JUDICIAL TOLERATION FOR NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OF BEARING ARMS IN PUBLIC: ADDRESSING THE SECOND AMENDMENT CIRCUIT SPLIT

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I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, Second Amendment objections to firearm regulation did not present itself.\(^1\) Even upon objection, longstanding prohibitions on who may possess firearms, what type of firearms, and how and where possession occurs have been consistently upheld.\(^2\) Recently, a few circuit courts have introduced a ‘why’ question to the regulation of firearms.\(^3\) These courts have placed more weight on the negative externalities of bearing arms than on a law-abiding citizen’s right to self-defense in public.

Several circuit courts have held that the government can refuse to permit a law-abiding citizen to bear arms in public until the citizen has established a reason ‘why’ he or she needs a concealed firearm for self-defense.\(^4\) In contrast, other sister circuit courts have held that the restrictions on bearing arms in public have gone too far when the burden is placed on law-abiding citizens to demonstrate why they need a firearm to ward off a specific dangerous person.\(^5\) Requiring this ‘why’ veers far from the longstanding prohibitions on possession in sensitive places and possession by those who have proven themselves dangerous to society.\(^6\) Law-abiding citizens have proven their right to bear arms by their conduct and these ‘why’ restrictions conflict with their right to be “armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.”\(^7\)

Nevertheless, several circuit courts have ignored the government’s burden to prove whether it has the authority to infringe upon an individual’s constitutional right to bear arms\(^8\) and has placed the burden

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\(^2\) Id. at 626–27.
\(^3\) See e.g. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2016).
\(^4\) Id.; see also Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429–30 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2012).
\(^5\) See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012).
\(^6\) See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings).
\(^7\) Id. at 584 (internal quotations omitted).
\(^8\) See e.g. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 87–88; Drake, 724 F.3d at 443. (Both courts assumed the general public had no right to self-defense without a “justifiable need” or “proper cause” to carry a handgun. Neither court placed a burden on the government to
on the shoulders of law-abiding citizens to prove they have the right to defend themselves.\(^9\)

These circuit courts ignore the implication of the Supreme Court’s analysis that the constitutional right of armed self-defense is broader than the right to simply have a gun in one’s home.\(^{10}\) In addition, these courts ignore that the Supreme Court has declared armed self-defense as the central component to Second Amendment rights.\(^{11}\) In spite of this, these courts have banned a large swath of law-abiding citizens from bearing arms in public, while not considering whether they could bear arms openly in their respective states.\(^{12}\) Although it was established in 1897 that a prohibition on carrying concealed weapons does not infringe upon Second Amendment rights, carrying arms was never considered a right that could be prohibited for the law-abiding.\(^{13}\)

Nonetheless, the judiciary in general has justified restricting access to firearms in order to “promote public safety and eliminate negative externalities.”\(^{14}\) The objective of the judiciary is to perform a balancing of individual liberties and negative externalities.\(^{15}\) However, when it comes to the bearing of arms by the law-abiding, the Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the people” that the court should not “conduct anew.”\(^{16}\) Therefore, outside of the “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places,”\(^{17}\) law-abiding citizens do not need a ‘why’ to bear arms because the Constitution gives them the right to “judicial toleration of the negative externalities”\(^{18}\) of bearing arms in public.

Below, this proposition and the thought process involved are further discussed. Part I describes the responsive dance the Supreme Court and Congress have performed since the 18\(^{th}\) century, cautiously shuffling through the issue of bearing arms. Part II further describes how the circuit courts, as of early 2018, have stepped into that dance and asserted their own paths toward new restrictions on bearing arms. Part III challenges

prove the general public had no such constitutional right although the cases both were ruled upon after \textit{Heller} and \textit{McDonald}).

\(^9\) \textit{Kachalsky}, 701 F.3d at 88; \textit{Drake}, 724 F.3d at 431.
\(^{10}\) \textit{See Moore}, 702 F.3d at 935.
\(^{11}\) \textit{See Heller}, 554 U.S. at 599.
\(^{12}\) \textit{Peruta}, 824 F.3d at 942.
\(^{13}\) \textit{U.S. v. Cruikshank}, 92 U.S. 542, 553, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875).
\(^{15}\) \textit{Id}. at 963.
\(^{16}\) \textit{Heller}, 554 U.S. at 635.
\(^{17}\) \textit{Id}. at 626–27.
\(^{18}\) Blackman \textit{supra} note 14, at 956.
those restrictions through an analysis of burden shifting and interest balancing. Part IV considers this author’s proposition for the Supreme Court’s next choreographed move toward judicial toleration. Finally, Part V concludes with practical implications with or without this movement in the law.

II. BACKGROUND OF BEARING ARMS

A. 18th & 19th Centuries

On December 15, 1791, Virginia was the last necessary state to ratify ten of the first twelve proposed amendments, consequently adding the Bill of Rights to the Constitution. The States did not ratify the first two proposals that aimed at protecting the principles of representation via reapportionment and controlling the compensation of representatives. This inaction framed the Bill of Rights to be solely focused on individual rights for the first nine amendments and states’ rights for the tenth. Therefore, the “collective rights” argument for the Second Amendment will not be addressed in this article. What will be addressed in Part I is that Congress and the Supreme Court have consistently held, from 1791 to 2018, that the right to bear arms can only be marginally regulated and not outright prohibited for law-abiding citizens.

Congress ratified the following text of the second amendment in 1791 and the text has never been altered. “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” It was not until 1856 when the Supreme Court embraced this right in the infamous case, Dredd Scott v. Sanford. There, the court declared the “privileges and immunities of citizens . . . give them the full liberty . . . to keep and carry arms wherever they went.” Soon after the Civil War, Congress spoke out on the right to bear arms for the first time since 1789 with the Freedman’s Bureau Act of

20 Id. at 530–31.
22 See U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990) (This article does not thoroughly address this issue, but this court declared that ‘the people’ protected by the Second Amendment are individuals, not states, which reinforced the ‘individual rights’ argument on Second Amendment issues.).
23 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
24 See 60 U.S. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1856) (superseded on other grounds (1868)).
25 Id. at 416–17.
1866. The law mirrored the Supreme Court’s findings from ten years before: “the right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security . . . including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to, and enjoyed by all citizens.”

