

The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy

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I. INTRODUCTION

It is now widely accepted that the objective of corporate law and corporate governance should be to promote the wealth and welfare of shareholders. Business managers typically profess that they see themselves as primarily accountable to shareholders, as opposed to being subject to a responsibility to a wider range of interests, including those of employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and local communities.¹ Scholars of corporate law, financial economists, and judges tend to share this view.² Shareholder primacy, however, has not always enjoyed such widespread approval. It is true that since the time of the famous Berle-Dodd debate,³ the discussion has always had two sides: some argue for greater accountability on the part of managers to shareholders, while others favor a larger responsibility of managers to other “stakeholders” of the corporation and even a corporate social responsibility to society as a whole.

Large, publicly traded corporations in the middle of the twentieth century were characterized by managerial capitalism—managers had taken over as the bearers of the creative entrepreneurial spirit within the firm and, compared to their predecessors a generation or two earlier, they were hardly responsible to owners.⁴ Economists sometimes saw this as a beneficial advance over the previous period of economic development characterized by a focus on founders and founding families, given that the system seemed more rational and stable.⁵ Around 1980, however,

¹ See Lynn A. Stout, *Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right*, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1445 (2005) (“[U]ntil quite recently, the idea that directors might show concern for stakeholders has been associated mostly with sandals-wearing activists . . .”).

² E.g., Bernard S. Sharfman, *Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under Corporate Law*, 65 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2198459> (discussing shareholder wealth maximization as the objective of corporate law); Leo E. Strine, Jr., *Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit*, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012).

³ A. A. Berle, Jr., *Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust*, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (arguing that managers should be accountable to shareholders); Merrick Dodd, Jr., *For whom Are Managers Trustees?*, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932) (arguing that managers should have a wider responsibility to society); A. A. Berle, Jr., *For whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note*, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1366–67 (1932) (rebutting the theory asserted by Dodd, *supra*).

⁴ See *infra* Part II.

⁵ *Infra* notes 24–31 and accompanying text.

managerial capitalism began to give way to investor capitalism.⁶ Hostile takeovers and, later, equity-based executive compensation, began to emerge as the new forces creating incentives for managers to focus on share value.⁷

This Article explores the reasons for this highly consequential change. It is often thought that shareholder primacy prevailed because it is more efficient, and managerialism therefore could no longer be maintained under modern economic circumstances.⁸ Relatedly, shareholder primacy is usually explored only as a phenomenon on the demand side of the capital market, that is, of the corporate governance of firms. By contrast, this Article argues that one of the most important reasons for the shift is a fundamental change in the supply side of the capital market, which has led to the heightened importance of interests of financial investors. Specifically, this Article suggests that changes in the pension system helped to transform corporate governance into a system dominated by the shareholder interest, to the detriment of the managerial model. Until the 1970s, workers typically relied on payouts from a defined benefit (DB) plan for retirement. Employers bore the investment risk, and designed plans to create incentives to stay with a particular employer.⁹ Workers' human capital and pension wealth were tied to the employer, thus creating a strong dependence on the employer's continued ability to fund the plan. Since the 1970s, however, DB plans have been losing ground to defined contribution (DC) plans, including 401(k) plans.¹⁰ These plans have the advantage of being more portable in the case of a job change, but workers bear the investment risk. Hence, a large part of the populace, at least the politically relevant middle class, became dependent on capital markets for retirement savings, and thus became, in the words of Chancellor Strine in the Delaware Court of Chancery, "forced capitalists."¹¹

⁶ E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, *The End of History for Corporate Law*, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 444 (2001).

⁷ See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, *How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law*, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 884 (2002) (suggesting that executive compensation creates incentives to abandon takeover defenses once the offer price has been bid up).

⁸ E.g. Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 6, at 444.

⁹ See *infra* Part III.A.

¹⁰ *Infra* Part III.A.

¹¹ Leo E. Strine, Jr., *Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance*, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007).

These changes in the pension system had consequences on the structure of the U.S. economy and the importance, nature, and content of corporate law that are hard to overestimate. First, pension wealth is no longer tied to the firm, but instead to the capital market. Second, workers' incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital seem to have decreased. In combination, these two shifts have not only been tied to higher labor mobility, but also to an increasing importance of pro-shareholder policies to the middle class relative to pro-labor policies aimed at strengthening employees' positions with a particular employer.¹² Thus, the appeal of shareholder primacy and enhanced shareholder rights increased. Ultimately, this is likely the reason why shareholder power has such widespread support today, and shareholders are slowly but steadily gaining power at the expense of boards of directors.

