

**THE SQUARE PEG BETWEEN TWO ROUND
HOLES: WHY CALIFORNIA’S TRADITIONAL
RIGHT TO CONTROL TEST IS NOT RELEVANT
FOR ON-DEMAND WORKERS**

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I. INTRODUCTION.....	352
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION.....	354
A. Classifying Worker Status	354
a. Why Do Employers Misclassify?	354
b. Common Law Test.....	355
c. The “ABC” Test	356
d. The IRS Test.....	356
e. Economic Realities Test.....	358
B. A New Era of Employee Misclassification Cases	358
a. Shift to an “On Demand Economy”	358
b. A New Dilemma.....	360
c. California’s Employee Friendly Laws	360
d. The <i>Borello</i> Decision	361
e. The <i>Alexander</i> Decision	363
III. NEW BUSINESS MODEL, SAME OLD TEST	365
A. What is Control?: Disparities Between Alexander and Emerging On-Demand Cases.....	365

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B. Why Traditional Classifications Under Borello Do Not Work For Uber And Lyft.....	367
C. Creating a New Classification: A Hybrid Employee and Independent Contractor.....	369
IV. CONCLUSION.....	373

I. INTRODUCTION

“What’s in a name? that which we call a rose// By any other name would smell as sweet.”¹ The idea that a name is artificial and meaningless seems enchanting with respect to Romeo and Juliet’s star-crossed romance. However, in today’s complicated and evolving workforce, where courts face the difficult challenge of differentiating employees from independent contractors a name actually has particular force. While an employer may use one label for a worker, it is the job of the courts to look past the label and ensure a worker is properly classified. The classification of a worker as an employee or independent contractor has significance for both parties. If a worker is labeled as an employee, an employer must provide statutorily required income among other benefits. Therefore, an employer can avoid substantial costs by characterizing a worker as an independent contractor. Currently there is no standardized test that provides guidance to courts for distinguishing employees from independent contractors. Rather different agencies and jurisdictions use different tests. This variation leaves courts with the challenge of applying the different factors of varying tests to aspects of a business’s policies and procedures that will definitively classify a worker as an independent contractor or an employer.

Today we have emerging new business models in which classification of workers is critical to the success of the company’s model, yet classifying workers in these new models poses a challenge because of their non-traditional nature. California, a traditionally employee-friendly state, is considering the classification issue of two rising on-demand companies, Uber and Lyft. In March 2015, two district court judges in the Northern District of California denied summary judgment to both companies, leaving the question of whether drivers were employees or independent contractors to a jury.² Both courts applied the California right to control test for determining if a worker is an employee or independent

¹ WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, *ROMEO AND JULIET*, act 2, sc. 2.

² *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015); *O’Connor v. Uber Techs.*, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

contractor, which was developed in *S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Industrial Relations*.³

The Ninth Circuit is no stranger to shaking up the independent contractor business model. In 2014, it ruled in *Alexander v. FedEx*⁴ that FedEx drivers were employees, despite the fact that FedEx labeled them as independent contractors. *Alexander* also applied California's right to control test, and found that the underlying employment relationship between FedEx and its drivers was clear and unambiguous because of FedEx's control over its drivers' appearance, vehicles, work hours, and means of delivering packages.⁵ However, the Uber and Lyft business models, which attract workers based on the ability of the driver to achieve flexibility in schedule and productivity, do not provide such an obvious answer to the classification question. Up to this point, the *Borello* factors have been applied to an economic model vastly different from the quickly evolving on-demand economy.⁶ That means that, if a court were to use the same test that found FedEx drivers were employees and applied it to Uber and Lyft's relationship with its drivers, they may also be found to be employees. As an alternative, this Article considers the possibility that Uber and Lyft drivers fall into a new category of employment, one that has not been considered among the traditional work relationships. First, the Article lays out the different tests various branches of state and federal government use to classify workers. Next, the Article will focus on the Ninth Circuit's case law and outline the history of the employment misclassification test formed in *Borello* and applied in *Alexander*. Then, the Article will turn towards the employee misclassification cases in California involving Uber and Lyft. The Article will contrast the on-demand business models analyzed in these cases with FedEx's business model. Finally, the Article will propose a new classification of workers that will make room for emerging on-demand business models—the square peg between two round holes.

³ *S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Industrial Relations*, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).

⁴ *Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.*, 765 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2014).

⁵ *Id.* at 990.

⁶ *Cotter*, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081.

II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION

A. *Classifying Worker Status*

a. Why Do Employers Misclassify?

Under a traditional understanding of employment, employees were “individuals hired on a permanent or full-time basis or part-time basis with an understanding of continuous employment”⁷ and independent contractors were “individuals who lack[ed] a contract for long term employment and whose minimum hours may vary at random.”⁸ However, this traditional understanding has been complicated by the different factors and balancing tests used by different government agencies and states to determine if a worker is an independent contractor or an employee.⁹ The complications arising from the numerous tests cause some employers to misclassify their workers out of genuine error. However, many employers intentionally misclassify because of the financial benefits they gain from labeling workers as independent contractors.¹⁰ If an employer classifies a worker as an employee, federal and state laws require employers to pay that employee at least minimum wage and overtime; refrain from discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and other personal characteristics; maintain safe and healthy workplaces; contribute toward payroll taxes that go towards the employee’s unemployment insurance; provide Social Security, Disability Insurance and Medicare; provide workers’ compensation insurance; and, in many employers’ cases, provide healthcare.¹¹ The laws that afford protections to a worker classified as an employee place an expensive burden on the employer. By mislabeling and classifying workers as independent contractors, employers can avoid the expenses of having a traditional employee.

