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On Tartan Tides: The Failure and Legacy of the Darien Scheme

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North and South America are continents defined in almost every respect by European colonization. However, for every successful European settlement in the Americas, there were many more that failed. Social experiments (such as George Oglethorpe’s Georgia), ill-conceived moneymaking schemes too numerous to list, and the personal vanity projects of emperors and kings all perished due to boiling jungles, searing deserts, rough seas, disease, Native Americans, rival Europeans, and a myriad of other obstacles. One of the more bizarre failed colonies was the so-called “Darien Scheme,” the disastrous attempt by the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies (hereafter referred to as the CSTAI) to establish a colony, to be named “New Caledonia”, in the area around the Gulf of Darien in present-day Panama in 1698. To this day, Darien remains a somewhat obscure incident outside of Scotland; there is no great “mystery” or “scandal” to draw attention to it in the same way as other, more famous, colonial failures such as Roanoke. Nevertheless, the story of Darien is still significant within the wider sweep of both British history and the history of European colonization in the Americas.

That the Darien Scheme was a failure is essentially a given; New Caledonia was levelled, all of its inhabitants died or fled, and Scotland was dealt a heavy economic blow. However, other questions about the Scheme are less settled. Of these, the questions of why the Darien Scheme failed in the first place, and how the Scottish public and state reacted to this failure “in the moment” will be examined throughout this paper. Based on close readings of both scholarly secondary sources, and primary sources such as letters, ballads, popular pamphlets, and personal journals, it is clear that the Darien Scheme was not by any means intended to be a shoddy, ill-conceived moneymaking operation. Rather it was a massive national enterprise, years in the making, one that began with all the trappings of a successful trading colony. Intentions aside, the colony of New Caledonia still failed, and failed for a number of reasons, including poor planning, natural factors such as disease and weather, direct and indirect interference by foreign powers, and constant feuding among both the project’s leaders and the community as a whole. Upon learning of the abandonment and destruction of New Caledonia, the Scottish public reacted with a mixture of dismay, fear, and anger, while the Scottish government attempted, with mixed results, to maintain public order.

Before an in depth discussion of the various facets of the Darien Scheme can begin, it is necessary to give a brief outline of the general course of events. Though William Paterson, the Scottish entrepreneur who initially developed the Darien Scheme, had already been advocating for a similar operation for years, nothing concrete really emerged until the establishment of the CSTAI in 1695. The next three years were spent planning and promoting the Scheme, and culminated in the sailing of the first expedition to Darien from
Scotland in July of 1698. This fleet arrived in Darien in November of the same year; New Caledonia was quickly established, but almost immediately began to founder for reasons which will be discussed shortly. By May of the next year, conditions had deteriorated so badly that the decision to abandon the colony was taken, and most of the surviving colonists fled to either Jamaica or New York. However, news of this decision did not reach Scotland in time to prevent a relief expedition from sailing for New Caledonia around the same time. This expedition arrived in November of 1699, but had no better luck than the first in creating a viable settlement. The story of New Caledonia ended for good in April of 1700, when the few remaining colonists surrendered the remains of New Caledonia to a Spanish army, which leveled the settlement shortly thereafter.

In order to accurately assess the reasons for the failure of the Darien Scheme, it is necessary to start at the beginning, with planning. As previously stated, the Darien Scheme did not begin life as the spontaneous dream of a madman or a profiteer. Rather, it actually has origins deeply rooted in the political and economic thought of the time. During the 1690s, the time in which New Caledonia was conceived, Scotland was in fairly dire straits. Having been legally bound to England by the ascension of King James VI of Scotland to the English throne as James I in 1607, Scotland was perpetually abused by its southern neighbor. Dependent on the old trade networks of the North Sea for its survival, Scotland had an extremely weak economy, and its monarch, the Dutch-born William III, “thought of the country as a recruiting center only, a storehouse for supplies, and was impatient with its Parliament and its peculiar pride.” Hoping to help his homeland escape this fate, William Paterson first devised the plan that would eventually become the infamous Darien Scheme.

Though Paterson’s plan seems almost insane in hindsight, it was actually fairly sensible according to the political and economic thought of the time. The political theorists of the time (of which Paterson was one), promoted international trade as the surest way to prosperity for any nation, and a state built on naturalized citizens, a "universal monarchy," as a solid foundation for any *res publica.* Thus, from the perspective of the late-17th century, the Darien Scheme made perfect sense: a free-trade port astride Panama, one of the great hubs of trans-oceanic shipping, to draw the wealth of the world into poor little Scotland. By all accounts, it certainly seems to have been taken as a serious proposition by most of the Scottish public, and by several foreign governments as well. However, just being a "good idea" does not necessarily guarantee success, as the course of the Darien Scheme shows.

