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City of Los Angeles v. Alameda: The Fractured Evidence Standard for Proving a Substantial Governmental Interest

Christopher A. Khatami
Seton Hall Law

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I. Introduction

Fractured cases make bad evidence law. In *City of Los Angeles v. Alameda*, the United States Supreme Court achieved minor success in clarification. The *Alameda* Court’s plurality opinion created a more concrete analytic framework in which to view both parties’ evidence, but produced an opaque rule as to how a court should determine the sufficiency of that evidence. *Alameda* generated more sophisticated evidence questions than it laid to rest in response to the inchoate reasonable-relevance standard established in *Renton* for proving a substantial governmental interest. A fractured *Alameda* opinion and unclear evidence rules created conflicting lower court interpretations, causing circuit courts to render its own interpretative judgment where the *Alameda* Court failed to clarify.

Lower courts have split over key evidence questions. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits are divided over whether studies with a longer shelf life, often having tested for unrelated secondary effects, constitute “shoddy data or reasoning” under *Alameda*. Another circuit split in the wake of *Alameda* turns on whether a city can rely only on pre-enactment data or can the city rely on

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2 Daniel R. Aaronson, Gary S. Edinger, James S. Benjamin, *The First Amendment in Chaos: How the Law of Secondary Effects Is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit Courts*, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 741, 755 (2009) (finding that lower courts agree that *Alameda*’s evidence standard does not require local governments to rely on *Daubert*-quality scientific evidence or studies, but that there is no lower court consensus or guidance from *Alameda* as to the weight or form of evidence sufficient to “cast direct doubt” on legislative findings that support the government’s secondary effects justification for state regulation of adult businesses).
3 Aaronson, Edinger, and Benjamin, *supra* note 2, at 755.
4 *Id.* at 750.
5 Brigman L. Harman, *Is a Strip Club More Harmful Than a Dirty Bookstore? Navigating a Circuit Split in Municipal Regulation of Sexually Oriented Businesses*, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1603, 1604–06 (2008) (noting that the Fifth Circuit has interpreted “shoddy data or reasoning” under *Alameda* to mean that cities cannot rely on “studies that do not differentiate between on-site sexually oriented businesses and off-site sexually oriented businesses.”). The Tenth Circuit, on the contrary, has read “shoddy data or reasoning” more conservatively. *Id.* Under the Tenth Circuit’s view, the plaintiff retains the burden of rebutting the presumption that on-site and off-site sexually oriented businesses are “‘reasonably similar businesses’ that will have reasonably similar effects.” This circuit split will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV of this paper. *Id.*
data compiled after enactment of the ordinance.\(^6\) Still another division answered differently within the same circuit hinges on whether foreign studies “trump actual local experience measured with reliable statistics?”\(^7\) More post-\textit{Alameda} questions still persist: the extent of judicial deference to legislative evidence and the evidentiary weight to be afforded local scientific studies in comparison to older anecdotal accounts from other jurisdictions which “may or may not have much in common with the community at issue.”\(^8\)

The \textit{Alameda} Court succeeded, however, in creating a burden-shifting mechanism and a balancing test designed to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to rebut the city’s asserted evidence of secondary effects at the summary judgment stage of litigation.\(^9\) The balancing test sought to create a boundary framework to address First Amendment concerns raised in Justice Souter’s dissent in \textit{Alameda}.\(^10\)

Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the burden shifting standard failed to articulate with greater precision and clarity the weight and form of evidence that cities are required to produce in support of the link between asserted secondary effects and the ordinance’s restrictions.\(^11\) Only spare mention of “shoddy data or reasoning” is offered as the blanket standard for unpalatable government evidence.\(^12\) The plurality opinion, however, jettisoned elaboration of any kind as to the types of evidence constituting “shoddy data or reasoning.”\(^13\)

Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s balancing test took a different analytical approach to reach the same conclusion with the same evidentiary flaws as the plurality opinion. The concurrence

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\(^6\) Aaronson, Edinger, and Benjamin, \textit{supra} note 2, at 756–58 (noting that the “\textit{timing of secondary effects} evidence has also hopelessly divided the Courts.”) Some courts have concluded that the government must produce all evidence relied upon at any time and at any stage of the litigation. \textit{Id} at 758. Other courts, however, have held that the city must produce all evidence “made at the time of legislative enactment.” These circuit cases and the timing of evidence issue will be discussed in Part IV of this paper. \textit{Id}.

\(^7\) \textit{Id}. at 756.

\(^8\) \textit{Id}. at 753–55.


\(^10\) \textit{Id}. at 446 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

\(^11\) \textit{Id}. at 437 (plurality opinion).

\(^12\) \textit{Id}.

\(^13\) \textit{Id}.
also failed to articulate the weight of evidence and the form of evidence required to be produced under *Alameda*. The burden-shifting mechanism fits hand in glove with the balancing test, but neither approach has proven instructive to lower courts on crucial evidence rules at the trial level.

The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have read *Alameda* as permitting considerable judicial deference to legislative findings of asserted secondary effects in a line of cases to be discussed further in this paper. A much more recent Seventh Circuit decision in *Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis*,\(^1^4\) however, retrenched a hitherto expansive reading of what evidence sufficiently sustained an adult zoning ordinance.

The *Annex* Court rejected the city’s reliance on a data from a pre-enactment study conducted twenty years prior that tested for secondary effects unrelated to the ordinance at issue.\(^1^5\) Applying the burden-shift and balancing approaches, the *Annex* Court read *Alameda*’s “shoddy data or reasoning” standard as including data from studies unrelated to the asserted secondary effects.\(^1^6\) *Annex*, in other words, undergirded evidentiary sufficiency with the requirement that proffered evidence must be at least comparably related to the types of land-use externalities produced by operation of adult businesses.

This paper argues that the *Alameda* Court’s fractured opinion left the sufficiency of evidence standard an unsettled area of law susceptible to unbridled legislative justifications for invasive adult zoning restrictions unrelated to purported secondary effects. Part II of this paper examines the broader constitutional landscape from which the sufficiency of evidence standard and the stakes surrounding it emerged. Part III provides a case analysis of *Alameda*, scrutinizes the three contending approaches of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Part IV analyzes evidentiary issues raised in *Alameda* that caused circuit splits and whether the Seventh Circuit’s

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\(^{14}\)581 F.3d 460, 461–63 (7th Cir. 2009).
\(^{15}\)Id. at 461.
\(^{16}\)Id. at 464–66.
decision in Annex constituted a game-changer for evidentiary sufficiency. Part V briefly argues that an evidence rule of comparable relatedness to asserted secondary effects is a vital safeguard that precludes city councils from abusing studies and other data to support unrelated ordinances in the name of combating secondary effects. Lastly, Part VI concludes that Alameda’s fogginess empowers city councils to surmount First Amendment challenges without allowing plaintiff-business owners the benefit of making their case for constitutional defect beyond the summary judgment stage of litigation.