Although Congress reached the same conclusion as the Supreme Court, the reasoning for the law could not have been farther apart. In 1856, the Supreme Court embraced the right to bear arms to keep non-citizens from obtaining it. In 1866, Congress embraced the right to bear arms because “the threat of this period was not a federal standing army, but state encroachment on basic civil rights, and the issue focused on private violence and local lapses in protection rather than federal tyranny.”

Law-abiding citizens needed their right to bear arms unobstructed through governmental regulations and Congress delivered protection of their right.

Within a decade, the Supreme Court further embraced the right to bear arms by holding it above the Constitution itself. In Cruikshank it declared, “[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.” As a side note, the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1872 boldly placed state civil rights enforcement out of the hands of the federal government, silently removing Fourteenth Amendment federal protections for the right to bear arms. This *dicta* pronouncement was overturned by McDonald in 2010. In 1886, the Court narrowed the right to exclude military drill-and-parade-under-arms outside of the control of the government. There, the Presser Court emphasized the difference between the right of the people to peaceably assemble and a mere assembly of people as a military company that drills and parades with arms, which is not a right. With this narrowing came a broad stroke of the Supreme Court’s power to deny any other restriction on the individual’s right to bear arms.

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27 *Id.*
29 Kealy, *supra* note 26, at 251.
30 See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 553.
31 *Id.*
33 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 791, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010) (“We therefore hold that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in *Heller.*”)
35 *Id.* at 266–67.
36 *Id.* at 265.
cannot, even laying the constitutional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general government.”

With the stroke of a pen, the Court informed law-abiding citizens that the right to parade with arms could only be granted by the government and its ruling was prohibiting no other use of arms. This was the beginning of ‘how’ one could bear arms.

In 1897, the Supreme Court plunged deep into our country’s English ancestry and expressed concern that the Bill of Rights could be interpreted as being a novel expression of new rights without exception. Seemingly off topic, the Robertson Court held that the Thirteenth Amendment was never intended to apply to the deserting seamen’s contracts within the conflict. In dicta, the Court announced that the Second Amendment also consisted of certain well-recognized exceptions as the Thirteenth. This unenumerated Second Amendment exception created by the Court was said to have been passed down from our English ancestors, who prohibited the carrying of concealed weapons. It read, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms (under article 2) is not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.” There, the Robertson Court halted the notion that the Bill of Rights was a blank check with which individual citizens could cash with full protection of his or her right. Other than the reference to English law, no further explanation for this exception can be found in Robertson. This lack of American precedent and weakness inherent in dicta pronouncements should make way for a 21st century Supreme Court to produce a different outcome. Since 1897, the ‘how’ of bearing arms lost its Second Amendment protections unless born openly, but that can change.

37 Id.
38 Id at 264–65.
40 Id. at 287–88.
41 Id. at 281–82. (As the Thirteenth Amendment does not prohibit all contracts that could be deemed to include involuntary servitude, neither does the Second Amendment prohibit all gun regulation such as laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons).
42 Id. at 281.
43 Id. at 281–82.
44 Id. at 281. (“The law is perfectly well settled that the first 10 amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as the ‘Bill of Rights,’ were not intended to lay down any novel principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which had, from time immemorial, been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions, arising from the necessities of the case.”).
45 Robertson, 165 U.S. at 275.
46 Id. at 281.
B. 20th & 21st Centuries

As the roaring twenties were well under way, Congress supported the Court’s restrictions on concealed weapons with the enactment of the Mailing Firearms Act (“MFA”) of 1927. The MFA “prohibited the mailing of concealable firearms through the United States Postal Service.” In the 1930s the question evolved from ‘how’ weapons could be born to ‘what’ weapons could be born. Congress introduced the National Firearms Act (“NFA”) in 1934, which “taxed the manufacture, sale, and transfer of short-barreled rifles and shotguns, machine guns, and silencers.” Then in 1938, the Federal Firearms Act (“FFA”) “spread a thin coat of regulation over all firearms and many classes of ammunition suitable for handguns.” The FFA went even further to hint at ‘who’ could possibly be restricted from bearing arms. “Licensees were prohibited from knowingly shipping a firearm in interstate commerce to some felons, a fugitive from justice, a person under indictment, or anyone required to have a license under the law of the seller’s state who did not have a license.” The Supreme Court ended the decade refocusing the law on ‘what’ arms could be born. There, the Miller Court held,

In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.

For the next generation, the Supreme Court and Congress would only be heard once, respectively, on this topic. Congress began this short conversation in 1941 with the Property Requisition Act (“PRA”). Although the PRA dealt with the federal government requisitioning private property, Congress used it to clarify that an individual right to bear arms would not be infringed due to this Act’s enforcement. The PRA

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48 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See Miller, 307 U.S. 174.
55 Id. at 178.
57 Id. at 599.
read, “Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed—(1) to authorize the requisitioning or require the registration of any firearms possessed by any individual . . . [or](2) to impair or infringe in any manner the right of any individual to keep and bear arms.” The Supreme Court only glimpsed at this topic when it dealt with cases challenging the FFA in 1943. There, the Tot Court held that a provision of the FFA which would prohibit the possession of firearms by those convicted of crimes of violence was unreasonable if the prohibition was due to the firearms traveling through interstate commerce. Tot rejected the presumption that, “mere possession tends strongly to indicate that acquisition must have been in an interstate transaction.” With Tot, Congress was informed that it had stretched its Commerce Clause powers too far. With that, the responsive dance between the Supreme Court and Congress ended and did not resume for the next twenty-five years.

The counter-culture movement of the 1960s reignited the Supreme Court and Congress’ interest in protecting individual rights. The Court acted first in 1966. There, the Katzenbach Court declared that Congress’ power granted by the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment “is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the [Fourteenth] Amendment; [section five] grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.” Although the Court’s move was not specifically targeted at the right to bear arms, when Congress considered passing gun control laws just two years later, it became the main issue. The Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) reads,

It is not the purpose of this title to place any undue or unnecessary Federal Restrictions or burdens on law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition, possession, or use of firearms appropriate to the purpose of hunting, trap shooting, target shooting, personal protection, or any other lawful activity, and that this title is not intended to discourage or eliminate the private ownership or use of firearms by law-abiding citizens.

