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An Empirical Investigation into the Power Behind Empowerment

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Using the four dimensional frame that Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan (1998) developed to conceptually explore the "power behind empowerment" the study empirically illustrates how a police organization's reform program, which was designed to empower lower level officers, foundered on its own innocence. The reform program adopts a resources dependency approach to power, which resonates with the first of the four dimensional frames of power; unobtrusive forms of power embedded at a deeper level of the organizations social system, which are consistent with the third and fourth dimensional frames, remain unaccounted for. A research and methodological framework is developed to bring the effects of these embedded forms of power into plain view. The results of the study indicate that while on the surface the organization has undergone significant change, at a deeper sociocultural level it has not. In consequence, under the guise of empowerment, somewhat paradoxically, unobtrusive forms of power continue to legitimize acts of domination.

Keywords: Power, Empowerment, Police, Change Management.

In the late 1990s a Royal Commission into the operations of one of the world's largest police organizations confirmed that it was subject to deeply rooted and established networks of "corrupt officers." The Police Force in question has more than 17,000 employees serving a population of seven million across an area of more than 800,000 square kilometers, equivalent in size to the U.S. state of Texas. It runs at a net cost of almost \$1.2 billion (Wood, 1997). Examples of corruption exposed by the Commission ranged from the abusing authority, taking bribes, providing false evidence, drug dealing, commissioning criminals to commit crimes, fixing internal promotions so that only already corrupted members were promoted, the use of intimidation and stand-over tactics, and murder.

The Royal Commission argued that the ongoing use of outmoded leadership and management practices based on orthodox hierarchical and authoritarian forms of governance were central to the Force's inability to control, amongst other things, corruption in its ranks. These outmoded practices created a discourse characterized by structures of dominancy that privileged few and marginalized many: those marginalized were silenced; those privileged were free to rationalize their own versions of rationality.

Based on the Commission's findings the force appointed a new CEO who instigated reforms that were characterized by forms organizing more inline with the contemporary organization theory and management literature. More specifically, inline with the new organizational forms of literature (Burke, 1986; Conger & Kanungo, 1988; Thomas & Velthouse, 1990; Ford & Fottler, 1995; Bolman & Deal, 2003) the force attempted to create a more democratic work environment by utilizing flatter structures, cross functional teams, and empowerment strategies. Such an environment was viewed as the means by which to usurp the power of those in positions of dominance; giving those officers who were previously silenced the 'voice' they required to speak out against corruption (Wood, 1997). The present study presents an ethnographic account of the Jumbuck Local Area Command's attempt to implement such change; a Local Area Command (LAC) is a geographical region the size of several city

suburbs or regional area that contains three to five police stations and approximately 150 police offices.

Hardy and Clegg (1996) point out that central to the wide spread adoption of new organizational forms is a fundamental shift in the “boundaries of power” that have constituted the nature of power in organizations throughout the modern era. That is, the adoption of flatter structures and the subsequent empowerment of lower level workers is rendering traditional authoritarian boundaries of power less salient. For some time however, writers have argued that the literature pertinent to these new organizational forms (Bernstein, 1992; Barker, 1993; Hardy & Clegg, 1996; Palmer & Dunford, 1997; Gordon, 2002) and in particular the empowerment of lower level workers, is problematic; they argue that while the redistribution of power is inextricably linked to empowerment, somewhat ironically the literature is almost devoid of any discussion on power—empirical insights are even more scarce (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998; Gordon, 2002).

The study draws on the four dimensional frame that Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) developed to conceptually explore the “power behind empowerment.” As shall be seen, the problems they identified, in regard to how the extant literature pertinent to empowerment in organizations addresses power, appear to be inherent to the reform program implemented by the police force in question. In a similar manner to the mainstream management literature, the reform program adopts a narrow resource dependency view of power. Such a view, while important, grounds power to formal rules of governance, control of tangible resources, and decision making; the more unobtrusive pragmatics of power however are unaccounted for.

Capturing the unobtrusive pragmatics of power is not easy; they are embedded in the social discourse of organizations and are subsequently taken for granted by employees as being part of their organization’s natural order of things (Clegg, 1975; 1989; Frost, 1987; Haugaard, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Gordon, 2002). A research and methodological framework is developed to bring the pragmatics of power within a Local Area Command (LAC) in the police force in question into “plain” view. Central to this framework are the methods, instruments, and protocols used for data collection, processing, and analysis. The study discusses its finding and concludes by considering the implications of the analysis for the theory and practice of empowerment.

The Power Behind Empowerment¹

This section draws on the four dimensional frame used by Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan (1998) to explore the power behind empowerment; their central arguments and conceptual findings are reviewed.

The first dimension of power

Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan’s (1998) point out that the vast majority of the mainstream management literature on power adopts a first dimensional view of power. Such a view grounds power to decision-making scenarios where conflict is necessarily apparent. Furthermore, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan illustrate how early management studies separated power and authority: those people formally sanctioned with authority (managers) where *the* legitimate organizational decision-makers, those people with power were not. The focus of these studies was on uncovering how the control of resources such as information, expertise, funds, and

rewards allowed those who were not sanctioned with authority to influence decision outcomes (French & Raven, 1968; Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1981).

The key assumptions that underpin this approach to power are: power is linked to the control of tangible resources; these resources can be manipulated at will; individuals are aware of their interests in a given context; individuals act upon their interests by participating in decision-making processes; non participation indicated that individuals were satisfied with the state of their lives; if individuals need to exercise power to realize their interest, conflict must exist, otherwise there would be no need to exercise power; conflict is resolved through the decision-making process (Bachrach & Barantz, 1963; Lukes, 1974; Clegg 1989; Hardy & Clegg, 1996; Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998).

The second dimension of power

The second dimension of power differs from the first by recognizing that full participation in decision-making scenarios cannot be assumed. Bachrach and Barantz (1963) argue that issues can be excluded from decision-making and that decision agendas can be controlled from behind the scenes to cause decisions not to be made as they would have otherwise been. They used the term "non decision-making" to refer to this dimension of power. Schattschneider (1960) aptly provides a practical analogy of non decision-making power by pointing out, that "those with the greatest need to do so often do not even get the chance to participate in the politics of decision-making—who decides what the game is about also decides who gets in the game" (p. 105). (See Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998, p. 455.)

