U.S. Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Panel Discussion*

MENZIES: I would like to begin by introducing the panel starting at the far end. First is Kristen Boon, known to many of you; she is a professor at the law school who specializes in international law and publishes in that area. Her J.D. is from New York University; her LL.M. is from Columbia. She has clerked in the Canadian Supreme Court, and she has been my partner in fighting for this day, and glad to have you here.

John Herbst. Ambassador John Herbst is, as you already know, the Coordinator for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. He has served as Ambassador to Ukraine and Ambassador to Uzbekistan. Those I highlight because you need to know that he has received this government’s highest awards for his work in those areas. He received a Presidential Distinguished Service Award for his work in Ukraine, where he and his staff prevented the theft of an election and preserved democracy for the people of that region. He received the State Department’s Distinguished Honor Award for his efforts to facilitate the supply of our forces and the protection of our forces in the Middle East, by creating an American Air Base, and supplies entering there. And so, John brings to his work a Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, where he was Phi Beta Kappa, and a Master of Law and Diplomacy, with Distinction, from the Fletcher School. We are delighted to have you here, John, and thank you for coming.

Ambassador James Dobbins currently works for the RAND Corporation, where he is the Director of the International Security and*

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* Symposium, When the Fighting Stops: Roles and Responsibilities in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Nov. 2, 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law. The panel chair was Ambassador John K. Menzies, Dean Whitehead School of Diplomacy, Seton Hall University. Panel members were Ambassador John E. Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, State Department; Ambassador James Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND National Security Research Division; and Daniel Serwer, Vice President, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace. Kristen E. Boon, Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, and Ambassador Clint Williamson, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, also participated in the discussion.
Defense Policy Center. He has broad experience. He has served as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, as a Special Assistant to the President for the Western Hemisphere, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for the Balkans, and Ambassador to the European Community. He was assigned, during the Clinton administration, almost all of the top issues that came up on the radar screen in international affairs—Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo. He was the Bush administration’s first Special Envoy for Afghanistan, and he also was the representative to the Afghan opposition in the wake of September 11, 2001. Also, he was my boss in the Foreign Service and is one of the best people I have ever worked for. And thank you, Jim, for coming today. Many of you have read his book *Beginners Guide to Nation Building* and the two other members of that series. So Jim, thank you.

The third is Daniel Serwer, who is Vice President of the Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations and the Centers of Innovation at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). That does not tell you all about Daniel. He has worked in the areas of Afghanistan, the Balkans, Haiti, Iraq, and Sudan while at the Institute of Peace. He is a former Foreign Service Officer. He did terrific work in Bosnia as the person that held the federation together—the federation of Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats—during the most critical period of peacebuilding in the area. Daniel is single-handedly responsible for taking the United States Institute of Peace from being a think tank to a do tank—an operational unit. For those of you who do not know the U.S. Institute of Peace, it was funded by the U.S. government but basically kept at arms length and rigorously independent. Daniel has made it into a player in providing support to countless international crises. So, I am delighted to have you here too.

With that introduction, I am going to start by asking a question, and that is how we are going to do this. We will open it to the floor in a few minutes, but I am going to take the chair and ask Ambassador Herbst what is new on the horizon, in terms of the U.S. response to post-conflict reconstruction.

HERBST: Thank you. S/CRS \(^1\) really has two major imperatives. First, they ensure that the U.S. government is organized in a unified way to handle stabilization or reconstruction crises, to make sure the next time we have such a crisis that all elements of U.S. power are used to address it, that there is a single comprehensive plan which

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\(^1\) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.
uses all elements of that power, and that it is implemented effectively and efficiently.

The second part of our mission is to make sure we have all the trained civilians with the right skill sets, the right equipment, ready to go in such a crisis. And here is where we are in achieving those objectives this morning.

There has been an agreement in the InterAgency regarding the creation of what we call the InterAgency Management System for responding to a stabilization crisis. The InterAgency Management System has the following elements.

First, you have a policy level group at the Assistant Secretary Level; it is called the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG). It consists of every agency which has a role in a crisis. It is chaired by a combination of the Regional Secretary and Senior Regional National Director of the NSC and the head of S/CRS. I am glad of the fact that you have three chairpeople consolidating strength; it is a bureaucratic compromise. By stepping into a real crisis, senior leaders of our government choose to take charge, and the S/CRS will have someone to run the policies and make sure that the trainings are on time.

