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## **Cover Page Footnote**

Walla D Elshekh is a graduating senior majoring in political science with a minor in economics. She is a member of the Pi Sigma Alpha Honor Society, as well as, Vice President of the Seton Hall Chapter of Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity, International. She presented her paper at the 2018 Pi Sigma Alpha Student Research Conference in Washington, DC. She hopes to enter law school in the fall.

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## INTRODUCTION

Entering into force in 1970, The Nonproliferation Treaty's (NPT) mission is to end the creation and spread of nuclear weapons, as well as, promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Treaty). Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the international community has placed regulating nuclear power as a top priority (Review Conference). With over 190 party states, five of which are nuclear weapons states, the NPT represents one of the only international efforts towards non-nuclear proliferation and complete disarmament (Treaty).

The NPT is among the most influential nuclear arms treaties. In the past 47 years, the NPT has directed states towards addressing the issue of nuclear arms, leading to the dismantling of over 50,000 nuclear weapons (Kristensen). However, the way in which the NPT has shaped the international community and its system, remains contested. Since 1970, states have either increased or decreased their stockpiles, while some have promised not to acquire weapons at all. Although the treaty has not changed, its influence on state's decisions to arm has. This leads one to question whether a world free of the threat of nuclear war is achievable under the NPT.

Some scholars argue that the NPT is the world's only hope for avoiding nuclear war, while others believe the NPT has promoted a hierarchical system where only certain states have permission to explore nuclear capabilities. To understand why countries continue to preserve, develop, or refrain from using nuclear arms, this

paper will consider the question: How has the NPT influenced nuclear party, non-nuclear party, and nuclear non-party states? Why are some states increasing their stockpiles, and others are not? Why are nuclear party states refusing to disarm further? Finally, this paper will consider whether the NPT prevents countries from pursuing nuclear weapons, especially when external threats incline them to do so.

## HISTORY

President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal initiated international efforts towards nuclear proliferation (Review Conference). His call to disarm and dismantle the nuclear technology used for weaponry, resulted in the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Since 1957, the IAEA has regulated the use of nuclear technology by the international community via the safeguard systems (Review Conference). The safeguards ensures that countries comply with the goals and regulations of the NPT by passing inspections administered by the agency (Treaty).

Since the establishment of the NPT, nuclear weapons have declined from about 70,000 to about 14,000 in 2017 (Kristensen). The majority of the disarmament is attributed to the proliferation agreements reached by the international community (Kristensen). NPT continues to strengthen its provisions every five years through considerable review (Review Conference). However, not every conference means continuous progress. Several conferences, including those in 1980, 1990, 1995, and 2005, were unable to reach

an agreement. Many states remained conflicted over how much progress the nuclear state parties – United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia – were making towards complete disarmament (Review Conference). This is a serious concern because the treaty asks parties to disarm at an “early date” (Duarte 3).

In addition, some states have not committed to the global efforts toward nuclear proliferation. For example, countries like Israel, Pakistan, and India have never signed the NPT; and continue to possess nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear weapon states such as Iraq, Libya, and Iran have also attempted to obtain nuclear weapons. This violates the regulations set forth by the treaty and the IAEA. Also, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and has since remained at the center of nuclear proliferation due to its testing of nuclear missiles (3). Furthermore, many party states find their ability to acquire technologies able to produce fissile materials to be an “inalienable right” (4). They believe that the safeguards constrain their ability for peaceful nuclear activities. In addition, these states find that the constraints are enforced disproportionately between the non-nuclear state parties and the nuclear-weapon states (4).

## LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the course of the NPT’s existence, various schools of thought have both analyzed and interpreted the function of the treaty on the international community, and its system as a whole. Exploring the perspectives and methodologies of realists, liberals, and constructivists theories on the NPT have led to various conclusions. Realists argue that the NPT functions as a tool by dominant states such as the United States and Russia to preserve their control over nuclear weaponry, while simultaneously restricting the ability of other states to this same control (Petersen 24). Liberals view the NPT as a tool to protect the world from the potential destruction nuclear weapons can cause. They also view the treaty as a means of reshaping the way leaders view state security and nuclear weaponry (26). While Constructivists perceive the NPT as a social construct that establishes order within the international community (43).