From a theoretical perspective, the second and first dimension of power converge. Underpinning both is a focus on the exercise of power by individuals in and around decision-making scenarios to realise intended outcomes; thus power remains premised on conflict and decision-making albeit, non decision-making. However, the second dimension illustrates that "power mobilized through the decision processes may be less visible than power that is mobilized through resources" (Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998, p. 455).

The third dimension of power

Lukes (1974) points out that by assuming conflict to be a necessary prerequisite for power, the first and second dimensional frames overlook the possibility that power might be used to prevent conflict. That is, power can be used to manage meaning; to shape peoples' "perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they view it as natural or unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial" (Lukes, 1974, p. 24). What Lukes argues is that people often remain politically inactive because they are not aware that it is in their best interest to be otherwise; they are unaware that power unobtrusively produces a consensus and order, replacing visible controls with hidden sociocultural forms of domination. Such perspectives draw on Marx's idea of "false consciousness" and Gramsci's concept of "ideological hegemony" (Haugaard, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 1998), where a "structure of power relations is fully legitimized by an integrated system of cultural and normative assumptions" (Hyman & Brough, 1975, p. 199). This approach illustrates that the study of power cannot be confined to situations in which conflict is observable, nor can it be confined to decision or non decision-making scenarios.

The fourth dimension of power

Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan (1998) suggest that developments in the study of power since Lukes' (1974) third dimensional frame of power constitute the existence of a fourth dimension. They identify the work of Michael Foucault (1977; 1980; 1982; 1984) as the foundation from which the literature that constitutes this dimension has emerged². Foucault's work and the literature that has emerged from it will not be discussed in its entirety here (see Smart; 1986; Clegg, 1989; 1990; Haugaard, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 1998 for such a review); rather, the key arguments and issues from this literature that render empowerment practices problematic will be discussed.

Underpinning the first, second, and third dimensional approach is a sovereign view of power. That is, certain groups or individuals have power over others, which necessarily implies power is linked to an entity of some sort. In this sense, individuals or groups either have or do not have power. Foucault contests such a view by conceptualizing power as a network of relations and discourses which, relative to given contexts, give rise to advantages and disadvantages alike (Deetz, 1992; Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998). This means that just because people are in a position of legitimate authority or a position that gives them control over resources does not mean that they will necessarily have power over others. Foucault's view is far more strategic; power is not a convenient, manipulable, or deterministic resource under the control of sovereign actors; rather, all actors are subject to "disciplinary" power—a historically constituted knowledge of the prevailing web of power relations in which these actors function (Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998; Gordon & Grant, 2005). In this regard, power is inextricably linked to knowledge; one cannot consider power without considering knowledge, one cannot consider knowledge without considering power. If one's knowledge is inextricably linked to power, then one is always subject to it and one always has access to it. This means, in contrast to what is espoused in the mainstream management literature, the most important question when it comes to power in organizations is not "who controls what resources" or in other words "who has more or less power," but what strategies do people need to employ to gain legitimacy for their interests and preferred courses of action (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Gordon & Grant, 2005).

By linking power to knowledge Foucault's work does resonate with Luke's (1974) third dimension of power. That is, Foucault also illustrates how the knowledge that people draw upon to make sense of their everyday working lives reflect an integrated system of socio-cultural and normative assumption – he refers to this as an archaeology of order. In other words, for the first, second, and third dimension of power – *knowledge is power*; that is, the more knowledge one has the more power one has. In contrast, Foucault shows us that *power is knowledge* (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Gordon & Grant, 2005). What he means is that for knowledge to be accepted as valid it must acquire legitimacy. If people are to have their viewpoints accepted as valid forms of knowledge, their viewpoints will have to "struggle for power" against other viewpoints. The significance of this point is that it renders the notion of ideals as forms of truth problematic. Foucault's work suggests that there is no grand narrative but multiple narratives, no single truth but multiple truths—each truth reflecting the historical struggle for power and subsequent constitution of knowledge for a given social system, cultural regime, or discourse formation. Rather than aspiring to a particular grand narrative or idea about how things "should" be, Foucault's approach is distinctly empirical.

It is this latter point that differentiates Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan's (1998) fourth dimension from the previous three dimensions. The first, second, and third dimensions of power prom-

ulgate some idea of how power “should” be. For the first dimension frame (not to mention the vast majority of management writers), power “should” be rational - only managers “should” have power. Incidentally Hardy and Clegg (1996) argue that the mainstream management writers’ neglect of power stems from their preoccupation with rationality: if things occurred rationally. There would be no need to address power. For the second and third dimensions and the critical theorists, power “should” be democratic: the marginalized need to be emancipated. The fourth dimensional approach illustrates that such promulgations are misleading; studying how power “should” be in organizations does not take into account how power “actually” is and therefore does not provide a “balanced view” of the workings of power in organizations. In short, what should occur is not what actually occurs. In consequence one does not study power by promulgating ideas about how power “should” be.

In summary, Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan’s (1998) four dimensional framework suggests that power can operate at a number of different levels. At a surface level power is exercised through the mobilization of scarce resources and through the control of decision-making processes. In this regard, empowerment initiatives would require the control of resources and decision-making processes to be transferred to lower-level workers. This was the case with the Jumbuck LAC reform program; the LAC’s devolved hierarchical and departmental (functional) boundaries of power to form cross functional teams. One of the key reasons for forming these teams was to give previously silenced officers a voice in the decision process. Operational decision-making, which involved front line tactical decisions, job scheduling, performance measurement, and the control of operational resources (vehicles, weapons, intelligence information) was transferred to the leader of each of these teams.

At a deeper socio-cultural level, power is exercised by managing the meaning that shapes others’ lives (Hardy & O’Sullivan, 1998). In this regard, empowerment initiatives would be aimed at shaping the perception of lower-level workers so that they actively engaged in decision processes. This was also the case at the Jumbuck LAC where communication strategies were used to manage meaning in a way that created shared conceptions (Roberts, 1991; Lawler, 1992) in regard to the goals and objectives of LAC’s reform initiatives. For example, empowerment terminology (Carr, 1991) such as “teams,” “members,” “mentors,” “we do things together,” “you can now have your say” were used to emphasize participation, collaboration, and consensus. And, the language of the “team effort” (Deetz, 1992; Barker, 1993) was also employed to emphasize how each officer’s actions affected their fellow team member (Foxman & Polsky 1991; Goski & Belfry, 1991).