Under the CRSG is something called the Secretariat, run by my office. It is InterAgency; it is designed to write a plan of operations for the U.S. government on the civilian side in a stabilization crisis. Equally important, it has Pentagon participation to ensure that military and civilian plans are completely in harmony.

To further ensure such harmony, if there is a stabilization crisis where there is a military component, we have something called Integration Planning Cell. This Integration Planning Cell is run by the S/CRS; it is also an InterAgency group. It will deploy to the headquarters of the military that is running the operation. If this is a U.S.-run military operation, it will deploy to the relevant Combatant Command. At the intervention as to the operations in the Middle East, it would deploy to CENTCOM; if it is Latin America, it would deploy to SOUTHCOM. If it is an international military operation—for example, the U.N.—this outfit would deploy to wherever the U.N. military headquarters are. The purpose here is to make sure at the field level that military and civilian plans are completely in sync.

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2 United States National Security Council.
3 United States Central Command.
4 United States Southern Command.
Finally, the InterAgency Management System has something called Advance Civilian Teams. These are our equivalent of PRTs. These are an InterAgency group. They would be under S/CRS leadership in most cases. If they deploy to a country where there is a U.S. embassy, it would be under the Chief of Mission; if not, it would be the senior U.S. civilian component to the country.

Their job is to run all civilian operations or all U.S. civilian operations in such a crisis. If it is a country which is large and which has many, many requirements, there would be field Advance Civilian Teams operated by the country under the leadership of the Advance Civilian Team headquarters. This Advance Civilian Team, as designed, can work in an operation where the U.S. is the principal power, and it can work in a multi-lateral setting with other countries. It could work in a sector where the U.N. has the leadership. It is designed to function in all kinds of international settings. This is the agreed [manner in which we now proceed] in a crisis.

The second part of our mission is to make sure that we have the civilians ready to go out to such crises. We have devised, and it has been approved by our government, a three-pool system of civilian employees. The employees we are looking for need to have the skills required when there is no functioning government. So we are looking for people, for these pools to be comprised of people, who have the following sets of skills. There will be all types of engineering—road engineers, civil engineers, water and electrical engineers. There will be people who can handle public administration—public health officials, city planners. All the people involved in rule of law, meaning police, judges, corrections officials, attorneys, and also the economists. In some instances, there might be port operators. All the people that we need to stand up a government which does not exist or to help any number of functions for a government that does not perform very well.

We have agreed to meet three different pools in which we will find people with these skills. The first pool is something we call the active response pool. These are people whose full-time job it will be to deploy to countries in crisis. They will work for the federal government, State Department, USAID,6 and other federal agencies.

Right now, the U.S. government has a ten-person capability, which is a tiny, tiny capability, which sits in my office. But there has

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5 Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
6 United States Agency for International Development.
been legislation proposed by Senators [Richard] Lugar\textsuperscript{7} and [Joe] Biden\textsuperscript{8} which would call for an advance response pool of 250 of whom roughly forty percent would be the State Department, forty percent would be USAID, and twenty percent sitting around the InterAgency. These folks would be trained and equipped to deploy within forty-eight hours of the decision. They would be truly a rapid response force for civilian needs.

The second pool of people is what we call the stand-by response pool. The same legislation under Lugar-Biden calls for a stand-by response pool of 2000 people. They would also sit throughout the Federal InterAgency. They would sit, again, forty percent at State, forty percent at the USAID, and twenty percent elsewhere. These folks would have full-time day jobs. They would deploy in a crisis. They would train for two or three weeks a year. It would take about forty-five to sixty days to get them out to the field. We feel we could have eighty percent of our active response corps deployed at any one time. We could have anywhere from ten to twenty-five percent of the stand-by corps deployed at any one time.

The third component of this civilian response capability is a civilian reserve corps. President Bush mentioned this during his State of the Union speech in January\textsuperscript{9}. This corps would function much like our military reserve system. People in civilian life, and state and local government, would sign up. They would sign up for a four-year period. Like our stand-by corps, they would train for two or three weeks a year. They would have a commitment within their four-year period of service to deploy for up to one year. We feel we would be able to deploy twenty-five percent of them at any given time and it would take about two months to get them out into the field.

