the multiplicity of circumstances in which the federal system allows for
concurrence of jurisdiction has been famously explained by Robert
Cover as an attempt to promote innovation and critical exchange.

Relying on the agency of parties in generating such experimental
dynamics is problematic, however. Litigants’ incentives do not tend to
overlap with the social interest in producing knowledge and
promoting innovation and experimentalism in institutional design.
Being strategic actors, parties go to the forums of their own preference.
Over time, a “free market” of court forums may lead strategic litigants
to prefer a certain forum and abandon another, although from a social
perspective, the latter may be an important resource of knowledge,
innovation, and critique (and aside from the related distributive
concerns). Indeed, the near-monopoly of Delaware courts over
corporate litigation in the U.S. has been decried by some for its
effective elimination of available normative/institutional alternatives
for U.S. companies. Random allocation solves this problem by
setting egoistic interests aside and giving precedence to the societal
interest in a diverse output of the judicial system.

106 See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1138 (2005) (noting “Delaware’s dominance” and the state’s
“significant degree of market power” in the U.S. corporate chartering market).
107 The most familiar statement of this kind appeared in Justice Brandeis’s dissent in
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932): “It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.” For a recent discussion of this argument and an assessment
of its critiques, see Friedman, supra note 11.
108 Cover, supra note 7, at 672–80.
109 See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139,
B. Counter-Arguments and Replies

1. Man as Means

One of the central challenges to the argument presented in this Article for randomized case allocation might echo the Kantian categorical imperative against treating human beings as a means alone. The argument goes like this: at the individual level, incorporating random elements into the management of the judicial system for the purpose of furthering general social interests would prevent some litigants from fulfilling their own will, and it might even forgo the possibility of attaching the most suitable process to a given case; the experience of individual parties thus turns into a means of sustaining institutional pluralism, albeit with its accompanying distributive, political, and epistemic advantages.

This may sound like a strong rejoinder, but I do not think the Kantian point to be compelling in the current context. Court systems are created and developed through complex political and bureaucratic processes, which reflect diverse reasons and purposes; some relate to the rights of individual litigants, while others to various public or parochial interests. Respect for the person that comes before the law does not necessarily entail establishing some particular forum or a forum that is necessarily to the person’s liking. Rather, it is achieved by ensuring that any forum at which she arrives will provide basic procedures and an impartial arbiter, so that the proceedings will be fair and intelligible. Given these conditions, design of the judicial forums and the mechanisms of choice and allocation among them is essentially a social matter of general concern. We are concerned with the design of institutions for the development and inculcation of the political community’s public norms, which are also the means for controlling the state’s use of its violent power against its citizens. Making the use of these institutions susceptible to the strategic choices of certain litigants seems, in this light, unfair (vis-à-vis their adversaries) and undemocratic (vis-à-vis the general public). Given sufficient fairness standards in all of the alternative forums, it is difficult to object to society’s making use of the diffuse system it has generated in order to realize its values to the fullest extent.

111 In fact, as Dorf and Sabel aptly argued, “we do not face a choice between experimentation or no experimentation. The status quo is an ongoing, albeit haphazard, experiment. Between that kind of experiment and a more democratically
In addition, recall that the notions of respect, autonomy, and agency cited in the current critique of the random model in fact apply only to one of the parties in typical court proceedings—the party that gets to choose the forum. As it is, the other party is dragged into the process and, as such, becomes a “means” for furthering the interests of the former, without having a say in the initial choice of forum. This is the result of a specific structure of the legal process that is neither necessary nor easily justified. It is a state of affairs that, in some circumstances, empowers sophisticated parties while denying society valuable sources of normative input that a re-imagined diffuse court system might yet produce.

2. Efficiency

The Random Allocation Model could be criticized on efficiency grounds for three related reasons: (1) it fails to utilize the information held by the parties regarding the suitable forum; (2) it introduces a new element of uncertainty into the litigation matrix, which can mean new insurance costs for risk-averse parties (this is also a matter of distributive concern, since risk aversion increases for low-income individuals\(^\textsuperscript{112}\)); and (3) in some contexts, it undermines the expertise and specialization rationales that led to the creation of separate forums in the first place. Therefore, in certain circumstances, the random allocation mechanism will entail litigating a case at a higher cost than otherwise necessary. The random model does away with rational input in the market for forums, and it does not replace it with the rational input of any other agent. It simply lets fate decide, and there is no reason to assume that luck has a tendency towards efficiency. The control of the central planner is limited to the establishment of the various court units (creating the field of alternatives), and the role of the proceedings’ initiator is exhausted with the decision to bring her case to court (entering the field). The allocation itself is taken away from both of these agents, and in this respect, we could argue that the Random Allocation Model is less efficient than reason-based alternatives.