At an even deeper level, power is embedded in the historically constituted knowledge or sociocultural meaning systems of organizations; it both constrains and enables how employees see, how they think, and how they do things. In this regard, empowerment initiatives would, in the first instance, need to identify how culturally normalized forms of power affect the behavior of the organization’s employees—both management and lower-level workers. A review of the Police Force’s reform agenda (Ryan, 2001) illustrates that no such identification process was considered let alone undertaken. This is somewhat understandable since the identification of embedded forms of power is not easy. As Foucault illustrated these effects are unobtrusive in nature and go largely unnoticed because they are considered by people as being part of the natural order of things (Haugaard, 1997). They are the result of the knowledge that employees have tacitly acquired over time about their power relations. Employees do not recognize, let alone question, the nature of these relations because, through the disciplined or recurring practice of these relations, they have learned to simply accept them as the –way things are (Clegg, 1989; Haugaard, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Gordon & Grant, 2005).

Accordingly, the present study takes into account the fourth dimensional frame's emphasis on the "actualities" of power and such a theoretical interest and empirical focus have some methodological implications. These will now be outlined.

Methodology

Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan (1998: 473) argue that tackling the power behind empowerment may be difficult within the context of positivistic science that mainstream management researchers traditionally rely. Because the focus of the third and fourth dimensions is on deeper more unobtrusive forms of power embedded in organizational social systems and discourses, the study of these dimensions does not lend itself to quantitative methodologies. Consequently, researchers may need to draw on more qualitative and ethnographic methodologies (e.g. Pettigrew, 1973; Clegg, 1975; Barker, 1993).

Accordingly, ethnography was chosen as the preferred methodology because it involves the use of methods, instruments and protocols that facilitate the detailed recording of what happens in a localized social system. More specifically, ethnography demands that researchers embedded themselves within the social system they are researching to familiarize themselves with the day to day works of the system (Clegg, 1975; Van Maanen 1988; Manning 1988; Silverman 2005).³

While ethnography is the preferred methodology, the nature of the study's theoretical focus gives rise to an additional operational parameter that needs to be accounted for. That is, by placing emphasis on capturing what is "actually" done as opposed to what "should" be done in the practice of empowerment, the study demands that measures be taken to control for the researcher's own "shoulds." That is, when handling the data, the researcher needs to control his own potential bias in regard to how power "should" be in organizations⁴. It is acknowledged that complete control of such bias is impossible, however that are taken to control such bias strengthen the link between the study's theory and method (Frost & Stablein, 1992). With this in mind the study's data collection and processing procedures will now be briefly outlined.

Data Collection, Saturation and Analysis Procedures

Data Collection

As mentioned previously, the Jumbuck Local Area Command (LAC) was the setting for the research. The first three months of the 18 months⁵ spent collecting data at the LAC were spent talking with and getting to know members of the command. Officers were also observed in their everyday work activities. The roles of these members spread across management, intelligence gathering, operational (patrol officers), traffic control, and criminal investigations (detectives).

After six months, the data gathering process was extended, primarily through informal interviews, observations of naturally occurring interactions, and conversations with key players, but also from sources such as organizational memos, flyers, newsletters, and public documents. In regard to the interviews, participant officers came from a variety of teams, positions, ethnicities, and gender. The length of time for each interview ranged from as short as 10 minutes to as long as three hours. The shorter interviews were conducted while on the job

with the nature of questions and answers being informal and in the most part reflecting the situation and task at hand. The longer interviews began with an invitation for participants to tell their story in regard to the reform program. As this period progressed data collection and analysis proceeded iteratively. Key themes related to power began to emerge; in regard to these themes respondents were asked to elaborate so as to acquire more detailed information. When the data collection ended more than 250 research hours of data had been accumulated, resulting in 34 interviews; which, along with field notes and other data sources, amounted to 68 text documents containing 14,840 paragraphs that needed to be transcribed and coded. One can appreciate that the dataset was particularly large; for this reason Nvivo qualitative analysis software was used to process and analyze the data.

Data saturation

Figure 1 outlines the details of the data saturation procedure⁶. By way of brevity here, the aim of the procedure is to identify and extract the data that is most relevant to the study's theoretical interest. The procedure also helps to control any potential preconceived bias that the researcher might have in regard to how power "should" be in organizations. This control is achieved by using NVivo Qualitative Research Software to systematically, rather than subjectively, select the most theoretically relevant data for analysis.

Data analysis

Prior to analyzing the saturated dataset (see Figure 1) the work of prominent writers in the field power and discourse analysis was drawn on to formulate operational explanations indicative of obtrusive forms of power (see Table 1 for details and theoretical sources), these are: rule of anticipated reaction, mobilization of bias, universal or essentialist viewpoints, ordering of statements, historical delineation of relationships, and boundaries of discursive action. This schema was used as a lens to *guide*⁷ the researcher's qualitative interpretation of the text examples that made up the final saturated dataset.


The Findings

The Embedded Nature of Power in the Force

The data revealed historical patterns of decision legitimacy. In the past senior officers had been privileged by virtue of the authority that went with their formally approved rank; over time however, their authority appears to have manifested itself into a right to dominate decision-making scenarios (Mills & Simmons, 1994). Lower ranking officers came to accept the superiority of senior officers as part of the natural order of things. When, after the reforms, lower level officers were supposed to embrace empowerment and more team-based methods they found it hard to do so, given taken for granted contexts premised on this essentialist viewpoint or "naturalized" order in regard to decision-making. A General Duties Senior Constable explained while traveling in a patrol vehicle:

Their [officers in supervising positions] usual reaction is just [a reflection of] all the people in that sort of era. They would say, "Who is the boss there"? They would then, to justify their position, say "I don't necessarily agree with this but the boss said

Figure 1
Data Saturation Procedure



so and we've got to do it." So straight away they ... appeal to the higher power but, at the same time, they brought themselves down to a level where they were saying "I am not part of management, I am not part of this decision." I knew full well that in those types of forums these people could have a voice and could have a say, but they chose not to because they felt they had to obey the boss (Dd,t040400r, Section 0, Paragraphs 77-81).

