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“V.I.P” VIDEOGRAPHER INTIMIDATION PROTECTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROTECT CITIZENS WHO VIDEOTAPE THE POLICE

David Murphy*

I. Introduction

With each passing day, more incidents involving police officers, private citizens, and video cameras are emerging on the internet, making the news, and sometimes appearing on civil and criminal dockets.¹ When these individuals bring these incidents to public attention, more people actively seek to record police, which creates more opportunities for police officers to intimidate videographers.² On YouTube, an internet user can watch hours of uploaded footage showing police officers aggressively confronting videographers.³ These encounters between police officers and videographers raise questions about police conduct and the rights of private citizens to film police. Several courts, police departments, and legal scholars have addressed these questions, but have failed to reach a consensus as to whether police will stop intimidating

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² See sources cited supra note 1. The titles of these videos and related posts on the internet indicate that at least some private citizens are actively filling the role of providing public oversight to police conduct. As “how to” and other oversight videos continue to be uploaded and earn views, the amount of videos being produced is likely to increase, thus increasing the likelihood for confrontations with police over the use of the video camera.

videographers.\(^4\) Thus, the power to protect individuals and their rights to film police officers lies in the hands of legislatures.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently addressed some of these questions when it decided *Glik v. Cunniffe.*\(^5\) Boston police officers arrested Simon Glik for using his cellular phone’s digital video camera to film several police officers arresting a young man.\(^6\) Glik was subsequently charged with violation of Massachusetts’ Anti-Wiretapping Statute\(^7\) and two other state-law offenses which the Court deemed baseless and thereby dismissed.\(^8\) Ultimately, the First Circuit held that defendant police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from Glik’s constitutional claims because Glik had “clearly established First Amendment rights in filming the officers in public space.”\(^9\)

*Glik* demonstrates that the First Circuit is willing to defend a First Amendment right to videotape police officers. But not all courts extend a public right to film police officers, and the precise source of the right to film police within the First Amendment is somewhat elusive.\(^10\) Arguably, the law is leaning in the direction of “protecting” individuals who film police officers in public, but police officers may be actively suppressing the use of video cameras to record police conduct.\(^11\) If a First Amendment right to film police officers exists, or at least ought to exist, then state legislatures must protect videographers from overreaching police intimidation.

The purpose of this Comment is to discuss police intimidation of videographers and to provide a legislative model that protects videographers who film police conduct. Part II discusses how filming police in public is protected First Amendment activity. Part III exposes

\(^4\) See discussion infra Parts III–IV.  
\(^5\) Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).  
\(^6\) Id.  
\(^7\) MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000).  
\(^8\) Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.  
\(^9\) Id. at 85.  
\(^10\) See infra Part II.  
\(^11\) See infra Part II.
how the current legal environment incentivizes police officers to intimidate videographers who attempt to film police conduct. Part IV scrutinizes the current framework of deterrents designed to prevent police misconduct and discusses why these safeguards fail to protect videographers. Part V proposes a bright-line rule imposing harsh punishments to effectively deter police officers from intimidating law-abiding videographers who capture police conduct on camera. Lastly, Part VI will provide the conclusion of this discussion.

II. Filming Police Officers in Public and First Amendment Protection

This section provides an overview of the ambiguous First Amendment right to film police in public and discusses how legal and academic consensus is trending towards protection for videographers. Some courts have already held that the First Amendment protects filming police officers, but these courts have failed to precisely explain such a right’s origins and limitations.12 Other courts, however, have not recognized a broad right to film police within the First Amendment.13 Despite this dissonance, a First Amendment right to film police officers in public will probably solidify in the future based on recent court decisions and legal scholarship arguing for such a right.14

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12 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs “had a First-Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, manner and place restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct,” and that the First Amendment “protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property,” but failing to clearly elaborate where in the First Amendment such a powerful right exists); State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *33–34 (Sept. 27, 2010) (“[S]tatutes which implicate the free speech protections of the First Amendment must be narrowly construed.”).

13 See, e.g., Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006) (explaining that the act of photographing, by itself, is not sufficiently communicative and therefore not subject to First-Amendment protection, regardless of whether or not the subject is a public servant).

In relevant part, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

Despite lacking direct reference to the language of the First Amendment, Glik recognized an “unambiguous” right to gather and disseminate information related to matters of public interest, especially police conduct. Likewise, the Supreme Court has indicated that First Amendment protection extends beyond the press, and to individuals like Glik, in regard to gathering public information.

But precisely how the First Amendment affords such protection is not clearly established. In Glik, First Circuit Judge Lipez remarked that “the First Amendment’s aegis extends further than the text’s proscription on laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,’ and encompasses a range of conduct” related to information-gathering and dissemination. To connect these principles to the filming of police officers in public, the court declared that “[t]he filming of . . . police officers performing their responsibilities” is a “cardinal First Amendment interest in protecting and promoting” information-gathering, dissemination, and “free discussion of government affairs.” The court easily categorized Glik’s activity as

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15 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16 Glik, 655 F.3d at 85 (holding that “though not unqualified, a citizen’s right to film government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and well-established liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment”).
18 See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82. In opinions such as Fordyce, the court merely glanced over “the First Amendment right to film matters of public interest” without sufficiently explaining where the right is derived from. Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).
19 Glik, 655 F.3d at 82 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (extending the First Amendment’s reach in Glik by attributing that it “goes beyond protection of the press and self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw”).
20 Id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)); see also Smith v. City of Cummings, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) ) ( “[T]he First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to
information-gathering and dissemination but it failed to clearly support why that activity was actually protected by the First Amendment. Circuit Judge Lipez strongly supported his position with case law like Smith v. City of Cumming and Fordyce v. City of Seattle. However, upon closer inspection, those Supreme Court opinions merely addressed a videographer’s First Amendment rights in passing and failed to precisely derive the source of protection from the language of the First Amendment. The majority of the sources used in Glik are somewhat ambiguous as to how the right to film matters of public concern is actually protected First Amendment activity.

However, one source provides more specific insight on how filming police officers is protected First Amendment activity. Glik cited Robinson v. Fetterman, which held that individuals have a free-speech right to film police officers in the course of their public activities. By at least referencing the Speech Clause (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”), the court in Robinson modestly provided some legitimate constitutional support for what Glik would ultimately declare to be a “clearly-established” First Amendment right to film police officers in public.
Branching off from the Speech Clause, some legal scholars have more thoroughly derived the existence of a First Amendment right to film police officers. The right to gather and disseminate information may be derived from three elements within the First Amendment: the Speech Clause ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech"); the Press Clause ("or of the press"); and the Petition Clause ("the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances"). The Speech Clause protects the direct dissemination of speech, whether the dissemination is the speech itself or conduct that necessarily facilitates the speech. Similarly, the Press Clause is interpreted to protect reasonable conduct antecedent to expression, such as legitimate means of news-gathering. Lastly, the Petition Clause protects information-gathering for private citizens seeking resolution of legal disputes and for general purposes of self-governance.

Conceivably, filming police officers could satisfy all three First Amendment clauses that form the right to gather and disseminate information. Hypothetically, a videographer could decide to make a documentary about the state of law enforcement in his community by video-recording the local police on duty. The videographer’s commentary about law enforcement would be the “speech” itself in satisfaction of the Speech Clause and, absent additional conduct

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28 Wasserman, supra note 14, at 665.
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30 A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 797–99 (9th Cir. 2006).
31 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First-Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”); Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249, 354 (2004) (noting that the Speech Clause and Press Clause may not necessarily even be separate sources of the right to disseminate information, but traditional press gets extensive First-Amendment protection for its structure news-gathering conduct).
warranting police intervention, would be facially reasonable.\textsuperscript{33} The Press Clause would protect the actual act of filming the police officers in public because it is a necessary and common means of news-gathering.\textsuperscript{34} Lastly, since a documentary could make a comment about law enforcement, the documentary would have a general purpose for self-governance, thus satisfying the Petition Clause.\textsuperscript{35} Albeit somewhat simplistic, this model provides how filming police is protected First Amendment activity directly from the language of the First Amendment itself.

