

CANNABIS CONUNDRUM

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I. INTRODUCTION

Marijuana and hemp are varieties of the cannabis plant. The marijuana plant appears in three types: sativa, indica, and a lesser-known non-psychoactive plant called ruderalis.¹ The sativa and indica plants have hundreds of compounds including psychoactive and non-psychoactive cannabinoids.² The major psychoactive compound and cannabinoid within these two plants is called Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”).³ Hemp, which is sometimes confused with marijuana, is a botanical class of cannabis sativa but has only small amounts of THC relative to the amount grown to produce marijuana.⁴ “Both hemp and marijuana come from the same cannabis species but are genetically distinct and are further distinguished by use, chemical makeup, and cultivation methods.”⁵

In 1970, with the passage of the Controlled Substances Act⁶ (“CSA”), *all* cannabis varieties, *including hemp*, were designated Schedule I controlled substances (along with heroin, LSD, peyote, and ecstasy).⁷ While marijuana remains illegal under the CSA, hemp was subsequently removed from the CSA due to the passage of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018—more commonly known as the 2018 Farm Act.⁸ This has led to the

¹ See *Why Weed Strains Look Different and How to Tell Them Apart*, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 1, 2021, 7:00 AM), <https://www.seattletimes.com/sponsored/why-weed-strains-look-different-and-how-to-tell-them-apart/>. See also *Cannabis Ruderalis: What Is It and How Is It Different From Sativa or Indica?*, MED. MARIJUANA INC., <https://medicalmarijuanainc.com/cannabis-ruderalis/> (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).

² See Zerrin Atakan, *Cannabis, A Complex Plant: Different Compounds and Different Effects on Individuals*, 2(6) THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY, 241, 244 (Dec. 2012).

³ See M.A. Costa et al., *The Psychoactive Compound of Cannabis Sativa, Delta-9-Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) Inhibits the Human Trophoblast Cell Turnover*, TOXICOLOGY, 94 (Aug. 2015).

⁴ Sian Ferguson, *Hemp v. Marijuana: What's the Difference?*, HEALTHLINE (Aug. 27, 2020), <https://www.healthline.com/health/hemp-vs-marijuana>.

⁵ Kentucky Hempsters, *Hemp 101: What is Hemp, What's it Used For, and Why is it Illegal?*, LEAFLY (Jul. 14, 2015), <https://www.leafly.com/news/cannabis-101/hemp-101-what-is-hemp-whats-it-used-for-and-why-is-it-illegal>.

⁶ See JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45948, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT (CSA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 117TH CONGRESS (2021).

⁷ *Id.* at 6 (emphasis added).

⁸ See *Hemp Production and the 2018 Farm Bill*, (Jul. 25, 2019) (testimony of Amy Abernathy, M.D., PhD., Principal Deputy Commissioner, Office of the

propagation of hemp derivatives like cannabidiol (“CBD”) and Delta-8 along with the proliferation of hemp products.⁹ To date and pursuant to the 2014 Farm Act and the 2018 Farm Act, forty-six states, two territories, and forty-five American Indian Tribes have enacted legislation to establish hemp production programs, allow for hemp cultivation research, or to approve hemp cultivation programs.¹⁰ Hemp is used to make a variety of commercial and industrial products, including rope, textiles, clothing, shoes, food, paper, bioplastics, insulation, and biofuel.¹¹ The global industrial hemp market attained a value of USD 4.7 billion in 2020.¹²

The cannabis hemp plant derivative, CBD, can be extracted from both the hemp and marijuana plants if its THC concentration does not exceed 0.3 percent THC weight.¹³ “Any plant containing less than a defined concentration of the psychoactive THC is classified as hemp.”¹⁴ This concentration ranges from 0.2 percent of dry weight in most European countries, to 0.3 percent in Canada and the United States.¹⁵ CBD

Commissioner).

⁹ Vishal Vivek, *A List of Legal Hemp States in the USA*, HEMP FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2020), <https://hempfoundation.net/a-list-of-legal-hemp-states-in-the-usa/>.

¹⁰ *Global Industrial Hemp Market Report and Forecast 2021–2026: Favourable Regulations Aid Growth with 22.5% CAGR Forecast Between 2021 and 2026*, BUS. WIRE (Aug. 19, 2021, 7:30 AM), <https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20210819005407/en/Global-Industrial-Hemp-Market-Report-and-Forecast-2021-2026-Favourable-Regulations-Aid-Growth-with-22.5-CAGR-Forecast-Between-2021-and-2026—ResearchAndMarkets.com>; see also *Status of State and Tribal Hemp Production Plans for USDA Approval*, USDA, <https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/hemp/state-and-tribal-plan-review> (last visited May 26, 2022).

¹¹ See *Hemp*, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, <https://www.britannica.com/plant/hemp> (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).

¹² See *Global Industrial Hemp Market Report and Forecast 2021–2026: Favourable Regulations Aid Growth with 22.5% CAGR Forecast Between 2021 and 2026—ResearchandMarkets.com*, YAHOO (Aug. 19, 2021), <https://www.yahoo.com/now/global-industrial-hemp-market-report-113000241.html>.

¹³ See *CBD Products are Everywhere. But Do They Work?*, HARV. HEALTH PUB. (Dec. 14, 2021), https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/cbd-products-are-everywhere-but-do-they-work.

¹⁴ Dinesh Adhikary et al., *Medical Cannabis and Industrial Hemp Tissue Culture: Present Status and Future Potential*, FRONTIER PLACE SCI., 1, 2 (Mar. 2021).

¹⁵ *Id.* at 2 (noting that the dry weight ranges differ among countries from 0.2 percent to one percent, with rates in China and Brazil at 0.3 percent and rates at one percent in Switzerland, Uruguay, Columbia, Mexico, and several Australian

products are now widely available to consumers through a variety of channels such as convenience stores, tobacco stores, newsstands, pharmacies, and the internet.¹⁶ The CBD “global cannabidiol market size was valued at USD 2.8 billion in 2020 and is expected to expand at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 21.2% from 2021 to 2028.”¹⁷

The proliferation of CBD and marijuana derivatives is impacting the courts, law enforcement, and workplace settings. It is creating a confusing testing environment for laboratories and potentially serious legal outcomes for citizens. CBD and Delta-8 users cannot rely on the fact that CBD is legal everywhere and Delta-8 is legal in some states because they may unknowingly be testing positive for illegal THC. A CBD Oracle Lab Study showed that some Delta-8 products contained 7,700 percent of the legal Delta-9-THC limit, which still remains federally illegal under the CSA.¹⁸ Lab tests done on CBD products by Ellipse Analytics found more than half of the two hundred products tested were inaccurately labeled and lab results showed that a quarter of them—more than fifty products—falsely claimed they were “THC-free.”¹⁹ This is compounded by the fact that laboratories, when testing, cannot easily delineate between low levels of THC in hemp and higher THC amounts in marijuana. Formerly, “laboratories had to identify hairs on marijuana flowers and test for the presence of cannabinoids, a process that required just a few minutes and a test strip that turned purple when it was positive.”²⁰ These lab tests are now more complex

states).

¹⁶ See *CBD Products for Sale*, CBDMD, <https://www.cbdmd.com/cbd-products> (last visited May 25, 2022).

¹⁷ *Cannabidiol Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis Report By Source Type (Hemp, Marijuana), By Distribution Channel (B2B, B2C), By End-use (Medical, Personal Use), By Region, and Segment Forecasts, 2021–2028*, GRAND VIEW RSCH. (Feb. 2021).

¹⁸ Lee Johnson, *CBD Oracle Lab Study Shows Some Delta-8 Products are 7700% Over the Legal Delta-9 THC Limit*, CBD ORACLE (Oct. 21, 2021), <https://cbdoracle.com/news/delta-8-thc-products-market-study-consumer-safety-and-legality/>.

¹⁹ *Can CBD Get You Fired Even Though It's Legal?*, ABC 13 NEWS (Oct. 3, 2019), <https://wlos.com/news/nation-world/can-cbd-get-you-fired-even-though-its-legal>.

²⁰ Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, *Texas Legalized Hemp, Not Marijuana, Governor Insists as Prosecutors Drop Pot Charges*, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 19, 2019),

and consequently more expensive.²¹

While on its face unwittingly and mistakenly using illegal THC in lieu of CBD may not seem troublesome, some users may suffer unfortunate personal and legal consequences. For example, a citizen who suffers from substance use disorders and practices a zero-tolerance alcohol and drug regime could lose their sobriety; a citizen who is mandated by a zero-tolerance drug policy through an employer may lose their job; a parolee or probationer who is mandated to practice a zero drug policy may have their parole or probation revoked; a driver may be charged and convicted with marijuana-impaired driving; a prospective employee may not be hired, or a defendant may be denied entry into a drug court program or be terminated from one. These consequences all materialize in the name of a positive THC test. People who have been injured by the mischaracterization of CBD as legal are bringing lawsuits against those companies who claim that their CBD products are legal concentrations, even though they ultimately tested positive for illegal THC.²²

Although there have been many past and present congressional attempts to declassify or reclassify marijuana under the CSA and there have been numerous legal challenges to the CSA classification, to date, we are at status quo with *legal* hemp and CBD and federally illegal marijuana.²³ The hemp and CBD

<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/us/texas-hemp-marijuana-legalization.html>.

²¹ See Jon Schuppe, *I Feel Lucky, for Real: How Legalizing Hemp Accidentally Helped Marijuana Suspects*, NBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2019, 1:47 AM), <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/i-feel-lucky-real-how-legalizing-hempaccidentally-helped-marijuana-n1043371>; Jolie McCullough & Alex Samuels, *This Year, Texas Passed a Law Legalizing Hemp. It Also Has Prosecutors Dropping Hundreds of Cases*, CBS 7 (Jul. 3, 2019, 6:00 PM), <https://www.cbs7.com/content/news/This-year-Texas-passed-a-law-legalizing-hemp-It-also-has-prosecutors-dropping-hundreds-of-marijuana-cases-512257731.html>.

²² Josh Long, *Pennsylvania Woman Sues CBD Company After Failed Drug Test*, NAT. PRODS. INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2019), <https://www.naturalproductsinsider.com/litigation/pennsylvania-woman-sues-cbd-company-after-failed-drug-test>; Barry Nixon, *A Lawsuit Waiting to Happen: Get Cannabis Testing Right or You Will End Up in Court!*, PREEMPLOYMENT DIRECTORY (Nov. 20, 2019, 7:24 AM), <https://preemploymentdirectory.com/a-lawsuit-waiting-to-happen-get-cannabis-testing-right-or-you-will-end-up-in-court/>.

²³ *State Industrial Hemp Statutes*, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Apr. 16, 2020), <https://www.ncsl.org/research/agriculture-and-rural-development/state-industrial-hemp-statutes.aspx>; see Nat'l Org. for Reform of Marijuana L. (NORML) v. Ingersoll, 497 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NORML v. Drug Enf't Admin., 559 F.2d

quagmire, piecemeal decriminalization by states, and differing state legalization of marijuana, all influence court decisions on the issue of cannabis search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The overall legalization of cannabis (including hemp) is impacting searches in homes, land, curtilage, vehicles, schools, workplaces, body specimens, and other scenarios, and is expanding and contracting exceptions to the search warrant requirement.²⁴

This Article will first briefly review the legal history of hemp and marijuana in the United States and examine the established legal constructs under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution's search and seizure provision. Second, this Article will explore past and developing state and federal appellate and U.S. Supreme Court cases in a variety of cannabis search and seizure settings. Third, this exploration will be followed by a full discussion on the exceptions to the warrant requirement and other search contexts in relation to cannabis searches. Finally, the Article will conclude by identifying trends related to the topic.

II. HISTORY OF MARIJUANA & HEMP

The hemp plant and marijuana plants have a protracted legal history in the United States. In the early days of the colonial settlements and prior to 1937, the forebears owned hemp plantations, and hemp and marijuana were simultaneously legal.²⁵ Indeed, "[i]t was a common crop in the colonies and fairly widespread. . . . at one point in the early 1600s, all settlers in the Jamestown colony were required to grow marijuana."²⁶ At that time, hemp was primarily used for shipbuilding.²⁷ Prior to

735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); *NORML v. Bell*, 488 F. Supp. 123 (D.D.C. 1980); *All. for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enf't Admin.*, 930 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1991); *United States v. Pickard*, 100 F. Supp. 3d 981 (E.D. Cal. 2015); *Washington v. Sessions*, No. 17 Civ. 5625, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30586, (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018); *Washington v. Barr*, 925 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2019).

²⁴ See *BUS. WIRE*, *supra* note 10; see also *USDA*, *supra* note 10.

²⁵ See *Hemp and Our Founding Fathers*, *WORLDHISTORY.US* (May 22, 2017), <https://worldhistory.us/american-history/hemp-and-our-founding-fathers.php>.

²⁶ Erin Krcatovich, *The Marijuana Tax Act of 1937*, *STUDY.COM* (Nov. 22, 2015), <https://study.com/academy/lesson/the-marijuana-tax-act-of-1937.html>.

²⁷ See Oscar H. Will III, *The Forgotten History of Hemp Cultivation in*

the late 1950s, hemp in the United States was considered an agricultural commodity, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) supported its production.²⁸

While the hemp plant was supported historically, marijuana plants, those that have higher levels of THC, did not fare as well. This traditional lack of support is perhaps because the hemp plant is considered utilitarian, while the marijuana plant is associated with its psychoactive effects or “high.” Irrespectively, in the past, marijuana (usually marketed as “cannabis”) could be found openly on pharmacy shelves as a medicinal elixir for a variety of ailments.²⁹ In 1916, however, individual states began to outlaw marijuana, and by 1931, a total of twenty-nine states had done so.³⁰ During this period there were rising concerns about marijuana use being harmful, some of which appeared to be racially motivated.³¹ More saliently, the lumber, paper, and nylon industries saw industrial hemp as a competitive threat to their industries.³² Those industries began to assert their political influence to make hemp, and consequently marijuana, less accessible.³³ Until today, marijuana and hemp were somewhat inextricable.

Some have argued that the lumber, paper, and nylon industries’ economic interests served as the precipitating factor for the congressional support and passage of the Marijuana Tax Act, which simultaneously convoluted and taxed the use of marijuana *and*, inextricably, hemp.³⁴ The Marijuana Tax Act of

America, FARM COLLECTOR (Nov. 1, 2004), <https://www.farmcollector.com/farm-life/strategic-fibers/>.

²⁸ RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44742, DEFINING HEMP: A FACT SHEET, 1, 1 (Mar. 22, 2019) <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44742.pdf> (noting that “[s]trictly speaking, the CSA does not make growing hemp illegal, but makes it illegal to grow without a DEA permit.”).

²⁹ See *A Social History of America’s Most Popular Drugs*, PBS FRONTLINE, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/buyers/socialhistory.html>.

³⁰ See *Marijuana Timeline*, PBS FRONTLINE, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dope/etc/cron.html>.

³¹ Matt Thompson, *The Mysterious History of ‘Marijuana’*, NPR (Jul. 22, 2013, 11:46 AM), <https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/07/14/201981025/the-mysterious-history-of-marijuana>.

³² *Hemp Politics—Why Was Hemp Made Illegal in 1937?*, HEMP FRONTIERS (Apr. 11, 2006), <https://hempfrontiers.com/why-was-hemp-made-illegal-in-1937/>.

³³ *Id.*

³⁴ See *Leary v. United States*, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).

1937 was the law of the land until the Act was challenged in 1969.³⁵ It was challenged on Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination grounds in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, *Leary v. United States*, which overturned the Act.³⁶ Leary, who had been transporting marijuana in his vehicle, claimed that by filling out the necessary forms to comply with the Marijuana Tax Act, he would be legally incriminating himself.³⁷ Leary argued that he would be admitting to transporting and possessing marijuana in violation of Texas law that had made it illegal to do so.³⁸ Although Leary was convicted, his Fifth Amendment challenge resulted in the nullification of the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 as the federal government, on the heels of this decision, passed the CSA.³⁹ In the interim between the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 and the CSA, there were some intervening drug laws like the Boggs Act of 1951⁴⁰ and the Narcotics Control Act (“NCA”) of 1956.⁴¹

Hemp again took center stage with the passage of the Farm Act in 2018.⁴² According to the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”), in 2017, “[fourteen percent] of American adults smoked cigarettes,” which [was] a sharp decrease from the 20.9 percent of American adults who smoked in 2005.⁴³ In the past 20 years, tobacco production in the state has declined 54.0 percent, to 117.1 million pounds harvested in 2021.⁴⁴ Providing that “Kentucky—the state with the second-largest tobacco harvest in the United States (North Carolina comes in first)—is responsible

³⁵ *Id.* at 6.

³⁶ *Id.* at 12.

³⁷ *Id.* at 12–13.

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ Schedules of Controlled Substances, 21 U.S.C. § 812.

⁴⁰ Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767, 782 (1951).

⁴¹ Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 728-84, 68A Stat. 562, 569 (1956).

⁴² Angelica LaVito, *CDC Says Smoking Rates Fall to Record Low in US*, CNBC (Nov. 8, 2018), <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/08/cdc-says-smoking-rates-fall-to-record-low-in-us.html#:~:text=An%20estimated%2014%20percent%20of%20adults%20in%20the,figure%20and%2042.4%20percent%20of%20adults%20smoked%20cigarettes>.

⁴³ *Id.*

⁴⁴ Andre Bourque, *How Hemp is Giving Renewed Life to America's Tobacco Farmers*, FORBES (Mar. 25, 2019, 2:58 PM), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrebourque/2019/03/25/how-hemp-is-giving-renewed-life-to-americas-tobacco-farmers/?sh=251906854726>.

for almost a quarter of that output.”⁴⁵ The reduction in the tobacco crop forced many farmers to look into other crops. Although one could say that economics motivated the passage of the Act, with tobacco farmers substituting for the lumber barons, it was also geopolitical.