The officer is reflecting on the behavior of past supervising officers at a time when questionable decisions had been made. With respect to power, embedded within his statement is a clear social division between higher ranking officers, referred to as management, and lower ranking officers that is based on power. The statement also has historical significance: over time supervisors had learned to obey their superiors. They learned not to “rock the boat.” In

this sense, irrespective of the reform program's formal endorsement, with respect to the naturalized order of decision-making its implementation had to struggle for legitimacy. For instance:

These people [the old guard], the amount of influence and pull that they have in the workplace is incredible. And people would often, I see, run off their [the old guard's] doubt in doing something. They had great doubts in the path that we might have been going down [the reform agenda]. So, it [the old guard's doubt] legitimized other people, junior people, having doubts in that path as well. So, it was a crucial thing that caused us [reformers] barriers, continues to cause us barriers, because the hangovers [in regard to decision legitimacy] are still there from those people as that generational thing ... they have been there for so long. These other people have been in the area for a shorter time, but they have picked up on that chain of the way things should be. That has caused us a lot of problems over the time [of reform]. So, it is the power that those people have...would be influencing over a long period of time it is still there, it is still there (Dd,t040400r, Section 0, Paragraphs 300-304).

In the above transcript, the officer introduces the dualism of old versus new guard. The old guard comprised older senior middle management officers who, over time, had acquired a degree of power and, subsequently, comfort, in the system as it has, at least for them, always been. Those officers driving the reform process make up the new guard. The officer refers to how the old guard influenced other officers, the basis of this influence being a legacy of past legitimacy as decision-makers. Behavior and attitudes such as those described in this and the previous transcript were routinely witnessed in field observations—team leaders in particular, who were formally empowered with authority over their team members, continually acted with deference when interacting with those members of their team, especially those who had previously held high status positions such as detectives.

One senior officer within the Force who was a member of the Crime Management Support Unit⁸ provided some historical insight into how cultural “fit” between people and the Force contributes to such behavior and attitudes:

The need to fit in, in a police Force, is higher than the need to fit in, in a University, and therefore, fitting in demands self-censorship from a very early age ... because, too much lateral thought leads to challenge, leads to isolation. You have to demonstrate your credibility to fit in to a network. And I think that this has got less to do with policing, incidentally, then to do with anti-intellectual environments, which the police Force is. It is an environment in which ideas are not honored. (Drj24, Section 0, Paragraphs 34-42).

The officer argues that the need to socially “fit in” to an already established discourse constrains the intellectual capacity of officers; they can only legitimately think and act within a very clear and narrow set of social boundaries. In consequence, what they learn and constitute as knowledge reflects the nature of these boundaries. Over time, through disciplined or recurring practices that are controlled by political action, these boundaries provide officers with a tacit understanding of how their relationships are delineated with respect to power. Central to this political action was an unwritten yet clearly understood “rule of anticipated reaction”; that

Table 1
Qualitative Analysis Schema
Operation Characteristic of Unobtrusive Forms of Power and Discourse

Power and discourse forms	Operational characteristics	Sources
Rule of anticipated reaction	Where people indicate that they remain mute and do not act against the preferred outcomes of other people because the consequences associated with the anticipated retaliation of these other people is too great.	Friedrich (1937); Clegg (1989)
Mobilization of bias	Where the viewpoints of dominant people and groups are privileged, becoming taken for granted as being “the” only viewpoints. Alternative viewpoints are not even recognized let alone considered.	Schattschneider (1960)
Universal and essential viewpoints	Viewpoints that are referred to as a grand principle, law, or totalizing truth; historical accounts that narrowly privilege one point of view over all others; usually presented by people as the way things “should” or “must” be.	Lyotard (1984); Boje (1995)
Ordering of statements	An operational example of an ordering of statements would be the existence of common discourse patterns in regard to the exercise of power across hierarchical and functional boundaries of an organization. Usually evident in instructional and disciplinary statements and actions.	Kendall & Wickham (1999)
Historical delineation of relationships	How the things people say and do make reference to the way relationships have been historically delineated with respect to power; how statements and actions produce differential subject positions; ways of being and acting that people can and cannot take up.	Martin (1990); Boje (2001)
Boundaries of discursive action	Where people are constrained by discursive boundaries—unobtrusive (informal) boundaries that designate the territories or domains in which officers may or may not act. Evident in the reference people make to where and when they and others may speak and act.	Haugaard (1997); Kendall & Wickham (1999); Boje (2001)

is, if an officer attempted to act outside the social boundaries in which he/she could legitimately operate, he/she knew that some form of punitive retaliation would occur. Over time the enforcement of this unwritten rule resulted in a socially constituted “mobilization of bias” or a discourse in which certain officers became privileged with positions of dominance while others were marginalized. Through such discourse, power relations are enacted and used to make sense of behavior as acceptable or not. For instance, while traveling on patrol, a Duty Officer (part of the LAC’s management team) offered his reflection on the relationship he had with his supervising officer, who had recently been appointed as the acting Local Area Commander for the Jumbuck LAC:

... she is ruthless. She is not to be challenged, she won't be challenged, and poor old XXXX [another Duty Officer] is just so passionate, he has let it all out, she knows

exactly where she stands with him. [In the past when she was on the same level as us], at the management meetings XXXX, has openly challenged her, and as a result he's [now] been isolated and he is coming under close scrutiny ... she has even interfered with his planning ... changing his deadlines ... it may have been to undermine him (Mdrf, Section 0, Paragraphs 181-184).

The duty officer went on to explain how the acting Local Area Commander's actions came about because of previous conflict. She views the other duty officers as a threat to her status and authority; so to protect her positional status she must keep them under close surveillance and act to constrain their discretionary action, even going as far as finding ways to discrediting them. Such an approach to subordinates is punitive, which is problematic in regard to the objectives of the reform initiatives.

This punitive approach to the management of subordinates was not an isolated event. The data illustrates for example, at an operational level a Team Leader, during a lunch break discussed with team members what happened when a colleague of theirs refused to give into pressure from his superiors:

Gillie sought legal advice in regard to charging those juveniles who did that arson attack, you know. They [juvenile justice division] told him to run one of these new perpetrator/victim conferences [new form of punishment/rehabilitation allocated for such crimes—which he did]. Bob Thompson [the Chief of Detectives] objected. The media got hold of it and blew it up. The Commissioner put pressure on Peter McDonnald [Regional Commander], who then put pressure on the boss [Local Area Commander] who pressured Gillie to change his decision [recommend a different form of punishment] – Gillie stuck to his digs [wouldn't change his decision] and because he did the boss sacked him, relieved of his higher duties (Dgsthdf, 1 passages).