A close analysis of the lead-up to the founding of New Caledonia reveals several major planning errors that likely played at least a partial role in dooming the colony. To begin with, it would seem that almost no one involved in the planning and execution of the initial expedition, not even William Paterson, had ever physically seen Darien, nor knew its exact location or how to reach it. Robert Pennecuik, captain of one of the ships initially bound for Darien, acknowledged in his journal the need to find a pilot who knew the way to Darien, a need that was eventually filled by an elderly ex-pirate and friend of William Paterson’s by the name of Robert Alliston. What little the planners and leaders of the Darien Scheme did know about the area seems to have come from either stories Paterson had heard from others during his time as a merchant in the Caribbean in the 1680s, or from a recently-published book written by one Lionel Wafer. Wafer, a one-time buccaneer who had spent two months in Darien in 1681, apparently gave a fairly objective description of the area, emphasizing both possibilities and perils. Regardless, the planners of the Darien Scheme seem to have selectively ignored the parts of Wafer’s description which did not fit their notion of Darien as an earthly paradise, contributing to a generally skewed view of just how difficult establishing a settlement in the area would be. While this lack of geographic knowledge may not have seriously hurt New Caledonia’s chances of survival in the long term, it certainly contributed to Scotland’s initial issues.

Another, more significant issue that hampered the Darien Scheme from the start relates to supplies. Shortly after the first expedition to Darien left Edinburgh in 1698, a meeting of the
expedition’s leaders revealed that the food supplies allocated to the fleet were inadequate; attempts to secure more before the fleet left Europe were scotched by fog that made navigation nearly impossible for days. The end result was a severe food shortage from the moment the expedition landed in Darien, a situation that would not improve as time went on. Beyond this, the settlers of New Caledonia had forgotten another important item: money. The organizers of the Darien Scheme expected the colonists to be able to trade for food once they arrived in Darien; as such they had given them not money, but instead a bizarre menagerie of trade goods, including wigs, shoes, nails, and Bibles. Unfortunately, neither local Native tribes nor European traders cared for the Scottish goods, and those few merchants who did visit Darien demanded payment in hard cash the settlers did not have. To make matters worse, the emphasis on constructing fortifications and housing lead to the neglect of agriculture. As a result, almost no food was ever grown at New Caledonia during its short lifespan. The end result of this situation was a severe food shortage that could not realistically be abated by any means fair or foul. While poor planning was not the only factor that doomed New Caledonia, colonizing “site unseen” and with inadequate supplies certainly played a significant role in the failure of the Darien Scheme.

Beyond planning (or a lack thereof), an additional factor in the failure of the Darien Scheme was the environment itself. The site chosen for New Caledonia was initially seen as being almost a paradise, with an unidentified colonist aboard the ship Endeavor recording in exquisite detail the many wonders of Darien. However, this romantic optimism would ultimately prove to be short-lived for several reasons. To begin with, New Caledonia’s harbor ultimately proved less than suitable due to the prevailing winds of the area, which made it difficult for ships anchored there to leave. Furthermore, the area’s mosquito population, combined with rotten provisions, produced a disease epidemic of Biblical proportions. According to William Paterson, over 200 colonists were felled by “A severe sickness of Fever, Ague [malaria], and Flux [dysentery],” during the time of the first settlement, and Robert Pennecuik’s journal reveals that illness began breaking out almost upon landing, although how much of this had already begun during the initial crossing cannot be precisely determined. A final environmental factor was the rain, which fell incessantly for weeks on end, fouling both provisions and moods, and rendering even the most mundane outdoor activities a challenge. All told, disease, rain, and wind took a serious toll on the settlers of New Caledonia, and likely made many of them seriously question the wisdom of their endeavor.