Alternatively, instead of focusing on a right to gather and disseminate information, some scholars argue that a right to film police officers can be derived from “freedom of expression.”\textsuperscript{36} For instance, captured images from photography or video-recording can be “like words inscribed on parchment” and therefore fall within the realm of First Amendment protection.\textsuperscript{37} The analogy is that a videographer and his recording are the same as a writer to his writings. Since the government cannot interfere with a writer chronicling his thoughts and beliefs, likewise it cannot disrupt a videographer recording in public.\textsuperscript{38} However, courts have rejected this view, stating that an image, or video, is not necessarily expression that warrants protection because no idea is communicated from merely recording.\textsuperscript{39} Courts, in determining whether an isolated expression

\textsuperscript{34} See id. Filming or videotaping is an essential part of reporting information and without the right to video-record, information-gathering could not possibly be effective as it is. Id. (“Videotaping is a legitimate means of gathering information for public dissemination.”).
\textsuperscript{35} Debate on public issues should be uninhibited even if they include unpleasant attacks and scrutiny on the government and public officials. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“For speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government. . . . [D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”).
\textsuperscript{36} See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 379.
\textsuperscript{37} Id. (“The government is barred from intermeddling . . . in both speech and thought . . . [which] undergird the constitutional commitments to personal autonomy and popular sovereignty.”).
\textsuperscript{38} Id. (“The government is barred from intermeddling . . . in both speech and thought . . . [which] undergird the constitutional commitments to personal autonomy and popular sovereignty.”).
\textsuperscript{39} Montefusco v. Nassau Cnty., 39 F. Supp. 2d 231, 241–42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that to warrant protection, “there must still be (1) a message to be communicated and (2) an audience to receive that message regardless of the medium in which the message is sought to be expressed. . . . [I]f either is lacking, there is absolutely nothing to transmit from ‘mind to mind’”); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
was protectable as “symbolic speech,” have weighed the presence or absence of a “message conveyed” in the act which could constitute expression.\textsuperscript{40} Compared to the right to gather and disseminate information, the freedom of expression analysis is somewhat weaker.

Overall, although courts have failed to sufficiently discern a First Amendment right to film police officers in public, a solid argument exists for such a right. The right to gather and disseminate information, when derived from the Speech Clause, the Press Clause, and the Petition Clause, fairly applies to a situation like \textit{Glik}, where a concerned citizen publicly sought to document the activity of law enforcement officers with his video camera.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, the right to film police officers in public has at least some identifiable roots in the plain language of the First Amendment.

\textbf{III. Incentives for Police Officers to Intimidate Videographers}

Despite “sweeping” decisions like \textit{Glik} which strongly protect videographers’ rights,\textsuperscript{42} police engage in arrests and intimidation tactics to suppress videographers from filming police conduct in public.\textsuperscript{43} This Part of the Comment discusses why. Specifically, this Part focuses on three aspects of the legal environment which compel some police officers to actively confront, intimidate, and even arrest individuals for filming police conduct in a public space: first, how police are often threatened by videographers; second, the advantages police wish to maintain in courtrooms; and lastly, the confusing state of anti-wiretapping statutes and laws of general applicability which often falsely justify arrests. Because of these three conditions, police officers

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\item[40]See \textit{Montefusco}, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 241–42; Kreimer, \textit{supra} note 14, at 371.
\item[41]See \textit{Glik} v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).
\item[43]\textit{ReasonTV}, \textit{The Government’s War on Cameras!}, \textit{YOUTUBE} (May 26, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=LY0MUARefisM#! (interviewing Professor Eugene Volokh, who remarks “as it happens, the unfortunate reality is that often officers can intimidate people into not doing things they otherwise legally could”).
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will continue to suppress video recording of police conduct regardless of how the First Amendment applies to the issue.

Police are often uncomfortable and threatened by civilians with video cameras. The basic reality is that some police officers do not appreciate being videotaped, which results in aggressive reactions from police officers toward videographers. Generally, “[p]olice, like many civilians, are often camera-shy” and “dislike being recorded in embarrassing situations and may be concerned that dissemination of their images may put them at risk of retaliation.” Additionally, police officers often view videography as a challenge to their authority. Considering those challenges to authority and the fear of retaliation, the problem for police is how to respond where every citizen is a potential threat of surveillance and scrutiny. Police face potential bombardment from videographers since recording devices are cheaper and handier than ever. With the proliferation of cheap and handy recording technology, police encounters in public are more commonly captured on portable media that is disseminated almost instantly, allowing the public to constantly scrutinize and form opinions of the police.

44 See, e.g., Police v. Civilians w/ Video Camera, supra note 3 (where the filmed police officer admitted, in apologizing to the videographers after they had a discussion with his superior, that he “was trying to intimidate” the videographers).
45 See id.
46 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357.
47 See Daniel Rowinski, Police Fight Cellphone Recordings, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 12, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/local/maasachusetts/articles/2010/01/12/police_fight_cellphone_recordings/ (quoting David Ardia, Director of the Citizen Media Law Project at Harvard’s Berman Center for Internet and Society, “[p]olice are not used to ceding power, and [video cameras] are forcing them to cede power”).
48 Kevin Johnson, For Cops, Citizen Videos Bring Increased Scrutiny, USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-10-15-1Avideocop15_CV_N.htm (quoting San Jose Police Chief Rob Davis, “[t]here is no city not at risk of a video showing an officer doing something wrong . . . [t]he question, when one of these videos surface, is what we do about it”).
49 Wasserman, supra note 14, at 617–18 (“Technology improvement means that recorded evidence of police-public encounters, good and bad, will be the norm, more frequently and more widely disseminated, within and without the news media.”).
Police assert that this trend is a threat to certain societal interests. Jim Pasco, the executive director of the Fraternal Order of Police, remarked that the proliferation of cheap video equipment has “a chilling effect on some officers who are now afraid to act for fear of retribution by video.” Pasco’s statement implies that video causes police officers to second-guess their actions before they act. This means that the police officers either act differently or put less consideration into their actions when they know their conduct is not recorded on camera. If a police officer knew that his conduct was lawful, justified, and otherwise correct, he would not hesitate from acting regardless of whether or not a videographer is recording his conduct. A police officer’s hesitation when he knows his conduct is being recorded reinforces the argument that the filming of police officers in public causes police officers to lawfully and thoughtfully conduct police business. Pasco and the police seem to consider recorded observation of police conduct to be a defect of society’s new power to digitally record in the public, but perhaps it is actually a positive feature which reduces occurrences of police misconduct.

As the voice of the world’s largest organization of law enforcement officers, Pasco established that some police are threatened by the concept that they are under surveillance. In an interview with Reason Magazine’s Radley Balko, Pasco supported the arrests of individuals

51 Johnson, supra note 48 (reporting that some police organizations believe “videotaping officers poses broad risks that reach beyond internet embarrassments: It could cause officers to hesitate in life-threatening situations”).
52 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, THE VOICE OF OUR NATION’S LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, http://www.fop.net (last visited Nov. 5, 2011) (“The Fraternal Order of Police is the world’s largest organization of sworn law enforcement officers, with more than 325,000 members in more than 2,100 lodges. We are the voice of those who dedicate their lives to protecting and serving our communities. . . . [N]o one knows police officers better than the FOP.”).
53 Johnson, supra note 48.
54 See id.
55 Radley Balko, Police Officers Don’t Check Their Civil Rights at the Station House Door, REASON (Aug. 9, 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/08/09/police-officers-dont-check-the (referencing how the Washington Post, USA Today, the Washington Examiner, the Washington Times, and other commentators have “all weighed in on the side that citizen photography and videography can be an important check to keep police officers accountable and transparent”).
56 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, supra note 52.
57 See Johnson, supra note 48.
like Anthony Graber, who faced over fifteen years in prison for filming his own traffic stop, because the video could be manipulated to negatively portray police officers. Pasco elaborated that civilian video could be edited or taken out of context, and when the video is not in the custody or control of law enforcement, it is rightly inadmissible as evidence. Further, Pasco asserted that “[l]etting people record police officers is an extreme and intrusive response to a problem that’s so rare it might as well not exist. It would be like saying we should do away with DNA evidence because there’s a one in a billion chance that it could be wrong.” The “problem” that Pasco is referring to is police misconduct that is uncovered by civilian videography. Overall, if Pasco truly represents the largest law enforcement organization in the world, then the law-enforcement community views the act of filming a police officer as “extreme and intrusive.” This anxiety explains why police officers may be particularly aggressive toward videographers.