What was alarming, when sitting and listening to this conversation, was the nonchalant reaction of the participants. Their reaction seemed to suggest that such punishment could only be expected. When questioned further, the officer's indicated that it was only "natural" to be punished for going against your superiors. And, at a more senior level:

Seddon said he was aware of antipathy towards the unit (CMSU) from the highest levels of the Force including [Mr. Ryan] the Commissioner. Ryan [Commissioner], he said, was scathing about the (now departed) reformer Sergeant Terry O'Connell. He ordered the then Assistant Commissioner Christine Nixon to get rid of him. She refused. Seddon said, Ryan told him he'd said to Nixon "if you don't, I'll get rid of you. She didn't, so I [Commissioner Ryan] got rid of her"—Nixon was demoted and transferred to a regional command position (Dsabc, Section 0, paragraphs 25-41).

This statement was made by the head of the Crime Management Support Unit (CMSU—the senior management group in charge of behavioral reform in the Force) Mr. Seddon, which was televised by the Australian Broadcasting Commission's *Stateline* program on May 4, 2001. Such actions on behalf of the Commissioner reflect his willingness to punish and dominate "his" officers, in contrast to the espoused objectives of the reform agenda.

Thus, as has historically been the case in the Force, noncompliance continues to be seen as an act that demands discipline and punishment. It is part and parcel of what police normally do.

The paradox of such action with respect to the reform initiatives, however, goes unrecognized by the police concerned. The data reveals that capturing and punishing criminals is the benchmark of behavioural order inside the Force: whatever serves this goal is legitimate—no matter how the means are interpreted. As the Royal Commission revealed, when it came to corruption, servicing this goal became problematic. Members of the police Force did not see some of their actions as corrupt; what they did, which they rationalized as “noble cause corruption⁹” (Wood, 1997), was simply enact the prerequisites of good policing. From their perspective, they had to do some “evil” (accepting bribes; faking evidence, protecting criminals, etc.) in order to do “good” (catch the big fish, etc.). To them, such action did not constitute corruption at all. The purpose, as they saw it, was to punish those who did wrong (as determined by them of course). Consequently, punishment became the historically constituted form of behavioral control within the organization. A Team Leader explains:

When I first started in the job, when the Senior Sergeant called out, you said, "Shit, what have I been called for, Christ I am in trouble here." When an Inspector called you would tremble in your boots. When a Superintendent called you, you would get your badge, because, you know, I am going to get my badge taken (Dbgt23Section 0, Paragraph 34).

The Team Leader’s account implies that, historically, the only time a superior would call for and officer would be to punish him/her; an understanding shared by fellow officers. Note that he frames the exercise of punishment within a hierarchical frame, evident in his reference to the increasing severity of the punishment that officers would expect from higher levels of the hierarchy.

Another Team Leader (TL) made reference to another social dimension related to the taken for granted use of discipline and punishment, that is, fear. He refers to a sense of fear strong enough to warrant him seeking a transfer to another command. He alluded to his superior, a sergeant, “doing the wrong thing.” The sergeant sought retribution after inaccurately assuming that the Team Leader “blew the whistle” on him. Interestingly, the sergeant’s actions indicated that he believed “blowing the whistle” was more “unjust” than the corrupt practices of which he was guilty; that being corrupt was of secondary importance, and that punishment for breaking the “code of silence” was more than warranted. The Sergeant’s action flags an important observation that will become more apparent in the data as our analysis progresses. It is an observation that is supported by Flyvbjerg (1998): people in positions of power often find themselves rationalizing their own versions of rationality which those in subordinate positions have little choice but to accept.

The 1996 Wood Royal Commission documents numerous problems associated with the Force’s punitive approach to the management of human resources. Despite this awareness and attempts to move away from it, officers continued to exercise forms of punishment—numerous officers independently commented that “punishment still pervades the organization.” Officers are still routinely put on insubordination charges for “speaking their mind,” especially when criticizing decisions made by higher ranking officers. The possibility of an insubordination charge, let alone it being carried out, does little to encourage lower level officers to move outside of their traditional boundaries of discursive action. It does, however, discourage conflict. With respect to unobtrusive forms of power, such forms of punishment condition a compliance mode in which the first priority is to avoid any clash of values with those perceived to be in positions of power. As the Royal Commission clearly revealed, the

avoidance of such conflict established a social environment in which those in positions of dominance were free to rationalize their practice of corruption.

The Power Behind Empowerment: The Employee Management System

According to the Senior Officers of the Force, one of the procedures implemented that was central to the success of the Force's reform was the Employee Management System (EMS). The EMS was designed to help change the culture of the Force by, among other things, providing a resource by which all officers could exercise their "voice." In theory, any officer could go to the EMS system and report anything to do with their LAC's operations that they didn't believe to be fair, right, or just, including the practices of superior officers. Because previously muted officers were provided with a resource through which they could comfortably challenge inappropriate behavior on behalf of their superiors and peers, the Commissioner said that the EMS would be "*the*" practice to bring about cultural change and ultimately instill efficient and ethically sound practices in the Force (Ryan, 2001). In this sense, the EMS represents an approach to empowerment that resonates with the first and second dimensions of power, where, along with the other structural changes that had been implemented, lower level officers have been given access to a resource which, in theory, "should" give them access to how decisions were made (Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan, 1998). The data reveals, however, that the EMS system became another mechanism through which punishment and more to the point domination could be practiced. Research participants provided numerous examples of how the EMS was used as a tool that officers in positions of power used to punish other officers in order to effect compliance. Senior officers not only used the EMS system as a disciplinary tool but also to strategically position themselves for promotion. Those in management or supervisory positions were utilizing the EMS system because its use was a criterion on which they would be judged for promotion. While walking on her beat a Team Leader's comments to the researcher added weight to this claim:

TL: Do you want to know something that is really interesting at the moment? Very interesting, and it happens here, I've noticed. All of our complaints, or not all of them, but 90 percent of them, are coming from internal. It's no longer the public that rings up and says, I want to whine about Constable so and so. It's, oh, you haven't got your nametag on, that's the third time in a row. I am going to put you on the EMS system. See, the people that are doing this ... they are out to further their own career. So, they do this so that they can put it into a module that they can use for a job application ... That's terrible! I find that this ... and I think you'll find ... that's why the blokes are going off sick all the time with this shit. Even puts me in there [meaning that a higher ranking Duty Officer reported on her in the EMS]. Unless there is something I really deserve, but nine times out of ten, these are little shit things that can be solved with a straight conversation ... "Look, you've done this, what is going on, what's the story, what's your side of things? Oh, look, I am sorry, it won't happen again... blah, blah, blah ... all right then, well, then consider yourself counseled and that's the end of the session, isn't it?" ... What they put on the system, what you're saying to them is, that's going to be used against you when you apply for a job. [The selection panel will say] "Hang on, you are on the bloody EMS system three times and you are saying you are the best Supervisor in the world?" And they can use it, because they know it exists ... so, suddenly my career path goes further down that way [pointing his finger to the ground], while his goes further that way [point his finger to the ceiling] (Dbatlii2 Section 0, Paragraphs 477-500).

The designers of the EMS system, while their intentions were commendable, neglected the power behind empowerment. They neglected the political complexities of the specific social context in which the EMS would be used. Not only did they neglect potential political action that reflects the first and second dimensions of power, as the content of the above transcripts represent, they also neglect what Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan (1998) described in the third and fourth dimensions of power. While, technically, lower level officers can report on their superiors, the unwritten "rule of anticipated reaction" was very much in their minds. In short, they were well aware that if they did make such a report they may well put their careers at risk: they would be disregarding historically constituted "rules of the game" (Clegg, 1989) in regard to decision legitimacy. Rather than empowering officers by giving lower level officers the voice they needed to "check" the behavior of those in positions of dominance, the EMS continues the disempowerment of officers and subsequently, their silence.

In summary, with respect to the first and second dimensions of power, empowerment *should* be facilitated by the EMS. However, at a deeper embedded level consistent with third and fourth dimensions of power, the *actualities* of power show that officers are anything but empowered.

The Power Behind Empowerment: The Operations, Control and Review Meeting

As mentioned previously, the Royal Commission revealed that when it came to corruption, many police officers referred to their wrongdoing as "noble cause corruption." That is, they acknowledged that their behavior might have been unethical and or corrupt but ultimately they saw such behavior as leading to something good. In their position as police officers, they assumed that it was in the best interest of the public that they acted the way they did. For them, collaborating with criminals and "green lighting"¹⁰ certain acts of crime prevented worse crimes occurring. Ostensibly, with respect to their frame of reference, unethical and corrupt behavior actually made sense. The idea that one has to do some evil in order to do good discursively framed their action. Furthermore, the discourse that ensued new employees with an implicit understanding of what police actually do when they do policing. A Team Leader explains:

What was happening was, you had certain people as they were being promoted or whatever ... gaining a lot of power, and those people had the ability to control other people. I am talking, like, junior staff and whatever else. And what was happening was, you're getting police coming from the Academy ... and if their particular Supervisor as it was then, or as it stood then, was corrupt, then basically they had to toe the line or they were ostracized or kicked out, or whatever... (Dbatlii1, Section 0, Paragraph 21).

The Team Leader refers to new recruits being constrained by a "rule of anticipated reaction"; officers knew that they needed to "toe the line." If the supervisors of new recruits were corrupt, this informal rule placed recruits in a situation where they were implicated in corruption: they could not resist and "toe the line" at the same time. Importantly, the constraint that this and other social rules or grammars (Goffman, 1959) place on the sense-making and discursive action of officers go largely unnoticed because, as a part of the prevailing discourse, they are considered to be the natural order of things. The nature and consequence of such constraint is aptly represented in a comment made at a management meeting by the then acting Local Area Commander (different person to that previously mentioned). He told the Duty Officers and Team Leaders present that it was time for "courageous leadership," which required

letting people know “If you're not going to play the game our way, then you are on your way” (Dm&dmf, Section 1.1.1.1, Paragraphs 258-263). He had just spent the entire meeting pointing out that the way the “game was to be played is the new, empowered, and team-driven way.” This acting commander was unaware of the paradox that underpinned his proposition—the managerial discourse that he was both a part of and enacting preventing him from recognizing that he was attempting to reform through the very forms of power that it was meant to reform.

The data reveals that the central point from which this managerial discourse emerged was the Operations Control and Review (OCR) meeting. The OCR is designed as a formal meeting in which the Commissioner and his senior executive team can coordinate and discuss the operational performance of all the LACs. An officer gave testament to the OCR's pervasive impact and infamous notoriety throughout the Force:

... we are OCR driven; because, the OCRs are every four months [or] five months. But even on the way home, in the car from the first ...from that OCR, you are thinking about how you can make sure that [in] the next one you're going to cover all your bases. And you really ... you are trying to put into place short-term strategies to cater for long-term problems (Dwst05 Section 0, Paragraphs 101-119).

When observing the meeting, one can see that the spatial arrangements of the meeting reinforced the Commissioner's and his executive team's position of dominance to the point where, despite the officers being told that the meeting was supposed to be participative, they also realized that “they were under attack by a superior force.” As a Team Leader said:

Look at the structure of it ... The place has two tables along the front, they [Commanders waiting to be questioned on their performance] are the heads on the block. You've got the Chiefs [Commissioner and his Executive Team] out at the front and facing them [the Commanders with their head on the block], the rest of it is all audience and on the fringes, there are people around the edges, this guy is putting these huge big bloody graphs up on the walls saying ah, what have you done about your robberies in this area? And the guy just sits there; it is just a big magnifying glass. (Djtt23', Section 0, Paragraphs 161-211)

While the OCR was designed to coordinate the operational performance of LACs through participative collaboration, according to the comments of numerous officers it appears to be more of an arena in which the senior executive team reinforced its superiority by attacking and punishing individuals. This is attested to by a comment made by a Crime Manager (head of detectives):

Inspectors and Superintendents go into these OCRs and being belittled by higher rank and they come back and it's embarrassing and belittling ... You know, like...and comments that I've heard is that, if we as police spoke to members of the public the same way senior officers spoke to other officers, we would have a complaint brought against us (NB_tltm, Section 0, Paragraph 65).