However, poor planning and unfavorable environmental conditions do not and cannot tell the entire story. After all, other colonies in the Americas suffered through such hardships and went on to prosper; Jamestown and Plymouth in the present-day United States, for example. For New Caledonia to fail so rapidly and spectacularly, there must have been other factors at play. As it happens, there were two additional factors that played an integral role in pushing New Caledonia past its breaking point. These were foreign interference, and internal conflict. In the case of New Caledonia, the aforesaid foreign interference was primarily the work of England and Spain. It makes sense to begin this analysis with Spain, as it played a more direct, although less significant, role in New Caledonia’s downfall. The land on which the CSTAI had chosen to plant its flagship venture was not terra incognita; rather, it was already settled by the Kingdom of Spain, which had first claimed the area in the 16th century. The Scots were well aware of this fact, as confirmed by the contents of the 1699 pamphlet entitled “A Defense of the Scots Settlement at Darien,” a work that attacked the legitimacy of Spain’s claim to the region at great length. Legal niceties aside, Darien was still de facto Spanish territory, and the Spanish were not about to share their property with a few boatloads of Scottish renegades. In fact, it was Spain that quite definitively put the final nail in New Caledonia’s coffin, seizing and destroying the settlement in 1700 after it had been re-occupied by a relief expedition in 1699. However, this rather spectacular ending masks just how little of an influence Spain had on New
Caledonia for much of its existence. In reality, Spain’s control over the region was fairly weak; its outposts were poorly defended, Native American raids were common, and a lengthy and somewhat disorganized chain of command meant that official orders could take months to actually be executed. The Barliavento, the part of the Spanish fleet assigned to this area, was fairly small and poorly maintained. Spain’s lack of power projection is best shown by the results of the initial expedition against New Caledonia launched in 1698, which was ultimately forced to turn back before even reaching the settlement due to disorganization, lack of food, and heavy rains. In fact, aside from the capture of the Dolphin, one of the CSTAI’s ships, Spain did not harm New Caledonia until 1700, when a major expedition against the colony was finally mounted. Even then, the expedition was only successful after suffering an initial defeat at the hands of the Scots, and was fighting against a greatly reduced population of settlers. Though Scottish pamphleteers made a great show of how threatening Spain supposedly was to both New Caledonia, and to the interests of Britain at large, the historical record clearly shows that, in fact, Spain was not New Caledonia’s primary external foe.

The identity of the foreign power that likely played a major role in New Caledonia’s demise is, at least initially, somewhat shocking: England. After all, Scotland and England had been united under the same royal house for almost 100 years at the time of New Caledonia’s founding. Why, then, would England sabotage Scotland’s colonial venture, especially when the two nations had cooperated on American settlements, such as Nova Scotia, in the past? The answers to this question are murky, but a rough answer reveals two main reasons: King William III, and the East India Company. The former cause is mainly political; Scotland had constantly rebelled against and fought England throughout the 17th century, and William III had had to put down a serious uprising a few years prior to the launching of the Darien Scheme in order to secure his throne. It is highly likely that “King Billy” was still wary of rebellion, and viewed the Darien Scheme as a potentially dangerous step towards greater independence for Scotland. Furthermore, a substantial portion of the Scottish aristocracy, men such as James Ogilvy, Earl of Findlater and Seafield, and the hated Earl of Stair, were loyal to William III and dependent his patronage, and likely viewed the Darien Scheme as a threat to this order. From an economic standpoint, the biggest opponent of the Darien Scheme was the East India Company, which saw the upstart CSTAI as a threat to its monopoly on foreign trade. Indeed, there does appear to be some truth to this claim, as some of the early supporters of the CSTAI were actually English merchants seeking a way to bypass the commercial stranglehold of the East India Company.

With all of this in mind, the English Crown set about obstructing the Darien Scheme at every turn. This effort was apparent early on, when an attempt to raise funds for the CSTAI from investors in the German city of Hamburg was scotched due to the interference of Sir Paul Rycaut, an English government official likely acting on William III’s orders. Rycaut warned potential investors that England would not look kindly in support for the CSTAI, and that relations between England and the small city-state might suffer as a consequence. Rycaut’s intimidation had the desired effect; almost no money was raised from Hamburg.

While Rycaut’s interference certainly hampered the establishment of New Caledonia, the greatest blow dealt by England to the fledgling colony was almost definitely the proclamation, issued by the Crown in April of 1699, which forbade any English subjects from trading or corresponding with the Scottish colonists. This was utterly devastating to New Caledonia. As previously mentioned, the colony was almost perpetually short on food; with this decree, merchants from Jamaica and North America were forbidden to visit New Caledonia, cutting off one of the settlement’s last sources of food. As William Paterson so elegantly put it:

“That the scarcity of fresh provisions and strong liquors was occasioned by the Proclamations published against them [the colonists] in Jamaica and the other English Plantations, which hindered several ships and brigantines that were desynd [sic]
Furthermore, the proclamation also delivered a devastating blow to morale, with many of the Darien settlers feeling cut off and abandoned. Soon after the proclamation was issued, the decision to abandon New Caledonia for the first time was taken, a decision motivated to a great degree by English efforts to sabotage the project.