II. Constitutional Framework: Zoning Regulation of Adult Businesses and the First Amendment

State zoning regulation of adult businesses is a creature of nuisance law. State and municipal governments retain broad zoning authority to regulate adult business establishments subject to certain First Amendment limitations.\(^{17}\) First Amendment limitation on state police power encompasses protection over a “wide variety of ‘expressive conduct,’ including adult entertainment.”\(^{18}\) Supreme Court decisions have consistently extended First Amendment protections to adult books, sexually explicit movies, and live adult entertainment.\(^{19}\)

The ambit of First Amendment protection of adult businesses in zoning and non-zoning cases alike has been frustrated by analytical difficulties in drawing sharp pliable distinctions

\(^{17}\) See, e.g., Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1971) (holding that zoning regulations must be content-neutral in their application and not infringe on speech protected by the First Amendment); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (holding that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon First Amendment speech are permissible as long as the regulations are administered fairly); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that the state’s police power is broad enough to allow government zoning regulation that segregates industrial company sites from residential areas of the community); see also Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint Neutral Zoning of Adult Entertainment Businesses, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 451 (2004) (explaining that the recognized power of local governments to enact zoning ordinances to combat nuisances has been broadly interpreted by the Supreme Court to include zoning for aesthetic reasons, improvements to neighborhood quality and urban life, reduction in noise, traffic, and crime, and protection of public morals); Kenneth L. Turchi, Note, Municipal Zoning Restrictions on Adult Entertainment: Young, Its Progeny, and Indianapolis’ Special Exception Ordinance, 58 IND. L.J. 505, 506–10 (1983) (describing constitutional background for state zoning regulatory authority over businesses in the community and the basic limits of that regulatory authority as it confronts, generally speaking, First Amendment concerns).

\(^{18}\) Baradaran-Robison, supra note 17, at 451.

\(^{19}\) See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (citing a litany of prior Supreme Court cases that recognized extensions of First Amendment protection to sexually explicit speech through a variety of communicative mediums such as television, radio, print, and live entertainment).
between expressive conduct and speech content. The Supreme Court first confronted this conduct-content bifurcation in *U.S. v. O'Brien*. The facts of *O'Brien*, however, do not lend themselves to easy analogy in the context of zoning adult businesses. *O'Brien* involved three defendants who burned their “Selective Service registration certificates,” or draft cards, on the steps of a local city courthouse in protest of the Vietnam War and in violation of a 1965 amendment to a federal statute. The statutory amendment imposed criminal liability on anyone who “‘knowingly destroys, [or] knowingly mutilates’” a draft card.

The defendants challenged the statute on First Amendment grounds, claiming that the act or conduct of burning a draft card in public fell within the First Amendment’s protection of free expression “because [the defendants] did it in ‘demonstration against the war and against the draft.’” The Supreme Court soundly rejected the notion that all conduct containing a communicative element that could be labeled as speech received First Amendment protection. Speech and non-speech elements combined in the same course of conduct are still subject to incidental First Amendment limitations if the restrictive law meets a four-part test adopted by the *O'Brien* Court.

Government regulation of expressive conduct is “sufficiently justified” if: 1) it is within the constitutional power of the Government; 2) if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 3) if it the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and 4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater

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22 Id.
23 Id. at 374.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Although the Court categorized the defendant’s conduct as expressive, it concluded that Congress retained the proper authority to pass a draft card burning statute under its Article I constitutional power to raise armies. In addition, the government’s substantial interest resided in furthering “the smooth and proper functioning of the system that Congress has established to raise armies.” The draft card burning statute protects the government’s capability to control a functioning military conscription system essential to national defense. Accordingly, the draft card burning statute is unrelated to suppressing any speech aspect of the conduct and the Court “perceived no reasonable alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly” assure the functional viability of the draft system.

O’Brien essentially provided that government regulation of expressive conduct is content-neutral if the government can meet each prong of the four-part test. The factors in the O’Brien test for expressive conduct statutes are closely analogous to the multi-factor analysis the Supreme Court developed for determining whether zoning ordinances are content-based or content-neutral. Unlike the O’Brien Court’s clear adoption of a test to determine a statute’s

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27 Id. at 374–77.
28 Id. at 377.
29 Id. at 379.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 379–81.
32 Interestingly, by contrast, the Supreme Court refused to apply the four-part O’Brien test to a Congressional flag burning statute in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), finding that the flag burning ban was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny despite the fact that the act of flag burning was expressive conduct that would otherwise come under O’Brien. See Dana M. Tucker, Preventing The Secondary Effects of Adult Entertainment Establishments: Is Zoning the Solution?, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 383, 395 (1987).
33 Christopher J. Andrew, Note, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Historical Development, Current Application, and Potential Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has “commented that the tests regarding time, place, and manner restrictions and expressive conduct restrictions are nearly identical, and appears to use them interchangeably with only minor amounts of difficulty”). It is important to note, however, that the majority opinions have applied the Renton test to zoning cases only, and applied the O’Brien test to expressive conduct cases involving public indecency statutes banning nude dancing a la Barnes and Erie. Where the different tests seem to converge is in the Court’s application of the secondary effects doctrine as legal justification for expressive conduct statutes regulating adult businesses.
content-neutrality, however, the Supreme Court hiccupped twice before it developed a multi-factor test similar to *O’Brien*.

Confronted with its first adult zoning case in *Young v. American Mini Theatres*, the Court sharply divided over the proper standard of review and whether the enterprise of adult zoning was content-based or content-neutral. The facts in *Young* stood in stark contrast to the antiwar political speech in the act of draft card burning in *O’Brien*. In *Young*, two adult movie theater owners challenged on First Amendment grounds Detroit’s zoning ordinance that prevented concentration of adult businesses within a 1,000 feet of each other or within 500 feet of any residential area.

At the time of enactment, the Detroit city council made a finding that “some uses of property are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are concentrated in limited areas.” Based upon this legislative evidence, the city decided to pass the ordinance. Subsequently, the city passed several amendments, the most important of which prevented clusters of adult businesses from operating within a certain range of each other. The plaintiffs argued that the recent amendments to the ordinance offended First Amendment protected speech given that the ordinance aimed directly at movie theaters exhibiting sexually explicit films. The plaintiffs further argued that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as it applied restrictions to adult movie theaters only based on the sexually explicit content of the films being shown at the theater.

The Court upheld the ordinance and classified the land-use restriction as a content-neutral, constitutionally benign time, place, and manner regulation subject to intermediate
scrutiny.\textsuperscript{41} Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens concluded that “[t]he mere fact that the commercial exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances.”\textsuperscript{42} The fact that the ordinance treated adult theaters differently and classified them based on the content they exhibited also proved to be of little consequence to the plurality.\textsuperscript{43} Justice Stevens distinguished the regulatory aims from the regulatory means of the ordinance.\textsuperscript{44} The plurality concluded that land-use regulations governing the time, location, and manner of operations pertaining to a particular kind of business does not violate the First Amendment if the city can demonstrate a significant governmental interest in combating purported secondary effects produced by operation of these adult businesses.\textsuperscript{45}

Secondary effects became the constitutional end-run around persuasive arguments raised in Justice Stewart’s dissent that adult zoning regulated adult businesses for its content above all and that secondary effects obfuscated a clear distinction between content-based and content-neutral ordinances.\textsuperscript{46} Accordingly, Justice Stewart argued that adult zoning constituted content-based regulation that demanded subjection to strict scrutiny.\textsuperscript{47} Justice Powell’s concurrence, on the other hand, agreed with the plurality on content-neutrality, but viewed the ordinance as regulating the conduct of how adult movie theaters operate in a community.\textsuperscript{48} Thus, the ordinance, under Justice Powell’s analysis, should be analyzed under the four-part \textit{O’Brien} test.\textsuperscript{49}

The plurality passed on the \textit{O’Brien} test and applied the significant governmental interest standard as the constitutional benchmark that cities must prove to sustain an adult zoning

\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 61.
\textsuperscript{42} Id.
\textsuperscript{43} Id.
\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 67.
\textsuperscript{45} Id. at 61.
\textsuperscript{46} Id. at 83–87.
\textsuperscript{47} Id. at 85–86.
\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 78–83.
\textsuperscript{49} Id. at 80.
regulation. The city’s interest in protecting its community from negative externalities generated by concentrations of adult movie theaters cloaked the ordinance in a content-neutral garb free from the glare of strict scrutiny. The plurality further concluded that the findings of the Detroit city council’s study provided a sufficient factual basis “for the [city council’s] conclusion that this kind of restriction will have the desired effect. The study findings of purported secondary effects, in other words, proved the city’s significant interest in preserving the quality of neighborhoods in the community through zoning regulation of adult businesses.