Additionally, the GCA restricted the right for “minors, convicted felons, and persons who had been adjudicated as mental defectives or

58 Id.
60 Id. at 468.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Zimring, supra note, 51.
64 Id. at 148.
66 Id. at 651.
67 Kealy, supra note 26, at 282.
committed to mental institutions.”

The 1960s ended with the federal government making it clear ‘who’ ‘law-abiding citizens’ were and how citizenship alone earned a citizen’s right to bear arms without government discouragement.

The 1970s and 1980s kept with this mantra and emphasized that the right to bear arms was protected for the ‘law-abiding’. In 1972, an officer seized a gun from the waistband of a suspect. The officer “asked no questions; he made no investigation; he simply searched.” Critics at the time considered whether both the Second and Fourth Amendments were being watered down. There, the Williams Court held that if a police officer “has reason to believe that a suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search limited in scope to [his] protective purpose.” Williams allowed a police officer’s probable cause deduction that a suspect is not a ‘law-abiding’ citizen to temporarily restrict the suspect’s Second Amendment rights. Again, only if one is ‘law-abiding’ are Second Amendment protections safeguarded.

Soon thereafter, the Court embraced the GCA in two consecutive cases. First in 1976, the Barrett Court declared, “[the] very structure of the Gun Control Act demonstrates that Congress . . . sought broadly to keep firearms away from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous. These persons are comprehensively barred by the Act from acquiring firearms by any means.” Then in 1980, the Lewis Court declared, “Congress clearly intended that the defendant clear his status [of felon] before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress’ purpose, broadly to keep firearms away from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.”

Although the Supreme Court stamped the GCA with its approval with these rulings, Congress implemented the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986 (“FOPA”). FOPA was the congressional culminating statement that began in 1866, continued from 1941 to 1968,

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71 Id. at 155.
72 Id. at 151.
73 Id. at 146 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)).
75 Id. at 218.
78 Halbrook, supra note 56, at 636 (citing U. S. v. Breier, 827 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noonan, J., dissenting)).
and was best summarized in the 1985 Senate Judiciary Committee.\textsuperscript{79} There, the history, concept, and wording of the Second Amendment indicated that it was “an individual right of a private citizen to own and carry firearms in a peaceful manner.”\textsuperscript{80} The 1980s ended with a familiar mantra, the right to bear arms was protected for the ‘law-abiding’ or peaceful private citizen.

The 1990s found the Supreme Court and Congress in less of a dance with one another and more of a friendly sparring match on the right to bear arms issue. The first scuffle began after Congress created the Gun Free School Zones Act (“GFSZA”) of 1990.\textsuperscript{81} GFSZA read in part, “It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.”\textsuperscript{82} The Supreme Court responded to the GFSZA with \textit{United States v. Lopez} in 1995.\textsuperscript{83} Lopez confronted Congress’s Commerce Clause authority again when Congress attempted to qualify this criminal statute as an issue within “commerce.”\textsuperscript{84} This move was explained foundationally: “In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence, a double security arises to the rights of the people.”\textsuperscript{85} The right to bear arms was protected by the Founders’ insight into the separation of powers and ‘the people’ had not surrendered that right to Congress by way of the Commerce Clause.\textsuperscript{86}

The next scuffle of the 1990s occurred after Congress passed the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady Law”) of 1993.\textsuperscript{87} The Brady Law had two components: background checks for gun purchasers that were to be provided by state law enforcement and a waiting-period gun dealers had to honor before consummating the sales.\textsuperscript{88} The waiting-period issue never came before the court.\textsuperscript{89} Yet, in \textit{Printz v. United States}, the Supreme Court addressed the background check issue with the same separation of powers concerns addressed in \textit{Tot} and \textit{Lopez}.\textsuperscript{90}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Kealy, \textit{supra} note 26, at 283.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2).
  \item \textsuperscript{82} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Id. at 561.
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Id. at 576.
  \item \textsuperscript{86} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Id. at 903.
  \item \textsuperscript{89} Id. at 935.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} Id.
\end{itemize}
Court found that when the federal government conscripted state actors to enforce the Brady Act, it undermined the independent authority of the state and risked the degradation of the safeguards on individual liberty. The Acts of the 1990s were the first hints that Congress was starting to weigh the negative externalities of bearing arms whereas the Supreme Court simply refused to participate in such a balancing act.

It was not until 2008 that the Supreme Court forcefully documented its unwillingness to balance negative externalities of bearing arms with the enumerated constitutional right. In *Heller*, the District of Columbia banned handgun possession in the home. The Supreme Court declared, the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right. The handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of ‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.

The Court concluded by declaring that prohibiting a law-abiding citizen from protecting his or her home and family by bearing arms failed constitutional muster.

Although the Supreme Court has challenged congressional movement on the Second Amendment, Congress has never challenged the Supreme Court on the issue. As of 2018, Congress has not challenged the *Heller* case. To the contrary, Congress made a statement on bearing arms within the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“CARD”). As odd as that seems, this Act has a provision protecting the right to bear loaded arms in national parks. Thus, Congress’s last words on the subject fully embrace the Second Amendment’s core that, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

Not long after *Heller*, the Supreme Court followed up its ruling by hearing an Illinois case that claimed the *Heller* ruling did not apply to the States. As mentioned earlier, in the 1872 *Slaughterhouse Cases*, the Supreme Court placed State civil rights enforcement out of the hands of the federal government using the Privileges and Immunities Clause as its...
tool.\textsuperscript{101} In 2010, the McDonald Court sidestepped the Slaughterhouse Cases and declared that “[C]ruikshank, Presser, and Miller do not preclude us from considering whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right binding on the States.”\textsuperscript{102} McDonald further articulated that,

\begin{quote}
[un]der our precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental . . . then, unless \textit{stare decisis} counsels otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values.\textsuperscript{103}
\end{quote}

With these words, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the people” that must not be conducted anew.\textsuperscript{104}

