THE ROGER GOODELL STANDARD: IS COMMISSIONER AUTHORITY GOOD FOR SPORTS?

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I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 192
II. THE POWERS THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE NFL, MLB, NBA, AND NHL ................................................................. 194
   A. The MLB Commissioner’s Authority .............................. 194
   B. The NHL Commissioner’s Authority .............................. 196
   C. The NBA Commissioner’s Authority .............................. 198
   D. The NFL Commissioner’s Authority .............................. 200
   E. The Ubiquity of “The Best Interest of the League” Clause ......................................................................................... 201
III. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF COMMISSIONER DISCIPLINE ILLUSTRATED BY DEFLATEGATE ................ 202
    A. Deflategate: Before the Courts ........................................ 203
    B. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n ................. 205
    C. Goodell’s Appeal: NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n ...................................................................................... 207
IV. LEGISLATION IN OPPOSITION TO THE “BEST INTEREST OF THE LEAGUE” CLAUSE ......................................................... 209
    A. Why Commissioner’s Broad Authority Is Unfair and Creates Wide-Ranging Problems ......................................................... 209
    B. Privacy and Constitutional Rights Legislation ................ 213
    C. Arbitration Legislation ................................................... 215
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 216

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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most prominent aspects of American popular culture is major league sports. They are pervasive, not only in economic and political arenas, but also within the spheres of community values and ethics. We look to athletes as bastions of morality and social consciousness, which puts a heavy emphasis on sports leagues and how they adjudicate the conduct of athletes both on and off the field. This is why the recent cheating scandal perpetrated by the New England Patriots and, most likely, Tom Brady garnered national and legal attention.

Specifically, the improper conduct involved Tom Brady using underinflated footballs in the 2015 American Football Conference (“AFC”) Championship game. As a result, not only was Brady suspended, but the New England Patriots were fined $1 million and lost two future draft picks. These punitive measures were dictated by Roger Goodell, the National Football League (“NFL”) Commissioner, who serves as arbitrator for all team and player disciplinary issues. This “Deflategate” incident, particularly the severity of the commissioner’s sanction, illustrates the magnitude of a sports commissioner’s power. The NFL Commissioner’s power, however, is not unique; commissioners in other major sports leagues—Major League Baseball (“MLB”), National Basketball Association (“NBA”), National Hockey League (“NHL”)—have doled out equally strong sanctions. The commissioners’ power to discipline players and teams for misconduct comes from the respective Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”) of each league, as well as the leagues’ constitutions and by-laws.

In the case of Roger Goodell, under the terms of the 2011 NFL CBA, “[t]he System [Commissioner] shall make findings of fact and determinations of relief including, without limitation, damages .

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2 Id.
3 Id.
5 Id.
7 Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League Commissioner Disciplinary Power: Bounty and Beyond, 3 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 93 (2014).
8 Id.
injunctive relief, fines, and specific performance.” There are no provisions that currently limit this power, prompting scholars to propose alterations to NFL regulations. Many associated with the league believe the unfettered authority afforded to Goodell under the new CBA is unfair, with no analogues in other major sports leagues. The power is so disconcerting to some that they are anxiously awaiting the year 2021, when the CBA will be renegotiated and there will be an opportunity to address Goodell’s authority. For the first time in recent memory, ratings for the NFL dropped, possibly due to an unprecedented public backlash over the league’s authority based on the handling of various player and team issues, especially Deflategate.

The issue with commissioner authority in the major sports leagues is that it unfairly prejudices the players and coaches, placing their actions under a microscope on and off the field, court, or ice. However, while some argue that the power of the NFL Commissioner exceeds that of other leagues, this Note posits that his authority is not incongruous with that of other sports commissioners and that the commissioner authority across all leagues is too broad. The issue with their authority revolves around their unfettered ability to punish players for both on and off field activities due to the ubiquity of “the best interest of the league” clause. Part II of the Note will examine the CBAs of each of the four major sports leagues in the United States—based on highest revenues, similarities in textual construction, and popularity amongst the American people—to elucidate the similarities in the powers of the commissioners. Part III will examine the Deflategate controversy, specifically, in order to show how the issues of review result in the plenary authority of sports commissioners. Part IV proposes legislation that would ameliorate these

9 Id. at 113.
11 Pacifici, supra note 7, at 94.
14 Pacifici, supra note 7, at 94.
issues of review, while also expediting CBA negotiations, thus saving leagues valuable time and revenue.

II. The Powers the Commissioners of the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL

The focus of commissioner review is based on the constitutions and by-laws, because they lay out the original powers of the commissioners that are then limited, qualified, or altered. Then the focus should shift to the CBAs, whose functions are to detail qualified commissioner authority for the period that they are valid, before the new player and league negotiations take place.

One must first look at the constitutions and by-laws because they can be clearer in enumerating the exact powers of the commissioner, making them important benchmarks for their authority.

“Historically, league commissioners have enjoyed expansive authority to regulate their leagues. The constitutions and by-laws for each league are the starting points in defining the authority of each league [C]ommission.” CBAs are significant because they offer “professional athletes an opportunity to impose checks on commissioner power, such as rule change restrictions and arbitration processes, while also reserving certain powers for the commissioner.” Any real disparity between commissioner powers enumerated in the CBAs can be accounted for by the relative power of the players’ union of the respective leagues. As a result, the stronger the players’ union, the weaker the authority of the commissioner under the CBA is likely to be.