Another benefit employers receive from misclassifying workers as independent contractors is escaping vicarious liability. Under that theory, an employer is liable, for the negligent acts of its employee, as long as the

⁷ Karen R. Harned, Georgina M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, *Creating A Workable Legal Standard For Defining An Independent Contractor*, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 95 (2010).

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Id.* at 99.

¹⁰ Ruth Burdick, *Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional Factors of Entrepreneurial Independence and the Relative Dependence of Employees When Determining Independent Contractor Status Under Section 2(3)*, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75, 76 (1997).

¹¹ Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, *A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: “The Independent Worker”*, in THE HAMILTON PROJECT, 7 (2015).

acts were committed in the course and scope of the employment.¹² If an employer retains a worker as an independent contractor, however, the employer cannot be held responsible.¹³

b. Common Law Test

Under the common law, an agency test is used to determine whether an individual is classified as an employee or an independent contractor for purpose of figuring out when an employer is vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its agents.¹⁴ The Restatement (Second) of Agency, balances these factors to determine the type of relationship that exists:

- (1) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the work;
- (2) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
- (3) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
- (4) the skill required in the particular occupation;
- (5) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
- (6) the length of time for which the person is employed;
- (7) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
- (8) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
- (9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and
- (10) whether the principal is or is not in business.¹⁵

These factors are weighed and balanced against each other. It is not necessary that each factor is met, and the main focus of the test is whether an employer retains the right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.¹⁶

¹² *Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth*, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998).

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, *Rethinking the Worker Classification Test: Employees, Entrepreneurship, and Empowerment*, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 67, 76 (2013).

¹⁵ Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 (2)(a)–(j) (1958). *See also* *Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden*, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24.

¹⁶ *Cmt. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid*, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989).

c. The “ABC” Test

The “ABC” Test is used by many states to determine an employer’s obligation to pay unemployment taxes.¹⁷ Under this test, to be considered an independent contractor, a worker must meet three requirements: (a) the worker is free from control or direction in the performance of the work; (b) the work is done outside the usual course of the company’s business and is done off the premises of the business; and (c) the worker is customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business.¹⁸ This test is broad and results in most workers being classified as employees.¹⁹ It creates a presumption of employment, which makes it harder for employers to escape financial and legal obligations through intentional classification.²⁰

d. The IRS Test

The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) created a twenty-factor test to determine whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor for purposes of withholding taxes.²¹ An employer is responsible for withholding income taxes, withholding and paying Social Security and Medicare taxes, and paying unemployment taxes on wages to employees.²² Employers do not pay these taxes for independent contractors, which is another incentive to classify workers as such.²³ The IRS grouped the twenty-factors that determine the degree of control and independence an employer holds over a worker into three categories: (1) Behavioral: Does the company control or have the right to control what the worker does and how the worker does his or her job?;²⁴ (2) Financial: Are the business

¹⁷ Karen R. Harned, Georgina M. Kryda & Elizabeth A. Milito, *Creating A Workable Legal Standard For Defining An Independent Contractor*, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 93, 102 (2010).

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ *Id.*

²¹ *Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?*, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, <http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&Self-Employed/Independent-Contractor-Self-Employed-or-Employee> (last updated Apr. 18, 2017).

²² *Understanding Employment Taxes*, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, <https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/understanding-employment-taxes> (last updated Dec. 14, 2016).

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ *Behavioral Control*, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, <https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/behavioral-control> (last updated Oct. 4, 2016). (1) Instructions: If the employer directs where, when, or how work is done, the worker is likely an employee. This is similar to the right-of-control common law test; (2) Training: If the employer provides training so that the worker performs in a particular manner and with a particular result, the worker is likely an employee. This is especially true if the training is provided at regular intervals; (3) Order or sequence: If the employer requires the

aspects of the worker's job controlled by the payer?;²⁵ and (3) Type of Relationship: Are there written contracts or employee type benefits?²⁶ Will the relationship continue and is the work performed a key aspect of

worker to perform his tasks in a particular order or sequence, or retains the right to establish a particular order or sequence, the worker is likely an employee; (4) Assistance: If the employer hires, supervises, and pays assistants to aid the worker, the worker is likely an employee; (5) Furnishing of tools and materials: If the employer provides the supplies, materials, equipment, and other tools necessary to perform the work, the worker is an employee dependent on his employer; (6) Oral or written reports: If the employer requires the worker to submit reports at regular intervals, the worker is likely an employee; (7) Payment: If the employer pays the worker by salary or by hour, week, or month, the worker is likely an employee. If the worker is paid when he or she bills for services performed, or is paid on commission, the worker is likely an independent contractor; (8) Doing work on employer's premises: If the employer requires the worker to perform his/her services on the premises, where the employer can have control over the worker, the worker is likely an employee; (9) Set hours of work: If the employer requires the worker to perform a set number of work hours, sets the worker's schedule, or retains approval rights over the worker's schedule, the worker is likely an employee. If the employer does not approve the worker's schedule, the worker is likely an independent contractor.; (10) Full time required: If the employer requires the worker to work on a full-time basis, the worker is likely an employee.; (11) Working for more than one firm at a time: If the employer does not allow the worker to perform work for another firm so long as it is performing work for the employer's firm, the worker is likely an employee. However, a worker can be an employee of multiple firms at the same time. (12) Making services available to the public: If the employer does not allow the worker to perform his work for the public as a free service, the worker is likely an employee.

²⁵ *Financial Control*, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, <https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/financial-control> (last updated Oct. 4, 2016). (13) Significant monetary investment: If the worker must make a significant monetary investment in order to perform his services, he is independent of the employer and is not an employee. There is no set dollar limit that qualifies as a "significant investment"; it is determined on a case-by-case basis.; (14) Payment of business and/or traveling expenses: If the worker must expend money for business or business-related travel, and the employer pays these expenses, the worker is likely an employee. In this case, the employer generally has the ability to control the extent of the employee's business or travel expenses.; (15) Realization of profit or loss: If the worker does not have the opportunity to profit (or loss) from his work, he is an employee. The employer is in the capacity of receiving the money directly from the client and has the opportunity for profit or loss.