The most recent case\textsuperscript{105} heard by the Supreme Court on the topic of bearing arms was Caetano v. Massachusetts in March of 2016.\textsuperscript{106} There, a woman defended herself with a stun gun and was arrested, tried, and convicted of possession of that stun gun.\textsuperscript{107} What makes this case more interesting than most is that the lower court used the losing \textit{Heller} arguments and then completely ignored the \textit{Heller} ruling.\textsuperscript{108} After dismissing all the arguments, the Caetano court provided the pertinent issue itself, “[w]hether stun guns are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes today.”\textsuperscript{109} This holding foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s future test for bearing arms going forward; whichever test is chosen, it will include the necessity of law-abiding citizens performing acts for lawful purposes.\textsuperscript{110} As the last words of the opinion attest, negative externalities balancing with enumerated constitutional rights is a fundamentally flawed method of protecting law-abiding citizens.\textsuperscript{111} “If the fundamental right of self-defense does not protect [Ms.] Caetano, then the safety of all Americans is left to the mercy of state

\textsuperscript{101} Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77–79. [To be completely honest, I’m not sure if “Slaughter-House Cases gets italicized here, so I’m going to ask my editor!] \textsuperscript{102} McDonald, 561 U.S. at 758. \textsuperscript{103} Id. at 784–85. \textsuperscript{104} Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. \textsuperscript{105} See U.S. v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1408 (2014) (Although not a Second Amendment case, Castleman’s conviction of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence was found by the Supreme Court to be enough to show that he was not a law-abiding citizen and, thus, forbid him from possessing firearms pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).). \textsuperscript{106} See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016). \textsuperscript{107} Id. at 1029. \textsuperscript{108} Id. at 1027–32. \textsuperscript{109} Id. at 1032. \textsuperscript{110} Id. \textsuperscript{111} Id. at 1033.
authorities who may be more concerned about disarming the people than about keeping them safe.”

C. Yesterday and Today

Part I of this article demonstrated the dance between the Supreme Court and Congress and in what manner those movements framed the who, what, where, and how of bearing arms. The ‘why,’ the necessity of arming for the bearer, is obviously missing. Even with longstanding prohibitions, which make certain activities outside the protection of the Second Amendment, Supreme Court decisions and congressional legislation focusing on the ‘why’ do not exist.

Part II will explore the sister circuits’ heated argument about the ‘why’ which has forced the issue of concealed carry to rise dramatically to the surface. The argument pits the circuits against each other and sometimes provokes panels to disagree within a circuit itself. Concealed carry is at the heart because citizens are being denied permits to carry weapons outside the home when open carry is not an option. However, open carry is not being adjudicated, only concealed. This is the reason the Supreme Court has denied hearing these cases. Until a case comes to the Court that takes on both manners of carrying weapons, certiorari will continue to be denied.

In the meantime, certain circuit courts are holding on to Robertson from 1897 with both hands. As you may recall, the Robertson court discussed in dicta that Second Amendment protections were not available for concealed carry. However, Robertson is without precedent since its ruling is based on English law. To demonstrate this lack of precedence issue, the Supreme Court held that constitutional issues, [n]must be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the context of the American constitutional scheme of government rather than the English parliamentary system. We should bear in mind that the English system differs from ours in that their Parliament is the supreme authority, not a coordinate branch.

Therefore, not only has the history of Supreme Court decisions and Congressional acts not supported adding a ‘why’ to the regulation of bearing arms, the one supposedly precedential case that supports prohibiting concealed carry has no legal foundation within the United States. Without even looking at the circuit courts, one would wonder how concealed carry for law-abiding citizens could be constructively banned.

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112 Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1033.
113 Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281–82.
114 Id.
III. CIRCUIT COURT DETOUR INTO THE ‘WHY’ OF BEARING ARMS

A. All Conflicting Circuits Agree, There is a Right to Bear Arms Outside the Home

In the last decade, right to bear arms arguments in the circuit courts have lost focus on militia dependence and collective rights largely due to *Heller* and *McDonald*. These landmark Supreme Court cases created new arguments for the judicially dissimilar sister circuit courts to distinguish themselves and further dilute the arguments made. Today, the hot topic among the circuit courts is whether the law-abiding have a constitutionally protected right to bear arms in public. Even with this contentious topic, all circuit courts that have ruled on this issue agree, “[t]he Second Amendment right to bear arms extends outside the home or have assumed that the right exists.” This article will focus on circuit decisions from each side of the debate: the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth circuits versus the Fourth, Seventh and District of Columbia circuits.

Initially, the Second Circuit declared, “[t]he Amendment must have some application in the very different context of the public possession of firearms.” The Third Circuit recognized “that the Second Amendment’s individual right to bear arms may have some application beyond the home.” The Fourth Circuit assumed, “[t]he *Heller* right exists outside the home . . . .” The Seventh Circuit explained, “To confine the right to be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of self-defense described in *Heller* and *McDonald*.” The Ninth Circuit determined that, “pursuant to *Heller* and *McDonald*, an individual’s right to self-defense extends outside the home and includes a right to bear arms in public in some manner.” Finally, the D.C. Circuit concluded “(longstanding exceptions aside) carrying beyond the home, even in populated areas, even without special need, falls within the Amendment’s coverage, indeed within its core.” As shown, the sister circuits agree that

118 Id. at 28.
119 *Peruta*, 824 F.3d at 947.
120 *Kachalsky*, 701 F.3d at 88.
121 *Drake*, 724 F.3d at 431.
122 *Woollard*, 712 F.3d at 876.
123 *Moore*, 702 F.3d at 937.
124 *Peruta*, 824 F.3d at 948.
the right to bear arms in public cannot be prohibited but they disagree on
what extent it can be regulated.

B. Circuit Courts Sidestepping the Supreme Court

The circuit splitting argument against concealed-carry permits
begins with 'why' law-abiding citizens need to possess a firearm in public.
The Second Circuit was the first to enter this side of the 'bearing arms in
public' debate in 2012 when it embraced a longstanding principle first
established in New York in 1913. In 1913, the “proper cause”
requirement for obtaining a concealed weapons license for bearing arms
in public was,

... it shall be lawful for any magistrate, upon proof before him that the
person applying therefor is of good moral character, and that proper cause
exists for the issuance thereof, to issue to such person a license to have and
carry concealed a pistol or revolver without regard to employment or place of
possessing such weapon.