A. The MLB Commissioner’s Authority

In terms of the MLB, the MLB Player’s Association (“MLBPA”) is quite strong due to the league’s long history, with nearly a century of player-Commissioner negotiations, and is, ostensibly, able to put significant restrictions on the power of the Commissioner in the CBA. However, under both the Constitution and the CBA, the Commissioner has pervasive authority for disciplinary purposes. Under the

19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Wilson, supra note 17.
24 Wilson, supra note 17.
25 Collective Bargaining Agreement between the 30 Major League Clubs and the Major
Constitution, the Commissioner has the authority to impose the following:

(a) a reprimand; (b) deprivation of a Major League Club of representation in Major League Meetings; (c) suspension or removal of any owner, officer or employee of a Major League Club; (d) temporary or permanent ineligibility of a player; (e) a fine, not to exceed $2,000,000 in the case of a Major League Club, not to exceed $500,000 in the case of an owner, officer or employee, and in an amount consistent with the then-current Basic Agreement with the Major League Baseball Players Association, in the case of a player; (f) loss of the benefit of any or all of the Major League Rules, including but not limited to the denial or transfer of player selection rights provided by Major League Rules 4 and 5; and (g) such other actions as the Commissioner may deem appropriate.

The Commissioner is also a member of the Executive Council, an entity comprised of eight team owners, or “chairmen,” responsible for protecting the position of baseball in public confidence and investigating whether or not there should be rule changes regarding various matters.

Under the Constitution, the phrase “best interests of baseball” has been utilized to broadly extend the authority of the Commissioner. The phrase was cited numerous times by various Commissioners in justification of the punitive actions taken against players.

In terms of the CBA, “a Player may be subjected to disciplinary action for just cause by his Club, the Senior Vice President, Standards and On-Field Operations or the Commissioner.” However, when a player feels as though he was punished unfairly, he may file a grievance in order to be made whole, subsequent to the punishment. The legitimacy of the grievance is determined by either a panel chair or, more commonly, by a tripartite committee of arbiters, with two of the arbiters being supplied by each party and an impartial third arbiter selected by both. If the parties do not agree upon an impartial arbiter from the

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26 Id. at art. II, § 3.
27 Id. at art. II, § 1.
28 Id. at art. III, § 2.
30 Id.
31 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XII.
32 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
33 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
Association and the Labor Relations Department ("LDR"), they must jointly request that the American Arbitration Association provide them with a list of appropriate candidates. Similar to the process of *voir dire*, the parties go down the list until one name is agreed upon. However, either party may remove the arbiter at any time during the negotiations. Essentially, the Commissioner, as the head of the league, has more bargaining power in these situations because he can delay the proceedings and select the arbiter that he wants to adjudicate the matters, even though it technically violates the CBA.

While it is true that both the players and the league can take advantage of these procedural loopholes, pressure from fans and owners coupled with the risk of losing income allow the league to draw out the process. Instances where grievances are appropriate are limited to conduct on the field and in the ballpark. That still leaves "[t]hose complaints that involve the preservation of the integrity of the game to be different from the routine grievances of an industrial employment relationship, and it is understandable that the commissioner of baseball believes that he must have final and binding authority to resolve such complaints." As evidenced by the detailed powers of the MLB Commissioner, his authority is far-reaching.

**B. The NHL Commissioner’s Authority**

The position of the NHL Commissioner—currently held by Gary Bettman—does not date back to the 1920s, like the MLB Commissioner. Instead, the position of NHL Commissioner was created in 1993, with its powers amended under the NHL Constitution in 2009. Similar to the role of the MLB Commissioner, the NHL Commissioner is “charged with protecting the integrity of the game of professional hockey and preserving public confidence in the league,” which gives the Commissioner broad discretionary power over matters:

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34 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
35 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
36 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
37 See 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XI.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1073.
42 Pacifci, supra note 7, at 101.
The specific disciplinary powers of the NHL Commissioner are laid out in Section 6(j) of the NHL Constitution. The Commissioner has broad authority to punish a person connected with the league or a Member Club for violation of the league’s Constitution, By-Laws, or CBA. Any such action can occur during or outside the season, so long as the violation in question is detrimental to the league. In accordance with Section 6(j)(1), depending on the nature and severity of the violation, the Commissioner may take action against an unruly player or Member Club through various disciplinary methods such as expelling or suspending players, cancelling contracts, imposing steep monetary fines or team draft pick penalties, and compelling player transfers.

The Commissioner’s determinations are also “final and not subject to any review,” which further compounds the Commissioner’s extensive powers to admonish members of the league.

It might appear under the new CBA that the Commissioner’s powers have been limited, but this would be inaccurate. Under Article 18.13 of the NHL’s CBA, a player receiving a suspension of six games or more can circumvent the Commissioner’s plenary authority and appeal to a Neutral Discipline Arbitrator (“NDA”). The NDA shall “hold an in-person hearing and shall determine whether the final decision of the League regarding whether the Player’s conduct violated the League Playing Rules and whether the length of the suspension imposed was supported by substantial evidence.” This secondary review “shall be binding and not subject to further review.” Before the implementation of the NHL’s CBA, the only instances in which the Commissioner’s decisions could be reviewed were: (1) when there was an expulsion from the league or a suspension of more than two years, or (2) when there was an imposition of a penalty that coincided with Section 6(j)(1)(d). In those instances, the player would have to appeal to the Board of

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44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Pacifici, supra note 7, at 102.
51 Id.
52 Id.
Governors, and could only prevail with a three-fourths majority vote.\textsuperscript{54}

Despite the changes made to the appeals process, there are those who still believe that the Commissioner has complete control over the NHL.\textsuperscript{55} Holding the position for twenty-three years now, and having weathered three lockouts, Commissioner Bettman has increased revenue from $400 million to $3.3 billion, garnering the support of the owners.\textsuperscript{56} “I think he’s emperor for life,” said Jonathon Gatehouse, author of the first in-depth biography on Commissioner Bettman.\textsuperscript{57} In furtherance of his outright authority, Article 6.4 indemnifies the Commissioner from a range of pecuniary obligations, including damages and legal fees, provided that he act in good faith and in furtherance of the league.\textsuperscript{58} It would seem, despite the best efforts of the National Hockey League Players’ Association, that Commissioner Bettman has comprehensive disciplinary authority.