²⁶ *Type of Relationship*, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, <https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/type-of-relationship> (last updated Oct. 4, 2016). (16) Services rendered personally: If the worker must perform the work personally, and cannot delegate the tasks, he/she is an employee; (17) Integration: If the employer uses the worker as part of the course of normal business operations, the worker is likely an employee. In this case, the success of the business may be directly related to the success of the individual employee; (18) Continuing relationship: If the employer and the worker have a longstanding, continuing relationship, the worker is likely an employee. This includes work that is done at recurring intervals or services performed by a worker who is "on call."; (19) Right to discharge: If the employer may fire or dismiss the worker, the worker is likely an employee.; (20) Right to terminate: If the worker can terminate the work relationship and not be liable for completion of a particular job or service, the worker is likely an employee. If the worker remains liable for a job or service, he or she is an independent contractor.

the business?²⁷ The IRS asserts that no single factor is dispositive of classification, and that businesses must weigh all the factors in relation to the relationship.

e. Economic Realities Test

Courts use the economic reality test to determine coverage and compliance with the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.²⁸ The economic realities test, like the common law right to control test, takes into account the degree of control an employer has over his or her employee, but it also considers the degree to which the workers are economically dependent on the business.²⁹ Under the economic realities test, courts look at six factors:

(1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; (2) the worker's opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker's investment in the business; (4) the permanence of the working relationship; (5) the degree of skill required to perform the work; and (6) the extent to which the work is an integral part of the alleged employer's business.³⁰

Courts must look at the totality of the circumstances rather than one single factor.³¹

B. *A New Era of Employee Misclassification Cases*

a. Shift to an "On Demand Economy"

A few years ago, no one knew about Uber³² or Lyft³³ and few could imagine technology that would allow for-profit ride sharing in a stranger's

²⁷ *Pivateau*, *supra* note 14, at 88–89.

²⁸ *See* *Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor*, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).

²⁹ *See* *Baker v. Flint Eng'g & Constr. Co.*, 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998).

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ *See id.*

³² "Uber Technologies, Inc. provides a smartphone application that connects drivers with people who need a ride. The company's application enables users to arrange and schedule transportation and/or logistics services with third party providers. Uber Technologies services customers in North, Central, and South Americas, as well as Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Asia Pacific [T]he company was founded in 2009 and based in San Francisco, California." *Company Overview of Uber Technologies, Inc.*, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 19, 2017, 11:54 PM), <http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=144524848>.

³³ "Lyft Inc. helps commuters to share rides with friends, classmates, and coworkers going the same way. It helps organizations to establish private and social networks for ridesharing. The company focuses on college, university, and corporate communities [T]he company was founded in 2007 and is based in San Francisco, California. Lyft Inc. operates as a subsidiary of Enterprise Holdings, Inc." *Company Overview of Lyft Inc.*,

personal vehicle. Now, these platforms have become well-recognized businesses that connect sellers and buyers of fast and cheap transportation. Uber and Lyft's business models revolve around smart-phone apps that connect drivers offering rides to passengers who seek them.³⁴ Customers are able to pay through the app, rather than directly to the driver.³⁵ The passengers pay a mileage-based fee through credit cards that the companies keep on file.³⁶ Uber and Lyft take a percentage of the fee and give the rest to the drivers.³⁷ The passengers input their location and destination, and the app informs the customer when the driver has arrived.³⁸ The app shows customers the route the driver takes, the estimated time of arrival, and the identity of the driver.³⁹ After the transaction is complete, the passenger rates the driver.⁴⁰ Central to Uber and Lyft's business model is the classification of drivers as independent contractors, and itself as a technological platform to connect those drivers with passengers.

These types of business models have given rise to the "on demand economy," which is "the economic activity created by technology companies that fulfill consumer demand via the immediate provisioning of goods and services."⁴¹ The theory behind this business model is that access to goods and skills is more important than ownership of them.⁴² It is creating a marketplace for efficient exchange: an entire economy is being formed around the exchange of goods and services between individuals instead of directly from business to consumer.⁴³ "This new class of on-demand companies relies on a large freelance workforce instead of on a classic company workforce."⁴⁴ Companies in the on-demand economy hire workers to perform the services the companies offer. The on-demand economy is breaking down the traditional

BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 19, 2017, 11:54 PM), <http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=58995029>.

³⁴ Brishen Rogers, *The Social Costs of Uber*, 82 U CHI L REV DIALOGUE 85, 86 (2015).

³⁵ *Id.*

³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ *Id.*

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ Rogers, *supra* note 34, at 97.

⁴¹ Mike Jaconi, *The 'On-Demand Economy' Is Revolutionizing Consumer Behavior-Here's How*, BUSINESS INSIDER, (July 13, 2014, 4:52 PM), <http://www.businessinsider.com/the-on-demand-economy-2014-7>.

⁴² Danielle Sacks, *The Sharing Economy*, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 18 2011), <http://www.fastcompany.com/1747551/sharing-economy>.

⁴³ Irving Wladawasky-Berger, *The Continuing Evolution of the On-Demand Economy*, THE CIO REPORT (July 24, 2015 12:25 PM), <http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/07/24/the-continuing-evolution-of-the-on-demand-economy/>.