An important reason why video threatens police officers is that civilian recordings have revealed serious inconvenient truths and exposed horrible incidents of police misconduct—most notably, the Rodney King incident. Arguably, prohibitions on video recording and image


59 Balko, supra note 55.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 See id.
63 Id. Pasco is not referring to conduct surrounding recording or police officers, just the act of recording alone. Id. (Pasco remarks “[y]ou have 960,000 police officers in this country, and millions of contacts between those officers and citizens. I’ll bet you can’t name 10 incidents [sic] where a citizen video has shown a police officer to have lied on a police report. . . . Letting people record police officers is an extreme and intrusive.”).
capture “are deployed to suppress inconvenient truths.” The police’s desire to censor videographers supports the argument that police officers are interested in controlling public perception of their conduct, and not just interferences with police business. Since police record their own conduct at nearly all times they are on duty, justifications for censoring videographers from recording the exact same conduct seem unreasonable. Police previously maintained a monopoly over the ability to record public confrontations using cameras in cruisers and recording equipment attached to officers. However, the power to record is no longer unilaterally in police possession since private citizens can cheaply record their lives with minimal effort. Potential First Amendment rights in filming police, broad availability of recording devices, and cultural obsession with posting personal videos on the internet eliminates any shroud of secrecy that police could maintain in the public discharge of their duties. This threatening environment encourages police officers to either act appropriately at all times, being conscious that they are under surveillance, or intimidate videographers to reduce their incentives to film police conduct. Thus, some police officers seek to chill the public from filming their conduct because that conduct may be illegal, while others like Pasco, find the act of recording


65 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 383.
66 Wasserman, supra note 14, at 651 (stating that “the basic act of recording officers in the performance of their official duties does not burden the officer or interfere ability”); Goode, supra note 42.
68 See Rowinski, supra note 47 (“[T]he proliferation of cellphone and other technology has equipped people to record actions in public.”).
69 Id.
70 See Balko, supra note 55.
police to be inherently intrusive. It is for these reasons that police officers are incentivized to confront, intimidate, and arrest videographers.

When the biggest threats to police credibility were merely eye witnesses disseminating their accounts of an incident, police could at least attempt to plausibly deny embarrassing or illegal conduct. However, once the availability of portable recordable media exploded, police officers lost the advantages of plausibility, deniability, and controlled documentation of the incident. In “he-said, she-said” factual disputes, police officers are usually given the benefit of the doubt during proceedings. In forming the record, police are accustomed to substantial deference, and many prefer to be in a position where they can shape the perception of their actions without competing against a digital record. In cases of police misconduct, the facts are often reduced to a citizen’s word against the police officer’s word. Juries are inclined to believe police officers moreso than ordinary citizens. So, prior to the widespread use of recording devices, police officers maintained a strategic advantage in creating the record.

As portable videography proliferates, police lose their strategic courtroom advantage. For instance, after Prince George’s County riot police beat Jack McKenna, police officers provided sworn statements that McKenna “struck [the] officers and their horses, causing minor

71 Id.
72 See INT’L ASSOC. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 67, at 5–6 (discussing the history of video recording in police cruisers, effectively beginning in the 1980s).
73 See Rowinski, supra note 47.
74 See Sanchez, supra note 50 (quoting James Green, an attorney for Sharron Tasha Ford, a woman for whom the ACLU of Florida filed a First-Amendment lawsuit after she was arrested for videotaping an encounter between police and her teenage son at a movie theatre, “[j]udges and juries want to believe law enforcement . . . they want to believe police officers and unless you have credible evidence to contradict police officers, it’s often very difficult to believe the word of a citizen over a police officer”).
75 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357.
76 See, e.g., Youa Vang Lee v. Anderson, Civ. No. 07-1205, 2009 WL 1287832, at *9 (D. Minn. May 6, 2009) (concluding, despite heavily disputed facts, that both the police officer who shot the plaintiff’s son and the city were entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of a policy or custom to be the cause of the police officer’s alleged misconduct).
injuries.” These sworn statements were directly contradicted by amateur video footage of the incident, which indisputably demonstrated that McKenna never touched the police officers or their horses but was actually calmly retreating when multiple riot police battered him against a wall and beat with him batons as he lay on the ground. Ultimately, the state dropped all charges against McKenna and the Prince George’s County Police Chief, Roberto Hylton, suspended one police officer.

As the McKenna case illustrated, police officers can lose their credibility very quickly if outside recordings are brought to the attention of the public and the court. Video evidence is so effective because the images provide a “direct, unmediated view of the reality they depict,” and viewers, such as jury members, are more likely to accept those images as “credible representations” of how events actually transpired. Compared to verbal descriptions of events, images are often more powerful for the viewer because the character of the medium is self-authenticating. When officers are caught “blatantly contradict[ing]” video evidence, the result is fierce public criticism and sometimes suspension, firing, embarrassment, or civil damages. Thus, expanding the availability of video reduces the likelihood that a police officer could successfully make a false statement.

80 Blackburn, supra note 78.
81 See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 619 (quoting RICHARD K. SHERWIN, POPULAR CULTURE AND LAW xiv (Richard K. Sherwin ed., 2006)).
82 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 386.
83 See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 651–52; see also Trymaine Lee, Police Officer Who Shoved a Bicyclist Is Off the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at A24. But see, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 343 (1983) (establishing that police officers who commit perjury have an absolute immunity against suits for money damages because allowing officers to be sued for their testimony as witnesses “might undermine not only their contribution to the judicial process but also the effective performance of their other public duties”).
Additionally, video evidence is particularly important in the resolution of civil rights claims that follow allegations of police misconduct. For example, video evidence can drastically change the outcomes of § 1983 civil rights actions.\(^8^4\) Courts understand video evidence as “singularly powerful” and “an unambiguous source of proof.”\(^8^5\) Fundamentally, video is perceived as truthful, objective, and generally unambiguous which often gives the video evidence dispositive weight in determining the outcome of the civil rights claim.\(^8^6\) Because videography has this power, police are tempted to preserve their advantage in recording by preventing outside videographers from ever capturing police conduct in the first place.\(^8^7\) Since a videographer may capture police misconduct that the officer cannot plausibly deny, police have to choose between acting appropriately or preventing the creation of evidence of misconduct. As a result of this dilemma, some police officers have chosen the latter option, and the result is intimidation, harassment, and sometimes arrests of videographers who film police officers.\(^8^8\)

When police arrest videographers, the videographers often demand justification for the arrest.\(^8^9\) Police officers commonly cite either the local jurisdiction’s anti-wiretapping statute\(^9^0\) or

\(^8^4\) See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (discussing how the “existence in the record of a videotape capturing the events in question” is an “added wrinkle” to the resolution of the case).

\(^8^5\) Wasserman, supra note 14, at 607; see also Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 239–40 (6th Cir. 2007); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d 1260, 1262 n.1 (11th Cir. 2007).

\(^8^6\) Wasserman, supra note 14, at 607.

\(^8^7\) See Rowinski, supra note 47.

\(^8^8\) See sources cited supra note 3.

\(^8^9\) See sources cited supra note 3.

\(^9^0\) 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-31 (1975); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 42.20.310 (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-60-120 (West 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-304 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-189 (West 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 1335 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.03 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 711-1111 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6702 (West 2006); ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-2 (West 2006); IND. CODE § 35-33.5-1 (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6101 (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 526.020 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1303 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 710 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.539 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 542.402 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.650 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-3 (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-287 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-15-02 (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29533.52 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13. § 176.3 (West 2006).
general laws such as obstruction of justice or failure to obey a police order.\footnote{91} Because of the confusing state of these laws, especially the anti-wiretapping statutes, citizens are often ignorant of precisely how the law applies to their videography, which allows police officers to intimidate videographers.\footnote{92} Although police may say otherwise, no law directly prohibits a videographer from filming or photographing things in public.\footnote{93} Nevertheless, some police still attempt to combat the spread of public surveillance of police conduct through other existing statutes and “creative prosecutorial discretion.”\footnote{94}

Police often rely on anti-wiretapping statutes\footnote{95} to arrest civilians who insist on recording the police officers without their consent.\footnote{96} In most states and under federal jurisdictions, the anti-wiretapping statutes only require one party to consent for legal recording or eavesdropping of a communication.\footnote{97} In these “one-party-consent” jurisdictions, if one person consents to the recording of a communication, the police may not lawfully arrest the person who is being recorded. However, multi-party-consent jurisdictions require consent from all parties involved in the communication. This can create confusion for videographers, as they may wonder if they have the right to consent to recording, especially when multiple parties are involved. For example, if the police are recording a conversation, the police may arrest the person who was being recorded if they did not consent.