The realist argument that the NPT is a means for superpowers to exercise their control stems from fundamental realist beliefs. A core premise in realist and classical realist theory is that states are rational actors looking to maximize their self-interest, which includes maintaining national security (Nel 27). The history of nuclear weapons, specifically, has brought about the “security dilemma.” The “security dilemma” causes insecurity among states in the international community (Ikenberry 14). As a state begins to equip itself with nuclear weaponry, other states feel insecure and begin to acquire their own nuclear arms. Evident between the United States and the Soviet Union, this ultimately leads to proliferation (14). States like the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom realized that the spread of nuclear weapons could destroy the control these superpowers have over their allies (Tertrais 1). Therefore, international treaties, like the NPT, are created by the will of these superpowers, since dismantling nuclear arsenals would not reflect the rational thinking states possess (Carranza 493 and Allison 12). Therefore, the NPT was, and is, intended for these powers to maintain control over their weapons and prevent others from acquiring their own (12).

Scholars have concluded that nations, especially great powers, obtain nuclear weapons for multiple reasons. One of which involves nations emulating the weaponry of other nations as a way to oppose them (Waltz). Another reason is that nations will build their own arsenals out of fear that their stronger allies will not protect them if they face nuclear threats from enemies. This was the reality in Great Britain when they feared the United States would not protect them from the Soviet Union’s threats. Another reason a nation will acquire nuclear weapons is if their adversaries also acquire weapons, or out of fear of their future capabilities. Also, countries find that nuclear weapons are a cheaper alternative than conventional arms and can solidify their international standing (Waltz).

In addition, realist scholar, such as Kenneth Waltz, even argue that a world where nuclear arms are available to all will lead to a peaceful world. Waltz reaches this conclusion by asserting that states discourage one another from using nuclear

weapons out of fear of the devastation it will cause (Waltz). Therefore, if all states have nuclear capabilities, and deterrence strategies fail, then these countries will avoid going to war out of fear of a nuclear catastrophe (Waltz). This is evident during the Cold War, when both the United States and the Soviet Union realized that going to war meant immeasurable losses on both sides. Knowledge of nuclear weapons along with fear enabled both parties to come to a resolution (Allison 136).

Liberal perspectives on the NPT center around the core belief that a state's best interest is to pursue the common good (Petersen 131). Liberals argue that the NPT is reducing the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. In addition, by following the NPT, states are able to focus on their national security (131). Since Carr and other liberals believe that the international community has a moral obligation to one another, treaties are an effective form of governance because of the element of cooperation it requires from all states (147). Evans and Kawaguchi demonstrate this claim by citing the 189 member states and South Africa's dismantling of their nuclear weapons (78). Since member states acknowledge "...nuclear weapons are simply wrong", the moral aspect of NPT should not be underestimated (78). Liberals view the NPT as a rational way for states to ensure their security by eliminating nuclear weapons.

In addition, liberals argue that economic costs stopped the United States and the Soviet Union from going to war. Liberals note that the amount of money spent on creating nuclear weapons, as well as, funding delivery vehicles and other transportation systems is in the billions (128). Therefore, going to nuclear war is not a rational decision because of the economic costs invested in creating and maintaining the weapons. Furthermore, liberals reference Germany, Japan, Belarus, South Africa, Ukraine, and other states that have removed their nuclear weapons or passed on the opportunity to create nuclear weapons. These states show that having this weaponry is not necessary for national security, nor is it a requirement for rational states, or those working in their self-interest (129).

Constructivist perspective on the NPT focuses on the way in which the treaty has formed as a

means for international governance (158).

Constructivism analyzes how ideas and beliefs shape the way in which states behave, and how other states react to that behavior (158). Through documents like the NPT, the international community is able to create new norms and standards for itself by reestablishing the community's behavior. This occurs when leaders come together to make decisions and ultimately define what is and is not acceptable (159). For the NPT, this occurs every five years at conferences that discuss the direction of nuclear arms in the international community. There, new provisions are drawn, issues are discussed, and resolutions are made, ultimately, reshaping what the NPT means to both the international community as a whole, and the individual member states.

An example of this constructivist concept is with Egypt's admission into the NPT. When it came to nuclear weaponry, Egypt was originally interested in acquiring its own nuclear technology. This interest formed from the threat Egypt faced from Israel's nuclear activity (Bakanic 18). Egypt attempted to move forward with nuclear programs, as well as, appeal to India and the Soviet Union for assistance; however, these attempts were unsuccessful. In 1981, Egypt joined the NPT (Gregory 22). Egyptian leaders agreed that joining the NPT would mean greater benefits than the status associated with having nuclear weapons (Ruble 147). This is evident from the strong US-Egypt relations, and the contribution of over \$2 billion in aid provided per year (Petersen 161). In addition, Egypt is able to criticize Israel's vague nuclear activity and be a leader in the region. This shift in Egypt's ideas and beliefs, from seeking security and stature via the attempt to acquire nuclear weaponry, to joining the NPT and combating Israel, shows how the NPT is able to alter state's identity, interests, and behaviors (162).