My office, right now, is working on creating, as soon as possible, a 500-person civilian reserve corps. We received appropriations in May [2007] to create such a corps. Unfortunately, we do not have authorized legislation yet passed which enables us to actually use this plan.

The Lugar-Biden legislation which I referred to is right now in consideration in the Senate. There is a similar bill proposed by Congressman [Samuel S.] Farr\textsuperscript{10} which is under consideration in the

\textsuperscript{7} Senior Senator from Indiana (Republican).

\textsuperscript{8} Senior Senator from Delaware (Democrat).


\textsuperscript{10} U.S. House of Representatives, California, Democrat.
House. It will take us approximately one year from the passage of that legislation to create this 500-person civilian reserve corps.

We see this as a prototype for a larger corps to be created. If you were to create a civilian reserve corps of 2000, and couple that with an active response corps of 250, and a stand-by response corps of 2000, we would be able to deploy about 1200 civilians overseas within sixty minutes, within sixty days of a decision.

(Audience Laughter)

A couple of other points. This capability is absolutely essential; this is understood. The U.S. government is going to have this capability at some point in the near future, and this capability can be used both by ourselves alone and in multi-lateral settings. S/CRS has excellent relations with our counterpart offices elsewhere around the world, and Clint was right to say that the U.S. government’s capability is not the first internationally,\textsuperscript{11} the greater capability probably belongs to our Canadian friends in the START office. They have a significant budget. They have the ability to put people in the field in large numbers which we do not have today. But if we establish the capabilities I have described, we will certainly launch to the forefront. We have excellent cooperation with our friends in the E.U. and the U.N. I have worked closely with Carolyn MacAskie,\textsuperscript{12} who I will speak with later this afternoon. This truly is the wave of the future.

MENZIES: Thank you very much. I should mention, too, that is a very good thing that you have mentioned, to hear of the developments and about the reserve. But I wanted to mention also that Daniel could almost get the award for “I told you so” for having—how should I put this—warned early and often that our efforts in Iraq were not adequately planned. Dan, where do you see the failures and how do you think the new approaches we are taking respond to that?

SERWER: I was not planning to start with Iraq, but I am just back from Baghdad and Kabul and I can say a few words about Iraq. You know, frankly, Iraq was done by a pick-up team—a pick-up team, which had no idea of the depths of the problems that we faced. And my colleagues and I have taken a close look at what went wrong in Iraq in a chapter in a book that I assume will be published this fall.

To give you the bottom line, what happened was they undermined their own plan basically. Their plan was decapitation—use the existing structures to govern Iraq with a new leadership. When the ministries were looted, that plan went by the wayside. You no longer


\textsuperscript{12} Carolyn MacAskie works for the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission.
had in Iraq the institutional setup to run a decapitated and bleeding government. And I actually believe that almost all the serious errors were made within a month or two months of victory and that we have played catch-up ever since, sometimes with enormous courage, sometimes with enormous results, not always, but still playing catch-up, and we have not caught up because the situation has largely spiraled out of control.

I just got back. I was in Baghdad recently at a reconciliation conference for a community called Mahmoudiyah; it is a community you know as the Triangle of Death on the Southern end of Baghdad. It was a reconciliation conference for tribal sheikhs, and they, both Sunni and Shia, very much wanted to begin to view the issues that could stabilize their community, and that has been made possible by a much better security situation.

I do not share the view of those who say that nothing has changed. I was in Baghdad for five days. I think I heard two detonations in five days, when you heard two detonations an hour at some points in Baghdad. Certainly the situation has improved.

But can the Iraqis hold the situation we have created? I think the answer for that question is no one believes that they can. In addition, I hasten to add that the Iraqis who came to help us in Baghdad through Tikrit, most of them reported that the situation with those places is not secure in any part because of the lack of American military presence. So it is a very mixed picture, certainly not uniformly deteriorating, as the Iraq Study Group said almost a year ago. I was Executive Director in the Iraq Study Group’s report after, and we certainly thought at that time—December of last year [2006]—that there was a marked deterioration in the situation. I would not say that right now on all fronts, but I also would not say that I see much possibility for anything that even remotely resembles the goals set out in the administration’s paper on victory.