Though the damage done to New Caledonia by English interference is fairly obvious, recent scholarship may indicate that England’s opposition to the Darien Scheme holds an even greater historical significance than first thought. In a recent study entitled, “Seventeenth-Century Scottish Communities in the Americas,” historian David Dobson attempted to refute the common argument that all Scottish settlements in the Americas were failures. Dobson’s research has lead him to conclude that the vast majority of the “Scottish” settlements established in the Americas during this period were in fact “British” settlements, populated by Scots but organized and supported by England. In fact, Dobson claims that New Caledonia is arguably the only truly Scottish colony to be established in the Americas during the 17th century, as it was founded and maintained without any support from England. Dobson’s observation that such settlements essentially lived and died based on English support provides further evidence for the significance of English opposition to the Darien Scheme as an explanation of its failure. Unlike prior settlements, New Caledonia was actually opposed, rather than supported by, England, leaving it without a source of support that, when the histories of other Scottish settlements are taken into account, likely would have been crucial to its survival. In short, New Caledonia was unique among the “Scottish” colonies, and it was this uniqueness that helped to doom it.

There is one final factor in the story of New Caledonia’s fall, and it is quite probably the most significant of them all. If disease, rain, rotting food, and hostile foreign powers were not enough, William Paterson’s free-trading dream was also riven with internal disputes. To begin with, the leadership of the New Caledonia was divided from the very start. Before the first expedition had left for Darien, the CSTAI had formed a seven-member council to lead the enterprise both during the crossing, and upon arrival in Darien. Of these seven, almost all were some combination of incompetent, jealous, and selfish, qualities that were possibly best embodied by Captain Robert Pennecuik, who was described by John Prebble as being, “Pig-headed and domineering, suspicious of all but other seamen, and of those too if they challenged his judgement.” Personal clashes between the Councilors began as soon as the expedition left Scotland, with Pennecuik’s status as an arrogant bully able to intimidate the other members of the Council a frequent cause of disputes. Another frequent source of internal conflict came from outside of the Council in the form of the faction formed by the brothers Robert and Thomas Drummond, impoverished nobles whose followers soon became known as the “Glencoe Gang,” due to Thomas Drummond’s involvement in the infamous Glencoe Massacre of 1693, an event that still inspired feelings of hatred and division in Scotland years after the fact. Factionalism, in short, had been brewing for months before the fleet first sailed to Darien. As soon as the first expedition left Scotland, it exploded.

The situation did not improve at all once the first expedition finally arrived at Darien. Conflicts between New Caledonia’s leaders steadily grew worse, until April of 1699, when the Council split over a motion to increase its size. By the end of the month, four of the seven original Councilors were on the verge of leaving New Caledonia for Scotland, and the enlarged Council was now controlled by the hated Glencoe Gang. The situation only worsened from this point. Pennecuik and Robert Drummond refused to allow food from their ships to be used to feed the starving colonists, and Pennecuik was accused of plotting to mutiny and turn to piracy. Though Pennecuik was never formally convicted in relation to this plot, the evidence against him was substantial enough for the CSTAI to order the leaders of the second expedition to Darien to strip him of all of his titles, and to apply other punishments as they saw fit. Even after New Caledonia was abandoned for the first time,
fighting among the former members of the Council continued; one of the Councilors deserted the returning fleet in New York City, and the Drummonds illegally obtained a new ship and returned to New Caledonia against orders. The second expedition to Darien fared little better in terms of leadership; though one man, Alexander Fonab, managed to organize a militia that held off the Spanish for a time, his skill was overshadowed by the quarrelling and indecisiveness of others, Thomas Drummond was arrested and charged with plotting mutiny, and New Caledonia failed once more.