⁴⁴ *Id.*

employment structure in favor of jobs that are more flexible and temporary.

b. A New Dilemma

Recently, two separate decisions in California district courts involving wage and hour suits brought by drivers for Uber and Lyft, have shaken the independent contractor business model the ride-sharing companies rely on. Two judges denied Uber and Lyft's motion for summary judgment that would have classified the drivers as independent contractors, and instead established a rebuttable presumption that the drivers were employees because they performed services for the company's benefit.⁴⁵ Both judges found that material facts remain disputed, and in light of this, the on-demand car services will need to make their cases to the juries as to why their drivers should not be classified as employees under the California Labor Code.⁴⁶

In both cases, the courts relied on the right to control test adopted in the California Supreme Court case *S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations*.⁴⁷ In addition, both courts relied on a Ninth Circuit wage and hour case, *Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.*, in which FedEx drivers alleged that FedEx had misclassified its drivers as independent contractors, which entitled the drivers to unpaid wages and expenses.⁴⁸ The court found that the California FedEx drivers were misclassified as independent contractors under the California right to control test.⁴⁹ The *Alexander* decision seems to be a catalyst for lawsuits against emerging on-demand companies Uber and Lyft, which similarly rely on independent contractors for the success of their business. However, Uber and Lyft's relationships with their drivers are far more complicated and inconclusive than FedEx's relationship with its drivers.

c. California's Employee Friendly Laws

California law provides employees with many benefits and protections, while independent contractors are afforded almost none.⁵⁰

Employees are generally entitled to, among other things, minimum wage and overtime pay, meal and rest breaks, reimbursement for work-related expenses, workers' compensation, and employer

⁴⁵ See *O'Connor v. Uber Techs.*, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).

⁴⁸ 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014).

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ *Cotter*, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1074.

contributions to unemployment insurance. Employers are also required under California Unemployment Insurance Code to withhold and remit to the state their employees' state income tax payments.⁵¹

California provides employees with these protections to ensure that employers do not exploit employees due to the inequality in bargaining power.⁵² The California legislature does not provide the same protections to independent contractors because their independent status presumably affords them more bargaining power against companies.⁵³ Independent contractors can "take their services and equipment elsewhere when faced with unfair or arbitrary treatment, or unfavorable working conditions."⁵⁴ Further, they often are working for more than one company at a time, and, therefore, are not "dependent on a single employer in the same all-or-nothing fashion as traditional employees who tend to work on a full-time basis for an indefinite term."⁵⁵ Past decisions in California have demonstrated that the statutory provisions aimed at employees should be liberally construed in favor of protecting the employees and implementing the legislature's intent.⁵⁶

d. The *Borello* Decision

In *Borello*, the California Supreme Court examined whether agricultural laborers hired to harvest cucumbers under a written "share-farmer" agreement were independent contractors exempt from workers' compensation coverage under the California Labor Code.⁵⁷ The deputy labor commissioner issued a stop order against a grower for failure to secure worker's compensation coverage for laborers.⁵⁸ The grower argued that the workers were seasonal agricultural laborers that harvested cucumbers working under a share-farmer agreement, meaning they were tenant farmers who received a share of the profits.⁵⁹ Therefore, the grower argued that the farmers were only seasonal, temporary workers, and should be considered independent contractors.⁶⁰

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² *Id.*

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ *Id.* (internal quotations omitted).

⁵⁵ *Id.*

⁵⁶ *Cotter*, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1075.

⁵⁷ *S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep't of Industrial Relations*, 769 P.2d 399, 400 (Cal. 1989).

⁵⁸ *Id.* at 401.

⁵⁹ *Id.* at 402.

⁶⁰ *Id.*

Following the common law's vicarious liability tradition, the court held that, "[t]he principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired."⁶¹ The court noted that the factor of control is often inapplicable to a variety of employment relationships when applied in isolation.⁶² Therefore, the court concluded that, although the right to control the work details is the most important consideration, the court also "endorse[ed] several 'secondary' indicia of the nature of a service relationship."⁶³ The court identified the right to discharge at will without cause, as strong evidence in support of an employment relationship.⁶⁴ Further, the court identified additional factors, which are all interrelated elements to finding an employment relationship, rather than separate tests:

(1) whether the one performing the services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (2) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (3) The skill required in the particular occupation; (4) Whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (5) The length of time for which the services are to be performed; (6) The method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (7) Whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (8) Whether or not the parties believe they are creating employer-employee relationship.⁶⁵

Ultimately, the court held that the share-farmers were employees and were entitled to compensation coverage.⁶⁶ The grower argued that the share-farmers managed their own labor, shared in the profit or loss, performed a job that required specific skill and judgment, and signed an agreement in which they expressly agreed that the parties' relationship was principal-independent contractor.⁶⁷ However, the court found that the grower exercised "pervasive control over the operation as a whole."⁶⁸ The grower owned and cultivated the land for his own account, made the decision to grow cucumbers, supplied the materials and transportation, and

⁶¹ *Id.* at 404.

⁶² *Id.*

⁶³ *Borello*, 769 P.2d at 404.

⁶⁴ It should be noted that this factor is unique to California's right to control test.

⁶⁵ *Borello*, 769 P.2d at 404.

⁶⁶ *Id.* at 410.

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 407-10.

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 408.

controlled workers' documentation for production and payment.⁶⁹ The court held that, "[a] business entity may not avoid its statutory obligations by carving up its production process into minute steps, then asserting that it lacks control over the exact means by which one such step is performed by the responsible workers."⁷⁰ Under the test the court had adopted, the grower maintained all necessary control over the process.⁷¹

e. *The Alexander Decision*

The Ninth Circuit reversed a ruling by the Multidistrict Litigation Court, which granted summary judgment in favor of FedEx in a class action alleging that FedEx drivers in California were employees rather than independent contractors.⁷² Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the amount of control FedEx exhibited over its drivers weighed in favor of finding an employment relationship.⁷³ The court applied the right to control test adopted in *Borello*.⁷⁴ The Ninth Circuit found that "FedEx's policies and procedures unambiguously allow FedEx to exercise a great deal of control over the manner in which its drivers do their jobs."⁷⁵ FedEx maintained control through its detailed appearance requirements for the drivers and their vehicles.⁷⁶ FedEx also controlled the time its drivers can work by adjusting workloads so that they were forced to work nine and a half to eleven hours a day.⁷⁷ The court found that FedEx controlled how and when drivers delivered packages.⁷⁸ The court rejected the crux of FedEx's argument, that it only controls the results of the work and that there were details of the driver's work it did not control.⁷⁹ The court noted that having absolute control is not necessary for workers to be considered employees under the right to control test.⁸⁰

The Court found that the secondary factors of the right to control test did not sufficiently favor FedEx to permit it to classify its drivers as independent contractors.⁸¹ First, the right to terminate at will is strong evidence of employee status.⁸² Further, there were factors that weighed in

⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰ *Id.* at 404 (internal quotations omitted).