John, I am wondering if I could add a word or two to what John said, because I think John talked about two absolutely essential components of the future of how we approach these operations: inter-agency coordination and the civilian reserve. Our institute, which did help to conceive of the civilian reserve, is now working on two other things that I know are also very close to John’s heart, and I wanted to mention it here.

One is the issue of developing doctrine. You cannot just have a group of civilians who know how to fix water systems know how to run a local government. You have to have them working within a strategic framework that they all understand in advance and that the mili-
tary folks also understand in advance. And it is my belief that that common framework should be more or less constant from operation to operation, and if it is done at a sufficient level of generality, that can happen.

So with John’s—what shall I say—blessing, USIP and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute of the U.S. Army, from which there are a number of people in the room, we are working together with a lot of NGOs, with a lot of other organizations, trying to develop a draft doctrine that would be the bedrock on which the civilian reserve would sit in a certain sense.

If you develop doctrine, you have to train, as well; you have to train whether you have doctrine or not. At the moment, there are many different ideas about training. Our institute is forging ahead with the development of an education training center, sometimes known as The Peace Academy, that will sit at the new headquarters of USIP almost across the street from the State Department on the Mall at 23rd [Street] and Constitution [Avenue]. And the unique thing, I think, about the USIP’s training capability is that we have the capability to train military, civilians, and NGOs in the same place, and I think that is, outside the academic world, in government, here in the government world, there are actually very few other institutions that can do that kind of training.

And I think, if you do not want to see more Iraqs, these are some of the essential elements: interagency coordination that John talked about, the civilian reserve, a professional civilian reserve that has doctrine and is well-trained and well-trained in a way that is joint. And by joint, I do not mean only civilian and military, but also NGOs and schools.

MENZIES: Thank you Daniel. Jim, you have been the author of, I think, one of the most successful post-conflict reconstructions, but also you played an absolutely critical role in what was initially not a military intervention role, or at least not a military formal intervention in Afghanistan. What do you think are the deficits in what we are doing? What should we be doing differently? How does it effect the neighborhood.

DOBBINS: Thank you, John. I think both Clint Williamson and John Herbst do deserve a lot of credit for turning around an administration that was initially disinclined to get seriously engaged in post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building, but I am a little worried about the durability of the changes that they have been able to intro-

13 Nongovernmental organizations.
duce because when administrations change, a lot of good things, as well as some bad things, can get thrown overboard. And if you re-
member back, looking at the American occupation of Iraq, you might think that this was the first time we had ever done something like this. It was one unanticipated challenge after another; it was one im-
provised response after another.

In fact, of course, it was not the first time that we had done something like this. In fact, it was the seventh time in a little more than a decade that the United States had liberated a society and then tried to rebuild it. In 1991, we had gone into Kuwait. We then went into Somalia, and to Haiti, and to Bosnia, and to Kosovo, and to Af-
ghanistan, and finally, into Iraq. And of those seven societies, six are Muslim. The only one of them that is not Muslim is Haiti. So, when the American Army went into Iraq in 2003, there was no army in the world with more experience in nation-building than the American. And incidentally, there was no Western army in the world with more experience operating within a Muslim society than the American Army. So you have to ask how we could do this so often and yet do it so badly.

And the lesson, and the reason goes back to the controversies that surrounded the whole nation-building paradigm in the 1990s that tended to discredit this form of behavior, even as it was begin-
ing to bear considerable success. The pace of these kinds of mis-
sions grew very substantially after the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the United States invaded a new country about once every ten years, so you had Grenada, Dominican Republic, Lebanon, [and] Panama. In the ‘90s, that went up from once every ten years to once every two years, and the duration of these missions was much longer.

The U.N.’s record went even more quickly. During the Cold War, the U.N. launched a new peacekeeping operation on the aver-
age of about once every four years. Since 1989, the U.N. launches a new peacekeeping operation every six months. And these missions are now lasting eight to ten years. So, if you are doing one every two years, pretty soon you are doing three or four at the same time as the United States has done. If you are doing one every six months, you are doing two dozen at the same time, which is where the U.N. is at the moment.