\textbf{C. The NBA Commissioner’s Authority}

As previously mentioned, it is commonly held that the NFL Commissioner has the most inherent power of any other league commissioner; however, a close examination of the NBA Commissioner’s authority brings that assertion into question. Beyond direct disciplinary action, one of the strongest powers of the NBA Commissioner is the ability to “promulgate and enforce reasonable rules governing the conduct of players on the court or conduct that is harmful to the preservation of the integrity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game.”\textsuperscript{59} The NBA Commissioner’s ability to generate rules is arguably the most extensive of the four major sports leagues.\textsuperscript{60} The NBA CBA also does not limit the rulemaking authority to conduct matters “on the playing court” and, instead, refers to “conduct in any area of the Arena.”\textsuperscript{61} “[A]ny area of the Arena” includes, but is not limited to,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{58} NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE, CONST., art. 6 (1993), http://sportsdocuments.com/2013/11/nhl-constitution/.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Wilson, supra note 17, at 49 (quoting Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Nat’l Basketball Ass’n and the Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. VI, §§ 12 (2011), https://www.scribd.com/doc/172760974/NBA-NBPA-CBA-2011 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
\item \textsuperscript{60} Wilson, supra note 17, at 49 (citing Brent D. Showalter, \textit{Technical Foul: David Stern’s Excessive Use of Rule-Making Authority}, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205, 215 (2007)).
\item \textsuperscript{61} Wilson, supra note 17, at 49; see Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Nat’l
“locker rooms, dormitories, loading docks, and other back-of-house and underground areas, including those used by television production and other vehicles . . . at, during or in connection with an NBA Exhibition, All-Star, Regular Season or Playoff game.” 62 Under the CBA, there is no requirement for the NBA to provide notice, negotiate, or receive consent before enacting any rule changes. 63

The authority of the NBA Commissioner to enforce disciplinary action is both subsumed under his ability to generate rules and expressed in CBA Article XXXI, Section 9. 64 The extent of this authority, and how it can be disputed, is outlined in Article XXXI of the NBA’s CBA. 65 This article lays out the “grievance and arbitration procedure and special procedures with respect to disputes involving player discipline.” 66 Player discipline is broken down into two categories: suspension for twelve games or less and suspension for twelve games or more. 67 For a suspension under twelve games issued by the Commissioner or his designee, there is no grievance review process and, thus, it will not be reviewable by an arbitrator. 68 This punishment is disputable only to the commissioner—the person whose authority the suspension invokes—so, this subsequent ruling on appeal is final. 69 However, the financial impact of such a suspension, whether it is through fine or loss of wages, may be reviewed by the Player Discipline Arbitrator. 70 The Player Discipline Arbitrator may either maintain or lower, but not extend, the financial penalty on the player, and must keep all considerations private. 71

The guidelines in Section 9(b) of this Article dictate the procedure for situations involving players suspended for twelve games or more. 72 Such suspensions involve either player conduct or the protection of the integrity of the sport. 73 Section 9(b) grants either the player or the union the ability to file for a review of the suspension. 74 Sections 2–7 of this

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62 Wilson, supra note 17, at 49; 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61.
63 Wilson, supra note 17, at 49.
64 Wilson, supra note 17, at 49; 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9.
65 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI.
66 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI.
67 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)-(b).
68 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a).
69 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(1)-(3).
70 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(5).
71 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(a)(5)(b)-(c).
72 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b).
73 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b).
74 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b) (referring to Sec. 2(a)).
Article articulate the exact procedure of the review.\textsuperscript{75} These proceedings are similar to court cases.\textsuperscript{76} There are pre-hearing motions, discovery, full hearings, and final rulings handed down by the Grievance Arbitrator.\textsuperscript{77} Like the MLB, either party can discharge the Grievance Arbitrator at any time before the Grievance Arbitrator delivers the final ruling.\textsuperscript{78} If the parties cannot agree on a new arbitrator, the parties shall jointly request a list of eleven attorneys from the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution (“the CPR Institute”).\textsuperscript{79} If the parties cannot decide on a new arbitrator from that list, each party may eliminate up to five names before returning the list to the CPR Institute, who will then make a final selection.\textsuperscript{80} However, if at any time the Commissioner believes that the matter, in its essence, involves the integrity of the sport, he may implement the appeals procedure for penalties under twelve games, outlined supra.\textsuperscript{81} While it may seem that the Commissioner does not have complete authority to discipline players,\textsuperscript{82} the CBA grants the Commissioner full discretion in suspensions for twelve games and under and near-unfettered control in suspensions involving over twelve games.\textsuperscript{83}

\textbf{D. The NFL Commissioner’s Authority}

The handling of the Deflategate scandal sparked the most recent issue of commissioner disciplinary authority. While the NFL CBA is the primary source of the Commissioner’s authority, the NFL Constitution also sets forth important powers.\textsuperscript{84} “Article VIII of the NFL constitution details the commissioner’s power to resolve disputes and to take action against a person connected with the league when the person engages in conduct detrimental to the league.”\textsuperscript{85} In this capacity, the Commissioner is authorized, at the expense of the League, to hire legal counsel and take or adopt appropriate legal action or such other steps or procedures as he deems necessary and proper in the best interests of either the League or professional football, whenever a party or organization not a member of, employed by, or connected with the League or