The plurality in Young created several key components of the undeveloped evidence standard that would confront the Alameda Court years later: Judicial deference to legislative evidence, data proffered from legislative studies to support secondary effects, the notion of secondary effects as a doctrinal basis for characterizing zoning ordinances as content neutral, and the city’s burden of proving a significant interest to sustain the constitutionality of the ordinance. The plurality decision in Young, however, confounded the lower courts. Lower courts struggled to articulate a clear standard of review as the doctrinal breadth and evidentiary scope of the secondary effects justification clouded hitherto starker distinctions between content-based and content-neutral ordinances. Justice Powell’s characterization of time, place, and

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50 Id. at 70–72.
51 Id. at 70.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 71; see also Andrew, supra note 33, at 1184.
54 Id. at 71.
55 Id. at 71 n.34.
56 Id. at 71.
57 Id. at 70–73.
58 Andrew, supra note 33, at 1186.
manner regulations as conduct-based and his invocation of the O'Brien test only compounded lower courts’ perplexity.\textsuperscript{60}

Five years after Young, the Supreme Court in \textit{Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim}\textsuperscript{61} refined its secondary effects analysis and reigned in the seemingly expansive writ of zoning authority over adult businesses.\textsuperscript{62} In \textit{Schad}, two adult bookstore owners were criminally indicted and convicted for violating a local zoning ordinance that banned all live entertainment as a permitted use in a commercial zone.\textsuperscript{63} The owners challenged the ordinance as violative of their rights of free expression under the First Amendment.\textsuperscript{64} The bookstore sold sexually explicit books, magazines, and films.\textsuperscript{65} In 1973, the bookstore obtained an “amusement” license from the Borough, permitting the store to install coin-operated video booths in which customers could pay to watch adult films on the commercial retail premises.\textsuperscript{66} Three years later, in 1976, the store installed a coin-operated live nude dancing booth in which customers could pay to view a live nude dancer gyrating behind a glass panel.\textsuperscript{67}

The \textit{Schad} Court attacked the blatant ambiguity in the language of the statute and its application. Borough officials’ conflicting interpretation of the extent of entertainment banned under the ordinance highlighted the ambiguity.\textsuperscript{68} The prosecutor construed the ordinance as banning all live entertainment, but the Borough building inspector “stated there was no basis for

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Id.} at 361.
\textsuperscript{61} 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
\textsuperscript{62} Andrew, supra note 33, at 1187.
\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim}, 452 U.S. 61, 62–64 (1981). § 99-15B of Mount Ephraim’s ordinance listed permitted uses on land and in buildings. The list included: offices, banks, taverns, restaurants, luncheonettes, automobile dealerships, and retail stores, “such as but not limited to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber, jewelry paint, wallpaper, appliances, flowers” . . . etc. \textit{Id.} at 64. The list did not expressly mention exclusion of sexually oriented retail businesses. \textit{Id.} As Justice White points out in the plurality opinion, the language of the ordinance is “ambiguous with respect to whether live entertainment is permitted.” \textit{Id.} at 66. The ordinance purports to list the “principal” permitted uses in a commercial zone, yet at the same time in a subsequent provision of the ordinance § 99-4 “declares that all uses not expressly permitted are forbidden.” \textit{Id.} at 67.
\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Id.} at 65.
\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Id.} at 62.
\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Id.} at 68.
distinguishing between live entertainment and other entertainment under the ordinance.” The Borough issued the amusement license to the adult bookstore, which permitted the live entertainment toll booths in the first place.

The Court seized upon the ordinance’s ambiguity to raise the evidentiary burden upon states to prove a substantial governmental interest. The Schad Court expounded upon the rough outlines of the evidentiary standard in Young. First, the Court acknowledged that the courts assumed the critical role of weigh the circumstances and appraising the “substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation.” Second, the Court required the government to provide evidence of the secondary effects that the ordinance purported to mitigate before the law could survive intermediate scrutiny. Third, overbroad zoning regulations that operated as either an express or an effective total ban on expressive speech constituted an unreasonable time, place, and manner regulation. On this point, the Court added that zoning regulations implicating First Amendment rights must be narrowly tailored or drawn to further the state’s substantial governmental interest and leave open “adequate alternative channels of communication.”

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69 Id. at 62.
70 Id. at 68.
71 Id. at 69.
72 Id. at 69–75.
73 Id. at 74–76.
74 Id. at 75–76; see also Matthew L. McGinnis, Note, Sex, But Not the City: Adult-Entertainment Zoning, The First Amendment, and Residential and Rural Municipalities, 46 B.C. L. REV. 625, 648–54 (2005) (making the astute observation that an alternative fair reading of Schad suggests that a total ban may “still be permissible in rural and residential communities” since the Court “explicitly declined to hold that every municipality, no matter how small, must allow such entertainment.”). The author notes “an unresolved conflict” between Renton and Schad regarding the available alternative avenues of communication requirement. Renton requires that municipal zoning regulations provide space for adult businesses within the city’s borders. Schad suggests, on the other hand, that small rural or residential communities may not have to preserve zoning space within its borders to meet the alternative avenues communication when other adult businesses are nearby but outside the municipality’s borders. Id. at 654. This unclear standard for available alternative avenues of communication requirement is an important component of First Amendment zoning jurisprudence, but beyond the scope of this note.
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence amplified the plurality’s articulation of the state’s heightened evidentiary burden.\textsuperscript{76} The state must be prepared, Justice Blackmun wrote, “to articulate, and support, a reasoned and significant basis for its decision.”\textsuperscript{77} Further, the city cannot rely on access to adult businesses in neighboring locales to satisfy the court’s concern with available alternative avenues of communication.\textsuperscript{78}

Justice Stevens, the plurality opinion author in \textit{Young}, wrote a concurrence in \textit{Schad} that shed new and interesting light in terms of the city’s evidentiary burden under \textit{Young} and the constitutional parameters of how a state may justify future assertions of restrictive zoning authority over adult businesses.\textsuperscript{79} In particular, Justice Stevens’ concurrence zeros in on the content-neutrality issue that raised analytical difficulties for lower courts in applying \textit{Young}.\textsuperscript{80} Narrowly tailored or drawn regulations, Justice Stevens’ argument implicitly acknowledged, reigned in the issue of overbroad ordinances, but also raised the opposite issue of ordinances narrowly drawn on the basis of content.\textsuperscript{81}