The modern version of this law pinpoints ‘proper cause’ as, “a
special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general
community or of persons engaged in the same profession.” This
limiting standard allowed government authority to provide concealed
weapon licenses only to those with a “special need for self-protection.” The
1913 New York law was supported by the 1897 Supreme Court
Robertson dicta, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . is not
infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.”

In Kachalsky, the court acknowledged that Heller did not use a
means-end scrutiny test when it held that “the ‘core’ protection of the
Second Amendment is the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use
arms in defense of hearth and home.” Yet, the Kachalsky court ruled
that defense outside the home needs to meet an intermediate scrutiny test
where “the fit between the challenged regulation need only be substantial,
not perfect.” In order to withstand strict scrutiny, “[t]he law must
advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means
available.” To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a law “must be

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126 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 92.
127 1913 N.Y. Laws 608, at 1629.
128 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 92. (citing Klenosky v. N.Y City Police Dep’t, 75 A.D.2d 793, 793, 428 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1st Dep’t 1980).)
129 Id.
130 Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281–82.
131 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 92 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-635).
132 Id. at 97.
substantially related to an important governmental objective.”  

To withstand minimum scrutiny, “a statutory classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”

The Second Circuit choosing a standard of scrutiny was the first sidestep away from the specific *Heller* ruling. For *Heller* declined to determine what level of scrutiny should be used for bearing arms outside the home. In fact, the *Heller* test consisted of a two-part approach purposely omitting a level of scrutiny distinction. The first part of the *Heller* test determined whether the individual right to bear arms for self-defense was a protected Second Amendment activity. In the second part, the Court weighed the effect of the challenged gun laws on that activity to determine the extent of the burden. Nevertheless, *Kachalsky* circumvented the *Heller* analysis.

Next, the Third Circuit entered this side of the ‘bearing arms in public’ debate in 2013. Like the Second Circuit, it chose not to use the *Heller* test, but instead, used its own 2010 two-part test. The Third Circuit asked whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee... If it does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.

The challenged law here came from a 1924 New Jersey law, which “directed that no persons (other than those specifically exempted such as police officers and the like) shall carry [concealed] handguns except pursuant to permits issuable only on a showing of ‘need.’” In 2013, the *Drake* court embraced this law as its “longstanding,” “presumptively lawful” exception to the Second Amendment guarantee. Thus, allowing it to move onto its second test, that of evaluating the law under some form of means-end scrutiny.

*Drake* began this inquiry by sidestepping the Supreme Court and declaring that strict scrutiny should only be used when the challenged law

135 *Id.*
136 *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 592, 628.
138 *Id.; Heller*, 554 U.S. at 576–626.
139 Gonne\lla, *supra* note 135, at 137; *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626–35.
140 *Drake*, 724 F.3d 426.
141 *Id.* at 429 (citing *U.S. v. Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)).
142 *Drake*, 724 F.3d at 429.
143 *Id.* at 432.
144 *Id.* at 433–34.
145 *Id.* at 435.
burdens “the ‘core’ protection of self-defense in the home.” For self-defense outside of the home, the Third Circuit went directly to an intermediate scrutiny test and asked, “whether there is a ‘reasonable fit’ between this interest in safety and the means chosen by New Jersey to achieve it: the Handgun Permit Law and its ‘justifiable need’ standard.” Unlike the intermediate standard embraced by the Supreme Court, where a law must be “substantially related” to an important governmental objective the Drake court skirted around the Supreme Court and embraced an arguably lower standard of “a reasonable fit” with legislative intent. Thus, not only did the Third Circuit sidestep the Supreme Court by ignoring the Heller test, but it also adjusted the test for intermediate scrutiny.

Also in 2013, the Fourth Circuit repeated a two-part inquiry, similar to that relied upon by the Third Circuit, in order to evaluate the good-and-substantial-reason requirement of the Maryland law being challenged. There, the Woollard court held that “public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.” Woollard, in full agreement with Drake and Kachalsky, held that the Second Amendment right of the party applying for a concealed-carry permit was burdened by the good-and-substantial-reason requirement, but that burden was constitutionally permissible. This is but another consistent sidestep of the Supreme Court by the circuit courts. Finally in 2016, the Ninth Circuit disregarded the Heller two-part inquiry to fully embrace the Supreme Court’s 1897 holding in Robertson. The Peruta court established that Robertson and the history surrounding it were all that were necessary to declare that the Second Amendment does not protect the right of a member of the general public to carry concealed firearms in public. Peruta also brought to the surface the issue of open-carry. While addressing the dissent, Peruta acknowledged the dissent’s argument that combining California’s ban on open-carry and its “good cause” restrictions on concealed carry may violate the Second Amendment, “tantamount to complete bans on the Second Amendment right to bear arms outside the home for self-

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146 Id. at 436 (citing Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012)).
147 Id. at 437.
148 Drake, 724 F.3d at 437.
149 Id.
150 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875–77.
151 Id. at 882.
152 Id.
153 Peruta, 824 F.3d at 939.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 941–42.
Nevertheless, since an open-carry argument was not before the Peruta court, the notion of a probable complete ban was not addressed.\textsuperscript{157} Again, Heller is ignored by a circuit court and, as with all the petitioning cases above, the Court denied certiorari for Peruta.\textsuperscript{158} In his dissent of the denial, Justice Thomas stated that there is a “distressing trend” in the court that treats the Second Amendment as a “disfavored right” compared to the First and Fourth.\textsuperscript{159} This author suggests, as stated previously, the right case has not yet come before the Supreme Court that would allow it to take on open- and concealed-carry as a whole.