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{75}{2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(b).}
\footnote{76}{See 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 2-7.}
\footnote{77}{2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, §3-6.}
\footnote{78}{2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 7(a).}
\footnote{79}{2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 7(b).}
\footnote{80}{2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 7(b).}
\footnote{81}{2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 9(d).}
\footnote{82}{Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103.}
\footnote{83}{Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103.}
\footnote{84}{Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103-04.}
\footnote{85}{Pacifici, supra note 7, at 103-04 (citing NFL Const. art VIII, § 6 (2006)).}
\end{footnotes}
any member thereof is guilty of any conduct detrimental to the League, its member clubs or employees, or to professional football.\footnote{NFL CONST. art VIII, § 6 (2006).}

The NFL is unique in that one can only appeal disciplinary decisions to the Commissioner; this may make the NFL’s disciplinary process seem much harsher than those of other professional sports leagues.\footnote{Wilson, supra note 17, at 49.} The NFL CBA primarily covers playing rules, with a particular focus on player safety.\footnote{Wilson, supra note 17, at 49.} There is an attempt to clarify the ambiguous powers of the Commissioner in the CBA, but the language utilized to ameliorate the ambiguity is itself ambiguous.\footnote{Pacifici, supra note 7, at 104.} The real issue of the ambiguity revolves around the Commissioner’s ability to punish “conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football . . . .”\footnote{2011 NFL CBA, supra note 6, at 204.} This language is so broad and undefined that it could allow the Commissioner to interpret any transgression as fitting this category. Such authority is woefully unfair to players. The full list of the Commissioner’s disciplinary authority is outlined in Article 8, Section 13, of the NFL Constitution, and is beyond the scope of this note, especially considering much of the constitution is inapplicable to player discipline.\footnote{NFL CONST. art VIII, § 13 (2006).} Also, there is a further expansion of his powers within the form player contract in Appendix A of the NFL CBA.\footnote{2011 NFL CBA, supra note 6, at 256; Pacifici, supra note 7, at 104.} Section 15 of the form contract is entitled “Integrity of the Game.”\footnote{2011 NFL CBA, supra note 6, at 256.} With this section, “the NFL Commissioner possesses the authority to discipline a player for ‘conduct detrimental’ to the League under the NFL constitution, the NFL CBA, and a standard form NFL player contract.”\footnote{Pacifici, supra note 7, at 104.} Ostensibly, the NFL Commissioner seems to have a despotic rule above all others. However, along with the intricate minutia of how each Commissioner enacts discipline, there is a unifying clause in all of the major sports leagues that augments their power beyond reason.

\section*{E. The Ubiquity of “The Best Interest of the League” Clause}

The concept of a commissioner as protector of a league’s integrity dates back to the very creation of the position. The inception of a “sports commissioner” came in 1921 in the MLB as a response to the “Black
Sox” scandal of the 1919 World Series.95 The original purpose of the MLB Commissioner was to serve as the ethical center of the sport, protecting its integrity and preventing ills, such as gambling, from blemishing it.96 Following the MLB’s decision, the other three major sports leagues eventually instituted the position of commissioner.97 The external limitations placed on each leagues’ commissioners can be found, primarily, in the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and, most likely, the First Amendment of the Constitution.98

However, despite these external encumbrances, it seems as though each league has found a similar way to strengthen the authority of their respective commissioners. As mentioned in each of the following sections, one of the commonalities we see amongst all four of the major sports leagues is language that gives the Commissioners authority to maintain the “best interests of the sport.”99 As such, they all are given substantial discretionary power that goes beyond certain textual limitations in order to maintain the ethereal essence of the sport.100 This extends to behavior both on and off the court, field, or ice that would challenge the integrity of the league.101 Apart from the expansive language of the clause, the “integrity” of each league is not specifically defined, and, therefore, it falls to each Commissioner to use his own judgment to determine what must be done to uphold this integrity.102 This authority is so far-reaching that no violation of any league rule is required for it to be activated, which severely limits the autonomy of league members beholden to the rules.103 While this “best interest” authority is not unlimited, considering it is constrained by the aforementioned CBA and Constitutional language, it is nonetheless significant.104 When the enumerated powers of each league’s commissioner are coupled with the authority of this clause, it becomes evident how each commissioner is similarly situated in their control over their respective sport in terms of disciplinary action.

III. ANALYSIS OF LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF COMMISSIONER DISCIPLINE

95 Wilson, supra note 17, at 46.
96 Wilson, supra note 17, at 46.
97 Wilson, supra note 17, at 46.
98 Wilson, supra note 17, at 46.
100 Id.
101 Wilson, supra note 17, at 47.
102 Wilson, supra note 17, at 47.
103 Wilson, supra note 17, at 47-48.
104 Wilson, supra note 17, at 48-54.
There are many intricacies in the world of sports that could require legal intervention. In 2015 alone, there were five major sports issues that arose across the nation: (1) free markets for college athletes; (2) college athletes’ right to unionize; (3) legalization of sports gambling; (4) antitrust litigation over territorial restraints and blackout rules; and (5) the NFL Commissioner’s disciplinary authority. While some of these issues may be external to the actual sport and its regulations, they implicate major areas of law from antitrust law to labor law. When reviewing the Deflategate controversy, one of the most prominent sports-law issues, the authority of sports commissioners is brought to light. This case is worth review not only because it is topical, but also because it illustrates the legal ramifications of the unfettered power of sports commissioners and how it should be mitigated through legislation.