⁷¹ *Borello*, 769 P.2d at 401.

⁷² *Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys.*, 765 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 2014).

⁷³ *Id.* at 997.

⁷⁴ *Borello*, 769 P.2d at 404.

⁷⁵ *Alexander*, 765 F.3d at 990.

⁷⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁷ *Id.*

⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁹ *Id.*

⁸⁰ *Id.*

⁸¹ *Alexander*, 765 F.3d at 994.

⁸² *Id.*

FedEx's favor such as their operating agreement that contained an arbitration clause,⁸³ and the provisions pertaining to tools and equipment.⁸⁴ However, the court found that, even though plaintiffs provided their own trucks and were not required to obtain equipment from FedEx, the majority of the drivers did so.⁸⁵ The final factor that favored FedEx was the parties' agreement that they were creating an independent contractor relationship.⁸⁶ The operating agreement identified the relationship as an independent contractor; however the court found that this factor was not dispositive or controlling if, as a matter of law, a different type of employment relationship exists.⁸⁷ "What matters is what the contract, in actual effect, allows or requires."⁸⁸ After examining FedEx's policies and procedures, the court concluded that the drivers were employees, rather than independent contractors.⁸⁹

In this holding, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the "entrepreneurial test" that had been adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit for classifying employment status.⁹⁰ Under the entrepreneurial test, the emphasis is shifted away from control, and the primary factor is whether the worker has significant opportunity for gain or loss.⁹¹ FedEx relied on the D.C. Circuit decision to argue that the drivers had the opportunity under the operating agreement to delegate to other drivers, take on additional routes, or sell routes to third parties.⁹² However, the court held that these entrepreneurial opportunities that FedEx provides drivers are limited because FedEx ultimately has final control, for example, FedEx may refuse to let a driver take on additional routes or sell his route.⁹³ The court held that, regardless, the entrepreneurial test had no application to the case: "There is no indication that California has replaced its longstanding right-to-control test with the new entrepreneurial-opportunities test developed by the D.C. Circuit."⁹⁴

⁸³ *Id.*

⁸⁴ *Id.* at 995.

⁸⁵ *Id.*

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 996.

⁸⁷ *Alexander*, 765 F.3d at 996.

⁸⁸ *Id.* at 989.

⁸⁹ *Id.* at 997.

⁹⁰ *Id.* at 993–94.

⁹¹ *FedEx Home Delivery v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.*, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

⁹² *Alexander*, 765 F.3d at 994.

⁹³ *Id.*

⁹⁴ *Id.* at 993.

III. NEW BUSINESS MODEL, SAME OLD TEST

The California right to control test, when applied to the facts in *Alexander*, led the court to the conclusion that the workers were employees. Though FedEx contracted with the drivers as independent contractors, most aspects of FedEx's relationship with its drivers looked like a traditional employer/employee relationship.⁹⁵ However, worker relationships in emerging business models, such as Uber and Lyft, do not neatly fit into the traditional independent contractor-employee dichotomy. The *Borello* test has consistently been applied to result in either independent contractor or employee status. In *Cotter* and *O'Connor*, both judges recognize a new, unclassified relationship between worker and company.

A. What is Control?: Disparities Between Alexander and Emerging On-Demand Cases

The court in *Cotter* examined whether Lyft drivers should be considered employees or independent contractors under California law.⁹⁶ The court denied cross-motions for summary judgment, and found that the issue presented a mixed question of law and fact that should be resolved by a jury.⁹⁷ The court in *O'Connor* reviewed a similar matter involving the classification of Uber drivers.⁹⁸ The court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, leaving a jury to resolve the matter.⁹⁹ In *Alexander*, even though FedEx cloaked its drivers as independent contractors, the Ninth Circuit found that FedEx drivers were employees as a matter of law because "the arrow pointed so strongly in the direction of one status or another that no reasonable juror could have pointed the arrow in an opposite direction after applying California's multi-factor test."¹⁰⁰ The courts in both ride-share cases acknowledged that the *Borello* right to control test does not produce such a conclusive result when applied to Uber and Lyft drivers. The court in *O'Connor* noted that "numerous factors point in opposing directions."¹⁰¹ The court in *Cotter* recognized that "[a]t first glance, Lyft drivers don't seem much like employees But Lyft drivers don't seem much like independent contractors either."¹⁰²

⁹⁵ *Id.* at 997.

⁹⁶ *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

⁹⁷ *Id.*

⁹⁸ *O'Connor v. Uber Techs.*, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

⁹⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰⁰ *Cotter*, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1078.

¹⁰¹ *O'Connor*, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153.

¹⁰² *Cotter*, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069 (alteration in original).