The stark contrast between each school of thought illustrates the dividing perspectives on the NPT's ability to achieve non-proliferation and complete disarmament. By analyzing the methodology, it is evident that the realist approach relies on the initial formation of the treaty and the power structure among states, while the liberalist approach requires a look at today's involvement among member states. The constructivist

perspective has a more fluid interpretation of the purpose and function of the NPT, which alters as leaders come together – via international conferences – to discuss it.

## METHODOLOGY

Regardless of how each school of thought analyzes the NPT, valid arguments are present on each side. These arguments give way to a better understanding of the successes and shortfalls of the treaty. Understanding the influence of the NPT on the international community requires an analysis of nuclear party, non-nuclear party, and nuclear non-party weapon states. This paper will examine nuclear party states such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China, and how the NPT has influenced their decisions to decrease their nuclear stockpiles. It will also explore how these states maintain their remaining weapons and the affect this has on the international community. The following research will also analyze whether the NPT is a reason for why non-Nuclear weapon states like Japan and Brazil, choose not to acquire nuclear weapons. Lastly, this paper will expand upon the NPT's relationship with nuclear non-party states like Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Within this point, further analysis will determine whether the NPT can discourage, or even prevent, countries facing external threats from acquiring nuclear weapons.

## CASE STUDIES: NUCLEAR - WEAPON STATE PARTIES

The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state party as a state that has “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967” (Treaty 1968). These countries include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia (Review Conference).

The treaty states that signers of the document believe there are benefits to the peaceful nuclear technology that states create, which include the byproducts that come with nuclear explosive devices. Therefore, nuclear technology should be available to all states regardless of whether they are a nuclear or non-nuclear weapon state party

(Treaty 1968). The NPT requires a number of non-proliferation efforts for nuclear-weapon states. The treaty prohibits nuclear-weapon state parties from transferring nuclear weapons and devices, as well as, control of such items to non-nuclear states. Article I also prohibits states from encouraging or assisting non-nuclear weapon states in engineering such weapons. Article VI of the treaty asks that each party pursue negotiations, and create an efficient means to reach nuclear disarmament at “an early date,” as well as, a treaty on complete disarmament under international control. In addition, the NPT requires the votes of all nuclear-weapon state parties in order for an amendment to be approved (Treaty 1968).

Of the 14,930 nuclear warheads remaining, about 9,400 are in military stockpiles (Kristensen). More than 3,900 are deployed with operational forces belonging to British, and French forces, however, about 93% of these weapons belong to Russia and the United States. About 1,800 are ready to launch at a moment's notice. Although the number of nuclear weapons has decreased tremendously since the 1986, (about 55,400 weapons reduction) many argue that the rate at which these countries are disarming has slowed in the last 25 years. In addition, all of the nuclear weapon states appear to be retaining their remaining stockpiles, and undergoing modernization programs to revolutionize them (Kristensen).

The United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China began creating nuclear weapons during the Cold War. The United States did so as an inexpensive and proactive approach to Russian aggression during that time. Not only did the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki end WWII, but it also sent a message to Russia of the United States capabilities. This sparked Russia's urgency to produce their own nuclear weapons, initiating what scholars call the nuclear arms race. Britain, France, and China went on to develop their own nuclear weapons programs as well, refusing to rely on the U.S. and Russia for security from a nuclear threat.

By 1986, the world held about 70,300 nuclear weapons (Kristensen). The creation of the NPT led to major disarmament among these nations, with a total reduction of about 55,000 nuclear weapons

(Kristensen). A majority of this reduction occurred during the 1990's when fear of nuclear war was a major concern (Kristensen). Today's reduction rate has slowed significantly with many leaders refusing to dismantle their nuclear stockpiles completely. In a 2015 U.S. State Department report, the U.S. found that Russia violated The U.S.'s Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) claiming that they tested a ground-launched cruise missile (Reif). According to a NATO report, Russia has also performed simulated nuclear attacks on NATO allies and partners, such as Sweden, in March of 2013 (Nato 15). In addition, Russia's President Vladimir Putin expressed his perspective on nuclear arms. In 2000, he adopted a military doctrine that allowed Russia to use nuclear weapons against those who present "large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian federation" (Russia's Military). This is a dramatic change in Russia's former policy, which had forbade Russia from being the first to use nuclear weapons (Russia's Military).