A. Deflategate: Before the Courts

Deflategate involved Tom Brady using underinflated footballs in the 2015 AFC championship game. In that game, the Colts’ safety, Mike Adams, intercepted Tom Brady twice and the Colts kept both balls, because the team believed the balls were not inflated correctly. It was reported that eleven of the twelve footballs allowed to the Patriots were under the NFL’s required range of 12.5 to 13.5 pounds per square inch. It was also reported that the game referee, Walt Anderson, inspected the balls two hours and fifteen minutes before the game began, in accordance with protocol. As a result, the NFL hired Ted Wells as the league-appointed attorney to complete an in-depth investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in a 243-page report that implicated Tom Brady, as well as some of the Patriots’ staff members. The primary conclusion was that Tom Brady was probably “at least

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106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Bunam & Cimini, supra note 4.
110 Id.
111 Id.
113 Id.
generally aware” that the footballs used were underinflated. The report also posited the likelihood “that Jim McNally [the Official Locker Room attendant for the Patriots] and John Jastremski [an equipment assistant for the Patriots] participated in a deliberate effort to release air from the Patriots’ game balls after they were examined by the referee.” There were also text messages exchanged between the two staffers discussing footballs and their level of inflation. However, the report found no conclusive evidence implicating the team coach, Bill Belichick, or team management in the deflation practice.

Due to these findings, the NFL ruled that Tom Brady would be suspended without pay for the first four games of the 2015-2016 NFL season. The NFL also decided to take punitive action against the New England Patriots team, fining it $1 million and taking away its 2016 first-round and 2017 fourth-round draft picks. The Patriots issued a statement expressing its belief that the findings of the Wells Report were incomplete, and that the report did not include evidence of the natural reduction of PSI in the footballs. The statement also said there was no evidence that Tom Brady had a preference for underinflated balls. In spite of this, the Patriots decided not to appeal the decision of the NFL. However, the National Football League’s Players’ Association appealed the decision on Tom Brady’s behalf. After deciding not to recuse himself from the internal appeal hearing, Commissioner Goodell upheld the suspension based on the protection of the “integrity of the game,” something he held to be the most important of the commissioner’s duties. Part of this decision was a result of Brady instructing his assistant to destroy his cell phone that he used since November—a period of time including the AFC Championship game and the early investigation—the day he was interviewed by Ted Wells. As a result of their inability to reach any sort of resolution, Brady and Goodell went before Judge Richard M. Berman of the United States District Court for

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114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Around the NFL Staff, supra note 118.
127 Around the NFL Staff, supra note 118.
2017] THE ROGER GOODELL STANDARD 205

the Southern District of New York. The judge urged them to settle, but ultimately decided that the positions of the parties were too disparate and that he would hand down a ruling.

B. NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n

While the judge addressed the court’s usual deference to an arbitrator’s findings and accepted his findings, he nevertheless decided that the decision should be vacated. The award in favor of Brady was granted on three legal grounds: (A) inadequate notice to Brady of both his potential discipline (four-game suspension) and his alleged misconduct; (B) denial of the opportunity for Brady to examine one of two lead investigators, namely NFL Executive Vice President and General Counsel Jeff Pash; and (C) denial of equal access to investigative files, including witness interview notes.

In response to Brady’s lack of suspension notice, the court drew a parallel between the NFL’s decision and how the league treats steroid use. The court found that Brady had no notice of a possible suspension equivalent to the use of performance-enhancing drugs or general awareness of a scheme to deflate footballs. The court also found that the suspension could not be based on Brady’s failure to cooperate with an ensuing investigation. While Goodell thought suspending Brady was consistent with the practice of punishing steroid use—reasoning that both gave the violators a competitive advantage—the court disagreed. As a result, the court held that no player alleged or found to have had general awareness of inappropriate ball deflation by other parties and failed to cooperate with the investigation could be considered to have reasonable notice of a punishment equivalent to NFL Policy on Anabolic Steroid and Related Substances use.

Based on this reasoning, the court found additional grounds to vacate Brady’s suspension. The court found that Brady’s general awareness of a scheme to deflate footballs did not amount to notice of possible punitive action. The court concluded that, “as a matter of law,

126 Around the NFL Staff, supra note 118.
127 Around the NFL Staff, supra note 118.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 464.
134 NFL Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 465.
135 Id. at 467.
136 Id.
no NFL policy or precedent notifies players that they may be disciplined (much less suspended) for general awareness of misconduct by others.”

137 The lack of precedent within the NFL, thus, violated the “law of the shop”: “A rule must clearly and unambiguously establish the scope of prohibited conduct, as well as the consequences of violations, in order to be enforceable . . .”

138 The “law of the shop” refers to “when an arbitrator enforces a past practice,” something that was not applicable here due to lack of precedent.

139 Finally, the court distinguished between notice of a fine and notice of a suspension. The court found that, under the Player’s Policy, a player has notice of a potential fine. However, Brady was punished under the Competitive Integrity Policy, which is only incorporated in the Game Operations Manual that applies to the chief executive, presidents, general managers, and head coaches—but not players. Goodell, in response, contended that conduct detrimental to the league, rather than the Competitive Integrity Policy, was the basis for Brady’s punishment.

140 The court stated that a player’s right to notice is quintessential to the CBA, as well as criminal and civil justice systems.

141 The court’s holding in favor of Brady was also based on past NFL arbitral precedent that the lack of notice of the Competitive Integrity Policy is grounds for dispensing with punishment.

142 In terms of conduct detrimental to the league, the court dismissed that argument based on NFL precedent.

143 For example, in the domestic violence cases of Ray Rice and Adrian Peterson, the NFL initially punished them on the grounds of conduct detrimental to the league, but ultimately punished them based on the NFL’s policy against domestic violence.

144 As such, the situations are not analogous. Also, the court found that Brady was denied equal opportunity to examine Co-Lead Investigator Jeff Pash.

