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DIPL 6181 Statecraft: Designing Foreign Policy

Ann Marie Murphy PhD
Seton Hall University

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**STATECRAFT: DESIGNING FOREIGN POLICY
DIPLOMACY 6181
SPRING 2021**

Professor: Ann Marie Murphy
E-mail: Annmarie.murphy@shu.edu
Tel: 973-275-2258

Office: 135 McQuaid Hall
Office Hours: Tues. 7:15-8:00,
Thurs.1:30-3:00 & by appointment

COURSE DESCRIPTION

This course will introduce students to the study of statecraft: the design of strategies to achieve foreign policy goals; the choice of policy instruments within these strategies; and an assessment of their relative utility in achieving national objectives. This class begins by exploring key theoretical underpinnings of statecraft such as bargaining, power, threats, promises and cost/benefit analysis. It then examines different tools of statecraft, including strategic bombing, economic sanctions, foreign aid and trade, targeted killings, and propaganda. The course analyzes the objectives typically associated with each policy tool, the conditions under which they are most likely to be effective in accomplishing these goals, and debates regarding the proper way to measure effectiveness. Using the conceptual tools studied in class, all students will craft a foreign affairs strategy on a topic of their choice.

REQUIREMENTS

All students are expected to come to class having read the assigned material and prepared to discuss it in an authoritative manner. Class participation is an important component of this class and will account for 10% of each student's grade. There are five graded discussion posts for classes 2-6, which will account for an additional 15% of your final grade. A take home midterm will be handed out on March 9 and due on March 16. The midterm will count for 30% of the class grade. Students will also write a 20-page strategy paper and present their conclusions to the class. For this paper, students will choose a foreign policy case, frame the policy in terms of the analytical tools studied in class. The paper and presentation will account for 35% and 10% respectively. Presentations will be made at the end of the semester and papers are due on May 11, the last day of class.

This course is roughly divided into two sections. The first half of the class is devoted to studying the foundations and tools of statecraft. The second half of class is devoted to constructing the policy paper. Particularly during this part of the course, you will need to *simultaneously* (1) read the assigned text, (2) conduct research on foreign (and domestic) policy of your chosen case, and (3) gradually design a viable cost-effective strategy. In order to accomplish the task of designing a strategy we will devote the first part of each class to analyzing the assigned texts. The second part of the class will be devoted to applying the material discussed in that class to your concrete case. Thus, you will not only have to *closely* read the assigned texts before each class, but you will also have to know whether a specific goal is desirable/viable and whether a specific foreign policy tool is available and useful for achieving your country's specific goal(s).

Case studies must be chosen in consultation with the instructor, so it behooves all of you to begin thinking about the country and issue you want to research as soon as possible. The paper must include a wide variety of primary and secondary sources and include proper citation of sources and a complete bibliography. The structure of the foreign affairs strategy should follow that laid out in the assigned text for this class, Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). The book has been ordered in the SHU bookstore. All other readings are available through blackboard.

In addition to the assigned materials, students should keep abreast of major foreign policy issues by reading the *New York Times* and magazines such as *The Economist*, and *Foreign Policy* on a regular basis. The instructor will reference current policy issues to illustrate analytical readings throughout the semester, and it is imperative that students be up to date. Critical contemporary cases that will be referenced during the spring 2021 semester

include the North Korean nuclear case, the Iranian nuclear/containment issue, and the multifaceted competition between the U.S. and China.

Citation Formats

Papers should utilize one of the Chicago Manual of Style citation formats: Author-Date or Notes and Bibliography. The guidelines for these formats are on the course Blackboard page.

Academic Integrity

Plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty will be reported to the administration and will result in a lowered or failing grade for the course and may lead to dismissal from the School of Diplomacy. See university and school standards for academic conduct here:

<http://www.shu.edu/offices/student-life/community-standards/community-standards.cfm>

<http://www.shu.edu/academics/diplomacy/academic-conduct.cfm>.

Policy on Incompletes

Incompletes will be given only in exceptional cases for emergencies. Students wishing to request a grade of Incomplete must provide documentation to support the request to the professor *before* the date of the final examination or paper submission. If the incomplete request is approved, the professor reserves the right to specify the new submission date for all missing coursework. Students who fail to submit the missing course work within this time period will receive a failing grade for all missing coursework and a final grade based on all coursework assigned. Any Incomplete not resolved within one calendar year of receiving the Incomplete or by the time of graduation (whichever comes first) automatically becomes an “FI” (which is equivalent to an F). It is the responsibility of the student to make sure they have completed all course requirements within the timeframe allotted. Please be aware that Incompletes on your transcript will impact financial aid and academic standing.