By no means was such quarreling confined to the leaders of New Caledonia. From the beginning of the first expedition, a rift developed between “Seamen” and “Landsmen;” “Seamen,” referring to the sailors who crewed the ships and their officers, and “Landsmen” referring to the settlers and soldiers bound for Darien, along with their leaders. The Seamen treated the Landsmen with rudeness and disdain, believing them to be incompetent and obnoxious, while the Landsmen resented the preferential treatment that the Seamen tended to receive due to the influence of their officers, particularly, Pennecuik and Robert Drummond. This seething tension continued after the establishment of New Caledonia, although it became only one of a host of other conflicts among the Darien settlers. The colonists resented their leaders for appearing to live in apathy and luxury, and resented each other over privileges such as better food. Desertion by settlers became common; Pennecuik’s journal records two separate incidents of fairly sizeable parties of settlers (eight men in one case, ten in another), deserting the colony with weapons and supplies, one of which was captured, brought back to New Caledonia, and imprisoned.

Conflict between colonists continued during the second expedition, but this time with added dimensions of religion, language, and culture. Many of those who joined the second expedition to Darien were Highland Scots who were illiterate and spoke no English, leading them to clash with their Anglicized Lowland compatriots. The internal conflicts present during this period are vividly captured in a letter written by Alexander Shields, by all accounts a fervent Presbyterian minister, to one of his colleagues in Scotland. Shields comments negatively on what he considers to be the low morals of his fellow settlers, remarking:

Our company very uncomfortable, consisting for the generality, especially the officers and volunteers of the warst [sic] of mankind, if yow [sic] had scummed the Land and raked to the borders of hell for them, men of lewd practices and venting the wickednesse [sic] of principles...

To what extent Shields’ statement is true is not of concern here. What is important is the degree of venom and resentment present in Shields’ statement. If a man like Shields was willing to speak of his shipmates and fellow settlers in this way, then that is a fairly good sign that tensions within the general population of New Caledonia were quite high, up to the moment of its final collapse.

All of this internal conflict, which seemed to pit everyone, from the highest official to the lowest settler, against each other, arguably played the greatest role in the failure of the Darien Scheme. In his study of Nova Scotia, another ultimately failed “Scottish” colony from roughly 60 years before New Caledonia, David Dobson observes that the settlers of Nova Scotia were able to establish a strong general community, a unity which enabled them to survive for quite some time until they were overwhelmed by external factors. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that a sense of community was vital to the survival of almost any new European settlement in the Americas. As should by now be patently obvious, New Caledonia did not have this at all. A community with incompetent, self-serving leaders, a community where every man is suspicious of his neighbors and out for himself, seeking only to survive another day, would find it difficult to withstand even the mildest of shocks. Considering these circumstances then, it should be no wonder that New Caledonia failed so rapidly and so spectacularly.

At this point, the causes of New Caledonia’s failure have been well-established: poor planning, environmental factors, foreign interference, and internal conflict. Now, it is time to turn to another
important question: how did the Scottish public, and the Scottish state, react to the failure of the Darien Scheme? To be able to answer the question, we first need to understand just how much enthusiasm the Scottish public had initially shown for the Darien Scheme. Scotland in the 1690s was land divided, politically and religiously, and land impoverished and famished. Yet the Scottish public rallied almost to man behind Darien and the CSTAI, contributing huge sums of money and food, as well as thousands of people.60 As John Prebble put it, “No family could claim respect if it had not one young man who was hot to serve the African company.”61 For the Scottish public, the Darien Scheme was not just a colonial venture; in many ways, it was a form of national salvation.62

It is easy to predict, then, that the people of Scotland would not take the failure of such an enterprise well. To say that they were angry would be a gross understatement. Once news of New Caledonia’s initial abandonment reached Scotland, the Scottish public exploded. Neither the CSTAI nor the government could calm the tide of popular outrage, which, somewhat ironically, was initially directed at those who had managed to survive the expedition and return to Scotland.63 Most of them were branded as cowards, publicly condemned, and ostracized.64

Following the initial wave of outrage was a “pamphlet war” in which partisans of the CSTAI and patriotic Scots clashed with supporters of King William in pen and ink about who, or what, was to blame for New Caledonia’s failure, and what was to be done about it.65 The two primary combatants in this war of words were Robert Herries, a disgruntled deserter from the first expedition to Darien, and James Hodges, his principal foe.66 Herries, whom Prebble asserts was likely a paid English agent, struck first, with his A Defense of the Scots Abdicating Darien, a work which apparently caused so much offense that it was banned in Scotland.67 Hodges answered back with Inquiry into the Causes of the Miscarriage of the Scots Colony, an inflammatory work which, essentially, accused the English government and crown of illegally interfering with the business of the CSTAI.68 Such boldness could not, and did not, go unpunished.