The focus on individuals rather than operations is also reflected in the previous officer's use of the metaphor (van Dijk, 1997) of “heads on the block,” which portrays the OCR as a setting for an execution. And, his comment “it is just a big magnifying glass” indicates that the executive team is “big brother” surveying all below it with its panoptical gaze.

While one may recognize that authoritarian control is both part and partial and necessary for police and other paramilitary organizations, the behavior of the Commission and his executive team reflects a discourse of propriety that legitimates acts of dominations; this behavior and the prevailing discourse derived a specific “ordering of statements” (Kendall and Wickham, 1999). An “ordering of statements” is where the way things are said and done in the OCR, particularly in the form of orders, commands and instructions are mirrored at each levels of the organization’s hierarchy. What helped to create this ordering of statements is the fact that while officers are being “grilled,” “ridiculed,” and “abused” (all terms used by research participants) during the meeting, the proceedings are being transmitted via police television to LACs across the state. It is these transmissions and the subsequent ordering of statements that have led to the constitution of a prevailing management discourse: the OCR meeting is the medium through which managers throughout the Force are made aware of how management *should* be done in the Force—via domination.

Discussion

The study’s findings indicate, like most other organizations (Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998), the Force has implemented an empowerment program that only addresses the first and second dimensions of power. The third and fourth dimension are neglected. For instance, the broader police literature (Cicourel, 1976; Manning & Van Maanen, 1978; Punch, 1979; Van Maanen, 1988; Finnane, 1987; 1996; Chan, 1997) suggests that most police organizations throughout the world have a military disciplinary frame based on authoritarian control (Dandeker 1990) and, assuming all things are rational, there is nothing wrong with such a frame. However, in the Police Force in question, under the guise of authority officers (senior ranking and specialist/detectives) practice domination. In consequence, the right to power on behalf of these officers has become a taken for granted reality. This is evident in the way lower level officers remain unwilling to exercise the “voice” with which they have supposed to have been empowered. They continue to act with deference despite the implementation of formalized structures, procedures, and policies that no longer required them to do so.

The text examples analyzed however, do not indicate, as the third dimension of power suggests, that lower level officers were victims of a false consciousness. Officers clearly indicate that they are aware that what is being discursively articulated by their senior officers at times did not make sense—that is, they realize that what was being articulated was inauthentic. It did not reign true in regard to their practical knowledge. There were different ways of dealing with this inauthenticity. Some transcripts represent a “rebel voice” (Boje, 2001), implying that lower level officers were resisting and did have important and worthwhile things to say that could help improve the Force’s working environment and performance. But, at the same time, many were not prepared to articulate these contrary views publicly—these views were a part of their rebel practical consciousness (Giddens, 1984; Haugaard, 1997) rather than something to be articulated as a part of the new discursive order—a way that things *should* be. Practical consciousness is a tacit knowledge which enables us to be competent and capable actors in our everyday lives. Despite the practical consciousness of the officers in the Police Force having been critically evaluated, the surface level changes and the new discursive order articulated lacked sufficient legitimacy in the minds of officers to outweigh their practical consciousness. What this means, is that even if the attempts at reform are genuine, which the surface level changes and the contents of the transcripts seem to indicate is the case, the force’s embedded forms of power, which legitimize acts of domination, continue to unobtrusively undermine the reform process.

The Royal Commission showed that traditional power relationships had led to corrupt behavior being seen as legitimate in the Force (Wood, 1997). Despite the changes aimed at facilitating empowerment, (such as the EMS or the OCR), these traditional relations continue to be reproduced rather than transformed. The OCR meeting, transmitted via police television, was aimed at eradicating corrupt behavior. In contrast, it subjects officers to the panoptical of the Commissioner and his executive team (Foucault 1977). A managerial discourse of domination emanates from the effects of the Commissioner and his executive team's behavior in this meeting. This discourse reinforces a historically constituted rule of anticipated reaction (Friedrich, 1937) and subsequent mobilization of bias: both of these unobtrusive forms of power are aligned with Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan's fourth dimension of power.

The design of the EMS is plagued with an ignorance of how police members are subject to and comply with such unobtrusive forms power. Senior executives, under the guise of empowerment, practice acts of domination and appear completely unaware of the paradox inherent to their actions. Moreover, they are unaware that their actions reinforce the cultural and political structures which had in the past legitimized corrupt behavior. Commissioner Ryan displays the consequences of such ignorance when just after he announced to the public that the reform program was in its final stages and that unethical and corrupt behavior had been eliminated from the Service, the Police Integrity Commission (PIC) released the findings of an undercover operation to the public, which revealed the contrary—the continuing practice of “the worst kind of corruption, with police not just taking bribes but actively organizing crime, introducing one [Drug] dealer to another and encouraging them to work harder ... corrupt police operated without fear of or hindrance from anti-corruption reforms introduced since the Royal Commission” (Divine, 2001, p.16). And, a short time after this, senior officers were caught giving the answers for formal tests to members of their networks prior to the tests being sat to secure the promotion of these members (Brown, 2001).

Commissioner Ryan eventually fell victim to such ignorance, on April 10, 2002, he was forced to resign his Commission by the new Police minister whom the Premier had appointed to try and get policing off the front pages of the local newspapers. Since the departure of Commissioner Ryan and the introduction of a new executive leadership team and its promise of even tighter codes of conduct, the public remain “gobsmacked” by similar ongoing revelations. The most recent being 65 officers brought before the courts in May 2005 for unethical and corrupt behavior that includes rape, drug trafficking, and assault. In April 2005 five of the states most senior officers were suspended from duty—all at the Assistant Commissioner level and members of the Commissioner's executive team—for offences related to the handling of evidence in a major investigation in which prominent sporting entities were acquitted of raping a woman. The exact nature of their standing down is yet to be revealed to the public.