President Putin is not the only leader who has presented such controversial policies. In 1978, the U.K. policy assured the international community the country would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear state parties, unless an attack was committed against the U.K., its territories, military, or allies, by a non-nuclear state party with assistance by a nuclear-weapon state (Kristensen 2011 93). Then in 1995, the U.K. broadened this policy to include any invasion or attack on any state that the U.K. possessed a security commitment with (93). The country's Strategic Defense and Security Review in 2010 stated that although the UK faces no threat from nuclear-states, they could still refer to this policy if a future threat of attack occurred, leaving room for potential conflict among the U.K. and non-nuclear state parties (94).

Policies toward maintaining and using nuclear weapons are only half the issue. These nuclear weapon states are also working towards modernizing their remaining stockpiles as well. In 2010, the U.K. released the number of warheads in its arsenal to the public by, announcing plans to shrink its stockpile from 160 to 120 (90). As of

2017, the U.K. still has roughly 215 weapons (Kristensen). This number encompasses weapons in military stockpiles, those that are retired, and those that 'will be' dismantled. The U.K.'s stockpile can arguably be considered the smallest of the five states (Kristensen 2011 91). However, the U.K. has also admitted to preserving some of its nuclear weaponry. In its Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR), the U.K. explained that it remains focused on renewing its nuclear deterrent force to protect itself from the current "age of uncertainty" (Securing Britain). Although the UK has renounced its biological and chemical weapons programs from the Cold War, the country still has a highly developed missile program that continues to develop (United Kingdom).

The U.K. has also joined forces with France, in terms of security and defense (Kristensen 2011 93). Through bilateral treaties, these countries are working to maintain and develop their respective nuclear arsenals (93). The French government is not, as of yet, planning a future reduction of their nuclear weapons (Kristensen, 2015 30). The country spends approximately 3.6-4.6 billion U.S. dollars annually on nuclear forces (Acheson). The French President Francois Hollande announced that 12.3% of that budget would specifically fund nuclear weapon modernization (France Nuclear). This includes modernizing submarines, aircrafts, warheads, and nuclear facilities (Kristensen 2015 30). Hollande plans to continue this funding until 2019 (France Nuclear). In addition, France is also looking into the study of next generation weaponry (Kristensen 2015 30). The country's interest in maintaining their current nuclear weapons arsenal, while simultaneously modernizing such technology, dramatically contrasts with the obligations imposed by the NPT to dismantle nuclear weaponry.

What began in 1970 as a major motivator for these superpowers to disarm is now forgotten. After decades of disarmament, the superpowers are now slowing their reduction, and simultaneously modernizing their stockpiles. The reason for this is twofold. First, relations today between countries are similar to that of the Cold War. Today, U.S.-Russia relations have reached serious lows comparable to that of the 1940s. This is a result of U.S.-Russia aggressions towards each

other from nuclear weapons disputes, the Syria crisis, U.S. allegations of Russian election hacking and more. Both the U.S. and Russia do not trust each other, in fact, officials in the Russian Defense Ministry have admitted that the Obama Administration's pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons is really an attempt to dominate with conventional weapons (Shuster). The five superpowers are working to maintain what is left of their stockpiles because they are certain that others are doing the same.

The second reason for the superpowers slowed dismantlement and simultaneous modernization is that the NPT does not discuss modernization. Although Article VI of the treaty requires the U.S., the U.K., Russia, France, and China to work towards the dismantlement of stockpiles and "pursue negotiations in good faith" at an "early date," there are no limitations in terms of modernizing weapons (Treaty 1968) (Kristensen 2014 106-107). In the 2015 review conference, many non-nuclear state parties pointed to the nuclear state's expensive and counterproductive modernization programs, nuclear policies, and slow disarmament pace, as evidence for concerns of serious penalties (Arms Control Experts). However, the vagueness of the NPT, as well as, the persistence of nuclear parties to follow through with such programs, has led to disputes and an inability to update a plan for action (Arms Control Experts).

The NPT originally functioned as a means to de-escalate tensions caused by the Cold War. These countries were fearful of the mutually assured destruction that would come from a nuclear war. The NPT was a way for these powers to reduce their stockpiles with assurance that other nuclear-armed countries were doing the same. However, now the intention to maintain nuclear stockpiles, regardless of NPT obligations, has resulted in its preservation by all five-weapon states. As Waltz describes, countries will acquire nuclear weapons in retaliation of other countries that have acquired them, as evidenced by Russia and the U.S. (Waltz). Countries will also equip themselves out of fear of uncertainty and, refusing to rely on other states like Britain, China, and France, for protection.