In *Cotter*, the parties disagreed about the amount of control Lyft exercises over its drivers. The court acknowledged that Lyft maintains a good deal of control over how drivers proceed after they accept ride requests.¹⁰³ Lyft provides a driver with instructions on what not to do on the job.¹⁰⁴ Also, Lyft reserves the right to penalize or terminate drivers who violate company policy.¹⁰⁵ Lyft maintains quality control over its drivers through a rating system, and any driver who falls below a certain threshold is subject to termination.¹⁰⁶ However, the court also recognized that the Lyft drivers “enjoy great flexibility in when and how often to work—far more flexibility than the typical employee.”¹⁰⁷ The court noted that there was no overwhelming evidence of an employment relationship, as in *Alexander*.¹⁰⁸ The court further pointed out, “[t]he experience of the Lyft driver is much different from the experience of the FedEx driver, underscoring why the plaintiffs have not established here that summary judgment should be granted in their favor.”¹⁰⁹

In *O’Connor*, the court recognized that many factors of control were disputed and ambiguous in Uber’s relationship with its drivers.¹¹⁰ First, the court pointed out that there was a dispute over whether a driver can be terminated at will.¹¹¹ Plaintiffs claimed that Uber might fire drivers at any time for any reason, which would be strong evidence of an employment relationship.¹¹² However, Uber pointed out that before it terminates drivers it must give notice or there must be a material breach in the driver agreement.¹¹³ Uber uses a customer rating system as a form of quality control, similar to the rating system Lyft uses.¹¹⁴ The court pointed to evidence that, if a driver’s star rating falls below the minimum star rating, Uber terminates the driver.¹¹⁵ The court noted that the customer rating system is a form of control used by Uber to “constantly monitor certain aspects of a driver’s behavior,” and that a jury could find it weighs in favor of finding an employment relationship.¹¹⁶ The court noted that the fact that Uber has no control over its drivers’ hours and when they report for

¹⁰³ *Id.* at 1078.

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*

¹⁰⁵ *Id.* at 1079.

¹⁰⁶ *Id.* at 1071.

¹⁰⁷ *Id.* at 1081.

¹⁰⁸ *Cotter*, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081.

¹⁰⁹ *Id.*

¹¹⁰ *O’Connor v. Uber Techs.*, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

¹¹¹ *Id.* at 1149.

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ *Id.*

¹¹⁴ *Id.* at 1151.

¹¹⁵ *Id.*

¹¹⁶ *O’Connor*, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1151.

work significantly weighs in favor of independent contractor status.¹¹⁷ However, the court pointed out that “[t]he more relevant inquiry is how much control Uber has over their drivers while they are on duty for Uber.”¹¹⁸ The court in *O’Connor* noted that there were many factors of the *Borello* test that pointed in different directions, including those involving Uber’s level of control over the manner and means of performance.¹¹⁹

B. Why Traditional Classifications Under Borello Do Not Work For Uber And Lyft

The courts in *O’Connor* and *Cotter* were faced with the task of applying traditional common law principles encompassed in the *Borello* right to control test, to technological platforms that operate from a smartphone. The independent contractor model of the emerging on-demand companies becomes the “Wild West”¹²⁰ of classification: “The test the California courts have developed over the 20th Century for classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century problem. Some factors point in one direction, some point in the other, and some are ambiguous.”¹²¹ It is true that the factors of the *Borello* test can sometimes produce different outcomes even when applied to many old economy jobs, depending on how a court interprets the facts of the case or weighs a specific factor. However, the business models of Uber and Lyft do not look anything like old economy jobs. From an economic and societal perspective, the technology Uber and Lyft provide creates exciting and new opportunities for workers. It seems critical to tread through the legal uncertainty and define the employment relationship between Uber/Lyft and the driver to protect drivers from employer exploitation.

The core test of an employment relationship under the *Borello* test is “whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.”¹²² The court in *O’Connor* recognized that the *Borello* test “evolved under an economic model very different from the new sharing economy.”¹²³ Companies employed workers to provide services for the companies’ own benefit.

¹¹⁷ *Id.* at 1152.

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

¹¹⁹ *Id.* at 1153.

¹²⁰ Daniel H. Handman and Derek Ishikawa, *Welcome To The ‘Wild West’ Of Calif. Class Actions, Uber*, LAW 360 (Sep. 4, 2015, 11:52 AM), <https://www.law360.com/articles/699160/welcome-to-the-wild-west-of-calif-class-actions-uber>.

¹²¹ *Cotter v. Lyft, Inc.*, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2015).

¹²² *S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Industrial Relations*, 769 P.2d 399, 400 (Cal. 1989).

¹²³ *O’Connor*, 82. F. Supp. 3d at 1153 (internal quotations omitted).

There was a traditional and more direct connection between the worker and the business. Whether an individual was an independent contractor or employee depended on how much control that business had over that worker. However, the Uber and Lyft business models diverge from the traditional forms of employment and present challenges to the application of the *Borello* test.

The relationships Uber and Lyft maintain with drivers do not neatly result in classification under the *Borello* test. Like an independent contractor, drivers are given freedom to work for different employers; they are not economically dependent on the ride-share services for their main source of income. The drivers have flexibility in their work hours and where they work.¹²⁴ The drivers use their own cars for each ride.¹²⁵ Drivers also control acceptance of rides, and therefore are in control of their own opportunity for profit or loss.¹²⁶ Contrastingly, like traditional employees, the drivers are integral to the companies' businesses. Uber and Lyft maintain control over pricing of rides and payment.¹²⁷ They maintain control through rating systems.¹²⁸ However, the form of control the courts in both cases focused heavily on was that the rating system differs from the control that exists in a traditional business model of a company, such as FedEx. The drivers in the Uber case argued that it is different because it does not seek to control every aspect of the worker's performance.¹²⁹ Looking at the differences between the two business models, the rating system in Uber and Lyft could be viewed as a form of quality control based on customer feedback. Uber and Lyft seek to continue or discontinue the engagement based on whether customers are satisfied. The on-demand companies rely on customer feedback to ensure quality performance. Under this system, the individuals receiving the service—those being transported—have the ability to rate and provide feedback. Once Uber or Lyft receive this feedback, the company responds accordingly to maintain quality control over its business, without controlling the workers' performance in a traditional sense.