In sum, metaphorically speaking, police are the “gatekeepers of normalcy” and customarily have a duty to punish those that abuse the law or, according to them, behaved abnormally. The police version of normalcy, however, has been largely predicated on a history of authoritarian rule within a command and control model of organization. In theory such a history *should* not be a problem, but in “practice” it has constituted taken for granted realities that are hard to change. The boundaries that constitute the Force's bounded morality reflect its traditional authoritarian based power relations. However, once authority becomes a taken for granted reality its legitimacy is no longer open for question, its exercise no longer contingent upon the decision of those subjected to it, then it becomes an unobtrusive form of domination

(Gordon, 2002; Gordon & Grant, 2005). The problem with this is that people in positions of dominance are free to rationalize their practices as legitimate, irrespective of whether they are or not (reflected in the term “noble cause corruption”).

Conclusion

The case at hand, as per the vast majority of empowerment programs (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998), primarily represents the adoption of an approach to empowerment that resonates with the first and second dimensional frames of power. The third dimensional frame of power is addressed by way of senior officers employing strategies to manage the perception that other officers had of the empowerment program, but only at a surface level. The effect of deeper unobtrusive forms of power that are central to the third and fourth dimensions of power are unaccounted for. The difference between the fourth dimension and the other three dimensions is also empirically apparent. While senior officers attempt to manage meaning (third dimension) they do so with the inherent assumption that because they think this is how power *should* be in *their* organization, it will be so. These officers don’t even recognize, let alone account for, the effects of the broader complexities associated with the pragmatics (actualities) of power that are central to the fourth dimensional view.

Obviously, the study cannot be generalized across industries without recognizing its limitations. It needs to be acknowledged that the police organization with its strictly hierarchical structure might breed a different climate for change than other organizations. Decision-making is influenced by societal norms as well as by the individual histories of organizational members and the organization. However at a localized level, power relations, and the language games that these relations are played out in, shape the practice of change. Typically, where organizations face major programs of social change, as the police organization in question did, the intersection of everyday life, organization change, and power is not trivial.

It could be objected that the study is of one organization only, and that, as a study of the police, it is a very special kind of organization. While some may argue that the likelihood that the sociocultural norms of such an organization would continue to be perpetrated despite the implementation of an institutionally sanctioned reform program is stating the obvious. However, this police organization was plagued with corruption and there is little evidence to suggest that it is an aberrant police force in this respect. Other Forces have been established as being equally corrupt over recent times, just as the Metropolitan Police Force in the UK, the Hong Kong Police, and the LAPD and NYPD have at various stages in their careers. Moreover police organizations are not the only type of coercive organization that states use to maintain order. There are also military organizations, as well as customs and immigration services, firefighters and coast guards that are similarly quasi-militaristic organizations. Such organizations, as they employ new technologies, are also often struggling with the legacy of their quasi-militaristic past, and seeking to change to flatter, more empowered and postmodern organization forms. A study such as this is relevant to all these types of organizations as well. Thus, the limitations of the organization’s particulars—its being a police organization and a solitary case study are less significant.

Putting the study into context, some important issues emerge for further research into the power behind empowerment. Since research into power in a police organization plagued with corruption is sensitive, the research framework, methods, and instruments developed here might be appropriate for other fields of unobtrusive and sensitive enquiry as well. The context of the research was one of change, where an organization was attempting to move from an

‘old’ to a ‘new’ state in order to improve its social dynamics. The study’s thesis is that behavior is shaped by power relations deeply embedded in organization discourses. The analysis illustrates further empirical studies that utilize discursive research frameworks similar to the one developed here can offer much in regard to informing our understanding of effects of power in change management scenarios.

Returning to the issues at hand, whether organizational theorists and practitioners want to acknowledge it or not, the empowerment of people, both in our broader societies and organizations, is a reality. Information technology has given people access to resources, mediums, and strategies that enable them to both question and, if desired, attempt to change the status quo. In an organizational context, the adoption of new organization forms with flatter structures necessarily requires lower level workers to be empowered with decision-making responsibilities. Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan’s conceptual analysis of the power behind empowerment provided conceptual insight to why empowerment practices may fail. Their central argument is that mainstream theorists and practitioners have largely avoided power because it renders their normative and rational standpoints problematic. The empirical results of the present study reinforce Hardy and Leiba-O’Sullivan’s argument. First and foremost mainstream management approaches to empowerment need to stop skirting around power. They need to acknowledge that empowerment is inextricably linked to power. They also need to adopt a more holistic view of power, one that engages all four dimensional frames. Such an approach to empowerment would not only transfer economic and political resources to lower level workers and provide these workers with access to political entities and decision-making processes (Hardy & Leiba-O’Sullivan, 1998), it would emphasize the need to manage meaning in a way that raises the political consciousness of these workers, most importantly it would need to account for how embedded forms of power affect the way an organizations workers think, feel and do things.

NOTES

¹ This title is drawn directly from Hardy, C. and S. Leiba-O’Sullivan, (1998) The Power Behind Empowerment: Implications for Research and Practice, *Human Relations*, 54(4), 451:483.

² While Hardy and O’Sullivan acknowledge that Foucault’s work reflects a broader body of postmodern and post structuralist literature, other writers would argue that, because of its nature, it would be difficult to conceptualize Foucault’s in dimensional terms.

³ Note that this is a different meaning of embedded reporting to that used to describe war correspondents who are tightly constrained within a sub-unit of a social system. The embedded researcher roams freely within the negotiated spaces rather than being confined tightly.

⁴ It is acknowledged that this is not a requirement for all forms of qualitative and in particular ethnographic research; it is however, due to the theoretical focus adopted, a requirement for the present study.

⁵ A schedule was established for visiting the LAC one to two days (6-8 hours) a week throughout the data collection period.

⁷ Data saturation is the term used for extracting theoretically relevant data (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1989; Gephart, 1993) from large datasets, the process of which draws on the principles of theoretical sampling (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

⁸ The schema was only used as a guide, allowing the analysis process to be informed by existing theory.

⁹ He was dismissed two days before Christmas by Commissioner Ryan after members of the unit publicly blew the whistle on senior members of the Police Force for undermining the unit's behavioral reform program.

¹⁰ Noble cause corruption, amongst other things, involved practices such as fabricating and planting evidence to obtain a conviction against a person they believed deserved to be found guilty.

¹¹ Green lighting involved giving criminals who supplied information that lead to the conviction of other criminals a "green light" to practice acts of crime, which involved armed robberies, drug trafficking, gaming and many others.

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