## **CASE STUDIES: NON-NUCLEAR - WEAPON STATE PARTIES**

Party states that signed the NPT and have not manufactured or exploded a nuclear weapon device prior to January 1, 1967 are called non-nuclear weapon state parties. There are over 180 non-nuclear weapon state parties, all of which are located in various regions around the world (Treaty). In accordance with the NPT, these parties cannot receive or have control over nuclear weapons and similar explosive devices (Treaty 1968). These states cannot seek or receive assistance to produce weapons. In addition, each non-nuclear weapon state party is to accept the safeguards negotiated with the IAEA, in order to remain in compliance with the NPT's requirements, and to remain within the bounds of peaceful nuclear activity (Treaty 1968). However, many non-nuclear state parties are capable of acquiring nuclear weapons. For example, Brazil and Japan have the technological and economic resources to do so; however, they have chosen not to acquire these weapons. Whether this is a result of obligations imposed on them by the NPT, is worth consideration.

Brazil's nuclear program first began in the 1930's (Brazil's Nuclear). Motivated by the military regimes that dominated Brazil between 1964 and 1985, the programs primarily focused on uranium enrichment (Brazil's Nuclear). Eventually every branch of Brazil's military had their own nuclear weapons program (Marvin). Their pursuit of nuclear weapons was due to a longstanding rivalry between Brazil and Argentina (Brazil's Nuclear). Their ambitions toward regional influence and recognition within the international community is what ignited the contention. In 1967, Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco making Latin America a nuclear free zone. However, limitations in nuclear activity were not set forth until 1988 when Brazil approved a new constitution restricting their use of nuclear activities to peaceful purposes only. Overtime, the competition between both Brazil and Argentina diminished because of democratization. Eventually, the two states signed an agreement pledging to maintain peaceful nuclear activities. In 1998, Brazil became a party of the NPT; however, the country's participation

in the treaty occurred much later due to hesitation from Brazil's leaders. They believed the NPT was a means for foreign forces to control and hinder Brazil's nuclear objectives. Leaders like President Lula Da Silva believed signing the treaty would be detrimental, especially considering the possibility of conflict between Brazil and a nuclear power (Brazil's Nuclear).

Since their signing of the NPT, Brazil's nuclear weapons programs has ended. Their current goal is to reach self-sufficiency in selling nuclear fuel to the international market (Brazil's Nuclear). Today, Brazil has the most advanced nuclear facilities in Latin America, and works to uphold nuclear weapon states to their nuclear disarmament obligations set forth by the NPT (Country Profiles). Although Brazil appears to have shifted from critic to advocate of the NPT, the real motivator behind Brazil's refusal to acquire nuclear weapons is that it does not have a reason to. Unlike nuclear weapon states, such as the U.S. and Russia, or nuclear non-party states, such as Pakistan and India, Brazil does not face a serious security dilemma (Marvin). Brazil's push for nuclear weapons in the 1930's was a result of the tense relations and rivalry with Argentina. Brazil along with Argentina and Chile have already had their own nuclear arms race. However, similar to the allies and Russia, the fear of mutually assured destruction pushed them towards disarmament. The democratization of the countries helped to diffuse the tension between Brazil and Argentina, as well as, the Treaty of Tlateloco provided an "out" that was preferable to the NPT at the time (Marvin). Today, Brazil does not face serious threats to its security. Regardless of its ability to obtain nuclear weaponry, it is the low security threat that inclines Brazil to avoid arming itself and not the NPT.

Another non-nuclear weapon state with the intelligence and financial resources to possess nuclear weapons is Japan. Japan's non-nuclear policy stance derives from its devastating history in the Cold War, specifically the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (Japan). The country has never developed a complete nuclear weapons program; rather, it has implemented anti-nuclear weapons policies. These policies restrict Japan's use of nuclear activity to peaceful purposes, and

forbids the manufacturing, possession, or transportation of nuclear weapons in Japan. The country became an official signatory of the NPT in 1968. Similar to Brazil, Japanese leaders had their reservations towards the NPT. Leaders were deeply concerned that it would hinder the country from achieving national energy needs through nuclear technology. Others worried it would be detrimental to Japan's security in the future (Japan).

Since its signing, Japan has remained a leader in the fight towards a nuclear-free world. In fact, the country has reached out to non-nuclear weapon states like Canada, Mexico, the United Arab Emirates, and Poland, to advance nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation efforts (Japan). Even the country's public, shares serious anti-nuclear weapons attitudes. Nevertheless, the country has undergone recent nuclearization debates primarily fueled by the tensions in the Korean peninsula (Japan). In October 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear weapons test, which caused many of Japan's top officials to question the idea of a Japanese nuclear arsenal (Hughes). Officials argued that Japan is constitutionally entitled to possess nuclear weapons for the exclusive purpose of self-defense (Hughes). Nonetheless, many scholars argue that Japan is too invested in its commitment to nonproliferation to begin developing nuclear weapons (Japan).