And these are expensive, and they are intensive, manpower-intensive, and the U.S. Congress and the American public were get-
ing fed up with this in the 1990s. It was a new burden. We paid twenty-five percent of all the U.N.’s costs and, of course, one-hundred
percent of our own, and, at least in the early years, it did not look like a particularly useful form of activity. You know, in the popular mind, it is the failures that linger. For every one person who can remember what the U.N. did in Cambodia or Namibia or El Salvador, there are a hundred who remember Rwanda or Srebrenica or have watched *Blackhawk Down*. And so these were the impressions that were formed and, as a result, when the new administration came in in 2001, they had pledged they were not going to do nation-building, and they were determined, when stuck with it, to do it very differently. And essentially, it fell overboard, everything that we had learned in the preceding decade.

And we had learned a good deal in the preceding decade. Both the U.N. and the U.S. slowly got better at these operations. If you look at the progression of the United States from Somalia to Haiti to Bosnia and Kosovo, you find each of them was better prepared, more professionally managed, and had a smoother transition than the ones that preceded it. And the U.N. had a similar improvement in its success rate. But this was tossed overboard, first in Afghanistan and then particularly in Iraq, where we tried a sort of a nation-building on the cheap approach, as if the lessons that we learned in the ‘90s could be ignored, and those lessons were important.

They were, first of all, that there is a big relationship between input and output, that military manpower and economic assistance are key variables for producing security and economic growth. And if you put in low levels of military manpower and economic assistance, what you get are low levels of security and economic growth. This was a lesson that escaped the administration in its early years.

Similarly, the role of neighboring states. If the neighbors do not want you to put a broken society back together again, you are not going to succeed because they simply have too much access and too much influence, and too much at stake to stand aside. They are going to interfere and they are often going to interfere in quite unhelpful ways.

So I think that it is to be applauded that the administration has embraced this paradigm. They do not call it nation-building; they call it stabilization or reconstruction, but they essentially mean the same thing, and [the administration has] begun to take it more seriously. I am concerned, however, if the administration’s reaction to the initial failures in Iraq is we have to do better next time. It is not clear that that is the American people’s reaction. The American people’s reaction may well be we better not do this again next time, a sort of post–Viet Nam phenomenon, where we forgot everything we
knew about counterinsurgency and went back to defending the Fulda Gap, and the result was that we spent five years in Iraq relearning those lessons very painfully. And it was not until General Patraeus was assigned that traditional approaches to counterinsurgency that had been worked out through dozens of different experiences by the United States and other nations were finally applied and have begun to have some modicum of success.

So I am concerned that we may go through another one of these rejections, and I just hope that the American people can somehow retain two conclusions at the same time. Yes, sure, do not invade large hostile Middle Eastern countries on the basis of flawed intelligence from a very narrow and unrepresentative coalition. Okay, that is a good lesson. But if Iraq was a war of choice and the choice is a poor one, Afghanistan rightfully was, and both of them left us with heavy burdens for reconstruction and stabilization. And we are going to find that, while we do not have to engage in every one of these missions that appears on the horizon, we are going to be engaged in some of them, and we are going to really have to learn a lot better.

So I hope that Iraq does not color the American perceptions of this activity in an irremediable way because it is important to recognize that, despite the occasional failures, and sometimes quite spectacular failures, there are tens of millions of people around the world who are living today at peace, and in most cases under freely elected governments, because American troops or NATO troops or European troops or U.N. troops went in and separated the combatants, disarmed the contending factions, oversaw a process of holding elections, and then stayed around long enough to ensure that those governments could take hold.

And so it is, in places like Mozambique and Cambodia and El Salvador and Namibia and Sierra Leone and Liberia and East Timor and Albania and Macedonia and Bosnia and Kosovo, that, as I said, people are living in peace, and in almost all those cases under freely elected governments, because the international community, in one guise or another, conducted those kinds of operations. And it is going to be very important that we continue to develop our capabilities and that the kinds of changes that Clint and John have succeeded in introducing endure and are taken up by succeeding administrations.

MENZIES: Kris?

BOON: Just a quick question. The terrorist threat has become a very apparent issue on the ground for Americans involved abroad, and I am wondering how this is being contained in terms of current
post-conflict reconstruction and whether this is influencing American policy generally on post-conflict reconstruction.