After the 2014 Farm Bill passed, the United States government, under the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), began to pilot and approve plans submitted by states and American Indian Tribes for the domestic production of industrial hemp.⁴⁶ This ultimately led to the passage of the 2018 Farm Act, which U.S. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) supported, because the people in his home state of Kentucky saw hemp as a lucrative replacement for tobacco.⁴⁷ Speaking on the Senate floor prior to the 2018 Farm Act’s passage, U.S. Senator McConnell stated, “[a]t a time when farm income is down and growers are struggling, industrial hemp is a bright spot of agriculture’s future.”⁴⁸ This has been, to date, the only marijuana-related congressional bill supported by Senator McConnell.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Bourree Lam, *From Growing Tobacco to Growing Hemp*, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 27, 2016), <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/hemp-farmer/505604/>; RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32725, HEMP AS AN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY (Jun. 22, 2018); *see also* David W. Olson et al., *Hope for Hemp: New Opportunities and Challenges for an Old Crop*, USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV. (Jun. 9, 2020), <https://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2020/june/hope-for-hemp-new-opportunities-and-challenges-for-an-old-crop/>; *The Shrinking Role of Tobacco Farming and Tobacco Product Manufacturing in Kentucky’s Economy*, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO FREE KIDS, <https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0347.pdf> (last visited August 3, 2022).

⁴⁶ *Legislative Summary: Agriculture*, JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. AND MUSEUM, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/legislative-summary/agriculture> (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).

⁴⁷ Bourque, *supra* note 44; *see generally* BUS. WIRE, *supra* note 10.

⁴⁸ Bourque, *supra* note 44.

⁴⁹ *See* Niels Lesniewski, *Mitch McConnell Touting Victory with Hemp Legalization on Farm Bill*, ROLL CALL (Dec. 11, 2018), <https://rollcall.com/2018/12/11/mitch-mcconnell-touting-victory-with-hemp-legalization-on-farm-bill/>; Jacqueline Thomsen, *McConnell: I Won’t Support Legalizing Marijuana*, THE HILL (May 8, 2018), <https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/386791-mcconnell-i-wont-support-legalizing-marijuana/>.

Unlike hemp, seeking to remove or reclassify marijuana out from under the CSA has met with a more tortured history and with little success. Today, the CSA still classifies marijuana as a most dangerous drug.⁵⁰ Many bills to either reclassify or declassify marijuana under the CSA have failed or are pending without much movement.⁵¹ As of the end of 2021, there are many marijuana-related bills sitting in committees, some of which took whole-cloth approaches while others are piecemeal.⁵² This list does not include all of the marijuana bills that have languished or died prior to 2021.⁵³ Additionally, to date, despite the many legal challenges to the marijuana classification, not one legal case has successfully overturned the marijuana classification under the CSA.⁵⁴

This leaves the United States with a mishmash of marijuana laws, with some states and localities decriminalizing small amounts of marijuana possession.⁵⁵ Some states have full-blown

⁵⁰ Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, 84 Stat. 1236, 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971); *see also* Melissa Kuipers Blake & Osiris Morel, *Cannabis Legislation Wrap Up for 2021*, JD SUPRA (Jan. 21, 2022), <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cannabis-legislation-wrap-up-for-2021-5746328/>.

⁵¹ Blake & Morel, *supra* note 50.

⁵² A few such bills include: the Marijuana in Federally Assisted Housing Parity Act (H.R. 3212), which was re-introduced by Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.) and referred to the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services; the Marijuana Data Collection Act (S.1456) introduced by Senators Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Rand Paul (R-KY) and referred to the Senate HELP Committee; the Secure and Fair Enforcement (SAFE) Banking Act (H.R. 1996), a bill passed by the U.S. House on April 19, 2021, and its coinciding bill, S.910, that was introduced in the Senate on March 23, 2021; the Veterans Medical Marijuana Safe Harbor Act introduced by Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI) on April 16, 2021; the Veterans Cannabis Use for Safe Healing Act (H.R. 430) introduced in the House and referred to the U.S. House Committee on Veterans' Affairs; the Marijuana 1-to-3 Act (H.R. 365) introduced and referred to the U.S. House Energy & Commerce Committee and U.S. House Judiciary Committee; the Cannabidiol and Marihuana Research Expansion Act (S.253) that has a bipartisan group of eleven sponsors and was introduced in the Senate in February 2021 before being referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.

⁵³ *See* John Hudak, *The Numbers for Drug Reform in Congress Don't Add Up*, BROOKINGS (Dec. 22, 2021), <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/12/22/the-numbers-for-drug-reform-in-congress-dont-add-up/>.

⁵⁴ *See* Mary A. Celeste & Melia Thompson-Dudiak, *Has the Marijuana Classification Under the Controlled Substances Act Outlived Its Definition?*, 20 CONN. PUB. INT. L. J. 18, 20 (2020).

⁵⁵ *See* Michael Hartman, *Cannabis Overview*, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Jul.

or limited medical marijuana laws.⁵⁶ Other states are without any medical marijuana laws, and some have recreational marijuana laws.⁵⁷ Without a uniform federal approach to marijuana legalization, the states will continue to differ in their approaches to the legalization of cannabis. These varied existing and developing cannabis laws are impacting the courts in a variety of ways, including in the context of the Fourth Amendment. The new legal stance on marijuana and hemp, along with the similarities between them, are creating novel search and seizure issues. It is no longer clear that marijuana possession or use constitutes illegal activity or that marijuana is illegal contraband. Various parties are now asking courts who have once held that the odor of marijuana alone may serve to establish probable cause to secure a warrant, or, who have in the past considered marijuana to be illegal contraband, to reconsider the matter.

By way of example, prior to Illinois passing medical and recreational marijuana laws, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the uncorroborated detection of the cannabis odor by a trained and experienced police officer provided probable cause for that officer to conduct a warrantless search.⁵⁸ In contrast, after Illinois's medical and recreational marijuana legalization, in a recent lower court ruling from Whiteside County, Illinois, the court held that the smell of marijuana does *not* give probable cause for officers to do a warrantless search during traffic stops.⁵⁹

Short of a change to the marijuana classification under the CSA, or U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing cannabis search and seizure issues in the face of these new cannabis laws,

6, 2021), <https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-overview.aspx>.

⁵⁶ See *State Medical Cannabis Laws*, NAT'L CONF. OF STATES LEGIS. (Nov. 29, 2021), <https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx>; see also *Medical Marijuana State-by-State Overview*, FED'N OF STATE MED. BOARDS 1 (2021).

⁵⁷ See Claire Hansen et al., *Where is Marijuana Legal? A Guide to Marijuana Legalization*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 14, 2021), <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/where-is-marijuana-legal-a-guide-to-marijuana-legalization>.

⁵⁸ *People v. Stout*, 106 Ill. 2d 77, 87 (1985).

⁵⁹ Sydney Dorner, *Smell of Marijuana No Longer Probable Cause for Illinois Car Searches*, FOX ILL. (Nov. 21, 2021), <https://foxillinois.com/news/local/smell-of-marijuana-no-longer-probable-cause-for-illinois-car-searches> (noting that the case may still be appealed by the state).

the courts will continue to vary on cannabis search and seizure issues. Prior to more fully discussing the varying state and federal cases on the issue of hemp and marijuana legalization and decriminalization and its relationship to cannabis searches and seizures, it is necessary to review the Fourth Amendment legal constructs.

III. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSTRUCTS FOR SEARCH AND SEIZURE

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution's search and seizure provision states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,⁶⁰ supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.⁶¹

The provisions of the Fourth Amendment are applicable to the states.⁶² A court will uphold a search if there is a warrant for the search that complies with the criteria as set forth in the Fourth Amendment.⁶³ It includes a sworn detailed statement

⁶⁰ *Ill. v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (stating that in order to obtain a search warrant, the court must consider whether based on the totality of the information there is a fair probability that contraband, evidence, or a person will be found in a particular place).

⁶¹ U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For an extensive discussion on the Fourth Amendment, see CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, 103RD CONG., S. Doc. No. 103-6, at 1197-1269 (1st Sess. 1992).

⁶² *Wolf v. Colo.*, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), *overruled by* *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); *see also* *Ark. v. Sullivan*, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (reasoning that states may grant citizens greater protections based on state constitutions, but not on the Fourth Amendment, however, the U.S. Supreme Court speaks the last word on the Fourth Amendment).

⁶³ *See* CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *supra* note 61, at 1197-1269; Sara J. Berman, *Arrest Warrants: What's in Them, How Police Gets Them*, NOLO, <https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arrest-warrants-how-when-police-get-them.html> (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).

made by a law enforcement officer before a neutral judge⁶⁴ that details the person or place to be searched with specificity⁶⁵ and that law enforcement officers show that there is probable cause to justify the search.⁶⁶ Because a definition of probable cause is not within the Fourth Amendment itself, it has become one of court constructs.⁶⁷ The U.S. Supreme Court has “defined ‘probable cause’ as an officer’s reasonable belief, based on circumstances known to that officer, that a crime has occurred or is about to occur.”⁶⁸

A court will also uphold a search if the defendant has legal authority over the items or places to be searched and voluntarily consents to the search.⁶⁹ However, a search made pursuant to a warrant “cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it turns out that the warrant was invalid.”⁷⁰ Additionally, a court will uphold a search if the search falls within a legally recognized exception to the warrant requirement.⁷¹ A warrantless search under one of the sanctioned exceptions requires the same probable cause standard required to secure a valid search

⁶⁴ The authority for a warrantless search extends beyond just law enforcement in a variety of other contexts like school officials, government employment, prisons, and drug testing. *See* CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *supra* note 61 at 1197–1269. *Coolidge v. N.H.*, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971).

⁶⁵ *Groh v. Ramirez*, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004).

⁶⁶ *United States v. Reed*, 993 F.3d 441, 446–47 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); *Zurcher v. Stanf. Daily*, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978), *superseded by statute* 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa; *see also Probable Cause*, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (last visited May 25, 2022).

⁶⁷ Sara J. Berman, *When the Police Can Make an Arrest: Probable Cause*, NOLO, <https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-police-can-make-arrest-probable-cause.html> (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).

⁶⁸ *See Carroll v. United States*, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (reasoning that an officer may establish probable cause with witness statements and other evidence, including hearsay evidence that would not be admissible at trial because an officer’s suspicion or belief, by itself, is not sufficient to establish probable cause.); *Aguilar v. Tex.*, 378 U.S. 108, 114–15 (1964), *overruled by Ill. v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). *The Search Warrant Requirement in Criminal Investigations*, JUSTIA (Oct. 2021), <https://www.justia.com/criminal/procedure/warrant-requirement/>.

⁶⁹ *Fernandez v. Cal.*, 571 U.S. 292 (2014). For an extensive list of consent cases, *see Consent*, CASE LAW 4 COPS, <http://www.caselaw4cops.net/searchandseizure/consent.htm> (last visited May 25, 2022).

⁷⁰ *Bumper v. N.C.*, 391 U.S. 543, 549 (1968) (footnote omitted).

⁷¹ *Probable Cause*, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).

warrant.⁷² The probable cause requirement for a search may not be necessary or has a lower standard of reasonableness in some specialized arenas including school searches, government offices, prisons, probation and parole regulation, and drug testing for public employees.⁷³

Despite the high constitutional protective standards under the Fourth Amendment, the exceptions to the warrant requirement for a search are numerous. The exceptions include the search incident to arrest exception,⁷⁴ the automobile exception,⁷⁵ the exigent circumstance exception,⁷⁶ the plain view exception,⁷⁷ which sometimes includes “plain smell,”⁷⁸ limited “open fields” exceptions,⁷⁹ the limited pat-down and stop and frisk exceptions,⁸⁰ the crimes committed in the presence of an

⁷² See *Whiteley v. Warden*, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971) (reasoning that standards must be at least as stringent for warrantless arrests as for obtaining a warrant).

⁷³ See *N.J. v. T.L.O.*, 469 U.S. 325, 327 (1985); *O'Connor v. Ortega*, 480 U.S. 709, 711-12 (1987); *Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984); *Griffin v. Wis.*, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987) (holding that the search under Wisconsin law was lawful under the Fourth Amendment based on information from the police detective that there was or might be contraband in the probationer's apartment); *Samson v. Cal.*, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006) (holding that suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful under California law and that the search in this case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); and *Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Exec's. Ass'n*, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989).

⁷⁴ *Chimel v. Cal.*, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Approval of warrantless searches pursuant to arrest first appeared in dicta in several cases. See *Weeks v. United States*, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); *Carroll v. United States*, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); *Agnello v. United States*, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). But see *Riley v. Cal.*, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (holding that police must obtain a warrant to search a person's cell phone after an arrest).

⁷⁵ *Carroll v. United States*, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

⁷⁶ See *United States v. Anderson*, 154 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 1998) *cert. denied*; *Ky. v. King*, 563 U.S. 452 (2011); *Schmerber v. Cal.*, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); *Missouri v. McNeely*, 567 U.S. 968 (2012); *Birchfield v. N.D.*, 136 579 U.S. 438 (2016); *Mitchell v. Wis.*, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019).

⁷⁷ *Horton v. California*, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).

⁷⁸ See *People v. Stout*, 106 Ill. 2d 77 (1985).

⁷⁹ *Hester v. United States*, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); *Oliver v. United States*, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).

⁸⁰ *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); *Fla. v. Bostick*, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (holding that a person's refusal to cooperate is not sufficient for reasonable suspicion); *Ill. v. Wardlow*, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000) (reasoning that a person's flight in a high crime area after seeing police was sufficient for reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk).

officer exception,⁸¹ the community caretaking limited exception,⁸² the DUI checkpoints and borders exception,⁸³ the administrative authorities searches exception in public schools, government offices, and prisons; the drug testing of public and transportation employees exceptions,⁸⁴ and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.⁸⁵

Over the decades, U.S. Supreme Court case law has developed these exceptions to the warrant requirement for a warrantless search. In the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court was “closely divided on which standard to apply.”⁸⁶ In fact, “the balance tipped in favor of the view that warrantless searches are *per se* unreasonable, with a few carefully prescribed exceptions.”⁸⁷ Over time and “guided by the variable expectation of privacy approach to coverage of the Fourth Amendment, the Court broadened its view of permissible exceptions and of the scope of those exceptions.”⁸⁸ While the paramount consideration for these exceptions was historically based on the “reasonableness” of the search,⁸⁹ the focus of the warrantless search exceptions were broadened by the U.S. Supreme Court to include privacy considerations.⁹⁰ A hierarchy of protected places has since developed. For example, the home has the highest expectation

⁸¹ *Kurtz v. Moffitt*, 115 U.S. 487, 504 (1885); *Draper v. United States*, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).

⁸² *See Cady v. Dombrowski*, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (reasoning not followed in many states).

⁸³ *See Michigan Department of State Police et al., Petitioners v. Rick Sitz et al.*, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); *United States v. Montoya de Hernandez*, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); *United States v. Flores-Montano*, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).

⁸⁴ *See N.Y. v. Burger*, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); *Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Exec's. Ass'n*, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); *Bd. of Educ. v. Earls*, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).

⁸⁵ *Ariz. v. Evans*, 514 U.S. 1 (1995); *Davis v. United States*, 564 U.S. 229 (2011); *Ill. v. Krull*, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); *Herring v. United States*, 555 US 135 (2009).

⁸⁶ *See* CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *supra* note 61, at 1203.

⁸⁷ *Id.*

⁸⁸ *Id.*

⁸⁹ *See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States*, 429 U.S. 338, 352–53 (1977) (unanimous opinion); *Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.*, 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); *Mich. v. Tyler*, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978); *Mincey v. Ariz.*, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (unanimous opinion); *Ark. v. Sanders*, 442 U.S. 743, 758 (1979); *United States v. Ross*, 456 U.S. 798, 824–25 (1982).

⁹⁰ *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

of privacy,⁹¹ whereas a vehicle has a lesser expectation of privacy.⁹²

The hallmark of the Fourth Amendment analysis to establish probable cause for searches is whether a person has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”⁹³ The United States Supreme Court has affected searches in a myriad of places including, but not limited to, on persons, personal effects and furnishings, automobiles, houses, apartments, motel rooms, offices, schools, land and curtilage, the workplace, electronic devices, and body specimens.⁹⁴ How privacy protection plays in the context of probable cause for a warrant or warrantless marijuana-based search is still evolving. While the level of expectations varies with the place searched, sometimes the method used for the search can also be at issue; for example, a search that uses an airplane is less intrusive than the use of infrared technology.⁹⁵ It is also dependent on whether a state has decriminalized or legalized marijuana.⁹⁶ If marijuana possession is permissible or decriminalized by state law, then the odor of marijuana may not mean that there is criminal activity. Moreover, whether a state offers greater protection than under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution can also play a role in the extent of the search.⁹⁷ Finally, “[s]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of

⁹¹ See *Payton v. N.Y.*, 445 U.S. 573, 582 n.17 (1980).

⁹² See *United States v. Chadwick*, 433 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1977); *Rakas v. Ill.*, 439 U.S. 128, 154 (1978); *Del. v. Prouse*, 99 U.S. 1391, 1398 (1979); see also *Fourth Amendment—Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Automobile Searches*, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 498, 506 (1979) (providing an extensive discussion about the automobile exception and the expectation of privacy in automobile searches).

⁹³ *Oliver v. United States*, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting *Katz*, 389 U.S. at 359).

⁹⁴ See generally CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *supra* note 61 at 1203 (explaining the various types of protection awarded by the Fourth Amendment).