Whether or not the NPT will continue to hold Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons is debatable. Although Japan is consistent in its anti-nuclear weapons stance, one can argue that this stance is the result of Japan's low-level security threats, and were it to have a threat to security, may alter this stance. Over the years, the Japanese government has maintained a relaxed response to events many would find concerning like China's nuclear test in 1964, the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and North Korea's nuclear efforts today (Hughes). Japan is able to maintain this composure, especially with North Korea, because it does not find the security threat to be high. The Japanese government believes that North Korea would require more time, beyond their first test, to develop the nuclear weapons they desired. This leaves more time for the Japanese to pursue diplomatic negotiations. Secondly, the Japan's

initial response to North Korean nuclear threats would be an acceleration in their ballistic defense systems (Hughes). Further, Japan's reliance on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is also a major reason for their relaxed approach (Japan). Their reliance began in 2013 when Japan created a national security strategy against North Korea. This strategy primarily consists of Japan's ballistic missile defense and increased cooperation in extended deterrence with the U.S. This commitment has ensured Japan's security making it easier for Japan to worry less about nuclear threats, and more on nonproliferation (Japan).

In addition, the security risks from Japan's pursuit of nuclear weapons will far outweigh the benefits. While Japan may be able to protect itself by working towards nuclear capabilities, their possession of nuclear weapons can potentially cause an arms race between Japan, China, and North Korea (Hughes). This security dilemma is not in the interest of the Japanese or the U.S., and any potential for the U.S. to not provide deterrence after Japan's nuclear weapon possession, would be detrimental to Japan's security. Although Japan is among those on the forefront of progressive nonproliferation efforts as outlined by the NPT, its decision to abide by it is ultimately a result of its lack of national security threats. If the threat posed by North Korea reached a state of serious concern to Japan, it will welcome U.S. nuclear arms into the country as it did in Okinawa in 1969 (Japan).

### **CASE STUDIES: NUCLEAR NON-PARTY STATES**

Nuclear non-party states are those that have not signed the NPT and pursue nuclear weapons. These countries are comprised of Israel, India, and Pakistan. North Korea also falls in this category, as it was originally a signer; however, it has since opted to possess nuclear weapons, therefore violating the treaty. Each of these countries began their nuclear weapons programs within a decade of each other. Israel is the first country in the Middle East to possess nuclear weapons (Israel Nuclear). Beginning its pursuit in the 1950s, Israel sought nuclear weaponry as a means to ease the threat posed by its neighbors. In addition, the U.S.'s "abandonment" of Israel during the Suez

Canal, solidified Israel's pursuit of a self-sustained nuclear deterrence. Maintaining a sense of secrecy, there it is unknown the exact size of Israel's nuclear weapons. Experts agree that the weapons do exist; however, specifics on the country's biological and chemical weapons programs are unknown. Although Israel is not a signer of the NPT, the country maintains that it is interested in a nuclear-free Middle East, with the caveat that comprehensive peace is essential before such talks can occur (Israel Nuclear).

India's exploration of nuclear weapons began in the 1940s with an actual program developed in the 1960s (India). From 1997 to 2009, the country also had a chemical weapons program. After completing five tests in 1998, the country declared itself a nuclear weapon state. In 2005, the U.S. collaborated with India allowing them into the international nuclear market as long as they abided by specific safeguards. As of 2015, India's nuclear arsenal consisted of 90 to 110 warheads. India remains a non-signer of the NPT for multiple reasons. For one, India's leaders believe the NPT maintains an unfair distinction between the nuclear weapon states and the rest of the world. The treaty allows these states to possess nuclear weapons while enforcing strict restrictions on non-nuclear states. In addition, India is highly critical of the nuclear-weapon state's disarmament efforts. Since the NPT's inception, the nuclear weapon states have yet to achieve the obligations set forth in Article IV of the treaty (India).

Pakistan began its nuclear weapons programs in the 1970s following the Indo-Pakistani War (Pakistan). Such efforts were motivated by Pakistan's desire to curb the conventional inferiority against India. Following India's tests, Pakistan began its own trials specifically focusing on uranium enrichment. Eventually, the country declared itself a nuclear weapon state. Since then, Pakistan refuses to sign the NPT in addition to a majority of other anti-nuclear arms treaties (Pakistan).