When evaluating these circuit court decisions, the argument requiring law-abiding citizens to provide ‘why’ they need to possess a firearm in public to earn the right to bear concealed firearms, condenses down to following nineteenth-century Supreme Court dicta or passing a test that balances individual rights with public safety. In contrast, sister circuits refuse to enter this “vast terra incognita” which the Supreme Court has chosen not to explore.\textsuperscript{160}

C. Circuit Courts Refusing to Enter Terra Incognita

The Fourth Circuit reappears on the opposite side of the ‘bearing arms in public’ debate. Before the Fourth Circuit chose to require a reason ‘why’ law-abiding citizens needed to carry a concealed weapon in Woollard, it ruled in Masciandaro that it would follow Heller and leave largely intact the right to “possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”\textsuperscript{161} The Masciandaro and Woollard courts did not share a single member of their judicial panels.\textsuperscript{162} Not surprisingly, while the Woollard court focused on the ‘why’, the Masciandaro court remained with the Supreme Court’s focus of ‘where’ law-abiding citizens are permitted to bear arms.\textsuperscript{163} Even in following the Supreme Court, the Masciandaro court struggled with the obscure nature of this “terra incognita.”\textsuperscript{164} Terra incognita has not been defined by the Supreme Court, but lower courts have described terra incognita as a place “where gossip

\begin{footnoteservice}
\textsuperscript{156} Id.
\textsuperscript{157} Id.
\textsuperscript{159} Id. at 1999.
\textsuperscript{160} Moore, 702 F.3d at 942; U.S. v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).
\textsuperscript{161} Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 474 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 591).
\textsuperscript{162} Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868; Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 458.
\textsuperscript{163} Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882; Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 471–73.
\textsuperscript{164} Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475.
\end{footnoteservice}
and guesswork abound”\textsuperscript{165} and as “blank areas which have no discernable details.”\textsuperscript{166} While \textit{Masciandaro} wrestled with this lack of clarity, it held that “self-defense has to take place wherever [a] person happens to be.”\textsuperscript{167} The Seventh Circuit followed this course just months later with a similar but expanded argument.\textsuperscript{168}

In 2012, \textit{Moore} began its analysis by boldly stating, “[a] right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.”\textsuperscript{169} The \textit{Moore} court reiterated that both \textit{Heller} and \textit{McDonald} were just about self-defense, and that a person is much more likely to need to be armed in a rough neighborhood rather than to have a loaded weapon under his or her mattress.\textsuperscript{170} The court evaluated multiple studies and their inconsistent conclusions led the court to find that “[i]f the mere possibility that allowing guns to be carried in public would increase the crime or death rates,” \textit{Heller} would have been decided differently.\textsuperscript{171} To build on \textit{Heller}’s longstanding prohibitions of “gun ownership by children, felons, illegal aliens, lunatics, and in sensitive places,” the \textit{Moore} court pointed to “a proper balance between the interest in self-defense and the dangers created by carrying guns in public is to limit the right to carry a gun to responsible persons.”\textsuperscript{172} Undoubtedly, the \textit{Moore} decision is the inverse of the \textit{Kachalsky} decision.\textsuperscript{173} In \textit{Moore}, laws prevent dangerous people from having handguns whereas in \textit{Kachalsky} laws prevent law-abiding citizens from having handguns without a justified need.\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Moore} declares that if there is to be a balancing test, even if \textit{Heller} says it is improper to make one,\textsuperscript{175} then the test should consist of measuring how public safety is balanced by responsible persons bearing arms in public.\textsuperscript{176}

In 2017, the District of Columbia Circuit Court became the last circuit court to touch on the ‘bearing arms in public’ debate and zealously followed \textit{Heller}.\textsuperscript{177} The \textit{Wrenn} court held that \textit{Heller} revealed “the Second Amendment erects some absolute barriers that no gun law may breach.”\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{165} Lynch v. Merrell-Nat’l Labs., Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 830 F.2d 1190, 1194 (1st Cir. 1987).
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Masciandaro}, 638 F.3d at 475.
\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Moore}, 702 F.3d 933.
\textsuperscript{169} Id. at 936.
\textsuperscript{170} Id. at 937.
\textsuperscript{171} Id. at 939.
\textsuperscript{172} Id. at 940.
\textsuperscript{173} Id. at 941; \textit{Kachalsky}, 701 F.3d at 97.
\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Moore}, 702 F.3d at 941; \textit{Kachalsky}, 701 F.3d at 97.
\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Heller}, 554 U.S. at 635.
\textsuperscript{176} \textit{See Moore}, 638 F.3d at 940.
\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Wrenn}, 864 F.3d at 650.
\textsuperscript{178} Id. at 664.
The gun law in question was a D.C. Code provision, which limited “licenses for the concealed carry of handguns to those showing a good reason to fear injury to [their] person or property or any other proper reason for carrying a pistol.” Wrenn discussed sister circuit rulings where “the circuits settling on a level of scrutiny to apply to good-reason laws explicitly declined to use Heller’s historical method to determine how rigorously the Amendment applies beyond the home.” In line with that discussion, the Wrenn court did not settle on a level of scrutiny because D.C.’s ‘good reason’ law was “analogous to the ‘total ban’ that the Supreme Court struck down in Heller without pausing to weigh its benefits.”

The Wrenn court viewed the good-reason law as leaving “each D.C. resident some remote chance of one day carrying in self-defense.” The court emphasized the notion that D.C. residents’ Second Amendment rights were being infringed by stressing, “[t]he Second Amendment doesn’t secure a right to have some chance at self-defense.” This amounted to a ban on carrying weapons in public, forcing the court to conclude “that (longstanding exceptions aside) carrying beyond the home, even in populated areas, even without special need, falls within the Amendment’s coverage, indeed within its core.” Thus, allowing the D.C. circuit to have the last word in the ongoing debate.

IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPANDING TO THE ‘WHY’

A. Shifting the Burden to the Law-Abiding

There are two necessary burdens of proof involved with the right to bear arms, that of the individual and that of the government. The first is an individual’s burden to prove whether he or she falls in the category of one of the types of people who have been historically prohibited from bearing arms, such as youth, felons, and the mentally ill. Once an individual proves he or she is a responsible (mature in age with acceptable mental health), law-abiding (non-felonious) citizen, further questions must be answered about what firearm was to be borne, where the firearm was to be borne, and how the firearm was to be borne. The courts

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179 Id. at 655 (internal quotation marks omitted).
180 Id. at 663.
181 Id. at 656.
182 Id. at 665.
183 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 665.
184 Id. at 664.
185 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; Zimring, supra note 51, at 140.
187 See discussion supra Part IB.
created these questions over time, and these questions make up the “longstanding prohibitions” to bearing arms formed by the courts that take away Second Amendment protection.\footnote{188See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.}

The individual’s burden to be ‘law-abiding’ is interlinked with the “foundation of the administration of our criminal law” that one has the “presumption of innocence” without obvious proof that one is not law-abiding.\footnote{189See Coffin v. U.S., 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).} The Supreme Court consistently holds the fundamental concept of the presumption of innocence and the equally fundamental principle that the government bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\footnote{190See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978).} This solid foundation supports the implication that once innocent, no further burden remains on the law-abiding citizen. Once an individual is removed from the list of people who have been historically prohibited from bearing arms, he or she is free to bear arms within the aforementioned limitations of what, where, and how.\footnote{191See discussion supra Part IB.}

Second, the government retains the burden to prove whether it has the authority to infringe upon an individual’s constitutional right to bear arms.\footnote{192Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.} At a very basic level, the Second Amendment declares that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed by Congress.\footnote{193U.S. CONST. amend. II.} Also in its basic form, the Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall deprive any person of liberty without due process of law.\footnote{194McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (holding “that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller,” meaning that the Second Amendment became enforceable against the states in the same manner as the federal government).} Both of these amendments place strict limits on the government, not the individual.\footnote{195U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.} In Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, there exists an additional limitation.\footnote{196Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 220 (1983).} There, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in Katzenbach, “Congress’[s] power under §5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; §5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”\footnote{197Kates, supra note 195, at 220; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (stating that Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article).} These amendments imply that the burden remains solely on the government to prove it has the authority to infringe upon a law-abiding citizen’s right to
bear arms. In general, this burden can be lessened by way of a means-end scrutiny test.

A means-end scrutiny test does not apply when the challenged law fits within Second Amendment guarantees due to the Supreme Court “declining to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions.” For example, the circuit courts dutifully follow Heller’s ruling that challenged laws which impose a burden on conduct falling within the scope of Second Amendment guarantees are unconstitutional. A burden cannot fall on the individual for conduct protected by the Second Amendment; therefore, the burden lies squarely with the government. However, conduct deemed to be not protected by Second Amendment guarantees, as described in Part II, have left room for lower courts to introduce means-end scrutiny tests on challenged laws. As of now, burdens are being shifted in the lower courts by using the intermediate scrutiny test where a law “must be substantially related to an important governmental objective.”

Whether it is Kachalsky’s “proper cause,” Drake’s “showing of need,” or Woollard’s “good and substantial reason” for why an individual should be permitted to exercise his or her rights, they all shift the burden. For example, in Kachalsky, the plaintiffs were denied a full-carry concealed-handgun license by one of the defendant licensing officers for failing to establish “proper cause”—a special need for self-protection. There, instead of the government carrying the burden of proving that an individual constitutes a threat before taking away a fundamental right, the individual maintains the burden to prove that he or she is being threatened in order to exercise a fundamental right. The fundamental right here, mirrors Heller’s “inherent right of self-defense.” This burden shift created by the lower courts gives greater weight to public safety than self-defense. Since the Supreme Court “elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible

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199 Id.
201 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634.
202 Drake, 724 F.3d at 430.
203 Id.
204 See discussion, supra Part IIB.
205 Id.
206 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97.
207 Drake, 724 F.3d at 449.
208 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882.
209 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 83–84.
210 See Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1033 (Alito, J., concurring).
211 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
212 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 83–84; Drake, 724 F.3d at 449; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882.
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home," this burden cannot be shifted in the home. Shifting the burden from the government to the individual outside the home has not been ruled upon by the Supreme Court, but the Court made it known that the inherent right of self-defense does not end at one’s front door.

B. Interest Balancing not to be Redone Anew

To settle this ‘bearing arms outside the home’ issue, an evaluation of interest balancing for bearing arms in public must be done. Remember, the Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the people” that the court should not “conduct for [the people] anew.” This phrase relates back to the consideration that “the people” of this country gave at the time of the ratification of the Constitution. Heller provided a clear illustration of lawful self-defense.

[T]he laws . . . punished the discharge (or loading) of guns with a small fine and forfeiture of the weapon (or in a few cases a very brief stay in the local jail), not with significant criminal penalties. They are akin to modern penalties for minor public-safety infractions like speeding or jaywalking. And although such public-safety laws may not contain exceptions for self-defense, it is inconceivable that the threat of a jaywalking ticket would deter someone from disregarding a “Do Not Walk” sign in order to flee an attacker, or that the government would enforce those laws under such circumstances. Likewise, we do not think that a law imposing a 5–shilling fine and forfeiture of the gun would have prevented a person in the founding era from using a gun to protect himself or his family from violence, or that if he did so the law would be enforced against him.

At the time of ratification, whether an individual needed to defend him or herself inside the home or out on the street, a law would not be enforced against him or her for lawful self-defense.

As a current example, the Supreme Court declared that it “would not apply an ‘interest-balancing’ approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie.” The reference draws a picture of an extremely dangerous activity performed by law-abiding, responsible people in which the government would not interfere. In this example, First Amendment rights are being exercised. Using the Moore ruling
in the Seventh Circuit, the court considered a similar example that dealt with the Second Amendment. Twenty-first century Illinois has no hostile Indians. But a Chicagoan is a good deal more likely to be attacked on a sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than in his apartment on the 35th floor of the Park Tower. A woman who is being stalked or has obtained a protective order against a violent ex-husband is more vulnerable to being attacked while walking to or from her home than when inside. She has a stronger self-defense claim to be allowed to carry a gun in public than the resident of a fancy apartment building (complete with doorman) has a claim to sleep with a loaded gun under her mattress. But Illinois wants to deny the former claim, while compelled by McDonald to honor the latter. That creates an arbitrary difference. To confine the right to be armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of self-defense described in Heller and McDonald.

With Judge Posner’s example above, it is apparent that he predicted the direction of the sister circuits. After Judge Posner authored the Moore opinion in 2012, the sister circuits followed by creating the very protective-order type restrictions that he presented in Moore. Nevertheless, his point is clear, it would be an arbitrary decision to restrict one type of self-defense and not another. Therefore, an interest-balancing approach that weighs public safety against self-defense of a responsible, law-abiding individual has already been done and should not be done “anew.”