A number of reasons for the rise of shareholder primacy have previously been advanced. It is sometimes thought that developments in economics and finance, specifically agency theory,¹³ contributed to an understanding that shareholder primacy was more efficient than managerial capitalism and delegitimized managers' technocratic expertise.¹⁴ But the relative success of the labor-centric corporate governance systems of West Germany and Japan in the 1980s rekindled U.S. academics' interest in foreign corporate law and created doubts about the superiority of U.S. practices.¹⁵ Relatedly, it is often thought that shareholder primacy is inherently more efficient, as shown, for example, by the failure of the conglomerate

¹² *Infra* Part IV.

¹³ See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, *Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure*, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (establishing agency theory).

¹⁴ See PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, ENTREPRENEURS AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 146–47 (R. Edward Freeman et al. eds., 2008) (discussing managerial expertise being increasingly questioned due to more widespread business knowledge); RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 313–17 (3rd ed., 2010) (discussing how agency theory undermined the legitimacy of the managerial model); Gerald F. Davis, *The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation*, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1127–30 (2011) (discussing the rise of the shareholder primacy model); Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 6, at 449 (citing the “force of logic” as a reason for the dominance of the shareholder model); Roberta Romano, *After the Revolution in Corporate Law*, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 343–46 (2005) (discussing the impact of corporate finance on corporate law and scholarship).

¹⁵ E.g., Mark J. Roe, *German “Populism” and the Large Public Corporation*, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 187 (1994).

movement in the 1970s.¹⁶ In this view, shareholder-oriented firms are inherently more competitive, which is why they eventually began to dominate markets.¹⁷ It has therefore been suggested that the absence of strong shareholder primacy in the post-World War II decades was only possible because the U.S. economy was growing and not subject to intense competition.¹⁸

This Article argues that the social desirability of shareholder primacy is contingent on specific conditions: pensions must directly depend on investment success in the capital market, rather than on a specific employer's or government's ability and willingness to keep paying them. While this is, at its core, an argument of economic efficiency, this Article also explores changes to the politics of corporate governance. Though it is clear that a number of factors affected actual corporate governance reforms through political and economic channels, this Article argues that the rise of shareholder primacy was in part an unintended consequence of regulatory changes in the pension sector. This Article's argument complements other explanations that have focused on the growth of the financial industry and the availability of external debt financing, particularly for takeovers.¹⁹

Most shareholder primacists would typically argue that the U.S. corporate governance system does not perfectly implement

¹⁶ See KHURANA, *supra* note 14, at 297–305 (discussing economic distress in the 1970s as a reason for the shift in business culture); Brian R. Cheffins, *Did Corporate Governance "Fail" During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500*, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 6–7 (2009) (discussing the inefficiency of conglomerates and mergers that destroyed shareholder value).

¹⁷ Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 6, at 449–52 (arguing for the superiority of the shareholder model).

¹⁸ E.g., William T. Allen, *Engaging Corporate Boards: The Limits of Liability Rules in Modern Corporate Governance*, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 82, 90–91 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011); GOMEZ & KORINE, *supra* note 14, at 137 (explaining that the prosperity of the post-war decades led to stability in corporate governance arrangements); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, *Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order*, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1524–33 (1997) (suggesting that liberalized trade regimes and capital markets have shifted income away from labor); Mark J. Roe, *The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization*, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2066–68 (2001) (suggesting that shareholder primacy is more efficient in competitive markets).

¹⁹ E.g., GERALD F. DAVIS, *MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA* 81–85 (2009) (discussing the role of takeovers in ending managerialism); John W. Gioffi, *Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle's Ambiguous Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power*, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1106–08 (2011) (discussing takeovers and the rising power of the financial industry in the 1980s); Sanford M. Jacoby, *Labor and Finance in the United States*, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM, *supra* note 18, at 277, 279–89.

shareholder primacy,²⁰ and often it is not clear if specific reforms actually help shareholders.²¹ While the politics of corporate governance are complicated, like political scientists such as Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, this Article suggests that these reforms led to a stronger preference of pro-shareholder policies among workers.²² Since pro-investor corporate law has become more important for the middle class, pro-shareholder policies have typically had the support of the center-left and of unions during the past two decades, which would previously have been hard to conceive. Admittedly, the strongest advocates of shareholder activism have in fact often been institutions managing DB plans, such as unions and state public pension systems, who became active equity investors because of the elimination of regulatory restrictions on their portfolios. These regulatory changes were clearly another factor that contributed to the spread of the idea of shareholder primacy. Both developments are two elements of a common trend toward equity investment. The increased dependence of retirees on equity investment strengthened the role of institutional investors across the board and made pro-shareholder policies more attractive. Drawing from the labor economics literature, this Article points out how firms

²⁰ E.g. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, *The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power*, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing, from a shareholder primacy perspective, that shareholder power should be increased).