SERWER: Well it is having a dramatic effect on capabilities in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In Iraq none of us traveled outside the International Zone without shooters and armored cars. It is not a great way to do business. There are a lot of courageous people though—and this is invisible to the American public—but there are several hundred very courageous advisors to ministries in Iraq, and they work quite frequently in Iraqi ministries, including the Interior Ministry, and it is just a downright dangerous thing to do, and we owe a great debt to those people who are doing it.

But our capabilities are severely limited in Iraq because of the security situation. In Afghanistan, I think we are in a very anomalous situation. I walked on the street in Kabul, freely without body armor, without armored cars, without shooters, and I felt perfectly safe. In fact, there is very little record of Western civilians being attacked in Afghanistan in recent years, and it really is quite safe—remarkably so.

Nevertheless, the embassy, all the aid contractors are under severe security restrictions that are likely to continue, if I understood what the Ambassador told me when I called him. And that is a real problem because Afghanistan is, in many ways, more hopeful than Iraq, and if we are not able to bring all of our tools there—and I might add the U.N. is quite restricted in their movements in Afghanistan as well, so I think it is having a dramatically negative impact in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

HERBST: There is another element to this too. When you put people out in the field or, in my office, we would plant the people in the field, security is an important consideration. Our folks are being taught in going into dangerous environments, environments where traditionally the State Department does not put people. But by the same token, we have to provide a subsystem for them, and what that means is that we plan operations, we plan a budget for operations. And that drives the cost considerably, and that is also dangerous.

MENZIES: I would like to open the floor to our audience, particularly our students for some questions. We have a few minutes left and I would like to take full advantage of it. We have microphones or if they can just shout out a question and we will repeat it for everybody. Do I see hands? Yes.

AUDIENCE SPEAKER: Hi. I am not a student. My name is Jenna Slotin, and I am from the International Peace Academy. I decided to come to New Jersey from my office in Midtown. I thank you for your presentation today.
One question I have is that, you touched on training and doctrine with respect to a civilian reserve corps, and certainly, getting trained professionals in place is critical for the person who is picked. But I think a very important and a close second is that those individuals are not only trained to set up the judiciary, the correction system, public administration, but trained to transfer those skills to local officials. And I think we have seen in the field of development, and now post-conflict reconstruction, capacity building is not done well, and the transfer of those skills is a serious challenge. But that is what is going to prevent us from needing to go back five years down the road; setting up an effective and capable state is of primary importance.

And so, I wonder if you are taking measures to integrate into the work training for a civilian reserve corps [with] training capacity for local officials.

HERBST: Right now, we do not have a civilian reserve corps. We are doing planning to provide training for them. You can be sure that what we have in mind is capacity transfer. We do not want to be in any specific country any longer than we have to. So the purpose is to put people on the ground who are able to oversee the provision of services, one, and two, to make sure that they train local people or find the right local people who continue that provision of services so they can leave.

SERWER: And maybe I can add just a word. That is one of our projected courses is in fact on the military and transferring the capability, but I recently had to re-do it as well, already. I mentioned our Reconciliation Conference from Mahmoudiyah; it was actually conducted by a set of Iraqi facilitators who we trained a couple of years before. I was there to make sure things kept on track and had a role to play, especially in preparing some of the statements. The actual activity was conducted by Iraqis who were conducting such activities in their own communities day by day.

WILLIAMSON: If I could just point out one other point. Just from a practical point of view, having done this in Kosovo and again in Iraq, there is always a tension between two objectives.

In Kosovo there was a big concern because there was a lack of stability there and that rule of law was not succeeding. So when I went in after two years of the mission being off the ground, I had a very strong mandate to go in and have a more robust interventionist policy, using international judges and prosecutors, where we were actually taking away some of the responsibilities that had already evolved to locals.
And so you had competing pressures. I had people from the development side saying, you have got to do more in terms of capacity building. Every time we would start down that road, you would get the competing pressure from NATO countries saying, you have got to do more about crime so that we can get our troops out here. And this is a dynamic that goes on in every one of these settings, and while it is easy to talk about doing capacity building, you are always going to come up against this hurdle as you try to implement it.