The Borough could overcome overbreadth charges by “showing that its ordinances were narrowly drawn and furthered ‘a sufficiently substantial governmental interest.’”\textsuperscript{82} Justice Stevens reasoned further that both the ambiguous ordinance language and a destitute evidentiary record demonstrating that the adult business created an “identifiable adverse impact on the neighborhood or on the Borough as a whole” proved fatal to the ordinance’s constitutional validity.\textsuperscript{83} The municipal regulation could be sustained, in other words, if the ordinance language is clear and narrowly focused on mitigating asserted secondary effects, the existence of

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Schad}, 452 U.S. at 77.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Id.} at 78.
\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Id.} at 79.
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Id.} at 83–84.
\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Id.} at 79.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Id.} at 83.
which is supported by evidence. “Unbridled discretion of a municipal official” did not satisfy the evidentiary burden created in *Young* and refined in *Schad*.\(^{84}\)

The *Schad* Court left it up to subsequent courts to elaborate on the type or amount of evidence that either the government or the plaintiffs could adduce at trial. *Young* and *Schad* marked a clear swing of the pendulum.\(^{85}\) States could use its zoning power to regulate adult businesses without the presumption of content-discrimination if the government premised its ordinance on ameliorating alleged secondary effects or negative externalities produced by operation of adult businesses.\(^{86}\) States could not, on the other hand, simply ban all adult businesses from a commercial district or merely assert that the ordinance combated secondary effects and pass constitutional muster.\(^{87}\) The state must produce evidence.\(^{88}\) Part of that evidentiary burden included clear ordinance language that corresponded to proffered evidence of secondary effects, which rooted the ordinance’s legitimacy in a significant governmental interest.\(^{89}\)

Lower courts heeded *Schad’s* tougher evidentiary burden on the government.\(^{90}\) The Eighth and Sixth Circuits in particular read the Supreme Court’s *Schad* opinion as a heightened evidentiary standard for proving that the ordinance aimed at combating secondary effects caused by the adult business location and not the content of the speech itself.\(^{91}\) Lower courts also scrutinized the government’s motivation in passing the ordinance as a factor in their evidentiary

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\(^{84}\) *Id.* at 84.

\(^{85}\) Andrew, *supra* note 33, at 1187.


\(^{87}\) *Schad*, 452 U.S. at 75–76.

\(^{88}\) *Id.* at 76.

\(^{89}\) *Id.* at 76.

\(^{90}\) Andrew, *supra* note 33, at 1187–88.

\(^{91}\) See Avalon *v. Thompson*, 667 F.2d 659, 661 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding that the ordinance was content-based and subject to strict scrutiny because the state produced insufficient evidence to justify a local dispersal ordinance similar to the one in *Young*); Keego Harbor Co. *v. City of Keego Harbor*, 657 F.2d 94, 97 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that the ordinance was content-based for lack of sufficient evidence that the regulation aimed at combating purported secondary effects).
analysis in the wake of Schad.92 Lower courts clearly interpreted Schad as sculpting reinforced evidentiary boundaries out of a vague and confusing mold in Young.

The disparate application of the evidentiary burden among lower courts, however, reflected the competing interests that the Supreme Court enlisted itself to balance in Schad.93 Without a clear framework in hand, two different circuits could view an identically worded ordinance but reach opposite conclusions in light of how a particular court interpreted the evidence offered by the government.94 Elements of the Court’s evidence standard for proving a significant governmental interest were taking shape. The Supreme Court utilized its subsequent decision in Renton to reign in lower courts’ analysis of the government’s motivation in enactment of an adult zoning ordinance and to translate the Young and Schad decisions into a coherent framework of analysis.95

If Schad constituted an increase in the government’s evidentiary burden, the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.96 abruptly dispelled that interpretation.97 The Renton Court’s opinion set to accomplish three objectives: clarification of its secondary effects rationale in Young, foreclosure of the government’s motivation in enacting the ordinance as a factor in lower courts’ analysis, and clear consensus articulation of the proper

92 Andrew, supra note 33, at 1189. Compare Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that the legislative history of the ordinance revealed “the city’s motive was to remove [the] adult theater from the vicinity of an opera house because of apprehension that an adult theater would drive patrons away,” which “did not support the [the city’s] claim that it was motivated by the crime and blight problem”), with Grand Faloon Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943, 949 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding that nature of evidence presented by the city to the district, including a police chief report citing numerous complaints and incidents of prostitution, assaults, acts of indecent exposure, and rape at the adult business establishment, justified the city ordinance banning nude dancing in places selling alcohol).
93 Andrew, supra note 33, at 1188. Compare the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Basiardanes with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Young. As the author noted, the ordinance in Basiardanes “textually mirrored the ordinance upheld in Young.” Id. at 1189, n.93. The Basiardanes Court distinguished the dispersal ordinance at issue with the ordinance in Young. Id. The Court found that the ordinance dispersed adult theaters in “the most unattractive, inaccessible, and inconvenient areas of the city,” thereby effectively cutting off adequate alternative channels of communication. Id.
94 Andrew, supra note 33, at 1189.
95 Id. at 1191.
96 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
97 Andrew, supra note 33, at 1192.
formulation of the government’s evidentiary burden that proved elusive in the Court’s *Young* and *Schad* opinions.  

In *Renton*, two adult theater owners challenged the City of Renton’s preexisting zoning ordinance that prohibited any adult motion picture theater from “locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single-, or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of any school.” The City Council predicated its decision to pass the dispersal ordinance upon several modes of informational evidence. The ordinance became law after several public hearings, review of data from other cities regarding the negative externalities of adult businesses upon the community, and a recommendation to pass the ordinance from both the City Attorney’s Office and the city’s Planning and Development Committee. The ordinance defined adult movie theaters broadly to include “‘[a]n enclosed building used for preventing motion picture films, video cassettes, cable television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or [characterized] by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to ‘specified sexual activities’ or ‘specified anatomical areas’…for observation by patrons therein.’”  

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, wasted no time establishing the Renton ordinance as identical in language, scope, and constitutional character with the dispersal zoning law in *Young*. Drawing a direct analogy with *Young*’s ordinance set the stage for the *Renton* Court’s amplified explanation of the proper constitutional analysis of time, place, and manner regulations. First, the ordinance is properly analyzed as a time, place, and manner regulation since it do not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely places restrictions on how, where, and when the adult theater can operate. The time, place, and manner character of the Renton 

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98 *Id.* at 1191–92.  
99 *Renton*, 106 S. Ct. at 927.  
100 *Id.* at 927.  
101 *Id.*  
102 *Id.* at 928.  
103 *Id.*
ordinance made it content-neutral subject to intermediate scrutiny, the Court explained, provided the government could show that the design of a given ordinance served “a substantial governmental interest and allow[ed] for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”

This formulation addressed both the significant governmental interest prong in *Young* and the narrow tailoring requirement in *Schad*.

Second, the Court next addressed the sufficiency of evidence burden upon the government for proving a substantial governmental interest. Relying on its secondary effects rationale in *Young*, the majority in *Renton* accorded “high respect” or high judicial deference to legislative attempts to combat asserted secondary effects of adult businesses in the form of restrictive zoning laws. City governments, the Court elaborated, must have “a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.”