North Korea has pushed for its own nuclear weapons program since the end of WWII (North Korea). Advancements toward nuclear weaponry increased after North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. The country justified this move by citing U.S. aggressions and

the Bush administration's pre-emption doctrine, as declarations of war (Pollack). Efforts by the international community to reduce North Korea's stockpile have been unsuccessful. In 2013, North Korea along with South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the U.S. held talks aimed to denuclearize the Korean peninsula (North Korea). However, after disputes with the U.S. over a North Korean rocket launch, the government voided the discussion and proceeded to conduct nuclear tests. Today, the country has an active nuclear weapons program, and it is believed to possess both a biological and chemical weapons program. State media has also announced that all nuclear facilities were functioning to improve the country's nuclear stockpile.

Israel, India, and Pakistan, and North Korea's nuclear history is a prime example of how external threats incline countries to adopt nuclear weaponry. The regional tensions and differences in military strength pose a serious security issue. These states refuse to rely on nuclear weapon states for protection. Nuclear nonparty states do not trust the NPT because they do not see all state actors in compliance with disarmament. These countries cannot be sure that nuclear weapon states will protect them, nor that they will comply with the disarmament efforts. Therefore, these countries would rather equip themselves with nuclear arms and stabilize their security, as opposed to being party to a treaty that infringes on their right to protection.

## ANALYSIS

After analyzing nuclear party, non-nuclear party, and nuclear non-party states, it is clear that the NPT influences each differently. Initially, the NPT was a way for states to address heightened tensions by disarming their nuclear stockpiles. Since then, the NPT has led to significant reductions in the world's nuclear inventory, as well as, a joint effort from nations across the globe to refrain from nuclear use. However, overtime the NPT's power over states has diminished.

Nuclear weapon states like Russia have ignored the NPT and openly admitted to preserving stockpiles, while simultaneously supporting their country's modernization programs. Super powers like France and Great

Britain have emphasized their right to use nuclear force in the case of an invasion, attack, or aggression, leaving opportunity for nuclear use against others in the international community. Again, this contradicts the NPT's function within the global system. Nonetheless, the nuclear powers continue to pursue these loopholes, which essentially undoes the progress made since the Cold War.

The NPT's influence on non-nuclear weapon states is also diminishing. The reality is non-nuclear weapon states are only abiding by the treaty because they are not facing a current security threat. States like Brazil and Japan do not have tense relations like that of the U.S. and Russia, making their pursuit of nuclear weapons rather pointless. In addition, some non-nuclear weapon states like Japan have ensured nuclear protection from the U.S. in the case of future security threats. This has also kept them from addressing a nuclear option. They are abiding by the NPT because they have ensured their nuclear protection by other means, i.e countries who already possess nuclear weaponry.

Nuclear non-party states are continuing their weapons programs with little consideration of the NPT. Israel, Pakistan, India, and now North Korea continue to explore nuclear capabilities in the name of national security. These countries have expressed opposition to the NPT believing that its sole function is to restrict their ability to protect themselves. India and other non-nuclear party states have criticized the NPT for not holding nuclear weapon states accountable to their obligations under the provision of the NPT. Overall, the NPT's influence is not pertinent to a non-party states decision to pursue nuclear weapons.

There are multiple reasons for why states increase their stockpiles. However, the driving force in their decision-making process is national security. States will ultimately decide on whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons, based on if they currently face a security threat. Countries that undergo their own "cold war tensions" will arm themselves with nuclear weapons as an attempt to even the playing field and secure their countries safety. As evidenced by the efforts of states like Israel, India, and Pakistan.

Countries that have not acquired a nuclear stockpile, like Brazil and Japan, do so because their current state of security does not dictate the need for nuclear weaponry. Brazil armed itself with nuclear weapons after its “cold war tensions” with Argentina. The two participated in their own arms race, which made securing a stockpile critical. However, since their signing of the Treaty of Tlateloco and the NPT, tensions between Brazil and Argentina have decreased significantly. The country no longer faces a security threat and no longer feels the need to arm itself with nuclear weapons.

However, that is not to say that Brazil or other non-nuclear weapon states will never consider nuclear weapons. If there is a national security threat, these states will consider a nuclear option, just as other’s have done in the past. This reality is present with Japan. Though the country has had a devastating experience with nuclear weapons, and has remained at the forefront of nonproliferation efforts, Japan still ensures its security from North Korea by relying on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. The lack of security threats along with this safety guarantee by the U.S. are the only reasons why Japan will not pursue a nuclear program today.