In jurisdictions with one-party-consent, the police may attempt to create confusion or intimidate the videographer by claiming that the law is unconstitutional and violating the First Amendment.\footnote{98} For example, in Maryland, police may cite the wiretap statute as unconstitutional and violating the First Amendment.\footnote{99} However, this is often not the case, as the laws are typically constitutional and do not violate the First Amendment.

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\footnote{91}{See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 357.}
\footnote{92}{See sources cited supra note 90.}
\footnote{93}{See Kreimer, supra note 14, at 378.}
\footnote{94}{See sources cited supra note 90. Only twelve jurisdictions in the United States have two-party consent requirements in the wiretap statute. These jurisdictions are: California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Washington. The Government’s War on Cameras!, supra note 43; see also Stossel, supra note 91.}
recording, including the person recording the communication, the conduct is legal.⁹⁸ Assuming the videographer is consenting to his own action, police cannot reasonably expect to prosecute or arrest a videographer in “one-party-consent” jurisdictions for anti-wiretapping reasons. However, Massachusetts and eleven other jurisdictions (“all-party-consent” jurisdictions) criminalize recording unless every party in the communication consents to the recording.⁹⁹

Amongst “all-party-consent” jurisdictions, the issue of whether or not police officers are protected by anti-wiretapping laws is hotly debated.¹⁰⁰ Some jurisdictions require that parties have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their communication in order to receive protection from anti-wiretapping statutes.¹⁰¹ A strong argument in these jurisdictions is that police officers do not have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” when conducting police business in public.¹⁰² Police officers ought not to expect privacy in public communication because of the public interest in police oversight, along with the fact that police communications in the line of public duty are generally less intimate than communications in other contexts.¹⁰³ In addressing this issue, some courts have found that police cannot enjoy a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the public discharge of their duties, while other courts have found that an expectation of privacy

⁹⁸ See Indiana Recording Law, CITZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/indiana/indiana-recording-law (last visited Jan. 17, 2012) (explaining that “you may record a telephone conversation if you are a party to the conversation or you get permission from one party to the conversation”). The purpose of the anti-wiretapping statutes in “one-party-consent” jurisdictions is to prevent a third party from recording a private conversation between two individuals without their consent. See id.
⁹⁹ See sources cited supra note 90.
¹⁰² See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965 (where the defendant validly but unsuccessfully argued that police officers do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their words during a traffic stop).
¹⁰³ See Dina Mishra, Undermining Excessive Privacy For Police: Citizen Tape Recording To Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1555 (2008).
is not necessary for a violation of an anti-wiretapping statute to occur.\textsuperscript{104} In jurisdictions which require a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” most courts have found that police officers are public officials, and as such, they are not afforded a reasonable expectation of privacy in the public discharge of their duties.\textsuperscript{105}

Another element of confusion added to these types of cases is the differentiation between video and audio recording.\textsuperscript{106} Many jurisdictions, in not requiring “all-party consent,” may still require that all parties to the communication be informed or put on notice that the conversation is being recorded.\textsuperscript{107} A party may provide notice by showing a video camera in plain sight.\textsuperscript{108} On the other hand, for conduct to be covered by an anti-wiretapping statute, it may also need to be an “oral communication,” which may exclude video from the scope of the anti-wiretapping statute.\textsuperscript{109} In \textit{Glik}, the police officer, assuming Massachusetts’ anti-wiretapping statute only applied to audio, asked Glik if his cellular phone recorded audio.\textsuperscript{110} It was only after Glik answered in the affirmative that police officers arrested him under color of the anti-wiretapping statute.\textsuperscript{111} In resolving \textit{Glik}, the First Circuit failed to differentiate between the audio and video aspects of Glik’s recording.\textsuperscript{112} Instead, the court simply declared that Glik had a “well

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See Hyde, 750 N.E.2d at 965 (upholding Michael Hyde’s conviction because the legislature expressly established a ban on surreptitious recording to protect privacy, even for police officers). \textit{But see} State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7 (Sept. 27, 2010) (remarking that “[t]hose of us who are public officials and are entrusted with the power of the state . . . should not expect our actions to be shielded from public observation. ‘Seq duis custodiet ipsos custodes?’ (Who watches the watchmen?)”).
\item See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing how the police officer only arrested Glik for illegal recording after he acknowledged that his cellular phone recorded audio).
\item Glik, 655 F.3d at 87.
\item See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000).
\item MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2000); Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
\item Glik, 655 F.3d at 79.
\item Id.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
established” right to film police officers in public without indicating precisely which aspect of Glik’s conduct was protected First Amendment activity.113

Overall, anti-wiretapping statutes are valuable for police officers seeking to suppress videographers. Since the laws lack clarity and well-defined scope, police can creatively and effectively cite anti-wiretapping statutes to intimidate even savvy videographers. However, if police do not assert charges from these anti-wiretapping statutes, they still have laws of general applicability at their disposal.114

Laws of general applicability are charges like obstruction of justice and may also include disobeying an officer, obstructing an investigation, interfering with an officer, failure to obey an officer, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, obstructing a street, and harassment.115 While many of these charges may be dismissed, people are still arrested, placed into squad cars, and carted away from the scene in the first place.116 Videographers may be fully within their rights to videotape the police, but after one confrontation they may expect intimidation, harassment, or arrest because often “nothing” happens to the police officers who make false arrests.117 Police are increasingly exercising laws of general applicability to suppress videographers from filming police conduct because citizens often do not know the laws, which allows police to think they can get away with applying the charges.118 Overall, the inconvenience and embarrassment of being arrested creates a chilling effect for videographers that makes laws of general applicability

113 Id. at 85.
114 See Stossel, supra note 91; Kreimer, supra note 14, at 361 (“Where wiretap prohibitions do not apply, officers faced with defiant videographers frequently turn to broader criminal statutes that provide substantial enforcement discretion.”).
115 Stossel, supra note 91.
116 Id.
117 Id. (quoting Radley Balko from the interview).
118 Kreimer, supra note 14, at 394 (“[O]ne growing source of litigation is the tendency of police officers to arrest photographers on trumped-up charges both as a way of preventing the spread of inconvenient truths and as a response to free-floating anxiety about individuals who remind officials of terrorists.”); ReasonTV, supra note 43.
another valuable tool for police officers who seek to suppress videographers from filming police conduct.  

IV. Safeguards to Police Misconduct are Ineffectively Protecting Videographers

When Radley Balka said that “nothing” happens to police officers who unlawfully intimidate videographers, he did not comprehensively describe how police officers have to answer for their actions. Balka did not mean that literally nothing happens following an incident between police and videographers, but rather that police do not face serious consequences for their actions. This Part discusses how the present framework of safeguards designed to deter police from harassing citizens fails to adequately protect videographers who are unlawfully intimidated by police. Specifically, this Part will cover the failure of three safeguards: first, the external check provided by the public at large; second, self-policing mechanisms such as internal affairs within police departments; and third, the civil remedy available to a citizen who believes a public official has violated his constitutional rights. This Part will demonstrate how each of these deterrents is ineffective at curbing potential police misconduct toward videographers.