The Court dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the city’s “justifications for the ordinance were ‘conclusory and speculative’ since the Renton ordinance was passed “without the benefit of studies specifically relating to ‘the particular problems or needs of Renton.’”

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in *Renton*, concluded that the state “was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and other cities, and in particular on the ‘detailed findings’ summarized in the Washington Supreme Court’s *Northend Cinema* opinion, in

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104 *Id.* at 928–29, (citing to the Court’s opinion in *Young*, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that “at least with respect to businesses that purvey sexually explicit materials, zoning ordinances designed to combat the undesirable secondary effects of such businesses are to be reviewed under the standards applicable to ‘content-neutral’ time, place, and manner regulations” (i.e., zoning ordinances proven to be aimed at secondary effects produced by sex businesses are reviewed under an intermediate scrutiny standard)).

105 *Id.* at 930.

106 *Id.*

107 *Id.* at 931.

108 *Id.* at 930; see also Aaronson, Edinger, and Benjamin, *supra* note 2, at 754–56. The Ninth Circuit’s focus on the city’s reliance on evidence related to the particular city and its asserted secondary effects generated by adult businesses is a recurring legal point that the Ninth Circuit made in *Renton* and in *Alameda*. In both instances, the Supreme Court rebuffed that consideration in favor of judicial deference to city governments on the avowed basis that city governments are better positioned than the courts to know of the particular problems, needs, and secondary effects concerning their particular city. Before some refinement in *Alameda*, this generous judicial deference meant that almost any proffered evidence from other cities, towns, and zoning court cases constituted sufficient evidence for proving a substantial governmental interest. This unbridled sufficiency of evidence standard caused the *Alameda* Court to reign in the implication of the evidence ruling in *Renton*. 

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enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance.”109 The First Amendment, the Court added, “does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities.”110 The next line etched Renton’s evidence standard into First Amendment zoning jurisprudence: “so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”111 Reliance, reasonableness, and relevance became the flashpoints of confusion and debate among the lower courts as to the extent of evidence sufficient to “justify reliance by a city and support a reasonable belief that the ordinance targeted secondary effects.”112

The Renton Court’s decision, put another way, constituted a constitutional patchwork of prongs from Young and Schad with an inchoate sufficiency of evidence standard that, on its face, appeared to permit all manner of evidence a city government could proffer in the name of combating secondary effects. The Renton Court extended the secondary effects reasoning in Young by holding that a city may rely on the studies of other cities, or detailed findings in judicial opinions from other courts, as opposed to conducting its own studies.113

Young’s secondary effects doctrine became an evidentiary proxy for proving a substantial governmental interest under Renton.114 Government could cherry pick bias, and in some cases wholly distinguishable and irrelevant, data to support its justification for passing the ordinance.115 More to the point, Justice Brennan’s dissent also zeroed in on the fact that some of the findings in the government’s evidence “do not relate to supposed ‘secondary effects’

109 Id. (citing to Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978)).
110 Id.
111 Id.
114 Id. at 70.
115 Id.
associated with adult movie theaters.”

Besides reliance on incomparable evidence, the Court, Justice Brennan insisted, “cannot, as it does, merely accept these post hoc statements at face value.”

Citing to Schad, Justice Brennan’s argument strongly indicated that the narrow tailoring requirement in Schad demanded that governments adduce evidence comparable, or at the very least, related to, the purported secondary effects that the ordinance aimed to mitigate.

Before giving a plaintiff the opportunity to challenge the government’s evidence or to offer evidence in front of a jury, the Renton Court, ironically, concludes that courts are in the best position to judge whether a particular plaintiff-adult business lodges sufficient legal arguments to strike down a particular city’s zoning ordinance under an intermediate standard of scrutiny, which “reduces a city’s burden to justify its regulation.”

In the wake of Renton’s expansive evidence rule, some lower courts imposed certain minimum requirements on official in city government such as the requirement that the government can rely only on data or evidence utilized before the ordinance’s enactment.

Other lower courts enforced Renton’s evidence standard with full force, holding that the government can rely on evidence or date obtained before or after the ordinance’s passage.

This nascent timing of evidence issue remains an unresolved legal issue even after the Court’s decision in Alameda.

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116 Renton, 475 U.S. at 935.
117 Id.
118 Id. 935–36.
120 Compare Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 175 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that city officials must articulate the secondary effects against which the ordinance purports to combat before the legislation is enacted), with T & D Video, Inc. v. City of Revere, 670 N.E.2d 162, 165–66 (Mass. 1996) (ruling that an adult business ordinance is invalid because the city relied on the secondary effects rationale after the ordinance’s enactment; the timing of evidence constituted an insufficient showing that the zoning restriction served a substantial governmental interest). This legal controversy whether courts can admit pre-enactment versus post-enactment evidence of secondary effects remains unresolved even post-Alameda. See also Goldrush II v. City of Marietta, 482 S.E.2d 347, 355 (Ga. 1997) (holding that the legislative body is required to “consider specific evidence of undesired secondary effects that it reasonably believes relevant” before enacting the ordinance).
121 See Di Ma Corp. v. City of St. Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that despite plaintiff-expert testimony that no evidence existed as to increased criminal activity around adult businesses, the court would not question the trial court’s judgment of the facts or evidence offered in support of the ordinance because the trial court’s decision was not clearly erroneous).
The third and final major legal issue that the Renton Court addressed turned on whether an adult zoning ordinance was intrinsically content-based. Armed with the Schad Court’s narrow tailoring requirement as caution against overbroad ordinances, lower courts increasingly considered the government’s motivation in passing an adult business ordinance.\footnote{Andrew, supra note 33, at 1189–90.} This motivation factor clearly reflected lower court concerns that content-based restrictions could be easily justified as content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations combating alleged secondary effects.

Justice Brennan’s dissent in Renton gave superior judicial voice to that consideration. Justice Brennan wrote incisively that even if the ordinance legitimately aimed at combating real secondary effects, it does not necessarily “mean, however, that such regulations are content-neutral.”\footnote{Renton, 475 U.S. at 934.} The fact the ordinances are directed at legitimate legislative aims does not change the fact that government passes ordinances imposing special restrictions \textit{because} of the speech content, not in spite of it.\footnote{Id. at 934–37.} Justice Brennan’s constitutional sentiments echoed the Ninth Circuit’s position that the city’s could not rely on unrelated data from other studies of cities with different problems and needs from Renton to prove a governmental interest.

The majority in Renton disagreed with Justice Brennan and the Ninth Circuit. The Court dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s \textit{O’Brien} analysis regarding the city’s motivation as a factor in determining whether the ordinance is content-neutral.\footnote{Id. at 929.} The majority concluded that alleged legislative motives created an unfair and unjustifiably high threshold for city governments to overcome.\footnote{Id.} Therefore, the Court adopted the “predominate concerns”\footnote{Id.} test as a buffer against lower court analysis of governmental motivations in passing an ordinance. This way the
ordinance would pass constitutional muster under the *O’Brien* test, even if suppression of speech was a motivating factor in the ordinance’s enactment provided the governments predominate concerns were secondary effects and not the speech content.128

The *Renton* Court may have foreclosed governmental motivation as a decisive factor but failed to blunt Justice Brennan’s cogent legal counterpoint that zoning regulation of adult businesses was inescapably based on the speech’s content irrespective of whether they aimed to combat harmful secondary effects.129 In particular, Justice Brennan pointed out that “‘other forms of adult entertainment’” were not subject to the same restrictions as adult movie theaters under the Renton ordinance.130 This disparate treatment of particular kinds of speech amounted to flagrant content-discrimination, requiring strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review for zoning regulations of sexual communicative conduct.131 In *Young*, the Supreme Court jettisoned disentanglement of the thorny distinction between the conduct and speech components of symbolic expression.132 On this point, the *Renton* Court only convinced critics that the conduct-content based distinction issue would remain unresolved.