Similar to nuclear weapon non-party states and non-nuclear weapon party states, countries like the U.S., the U.K., France, Russia, and China refuse to disarm because of their national security. Initially, the NPT functioned as a means to lessen tensions during the Cold War and push for the elimination of the world’s nuclear stockpile. However, today tense relations have resurfaced. The U.S.-Russia relationship has declined tremendously. For Russia to compete with the U.S.’s conventional weapons, it must maintain whatever is left of its nuclear arsenal. Curbing this gap helps secure Russia’s security against the U.S. Since Russia has openly admitted to preserving its remaining stockpile, other nations – the U.S., the U.K., France, and China – will follow suit. The U.S. will maintain and modernize its nuclear weapons because of the threat Russia poses to U.S. security. The U.K., France, and China will do the same to avoid relying on the U.S. and Russia for protection. These nations have placed their security before fulfilling their NPT obligations,

and in doing so have undone the majority of the NPT’s progress since the Cold War. Now the world faces the reality of having a smaller amount of nuclear weapons that can cause larger amounts of damage.

Whether the NPT can prevent countries from pursuing these nuclear weapons, especially when external threats incline them to do so, is debatable. However, the research implies that it is not likely. Regardless of which countries are in dispute, as long as that nation’s security is threatened, nuclear weapons will remain an option. Countries will not withhold themselves from nuclear weapons if the rest of the international community is working towards them. As long as countries feel threatened, nuclear weapons will remain a legitimate option for stability, which surpasses their obligations or commitments to the NPT. Countries like Pakistan, India, and North Korea will ignore the international community’s call for a nuclear-free world to ensure they are protected from the regional threats they face. States like Japan will comply with the NPT as long as they are promised nuclear security by other states like the U.S., otherwise they may explore a nuclear option. Lastly, countries like the U.S. and Russia will continue to maintain and modernize existing stockpiles out of fear of security and argue that modernization does not outright violate the NPT.

This ultimately leads one to question whether a world free of nuclear arms is achievable under the NPT. Although the international community had intentions to reduce and completely dissolve the world of nuclear weapons, it is apparent now that the treaty no longer has the same power on states. The NPT does not provide effective solutions for the reasons why countries pursue and preserve nuclear arms in the first place. At the time of its creation, writers of the NPT did not foresee modernization as an option for states. The goal was to reduce U.S.-Soviet Union tensions and push for total elimination of nuclear weapons. Since the NPT does not address modernization, states can continue to do so while arguing that it does not violate the NPT. In addition, the NPT lacks specificity in its obligations. The NPT requires nuclear weapon states to disarm at an “early date,” giving these countries room to argue for as much time as they please. These major issues

within the treaty have fueled disputes among the international community. Many non-nuclear party states are growing frustrated with the lack of commitment exhibited by nuclear party states. Instead of dismantling stockpiles further, these states are advancing their weaponry, which will only ignite tensions among other states. The rising tensions will ultimately lead to more countries pursuing nuclear weapons programs and decrease the number of countries willing to follow the guidelines and goals of the NPT.

## CONCLUSION

The reality of the NPT and its influence on the international community remains consistent with the realist perspective. The realist perspective on the NPT relies on the fact that states will always prioritize their security, since doing so reflects the rational behavior of states. Nuclear weapon states have not only admitted to preserving their existing stockpiles, but also to making them more dangerous. This is all in the name of security, which is what realist theory highlights. Realists also argue that states will never completely disarm because doing so is irrational. This is evident in the nuclear weapons states inability to disarm further than they already have. These states want to maintain some level of competitive warfare to ensure their existence against rivaling states.

Realist perspective argues that the NPT has created a hierarchical system where some states have permission to explore their nuclear capabilities, while restricting access to this technology for others. States have contended the imbalance in regulating nuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapon states are able to continue such programs whilst the international community debates over the legitimacy of such actions under the NPT. Regardless of the obvious contradiction in the actions of nuclear weapon states and the NPT, the U.S., Russia, U.K., France, and China continue to preserve and modernize stockpiles.

The Liberal perspective argues that the NPT will work because countries are looking to avoid nuclear war. They contend that avoiding nuclear war falls in line with maintaining national security and therefore is in their best interest. While the Constructivists argue that, the NPT's influence ultimately depends on how state actors give

meaning to it. However, these approaches requires all states to comply with the obligations set forth in the NPT. Otherwise if one state opts for a nuclear program, other countries, especially those that find the nuclear state a threat, will push for their own program.

Today, the international community is composed of states all interested in maintaining self-existence. States have neglected their responsibilities to the NPT for the sake of maintaining national security. States that do comply with the NPT, only do so because they do not yet have a national security threat, which would result in their needing to invest in nuclear warfare. However, given certain circumstances these countries are not compelled by the NPT to consider non-nuclear options. This security-driven focus aligns with the realist theory, further illustrating this school of thought as the most accurate in addressing the function and effectiveness of the NPT on the international community.

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