Students with Disabilities

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Civil Rights Restoration Act, students at Seton Hall University who have a disability may be eligible for accommodations in this course. Should a student require such accommodation, he or she must self-identify at the Office of Disability Support Services (DSS), Room 67, Duffy Hall, provide documentation of said disability, and work with DSS to develop a plan for accommodations. The contact person is Ms. Diane Delorenzo at [\(973\) 313-6003](tel:9733136003).

CAPS:

As part of our commitment to the health and well-being of all students, Seton Hall University’s Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS) offers initial assessments, counseling, crisis intervention, consultation, and referral services to the SHU community. The CAPS office is located on the second floor of Mooney Hall, room 27. Appointments can be made in-person or by calling 973-761-9500 during regular business hours, Monday-Friday, 8:45 a.m. - 4:45 p.m. In case of a psychological emergency, call CAPS (973-761-9500) at any time to speak to a crisis counselor. For more information, please visit: <https://www.shu.edu/counseling-psychological-services/index.cfm>

COVID-19 Ground Rules

We are in a global pandemic and all of us are impacted in myriad ways. If you tell me you are struggling, I am not going to judge you or think less of you. You do not owe me personal information about your health (mental or physical) or living circumstances. If you must miss a class, need extra help, or more time on an assignment, please ask. I will work with you and if I cannot help you, I usually know someone who can. There are lots of campus resources (both virtual and in-person) available so please use them.

FEBRUARY 2 CLASS 1 INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS STATECRAFT AND HOW WILL IT BE STUDIED IN THIS COURSE?

David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 3-28.

Key Questions: What is statecraft and why should we study it? What are the four key types of statecraft discussed by Baldwin? What is power, and why is it so central to the study of foreign policy? What is the distinction between power resources and influence?

FEBRUARY 9 CLASS 2 FOUNDATIONS OF STATECRAFT: POLICY ENGINEERING, THREATS AND PROMISES

Philip Zeilkow, "Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again" *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring, 1994) pp. 143-171. Focus on his 7 components of foreign policymaking, which begins on p. 155.

David A. Baldwin, "Thinking About Threats" and "The Power of Positive Sanctions" in *Paradoxes of Power* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989) pp. 45-57, and 58-81.

Alexander George, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boulder, Westview Press,), pp. 7-21

Case: Iranian Nuclear Chess: After the Deal, Robert Litwak, available at:

<https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/irans-nuclear-chess-after-the-deal>

Key Questions: Under what conditions are threats/promises more costly? Are positive or negative sanctions necessarily more effective than the other? What type of information would Baldwin contend a policymaker needs to know in order before choosing how to attempt to exert influence in a given situation? Do we need different conceptual frameworks to analyze military and economic statecraft? What three types of knowledge does Zeilkow contend good policymaking requires? What are the seven components of his policy-making process? What is coercive diplomacy? Is it synonymous with military statecraft? Can promises be a component of a coercive strategy?

Case: Iranian Nuclear Chess: After the Deal, Robert Litwak. This is a long, 130 page report, albeit with lots of charts, footnotes etc. Read the following, although the entire report is very useful. Executive Summary p. 7- 11 and the Introduction p. 13-19. Please note that we will return repeatedly to this case, so if your workload is fairly light at the beginning of the semester, READ ahead! As you read the case, apply the readings to it. Zeilkow makes a distinction between policy objectives and policy preferences—identify them in this case. What tools of statecraft were used to achieve the nuclear deal? Identify the threats and promises used in this case to arrive at the deal from both the U.S. and Iranian perspective.

FEBRUARY 16 CLASS 3 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT I: THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS DEBATE

Stefanie Ann Lenway, "Between War and Commerce: Economic Sanctions as a Tool of Statecraft," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 2, (Spring 1988) pp. 397-426. NO need to read the Megarian Case.

Risa A. Brooks, "Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?" *Security Studies* 11, No 4, (Summer 2002) p. 1-50.

Arne Tostensen, Beate Bull, "Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?" *World Politics*, Vol 54, No. 3, April 2002, pp. 373-403.

John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "The Sanctions of Mass Destruction?" *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1999. pp. 43-53.

Emma Ashford, "Not so Smart Sanctions" *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2016.

Articles on US Sanctions on Iran, 2018 CSIS, BBC 2019, Washington Post, 2020

Recommended:

David, A Baldwin, "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice," *International Security*, 24, No. 3, (winter 1999/2000) pp. 80-107.

Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work" *International Security* 22, No 2 (Fall 1997) pp. 90-136.

Kimberly Ann Elliot, "The Sanctions Galss: Half Full or Completely Empty?" *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998) pp. 50-65.

Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work, *International Security* 22, No 2 (Fall 1997) pp. 90-136.

Key Questions: What is the precise logic of the process by which sanctions are designed to achieve the goals of the sender country? How do HSE define and measure state goals and the success of sanctions episodes? Lenway compares and contrasts the frameworks employed by HSE and Baldwin, particularly the criteria used to evaluate the effectiveness of sanctions. Which one do you find more compelling for policymakers? Brooks calls for a more nuanced approach to sanctions, focusing on targeted sanctions designed to impose costs on politically influential groups. How does a country's regime type affect the likelihood that different types of sanctions will be effective? What are smart sanctions? What are some of the difficulties of implementing smart sanctions? What costs do sanctions impose on the sending country? Does Emma Ashford believe that the sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine are smart? Do you agree with her assessment of a) how to frame the goals of the countries imposing sanctions and b) their effectiveness? There is a tendency in the literature to view economic sanctions as a more "humane" tool of statecraft than military force. Do Mueller and Mueller agree? What is the objective of U.S. sanctions on Iran? U.S. sanctions on Iran have hit the country hard, how likely are they to achieve their objectives? How would you assess the negative consequences of U.S. sanctions on Iran?

FEBRUARY 23 CLASS 4 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT II: FOREIGN AID, TRADE, AND FINANCE

David A. Baldwin, "Foreign Trade" and "Foreign Aid" in *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985) pp. 206-222. and pp. 290-310. NOTE THAT YOU ARE ONLY ASSIGNED PARTS OF BALDWIN'S CHAPTERS ON TRADE AND AID

Michael Froman, "The Strategic Logic of Trade: New Rules of the Road for the Global Market," *Foreign Affairs*, 93, 6, Nov-Dec, 2014. The USTR making a case for the TPP, what are its goals?

Richard Katz, "Mutually Assured Production: Why Trade Will Limit Conflict Between China and Japan" *Foreign Affairs*, 2013. Shiro Armstrong, "Australia's Trade War with China is Unwinnable for Both Countries" *East Asia Forum*, December 1, 2020.

CSIS China Power Project, "How Will the BRI Advance Chinese Interests?" <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative>

The Asia Society Policy Institute, “Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative” September 8, 2020.
<https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/weaponizing-belt-and-road-initiative>.

“China Wanted to Show Off its Vaccines, its Backfiring” *The New York Times*, January 29, 2021.

NYT Articles on Russia and Gazprom’s cut-off of natural gas to Ukraine.

Recommended:

Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa” *International Organization*, Vol. 55, No. 1, Winter 2001, p. 123-144.

Mark Strauss, “How China’s Rare Earth Weapon Went from Boom to Bust”

Rogue to Vogue? Despite its Reputation, Chinese Aid is Quite Effective” *The Economist*

<https://www.economist.com/news/china/21730195-new-study-reassesses-notion-china-bad-donor-despite-its-reputation-chinese-aid>

Key Questions: What are supply and influence effects of international trade and the logic by which they exert influence? What are strategic goods? How should one conceptualize the role of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy? How should the effectiveness of foreign aid be measured? Conditionality in foreign aid is a controversial topic. What are the arguments made by each side in this debate and which ones do you find more persuasive? What are the mechanisms through which USTR Michael Froman believes strategic trade will achieve U.S. objectives? Are the mechanisms the same as Chinese aims for the BRI? Why does Katz claim that trade will limit conflict between China and Japan? Does Russia have an oil and gas weapon, and how should one measure the cost of using it, and assess its relative success? What are the goals of the BRI, and to what extent have they been successful? Do CAATSA sanctions serve the U.S interest?

MARCH 2 CLASS 5 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT III: STRATEGIC BOMBING

Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 12-86, and the 1991 Iraq case, pp. 211 to 254.

Angela Stent, “Putin’s Power Play in Syria” *Foreign Affairs*, 2016.

Karl P. Mueller, Jeffrey Martini, and Thomas Hamilton, “Airpower Options for Syria” Rand Corporation, 2013.

CFR, Backgrounder on Target Killings.

Zachary Keck, “Why North Korea is So Scared of America” *The National Interest*,

Victor Cha, “Giving North Korea a “Blood Nose” is Risky” *The Washington Post*, February 28, 2018.