Five years later the Court aggressively upended the conduct-content based distinction but outside the zoning context in *Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.*133 The *Barnes* line of cases involved a distinct breed of conduct regulation of adult businesses. In *Barnes*, the Indiana State Legislature sought to enforce its public indecency statute against two strip clubs that featured totally nude dancing and served alcohol.134 The indecency statute required “that the dancers wear ‘pasties’

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128 *Id.*
129 See *id.* at 934 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130 *Id.* at 935–36.
131 *Id.* at 934–35 (arguing that since the city had not adduced any evidence *at the time of enactment* to justify disparate treatment between other adult entertainment establishments and adult movie theaters, which were not even in existence at the time of the ordinance’s passage). “The ordinance’s underinclusiveness is cogent evidence that it was aimed at the *content* of the films shown in adult movie theaters.” *Id.* at 935.
134 *Id.* at 560.
and ‘G-strings’ when they dance.”135 The two strip club owners challenged the statute on the grounds that prohibiting the performance of nude dancing impermissibly infringed on their First Amendment rights in symbolic expression.136 In addition, the strip club respondents carefully distinguished between time, place, and manner restrictions on adult businesses and government imposed limits on conduct that qualifies as symbolic expression protected by the First Amendment.137

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, analyzed the statute under the \textit{O’Brien} test, noting that the \textit{Renton} test embodied “much the same standards as those set forth in \textit{[O’Brien].}”138 On that doctrinal basis, the plurality concluded that the Indiana statute fell within the purview of state police power to protect morality and the public order.139 Conduct statutes designed to mitigate the harmful effects of conduct that threatened the public order or morality justifiably placed incidental curbs on symbolic expression.140 This reasoning mirrored the broad secondary effects pretext on which the government could rely in passage of zoning regulation of adult businesses.141 Instead of elucidating the boundary line between conduct and content in symbolic expression, the \textit{Barnes} plurality expanded the scope of the secondary effects doctrine into unprecedented legal terrain—the non-zoning context.142 The \textit{Barnes} decision empowered states with the constitutional authority to directly regulate conduct in adult businesses.

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135 \textit{Id.}
136 \textit{Id.} at 566.
137 \textit{Id.}
138 \textit{Id.}
139 \textit{Id.} at 570–72.
140 \textit{Id.} \textit{See also} Kevin Case, \textit{Note, “Lewd and Immoral”: Nude Dancing, Sexual Expression, and the First Amendment}, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1185, 1192–95 (2006) (arguing that conduct statutes regulating nude dancing specifically requires “the same level of judicial scrutiny applied to political speech” because public sexual expression is not low value, mere conduct speech). Moreover, the government’s evidentiary burden to substantiate conduct based statutes is treated by the \textit{Barnes} plurality as pro forma rather than a constitutional requirement with teeth. \textit{Id.} at 1193.
141 Andrew, \textit{supra} note 33, at 1199–1200.
142 \textit{Id.} at 1199.
irrespective of the free speech implications or of any burden of proof to substantiate the content-neutrality of the conduct statute.\textsuperscript{143}

Justice Scalia’s concurrence agreed almost entirely with the plurality’s legal conclusions, but differed on the proper standard of review.\textsuperscript{144} For Justice Scalia, nude dancing regulation not only warranted state regulation, but also required judicial deference to legislative prerogatives. The Court, Justice Scalia wrote, “should avoid wherever possible . . . a method of analysis that requires judicial assessment of the ‘importance’ of government interests—and especially of government interests in various aspects of morality.”\textsuperscript{145}

Justice Souter’s concurrence, however, reached the same legal conclusion on different grounds. Justice Souter assumed the more difficult analytical undertaking of responding to Justice White’s dissenting point that public indecency statutes are inherently content-based, as they are aimed to limit symbolic speech because of its content.\textsuperscript{146} Justice Souter countered with two points. First, the nudity aspect of dance performance does not subtract from the expressive communicative quality freely conveyed in that form of expression.\textsuperscript{147} Second, the fact that the legislature’s rationale for passing the statute is correlated with effects generated by the existence of adult businesses does not mean such statutes are content-based.\textsuperscript{148} If the regulation is “‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’”\textsuperscript{149} in other words, the statute is content-neutral. Justice Souter, citing to the Court’s reasoning in \textit{Renton}, added that under the \textit{O’Brien} analysis the government’s evidentiary burden did not include an affirmative obligation to prove the existence of secondary effects in its city in particular.\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{143} Hudson, \textit{supra} note 113, at 70.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Barnes}, 501 U.S. at 579–80.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Id.} at 580.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Id.} at 585.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Id.} at 581.
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Id.} at 585–86.
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Id.} at 586.
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Id.} at 583–84.
The Court’s subsequent opinion in *R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul*\(^{151}\) flew under the radar, as it did not involve any state regulation of adult businesses. *R.A.V.* involved a constitutional challenge to a statutory provision that criminalized derogatory verbal or symbolic speech aimed at persons “on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”\(^{152}\) Writing for the plurality, Justice Scalia struck down the statute, but a kernel of his reasoning implicated First Amendment concerns for state regulation of adult businesses.\(^{153}\) Justice Scalia concluded that the government could not discriminate against particular kinds of proscribable speech and not others.\(^{154}\) For our purposes, Justice Scalia reasoned that secondary effects provided a valid basis on which to classify certain speech as containing proscribable content.\(^{155}\) Therefore, the government could pass regulations that constitutionally discriminate against particular kinds of speech carrying negative secondary effects “because of their constitutionally proscribable content.”\(^{156}\)

The expansion of secondary effects reached its apogee in *R.A.V.* Justice Scalia’s reasoning suggested that speech producing harmful secondary effects was tantamount to other categories of speech not afforded First Amendment protections such as libel and obscenity.\(^{157}\) To be fair, Justice Scalia may not have meant that speech engendering secondary effects constituted a new category of unprotected speech. The thrust of his reasoning, however, strongly indicated that courts should treat conduct and zoning state regulations of adult businesses as a category receiving no First Amendment protection.\(^{158}\) Although the Court refused to take the secondary effects reasoning as far as denying the protected status of adult speech,\(^{159}\) the Court’s

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151 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 292.02 (1990)).
152 *Id.* at 380.
153 *Id.* at 381.
154 *Id.* at 383–84.
155 *Id.* at 389.
156 *Id.* at 383.
157 *Id.* at 385–94.
vague evidence rule in *Renton* and the expansion of secondary effects into non-zoning cases suggested the Court’s willingness to permit the state expansive power to regulate adult businesses with feeble limitations.\(^{160}\)