⁹⁵ Caren Chesler, *A Whiff of Pot Alone No Longer Airtight Probable Cause for Police To Search Cars in Several States*, WASH. POST (June 26, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/marijuana-police-probable-cause/2021/06/26/9d984f8e-d36c-11eb-a53a-3b5450fdca7a_story.html.

⁹⁶ *Fourth Amendment*, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/probable_cause (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).

⁹⁷ *Id.*

individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretations of federal law."⁹⁸

IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT

In 1985, one commentator cataloged twenty exceptions to the warrant requirement, including "automobile searches . . . border searches . . . administrative searches of regulated businesses . . . exigent circumstances . . . search[es] incident to nonarrest when there is probable cause to arrest . . . boat boarding for document checks . . . welfare searches . . . inventory searches . . . airport searches . . . and school searches[es]."⁹⁹ There are additional exceptions that the commentator has not noted, which include mobile home searches,¹⁰⁰ searches of offices of government employees,¹⁰¹ "stop and frisk," "open fields," "plain sight-view," (sometimes referred to as doctrine) "plain smell" (sometimes referred to as doctrine), and public and private employment searches that have search and testing mandates.¹⁰² For example, since public employees work for the government, the public employer's actions are by definition "state action" subject to the Bill of Rights.¹⁰³ Therefore, employees of any level of government are protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure.¹⁰⁴ However, private employers are not engaging in state action and thus the constitutional protections do not apply, therefore, private sector employees have lesser protections against workplace searches than those of the public sector.¹⁰⁵ Assuming that the circumstances and standards of those

⁹⁸ William J. Brennan, Jr., *State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights*, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).

⁹⁹ Craig M. Bradley, *Two Models of the Fourth Amendment*, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473–74 (1985) (footnotes omitted).

¹⁰⁰ Cal. v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 406 (1985).

¹⁰¹ O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987).

¹⁰² Scott Thompson, *Private-Sector Vs. Public Sector Workplace Searches*, HOUS. CHRON. (May 17, 2022), <https://work.chron.com/privatesector-vs-publicsector-workplace-searches-28187.html>.

¹⁰³ *Id.*

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*

warrantless searches are upheld, the exceptions seem to consume the Fourth Amendment protection.

A. *Stop & Frisk*

The probable cause standard for searches is not to be confused with reasonable suspicion for a legal stop, which is not considered a search and most importantly, not considered a seizure.¹⁰⁶ A “seizure” of a place or object is any action by the government that limits your ability to use your property.¹⁰⁷ For example, if the police impound your car or prevent you from entering your house—a seizure has occurred, requiring a warrant.¹⁰⁸ A seizure may also be applicable to the taking of body specimens.¹⁰⁹ The Supreme Court has characterized reasonable suspicion as the sort of common sense conclusion about human behavior on which practical people are entitled to rely.¹¹⁰ It has also defined reasonable suspicion as requiring only something more than an “unarticulated hunch.”¹¹¹ Reasonable suspicion requires facts or circumstances that give rise to more than a bare, imaginary, or purely conjectural suspicion.¹¹² Reasonable suspicion means that any reasonable person would suspect that a crime was in the process of being committed, had been committed, or was going to be committed very soon.

¹⁰⁶ *United States v. Arvizu*, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (“Although an officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop . . . the likelihood of criminal activity need not arise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.”).

¹⁰⁷ *See Fourth Amendment*, LEGAL INFO. INST. CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).

¹⁰⁸ Don Samuel Garland, *Search and Seizure—Inventory Searches—Impoundment*, CASETEXT (Sept. 1, 2015), <https://casetext.com/analysis/search-and-seizure-inventory-searches-impoundment>.

¹⁰⁹ *See* Kelly Lowenberg, *Applying the Fourth Amendment When DNA Collected for One Purpose is Tested for Another*, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1289, 1396 (2011).

¹¹⁰ *N.J. v. T.L.O.*, 469 U.S. 325, 346 (1985); *United States v. Sokolow*, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); *Ala. v. White*, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

¹¹¹ *See generally*, JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FRIEDMAN’S PRACTICE, (Wolters Kluwer Law & Bus. 2009).

¹¹² *White*, 496 U.S. at 330; *State in the Int. of H.B.*, 75 N.J. 243, 251 (1977).

In *Baptiste v. State*,¹¹³ the court stated that reasonable suspicion is a

less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.¹¹⁴

Stated differently, reasonable suspicion can be based upon a lesser amount of information and less reliable information compared to the higher standard required for probable cause.

This distinction between probable cause for a search versus reasonable suspicion for a stop is oftentimes blurred. This is best illustrated in the context of stop and frisks, pat-downs, and vehicle stops. The Supreme Court made an important ruling on the use of “stop-and-frisk” in the 1968 case, *Terry v. Ohio*,¹¹⁵ hence such stops are referred to as *Terry* stops. Prior to *Terry*, a police officer could not search arrested persons, unless the officer obtained a search warrant.¹¹⁶ A *Terry* stop permits a weapons pat-down if there is reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous.¹¹⁷ This type of pat-down may also extend to a pat-down of a vehicle’s passenger compartment if there is reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous as the police may open any container that may contain a weapon.¹¹⁸ Police may also require a driver to exit a vehicle,¹¹⁹ order passengers out of a

¹¹³ *Baptiste v. State*, 995 So. 2d 285, 291 (Fla. 2008).

¹¹⁴ *Id.*; see also *Alabama*, 496 U.S. at 330; *State in the Int. of H.B.*, 75 N.J. at 251.

¹¹⁵ *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968).

¹¹⁶ See *Jefferson v. State of Ark.*, 349 Ark. 236 (Ark. 2022); see also *Probable Cause Versus Reasonable Suspicion*, MARICOPA COUNTY, <https://www.maricopa.gov/919/Probable-Cause-Versus-Reasonable-Suspici> (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).

¹¹⁷ *Mich. v. Long*, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047–48 (1983); *Ariz. v. Johnson*, 555 U.S. 323, 326–27 (2009).

¹¹⁸ *Long*, 463 U.S. at 1049.

¹¹⁹ See *Pa. v. Mimms*, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (acknowledging that ordering a

vehicle,¹²⁰ and even require passengers to stay at a scene,¹²¹ all with the goal of maintaining officer safety.¹²² If officer safety is asserted as the basis for the search, “the officer . . . must articulate ‘why’ officer safety was an issue (exactly what risk/danger to the officer . . . existed). The officer must ‘explain’ why there was a risk to the officer. . . . If the explanation is found to be reasonable, the frisk is good.”¹²³

The *Terry* stop is already playing out in marijuana cases with a New York court finding that the mere odor of marijuana emanating from a pedestrian may not be enough to stop, frisk, or search.¹²⁴ The *Terry* Court’s rationale was that reasonable suspicion requires more evidence of criminal conduct to justify a stop and detention.¹²⁵ The New York Police Department (hereinafter “NYPD”) has adopted this position with a new policy that was disseminated the day after the passage of the New York recreational marijuana law.¹²⁶ How long a *Terry* detention may last varies with the circumstances.¹²⁷

person out of their vehicle results in de minimis constitutional intrusion).

¹²⁰ *Md. v. Wilson*, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997) (reasoning that after validly stopping a car, an officer may order passengers as well as the driver out of the car—“the same weighty interest in officer safety is present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passenger”).

¹²¹ *Brendlin v. Cal.*, 551 U.S. 249, 258 (2007).

¹²² *Basic Course Workbook Series*, CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAININGS (Sept. 2018), https://post.ca.gov/portals/0/post_docs/basic_course_resources/workbooks/LD_22_V-3.2.pdf.

¹²³ See Steven L. Argiriou, *Terry Frisk Update: The Law, Field Examples and Analysis*, FED. L. ENFT TRAINING CTR., at 1, https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/training/programs/legal-division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-by-subject/4th-amendment/terryfriskupdate.pdf.

¹²⁴ *People v. Brukner*, 25 N.Y.S.3d 559, 571 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. Dec. 31, 2015), *aff’d*, 43 N.Y.S.3d 851 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. Nov. 30, 2016).

¹²⁵ See *Terry v. Ohio*, 392 U.S. 1 (1986); see generally Illya D. Lichtenberg et. al., *Terry and Beyond: Testing the Underlying Assumption of Reasonable Suspicion*, 17 *Touro L. Rev.* 439 (March 2016).

¹²⁶ Memorandum from Det. Smertiuk, New York Police Department, to all Police Commands, Re: General Administrative Information (Mar. 31, 2021), at <https://nypost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/04/39319402msg.pdf> [hereinafter Smertiuk Memorandum]; Tina Moore et al., *NYPD Gives Cops New Orders to Let People Smoke Weed in Public*, N.Y. POST (Apr. 1, 2021, 5:16 PM), <https://nypost.com/2021/04/01/nypd-gives-cops-new-orders-to-let-people-smoke-weed-in-public/>.

¹²⁷ *United States v. Sharpe*, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). A more relaxed standard has been applied to the detention of travelers at the border with the Court testing

The issue of the odor of marijuana as the basis for a *Terry* stop also arises with the use of sniff dogs. May an officer, informed by his experience or the use of a sniff dog, conduct a stop and frisk based upon the odor of marijuana? That was precisely the issue in *In re D.D.*¹²⁸ where a Maryland appellate court held that the odor of marijuana, by itself, does not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and therefore, a stop based on this circumstance alone is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.¹²⁹ The arresting officer in that case testified that he could not differentiate the smell of marijuana, an illegal substance, from the smell of hemp, a legal substance.¹³⁰ The court reasoned that “because an officer cannot tell by the smell of marijuana alone that a person is engaging in criminal activity, we hold that the odor of marijuana, by itself, does not provide reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.”¹³¹ Additionally, the Maryland General Assembly has decriminalized possession of fewer than ten grams of marijuana.¹³²

Other courts have reached this same conclusion. In *State v. Francisco Perez*,¹³³ after the decriminalization of small amounts of marijuana, the odor of marijuana remained a relevant factor in assessing reasonable suspicion, but it did not alone provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.¹³⁴ In *Commonwealth v. Cruz*,¹³⁵ after the decriminalization of one ounce or less of marijuana, the odor of marijuana alone did not provide

the reasonableness in terms of “the period of time necessary to either verify or dispel the suspicion.” See *United States v. Montoya de Hernandez*, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985) (approving warrantless detention for more than 24 hours of traveler suspected of alimentary canal drug smuggling). For a full discussion of the doctrine of the *Terry* stop, see *Terry Stop and Frisks: Doctrine and Practice*, CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED (last visited May 25, 2022) https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt4_4_4_1_1/.

¹²⁸ *In re D.D.*, 250 A.3d 284, 286–87 (2021).

¹²⁹ See *id.*

¹³⁰ See Amber Stegall, *Case Dismissed After 3,350 Pounds of Hemp in U-Haul Mistaken for Marijuana*, KCBD 11 (Jan. 2, 2020, 8:40 PM), <https://www.kcbd.com/2020/01/02/case-dismissed-after-pounds-hemp-u-haul-mistaken-marijuana/>.

¹³¹ *In re D.D.*, 250 A.3d at 295.

¹³² See *Lewis v. State*, 233 A.3d 86, 91 (2020).

¹³³ *State v. Perez*, 239 A.3d 975, 985–86 (2020).

¹³⁴ *Id.* at 984.

¹³⁵ *Commonwealth v. Cruz*, 945 N.E.2d 899, 908 (2011).

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.¹³⁶

B. *Homes & Curtilage*

The expectation of privacy of the home has been found to be sacrosanct.¹³⁷ Protection of property interests as the basis of the Fourth Amendment protection is rooted in early U.S. Supreme Court cases¹³⁸ which found that a search or seizure within a home or its curtilage,¹³⁹ without a warrant, was *per se* an unreasonable search.¹⁴⁰ Whether an expectation is reasonable, depends upon: (1) whether the individual exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) whether the actual expectation was one that society recognizes as reasonable.¹⁴¹ The home privacy protection has ostensibly been extended in some instances to offices,¹⁴² apartments,¹⁴³ motel rooms,¹⁴⁴ rooms for rent,¹⁴⁵ garages,¹⁴⁶ dorm rooms,¹⁴⁷ front porches,¹⁴⁸ and even tents

¹³⁶ *See id.*

¹³⁷ *See* Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Mincey v. Ariz., 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty—worth protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's castle.

United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315–16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting).

¹³⁸ Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886); Adams v. N.Y., 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904).

¹³⁹ “At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.’” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (citation omitted).

¹⁴⁰ *See* G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352–53 (1977) (unanimous opinion); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Mich. v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978); Mincey v. Ariz., 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (unanimous opinion); Ark. v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 743, 758 (1979); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824–25 (1982).

¹⁴¹ *See* Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

¹⁴² S.D. v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); *see also* O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987).

¹⁴³ People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 60–61 (1968).

¹⁴⁴ *See* United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2004).

¹⁴⁵ *See* State v. Fleming, 790 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 2010).

as a home.¹⁴⁹ Essentially, anywhere that will be recognized as private by society, even vehicles parked within the curtilage, are protected and do not come within the automobile exception to a warrant requirement.¹⁵⁰

At common law, curtilage is the area to which extends “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”¹⁵¹ The U.S. Supreme Court in *Florida v. Jardines*¹⁵² stated, “[w]e therefore regard the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’”¹⁵³ In *United States v. Dunn*,¹⁵⁴ the Court stated that

curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.¹⁵⁵

The states differ on whether the search of a home or curtilage, based upon the odor of marijuana alone, and, by virtue of the experience of a law enforcement officer or a “sniff dog,” is enough to establish probable cause to secure a warrant or to conduct a warrantless search.¹⁵⁶ In *State v. Kazmierczak*,¹⁵⁷ the

¹⁴⁶ See *Coffin v. Brandau*, 642 F.3d 999, 1010 (11th Cir. 2011).

¹⁴⁷ See *State v. Rodriguez*, 529 S.W.3d 81 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015).

¹⁴⁸ See *State v. E.D.R.*, 959 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).

¹⁴⁹ See *United States v. Gooch*, 6 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1993); *LaDuke v. Nelson*, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985); *LaDuke v. Castillo*, 455 F. Supp. 209 (E.D. Wash. 1978).

¹⁵⁰ *Collins v. Virginia*, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018).

¹⁵¹ *Oliver v. United States*, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).

¹⁵² *Fla. v. Jardines*, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).

¹⁵³ *Id.* at 6 (citing *Oliver v. United States*, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).

¹⁵⁴ *United States v. Dunn*, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).

¹⁵⁵ *Id.* at 301.

¹⁵⁶ The scope of a search is another matter. See *State v. Huff*, 291 P.3d 751, 754 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming that the “current possession of a small amount of illegal drugs in a person’s home does not give rise to probable cause to search the

Georgia Court of Appeals upheld a search warrant that was issued solely based upon the strong odor of marijuana that police detected when they visited the home after receiving a complaint that the residence was being used to manufacture marijuana.¹⁵⁸ In *Johnson v. United States*,¹⁵⁹ the U.S. Supreme Court found that while the presence of odors was *insufficient* to authorize a warrantless search, proper evidence of the presence of odors may be sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant.¹⁶⁰ In *People v. Marshall*,¹⁶¹ the California Supreme Court ruled that the smell of marijuana created probable cause to obtain a search warrant for an apartment search but did not defend a warrantless search.¹⁶²

In *Florida v. Jardines*,¹⁶³ the Supreme Court found that law enforcement officers' use of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a home, to investigate an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown in the home without a warrant, was a trespassory invasion of the curtilage and constituted a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.¹⁶⁴ The Court made its decision in spite of the fact that twenty-seven states and various departments of the federal government, among others, had supported Florida's argument that such use of a police dog was an acceptable form of minimally invasive warrantless search to the home's front porch.¹⁶⁵ Whether this U.S. Supreme Court position will be bolstered by the fact that Florida, post-*Jardines*, passed a medical marijuana law in 2016,¹⁶⁶ or if Florida does indeed pass recreational marijuana in 2022 as purported, remains to be seen.¹⁶⁷

home for additional drugs").

¹⁵⁷ State v. Kazmierczak, 771 S.E.2d 473 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).

¹⁵⁸ *Id.* at 478–79.

¹⁵⁹ Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).

¹⁶⁰ *Id.* at 13 (emphasis added).

¹⁶¹ *Id.*

¹⁶² People v. Marshall, 442 P.2d 665, 671 (Cal. 1968).

¹⁶³ Fla. v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013).

¹⁶⁴ *Id.* at 11–12.

¹⁶⁵ Brief for Texas, et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Fla. v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (No. 11-564).

¹⁶⁶ FLA. STAT. § 381.986 (2021).

¹⁶⁷ *Understanding Marijuana Legislation: What is Legal and What's Not?*, TURNING POINT OF TAMPA (Apr. 12, 2021), <https://www.tpoftampa.com>

Probable cause for a warrant to search a garage based upon an anonymous tip that it contained a marijuana grow-house and substantiated by law enforcement when they smelled the marijuana emanating from the garage, was upheld by a Pennsylvania Superior Court in *Commonwealth v. Batista*.¹⁶⁸ There, the defendant contended that “the smell of marijuana is not indicative of criminal activity. It is certainly not a circumstance that would prompt a person of reasonable caution to believe that a search of a private home should be conducted without more.”¹⁶⁹ The defendant’s argument that marijuana was decriminalized in Pennsylvania and that the state had passed a medical marijuana law was not persuasive.¹⁷⁰ It is interesting to speculate what the Pennsylvania Superior Court would have done had the defendant argued that the officer could not tell the difference between the odor of hemp and marijuana. Pennsylvania is now considering the passage of a recreational marijuana law making it legal for adults to possess small amounts of marijuana.¹⁷¹ Whether this potential change in Pennsylvania’s marijuana law will be more persuasive in cases involving marijuana searches in a garage based upon odor also remains to be seen.