V. JUDICIAL TOLERATION OF THE NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES

This article has established that public safety cannot undermine the inherent right of self-defense, which responsible and law-abiding individuals can exercise. However, plenty of negative externalities affect the right to bear arms that beg the question of whether all law-abiding citizens should bear arms. An incident involving police officers in New York who shot and killed a gunman on the street presents an instructive example of this question. During this confrontation, the police officers mistakenly shot nine bystanders. Although the officers were trained how to shoot, when to shoot, and when not to shoot, this horrible event

\[222\] See Moore, 702 F.3d at 933.
\[223\] Id. at 937.
\[224\] Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882; Drake, 724 F.3d at 449; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97; Moore, 702 F.3d at 937.
\[225\] Moore, 702 F.3d at 937.
\[226\] Id.
\[227\] Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
\[228\] Danielle Weatherby, Opening the “Snake Pit”: Arming Teachers in the War Against School Violence and the Government-Created Risk Doctrine, 48 CONN. L. REV. 119, 142 (2015).
\[229\] Id.
still occurred. Mistakes will be made by law-abiding citizens and that actuality does not diminish the fact that the Second Amendment right to bear arms does not depend on “casualty counts.”

Looking at the bigger picture, there are positive as well as negative externalities for bearing arms. The former focuses on “arms as a mechanism of self-defense that can ensure the safety of the gun-carrying individual”; the latter focuses on the “benefits to society as a whole.” The positive externalities of public and private deterrence of wrong doing are arguably not outweighed by the negative ones. The negative externalities of bearing arms in public include individuals fearing “being mistaken for criminals and shot, or caught in a cross-fire between people asserting a right to bear arms for self-defense.” Even within such a harsh reality, the Supreme Court has choreographed its legal moves away from these named negative-externalities. The Court declared that when you “[d]isarm a community . . . you rob them of the means of defending life. Take away their weapons of defense and you take away the inalienable right of defending liberty.” This is a constitutional view; a broader view that demands the judicial toleration of the negative externalities of bearing arms in public.

VI. CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

The journey between ratification and incorporation took over two-hundred years, but the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms for responsible, law-abiding individuals is now fully enforceable against state and federal governments. During those two-hundred-plus years, the Supreme Court and Congress consistently found that the right to bear arms was an individual right with few exceptions. The questionable exceptions focused on in this article are found in Robertson’s dicta and the circuit courts. Robertson states that a prohibition on carrying concealed weapons does not infringe Second Amendment rights. This dicta places concealed-carry outside the guarantees of the Second Amendment. As the Robertson case has shown to be without precedent and its dicta being a remnant from English law, the longstanding placement of concealed-carry as outside constitutional protections should be eliminated.

230 Id.
231 Moore, 702 F.3d at 939.
233 Id. at 295–96.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 296.
236 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 856.
237 Id. at 776.
The *Heller* and *McDonald* courts lend plenty of support to this proposition. Both courts find that constitutional protections are for law-abiding citizens performing lawful acts. The *Heller* court declared that the very enumeration of the right to bear arms removes from the branches of government the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon for the law-abiding.\(^{238}\) For both *Heller* and *McDonald*, responsible, law-abiding citizens have an inherent right to self-defense that is protected by the Second Amendment.\(^{239}\) Nevertheless, a handful of circuit courts are bringing forth the notion that the law-abiding must justify exactly ‘why’ they need to conceal carry.\(^{240}\) If looked upon with a First Amendment lens, these courts would be acknowledging that a citizen has freedom of speech but require that citizen to petition the government with a documented need to speak or it would be forbidden. As absurd as that sounds, circuit courts have made a similar argument for the Second Amendment since 2012.

These courts lean on the negative externalities of bearing arms to further their position. However, neither *Heller* nor *McDonald* put much, if any weight to the inconsistent studies that have neither confirmed nor denied if the negative externalities outweigh the positive externalities. With this, the Supreme Court has made it clear that a means-end scrutiny test is not appropriate for self-defense issues. The Court concluded that the right to bear arms by responsible citizens balances out the dangers created by carrying guns in public.\(^{241}\) In 2016, the Court followed up that conclusion with a warning, “[t]he lower court’s ill treatment of *Heller* cannot stand.”\(^{242}\) As of 2018, the Supreme Court has not acted on that warning or ruled specifically for reconstituting Second Amendment protections for the concealed bearing of arms in public. Nevertheless, the Court’s holdings throughout its history and its *dicta* in the past one-hundred plus years lead this author to believe that open-carry and concealed-carry will be held together as constitutionally protected under Second Amendment guarantees for responsible, law-abiding citizens in the near future.

Regardless of that prediction, today’s implications of requiring the law-abiding to have a special need for self-protection are many. First, in requiring the intent of the law-abiding before they are permitted to exercise constitutional rights is a slippery slope that slides into having no rights at

\(^{238}\) *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 634.

\(^{239}\) Id. at 628; *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 888.

\(^{240}\) See *Peruta*, 824 F.3d 919; *Woollard*, 712 F.3d 865; *Drake*, 724 F.3d 426; *Kachalsky*, 701 F.3d 81.

\(^{241}\) See *Moore*, 638 F.3d at 940.

\(^{242}\) *Caetano*, 136 S.Ct. at 1033.
all. Second, the government being permitted to evaluate rights requests based on a balancing of that right with need for public safety, is exactly what it sounds like, a request to a government to exercise rights instead of a right in which a government is limited in its ability to infringe rights.

Whether the burden of proof shifts from the government to the individual or a balancing test is being performed, Second Amendment rights continue to be infringed. Therefore, the obvious next move for the Supreme Court is to return concealed-carry back under the protection of the Second Amendment. This move will conclude the circuit courts’ venture into the terra incognita in which the law-abiding were forced to give a reason for ‘why’ they needed to defend themselves. This future Supreme Court ruling would conclusively declare that no balancing test will be used when deciding whether law-abiding citizens can endeavor into lawful activity. Then, judicial toleration of the negative externalities of bearing arms in public will bear constitutional fruit.