The Court retrenched its secondary effects analysis in non-zoning cases eight years later in *City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.*\(^{161}\) The facts of *Erie* were virtually identical to *Barnes*. In *Erie*, a strip club owner operating a nude dancing club challenged a Pennsylvania Ordinance enacted by the City of Erie.\(^{162}\) The ordinance required dancers to wear, “at a minimum, ‘pasties’ and a ‘G-string.’”\(^{163}\) The language of the ordinance broadly encompassed any nudity in public places, which included “all buildings and enclosed places owned by or open to the general public,…such places of entertainment, taverns, restaurants, clubs, theaters, dance halls, banquet halls, party rooms or halls limited to specific members, restricted to adults or to patrons invited to attend, whether or not an admission charge is levied.”\(^{164}\)

Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, amplified the secondary effects analysis nascent in *Barnes*.\(^{165}\) The *Erie* plurality referenced the facts of *O’Brien* throughout the opinion to demonstrate that if the Court curbed anti-war political speech in the name of furthering a governmental interest, the Court refused to carve out an exception for nude dancing in strip clubs, which is lower value symbolic expression.\(^{166}\) Justice O’Connor held further that the government’s evidentiary burden for proving whether the regulation furthers an important governmental interest is judged under the broad *Renton* reasonable-relevance standard.\(^{167}\) The

\(^{160}\) Andrew, *supra* note 33, at 1201.
\(^{161}\) 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
\(^{162}\) *Id.* at 283.
\(^{163}\) *Id.* at 284.
\(^{164}\) Penn. Ordinance 75-1994, Art. 711(3).
\(^{165}\) *Erie*, 529 U.S. at 293.
\(^{166}\) *Id.* at 299.
\(^{167}\) *Id.* at 296–97.
plurality in *Erie* essentially applied the opaque evidence rule from its analysis in *Young, Schad,* and *Renton* to non-zoning statutes in *Barnes* and *Erie.*\(^{168}\)

For evidence purposes, *Barnes* and *Erie* failed to mark a watershed moment in the Court’s clarification of the evidence rule established in *Renton.*\(^{169}\) The opinions, however, represented a significant doctrinal expansion of the secondary effects justification in the state’s ability to directly regulate expressive conduct as well as time, place, and manner of operation of adult businesses.\(^{170}\) Furthermore, although silent in expounding on the meaning of the *Renton* evidence rule, the *Barnes, R.A.V.,* and *Erie* decisions highlighted the integral part that a clear evidence rule plays in protecting the First Amendment rights of adult speech from potent governmental power.

Interestingly, Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in *Erie* alluded to this same concern. Justice Souter sharply disagreed with the plurality’s legal conclusions because “the record before us today is deficient in its failure to reveal any evidence on which Erie may have relied, either for the seriousness of the threatened harm or for the efficacy of its chosen remedy.”\(^{171}\) The plurality, in other words, rubber stamped the Erie City Council’s “speculative supposition” without the benefit of any “demonstrated fact.”\(^{172}\) Justice Souter’s opinion underscored the meekness that opacity produced in the *Renton* evidence rule, and the need to clarify the rule to protect adult businesses’ protected speech.

III. The Unclear Evidentiary Standard for Proving Substantial Governmental Interest: *Alameda Books*

\(^{168}\) *Id.*
\(^{169}\) Andrew, *supra* note 33, at 1203.
\(^{171}\) *Erie,* 529 U.S. at 313–14.
\(^{172}\) *Id.* at 314.
The Supreme Court’s renewed opportunity to squarely and directly address the vague Renton evidence rule arrived in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books173 three years after Erie and seventeen years after Renton. In Alameda, two adult business owners operating two businesses—an arcade and bookstore—in a single building unit challenged the revised ordinance that the operation of more than one adult business in the same building.174 The Ninth Circuit Court, much as it did in Renton, concluded that the city failed to “demonstrate that the prohibition was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest.”175 In particular, the Ninth Circuit found that the city failed to adduce sufficient evidence on which it could reasonably rely to “demonstrate a link between multiple-use adult establishments and negative secondary effects.”176

The Alameda Court produced another plurality opinion split in their approach to the government’s evidentiary burden for proving a substantial governmental interest. The opinions can be categorized into three competing approaches. First, Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, articulated a burden-shifting mechanism in which plaintiff-adult businesses could “cast direct doubt” on the government’s adduced evidence supporting its secondary effects justification.177 Plaintiffs casted direct doubt on the city’s rationale “by demonstrating that the municipality’s evidence does not support its rationale, or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality’s factual findings.”178 If the plaintiff fails to cast direct doubt, the government satisfies the Renton reasonable-relevance standard.179

If the plaintiff succeeds, on the other hand, in casting direct doubt on the government’s rationale, the burden shifts back to the government to offer additional evidence “renewing

174 Id. at 429.
175 Id. at 430.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 438–39.
178 Id. at 439.
179 Id.
support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.” Justice O’Connor reinforced, however, the Court’s holding in Renton that the government’s evidentiary burden did not include conducting its own empirical studies.  

Further, the government’s evidentiary burden also excluded “providing evidence that rules out every theory for the link between concentrations of adult establishments that is inconsistent with its own.” The plurality also stated that the government could rely on evidence obtained after the original ordinance passed but preceded revision of the ordinance. Besides the burden shifting mechanism, the plurality also provided that a municipality could not rely on “shoddy data or reasoning” to support its rationale.  

The plurality’s evidence formulation is flawed in three key respects. First, the burden shifting mechanism remained silent as to how courts should weigh the plaintiff’s rebuttal evidence casting direct doubt on the government’s rationale. More importantly, the plurality also failed to address the type or form of evidence that a plaintiff could adduce to cast direct doubt upon the government’s rationale. The plaintiff’s evidentiary burden on rebuttal, in other words, remained unclear.  

Second, the timing of evidence on which the government could not rely was left unresolved by the plurality. No less than the scope of permissible evidence was at stake. The plurality deficient explanation did not articulate a clear timeline of evidence. The government could clearly rely on pre-enactment evidence, but how far back and did older evidence or data carry less evidentiary weight than fresher evidence or data. Moreover, the plurality failed to address whether the government could rely on evidence or data obtained after enactment of the

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180 Id.  
181 Id. at 439–40.  
182 Id. at 437.  
183 Id. at 430.  
184 Id. at 438.
ordinance. Similarly, even if the government could rely on post-enactment evidence or data, the
degree of evidentiary weight to be accorded different evidence over time was unclear.

Third, the “shoddy data or reasoning” requirement raised a hullaballoo of disagreement
and confusion regarding what the requirement actually meant. The plurality created a
category without explaining the criteria for qualification or disqualification. At the very least,
the Court seemed to suggest that “shoddy data or reasoning” included evidence completely
unrelated to the purported secondary effects ailing the particular community. Suggestions of
law, however, compounded an already unclear evidence rule.

Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion sought to clarify how courts should properly
measure the government’s evidentiary burden. Justice Kennedy formulized a cost-benefit
approach or balancing test that weighed whether a given ordinance substantially reduced speech
in the name of mitigating secondary effects. Justice Kennedy predicated this approach on two
legal questions. First, “what proposition does a city need to advance in order to sustain a
secondary effects ordinance?” Second, “how much evidence is required to support the
proposition?” On the appropriate proposition, Justice Kennedy concluded that “a city must
advance some basis to show that its regulation has the purpose and effect of suppressing
secondary effects, while leaving the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially intact.”