Many cases pre-date a state’s decriminalization or legalization of marijuana and the federal legalization of hemp, which can be grown commercially and privately in some states.¹⁷² With these legal changes, the courts may overrule prior decisions. Changes in the laws or statutes may also impact case law.

/understanding-marijuana-legislation/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2021).

¹⁶⁸ *Commonwealth v. Batista*, 219 A.3d 1199, 1207 (Pa. 2019).

¹⁶⁹ *Id.* at 1202.

¹⁷⁰ *See id.*

¹⁷¹ Anne Shannon, *Pennsylvania Lawmakers Consider Bill to Legalize Recreational Marijuana*, WGAL 8 (Sept. 28, 2021), <https://www.wgal.com/article/pennsylvania-lawmakers-bill-legalize-recreational-marijuana/37769691>.

¹⁷² *See* Herbert Fuego, *Ask A Stoner: Can I Grow Hemp at Home Now?*, WESTWORD (Jan. 22, 2019), <https://www.westword.com/marijuana/farming-hemp-is-legal-now-but-what-about-growing-at-home-11111741>.

In *United States v. Jones*,¹⁷³ the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for a variety of charges, including marijuana possession.¹⁷⁴ The officers smelled the odor of marijuana at Jones' house and then observed a marijuana cigarette.¹⁷⁵ The officers obtained a warrant to search the house for evidence of marijuana because simple possession of marijuana was a crime in Virginia.¹⁷⁶ Jones was arrested and indicted for, among other charges, marijuana possession.¹⁷⁷ Both the search itself and the scope of the search were issues in the case.¹⁷⁸

Since that time, in July 2021, Virginia repealed the simple possession of marijuana statute that it used to convict Jones.¹⁷⁹ Given the repeal of that statute, would probable cause based upon the odor of marijuana, which led to the observation of the marijuana cigarette, suffice to execute a warrant in this case? If so, would this same court uphold that warrant, or would the court believe that the odor would not be indicative of whether the marijuana possession was simple and therefore legal, or was it an illegal amount? What about the fact that now-legal hemp smells like marijuana? Could this fact also affect the execution of the warrant? These same types of issues are arising in the context of exceptions to the warrant requirement, as will be discussed below.

Irrespective of whether a state has decriminalized or legalized marijuana, law enforcement may still not be able to conduct a warrantless search of a home or its curtilage because someone is in possession of marijuana. In *State v. Markus*,¹⁸⁰ a police officer observed the defendant smoking a marijuana

¹⁷³ *United States v. Jones*, 952 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2020), *cert. denied*, 141 S. Ct. 1080 (2021).

¹⁷⁴ *Id.* at 160.

¹⁷⁵ *Id.* at 155.

¹⁷⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷⁷ *Id.* at 157.

¹⁷⁸ *See* Petition for Writ of Certiorari, *United States v. Jones*, 952 F.3d 153 (2020) (No. 20-5285) In the Petition for Certiorari, which was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court, the defense pointed out that “[i]f Mr. Jones had lived in one of the states in the Sixth, Ninth, or Tenth Circuit, or one of the states agreeing with those courts, the police would have needed more than a mere sniff of marijuana at his front door in order to have probable cause to search his entire house, including a locked safe in his bedroom that could not have contained burning marijuana.” *Id.*

¹⁷⁹ VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-250.1 (repealed 2021).

¹⁸⁰ *State v. Markus*, 211 So. 3d 894, 897–98 (Fla. 2017).

cigarette outside and, when the police approached him, the defendant threw it to the ground and backed into his open garage.¹⁸¹ This resulted in a warrantless search of the garage.¹⁸² The Florida Supreme Court stated that the underlying crime of marijuana possession was a nonviolent misdemeanor and unless the search rose to the level of an exigent circumstance, which it did not, the search should *not* be upheld.¹⁸³ Interestingly, Florida had no decriminalization or legalization of marijuana at the time.

C. *Land as Curtilage*

In *Florida v. Jardines*,¹⁸⁴ Justice Scalia cited a variety of pertinent U.S. Supreme Court cases and addressed the extent of curtilage as follows:

We therefore regard the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home”—what our cases call the curtilage—as “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” That principle has ancient and durable roots. Just as the distinction between the home and the open fields is “as old as the common law,” so too is the identity of home and what Blackstone called the “curtilage or homestall,” for the “house protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenants.” This area around the home is “intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically,” and is where “privacy expectations are most heightened.”¹⁸⁵

Despite this extensive interpretation of curtilage, ascertaining the boundaries of curtilage is not a simple concept and is mostly dependent on how and where the search is conducted. Courts seem willing to find areas to be outside of the curtilage if they are in any way separate from the home.¹⁸⁶ For example, the land

¹⁸¹ *Id.*

¹⁸² *Id.* at 898.

¹⁸³ *Id.* at 912.

¹⁸⁴ *Fla v. Jardines*, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013).

¹⁸⁵ *Id.* at 6–7 (citations omitted).

¹⁸⁶ *United States v. Hatch*, 931 F.2d 1478, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991).

surrounding a home may be characterized as curtilage and therefore be subject to constitutional protection against warrantless searches.¹⁸⁷ Whether a court wants to extend the protection on the issue of marijuana grows on land without a warrant varies from court to court.

Although backyards have been deemed curtilage, long before any marijuana laws were enacted and as far back as 1986 in *California v. Ciraolo*,¹⁸⁸ the U.S. Supreme Court held that warrantless aerial observation of a fenced-in backyard within the curtilage of a home was *not* unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.¹⁸⁹ In *Ciraolo*, the police based their observation upon an anonymous tip that a person was growing marijuana on their land.¹⁹⁰ The Court stated that Ciraolo's expectation of privacy "from all observations of his backyard" was unreasonable.¹⁹¹ The Court reasoned that the yard and its crop being within the "curtilage" of Ciraolo's home did not, itself, "bar all police observation."¹⁹² In fact, "[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that [the] officers observed."¹⁹³

In *State v. Davis*,¹⁹⁴ the state police "received several reports that residents were growing marijuana plants" and conducted aerial surveillance of the defendant's greenhouse with a low-flying helicopter.¹⁹⁵ The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that the aerial surveillance was an unconstitutional search requiring a warrant.¹⁹⁶ Although the U.S. Supreme Court found that an aerial observation of marijuana grow did *not* constitute a search

¹⁸⁷ *Id.* at 1481.

¹⁸⁸ *Cal. v. Ciraolo*, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).

¹⁸⁹ *See Hoffman v. People*, 780 P.2d 471, 475 (Colo. 1989); *Ciraolo*, 476 U.S. at 215; *Hudson v. Michigan*, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). *But see Lacey v. State*, 931 N.E.2d 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). *See also* Jon Delano, *On 4/20, Pennsylvania moves closer to legalizing adult recreational cannabis*, CBS PITTSBURGH (Apr. 20, 2022), <https://www.cbsnews.com/pittsburgh/news/pennsylvania-moves-closer-legalizing-adult-recreational-cannabis/>.

¹⁹⁰ *Ciraolo*, 476 U.S. at 209.

¹⁹¹ *Id.* at 211–12, 213–14.

¹⁹² *Id.* at 213.

¹⁹³ *Id.* at 213–14.

¹⁹⁴ *State v. Davis*, 360 P.3d 1161 (N.M. 2015).

¹⁹⁵ *Id.* at 1163.

¹⁹⁶ *Id.* at 1173.

in *Ciraolo*, fifteen years later, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed the use of infrared heat technology to detect marijuana grow in a home without a warrant was a search.¹⁹⁷ In *Kyllo v. United States*,¹⁹⁸ the Court stated, that “where . . . the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a [Fourth Amendment] ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”¹⁹⁹

Thus, the home and curtilage constitutional protections have two nuances: like some other constitutional protections, a state may grant more protections than what is granted under the federal Constitution,²⁰⁰ and while a warrantless search of a home and curtilage is presumed unreasonable, there are a few exceptions.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁷ See *Kyllo v. United States*, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

¹⁹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹⁹ *Id.* at 40.

²⁰⁰ Timothy Sandefur, *The First Line of Defense: Litigation for Liberty at the State Level*, GOLDWATER INST. (Apr. 23, 2019), <https://goldwaterinstitute.org/first-line-of-defense/> (“The federal Constitution creates a basic minimum of legal security for rights such as free speech, due process, and security against searches and seizures—a ‘floor’ below which the states may not fall. But states can provide increased protections, and most states do just that, at least on paper.”); see also *State Constitutions in the Federal System: Selected Issues and Opportunities for State Initiatives*, ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELS. 79–81 (July 1989), <https://library.unt.edu/gpo/acir/Reports/policy/a-113.pdf>.

²⁰¹ See *Payton v. N.Y.*, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (“The seizure of property in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.”); *Coolidge v. N.H.*, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (“In each case, this initial intrusion is justified by a warrant or by an exception such as ‘hot pursuit’ or search incident to a lawful arrest, or by an extraneous valid reason for the officer’s presence.”); *Smallwood v. State*, 113 So.3d 724, 731 (Fla. 2013) (discussing the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement); *Riggs v. State*, 918 So.2d 274, 278 (Fla. 2005) (“When the government invokes [the exigent circumstances exception] to support the warrantless entry of a home, it must rebut the presumption that such entries are unreasonable.”).

D. *Exigent Circumstances Exception*

The exigent circumstances exception applies when “the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”²⁰² The burden is on the state to demonstrate that an exigent circumstance existed to justify the warrantless search.²⁰³ Exigent circumstances require that there be a “‘grave emergency’ that ‘makes a warrantless search imperative to the safety of the police and of the community.’”²⁰⁴ The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized three major categories of exigent circumstances: (1) the emergency aid exception, whereby an officer enters a home to render emergency assistance to an occupant who is seriously injured or to whom serious injury is imminent; (2) “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence;” and (3) the hot pursuit exception, which allows officers to proceed into a residence without a warrant if they are in the process of the continuous hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.²⁰⁵ As is true for any protected right against a warrantless search, if there is an exigent circumstance, the revered home and its curtilage protection could be lost.

²⁰² *Mincey v. Ariz.*, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).

²⁰³ *See Riggs*, 918 So.2d at 278–79. To carry that burden, the State must show an existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances to validate the warrantless entry. *Welsh v. Wis.*, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984).

²⁰⁴ *Riggs*, 918 So.2d at 278–79 (Fla. 2005) (quoting *Ill. v. Rodriguez*, 497 U.S. 177, 191 (1990)).

²⁰⁵ *Ky. v. King*, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (citations omitted)

This Court has identified several exigencies that may justify a warrantless search of a home. Under the “emergency aid” exception, for example, “officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Police officers may enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. And—what is relevant here—the need “to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence” has long been recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search.;

see also *Brigham City v. Stuart*, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); *Holder v. State*, 847 N.E.2d 930, 936–37 (Ind. 2006); *Payton v. N.Y.*, 445 U.S. at 590 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”).

E. “Open Fields”

The “open fields” doctrine was first recognized in 1924 in *Hester v. United States*,²⁰⁶ where the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment “did not protect ‘open fields’ and that, therefore, police searches in such areas as pastures, wooded areas, open water, and vacant lots need not comply with the requirements of warrants and probable cause.”²⁰⁷ In *Oliver v. United States*,²⁰⁸ the Supreme Court held that a search of open fields is *not* considered a Fourth Amendment search, and thus, it is not governed by the Fourth Amendment.²⁰⁹ There, narcotics agents investigated Oliver’s farm based on reports that marijuana was being grown on Oliver’s farm.²¹⁰ Upon arrival at the farm, the agents drove past Oliver’s house to a locked gate with a “No Trespassing” sign, but with a footpath around one side.²¹¹ The agents then “walked around the gate and along the road” and found a marijuana field over a mile from Oliver’s house.²¹² Oliver was arrested and indicted for manufacturing a “controlled substance” in violation of a federal statute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1).²¹³ The Oliver majority held that, even for secluded lands and notwithstanding efforts of the owner to exclude the public by erecting fences or posting “No Trespassing” signs, a warrantless search was not constitutionally protected.²¹⁴ The Court reasoned that society does not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields because they “do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.”²¹⁵

²⁰⁶ *Hester v. United States*, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); *see also* *Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp.*, 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974) (stating that the “open fields” exception was approved in *Hester*).

²⁰⁷ CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *supra* note 61, at 1197-1269 (citing *Hester*, 265 U.S. at 59).

²⁰⁸ *Oliver v. United States*, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).

²⁰⁹ *Id.* at 180–81.

²¹⁰ *Id.* at 173.

²¹¹ *Id.*

²¹² *Id.*

²¹³ *Oliver*, 466 U.S. at 173.

²¹⁴ *Id.* at 182–84.

²¹⁵ *Id.* at 179.

Since *Oliver*, the highest courts of Montana, New York, Oregon, and Vermont, as well as a Washington state appeals court, have rejected the open fields doctrine and protected the privacy rights of their citizens based upon their state constitutions, and in some instances, the steps taken by the defendant to protect their privacy interest.²¹⁶

In *State v. Dixon*,²¹⁷ after flying over the property in question and observing groves of the plant, based upon a tip, the police were able to see cannabis planted outside the curtilage of the house.²¹⁸ The defendant's conviction of manufacturing and possessing a controlled substance was upheld.²¹⁹ The Supreme Court of Oregon held that: (1) there is no open field exception to the search and seizure provision of the Oregon Constitution; *but* (2) an individual's privacy interest in land which she or he has left unimproved and unbounded is not sufficient to trigger the protections of the constitutional provisions; and (3) officers could make a warrantless entry into an open field which was only posted with a "No Hunting" sign.²²⁰

In *People v. Scott*,²²¹ law enforcement officers executed a search warrant on property based on the use of "in-camera" testimony of a private citizen who observed what appeared to be the remnants of a marijuana growing operation.²²² The defendant appealed his conviction for first-degree possession of marijuana.²²³ The question presented on the appeal was whether defendant's act of posting "No Trespassing" signs about every twenty to thirty feet around the perimeter of his property where he was growing marijuana, established an expectation of privacy cognizable under the right to privacy protection of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, section 12 of

²¹⁶ *State v. Bullock*, 901 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1995); *People v. Scott*, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992); *State v. Dixon*, 766 P.2d 1015 (Or. 2005); *State v. Kirchoff*, 587 A.2d 988 (Vt. 1991); *State v. Johnson*, 879 P.2d 984 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).

²¹⁷ *State v. Dixon*, 766 P.2d 1015 (Or. 2005).

²¹⁸ *Id.* at 1016.

²¹⁹ *Id.* at 1024.

²²⁰ *See id.* at 1024.

²²¹ *People v. Scott*, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992).

²²² *Id.* at 1330.

²²³ *See id.* at 1331.

the New York Constitution.²²⁴ The court ruled that the warrantless entries of the police and the trespasser were illegal under the N.Y. Constitution.²²⁵ The court reasoned that because Scott's property was posted with "No Trespassing" signs, Scott manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.²²⁶

The Vermont Supreme Court, after an extensive discussion of the open field doctrine, took a similar posture to New York.²²⁷ The court provided the only issue on appeal of a conviction for cultivating marijuana was the legality under the Vermont Constitution of a warrantless search of defendant's property.²²⁸ The court held that this search violated Chapter I, Article 11, of the Vermont Constitution, and reversed.²²⁹ Based on a tip, officers flew over a property and took photographs.²³⁰

The Vermont Supreme Court stated "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could the officers reasonably conclude . . . that their 'walk-on' search was permissible."²³¹ Indeed, "[g]iven the extensive posting of the land, defendant's intent to exclude the public was unequivocal."²³² As such, the court found that the "officers' walk over defendant's logging roads and through his woods violated his right to privacy under Article 11 [of the Vermont Constitution], and the evidence obtained thereby may not be used against him."²³³

It is interesting to note that these series of cases were decided well before the passage of any marijuana laws. Each court will continue to determine whether they will follow the U.S. Supreme Court "open field" doctrine as decided in *Oliver* or look to their own state Fourth Amendment constitutional protection.²³⁴ Those states that do not follow the *Oliver* doctrine will look to whether the facts of the case establish an expectation of privacy

²²⁴ *See id.* at 1341.

²²⁵ *Id.* at 1338.

²²⁶ State v. Dixon, 766 P.2d 1015, 1338 (Or. 2005).

²²⁷ *See* State v. Kirchoff, 156 Vt. 1 (Vt. Sup. Ct. 1991).

²²⁸ *See id.*

²²⁹ *See id.*

²³⁰ *See id.*

²³¹ *Id.* at 14.

²³² *Kirchoff*, 156 Vt. At 14.

²³³ *Id.*

²³⁴ *Oliver v. United States*, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).

consistent with the analysis set forth in *Katz*, where the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment permits the police to conduct a warrantless search of an area in which a person does not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”²³⁵ In the meantime, the presence of illegal commercial hemp grows: growers without state permission under a hemp program, along with the perceived odor of marijuana, may play a role in conducting warrantless searches in “open fields.”²³⁶ The 2018 Farm Bill permits the USDA to approve plans submitted by states and native American tribes for the domestic production of hemp.²³⁷ It further establishes a federal plan that the USDA directly manages for producers in states or territories of native American tribes that do not have a USDA-approved plan but the production of hemp is legal.²³⁸ In fact, searches in open fields for hemp may even increase. Despite the fact that recreational marijuana is legal in sixteen states and more accessible now than ever before, illegal grows continue.²³⁹ In California for example, “as more licenses to grow marijuana are added, illegal growing has also risen” with more than 1.11 million illegal plants seized in 2020.²⁴⁰

F. Plain Sight/View & Plain Smell Doctrines

Unlike the “open fields doctrine,” the plain sight/view and plain smell doctrines are very much impacted by the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana and hemp.²⁴¹ The smell and look of illegal marijuana and legal hemp are almost indistinguishable, which is making identification for law

²³⁵ *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).