A partial response to this point turns on the fact that random mechanisms are typically very cheap in and of themselves. This is an important point to keep in mind, given the considerable costs invested in litigating initial disputes over jurisdiction, venue, and forum conveniens. At least some of these disputes and their accompanying costs will be saved by a default random mechanism for resolving questions of concurrent jurisdiction. A random allocation mechanism also will reduce the ex-ante incentive of strategic actors to invest resources to prepare for future litigation—an investment that is, as discussed, pure waste from a social point of view.

But a more comprehensive reply to the efficiency critique requires a shift from assessing the efficiency of a single instance of litigation to considering the aggregate social outcomes over time. Even forgoing the distributive justification for the random model (assuming, though we shouldn’t, that equality does not promote efficiency), the pluralist and epistemic aspects of the model suffice as evidence of its concern with improving the quality of law and adjudication over time. Specialization is an important utilitarian principle for institutional designers, but over-specialization, which dissects legal knowledge into separate and enclosed forums, can also lead to a detachment from generalist legal discourse and to the vulnerability of such forums to the biases of interest groups and self-sustaining informational cascades. The very demand for efficiency may, therefore, justify relaxing the rigid boundaries of specialization, to some extent, so as to maintain contact and cross-pollination among the system’s various units.

Indeed, no experiment is short-term “efficient,” since it inevitably wastes resources on examining alternatives that are due to be proven inferior and eventually abandoned. But we keep on conducting experiments, and we try to converse across institutional and cultural borders, because accumulation of knowledge is a project of obvious utilitarian benefit from a social perspective. In this regard, the ideal of pluralism not only derives from deontological conceptions of dignity and equality, but also emerges as a means for maximizing social welfare over time.

113 The knowledge that the case will be allocated by lottery can also incentivize parties to settle before the forum is decided; eliminating the strategic element reduces the incentive to withhold information and, thereby, making settlement more attainable. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).

114 See Aronson, supra note 13, at 287–96.
3. Legitimacy

How would a lottery affect the experience of the litigant in the judicial process? The behavioral literature on procedural justice has shown that people ascribe considerable importance to the nature of the process that led to a decision on their matter, regardless of the contents of that decision. This means that a fair process can reinforce the legitimacy of its outcome, even if its subject landed on the losing side. Familiar versions of the procedural justice claim are characterized by the expectation that the subject of the decision be able to affect its making to present evidence and arguments and witness the process by which the evidence and arguments lead to the eventual outcome.\textsuperscript{115} This conception of fairness requires a rational decision-making process, and flipping a coin is perceived as its very antithesis.\textsuperscript{116}

This potential argument against the involvement of procedural randomness in the process leading to a judicial decision certainly has some merit. Yet it is important to remember that the decision to resort to such a mechanism in the first place is reasoned and rational, as well as justified by the understanding that it is superior to other allocative options.\textsuperscript{117} Indeed, it is not easy to say what is preferable from a procedural justice point of view. A decider unable to choose among given alternatives who disguises a random choice with rational arguments that fail to persuade her, or a decider who exposes the dead end she has reached and openly resorts to a process that, albeit arbitrary, at least ensures equality, like a lottery.\textsuperscript{118} Nonetheless, given the obvious modernist preference for rationality and consistency in decision-making,\textsuperscript{119} it would be reasonable to assume that a random allocation mechanism would yield some cost in terms of legitimacy and public confidence in the courts. The knowledge that a decision was reached in conditions of ex-ante equality is not always sufficient to soften the sense of injustice that results from a consequential defeat.\textsuperscript{120}


\textsuperscript{116} For a detailed description of the argument in the context of lotteries, see DUXBURY, supra note 59, at 132–35. See also ELSTER, supra note 44, at 118–20.

\textsuperscript{117} See ELSTER, supra note 44, at 116. Cf. Perez, supra note 42, at 141–42.

\textsuperscript{118} See DUXBURY, supra note 59, at 120–21, 132–33.