A. Safeguard #1: Public Oversight and How Police Can Defeat Its Purpose By Eliminating Public Recording of Their Conduct

Some scholars argue that allowing citizens to freely videotape police in public incentivizes police officers to properly fulfill their duties. Leaders at some police departments

119 See Wasserman, supra note 14, at 648–49 (“Government might stop people from recording public encounters . . . through enactment and enforcement of express prohibitions on secret or unconsented-to recordings of persons and conversations . . . [or] through officers’ efforts to move filmers away from the scene, to confiscate equipment, and perhaps, to arrest filmers for violating non-speech laws of general applicability.”).
120 See Stossel, supra note 91.
121 See id.
122 Mishra, supra note 103, at 1553.
have adopted this view as well. Lieutenant Robin Larson, of the Broward County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office, for instance, takes the position that “all our people should be conducting themselves like they are being recorded all the time.” With the persistent threat of surveillance, rational police officers would want to avoid committing any misconduct in public because video documentation of that misconduct could be widely disseminated very rapidly. In that event, the general public, aware of the misconduct, could utilize the political process to pressure law enforcement officers to respect the limits of their authority. Thus, mindful of potential public scrutiny and scorn, police officers would generally avoid performing illegal activities to protect themselves.

The existence of some press coverage and public scrutiny of police misconduct indicates that this deterrent is somewhat effective, but the evidence of police-videographer confrontations in the news and on the internet suggests that police are undermining the effectiveness of video by attempting to eliminate it. By intimidating and arresting videographers, police are creating more footage of police-videographer confrontations, but may also be preventing footage of more alarming misconduct, such as the beatings of Jack McKenna or Rodney King, from being

123 Johnson, supra note 48 (quoting Lieutenant Robin Larson of the Broward County, Florida Sheriff’s Office).
124 Id.
125 See Rowinski, supra note 47 (“[W]ith the advent of media-sharing websites like Facebook and YouTube, the practice of openly recording policy activity has become commonplace.”).
126 Wasserman, supra note 14, at 645 (“Public attention and outrage produces government action . . . . [A]ttention and outrage are more likely when video has gone “viral” and is being devoured and dissected on YouTube, blogs, and the mainstream new media, and where visceral public reaction to the video reflects a wide popular interpretation of the video as showing governmental misconduct. A viral video puts government on its heels, forcing it to publicly defend its officers (at least initially), while also recognizing that, because of the video, the people have developed informed perceptions and conclusions about the incident—perceptions that officials must respect (or at least consider) in making administrative decisions.”).
127 See id.
128 See Rowinski, supra note 47 (“There are no hard statistics for video recording arrests. But the experiences of Surmacz and Glik highlight what civil libertarians call a troubling misuse of the state’s wiretapping law to stifle the kind of street-level oversight that cellphone and video technology make possible.”).
created. An example is the case of Emily Good, a Rochester woman whose video-confrontation with police garnered national attention. Rochester police officers arrested Good for obstructing governmental administration when she filmed a traffic stop directly outside her home. Good was somewhat of a social activist and she filmed the traffic stop because she believed it involved racial profiling. Police commanded Good to stop recording the incident, but when she continued one of the officers arrested her. Although a highly publicized discussion about Good’s rights sprouted from the incident, police successfully frustrated Good’s original purpose for filming. Good’s objective was to monitor police conduct in regard to racial profiling, a rather serious issue, but the Rochester police officers succeeded in preventing her from documenting anything related to that issue.

The Good case highlights why the public-oversight deterrent fails to protect videographers from harassment and intimidation. Instead of incentivizing officers to conduct their police business properly, the presence of a video camera may actually encourage a police officer to prevent the creation of footage of his conduct. To do so, the police officer may harass, intimidate, and arrest the videographer and ultimately shield himself from liability for potentially serious acts of misconduct. While some videographers may be defiant and willing

131 Id.
132 Id. (the traffic stop in front of Good’s home involved three white police officers arresting a lone black man and searching his car).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See Levato, supra note 130.
137 See id.; see also Rowinski, supra note 47 (quoting Sarah Wunsch of the American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, stating that “[t]he police apparently do not want witnesses to what they do in public”).
138 See Rowinski, supra note 47 (“Ever since the police beating of Rodney King in Los Angeles in 1991 was videotaped... the arrests of street videographers, whether they use cellphones or other video technology, offers a dramatic illustration of the collision between new technology and policing practices.”).
to resist police pressures, many individuals may simply seek to avoid confrontation and instead move on with their lives.\textsuperscript{139} The ultimate result is a chilling effect of filming police in public.

Granted, if the footage of the police officer attacking the videographer is as offensive as the Rodney King beating, the public would probably demand accountability in a similar manner.\textsuperscript{140} Still, this deterrent may only be effective when videographers are successful in capturing police misconduct that warrants unified public outcry. Police harassment of videographers certainly warrants public scrutiny, but because the act of intimidating a videographer is not nearly as offensive as police beatings, shootings, or corruption scandals, it is not as likely to stir an equally strong public reaction.\textsuperscript{141} Ideally, the issues surrounding police confrontations with videographers ought to be resolved before an incident similar to Rodney King’s reoccurs.

Overall, another solution is needed because public awareness is not enough to prevent police officers from intimidating and arresting videographers. By aggressively engaging videographers, police effectively chill videographers from monitoring police conduct which simultaneously shields other types of misconduct from exposure.\textsuperscript{142} Since the public is not as offended as it would be if other types of misconduct were captured on camera, it is not as motivated to remedy the situation.

B. Safeguard #2: Internal Affairs: Why Law Enforcement Self-Policing Is Insufficient

Law enforcement leadership is in a position to self-correct police misconduct through internal investigations and disciplining police officers.\textsuperscript{143} In the past, police leadership has

\textsuperscript{139} Cohen, supra note 129 (“Most people are not so game for a fight with the police. They just stop filming. These are the cases no one finds out about, in which there is no arrest or prosecution, but the public’s freedoms have nevertheless been eroded.”).

\textsuperscript{140} See id.

\textsuperscript{141} See id.

\textsuperscript{142} See Levato, supra note 130; see also discussion supra pp. 21–23.

\textsuperscript{143} See Cohen, supra note 129.
sternly held violating officers accountable for their actions. Also, some police departments claim that the increase in public video-recording of police conduct has positively affected change in department training and staffing. Broadly speaking, internal affairs has sometimes been effective in combating forms of police misconduct.

While police departments should be able to self-regulate, this established deterrent has demonstrated several limitations. Especially in the context of police officers harassing and intimidating videographers, it is unlikely that any substantial consequences will result when a videographer complains to the police department. For instance, in Emily Good’s case, Rochester Chief of Police James M. Sheppard conducted an investigation that resulted in no announced disciplinary action but merely additional training and awareness for officers on the force. Because the internal investigations are not transparent, the public has no way of actually knowing if they are effective in correcting the problem.

144 See Cohen, supra note 129 (discussing the New York City police officer who was laid off after amateur video footage revealed he lied in his sworn statement about how he shoved a bicyclist to the ground); Johnson, supra note 48 (discussing the case of Jack McKenna and the ensuing suspensions of three officers involved in the beating of the University of Maryland student).
145 See Cohen, supra note 129 (Broward County Sheriff’s Officer, Larson, discusses how recorded incidents have “sparked” activity from the department to better train its officers).
146 See Skehill, supra note 14, at 996 (“[M]any police departments have implemented internal affairs departments and citizen investigatory commissions to investigate and discipline police misconduct.”).
147 See Scossel, supra note 91 (Radley Balko commenting how “nothing” happens to police officers who falsely arrest videographers for filming their conduct).
148 See Press Release, Rochester Police Dept., Chief Sheppard Announces Outcome of Internal Administrative Reviews on Emily Good Arrest, Traffic Enforcement Operation (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.rochestercitynewspaper.com/uploads/articles/12343-9.2.11-Press-Conference-Media-Packet.pdf. In a letter attached to the report, Sheppard stated that although police officers deal with high amounts of stress and danger, they must act professionally and with “appropriate respect for the rights of those involved.” Id. Sheppard discussed how videographers generally have First-Amendment rights to film police officers in public spaces, and that police officers “should assume that someone is watching and recording [their] actions at all times.” Id. But police officers are to use “good judgment” to determine when those individuals recording them cross the line into obstructing justice. Id.
Another problem with the internal-affairs model for reporting police misconduct is that in the context of video records, citizens may be afraid to report. In Massachusetts, Michael Hyde was arrested for violating wiretapping statutes while trying to report police abuse. Six days after Hyde recorded an incident with police, he went to file a formal complaint at the Abington police station. After the Abington police department performed an internal investigation, which absolved five of its officers, it also sought a criminal complaint against Hyde for the recording he used to complain about the officers. Since Hyde’s conviction was upheld, videographers can be fearful, especially in states like Massachusetts with two-party-consent wiretapping laws, that reporting incidents to the local police station could result in their own arrest.