²³⁶ *Hemp and Farm Programs*, USDA, <https://www.farmers.gov/your-business/row-crops/hemp> (last visited May 25, 2022).

²³⁷ *Hemp Production Questions and Answers*, USDA, <https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/hemp/questions-and-answers> (last visited Aug. 2, 2022).

²³⁸ *Id.*

²³⁹ *Id.*

²⁴⁰ Kurt Snibbe, *As More Licenses to Grow Marijuana are Added, Illegal Growing Has Also Risen in California*, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2021, 9:21 PM), <https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/08/11/as-more-licenses-to-grow-cannabis-are-added-illegal-growing-has-also-risen-in-california/>.

²⁴¹ Matt Shipman, *Is Hemp the Same Thing As Marijuana?*, NC STATE UNIV. (Feb. 14, 2019), <https://news.ncsu.edu/2019/02/is-hemp-the-same-thing-as-marijuana/>.

enforcement and their “sniff dogs” difficult.²⁴² While hemp remained illegal under the CSA, law enforcement officers and their “sniff dogs” did not have to distinguish between hemp and marijuana visually or olfactorily, as they are now being called upon to do. These similarities are compounded by the fact that many locales and states have either decriminalized marijuana²⁴³ or outright made it available statewide through the passage of medical and recreational marijuana laws.²⁴⁴

The “plain sight” or “plain view” doctrine was first recognized in 1971 in the U.S. Supreme Court case *Coolidge v. New Hampshire*.²⁴⁵ Although a car was seized in *Coolidge* instead of marijuana plants, and, the officers intended to seize the car when they entered on petitioner’s property, the Court found that the “plain view” doctrine was inapplicable.²⁴⁶ The Court stated that “where the police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant, knew in advance the car’s description and location . . . and no contraband or dangerous objects were involved, the exception was inapplicable.”²⁴⁷

The Court characterized “plain view” as an exception to a warrant requirement.²⁴⁸ The *Coolidge* plurality set forth three requirements necessary to uphold the warrantless seizure by police of private possessions based on “plain view.”²⁴⁹

First, the police officer must lawfully make an “initial intrusion” or otherwise properly be in a position from which he can view a particular area. Second, the officer must discover incriminating evidence “inadvertently,” which is to say, he may not “know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and intend to seize it,” relying on the plain view doctrine only as a

²⁴² JOHNSON, *supra* note 28.

²⁴³ See generally Hartman, *supra* note 55.

²⁴⁴ See *State Medical Cannabis Laws*, NAT’L CONF. OF STATES LEGIS. (Feb. 3, 2022), <https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx>.

²⁴⁵ *Coolidge v. N.H.*, 403 U.S. 443, 464 (1971).

²⁴⁶ *Id.* at 472.

²⁴⁷ *Id.* at 444.

²⁴⁸ *Id.* at 464.

²⁴⁹ *Id.* at 467–68.

pretext. Finally, it must be “immediately apparent” to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. While the lower courts generally have applied the *Coolidge* plurality’s discussion of “plain view,” it has never been expressly adopted by a majority of [the U.S. Supreme Court].²⁵⁰

In *Texas v. Brown*, the U.S. Supreme Court further stated that “‘plain view’ is perhaps better understood . . . not as an independent ‘exception’ to the warrant clause, but simply as an extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer’s ‘access to an object’ may be.”²⁵¹ In *Brown*, the Court distinguished “plain view” from “plain sight.”²⁵² The Court noted that the term “plain view” as used to justify seizure of an object must be distinguished “from an officer’s mere observation of an item left in plain view.”²⁵³ The latter “generally involves no Fourth Amendment search . . . [but] the former generally does implicate the [Fourth] Amendment’s limitations upon seizures of personal property.”²⁵⁴ The Court further noted that “information obtained as a result of observation of an object in plain sight may be the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion of illegal activity,” and “these levels of suspicion may, in some cases . . . justify police conduct affording them access to a particular item.”²⁵⁵ Stated another way, the seizure of property in plain view is permissible without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the property observed is somehow involved in criminal activity or is illegal contraband.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁰ *Tex. v. Brown*, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (citing *Coolidge*, 403 U.S. at 465–68, 470); See Howard E. Wallin, *The Uncertain Scope of the Plain View Doctrine*, 16 U. OF BALT. L. REV. 266 (1987).

²⁵¹ *Brown*, 460 U.S. at 738–39.

²⁵² *Id.* at 738 n.4.

²⁵³ *Id.*

²⁵⁴ *Id.*

²⁵⁵ *Id.*

²⁵⁶ See *Plain View: Annotations*, JUSTIA, <https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-04/21-plain-view.html#tc-345>, at n.345 (last visited Mar. 28, 2022).

With respect to the “plain view” doctrine, the decriminalization and legalization of recreational and medical marijuana and hemp calls into question whether an officer who is lawfully present at a location and views what is believed to be illegal marijuana is *in fact* viewing illegal marijuana. If marijuana has been legalized, is what is being *viewed* incriminating evidence of a marijuana crime or illegal contraband? Many marijuana laws permit adults to grow a certain amount of marijuana plants in their abode and outdoors in a secure manner.²⁵⁷ Prior to marijuana legalization in any form, it was clear that an officer did not have to face the issue of the legality of marijuana.

After Pennsylvania passed a medical marijuana law in 2016 and decriminalized small amounts of marijuana possession in several counties, a Pennsylvania court, in *Commonwealth v. Rial*,²⁵⁸ upheld a trooper’s warrantless intrusion into the defendant’s yard and subsequent seizure of marijuana plants based on the trooper’s plain view of the defendant’s marijuana plants.²⁵⁹ The plain view was based upon the trooper’s training and experience as immediately identifying the plants as marijuana.²⁶⁰ Rhetorically speaking, could the defendant have

²⁵⁷ See Susan Gunelius, *Which States Allow You to Grow Your Own Recreational or Medical Cannabis?*, CANNABIZ MEDIA (Sept. 8, 2020), <https://www.cannabiz.media/blog/which-states-allow-you-to-grow-your-own-recreational-or-medical-cannabis> (stating that “of the 34 states that have legalized medical and/or adult-use cannabis, more than half of them . . . allow some form of at-home cannabis growing.”); Meghan Matt, *Cannabis Law & Policy: In the Age of Decriminalization, Is the Odor of Marijuana Alone Enough to Justify a Warrantless Search?* 47 S.U. L. REV. 459 (2020); Amber Taufen, *Colorado Cannabis Laws*, WESTWORD, <https://www.westword.com/marijuana/laws> (last visited Jan. 4, 2022); see also *Know the Law*, WASH. ST. LIQUOR & CANNABIS BOARD, <https://lcb.wa.gov/mj-education/know-the-law> (last visited Jan. 4, 2022); *Frequently Asked Questions: Can I Smoke or Consume Adult-Use Marijuana Products in Public?*, CANNABIS CONTROL COMMISSION, <https://masscannabiscontrol.com/frequently-asked-questions/#general> (last visited Jan. 4, 2022).

²⁵⁸ *Commonwealth v. Rial*, No. 891 WDA, 2021 WL 3163154 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 27, 2021).

²⁵⁹ See Max Cherney, *Philadelphia Is Decriminalizing Marijuana Possession*, VICE NEWS (Sept. 14, 2014, 9:00 AM), <https://www.vice.com/en/article/yw44q5/philadelphia-is-decriminalizing-marijuana-possession>; see also Laila Kearney, *Pittsburgh to Decriminalize Small Amounts of Marijuana*, REUTERS (Dec. 21, 2015, 2:32 PM), <https://www.reuters.com/article/pennsylvania-marijuana/pittsburgh-to-decriminalize-small-amounts-of-marijuana-idUSL1N14A28P20151221>.

²⁶⁰ *Rial*, 2021 WL 3163154 at *4.

inquired at trial if the trooper could accurately distinguish between the look and smell of marijuana and hemp? If the plants were in a *secure* location in the defendant's yard, would it be reasonable for the trooper to conclude that the plants were being illegally grown? If there was any question about whether the marijuana grown was more than the permissible amount under a state recreational or medical marijuana law, should the trooper have secured a warrant?

While the "plain view" and "open fields" doctrine have enjoyed a long-standing exception to the warrant requirement, the "plain smell" doctrine has a more limited status, as some states uphold it as the basis for probable cause, while others do not.²⁶¹ In *Johnson v. United States*,²⁶² the United States Supreme Court did address the "smell" of opium along with other factors that resulted in entry into a house and ultimately a room therein.²⁶³ The search and subsequent arrest were *not* upheld for a variety of reasons, none of which were related to the "smell" of opium.²⁶⁴ There is still no final word on this doctrine from the U.S. Supreme Court, but without acknowledging its validity, the Court did briefly discuss the "smell" of marijuana as it related to the case in the *Florida v. Jardines* concurring opinion.²⁶⁵ Despite the Supreme Court's failure to adopt "plain smell," the lower federal courts embrace it overwhelmingly²⁶⁶ and the states have

²⁶¹ *United States v. Martinez-Miramontes*, 494 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1974); *see also* *United States v. Curran*, 498 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1974).

²⁶² *Johnson v. United States*, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).

²⁶³ *Id.* at 12–13.

²⁶⁴ *Id.* at 16.

²⁶⁵ *Fla. v. Jardines*, 569 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2013) (concurrency) (discussing whether using a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch to investigate the contents of the home constituted a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); *see also*, Olivia Khazam, *It's Right Under Your Nose! The Trial of the Senses and the "Plain Smell" Doctrine*, CTR. FOR SENSORY STUDS. (Apr. 23, 2014), <https://centreforsensorystudies.org/occasional-papers/its-right-under-your-nose-the-trial-of-the-senses-and-the-plain-smell-doctrine/> (noting that in *United States v. Johns*, Justice O'Connor of the U.S. Supreme Court did mention by dicta the plain smell doctrine, and referred to *United States v. Haley*, "in which the Fourth Circuit held that 'plain smell' may justify a warrantless search of a container.").

²⁶⁶ Michael A. Sprow, *Wake Up and Smell the Contraband: Why Courts that Do Not Find Probable Cause Based on Odor Alone Are Wrong*, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 289, 295 (2000).

also addressed the doctrine with varying outcomes.²⁶⁷

Sometimes these doctrines overlap with the exigent circumstance's exception. For example, law enforcement may identify marijuana through "plain sight" and "plain smell" in a home where a child resides and is exposed to the marijuana. Does that scenario establish an exigent circumstance that would obviate the need to secure a warrant? After a state decriminalizes and legalizes marijuana, it may not be enough to conduct an emergency search of the home without a warrant for several reasons. In *Holder v. State*,²⁶⁸ the Indiana Supreme Court held that police officers' detection of a "very strong odor of ether" near a residence provided sufficient exigent circumstances for them to enter the apparent curtilage of the dwelling without a warrant to confirm that the smell was, in fact, emanating from it and then, upon learning that a young child was inside the house, entering to bring her outside.²⁶⁹ Nevertheless, with respect to potential child endangerment, where marijuana is legally used or grown in a home in front of a child, the trend seems to be that there needs to be evidence that the use or grow is detrimental to the child in some regard.²⁷⁰ Further, growing and using marijuana in one's home may be legal in those states that have passed medical and recreational marijuana laws that permit adult-use and grow of marijuana plants within the confines of a home.²⁷¹

²⁶⁷ *Id.* at 291 n.17, 296 n.41 (noting that the "majority of courts addressing plain smell have adopted it").

²⁶⁸ *Holder v. State*, 847 N.E.2d 930, 934, 938 (Ind. 2006).

²⁶⁹ *Id.*

²⁷⁰ *See, e.g.*, In re Drake M., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); In re Alexis E., 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); In re J.A., 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d 915 (Cal. Ct. App. 2020).

²⁷¹ *Can You Grow Hemp at Home?*, FORTUNA HEMP, <https://fortunahemp.com/can-you-grow-hemp-at-home/#> (last visited May 25, 2022)

Arizona, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Washington State only allow medical marijuana cultivation. . . . Alaska, Colorado, Maine, and Massachusetts allow residents to grow their own cannabis—whether it's hemp or marijuana is moot. . . . "California, Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, and Vermont" allow medical patients higher plant counts compared to their recreational neighbors.

These “plain smell” and “plain view” doctrines have also been examined in conjunction with the “automobile exception” and the “search incident to arrest” exception to the warrant requirement.²⁷² In the cases preceding the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana and hemp, the odor of marijuana as illegal contraband mostly gave rise to probable cause to conduct a search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.²⁷³ Additionally, several appellate courts had expanded the search to the trunk and other areas of the vehicle based on the odor of marijuana.²⁷⁴ Post-state decriminalization and legalization of recreational or medical marijuana, appellate cases are addressing whether the odor of marijuana may form the basis of a warrantless search of a vehicle, including its occupants. The developing appellate case law in this area is meeting with mixed outcomes.

G. Automobile Exception

The automobile exception to the warrant requirement was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in *Carroll v. United States*.²⁷⁵ Chief Justice Taft stated that there was a lower standard of reasonableness for searching an automobile than for other places since, due to its mobility, the automobile might be gone by

²⁷² See *United States v. Russell*, 670 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

²⁷³ See *United States v. Haley*, 669 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1982); see also *United States v. Loucks*, 806 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1986); *State v. Walker*, 974 N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012); *State v. Smalley*, 225 P.3d 844 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).

²⁷⁴ See *United States v. Winters*, 221 F.3d 1039, 1041 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming the lower court’s conclusion that “once the trooper smelled marijuana, he had probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including the trunk and all containers therein, for controlled substances”); *United States v. Turner*, 119 F.3d 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that evidence of personal use amounts of marijuana “was sufficient to establish a ‘fair probability’ that Turner might have hidden additional drugs not necessary for his current consumption in areas out of plain sight, including the trunk of the car”); *United States v. McSween*, 53 F.3d 684, 686–87 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that “the smell of marihuana [in the passenger area] alone may be ground enough for a finding of probable cause” to search other areas of the vehicle).

²⁷⁵ *Carroll v. United States*, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see *Pa. v. Mimms*, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977); *United States v. Martinez-Fuerte*, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976); *S.D. v. Opperman*, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); *Cardwell v. Lewis*, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion); *Cady v. Dombrowski*, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973) (all indicating the lesser protection afforded to automobiles).

the time a search warrant could be obtained.²⁷⁶ Since that decision, the reasons for the vehicle exception have become two-fold. “Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.”²⁷⁷ Since mobile homes are a hybrid of automobiles and more traditional homes or offices, their Fourth Amendment protection is circumstance-driven.²⁷⁸ In this totality of the facts analysis, courts have considered whether the motor home is on wheels and traveling,²⁷⁹ or whether the mobile home is stationary or on stilts.²⁸⁰ “If the motor home were parked in the exact middle of the intersection between the general rule and the exception for automobiles, priority should be given to the rule rather than [to] the exception.”²⁸¹

The *Carroll* Court further stated that the search must be based upon probable cause, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle contains such contraband.²⁸² The search, however, “extends no further than the automobile itself.”²⁸³ *Carroll* was decided in 1925 during alcohol prohibition, thus the contraband addressed in that case was alcohol.²⁸⁴ Marijuana has been considered and treated as illegal contraband at least since the Marijuana Tax Act,²⁸⁵ during the 1930s when several states started to make possession of marijuana illegal, and with the passage of the Controlled Substance Act (“CSA”).²⁸⁶ Whether it still maintains that characterization is one of the preeminent questions arising in the courts, that is, whether marijuana after decriminalization or the

²⁷⁶ *Carroll*, 267 U.S. at 153–55.

²⁷⁷ *Opperman*, 428 U.S. at 367.

²⁷⁸ *See Powell v. State*, 120 So. 3d 577, 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).

²⁷⁹ *See United States v. Salzano*, 158 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 1998).

²⁸⁰ *See Cal. v. Carney*, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).

²⁸¹ *Id.* at 402.

²⁸² *Carroll*, 267 U.S. at 149.

²⁸³ *Collins v. Va.*, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018).

²⁸⁴ *See Carroll v. United States*, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); *see also Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 24–27 (2005).

²⁸⁵ *See United States v. Leazar*, 460 F.2d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 1972).

²⁸⁶ *See JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45948, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT (CSA): A LEGAL OVERVIEW FOR THE 117TH CONGRESS 2* (2021), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45948.pdf>.

passage of recreational or medical marijuana laws, is still illegal contraband. The courts have also addressed whether, if marijuana is not considered illegal contraband, may the odor alone permit a warrantless search of a vehicle or person therein.²⁸⁷

Courts weigh the “plain smell” doctrine heavily when discussing the automobile exception as it relates to marijuana odor.²⁸⁸ As early as 1948, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the odor of an illegal drug can be probative in establishing probable cause for a search without a warrant.²⁸⁹ In *Johnson v. United States*,²⁹⁰ the Supreme Court explained:

[i]f the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant. Indeed, it *might very well be found* to be evidence of most persuasive character.²⁹¹

A Pennsylvania Superior Court further wrestled with these issues in *Commonwealth v. Barr*,²⁹² where the court found that the odor of marijuana does not per se establish probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle “because a substantial

²⁸⁷ See *United States v. Rivera*, 595 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that odor of marijuana established probable cause for a search); *United States v. Pond*, 523 F.2d 210, 211 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that informant’s detection of odor of marijuana was sufficient to provide probable cause for issuance of a search warrant); *United States v. Valen*, 479 F.2d 467, 470–71 (3d Cir. 1973) (validating a search of a suitcase based solely on officer’s detection of the odor of marijuana).

²⁸⁸ *Rivera*, 595 F.2d at 1099; *Pond*, 523 F.2d at 211 (both finding detection of odor in the vehicle established probable cause for a search).