\textsuperscript{120} See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 44, at 170 (“Equality ex post has a much more robust appeal than equality ex-ante. Once the coin is tossed, the winner takes all and the loser’s knowledge that he or she had an equal chance of being the winner is meager consolation.”).
A partial response to this concern is tied to the distinction suggested earlier in the Article, between substantive judicial decisions and administrative decisions made in the pre-trial case allocation process.\footnote{See supra Part III.C.} As demonstrated, the reality is that most litigants are already subject to a random allocation process when it comes to the judge assigned to their cases or the pool from which their jury is selected. And as discussed earlier, we may be willing to tolerate this treatment because we assume that all judges satisfy some minimal standard of rational professionalism, so we do not expect to face unbearable injustice, whoever the judge may be. This notion is in fact similar to the condition stated above for the legitimacy of forced pluralism in court forums—that all available forums satisfy basic tenets of procedural tolerability, such that even by arbitrary allocation, we will achieve a reasonably fair court.

In addition, as stressed throughout the discussion, the existing arrangement for choice of forum from among concurrent jurisdictions does not rest on a fair decision-making process either. Rather, it is based on the strategic agency of the forum chooser, who, surely, pays no heed to the preferences of her adversaries. Adopting a random allocation mechanism in place of the prevailing principle of initiator’s agency would raise procedural justice concerns for those who have become accustomed to making the initial choice of forum; it would offer a new element of fairness to the other side.

4. Opt Out

It could be argued that sophisticated litigants, knowing they face a barrier to strategic preparation due to randomization, will act in advance to counteract the uncertainty. They could do this, in principle, in one of two ways: (1) either by resorting to mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), where the parties have greater control over the character of the forum and nature of the proceedings; or (2) by contractually ensuring choice of forum or rules of procedure.\footnote{See Jaime Dodge, The Limits Of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 731–54, 783–90 (2011) (surveying the doctrinal landscape regarding procedural private ordering, and suggesting a “symmetrical theory” of enforcement which relies on the rules governing procedural agreements during trial); Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 516–25, 533–55 (2011) (describing the practice and evaluating the social spillovers that result from the “outsourcing” of procedural norms).} Although these possibilities are already available and might not breed unique concerns, they do seem to undermine the fundamental purposes of the random model. They diminish the
redistributive qualities of randomness, because strong parties could use superior bargaining power to avoid it; and they erode the redeeming potential of jurisdictional multiplicity, because parties might abandon the court system for more certain alternatives and thereby fail to provide it with the cases it needs to reap the benefits of diffusion.

This is a serious challenge to randomness in some respects, but its limits should be noted. First, with regard to the possibility of opting out of the judicial system in favor of alternative forums, this option is not available in matters in which the law requires judicial involvement and does not allow for non-state alternatives. The criminal process is an obvious example, but so are child custody determinations. Second, as to the possibility of contracting around the random allocation process, this can be controlled by fairly straightforward contract law doctrines, such as unconscionability, and made subject to judicial review.

Naturally, the risk of contracting around the random process also touches on parties’ interest to negotiate the choice of forum question ex-post facto—that is, to make a deal after the lottery has already handed one of the parties, in random fashion, access to an advantageous forum. Given an equal lottery, the ability to contract ex-post would sometimes benefit an already-better-off party (although at other times, it would give a weaker party an additional bargaining chip), as well as undermine the systemic interest in preserving a plurality of active forums. The random model therefore requires a “protection mechanism.” Such a mechanism could determine that the result of the lottery is final and unchangeable, although this would not contend with the option of withdrawing the case altogether from the judicial system. Accordingly, a means of regulating contractual evasions would be needed here too.

CONCLUSION

The idea of incorporating random decision rules into the legal process is not a panacea, and it certainly has its costs. But it also hints at new directions for solving the puzzle of procedural law—how to create a normative field that meets the moral requirements of procedural justice and promotes the values embedded in litigation, without distorting people’s pre-litigation preferences and choices. Randomization can diminish harmful incentives and distributive disparities ex-ante. At the same time, it can facilitate the realization of the pluralist potential of a diffuse court system as well as the treasure-trove of knowledge it generates.
On our way to these goals, we must consider the procedural norm in its systemic, not individualized, context. A systemic perspective relates to the aggregate product of the judicial system over time and across cases and courts and not the personal achievement of one or another party. The procedural norm is, of course, subject to foundational conditions of fairness, because all litigants are persons worthy of respectful treatment. But being exempt from the need to instruct behavior beyond the courthouse, this norm may also be released from the requirement of rigid consistency in the management of adjudication, if other purposes may be better served otherwise. Randomness offers an inconsistency that is not corrupt; it is a resource worth utilizing.