145 NFL precedent dictates that, in Article 46 arbitration appeals, players must be given the opportunity to confront
their investigators. Consequently, Brady was unfairly prejudiced. In that same vein, the court found that Goodell improperly denied Brady equal access to investigative files. Lastly, Brady contended that Goodell was “evidently partial” within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2), which will be essential to the legislation this paper proposes.

C. Goodell’s Appeal: NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n

In the wake of the court’s decision, Goodell appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit reversed the ruling of the lower court on several grounds. First, in regards to the Player Policies, the circuit court agreed that the policies did not apply, but did not foreclose the possibility of suspensions. Normally, under the Player Policies, tampering with equipment only called for a fine. While the policy under the Other Uniform/Equipment Violations section mentions nothing about tampering with balls, the court found that Article 46 gives the Commissioner broad authority to deal with conduct that goes against the integrity of the game. Also, while this section cites fines for first-time offenses, the court noted that these fines are minimums and can be augmented based on the severity of the violation.

In terms of the steroid comparison, the circuit court found little issue with it, in contrast with the lower court. The court recognized that arbitrators are given broad latitude in their decisions. While Brady had the right to notice of potential punishment, there is no enumerated right that Brady is given notice to analogies made by the arbitrator that would inform their decision. Thus, while the court found the comparison imperfect, the Commissioner was still within his rights, because this issue was not essential for his punishment.

In regards to the issue of awareness of the underinflated balls, the

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149 Id. at 472.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 473; 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(2) (Westlaw through P.L. 115-61).
153 See NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 527 (2d Cir. 2016).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 539.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 NFL Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 539-40.
160 Id. at 540.
161 Id. at 540-541.
162 Id.
court found that the Wells Report did not limit itself to the standard of general awareness, but rather that report determined that was the most likely level of awareness, rather than direct involvement or potential awareness. The real issue here for the Commissioner was whether the discipline he imposed was within his Article 46 powers to protect the integrity of the league. The court found that, in conjunction with the evidence presented from the Wells Report, and other exigent circumstances surrounding the investigation, there was a factual basis for Goodell to determine that Brady committed a punishable offense. Therefore, the court held that the Commissioner was within his rights to find that Brady participated in conduct detrimental to the league.

The court also found that there were grounds to punish Brady for non-cooperation with the investigation. Again the court found that the league had authority under Article 46 detrimental conduct, but also because of Brady’s general notice of the investigation. The court reasoned that Brady was on notice of potential punishment for destroying his phone when he received a letter from the league stating that he failed “to cooperate fully and candidly with the investigation, including by refusing to produce any relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts, etc.).” Also, the court noted that any reasonable litigant would understand that the destruction of evidence days before an arbitration hearing would be a substantial issue. The court also dismissed the issue of the Competitive Integrity Policy, stating the Brady was clearly being punished under Article 46.

On the issue of exclusion of testimony from the NFL General Counsel, the court found that any of Pash’s insight into the matter was collateral to the arbitration and it was not necessary that Brady be privy to it. The court also found that the Commissioner did not receive any extensive information from any of the members of counsel that fell beyond that of the Wells Report and what was disclosed in hearings and the previous case. With regard to the denial of access to investigative files, the court found that the Commissioner himself did not rely on any

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163 Id.
164 Id. at 542.
165 NFL Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 543.
166 Id. at 552.
167 Id. at 542.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 543.
170 Id.
171 NFL Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 544.
172 Id. at 546.
173 Id.
internal interview notes in making his decision. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for him to assume that Brady would require access to them. Finally, the court found no merit to the issue of the Commissioner being an evidently partial arbitrator. The court cited, yet again, the Article 46 authority of the Commissioner to determine what constitutes conduct detrimental to the league. As such, the Second Circuit reinstated the four-game suspension and the fine.

IV. LEGISLATION IN OPPOSITION TO THE “BEST INTEREST OF THE LEAGUE” CLAUSE

A. Why Commissioner’s Broad Authority Is Unfair and Creates Wide-Ranging Problems

In the wake of the Second Circuit’s decision, Brady decided not to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, accepting the suspension. While it is unclear how the Supreme Court would have ruled, the decision clearly illustrates the overly-broad authority delegated to Roger Goodell in his duty to protect the best interest of the league. Further, the issue is not limited to the NFL Commissioner, as illustrated in Part II. So, the question remains: what can be done?

One might ask: Why is change necessary, considering that these leagues are extremely profitable and popular? Apart from the looming issues of player dissatisfaction in some of the leagues, issues may also arise when each leagues’ CBA expires and it becomes time for the players’ unions and the leagues to renegotiate. Firstly, as the commissioners’ authorities increase, discipline is likely to increase,
resulting in the loss of salary through suspensions and fines, which can be significant for lower level players who do not play as long and make less money.\(^\text{184}\) Another reason relates more to player freedom, regarding whether players should be suspended for non-sports affiliated activities.\(^\text{185}\) A commissioner does not need to wait for a guilty verdict in a criminal matter to punish a player for actions he finds detrimental to the sport.\(^\text{186}\) This practice goes against the societal and legal norm of innocent until proven guilty; however, sports leagues are private organizations that players enter freely.\(^\text{187}\) Nevertheless, this still is an incentive for players to want to renegotiate.\(^\text{188}\)

A secondary question is whether or not leagues should fine players for non-criminal activity that occurred off the court.\(^\text{189}\) There are serious implications here that could violate a player’s right to free speech, and put their political, religious, and social beliefs at risk.\(^\text{190}\) As players begin to act out in different ways, new rules are promulgated to regulate their behavior.\(^\text{191}\) Any player that feels as though the league has too much control over his personal life may feel disenchanted with the sport and face further action due to acts of frustration.\(^\text{192}\)