²¹ E.g. Iman Anabtawi, *Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power*, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 590 (2006) (arguing that increased shareholder power would be detrimental to shareholder interests). The SEC's long-discussed proxy access rule provides a pertinent example. The SEC has repeatedly issued proposals to amend its rules in order to expand "shareholder access," which would have permitted larger shareholders to place nominees for a limited number of seats on the company's proxy statement. The initial proposal was made in 2003. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,785 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003). Section 971 of the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly gave the SEC authority to pass such a rule, which it did in the form of Rule 14a-11. This highly controversial rule was struck down by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. *Bus. Roundtable v. S.E.C.*, 647 F.3d 1144 (DC Cir. 2011). The SEC subsequently decided not to appeal. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro on Proxy Access Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), available at <http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm>. Regarding the discussion, see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, *The Insignificance of Proxy Access*, 97 VA. L. REV. 137 (2011); Jill E. Fisch, *The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access*, 61 EMORY L.J. 435 (2012) (both doubting the purported beneficial effects of the rule).

²² PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL 220–21 (2005) (suggesting a shift in the political preferences of workers toward minority shareholder protection); see also ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 66–70 (2009) (discussing retirement savings of workers as reason for the political importance of shareholders); Davis, *supra* note 14, at 1129.

used the possibility created by these changes to shift how they interact with workers, and how this shift affected the creation of human capital. If firms have indeed become more competitive, it is likely due in part to these changes.

This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief overview of the move from “managerial” to “shareholder” capitalism that has so fundamentally transformed the practice and theory of corporate law, and discusses reasons that have been advanced in the literature. Part III describes the move from DB to DC plans in retirement savings and explores the reasons for the shift, which are grounded primarily in regulatory changes, but are also connected to structural changes in the U.S. economy. Part IV connects the two issues and suggests that there is an institutional complementarity between the pension and corporate governance systems: when many people effectively depend on capital markets for retirement savings, shareholder primacy in corporate law is relatively more desirable from the perspective of workers. Concurrently, with increased labor mobility and possibly less firm-specific human capital, the significance of policies protecting workers’ positions with a particular employer has decreased. While Part IV takes a public policy perspective, Part V illustrates the effects for the political economy of corporate governance. Shareholder primacy has become a political cause for “the man on the street,” and therefore the center-left. Unions adapted their strategies to this new situation and joined the ranks of shareholder activists pushing for stronger shareholder rights and shareholder wealth maximization. Part VI suggests that an international comparison with other developed economies confirms the thesis: continental Europe and Japan, whose corporate governance systems are known to be more mindful of the interests of employees and less shareholder-oriented than that of the United States, also have very different pension systems, in which workers do not depend on the capital markets for retirement. Part VII concludes.

II. FROM MANAGERIAL TO SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM

The American corporate landscape today is very different from what it was thirty years ago. At least from the 1930s to the 1970s, corporate governance was characterized by what is often called “managerial capitalism.” Large corporations were dominated by extensive managerial hierarchies that were, to some extent, self-replicating. Often corporate boards effectively perpetuated themselves without giving strong weight to the interests of

shareholders.²³ Corporations were truly “Berle-Means” firms, in the vein of the seminal study by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, which identified the “separation of ownership and control” as the defining characteristic of large American firms in their 1933 book.²⁴ Some economists such as John Kenneth Galbraith²⁵ and management guru Peter Drucker²⁶ lent academic support to the proposition that this was an advancement compared to earlier stages of capitalism dominated by the owners of corporations.²⁷ In the words of modern critics Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, it was thought that “professional corporate managers could serve as disinterested technocratic fiduciaries who would guide business corporations to perform in ways that would serve the general public interest.”²⁸ As Berle explained in a widely noted exchange with law-and-economics pioneer Henry Manne in 1962, the capital market was hardly an important constraint on managers in those days, given that contests for corporate control were unusual and firms rarely needed external equity finance.²⁹ While the discussion about the purpose of the corporation was still dominated by concerns about the role of powerful managers,³⁰ the idea of the “public interest” role of the corporation and corporate law remained stronger than today. Corporate law trailed this ascendance of managerialism, as

²³ See DAVIS, *supra* note 19, at 72–77 (describing managerial dominance during this period); DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 108–11 (2005). For contemporary accounts of the “managerial revolution,” see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (4th ed. 1985).