This formulation aimed to address the encroaching and enlarging scope of acceptable
evidence on which governments could rely to substantiate their secondary effects justification.
Justice Kennedy’s cost-benefit approach, in other words, sought to reign in governmental
reliance on thinly veiled attempts at overt regulation without strong evidentiary support. The
broadening scope of admissible evidence, no matter how unrelated, began to water down the

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185 Id. at 438.
186 Id. at 449–50.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 450.
purpose of having an evidence rule. The problem with Justice Kennedy’s formulation, however, is that reads more like a template for writing ordinance language that will more likely overcome constitutional challenges.

On the second proposition, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence falls way short. The sufficiency of evidence that the government must produce, Justice Kennedy insists, is explained in the *Renton* rule. The Court must accorded broad judicial deference to legislative rationale. Citing to *Renton* and similar to Justice Scalia’s position in *Barnes*, Justice Kennedy wrote, [a]s a general matter, courts should not be in the business of second-guessing fact-bound empirical assessments of city planners. The Los Angeles City Council knows the streets of Los Angeles better than we do.”

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is defective in two key aspects. First, the concurrence conflates the sufficiency of asserting a related secondary effect with sufficiency of evidence in proving a substantial governmental interest. The cost-benefit approach is a reformulation of the narrow tailoring requirement in *Schad*. Second, the concurring opinion, similarly, punted on the question of the timing of evidence, the weight of evidence, the type or form of admissible evidence, and how much evidence is sufficient to defeat an ordinance.

Justice Souter’s dissent makes two critical points regarding sufficiency of evidence. First, Justice Souter begins on the premise that zoning regulation of adult businesses is “content-correlated.” Zoning regulations of adult businesses, in other words, have a “correlation with secondary effects.” Second, as such, the sufficiency of evidence standard should also require a correlation between the purported secondary effects in a community and the particular type of operation of adult businesses in the community that gives rise to these alleged secondary effects.

IV. An Unclear Evidentiary Standard Emboldens Invasive State Zoning Regulation In the Spirit of *Barnes* and *Erie*
In the wake of *Alameda’s* unclear evidence standard, lower courts and commentators are split over what constitutes sufficient evidence to sustain or rebut the substantial governmental interest prong under *Renton*. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in *Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach,*\(^{190}\) for example, reversed the District Court’s finding that the city relied heavily on “pre-enactment evidence [consisting] either of purely anecdotal evidence or opinions based on highly unreliable data.”\(^{191}\) The District Court construed *Alameda’s* “shoddy data or reasoning” sufficiency of evidence standard to exclude anecdotal evidence such as reliance on testimony from past and present law enforcement officials and appropriately comparable control studies for secondary effects.\(^{192}\)

The Eleventh Circuit sharply disagreed with the lower court’s reading of *Alameda*, explaining that the *Alameda* Court did not raise the evidentiary bar “or [require] a city to justify its ordinances with empirical evidence or scientific studies.”\(^{193}\) The *Daytona* Court concluded further that anecdotal evidence sufficiently sustains an adult ordinance and that empirical studies are not required as part of the city’s evidentiary burden under *Alameda*.\(^{194}\)

The Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence has paralleled the Eleventh Circuit’s view on sufficiency of evidence until its most recent 2009 decision in *Annex Books v. City of Indianapolis*.\(^{195}\) In *Annex*, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority measured the city’s sufficiency of evidence under Justice Kennedy’s cost-benefit approach. The revised ordinance expanded the amount of retail stores subject to zoning regulation as adult businesses.\(^{196}\) The ordinance increased the number of retail stores by decreasing the threshold of adult material

\(^{190}\) 490 F.3d 860, 862, 869 (11th Cir. 2007).
\(^{191}\) 521 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 490 F.3d 860 (11th Cir. 2007).
\(^{192}\) Id.; see also Aaronson, Edinger, and Benjamin, supra note 2, at 749.
\(^{193}\) *Daytona*, 490 F.3d at 880.
\(^{194}\) Id. at 881.
\(^{195}\) 581 F.3d 460 (7th Cir. 2009).
\(^{196}\) Id. at 461.
inventory sold in the store necessary to come within the statute’s scope. Judge Easterbrook soundly rejected the government’s position that “any empirical study of morals offenses near any kind of adult establishment in any city justifies every possible kind of legal restriction in every city.” The Annex Court, in other words, rejected the city’s reading of Alameda that any and every study from other cities qualified as sufficient evidence.

The Annex decision reflected the Seventh Circuit’s concern that city governments would read Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Alameda as a template for writing proper language in the ordinance to support its rationale and pass constitutional muster. Annex represents a yield sign more than a stop sign about the scope of evidence on which governments may rely to support its rationale under Alameda.

V. Not All Secondary Effects Are Created or Equal: Establishing Rules of Comparability In Alameda Books Evidence Standard

The Alameda evidence standard should adopt a rule of comparability standard regarding the sufficiency of evidence on which the government may rely. A recent study conducted an empirical comparison of purported secondary effects and the purported results produced in the community. Justice Souter and Judge Easterbrook’s opinions in Alameda and Annex, respectively, lay out the blueprint for an evidence standard that reign the broad scope of unrelated evidence on which the government may rely. The government should not shoulder the burden of producing new empirical studies of its own. But the government should be required to adduce evidence that tracks closely with the type of secondary effects its ordinance is designed to combat. This rule of comparable data or evidence as a requirement for sufficient evidence balances the interests of the government in protecting the community from actual negative

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197 Id. at 462.
198 Id. at 464.
externalities produced by operation of adult businesses near schools or churches against the First Amendment speech rights of adult business owners.

VI. Conclusion

The United States Supreme Court has steadily expanded the writ of state and municipal regulatory authority over adult businesses. In its wake, the Court’s decisions defanged First Amendment protections of adult businesses, conflated the applicability of the secondary effects doctrine in non-zoning cases, and confused lower courts’ understanding of the proper evidentiary burden for proving a substantial governmental interest. Judicial expansion of state and municipal regulatory power over adult businesses has increasingly paved the way for legislative morality as states began passage of conduct statutes aimed at the sexual content adult businesses are selling. A more balanced and efficient regulatory approach contemplates rules of comparable relatedness when it comes to the government’s evidentiary burden for proving a substantial governmental interest.

Rules of comparable relatedness can narrow the inconsistency in lower court interpretations of Alameda’s evidence standard which has become the basis for legislative abuse in adult zoning regulation. Protection of our families and communities is an essential legislative prerogative. But protection must be proportional to the threat and the threat must be fairly measured by a clear evidence standard that does not transform protection of the community into a legislative license to oppress First Amendment protected speech to which adult businesses are entitled.

201 Christine MacDonald, Detroit Passes New Rules On Strip Clubs, DETROIT NEWS, February 23, 2010, available at http://detnews.com/article/20100223/METRO/2230412/Detroit-passes-new-rules-on-strip-clubs (reporting that the City of Detroit, the same city that passed a zoning ordinance for adult businesses at issue in the watershed zoning First Amendment case, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., recently passed new rules that would ban VIP rooms, require most employees (presumably including dancers) to obtain employment licenses from the city to work in the strip clubs, and limit dancers to eighteen inch stages, which effectively prohibits lap dances, and prohibits customers from touching dancers even if they are clothed).