A final consideration for why legislation is necessary is the economic ramifications of dissatisfaction with commissioner authority that could result in strikes and lockouts.\(^\text{193}\) One such example is the 2011-2012 NBA season lockout.\(^\text{194}\) While this strike was primarily based on the allocation of money from various sources, the economic effects are explanatory.\(^\text{195}\) Because of the reduction of the season from eighty-two to sixty-six games, the players lost roughly twenty percent of their salaries.\(^\text{196}\) The NBA players are guaranteed 51.2% of all basketball-related income.\(^\text{197}\) The lockout resulted in a revenue loss of about $3.3 billion, half of which was borne by the players.\(^\text{198}\) If legislation was

\(^{184}\) Id. at 200-01.
\(^{185}\) Id. at 201.
\(^{186}\) Id.
\(^{187}\) Id.
\(^{188}\) Id.
\(^{189}\) Parlow, supra note 183, at 201.
\(^{190}\) Parlow, supra note 183, at 201.
\(^{191}\) Parlow, supra note 183, at 201.
\(^{192}\) Parlow, supra note 183, at 201.
\(^{194}\) Id.
\(^{195}\) Id.
\(^{196}\) Id.
\(^{197}\) Id.
\(^{198}\) Id.
enacted to settle any disputes that could arise during a CBA negotiation year, it could result in the saving of millions, if not billions, of dollars.

Examining how the commissioners are compensated in comparison to the average player is illustrative of how entrenched the position of commissioner is and raises questions of self-dealing. This further indicates a need to mitigate commissioner positions in the major sports leagues. Respectively, the average salaries for players in the NBA, MLB, NHL, and NFL (in 2014) and their potential career earnings are as follows: $5.15 million, $3.2 million, $2.4 million, and $1.9 million. Over the course of an average NBA, MLB, NHL, and NFL career, these averages, respectively, allow for career earnings of: $24.7 million, $17.9 million, $13.2 million, and $6.7 million. These figures, when compared to the salaries of the commissioners of these leagues, show a stark contrast in the yearly and career earning potentials. Based on figures from 2010, Bud Selig, the Commissioner of the MLB, earned $18.35 million in 2007, with only ten players earning more than him at the time. The NFL Commissioner was the second highest earner, taking in $8 million in 2009, after taking a twenty-five percent pay cut. The third and fourth highest paid commissioners were the NBA and NHL Commissioners, earning a “modest” $10 and $7.2 million respectively. These figures have likely increased in the near decade that has passed since their recording, as have the players’ averages, but the contrast is still as appalling. These earning figures become even more concerning when considering the recent history of the duration of sports commissioners’ tenure. The previous NBA Commissioner, David Stern, served for thirty years in his position. The next longest tenured commissioners are the previous MLB Commissioner Bud Selig who served for twenty-four years, including time as active and formal Commissioner, and NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman who has served

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200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
for roughly the same amount of time. While NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell has only served since 2006, a meager eleven years, he is an example of the self-dealing inherent to the position. It is widely known that Goodell was groomed for the job by his predecessor, Paul Tagliabue, as was the current NBA Commissioner Adam Silver. While the owners are required to vote, the unanimity in both instances strongly suggests a dynastic system.

Some people have offered alternatives to legislation, such as a player conduct policy (“PCP”). This would undoubtedly be something generated by CBA negotiations, rather than unilaterally by either the players or the league. A PCP would specifically enumerate how players are meant to comport themselves, alleviating some confusion. However, the specifics would have to be negotiated, which could result in a lockout or ambiguous rules. Furthermore, PCP would still leave the issue of player autonomy off the court, and would do little to lessen the “best interest of the league” authority, which “[s]cholars have criticized [because] this model of a commissioner sitting as accuser, judge, and jury . . . gives rise to perceived, if not real, bias.” As previously alluded to, this could run afoul of restriction of “evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators” provision of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2).

As such, proposed legislation that would make ambiguous clauses, such as the “best interest of the league” clause, a violation of players’ rights would be beneficial. This legislation could stand on its own or become a provision of some other federal legislation, such as the Federal Labor Relations Act. Congress would have the authority to implement such legislation under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, which allows regulation of interstate commerce, and would apply to all major sports leagues. The primary issue here is that many of the leagues have teams in Canada, which would require a separate source of authority.

208 Id.; Windhorst, supra note 204.
209 Parlow, supra note 183, at 202.
210 Parlow, supra note 183, at 202.
211 Parlow, supra note 183, at 202.
212 Parlow, supra note 183, at 202.
213 Parlow, supra note 183, at 202.
This legislation would require each league to specifically enumerate all possible infractions punishable as players of the league, if they do not go so far as to infringe upon their First Amendment rights. The legislation would also prevent athletes from being punished for criminal behavior if they are not found guilty. Finally, the legislation would require that all disciplinary hearings be appealable to a panel of arbitrators, independent of the league. The panel would be provided by one or several outside arbitration sources to ensure impartiality. The players’ union and the league will retain the right to remove one or multiple arbitrators from the panel at any time, if they can show good cause. In such an instance, they would have no say in the replacement arbitrators.