Another example is the case of Anthony Graber in Maryland. Maryland State Police raided Graber’s home and seized his camera and computer equipment after he posted a video of himself being pulled-over by a police officer on YouTube. Graber was facing more than fifteen years in prison if he was convicted of violating Maryland’s anti-wiretapping statute. Fortunately for Graber, Circuit Judge Emory Pitt threw out the four-count indictment against Graber. Although Graber was ultimately vindicated, the prospect of spending over fifteen years in prison for what may have been protected First Amendment activity is quite horrifying.

If a different Judge presided over his case, it is very possible that Graber would be sitting in

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151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 See supra Part II.
156 See sources cited supra note 58.
157 See sources cited supra note 58.
158 Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *34–35 (“[T]he statute on its face is unconstitutional; that it is unconstitutional and violative of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.”).
159 Id. at *6 (remarking that Maryland’s anti-wiretap statute “on its face is unconstitutional; that it is unconstitutional and violate of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution”).
prison until approximately the year 2026.\textsuperscript{160} Although Graber was not reporting police misconduct to the police, the effort by police to arrest Graber long after the traffic stop indicates that if Graber had tried to report police conduct the way that Hyde did, he may have been arrested in the same manner.\textsuperscript{161} Any videographer with footage of police misconduct might be hesitant to bring such footage to the police’s attention if it may jeopardize his freedom.

Overall, law enforcement self-policing is unreliable in safeguarding against police aggression toward videographers. Police officers are typically not punished harshly for violating the rights of videographers and the reporting mechanism for concerned citizens poses too great of a risk of arrest.\textsuperscript{162} If a citizen wishes to complain to police about an officer’s conduct, he may hesitate to bring his video evidence of the alleged misconduct. So with no reason to take internal investigations seriously and too much risk for citizens to bring video evidence of misconduct to the police’s attention, it is unlikely that internal affairs can properly deter police officers from violating videographers rights to film police in public.

C. Safeguard #3: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Remedies and Their Shortcomings

As part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,\textsuperscript{163} Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide civil remedies for citizens whose rights have been abused “under the color” of state law.\textsuperscript{164} The statute allows a private citizen to sue for damages and prospective relief against municipalities and local governments\textsuperscript{165} when officials violate their civil rights.\textsuperscript{166} Section 1983 is not itself a

\textsuperscript{160} See id.
\textsuperscript{162} See discussion supra pp. 23–26.
source of substantive rights; rather, it is merely a remedy or method for citizens to vindicate their rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.\textsuperscript{167} In defining the remedy, the Supreme Court has noted that § 1983 is intended to financially compensate victims of official misconduct.\textsuperscript{168}

When a lawsuit is filed against a police officer in his official capacity, the suit is known as an “official-capacity suit” and is treated as a suit against the government itself.\textsuperscript{169} To prevail in a § 1983 official-capacity suit, a plaintiff must show that “the entity’s policy or custom played a part in the violation of federal law.”\textsuperscript{170} Thus, for the government to be liable, the Supreme Court requires the agent to directly harm the plaintiff on behalf of the government after it implemented a policy, statement, regulation, or custom to be the “moving force” behind the agent’s action.\textsuperscript{171} Besides a direct policy endorsing unlawful conduct, a failure to properly train agents and employees can be a “moving force” behind the agent’s wrongful conduct.\textsuperscript{172} The failure to train must amount to “deliberate indifference,” however, meaning that the government entity made a deliberate choice to not train police officers with respect to the violated right in question.\textsuperscript{173} But, § 1983 plaintiffs will not succeed in showing “deliberate indifference” where a police officer’s conduct is “obvious to all without training or supervision.”\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{170} Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
\textsuperscript{171} Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–94.
\textsuperscript{172} City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
\textsuperscript{173} Id.; Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489–90 (11th Cir. 1997). Since the Supreme Court rejected respondeat superior liability for municipalities, the aggrieved plaintiff must prove that the municipality somehow trained or was “deliberately indifferent” toward training police officers. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
\textsuperscript{174} Sewell, 117 F.3d at 490 (quoting Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 299–300 (2d Cir. 1992). For instance, a police officer molesting young women at traffic stops and in the police station qualified as obviously wrongful conduct “without training or supervision.” Id.
Doubts exist as to whether § 1983 is an effective remedy.\textsuperscript{175} Absent a discoverable pattern of violations, in order to claim that the government was “deliberately indifferent,” the plaintiff would have to show that the failure to train officers made violations of federal rights “highly predictable.”\textsuperscript{176} This requirement is farcical because the existence of a pattern does not change that an individual’s rights have been violated in one specific instance. A pattern, by definition, requires multiple occurrences of linkable events, but the plaintiff in any given § 1983 suit should not need to worry about anyone else’s violated rights. Whether others have had their rights similarly violated is irrelevant in regard to compensating an individual for his injuries. Attempting to prove that a failure to train made commission of violations “highly predictable” is dubious as well.\textsuperscript{177} To determine if a violation is “highly predictable,” the court will determine if the propensity to arrest videographers is a “plainly obvious consequence” of the government entity’s decision-making procedures.\textsuperscript{178} This attenuated process ultimately circles back to searching for a pattern of violations in the past, which, as discussed, seems unimportant in relation to the fact that the plaintiff’s rights were violated.\textsuperscript{179} As it is difficult to find the municipality liable for a violation, additionally, the individually-offending officers may be shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.\textsuperscript{180} The qualified-immunity doctrine is intended to shield public officials from

\textsuperscript{176} Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d. Cir. 2000)).
\textsuperscript{177} See \textit{Brown}, 520 U.S. at 405 (“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employees.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, \textit{FEDERAL JURISDICTION} 519 (5th ed. 2007) (stating that “\textit{Brown} articulate[d] a heightened requirement for causation, but \[did\] not define it with any precision”).
\textsuperscript{179} See \textit{Brown}, 520 U.S. at 413–14 (explicating that attempting to determine whether the hiring of a particular police officer involved a highly predictable consequence, the Court discussed the relevance of the hiree’s background and pattern of violence in relation to violating constitutional rights).
\textsuperscript{180} See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (using the term “good faith immunity” which is synonymous with “qualified immunity”). A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless he acted “so obviously wrong, in
harassment, distraction, and liability when they are legitimately performing their duties.\textsuperscript{181} Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability when their actions arise out of discretionary functions.\textsuperscript{182} To circumvent a police officer’s qualified-immunity defense, the plaintiff must show or allege a violation of a “clearly established” constitutional right at the time of the police officer’s alleged violation.\textsuperscript{183} Determining if a constitutional right was “clearly established” requires two inquiries: whether the law was clear at the time of the alleged civil rights violation; and, whether a reasonable police officer would have understood that his conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.\textsuperscript{184}

In examining the “clearly established” requirement, the clarity of the law at the time of the alleged violation must be narrowly determined with respect to the specific facts of the case.\textsuperscript{185} In addressing how specific the law must be in order to deny an officer qualified immunity, a broad and generalized conceptualization of the law is not sufficient.\textsuperscript{186} However, this standard does not require that a prior court decision be on point.\textsuperscript{187} The Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Hope v. Pelzer} established that firm precedent is not necessary for a plaintiff to recover against an official.\textsuperscript{188} The reasonableness of a police officer depends on “whether the

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\item\textsuperscript{181} Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
\item\textsuperscript{182} See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
\item\textsuperscript{183} See Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Barton v. Clancy, 632 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2011).
\item\textsuperscript{184} Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269
\item\textsuperscript{186} Id.
\item\textsuperscript{187} Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)
\item\textsuperscript{188} Id. (declaring that “[a]lthough earlier cases involving ‘fundamentally similar’ facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly establish, they are not necessary to such a finding”). In \textit{Hope}, the court found an Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff prisoner was tied to a hitching post and taunted by police. \textit{Id}.
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\end{footnotesize}
state of the law at the time of the alleged violation gave the [officer] fair warning that his particular conduct was unconstitutional."