²⁸⁹ *Johnson v. United States*, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).

²⁹⁰ *Id.* at 10.

²⁹¹ *Id.* at 13 (emphasis added).

²⁹² *Commonwealth v. Barr*, 240 A.3d 1263, 1269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020), *vacated*, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021) (vacating superior court’s decision and remanding decision holding that while the court was in agreement with the superior court about the law as stated in the article, the superior court did not sufficiently consider a specific factor in its analysis).

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number of Pennsylvania citizens can now consume marijuana legally, calling into question the so-called plain smell doctrine.”²⁹³ The defendant in *Barr* argued that the U.S. Supreme Court in *Johnson* did not articulate a *per se* rule regarding the odor of obvious contraband.²⁹⁴ Instead, Justice Jackson clearly expressed that the odor of a “forbidden” substance is a factor that “might” constitute evidence of the “most persuasive character” when considered in the totality-of-the-circumstances test for probable cause.²⁹⁵

The Pennsylvania Superior Court agreed that there is no preexisting *per se* rule that the odor of marijuana is always sufficient to establish probable cause to believe a crime is being committed.²⁹⁶ The court referred to language in the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act to show that compliance with the Act will not constitute a crime under the CSA.²⁹⁷ It is important to note that the defendant in *Barr* presented the officers with his medical marijuana card prior to the search at issue.²⁹⁸ The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further taken these matters up on review and phrased the issues as: (1) what weight, if any, should the odor of marijuana be given in determining whether probable cause exists for a warrantless vehicle search, in light of the enactment of the Medical Marijuana Act, and (2) to what extent does this court’s decision in *Commonwealth v. Hicks* apply to probable cause determinations involving the possession of marijuana following the enactment of the Medical Marijuana Act.²⁹⁹

In 2014, Maryland passed a medical marijuana law and decriminalized possession of fewer than ten grams of marijuana.³⁰⁰ In *Pacheco v. State*,³⁰¹ the Maryland Court of

²⁹³ *Id.* at 1268–69.

²⁹⁴ *Id.* at 1274–75.

²⁹⁵ *Id.* at 1275.

²⁹⁶ *Id.*

²⁹⁷ *Id.* at 1278.

²⁹⁸ *See Commonwealth v. Barr*, 240 A.3d 1263, 1271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2020).

²⁹⁹ *See id.*

³⁰⁰ MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 5-601 and 5-601.1; *see also Maryland, WEEDMAPS*, <https://weedmaps.com/learn/laws-and-regulations/maryland> (last visited May 25, 2022)

Maryland’s HB 881, the Natalie M. LaPrade Medical Marijuana

Appeals held that law enforcement, who detected marijuana odor emanating from a vehicle and observed a marijuana “joint” in the vehicle console, had probable cause to search that vehicle under the automobile exception to warrant requirement.³⁰² The search of the defendant was unreasonable because the possession of a “joint” and the odor of marijuana did not give the officers probable cause to believe the defendant was in possession of a criminal *amount* of marijuana.³⁰³ The court stated that “the facts presented by the State and credited by the hearing judge were sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle based on the presence of contraband.”³⁰⁴ The court went on to reason that “little else was presented that addressed why this minimal amount of marijuana, which is not a misdemeanor, but rather a civil offense, gave rise to a fair probability that [defendant] possessed a criminal amount of marijuana on his person.”³⁰⁵

The following year, in *Lewis v. State*,³⁰⁶ an officer approached a defendant and smelled an odor of marijuana emitting from him, stopped the defendant based on the odor of marijuana and the information that he received, and searched him.³⁰⁷ The court held “that the odor of marijuana, if localized to a particular person, provides probable cause to arrest that person for the crime of possession of marijuana.”³⁰⁸ The court found when the officer smelled the odor of marijuana from appellant’s person and localized to appellant, the officer had probable cause to arrest appellant and search him incident to that arrest.³⁰⁹ The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded the case and held that the odor of marijuana, without more, does

Commission legislation, was signed by Gov. Martin O’Malley in 2014. HB 881 created the Natalie M. LaPrade Maryland Medical Cannabis Commission (MMCC) and charged it with establishing regulations for the legal consumption, cultivation, possession, and distribution of cannabis products to patients 18 and older.

³⁰¹ Pacheco v. State, 214 A.3d 505, 508 (Md. 2019).

³⁰² *Id.* at 517–18.

³⁰³ *Id.*

³⁰⁴ *Id.*

³⁰⁵ *Id.* at 518.

³⁰⁶ *Lewis v. State*, 237 Md. App. 661 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018).

³⁰⁷ *See id.*

³⁰⁸ *See id.*

³⁰⁹ *Id.* at 669.

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not provide law enforcement officers with the requisite probable cause to arrest and perform a warrantless search of that person incident to the arrest.³¹⁰ The court went on to hold that the odor of marijuana

is not indicative of the quantity, if any, of marijuana in someone's possession for purposes of search incident to arrest exception to warrant requirement . . . arresting and searching a person, without a warrant and based exclusively on the odor of marijuana on that person's body or breath, is unreasonable; and odor of marijuana emanating from defendant's person fell short of supplying the requisite probable cause to conduct search incident to arrest.³¹¹

In *Butler v. United States*,³¹² the court noted that prior to the legalization of marijuana in Washington D.C., "the smell of marijuana generally emanating from appellant's vehicle . . . indisputably would allow the police to search the vehicle," but the court had "reservations" about whether the driver's arrest could have been upheld without the additional facts that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity.³¹³ After the decriminalization of marijuana in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, the odor of marijuana remains a relevant factor in assessing reasonable suspicion, but it does not alone provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.³¹⁴

³¹⁰ *Id.*

³¹¹ *Lewis v. State*, 233 A.3d 86, 86 (Md. 2020).

³¹² *Butler v. United States*, 102 A.3d 736, 741 (D.C. Ct. App. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

³¹³ *Id.* at 739.

³¹⁴ *State v. Perez*, 239 A.3d 975, 985–86 (N.H. 2020) (decided after decriminalization of small amounts of marijuana); *Commonwealth v. Cruz*, 945 N.E.2d 899, 908 (Mass. 2011) (decided after the decriminalization of one ounce or less of marijuana and reasoning that the odor of marijuana alone does not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).

In *State v. Seckinger*,³¹⁵ the Nebraska Supreme Court also addressed the issue of whether the odor of marijuana, standing alone, furnished probable cause to support the warrantless search of defendant's vehicle.³¹⁶ There, the defendant argued that Nebraska had decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana and that the neighboring state of Colorado had legalized recreational marijuana.³¹⁷ The defendant's primary contention was that the legalization of marijuana in Colorado eroded the legal premise of the court's precedent because the odor of marijuana standing alone no longer suggests criminal activity.³¹⁸ The court upheld that the odor of marijuana coming from a vehicle, standing alone, still provided probable cause to search the vehicle.³¹⁹

In 2019, in *People v. Shumake*,³²⁰ after California legalized recreational marijuana, an officer lawfully stopped a vehicle, and based upon the odor of marijuana and the defendant admitting to possessing marijuana, which he handed to the officer from the console, he established "more probable cause to believe there was more marijuana in the vehicle" and thus, the officer conducted a full search of the vehicle.³²¹ The court concluded that, given the legality of the personal use of marijuana in the State of California, there was not a fair probability that the officer would find evidence of a crime in the vehicle.³²² The court went on to state that "anyone 21 years and older can now lawfully smoke marijuana in California, and as [the officer] testified, the smell can linger for more than a week."³²³ Further, the law "permits possession and transportation of up to 28.5 grams of cannabis in a car."³²⁴ Accordingly, the search of the vehicle was not upheld.³²⁵

³¹⁵ *State v. Seckinger*, 920 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Neb. 2018).

³¹⁶ *Id.* at 846.

³¹⁷ *See id.* at 850.

³¹⁸ *Id.*

³¹⁹ *Id.*

³²⁰ *People v. Shumake*, 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 405, 408–09 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2019).

³²¹ *Id.* at 407.

³²² *Id.* at 410.

³²³ *Id.*

³²⁴ *Id.*

³²⁵ *Id.*

The following year in *United States v. Martinez*,³²⁶ another California case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, found that the lower court erred by relying on pre-Proposition 64 (statewide recreational marijuana law) California cases held that the odor of marijuana alone provides probable cause to search for violations of state marijuana laws.³²⁷ The court stated that those cases were decided when possession of any quantity of marijuana was unlawful under state law, which is no longer true in California after recreational marijuana was passed.³²⁸ The court remanded the case and directed the trial court to determine whether the facts known to the law enforcement officer supported probable cause to believe that Martinez's car had evidence of a crime.³²⁹ They went on to say that it was conceivable that there was a violation of the California Health and Safety Code, which prohibits an open container of marijuana while operating a vehicle.³³⁰ In sidestepping the issue of whether there was probable cause to believe that there was a violation of *federal* laws, the court stated "[w]e are a court of review, not first view."³³¹

In *People v. Hill*,³³² the Illinois Supreme Court *upheld* a vehicle search based upon the odor of marijuana.³³³ There, after a lawful stop, the officer told the occupants that he smelled raw cannabis in the car, and defendant was asked to exit the vehicle.³³⁴ Defendant was then patted down and asked to sit on the curb next to the car.³³⁵ A search of the vehicle produced an unspecified amount of cannabis.³³⁶ Defendant argued that smelling cannabis cannot create probable cause because Illinois decriminalized marijuana possession in amounts under ten

³²⁶ *United States v. Martinez*, 811 F. App'x 396, 397 (9th Cir. 2020).

³²⁷ *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Newman*, 563 F. App'x 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2014); *U.S. v. Solomon*, 528 F.2d 88, 91 (9th Cir. 1975); *U.S. v. Barron*, 472 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1973).

³²⁸ *Martinez*, 811 F. App'x at 397.

³²⁹ *Id.* at 40.

³³⁰ CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.3(a)(4) (West 1972).

³³¹ *Martinez*, 811 F. App'x at 398.

³³² *People v. Hill*, 162 N.E.3d 260 (Ill. 2020).

³³³ *Id.*

³³⁴ *Id.* at 263.

³³⁵ *Id.*

³³⁶ *Id.*

grams.³³⁷ The Illinois Supreme Court cited *In re O.S.*,³³⁸ which states that “decriminalization is not synonymous with legalization” and that under Illinois law, the knowing possession of cannabis is still a criminal offense under the CSA because the possession of more than ten grams remains a crime subject to criminal penalties.³³⁹ The court pointed out that the defendant failed to explain how a police officer “confronted with the obvious odor of cannabis when he first approaches a vehicle, is left to discern how much cannabis may be present by its smell alone.”³⁴⁰ The Illinois Supreme Court still considers the odor of marijuana relevant to a probable cause determination and “support[s] an inference that a crime is ongoing, even though possession of one ounce or less” was legal.³⁴¹

The Illinois Supreme Court found the reasoning in *Zuniga*³⁴² applicable to *Hill* because a “substantial number of other marijuana-related activities remain unlawful.”³⁴³ However, the Colorado Supreme Court has since decided the *McKnight* case, discussed below, on the issue of the use of sniff dogs to detect marijuana that may affect the *Zuniga* rationale and may ultimately take the Illinois Supreme Court down a different path.³⁴⁴ Now that Illinois has legalized recreational marijuana, the question is whether the Illinois Supreme Court change the rationale that it adopted from the *Zuniga* case in *People v. Hill*.³⁴⁵

The day after former New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo signed New York’s recreational marijuana law,³⁴⁶ the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) issued a Memorandum to all police officers addressing the search of vehicles on the basis of the odor of marijuana that stated in part:

³³⁷ *Id.*

³³⁸ *People v. O.S. (In re O.S.)*, 112 N.E.3d 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).

³³⁹ *Id.* at 633–34.

³⁴⁰ *People v. Hill*, 123 N.E.3d 1236, 1247 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).

³⁴¹ *O.S.*, 112 N.E.3d at 633.

³⁴² *People v. Zuniga*, 372 P.3d 1052 (Colo. 2016).

³⁴³ *Id.* at 1059.

³⁴⁴ *People v. McKnight*, 446 P.3d 397, 413 (Colo. 2019).

³⁴⁵ *See People v. Hill*, 162 N.E.3d 260 (Ill. 2020).

³⁴⁶ Rich Mendez, *Gov. Andrew Cuomo Signs Bill to Legalize Recreational Marijuana in New York*, CNBC (Mar. 30, 2021, 7:45 PM), <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/30/new-york-state-senate-passes-bill-to-legalize-recreational-weed.html>.

*Effective immediately, the smell of marihuana alone no longer establishes probable cause of a crime to search a vehicle. This change applies to both burnt and unburnt marihuana. Searches of vehicles related to marihuana enforcement may only be conducted in accordance with the following: driving while impaired by drugs: if the driver appears to be under the influence of marihuana and there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the impairing marihuana (e.g. smell of burnt marihuana or admission of having smoked recently), a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle is permissible. However, the trunk may not be searched unless the officer develops separate probable cause to believe the trunk contains evidence of a crime.*³⁴⁷

This position is consistent with a recent New York appellate case in which police officers smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from a car, searched the console where they found a small amount of marijuana, and then proceeded to search the trunk.³⁴⁸ The court held that “the odor of marijuana, together with a de minimis amount of marijuana found in the center console of the vehicle, did not furnish the requisite probable cause to search the trunk of defendant’s vehicle and that there was no factual nexus between the possession of an amount of marijuana consistent with personal consumption and a search for contraband in the trunk of the vehicle.”³⁴⁹

On the heels of this decision, in another New York appellate case, officers smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from a car and searched the console, where the officers found marijuana and a bottle, which contained a significant amount of

³⁴⁷ Smertiuk Memorandum, *supra* note 126; *see also* Moore, *supra* note 126 (emphasis added).

³⁴⁸ *People v. Ponder*, 195 A.D.3d 123, 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).

³⁴⁹ *Id.* at 124.

Oxycodone.³⁵⁰ There, the court held that there was probable cause to believe that additional drugs were being stored in the car, including the trunk.³⁵¹ Neither of these two cases post-date the newly enacted New York recreational marijuana law nor the new NYPD police policy as stated above. It is interesting to keep in mind that irrespective of the new NYPD policy, New York courts are still free to make decisions on these issues should cases, based upon the odor emanating from a car that results in a search, come before them.

States have approached the use of “sniff dogs” or drug-detection dogs to detect drugs from the exterior of a vehicle without a warrant with mixed results. Some states hold that the use of a sniff dog to detect marijuana is a *search*, and some do not.³⁵² Some states find that the sniff dog’s alert establishes probable cause to search the vehicle, and some do not. Still, other states extend further Fourth Amendment protections than others.³⁵³ The U.S. Supreme Court in *Illinois v. Caballes*³⁵⁴ held that a sniff of a vehicle’s exterior by a trained narcotics dog is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if conducted without extending a traffic stop.³⁵⁵ In *Caballes*, an officer led a drug-detection dog around a vehicle that was lawfully stopped for speeding.³⁵⁶ The dog alerted at the trunk, leading to a search that revealed marijuana.³⁵⁷

A series of cases have developed since *Caballes*. In *Varner v. Roane*,³⁵⁸ the court held police can have a drug-sniffing dog circle a motor vehicle without individualized suspicion or a search warrant.³⁵⁹ In *United States v. Jones*,³⁶⁰ a drug-detection dog’s positive alert on a vehicle provided probable

³⁵⁰ *People v. McCray*, 195 A.D.3d 555, 556 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021).

³⁵¹ *Id.*

³⁵² *See People v. Restrepo*, 504 P.3d 983 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021); *Fla v. Jardines*, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).

³⁵³ *Id.*

³⁵⁴ *Ill. v. Caballes*, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).

³⁵⁵ *Id.* at 410.

³⁵⁶ *Id.* at 406.

³⁵⁷ *Id.*

³⁵⁸ *Varner v. Roane*, 981 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2020).

³⁵⁹ *Id.* at 294.

³⁶⁰ *United States v. Jones*, 311 F. Supp. 3d 761 (E.D. Va. 2018).

cause to search that vehicle.³⁶¹ In *Flora v. Southwest Iowa Narcotics Enforcement Task Force*,³⁶² “a drug dog sniff itself did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, because the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item in which a person maintains no inherent privacy interest.”³⁶³ These three cases pre-date the legalization of hemp and the added issue of how the smell of hemp and marijuana cannot be distinguished by a sniff dog.³⁶⁴

In some states, sniff dogs are now becoming obsolete. Sniff dogs have been retired or repurposed in some states, such as Virginia, Colorado, California, Michigan, and Massachusetts, based on the legalization of marijuana in those states.³⁶⁵ Based upon the adoption of a new marijuana possession law, Virginia is set to retire fifteen drug-sniffing dogs “because these dogs are trained to alert to the scent of cannabis” and “any alert is interpreted by police . . . as probable cause to effect a search under the Fourth Amendment.”³⁶⁶ Further, the sniff dog cannot discern “between a large amount of cannabis and a single joint, and because a dog trained to detect both cocaine and marijuana [cannot] inform its handler what was detected, the only path forward for police narcotics units is to retire their drug-sniffing dogs.”³⁶⁷ When recreational marijuana was passed in New Mexico

³⁶¹ *Id.* at 773.

³⁶² *Flora v. Sw. Iowa Narcotics Enf't Task Force*, 292 F. Supp. 3d 875 (S.D. Iowa 2018).

³⁶³ *Id.* at 890 n.13.