Uber and Lyft provide workers flexibility and freedom in some important aspects of the work relationship yet maintain control in others. This relationship falls into a gray area of employment classification.

¹²⁴ *Id.* at 1149.

¹²⁵ *Cotter*, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1070.

¹²⁶ *Id.*

¹²⁷ *O'Connor*, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142.

¹²⁸ *Cotter*, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1071.

¹²⁹ *O'Connor*, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1151.

C. Creating a New Classification: A Hybrid Employee and Independent Contractor

The court in *Cotter* correctly stated that “the jury in this case will be handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round holes.”¹³⁰ Nearly all workers in the United States fall into one of two categories: employee or independent contractor. However, these categories seem outdated and ill fit with the technological age of on-demand businesses run through apps. In these businesses, where workers seem to cross the border of independent contractor and employee, a third category seems necessary. For example, courts and labor and employment statutes in Canada and Germany recognize an intermediate class, called the “dependent contractor.”¹³¹ This relationship forms when a contractor has formed an exclusive relationship¹³² over a period of time with one client, and the client therefore becomes economically dependent on the relationship.¹³³ While this new worker status that has developed demonstrates the workability of new categories of work relationships, it does not precisely illustrate the flexible relationships of the on-demand economy. Society is still in need of a category that encompasses employees who make a living working for different companies throughout their careers, and sometimes working those jobs simultaneously.¹³⁴

Seth Harris, a professor at Cornell University, and Alan Krueger a professor at Princeton University, have proposed legal reform that could provide a possible solution to the ambiguous classification of Uber and Lyft drivers.¹³⁵ Harris and Krueger propose a new classification of workers, called the independent workers, who “occupy the gray area between [traditional] employees and independent contractors.”¹³⁶ In an effort to define this new class, Harris and Krueger suggest ideas of what protections and benefits these new workers would be provided. First, Harris and Krueger argue that independent workers should be given the freedom to organize and collectively bargain.¹³⁷ They contend that these workers should have the ability to bargain over the equivalent of wages,

¹³⁰ *Cotter*, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081.

¹³¹ Benjamin Sachs, *A New Category of Worker for the On-Demand Economy?*, ON LABOR (June 22, 2015) <http://onlabor.org/2015/06/22/a-new-category-of-worker-for-the-on-demand-economy/>.

¹³² Note that 80% is the equivalent of exclusive for Canada.

¹³³ Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, *A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: “The Independent Worker”*, in THE HAMILTON PROJECT, 7 (2015).

¹³⁴ *Id.*

¹³⁵ *Id.* at 5.

¹³⁶ *Id.*

¹³⁷ *Id.* at 15.

hours, and the terms and conditions of their contractual relationships.¹³⁸ Harris and Krueger point out that the main challenge to independent workers organizing is the federal anti-trust laws.¹³⁹ They suggest an independent workers' exemption to anti-trust laws, which would allow the workers to have a voice and some ability to influence their relationship.¹⁴⁰

Harris and Krueger also advance that independent workers should be included within the protections of federal anti-discrimination statutes.¹⁴¹ Providing independent workers with protections against discrimination could encourage better policy enforcement by Uber and Lyft against racial and sexual discrimination.¹⁴² Uber would have to administer a new policy that not only takes into account the rating system of customers, who may discriminate against drivers, causing driver terminations, but possibly also co-worker perception.

Harris and Krueger also suggest allowing intermediary companies, such as Uber and Lyft, to opt-in to workers' compensation without transforming the relationship into employment.¹⁴³ However, Uber and Lyft might be better off including workers' compensation into their business model. Drivers would have a reasonably predictable compensation for work related injuries, and Uber¹⁴⁴ and Lyft¹⁴⁵ could avoid costly lawsuits.

These changes suggested by Harris and Krueger would help to protect every Uber and Lyft driver; however, other protections they

¹³⁸ *Id.*

¹³⁹ Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, *A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: "The Independent Worker"*, in THE HAMILTON PROJECT, 16 (2015).

¹⁴⁰ *Id.*

¹⁴¹ *Id.* at 17.

¹⁴² *Id.*

¹⁴³ *Id.* at 19.

¹⁴⁴ Note that Uber already provides drivers with car insurance. While drivers are on a trip, Uber covers, "\$1 million of liability coverage per incident. Uber holds a commercial insurance policy with \$1 million of coverage per incident. Drivers' liability to third parties is covered from the moment a driver accepts a trip to its conclusion. This policy is expressly primary to any personal auto coverage (However it will not take precedence over any commercial auto insurance for the vehicle). We have provided a \$1 million liability policy since commencing ridesharing in early 2013." See *Insurance for UberX With Ridesharing*, UBER, <https://newsroom.uber.com/insurance-for-uberx-with-ridesharing/>.

¹⁴⁵ It should be noted that Lyft also already provides drivers with car insurance that varies depending on whether the driver is using the vehicle for personal use, using the app, or driving a passenger. Under Lyft, "the primary liability insurance is designed to act as the primary coverage during the period from the time you accept a ride request until the time the ride has ended in the app. The policy has a \$1,000,000 per accident limit. Note: If you already carry commercial insurance (or personal coverage providing specific coverage for ridesharing), Lyft's policy will continue to be excess to your insurance coverage." See *Insurance Policy*, LYFT, <https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213584308-Insurance-Policy>.

address may be better aimed at drivers who work for the company in a more full-time capacity. For example, Harris and Krueger assert that independent workers should not be eligible for wage and hour protections, such as minimum wage, because it is too hard to measure the hours of a flexible, independent worker compared to a traditional employee.¹⁴⁶ While it is true that Uber and Lyft drivers work flexible and somewhat unpredictable hours, every hour they work is clocked in and out through the app. A better solution might be for Uber to pay minimum wage to drivers who work over thirty hours per week. Uber pays drivers on a weekly basis and uses the app to create a payment summary that shows the breakdown of all rides. It would be easy to calculate hours and pay drivers minimum wage just by requiring drivers to hit a thirty hour or more limit, and then referring to the app to see when that driver worked.