Despite the plaintiff-friendly standard developed in *Hope*, the absence of cases on point is still a basis for dismissal on qualified immunity. In dismissing for qualified immunity, the Supreme Court, in *Brosseau*, stressed the lack of similar cases where a police officer shot and wounded the plaintiff, who alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The Court’s dissonance with its own decision in *Hope* has created confusion in lower courts and clouded the “clearly established” standard for qualified immunity. Often, police officers will have qualified immunity, which creates a heavy burden for a videographer seeking damages from an individual police officer. In practice, “[t]he qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Essentially, if the law is confusing, police officers may be able to invoke qualified immunity.

In regard to incidents involving recording police, some courts have allowed arresting officers to invoke qualified immunity after wrongful conduct. An example is *Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle*, where a police officer arrested a passenger and seized his camera for filming him during a traffic stop. Maintaining the officer’s qualified immunity, the Third Circuit recognized a broad right to videotape police, but not a “clearly established” right due to the


\[189\] *Id.*


\[191\] *Id.*

\[192\] See CHEMERINSKY, *supra* note 177, at 555.

\[193\] See Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 2005).

\[194\] *Id.* (internal quotations omitted).

\[195\] See *id.* at 255 (“Considering the proliferation of laws and their relative complexity in the context of a rapidly changing world, we cannot fairly require police officers in the field to be as conversant in the law as lawyers and judges.”).

\[196\] See *Kelly*, 622 F.3d at 252; Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 2006).

\[197\] *Kelly*, 622 F.3d at 251–52 (exemplifying a case where the police officer believed the passenger’s conduct violated Pennsylvania’s anti-wiretap statute).
confusing state of the law. Because the case law was murky, a reasonably competent officer could not be put on “fair notice” that seizing a camera and arresting the videographer would violate the First Amendment. Additionally, after the police officer initially seized the passenger’s camera, he called the assistant district attorney to inquire whether the passenger actually violated Pennsylvania’s anti-wiretap statute. Unfortunately, the assistant district attorney misunderstood the law and recommended that the police officer arrest the passenger. Although this fact vindicates the officer’s reasonableness in making the final arrest, the officer still seized the camera before contacting the local prosecutor. If the police officer inquired before confiscating the videographer’s camera, it would be difficult to argue that his conduct was unreasonable. That was not the case but, nevertheless, the police officer was vindicated.

In circumstances where a § 1983 litigant is successful, the statute permits courts to fashion a range of both legal and equitable remedies, but severely limits injunctive relief. Specifically, federal courts are not in a position to enjoin municipal police departments. Without injunctive relief, successful plaintiffs could seek compensatory damages for injuries, but in order for the court to award damages, the plaintiff must suffer actual harm. Additionally,

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198 Id. at 262.
199 Id. at 251–52.
200 Id.
201 Id. The assistant district attorney who misunderstood the law would probably be shielded from § 1983 liability under the doctrine of absolute immunity for officials with prosecutorial functions. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976).
202 Kelly, 622 F.3d at 252.
203 The Third Circuit held that “a police officer who relies in good faith on a prosecutor’s legal opinion that the arrest is warranted under the law is presumptively entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. at 255–56. However, the holding applies specifically to Fourth Amendment claims premised on lack of probable cause. Id. at 256. Still, the police officer’s reliance on a prosecutor’s advice must be objectively reasonable. Id.
204 Id. Kelly was remanded to allow the plaintiff to rebut the presumption that the police officer’s contact with the local prosecutor reasonably justified his conduct. Id. at 266.
206 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–79 (1976) (holding that where the district court “injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of [the] state agency, it departed the principles of federalism “which play such an important part in governing the relationship between federal courts” and state governments).
the Supreme Court has permitted plaintiffs to recover punitive damages from individual police officers, but not from municipalities.\textsuperscript{208} However, punitive damages are only available from an individual officer where his “conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federal protected rights of others.”\textsuperscript{209}

For videographers, whose right to film has been violated, § 1983 remedies are not very helpful. First, losing the ability to film does not constitute what is typically considered an “actual injury” deserving of compensation.\textsuperscript{210} In \textit{Carey v. Piphus}, despite finding that the plaintiffs were denied due process when they were wrongly suspended from school, the Supreme Court rejected anything but nominal damages because the plaintiffs lacked evidence of actual injury.\textsuperscript{211} Subsequently, the Court interpreted \textit{Carey} as denying any concept of presumed damages.\textsuperscript{212} In \textit{Memphis Community School District v. Stachura}, the Supreme Court solidified the \textit{Carey} principle when it concluded that damages under § 1983 exist only to compensate plaintiffs who are actually injured, noting that “damages based on the ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not authorized . . . because they are not truly compensatory.”\textsuperscript{213} Punitive rights are similarly unattainable because of the ambiguous “evil motive or intent” standard required, the limitation against application to municipalities, and the likelihood that qualified immunity will be shield an offending officer.\textsuperscript{214} Therefore, because First Amendment rights such as free speech and news-gathering cannot be monetized, § 1983 fails to adequately protect aggrieved videographers.\textsuperscript{215}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{208} City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 265 (1981).
\item \textsuperscript{209} Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983).
\item \textsuperscript{210} See \textit{Carey}, 435 U.S. at 258.
\item \textsuperscript{211} \textit{id.} at 258.
\item \textsuperscript{213} \textit{id.} at 309 n.13.
\item \textsuperscript{214} See \textit{supra} text accompanying notes 194–95, 208–09.
\item \textsuperscript{215} See CHEMERINSKY, \textit{supra} note 177, at 599.
\end{itemize}
Overall, although § 1983 initially looks like a decent remedy, it is too narrow for videographers because the burden for establishing a municipality’s liability is too heavy, qualified immunity shields offending officers, and courts do not provide adequate damages when officers violate constitutional rights. Since the likelihood of a plaintiff receiving compensation for his injury is rather diminished, it follows that the rules of § 1983 seem to favor protecting police officers who did not know or care that a right existed over preservation of the right itself. Absent a prescribed remedy for violations, § 1983 fails to safeguard against unreasonable law enforcement intrusions. Although § 1983 was put in place to address citizens’ grievances for violations of their constitutional rights, in the context of citizens filming police it fails to remedy anything, which results in no deterrence for police officers and no protection for videographers.

V. Bright-Line Rule: Explicitly Stated Remedies and Personal Liability

The purpose of this Part is to provide a model legislative framework for protecting videographers against police harassment. First, this Part will discuss the rationale behind the model and how the legislation should meet the shortcomings of § 1983 civil rights actions. Then, this Part will present the model legislation itself, which state governments could consider, amend, and enact to protect videographers from police intimidation.

A. Considerations in Constructing a Videographer Protection Law

Police should be deterred from intimidating and harassing videographers who film their conduct in public. To effectively deter police officers, the choice of whether or not to violate an individual’s rights must be eliminated from a reasonable police officer’s mind. Rationally, in making every decision a police officer would most likely balance interests of privacy, safety, and

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216 See Skehill, supra note 14, at 994.
217 See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (alluding to society’s expectation that police are to endure significant burdens caused by citizens exercising their First-Amendment rights, Judge Lipez discusses how police are expected to endure criticism and public scrutiny while exercising a higher level of restraint than normal citizens).
self-preservation in deciding whether or not to act in a certain situation. If the balancing of these values is altered by making a police officer, in the interest of self-preservation, not want to violate a videographer’s First Amendment rights, then the deterrent is effective.

The framers of the Constitution recognized that police power could potentially be abused and in turn harm free society. Communities entrust police officers with powers that are sometimes abused. Permitting individuals to record interactions with police without fear of prosecution is essential to balance the government’s need to enforce laws and a citizen’s right to be free from government abuse. When abuses occur, police officers ought to be fully accountable for their actions. Protecting certain police interests, such as privacy when performing official public functions, is “inconsistent with democracy and democratic political accountability” when it results in a violation of a private citizen’s guaranteed First Amendment rights. Police should not be insulated from consequences when their conduct is unlawful. Instead, police officers’ discretionary power should be reduced so that they have less of an opportunity to harm citizens’ First Amendment rights without a challenge.