³⁶⁴ Bill Bush, *Police Dogs Can't Tell the Difference Between Hemp and Marijuana*, AKRON BEACON J. (Aug. 12, 2019, 4:27 PM), <https://www.beaconjournal.com/story/news/local/2019/08/12/police-dogs-can-x2019-t/4481487007/>; see also Denise Lavoie, *Since the Nose Doesn't Know Pot is Now Legal, K-9s Retire*, AP NEWS (May 29, 2021), <https://apnews.com/article/va-state-wire-police-marijuana-marijuana-legaliz>; Chris Roberts, *Marijuana Legalization Is Retiring Police Dogs. Why That's Good—And Why All K9 Drug Units Should Go.*, FORBES (May 30, 2021, 2:01 PM), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrisroberts/2021/05/30/marijuana-legalization-is-retiring-police-dogs-why-thats-good-and-why-all-drug-k9-units-should-go/?sh=35d500ea3695ation-253af1ba6e541060085108e027b367c1>.

³⁶⁵ Peter Hermann & Justin Jouvenal, *Decriminalization of Marijuana is Pushing Pot-Sniffing Police Dogs Into Retirement*, WASH. POST (Jul. 14, 2021, 5:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/police-canine-marijuana-washington/2021/07/14/fl18eb66-e01c-11eb-ae31-6b7c5c34f0d6_story.html.

³⁶⁶ Roberts, *supra* note 364.

³⁶⁷ Roberts, *supra* note 364.

in 2021, law enforcement also reconsidered using sniff dogs to detect marijuana.³⁶⁸

A sniff dog that alerts to marijuana in a state that has legalized marijuana raises privacy issues and could lead to an “unnecessary” search.³⁶⁹ Hemp and marijuana “look and smell alike” and police officers might not be able to determine whether a search has unveiled hemp or marijuana without testing the THC levels.³⁷⁰ A sniff dog does not know the difference between what is legal and what is not legal. As determined in *People v. McKnight*,³⁷¹ a sniff dog cannot specifically distinguish between marijuana and methamphetamine and the presence of both drugs would “trigger the same response” from the sniff dog.³⁷² Properly distinguishing hemp versus marijuana could mean the difference between a conviction or not, depending on the state and whether it has decriminalized or legalized marijuana.³⁷³

Legalization in Colorado has already impacted court decisions involving marijuana and sniff dogs. In *People v. McKnight*,³⁷⁴ the Colorado Supreme Court, after Colorado passed a recreational marijuana law where possession of an ounce or less of marijuana by someone twenty-one or older is legal, found that marijuana was no longer always “contraband” under state law.³⁷⁵ There, police observed a parked pickup truck facing the wrong way in a one-way alley and followed the truck as it traveled a few blocks.³⁷⁶ The truck then parked in front of a residence where police had found drugs two months earlier, and it remained

³⁶⁸ Nathan O’Neal, *4 Investigates: Drug Sniffing Police Dogs’ Future in Limbo with Legalization of Marijuana*, KOB 4 (May 20, 2021, 10:25 PM), <https://www.kob.com/new-mexico-news/4-investigates-drug-sniffing-police-dogs-future-in-limbo-with-legalization-of-marijuana/6116175/>.

³⁶⁹ *Id.*

³⁷⁰ *Legal Hemp, Pot’s Look-Alike, Creates Confusion for Police*, CNBC (Mar. 28, 2019, 11:00 AM), <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/28/legal-hemp-pots-look-alike-creates-confusion-for-police.html>.

³⁷¹ *People v. McKnight*, 446 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2019).

³⁷² *Id.* at 399; Hermann, *supra* note 365.

³⁷³ *See generally* CNBC, *supra* note 370 (noting that, for example, hemp is illegal under Idaho law whereas hemp is legal in Colorado and Kentucky).

³⁷⁴ *McKnight*, 446 P.3d at 399.

³⁷⁵ *Id.* at 401.

³⁷⁶ *Id.* at 400.

parked there for fifteen minutes.³⁷⁷ During that time, no one exited the truck or the residence.³⁷⁸ When the truck started moving again, the officer followed it and observed a traffic infraction.³⁷⁹ The officer recognized the passenger as someone who had previously used methamphetamine.³⁸⁰ A sniff dog was called to the scene and alerted the officers as to potential drug contraband, including marijuana.³⁸¹ The officers next ordered McKnight and the passenger to exit the truck, patted them down, and found nothing on them; the officers then searched the truck by hand.³⁸²

The court concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, there was no probable cause justifying the use of the dog to sniff McKnight's truck or the subsequent hand search of the truck.³⁸³ The court reasoned that in legalizing marijuana for adults twenty-one and older, Amendment 64 expanded the protections of Article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution and provided a reasonable expectation of privacy to engage in the lawful activity of possessing marijuana in Colorado.³⁸⁴ Because there was no way to know whether the dog was alerting to lawful marijuana or unlawful contraband, the sniff violated McKnight's reasonable expectation of privacy.³⁸⁵ Thus, McKnight's conviction was overturned because the dog had alerted to drugs in the car but may have just alerted to the "legal amount of marijuana" in the vehicle.³⁸⁶

The Colorado Supreme Court further stated that "[m]arijuana is now treated like guns, alcohol, and tobacco—while possession of these items is lawful under some circumstances, it remains unlawful under others."³⁸⁷ The court went on to state that, "[a]lthough possession of guns, alcohol, and

³⁷⁷ *Id.*

³⁷⁸ *Id.*

³⁷⁹ *Id.*

³⁸⁰ *McKnight*, 446 P.3d at 400.

³⁸¹ *Id.*

³⁸² *Id.*

³⁸³ *Id.* at 402.

³⁸⁴ *Id.* at 408.

³⁸⁵ *Id.*

³⁸⁶ Hermann, *supra* note 365.

³⁸⁷ *McKnight*, 446 P.3d at 408.

tobacco can be unlawful, persons still maintain an expectation of privacy in lawfully using or consuming those items. The same now goes for marijuana.”³⁸⁸ In diverting from the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in *Caballes*, the Colorado Supreme Court cited its previous holding in *Sporleder*,³⁸⁹ stating, “we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when determining the scope of state constitutional protections.”³⁹⁰

H. *Search Incident to Arrest*

The exception that authorizes a search incident to the lawful³⁹¹ arrest of a person was recognized long before it was iterated in *Birchfield v. North Dakota*.³⁹² The search incident to arrest exception was first announced in *Chimel v. California*.³⁹³ For the search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the police must be armed with probable cause to believe that the person subject to arrest has committed a felony or is committing a felony or misdemeanor in the presence of the police.³⁹⁴ The

³⁸⁸ *Id.*

³⁸⁹ *People v. Sporleder*, 666 P.2d 135, 140 (Colo. 1983).

³⁹⁰ *McKnight*, 446 P.3d at 406 (quoting *Sporleder*, 666 P.2d at 140).

³⁹¹

By its express terms, the condition precedent to a search incident to arrest is that the police have made a lawful custodial arrest of the person, that is, an arrest supported by probable cause that the arrestee has committed or is committing a crime. . . . Because the search is premised on probable cause to make the arrest, the first question to be considered whenever such a search has been conducted is whether the police had the requisite probable cause *before* conducting the search.

Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 323 (2019) (citations omitted); *see also id.* at 323 (citing *Rawlings v. Ky.*, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) (“stating that a search incident to an arrest may precede the formal arrest so long as the police already have amassed the requisite probable cause to make the arrest and the search is conducted ‘incident’ to the arrest.”)).

³⁹² *Birchfield v. N.D.*, 579 U.S. 438 (2016) (reasoning delineated in *Schmerber v. Cal.*, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).

³⁹³ *Chimel v. Cal.*, 395 U.S. 752, 779 (1969).

³⁹⁴ *See Maryland v. Pringle*, 540 U.S. 366, 369–70 (2003); *see also United States v. Robinson*, 414 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (quoting *Agnello v. United States*, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925)).

The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search

justification of officer safety for this exception is long rooted in U.S. Supreme Court cases.³⁹⁵ The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person to prevent the concealment of weapons or destruction of evidence.³⁹⁶ Essentially, there are two types of warrantless searches that may be made incident to a lawful arrest: a search of the arrestee's person and a search of the area within the arrestee's immediate control.³⁹⁷ *Arizona v. Gant*,³⁹⁸ partially overruling *Chimel*, limited searches justified by concerns of officer safety or the preservation of evidence, to those areas within reaching distance at the time of the search.³⁹⁹

As discussed above, the *Lewis* case in Maryland is on appeal and one of its questions for review is whether probable cause existed to allow a *search incident to arrest* based solely on the odor of marijuana.⁴⁰⁰ The underlying Maryland Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Maryland circuit court that the odor of marijuana emanating from a person, like the odor coming from a vehicle, was *sufficient* to establish probable cause to perform a search incident to arrest.⁴⁰¹ However, the dissent in the lower court decision drew a distinction between the types of searches and noted that there are several benign reasons one might smell like marijuana without having the contraband on their person.⁴⁰² Some identified issues related to the "plain smell" doctrine and marijuana include: the odor may not be current, odors are mobile, the source of the odor may not be identifiable, the confusion with the hemp odor for both law enforcement and sniff dogs, the lack of quick testing

the place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.

³⁹⁵ *Preston v. United States*, 376 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1964).

³⁹⁶ *See Riley v. Cal.*, 573 U.S. 373, 383 (2014).

³⁹⁷ *United States v. Robinson*, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973); *State v. Byrd*, 310 P.3d 793, 795–96 (Wash. 2019).

³⁹⁸ *Ariz. v. Gant*, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

³⁹⁹ *Id.* at 351.

⁴⁰⁰ *See Lewis v. State*, 233 A.3d 86, 95 (Md. 2020).

⁴⁰¹ *Id.*

⁴⁰² *Id.*

methods, and the potential for discriminatory stops.⁴⁰³

V. EXCLUSIONARY RULE & GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION

All these exceptions to a warrant requirement do not amount to much if they do not have an impact in a criminal case. If a search is found to be unconstitutional by a court of law, the court will typically exclude or suppress seized evidence against the defendant from admissibility against them at trial.⁴⁰⁴ That is, if a warrant is found to be invalid, or reasonable suspicion for a stop or probable cause for a search did not meet legal requirements, it will be deemed a Fourth Amendment violation.⁴⁰⁵ This suppression of evidence is legally known as the exclusionary rule as set forth in 1961 in *Mapp v. Ohio*,⁴⁰⁶ which has its roots in the long-standing doctrine known as “fruits of the poisonous tree.”⁴⁰⁷

There are a couple of exceptions to the good faith exception. First, for a search conducted *with* a warrant, the search may be upheld if the warrant has some flaws unbeknownst to the officer when executing it and the officer in good faith.⁴⁰⁸ The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a court can consider evidence obtained from a search that appeared to have a lawful basis, such as a search supported by a warrant.⁴⁰⁹ If the warrant later turns out to have been invalid, the police may not be held accountable for conducting a search while relying on it.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰³ See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 251145, SPECIAL REPORT: CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 4 (2018); German Lopez, *After Legalization, Black People are Still Arrested at Higher Rates for Marijuana Than White People*, VOX (Jan. 29, 2018), <https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/29/16936908/marijuana-legalization-racial-disparities-arrests>; *Race & Justice News: Blacks Disproportionately Arrested for Marijuana in Alabama*, SENTENCING PROJECT (Oct. 30, 2018), <https://www.sentencingproject.org/news/race-justice-news-blacks-disproportionately-arrested-marijuana-alabama/>; see also Matt, *supra* note 257, at 459 (providing insight on issues and recommendations related to “plain smell” and marijuana).

⁴⁰⁴ See *Wong Sun v. United States*, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

⁴⁰⁵ See *id.*

⁴⁰⁶ *Mapp v. Ohio*, 367 U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961).

⁴⁰⁷ *Nardone v. United States*, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); *Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States*, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).

⁴⁰⁸ See *Davis v. United States*, 564 U.S. 229 (2011).

⁴⁰⁹ See *id.* at 238–39 (2011).

⁴¹⁰ *Id.*

Another exception is when an officer takes steps based on the existing interpretation of the law, but a court later rules that the law should be interpreted differently; there the police may be found to have acted in good faith.⁴¹¹ Some states do not apply this good faith exception in their courts, while other states apply a limited version of the exception. This is because states have a right to provide greater liberties to their citizens under their own state constitutions than those contained in the U.S. Constitution.

VI. OTHER SEARCH SETTINGS

A. *Body Specimens*

Searches related to automobiles arise in yet another context, that is, the taking and testing of body specimens from drivers without a warrant. A cadre of U.S. Supreme Court cases came forward from 2012–2019 addressing this issue.⁴¹² In *Missouri v. McNeely*,⁴¹³ the driver was stopped by a highway patrolman for speeding, failed several field sobriety tests, and was asked to submit to an alcohol breath test, which he refused.⁴¹⁴ The driver was then transported to a medical clinic where the clinic staff administered a blood test without the suspect's consent and without a warrant.⁴¹⁵ The issue in the case was whether a law enforcement officer may obtain a nonconsensual and warrantless blood sample from a drunk driver under the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement based upon the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream.⁴¹⁶ The U.S. Supreme Court, in affirming the Missouri Supreme Court, held that “in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does *not* constitute an exigency in every case

⁴¹¹ *United States v. Leon*, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984); *contra* *Groh v. Ramirez*, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).

⁴¹² *See, e.g.*, *Miss. v. McNeely*, 569 U.S. 141 (2013); *Birchfield v. N.D.*, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016); *Mitchell v. Wis.*, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2530–31 (2019); *Ill. v. Andreas*, 463 U.S. 765 (1983).

⁴¹³ *Miss. v. McNeely*, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).

⁴¹⁴ *Id.* at 145.

⁴¹⁵ *Id.* at 146.

⁴¹⁶ *Id.* at 147.

sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.”⁴¹⁷

A few years later in *Birchfield v. North Dakota*,⁴¹⁸ along with invalidating an implied consent statute that imposed criminal penalties for refusing to submit to a blood test, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a breath test, but *not* a blood test, may be administered as a *search incident to a lawful arrest* for drunk driving.⁴¹⁹ The Court reasoned that a blood test is not only more invasive than a breath test, but also more intrusive because it reveals too much information about the defendant.⁴²⁰ The U.S. Supreme Court revisited body specimen searches once again in *Mitchell v. Wisconsin*.⁴²¹ There, the Court held that the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement *almost always* permits a blood test without a warrant where the driver suspected of drunk driving is *unconscious*, and therefore cannot be given a breath test.⁴²²

It is also noteworthy to briefly address the “plain view” doctrine in the context of warrantless searches of automobiles. Before any state decriminalized or legalized medical and recreational marijuana, in *Illinois v. Andreas*,⁴²³ a large, locked metal container, shipped by air from Calcutta to respondent in Chicago, was opened by a customs officer at the airport, who found marijuana concealed in a compartment.⁴²⁴ A Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent confirmed that it was marijuana.⁴²⁵ “The next day, the DEA agent and a Chicago police officer posed as delivery men and delivered the container to respondent, leaving it in the hallway outside his apartment. . . . the container was reopened and the marihuana found inside the table was seized”⁴²⁶ The warrantless reopening of the container following its reseizure did not violate

⁴¹⁷ *Id.* at 165 (emphasis added).

⁴¹⁸ *Birchfield v. N.D.*, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).

⁴¹⁹ *Id.* at 2185–86.

⁴²⁰ *Id.* at 2184.

⁴²¹ *Mitchell v. Wis.*, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2530–31 (2019).

⁴²² *Id.* at 2539.

⁴²³ *Ill. v. Andreas*, 463 U.S. 765 (1983).

⁴²⁴ *Id.*

⁴²⁵ *See id.*

⁴²⁶ *See id.*

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respondent's rights under the Fourth Amendment.⁴²⁷ The U.S. Supreme Court held that an officer may search an individual's vehicle when the officer can see incriminatory evidence in the car from outside of the car.⁴²⁸

B. Schools

School policies are amid change with respect to medical marijuana use and possession on school grounds. Under certain conditions, some schools now permit medical marijuana to be administered, used, and stored in schools.⁴²⁹ While there is a rise in marijuana use among college students, according to several sources, however, marijuana use by youth has not increased with the legalization of marijuana.⁴³⁰ Nonetheless, without a school sanction for medical marijuana use and possession on school grounds, illegal marijuana possession continues to be an issue in schools, prompting Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues both pre- and post-marijuana decriminalization and legalization.⁴³¹ The Fourth Amendment's prohibition

⁴²⁷ *See id.*

⁴²⁸ *Id.* at 771.

⁴²⁹ *See* Jenna Bourne, *9 Out Of 10 Tampa Bay School Districts are Breaking Law Meant to Help Sick Kids*, WTSP (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:35 PM), <https://www.wtsp.com/article/news/investigations/10-investigates/tampa-bay-area-school-medical-marijuana-policy/67-c58d1872-cad6-4dfd-8844-a47ccf01d13b>; Madeline Coats, *Medical Marijuana Could be Allowed on School Grounds*, DAILY WORLD (Jan. 14, 2019, 7:00 PM), <http://www.thedailyworld.com/news/medical-marijuana-could-be-allowed-on-school-grounds/>; Frances Rogers & Kate S. Im, *Cannabis in the Classroom: Navigating the Administration of Medical Marijuana on Campus Under New California Law*, LAW.COM (Feb. 20, 2020, 4:55 PM), <https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/02/20/cannabis-in-the-classroom-navigating-the-administration-of-medical-marijuana-on-campus-under-new-california-law/?slreturn=20200121151743>; *see also* FLA. STAT. § 1006.062 (3)(8) (2021); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49414.1(b) (Deering 2020).

⁴³⁰ *Marijuana Use at Historic High Among College-Aged Adults in 2020*, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH (Sept. 8, 2021), <https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/marijuana-use-historic-high-among-college-aged-adults-2020>; Kyle Jaeger, *Teen Marijuana Use Is Not Increasing As More States Legalize, Another Federal Study Shows*, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Oct. 28, 2021), <https://www.marijuanamoment.net/teen-marijuana-use-is-not-increasing-as-more-states-legalize-another-federal-study-shows/> (noting numerous state and federal sources demonstrating that "legalization does not lead to increase[d] youth use despite prohibitionist arguments to the contrary").