Another option might be to allow customers to tip Uber and Lyft drivers.¹⁴⁷ The U.S. Department of Labor does not require employers to pay minimum wage to a worker if the amount paid plus tips received equals at least the federal minimum wage.¹⁴⁸ Currently, Uber's website states that, "tips are not included in the fare, nor are they expected or required."¹⁴⁹ Lyft's website provides instructions of how to tip a driver, but the reputation surrounding these platforms is that once the ride is over, the fare automatically charged is the final cost.¹⁵⁰ If both Uber and Lyft promoted tipping drivers, this may change how riders view the experience. Then, Uber and Lyft could avoid paying full minimum wage to drivers who make it in tips and only make up the difference to those who do not.

Similarly, health insurance could be distributed to drivers who reach the thirty-hour requirement. However, this presents a problem with

¹⁴⁶ Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, *A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: "The Independent Worker"*, in THE HAMILTON PROJECT, 20 (2015).

¹⁴⁷ See Samuel Estreicher & Jonathan Remy Nash, *The Case for Tipping and Unrestricted Tip-Pooling*, (NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-05; NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 16-07.), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2725699> (there has been dispute about the social value of tipping. Some restaurant owners are moving to eliminate tipping and raise prices instead, arguing that laws against splitting tips with back of the house employees prevent employers from equally compensating. However, others have noted that tipping is a form of quality control, noting customer satisfaction and encouraging improvement in job performance and employee cooperation).

¹⁴⁸ *What is the minimum wage for workers who receive tips?*, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, <http://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/faq/esa/flsa/002.htm>. (last visited May 19, 2017).

¹⁴⁹ *Can I Tip My Driver With The App?*, HELP.UBER.COM, <https://help.uber.com/h/8459a496-5ed2-4f9d-b15c-d8afd9ccf34f>. (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).

¹⁵⁰ *How to Tip Your Driver*, HELP.LYFT.COM, <https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-us/articles/213583978-How-to-Tip-Your-Driver>. (last visited May 19, 2017).

maintaining neutrality of independent workers between the employer/independent contractor classifications. Under the Affordable Care Act, employers must provide health insurance to employees who work thirty hours or more.¹⁵¹ Instead, Harris and Krueger propose that intermediary companies pay a contribution equal to five percent out of independent workers' earnings to go towards health insurance tax subsidies.¹⁵²

A new classification for the on-demand workforce could clear up ambiguities for courts that have previously attempted to pigeonhole these workers into the employee/independent contractor category. However, it is a lengthy conversation and one that would take years before implementation. The courts cannot create this new category of workers on their own, and, therefore, it will be left to the legislatures to provide a workable solution. In the meantime, the ongoing lawsuits within the Ninth Circuit probably will not force Uber and Lyft to change their business models. Uber and Lyft are entirely constructed around their flexible drivers and independent contractor model. The cases, as of now, are limited to California drivers. These drivers are up against multi-million dollar companies, so any damages they win will matter little in the general scheme of things.¹⁵³ However, if the lawsuits spread, both on-demand companies and the legislature will need to consider a new solution to fit the needs of a changing economy.

Uber and Lyft could potentially change their business models to make the drivers employees. However, if the drivers were to become employees they may lose the flexibility that attracts many of them to the ride-share companies in the first place.¹⁵⁴ As it stands, Uber and Lyft drivers have control over when and how often they work. They are free to work other full-time jobs and still drive for Uber whenever the opportunity arises.¹⁵⁵ As employees, the employer would control their schedules.¹⁵⁶ The convenience that results to the driver from freedom to drive whenever and however they like would be lost.¹⁵⁷ Drivers who treat the job as a full-

¹⁵¹ E.g., Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, *A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for Twenty-First-Century Work: "The Independent Worker"*, in THE HAMILTON PROJECT, 7, 20 (2015).

¹⁵² *Id.*

¹⁵³ Tyler Durden, *Battle of the Unicorns: Uber Says Lyft Is Worth Only \$2 Billion, One Third Of Its Latest Valuation Round*, ZEROHEDGE (Aug. 21, 2016, 12:50PM), <http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-08-21/uber-says-lyft-worth-only-2-billion-one-third-its-latest-55-billion-valuation-round>.

¹⁵⁴ Benjamin Means and Joseph A. Seiner, *Navigating The Uber Economy*, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).

¹⁵⁵ *Id.*

¹⁵⁶ *Id.*

¹⁵⁷ *Id.*

time job would benefit from this, but the many other drivers who do not would suffer.¹⁵⁸ Uber would likely compensate for rising labor costs by taking a larger cut in fares and decreasing its workforce.¹⁵⁹ As we address possible solutions to the on-demand dichotomy and ways to better protect worker interests, we must keep in mind that many workers are interested in preserving the flexibility and freedom that first attracted them to Uber and Lyft.

IV. CONCLUSION

The recent Uber and Lyft cases provide insight into the outdated employment classification test in California in light of the changing economy. However, on a broader scale it raises issues about what benefits and protections workers are entitled to when they are not an employee or independent contractor, but something in between. Ultimately, creating a new category of workers could strengthen the on-demand workforce and clear ambiguity among courts that have wrestled with these employment relationships.

¹⁵⁸ James Surowiecki, *Gigs With Benefits*, THE NEW YORKER, July 2015, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/06/gigs-with-benefits>.

¹⁵⁹ *Id.*