B. Privacy and Constitutional Rights Legislation

This section will propose extensions of privacy laws and state-adopted constitutional principles in order to mitigate major sports leagues’ commissioner authority to take punitive actions. This section will not argue that there are alterations to commissioner authority in regard to on-field and other related activities, because those powers are strongly enumerated and extend beyond the scope of its purpose. The first legislative proposal addresses how players are often subject to double punishment for criminal activity, as well as an invasion of their rights to privacy during legal proceedings that do not involve the sports leagues. This parallels a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Traditionally, this provision has offered three constitutional protections: (1) protection from a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. Admittedly, this does not apply here, because double jeopardy only applies to government action, but that is why there is a call for legislation to mirror its applicability to private entities. There is clear precedent for expanding constitutional protections through either state or federal action. One example of a state law expanding constitutional rights is N.J.S.A. 2A: 161A-1. As explained in State v. Evans, this statute expands the rights of detainees relating to unlawful search and seizure,

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215 See 2011 NBA CBA, supra note 61, at art. XXXI, § 8(c).
217 Id.
218 Id.
which is derived originally from the Fourth Amendment.\textsuperscript{220} If players were to be punished or acquitted by the courts only to face punishment from the league, it would completely contravene this essential Constitutional principal. Many state constitutions have adopted the principle of double jeopardy and can apply it as they see fit, as long as it does not contradict Supreme Court precedent.\textsuperscript{221} As such, “[s]tate courts can also interpret any double jeopardy clauses in their own state constitutions which often provide more protection than that which is afforded by the federal constitution since the minimum standards under the U.S. Constitution always apply.”\textsuperscript{222} States that have adopted heftier protections include: Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and Texas.\textsuperscript{223} With enhanced protections like these extended to athletes and fines for non-sports related offenses, the ability of commissioners to commit double jeopardy violations would be extinguished.

While this is an extreme example, and there are other exigencies that would need to be considered, the case of Aaron Hernandez is informative in how a sports league could violate the principle of double jeopardy.\textsuperscript{224} In an effort to avoid a publicity nightmare, Roger Goodell made it a point to wait until Aaron Hernandez was convicted of murder to suspend him.\textsuperscript{225} Obviously, suspending Hernandez subsequent to his conviction would make little sense considering the charges would call for a life sentence, but the point still stands.\textsuperscript{226} Assuming a player was convicted of a more innocuous crime, like drug possession, a conviction could warrant a suspension or fine in the eyes of a league commissioner, providing double punishment. This note proposes that legislation should be created that would prevent sports leagues from punishing players for crimes, at least of the non-violent nature. This is not meant to promote non-violent crimes, such as marijuana use, but to protect players as private citizens.

In fact, it could be argued that such treatment by sports leagues

\textsuperscript{222} Id.
\textsuperscript{223} Id.
\textsuperscript{225} Id.
perpetuate a false narrative about athletes as criminals, bordering on defamation. As players in the most popular sport in America, many players rise to the level of public figures, but the way many are represented in the media, and the way leagues handle such publicity, often casts them in a false light.\textsuperscript{227} Taking the NFL—the league with the most players—as an example, demonstrates that athletes are generally less likely to commit crimes than the average person, despite the rampant reports of misconduct.\textsuperscript{228} One study found that the rates of pro-athletes committing assault or domestic violence were half that of the general population.\textsuperscript{229} However, teams and leagues do not view players as people, but rather as market commodities that can bring in great revenue, but also terrible publicity.\textsuperscript{230} Teams have often stood by players in support of them, adhering to the principle of “innocent until proven guilty.” However, many teams and leagues are quick to repudiate their stars in order to protect their own image, even at the expense of the players involved.\textsuperscript{231} While this would likely be protected under free speech, teams and leagues alike should be wary of speaking too soon on an issue.

C. Arbitration Legislation

It has been established that the “best interest of the league” clause is detrimental to sports and players, promoting this proposal for legislation. The clause gives commissioners too much authority, even when there is an arbitration process involved. The proposal would create legislation that would include a uniform arbitration process across all of the major sports leagues. This process would serve to be impartial, as well as strip the “best interest of the league” authority from the Commissioners.

The proposal would mandate that arbitration for any transgression related to the sport be brought before an impartial panel comprised of arbitrators that work independently of any league. The process would be similar to standing arbitration process in the MLB, but with certain distinctions.\textsuperscript{232} A list of names would be provided by an independent arbitration entity—one that the players’ association and the league have agreed upon.\textsuperscript{233} Once a consensus is reached about who the arbitrators

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\textsuperscript{228} Id.
\textsuperscript{229} Id.
\textsuperscript{230} Id.
\textsuperscript{231} Id.
\textsuperscript{232} 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XII.
\textsuperscript{233} 2012-2016 MLB CBA, supra note 25, at art. XII.
will be, then the process can continue. If either party has an issue with any of the arbitrators, they will have to show cause to have them removed from the panel. Examples of justifiable cause could be that the arbitrator is biased or unqualified or not in the right state-of-mind to participate in the proceedings, but there must be cause. It will not be the case, like in the MLB arbitration system, that a party can remove an arbitrator at their whim. Nor will it be like in *voir dire* where each party receives a certain number of jurors that they may dismiss without cause. If adequate cause cannot be shown, the arbitrator will remain on the panel. At the end of the arbitration, if either party is not satisfied, they can take the matter to the courts. However, if a party chooses to litigate the matter and is unsuccessful, the losing party will be responsible for the opposing party’s attorney’s fees.

This system will allow for a truly fair way to determine what punishment is suitable for a given transgression, especially when the constitution, by-laws, and the CBA are ambiguous on an issue. If such an issue of ambiguity arises, the team owners will vote on how it will be interpreted, and the arbitrators can proceed from there. It is still up to the players’ associations and the leagues to negotiate the CBAs and what infractions are punishable, but the punishments will not be left to parties that have a vested interest in the outcome. Only with these legislative changes will players, in all types of situations, be treated fairly and impartially.

V. Conclusion

In summation, since the inception of the position in 1921, the authority of sports commissioners has grown to an unacceptable level. Primarily driven by the “best interest of the league clause,” commissioners’ power must be checked through legislation in order to promote the best interests not only of the leagues, but also their numerous players. Without such legislation, players will remain in the precarious position of negotiating CBAs that leave them open to unfair disciplinary action.