⁴³¹ *See generally* Jason E. Yearout, *Individualized School Searches and the Fourth Amendment: What's a School District To Do?*, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.

on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by school officials.⁴³²

In *New Jersey v. T.L.O.*,⁴³³ the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the standard for warrantless school searches in holding that “[n]either the warrant requirement nor the probable cause standard is appropriate.”⁴³⁴ Instead, “a simple reasonableness standard governs all searches of students’ persons and effects by school authorities.”⁴³⁵ The Court further explained that school authorities are permitted “to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense.”⁴³⁶

The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the parameters of a warrantless search of a school student in *New Jersey v. T.L.O.*⁴³⁷ There, an assistant vice principal conducted a search of a student’s purse for the cigarettes based upon a report that the student was smoking in the school lavatory in violation of school policy.⁴³⁸ In the purse, the assistant vice principal found marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and other evidence of marijuana dealing activities.⁴³⁹ The U.S. Supreme Court iterated that public school teachers function as agents of the state, and not merely agents of the students’ parents.⁴⁴⁰ Thus, the Fourth Amendment applies to their actions.⁴⁴¹ The Court also established the following test to determine the reasonableness of a search: whether the search was (1) “justified at its inception,” and (2) as the search was conducted, whether it was related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.⁴⁴² A search will be “permissible in its scope” when “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the

489 (2002) (discussing the issues of marijuana in schools as related to the Fourth Amendment).

⁴³² *N.J. v. T.L.O.*, 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985).

⁴³³ *See generally id.*

⁴³⁴ *Public Schools*, JUSTIA, <https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-04/22-public-schools.html> (last visited Aug. 14, 2022).

⁴³⁵ *Id.*

⁴³⁶ *T.L.O.*, 469 U.S. at 364.

⁴³⁷ *See id.* at 327–28.

⁴³⁸ *Id.* at 328, 345.

⁴³⁹ *See id.* at 328.

⁴⁴⁰ *Id.* at 336–74.

⁴⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴⁴² *T.L.O.*, 469 U.S. at 341.

search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”⁴⁴³

The Court in *T.L.O.* found that the report provided to the assistant vice principal accusing the student of smoking warranted a reasonable suspicion that she had cigarettes in her purse, and thus the search was justified at its inception.⁴⁴⁴ Further, the discovery of drug paraphernalia in the student’s purse gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that she was carrying marijuana in her purse.⁴⁴⁵ This justified a further exploration of the purse that turned up more evidence of marijuana-related activities.⁴⁴⁶ In this case, both prongs of the *T.L.O.* test were met, and the search was upheld.⁴⁴⁷

A search may be reasonable at its inception, but not reasonable in scope. It would stand to reason then that if the search is *unreasonable* at its inception, the court need not consider the second prong of the test related to the scope of the search, and, that if the search is reasonable at its inception, but the scope of the search is unreasonable, the search will *not* be upheld. These propositions are best demonstrated in the following two cases.

In *Phaneuf v. Fraikin*,⁴⁴⁸ school officials performed a “pre-announced search of all students’ bags for security purposes.”⁴⁴⁹ This search “revealed a package of cigarettes in Phaneuf’s purse,” which was prohibited by school policy.⁴⁵⁰ A student reported to a teacher that Phaneuf told her and other students that she possessed marijuana.⁴⁵¹ Phaneuf told the other student that she planned to hide the marijuana “down her pants” during the mandatory bag check.⁴⁵² After receiving this information from the student, the teacher reported the statement to the

⁴⁴³ *Id.* at 342.

⁴⁴⁴ *Id.* at 345.

⁴⁴⁵ *See id.*

⁴⁴⁶ *Id.* at 329–30.

⁴⁴⁷ *See id.* at 331–32.

⁴⁴⁸ *Phaneuf v. Fraikin*, 448 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 2006).

⁴⁴⁹ *Id.* at 592–93.

⁴⁵⁰ *Id.* at 593.

⁴⁵¹ *Id.*

⁴⁵² *See id.*

principal.⁴⁵³ The principal subjected Phaneuf to a strip search.⁴⁵⁴ The issue was “whether the school officials had a reasonably high level of suspicion that Phaneuf had marijuana on her person to justify an intrusive, potentially degrading strip search.”⁴⁵⁵

Unlike in *T.L.O.*, where marijuana and drug paraphernalia were found as contents of the student’s purse, the search of Phaneuf’s purse only discovered cigarettes and a lighter.⁴⁵⁶ The Court “believe[d] that the discovery of this particular contraband ha[d] such a tenuous connection to the alleged marijuana on her person to be of relatively little consequence in deciding whether the strip search for drugs was reasonable.”⁴⁵⁷ Consequently, the Court concluded that the search was not justified at its inception, and therefore, the scope of the strip search did not need to be addressed.⁴⁵⁸

In contrast, in *D.H. v. Clayton County Sch. Dist.*,⁴⁵⁹ a warrantless strip search of a student for marijuana was justified at its inception while forcing the student to strip fully naked in front of his peers was unconstitutionally excessive in scope.⁴⁶⁰ Even where a student strip search is justified at its inception, the Fourth Amendment still requires the execution of the search to be reasonable in scope.⁴⁶¹ While some of these cases involved searching purses, the same approach would apply to backpacks, lockers, or any other possessions owned by a student, and thus would all be subjected to the *T.L.O.* analysis.⁴⁶²

Public schools and colleges also face marijuana search issues in the context of mandatory drug testing. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a school district’s student-athlete drug policy, which authorized random urinalysis drug testing of students who participated in its athletic programs, did not violate students’ federal or state constitutional right to be free from

⁴⁵³ *See id.*

⁴⁵⁴ *Phaneuf*, 448 F.3d at 593.

⁴⁵⁵ *Id.* at 597.

⁴⁵⁶ *Id.* at 599.

⁴⁵⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁵⁸ *Id.* at 600.

⁴⁵⁹ *D.H. v. Clayton Cnty. Sch. Dist.*, 830 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2016).

⁴⁶⁰ *Id.* at 1318.

⁴⁶¹ *Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding*, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).

⁴⁶² *See id.*

unreasonable searches.⁴⁶³ In *Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton*,⁴⁶⁴ the Court reasoned that the school district had an immediate, legitimate concern in preventing student-athletes from using drugs, invasion of student privacy interest was negligible, and the district was not required to come up with a less intrusive search.⁴⁶⁵ Likewise, students who are studying health and other medical professions, like nursing, are subject to mandatory drug testing but not without growing legal challenges.⁴⁶⁶

Some colleges, due to the passage of medical marijuana laws, have permitted the possession of medical marijuana on campus. An Arizona State University police officer arrested student Juwaun Maestas after the officer observed Maestas sitting on a road near his on-campus dormitory.⁴⁶⁷ The officer found a valid Arizona Medical Marijuana Act (hereinafter “AMMA”) registry identification card in Maestas’s wallet.⁴⁶⁸ “After Maestas admitted that he had marijuana in his dorm room, the officer obtained a search warrant, searched Maestas’s dorm room, and found . . . 0.4 grams of marijuana.”⁴⁶⁹ The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the state cannot criminally charge public college students for having and using marijuana on campus if they have a medical marijuana card.⁴⁷⁰ The court reasoned that banning medical marijuana on college campuses violated the Arizona Constitution’s protections for voter-approved laws referring to the AMMA.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶³ Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002); *contra* York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995, 997 (Wash. 2008) (not followed on state grounds).

⁴⁶⁴ *Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton*, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).

⁴⁶⁵ *Id.* at 662.

⁴⁶⁶ Ben Walker, *Girl Expelled for Using Medical Marijuana is Suing Her College*, STONER THINGS (Nov. 17, 2019), <https://stonerthings.com/girl-expelled-medical-marijuana-suing-college/>.

⁴⁶⁷ *State v. Maestas*, 417 P.3d 774, 776 (Ariz. 2018).

⁴⁶⁸ *Id.*

⁴⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁷⁰ *Id.* at 779.

⁴⁷¹ *Id.* at 776.

C. Workplaces

In workplaces, cannabis search and seizure issues arise in the context of searches of people, places, things, and the taking and testing of body specimens like blood, urine, and oral fluids. The constitutionality of those searches is dependent upon whether the search is related to a public (governmental) or private employer, with searches by public employers treated differently than searches conducted by law enforcement.⁴⁷² The Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections and standards for *public* employees are the same as protections afforded to students in *public* schools, which is consistent with the school search standards set out in the two-pronged test from *T.L.O.*⁴⁷³ In *O'Connor v. Ortega*, the U.S. Supreme Court held that: (1) “public employer intrusions on constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by a standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances,” and (2) should be reasonable *both in its inception and in its scope*.⁴⁷⁴

This protection to public employees has extended to a search of employees’ persons, desks, and other effects including the taking and testing of body specimens. The U.S. Supreme Court held that “the collection and subsequent analysis of . . . biological samples must be deemed Fourth Amendment searches.”⁴⁷⁵ There are some categories of constitutionally permissible “suspicionless” searches that will automatically be upheld for the taking of body specimens to test for drugs (including marijuana) in the workplace.⁴⁷⁶ For example, in *National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab*,⁴⁷⁷ the U.S. Customs Service mandatory drug screening requiring urinalysis

⁴⁷² *Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Exec’s. Ass’n*, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (discussing public governmental searches); *O’Connor v. Ortega*, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (discussing private employment searches).

⁴⁷³ *See N.J. v. T.L.O.*, 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).

⁴⁷⁴ *O’Connor*, 480 U.S. at 725–26.

⁴⁷⁵ *Skinner*, 489 U.S. at 618.

⁴⁷⁶ *See Chandler v. Miller*, 520 U.S. 305, 308–09 (1997); *Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton*, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); *Skinner*, 489 U.S. at 602; *Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Von Raab*, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); *see also Tamburelli v. Hudson Cnty. Police Dep’t*, 742 A.2d 560, 562 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).

⁴⁷⁷ *Von Raab*, 489 U.S. at 656.

tests of U.S. Customs Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to positions having a direct involvement in drug interdiction was permissible.⁴⁷⁸ The “Government’s compelling interests in preventing the promotion of drug users to positions where they might endanger the integrity of our Nation’s borders . . . outweigh the privacy interests of those who seek promotion to these positions.”⁴⁷⁹

Additionally, there are mandatory drug testing requirements, which include testing for marijuana, in federal safety-sensitive employment positions such as truckers with the Department of Transportation.⁴⁸⁰ Under the Federal Drug-Free Workplace Act, federal employers are bound by the fact that marijuana is still considered illegal federally, and therefore federal employers implement zero-tolerance policies for all drugs including marijuana.⁴⁸¹ Thus far, and even in the face of state medical marijuana laws, employees bringing actions under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which is an employee protection law, have lost their civil actions due to the federal illegality of marijuana.⁴⁸²

On the other hand, private employers, as non-governmental entities, are left to establish their own drug testing policies, including but not limited to, zero-tolerance, random and suspicion-based testing. Some private employers will deny potential employee hires or fire an employee based on positive marijuana test results, while others will not test for it at all. As more state medical marijuana laws carve out protections for employees who legally use medical marijuana, more employment

⁴⁷⁸ *Id.* at 671.

⁴⁷⁹ *Id.* at 679.

⁴⁸⁰ *E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers*, 531 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).

⁴⁸¹ *See generally* 41 U.S.C. § 8102; *see also Procedures for Transportation Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs*, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., <https://www.transportation.gov/odapc/part40> (last visited May 26, 2022) (referring to 49 C.F.R Part 40, which describes the “required procedures for conducting workplace drug and alcohol testing for the Federally regulated transportation industry.”).

⁴⁸² *See, e.g.,* *Baustian v. La.*, 910 F. Supp. 274, 275 (E.D. La. 1996); *Johnson v. Columbia Falls Aluminum Co.*, No. DA 08–0358, 2009 WL 865308 (Mont. Mar. 31, 2009); *Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Lab. & Indus.*, 230 P.3d 518, 535 (Or. 2010) (*en banc*).

cases are developing.⁴⁸³ Employees are bringing actions against employers for the use of medical marijuana by utilizing state discrimination statutes,⁴⁸⁴ disability statutes,⁴⁸⁵ off-duty conduct statutes,⁴⁸⁶ and even housing statutes,⁴⁸⁷ with mixed results. Some courts point to the federal illegality of marijuana and rule against the employee, some point to medical marijuana statutes that either protect the employer or employee, while some look to disability, discrimination, and off-duty conduct statutes for guidance.⁴⁸⁸

VII. CONCLUSION

We are at an impasse with *legal* hemp and CBD, state decriminalization and legalizations of marijuana, and federally *illegal* marijuana. Oddly, *legal* CBD can be extracted from the *illegal* marijuana plant in addition to the *legal* hemp plant. This is further compounded by the removal of hemp from the CSA and the resulting propagation of CBD products. These products

⁴⁸³ Arizona, California, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Rhode Island, and Connecticut have medical marijuana statutes with employee protections. *See e.g.*, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2807, 36-2813, 36-2814 (2016); A.B. 2069 (inactive bill) (Cal. 2018); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4905A, 4907A, 4921A (2011); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 130/40 (2019); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2423-E (2009); MINN. STAT. § 152.32 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.800 (2020); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3360–3369-D (McKinney 2021); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 1004.18 (2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. tit. 21, § 21-28.6-4 (2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-408p (2012); *see also* Jay Starkman, *What New Marijuana Laws Mean for Employers*, BUS. J., <http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/how-to/growth-strategies/2016/12/what-new-marijuana-laws-mean-for-employers.html> (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).

⁴⁸⁴ *See, e.g.*, *Callaghan v. Darlington Fabrics Corp.*, No. PC-2014-5680, 2017 WL 2321181, at *1, *5–7 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 23, 2017).

⁴⁸⁵ *See, e.g.*, *Wild v. Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc.*, 241 N.J. 285, 287 (2020); *Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prods.*, 134 P.3d 161, 162 (Or. 2006).

⁴⁸⁶ *See, e.g.*, *Coats v. Dish Network, LLC.*, 2015 CO 44, ¶ 15; *see also* Scott Horton, *New York Law Protects Employee Marijuana Use*, JD SUPRA (Apr. 1, 2021), <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-york-law-protects-employee-1275108/>.

⁴⁸⁷ *See Discrimination Laws Regarding Off-Duty Conduct*, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Oct. 18, 2010), <https://www.ncsl.org/documents/employ/off-dutyconductdiscrimination.pdf>; *Newton v. Equilon Enterprises LLC*, 411 F. Supp. 3d 856 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

⁴⁸⁸ *See* Kathryn J. Russo, *Alabama Enacts Medical Marijuana Law*, NAT'L L. REV. (May 25, 2021), <https://www.natlawreview.com/article/alabama-enacts-medical-marijuana-law>.

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are not always accurate in representing THC concentrations which sometimes results in a positive test for THC. Consequently, this causes unintended negative legal outcomes in the workplace, in the criminal justice system, and at a personal level.

The decriminalization and legalization of marijuana and hemp is also testing the boundaries of established principles of warrants and warrantless searches. Due to the similarities of the sight and smell of hemp and marijuana, hemp legalization is causing confusion in a variety of settings, particularly on the roadways where the “plain view” and “plain smell” doctrines, as exceptions to the warrant requirement, are prevalent. A law enforcement’s or sniff dog’s identification of hemp versus marijuana by sight or smell is now more complex.

Additionally, with this decriminalization and legalization, law enforcement can no longer assume that the odor of marijuana is due to something nefarious that involves illegal activity or illegal contraband. Some courts espouse that even if possession of marijuana is legal, there is no way to know if the amount possessed exceeds the permissible legal amount. Some courts mandate something more than odor alone to form the basis for probable cause for a search. A court’s stance toward this issue may either validate or invalidate a search. The courts often discuss the status of marijuana state decriminalization and legalization laws in their marijuana search decisions. The scope of a search in the context of marijuana is also being addressed in the courts. The legal standards for the scope of a marijuana search vary and may be dependent upon where the search occurs, with some cases being more stringent in scope and others more liberal in scope.

The state legalization of cannabis and federal legalization of hemp is impacting how searches are conducted in stop and frisks, homes, land, curtilage, vehicles, schools, workplaces, body specimens, and other scenarios, and is fluctuating exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Legalization is also impacting exceptions to the warrant requirement including the “automobile exception,” the “open fields” doctrine exception, the “exigent circumstances” exception, and the search incident to arrest exception, with varying outcomes.

While states continue to move to decriminalize, legalize, or regulate recreational and medical marijuana, the schism between the states and the federal government continues. As a result, issues related to marijuana in all regards, and pinpointedly on the topic of search and seizure, remain in flux. Even if the U.S. Supreme Court renders opinions on developing search and seizure issues, states may still rule under their own constitutions and grant their citizens more expansive Fourth Amendment rights than the federal Constitution. While the courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, grapple with marijuana search and seizure issues, until and unless marijuana is declassified or reclassified and hemp is placed back into the CSA, which is unlikely on both accounts, this confusing and ever-changing landscape will persist.

In the words of conservative Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas,

If the Government is now content to allow States to act “as laboratories” and try novel social and economic experiments then it might no longer have authority to intrude on [t]he States’ core police powers . . . to define criminal law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. A prohibition on intrastate use or cultivation of marijuana may no longer be necessary *or* proper to support the Federal Government’s piecemeal approach.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸⁹ *Standing Akimbo, LLC v. United States*, 141 S. Ct. 2236, 2238 (Jun. 28, 2021); *See also* *Gonzales v. Raich*, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005).