John Bolton, “Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran” *The New York Times*, March 26, 2015.

“The Killing of General Suleimani: What We Know” *The New York Times*, January 4, 2020.

“Iran Warns of Crushing Response if Trump Targets Nuclear Sites” *The Guardian* November 17, 2020.

“US Airstrikes Kill Top ISIS Leader in Iraq” *The New York Times*, January 30, 2021.

Recommended:

Aaron Belkin et al, "When is Strategic bombing Effective? Domestic Legitimacy and Aerial Denial. *Security Studies*, 11, no 4 (Summer 2002) p. 51-88.

Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare" *International Security*, vol. 26, No. 2, (Fall 2000) pp. 5-44.

A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo" *International Security*, Vol. 27, No 3, (Winter 2002/03), pp. 124-157.

Key Questions: Pape argues that coercive airpower takes two different forms: punishment and denial. What is the difference in logic underlying these two strategies and which one does he contend is more effective? Why? What is the logic of decapitation? One of the key difficulty in evaluating the relative effectiveness of air power as an instrument of statecraft is isolating its influence from the threat of conventional war. How does Pape contend this can be done? What are the different policy objectives that the Rand study considers and how effectively do they contend airpower can achieve them? What were the U.S. objectives in Syria? How would it rank them and to what extent are they compatible or competing? What are Russia's policy objectives and how did they seek achieve them? Which Syrian and other regional actors (Iran, Saudi Arabia) are targets of the U.S. and Russian influence attempts, and what they trying to influence them to do? Are drones strikes and targeted killings of individuals effective tools of statecraft?

MARCH 9 CLASS 6 TOOLS OF STATECRAFT IV: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY & PROPAGANDA

***Midterm Handed Out**

Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (CA: Sage Publications, 2012). Chapter 1 Introduction, pp. 1-50; Chapter 5, Propaganda and Psychological Warfare, only pp. 264-288 on Gulf of Tonkin Incident through Public Diplomacy; Chapter 6, How to Analyze Propaganda, pp. 289-306; Chapter 7 Four Cases, only read the Pentagon Pundits for Hire case, pp. 353-358; and Chapter 8, How Propaganda Works in Modern Society, pp. 359-368.
212-228.

Russia Propaganda in Crimea: How does it Work? *The Guardian*,
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/17/crimea-crisis-russia-propaganda-media>.

David Shambugh, "China's Soft-Power Push." *Foreign Affairs* 2015.

Jessica Brandt and Bret Schafter, "How China's Wolf Warrior Diplomats Use and Abuse Twitter" Brookings Institutions, October 2020.

Laura Rosenberger, "Making Cyberspace Safe for Democracy: the New Landscape of Information Competition" *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2020.

Brian Raymond, "Forget Counterterrorism: United States Needs a Counter-Disinformation Strategy" *Foreign Affairs* October 30, 2020.

MARCH 16 CLASS 7 NO NEW READING: DISCUSSION OF MIDTERM & PAPER

MARCH 23 CLASS 8 STRATEGY: ASSESSING THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapters 1 & 2.

Key Questions:

Discuss the overarching strategic vision of your case. What is its international context and how does that constrain or incentivize different strategic options?

MARCH 30 CLASS 9 STRATEGY: ASSESSING THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT

Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 3.

Key Questions:

What are the key domestic factors influencing your strategy?

APRIL 6 CLASS 10 STRATEGY: INTERESTS, THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES & POWER

Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 4&5, pp. 123-206.

Key Questions: What are your country's objectives? Be prepared to justify the objectives, list them in order of priority and justify the ordering.

APRIL 13 CLASS 11 STRATEGIC PLANNING: INSTRUMENTS OF STATE POWER

Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapter 6, pp. 207-280.

Key Questions: what instruments of state power will you use to achieve your objectives? How will you use them? By what mechanisms are they designed to achieve your objectives?

APRIL 20 CLASS 12 LINKING ENDS AND MEANS & EVALUATING STRATEGY

Terry L. Deibel, *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Chapters 7&8, pp. 281-359.

Key Questions: by what precise linkages is your strategy supposed to achieve your desired objectives? How will your target (s) react? Can you envision scenarios in which your proposed actions have an alternative affect? Are there back up plans for such contingencies?

APRIL 27 CLASS 13 STUDENT PRESENTATIONS

MAY 4 CLASS 14 STUDENT PRESENTATIONS

MAY 11 CLASS 15 STUDENT PRESENTATIONS