In the narrow context of protecting citizens who are filming police officers in the public discharge of their duties, an effective means of deterring police misconduct is to have a strict law

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218 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (“Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.”).
220 See Skehill, supra note 14, at 993–94.
221 Id. at 1011.
222 Wasserman, supra note 14, at 650.
223 Id.
224 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051 (1991) (“[H]istory shows that speech is suppressed when either the speaker or the message is critical of those who enforce the law.”) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58, 361 (1983)); see also King v. Ambs, 519 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2008) (where plaintiff’s outrageous conduct while he was filming, but apart from filming, rendered his speech unprotected); McCormick v. City of Lawrence, No. 02-2135, 2008 WL 2795134 (D. Kan. July 18, 2008) (same).
that punishes police officers who harass, intimidate, oppress, or arrest an individual because the individual is video-recording their conduct. Legislatures, in constructing such a law, should weigh many interests, such as police safety, potential unlawful conduct on behalf of the videographer apart from the act of filming, and the overall context of the incident. But to be effective, the primary objective of the law must be to protect a videographer’s rights to be free from police abuse.

A categorical prohibition on police conduct would be problematic because circumstances exist where police action against a videographer is appropriate. But such circumstances must be narrowly construed. A broad exception based on soft standards like “reasonableness” could render the entire law useless. To help prevent this from happening, legislatures must define possible exceptions to the rule as affirmative defenses. These exceptions could include that the videographer was simultaneously breaking some other criminal statute besides the filming or that the police officer or videographer would be in direct, impending danger without the officer’s intervention. Under this model, defendant police officers carry the burden of proving that their conduct did in fact fall within the grounds of the exception for what otherwise may have been an unlawful violation of a citizen’s First Amendment rights.

Since First Amendment rights are unclear from things such as time, place, and manner restrictions, and murky wiretapping statutes, a presumption should exist that protects openly filming the police officer’s public conduct. This presumption would provide the law with a “tie-goes-to-the-runner” judgment mechanism which leans toward protecting videographers.

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225 See generally Mishra, supra note 103.
226 See supra Part II.
227 “Tie goes to the runner” refers to an unwritten rule in baseball where if a play is so close that an umpire cannot determine whether the base runner was safe before a fielder made a tag, the umpire rules in favor of the base runner. David Wade, Inside the Rules: Tie Goes to the Runner, HARDBALL TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.hardballtimes.com/main/blog_article/inside-the-rules-tie-goes-to-the-runner/.
“Tie goes to the runner” would mean that where the First Amendment right’s existence is subject to close dispute, the conduct should go undisturbed by police. Of course, other conduct apart from the act of filming may open a videographer to interference from police. However, possible exceptions which allow a police officer to interfere with a videographer’s filming of his conduct should revolve around actual, not theoretical, threats to the safety of the videographer, the police officer, and other citizens and enforcement of other citizens’ privacy rights.

Additionally, for the law to be effective as a deterrent, the remedy must be appropriate. The goal of the remedy must be, in part, to offer some compensation to the aggrieved videographer, but moreso to punish the violating police officer who may have offended the videographer’s First Amendment rights. Unless the harm done to the videographer can actually be categorized under other forms of misconduct such as brutality, the mere intimidation and arrest of the videographer should result in direct damages against the violating police officers and a short suspension from field duty. This degree of punitive treatment would raise a greater deterrent effect than internal investigations, which at times merely led to additional training without any actual discipline.228

Besides adequate deterrence, the state law should also seek to fill in the holes left by § 1983 and the federal courts. Since § 1983 fails to provide adequate damages for those who suffer no injury besides a violated constitutional right, legislatures should incorporate liquidated or presumed damages into the statute.229 In terms of avoiding problems that qualified immunity causes, automatic liability eliminates the shield and simultaneously bypasses the entire debate

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228 See Press Release, supra note 148 (despite national attention drawn from the Good incident, Rochester Police Chief James Sheppard merely indicated that police officers would receive additional training and procedural guidance on how to resolve similar future incidents but did not state that the offending officers would receive any discipline for their misconduct).

229 See supra Part IV.C.
about “clearly established” laws.\textsuperscript{230} If a state passes the model legislation below, the state essentially removes the narrow issue of filming police officers from the complicated and cloudy realm of federalism and constitutional law. Lastly, considering how state legislatures may be cautious to micro-manage executive-operated agencies, liability for the municipalities is not part of the legislation. The rationale for this omission is centered around law enforcement’s inability to effectively self-police\textsuperscript{231} and to attack individual police officers’ temptations to violate videographers’ rights.\textsuperscript{232}

B. Model “Videographer Intimidation Protection Act”

Below is the “Videographer Intimidation Protection Act” or the “V.I.P. Act.” The following is a hypothetical construction of legislation that could effectively deter police from violating videographers’ First Amendment right to openly film police conduct in public:

Section 1: [Violation] No law enforcement officer, in the scope of his or her official duties, shall:

(a) abridge the right of an individual to video-record (including audio) his or her conduct, or the conduct of other police officers in a public place;

(b) harass, intimidate, abuse, question, or arrest any private citizen for the purposes of stopping, inhibiting, or preventing an individual from recording any law-enforcement officer’s conduct in a public place; or

(c) demand or require an individual to turn off his or her camera or otherwise stop filming for the purpose of stopping, inhibiting, or preventing an individual from recording any law enforcement officer’s conduct in a public place;

\textsuperscript{230} See supra Part IV.C.
\textsuperscript{231} See supra Part IV.B.
\textsuperscript{232} See supra Part III.
Section 2: [Defenses] A law enforcement officer may present any of the following affirmative defenses:

(a) Actual, not theoretical, threat of impending harm to the police officer that is materially related to the videographer’s act of filming;
(b) Actual, not theoretical, threat of impending harm to the videographer that is materially related to the videographer’s act of filming;
(c) Actual, not theoretical, threat of impending harm to a nearby third party that is materially related to the videographer’s act of filming;
(d) Valid reason exists to confront the videographer outside of his act of filming, including but not limited to violations of a criminal statute not related to recording a law-enforcement officer’s conduct; or
(e) Enforcing the privacy rights of private citizens, or a criminal anti-wiretapping statute as it pertains to private citizens, but not of any public official acting in his or her official capacity.

Section 3: [Evidence] In the event that the law-enforcement officer destroys the recording and cannot successfully assert an affirmative defense, liability is automatically applied.

Section 4: [Penalty] Where a law-enforcement officer is found to have violated this statute, the law-enforcement officer is to be:

(a) held personally liable for no less than $1,000 but no more than $2,500;\(^{233}\) and

(b) suspended from public duty for at least three days but no more than twenty-one days.

\(^{233}\) These figures were determined based on median pay for patrol officers in the United States. With the median salary at approximately $50,000 per year, a discretionary penalty between two and five percent of annual pay is appropriate for deterrence purposes but not devastating to the officer’s well-being. See Police Patrol Officer—U.S. National Averages, SALARY.COM (last visited Feb. 14, 2012), http://www1.salary.com/police-officer-Salary.html.
VI. Conclusion

A First Amendment right to film police officers in public exists and ought to be universally supported. From case law and scholarly legal commentary, it is more than reasonable to conclude that the right exists and, subject to some narrow limitations, should not be abridged. However, individuals’ First Amendment rights are sometimes violated. This occurs because police officers have interests in resisting the legal community’s statement that private citizens have a right to film police officers in public.

Police frequently escape liability when they abuse their power because the legal landscape is proving to be an enabling environment. That environment, combined with the growing widespread availability of video-recording devices, has police resorting to abuse of their power to chill videographer’s actions. The current framework of deterrents fails to address this chilling effect adequately. Since the deterrents are too weak, or too avoidable, officers can often abuse their power without punishment.

To resolve this problem, legislatures should pass a stricter law which directly targets and prevents police officers from interfering with videographers filming their conduct. Had a safeguard effectively been enacted, perhaps citizens like Emily Good would not have been falsely arrested for openly and unobtrusively monitoring police in the public discharge of their duties.

\(^{234}\) See supra Part II.  
\(^{235}\) See supra Part II.  
\(^{236}\) See supra Parts II–IV.  
\(^{237}\) See supra Part III.  
\(^{238}\) See supra Part IV.  
\(^{239}\) See supra Parts II–IV.  
\(^{240}\) See supra Part IV.  
\(^{241}\) See supra Part IV.  
\(^{242}\) See supra Part V.  
\(^{243}\) See supra Part V.