King William III issued a royal proclamation banning Hodges’ work, and he was subsequently arrested and jailed.69 The reason for this somewhat heavy-handed response does not seem to have had as much to do with a desire to shape public perception of the Darien Scheme so much as it was an attempt to defend the dignity of the government. William III seems to have been a monarch who never felt entirely secure on his throne; such brazen accusations as were made by Hodges had to be dealt with swiftly and publicly, lest they inflame further dissenters. The situation simmered uneasily throughout the next few months, only to crest spectacularly in 1700. Oddly enough, it was a Scottish victory that set off the powder keg of public discontent. When news of a victory by a militia of New Caledonia’s settlers over a small Spanish garrison at Toubacanti several months prior reached Edinburgh on June 20th of that year, what began as a celebration quickly turned into a street riot, largely thanks to the provocations of Jacobites, who hoped that news of the victory might help to generate support for their cause.70 Bonfires were lit, pistols were fired into the air, the homes of several government officials were attacked, the Old Tollbooth, Edinburgh’s main jail, was stormed, and Parliament Hall was briefly surrounded before the mob dispersed the next morning.71

Though very little ultimately came of the so-called “Toubacanti Riot,” it does serve as a very effective demonstration of how emotional of an issue the Darien Scheme was for the Scottish public, and of how difficult it was for the civil authority to keep order in the face of such sentiments.72 By year’s end, the failed colony had entered Scottish popular culture, as evidence by The Dreadful Voice of Fire, a popular “broadside ballad” of the day.73 The ballad enshrines Darien into the realm of myth, comparing its failure to that of the legendary Tower of Babel as an example of mankind’s hubris.74 Such a song would have had a fairly wide circulation, even among the illiterate, and gives a unique example of how the Scottish public perceived the Darien Scheme at the time of its conclusion. Though the issue of Darien seems to have faded in importance somewhat after the union of England and Scotland into Great Britain in 1707, it is important not to minimize the
massive impact that it had on the Scottish public and state “in the moment.”

In conclusion, the most important legacy of the Darien Scheme is what it can tell us about how and why European colonies in the Americas failed. It is easy to assume that most “failed” colonies collapsed for obvious reasons: starvation, disease, etc. While these factors obviously should not be discounted, the story of Darien shows the importance of looking beyond the obvious. Foreign interference played a key role in New Caledonia’s fall, as did a divided leadership and internal quarrelling. These factors are certainly not very dramatic, but they matter nonetheless. Only by incorporating and understanding such factors, then, can we really understand just what separated the successful American colonies from the unsuccessful.

Notes
33. Prebble, Darien, 85.
34. Prebble, Darien, 88-89.
35. Prebble, Darien, 197.
38. Prebble, Darien, 198.
43. Prebble, Darien, 111-112.
44. Prebble, Darien, 125, 128-129.
45. Prebble, Darien, 102-103. For a good short account of the events of the Glencoe Massacre, see C.R. MacKinnon’s The Highlands in History. Special thanks to Prof. Dermot Quinn for background information on Glencoe.
46. Prebble, Darien, 186-187.
47. Prebble, Darien, 187.
48. Prebble, Darien, 189.
50. Prebble, Darien, 213-216.
51. Prebble, Darien, 241-244, 256-261.
52. Prebble, Darien, 123, 143-144.
53. Prebble, Darien, 123, 143-144.
54. Prebble, Darien, 144, 184, 186, 188.
56. Prebble, Darien, 240.
58. Shields.
60. Prebble, Darien, 9, 80.
61. Prebble, Darien, 100.
63. Prebble, Darien, 268-270.
64. Prebble, Darien, 269-270.
66. Prebble, Darien, 275-281. Again, James Hodges was likely not the actual author of the pamphlet in question. Since his name was nevertheless legally associated with the work, it is used here for the sake of brevity.
68. Hodges, Inquiry, 522-523, 554.
70. Prebble, Darien, 283-284.
71. Prebble, Darien, 283-286.
73. The Dreadful Voice of Fire (Edinburgh, 1700; National Library of Scotland), http://digital.nls.uk/broadsides/broadside.cfm/id/15857. A “broadside ballad” was a cheaply-printed popular song of the day, usually published without sheet music.
74. Fire.
REFERENCES