²⁴ ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 69–118 (1933).

²⁵ GALBRAITH, *supra* note 23. For a discussion of the goals of the “Galbraithian” corporation, see Charles R.T. O’Kelley, *The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: Corporate Governance Reform in Context*, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (working paper at 32–39), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136044>.

²⁶ See PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ORDER 340–43 (1950).

²⁷ See Alan Dignam & Michael Galanis, *Corporate Governance and the Importance of Macroeconomic Context*, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL. STUD. 201, 222 (2008) (explaining that the left saw managerialism as positive because it reduced the power of elite families, while the right welcomed it because society became more meritocratic).

²⁸ Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 6, at 444; see also O’Kelley, *supra* note 25, at 35 (describing how corporate “technostructures” were rarely motivated solely by profit-making).

²⁹ Adolf A. Berle, *Modern Functions of the Corporate System*, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 438–47 (1962); see also GORDON DONALDSON, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 57–70 (1994) (explaining that up to the 1970s, large firms financed expansion projects through retained earnings rather than stock issues).

³⁰ Martin Gelter, *Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light*, 7 NYU J. L. & BUS. 641, 671 (2011).

developments in both statutory and case law made it harder for shareholders to challenge management decisions.³¹ Even just before 1980, “corporate governance structures . . . gave the managers of the large public corporations little reason to focus on shareholder concerns.”³²

Around 1980, corporations began to move toward a shareholder-centric model, which was brought about by two developments in the institutional structure of corporate governance.³³ Hostile takeovers began to shake up corporate America.³⁴ Innovations in banking, such as the development of junk bonds and the proliferation of leveraged buyouts, played an important role.³⁵ As predicted by Henry Manne in 1965, the threat of being ousted by a hostile bidder created incentives for management to run the company efficiently³⁶ instead of, say, engaging in empire building and creating unwieldy conglomerates that did not contribute to shareholder wealth creation. On the academic level, agency theory, jump-started by Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s famous 1976 article,³⁷ found its way into the academy and into the hearts and minds of economists as well as business and legal scholars. Hence, a changing paradigm in business education began to align the professed managerial objective with shareholder wealth maximization.³⁸ When the takeover market declined during the early 1990s, incentive-based executive compensation began to expand dramatically and to focus more on

³¹ Harwell Wells, “*Corporation Law is Dead*”: *Heroic Managerialism, the Cold War, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century*, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2013) (working paper at 35–41), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2143397>.

³² Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, *Corporate Governance and Merger Activity: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s*, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2001).

³³ See Davis, *supra* note 14, at 1127–29; John C. Coffee, Jr., *The Folklore of Investor Capitalism*, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1970, 1973 (1997) (“No one doubts that managements are much more constrained today by investor preference . . .”).

³⁴ See Holmstrom & Kaplan, *supra* note 32, at 124–27 (providing data about the prevalence of takeovers).

³⁵ See DAVIS, *supra* note 19, at 81–87; SKEEL, *supra* note 23, at 111–16; John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., *Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation*, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1755 (2007); Kahan & Rock, *supra* note 7, at 873–74 (2002).

³⁶ Henry G. Manne, *Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control*, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112–14 (1965).

³⁷ Jensen & Meckling, *supra* note 13; see also JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET 160–71 (2009); KHURANA, *supra* note 14, at 317–26.

³⁸ See KHURANA, *supra* note 14, at 305–23; see also DAVIS, *supra* note 19, at 87–93 (arguing that a shareholder-based corporate governance system replaced a managerial system); KHURANA, *supra* note 14, at 297–305 (same); Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 6, at 440–41 (same).

aligning incentives with share price. Thus, the professed alignment of managers' interests with shareholder interests remained in place.³⁹

Shareholder primacy is of course not free of problems, which has led to its criticism and, sometimes, outright rejection. First, the scandals of the early 2000s—such as Enron and WorldCom—have led to the observation that the contemporary corporate governance system is inherently unstable due to the large disparity in power between management and diffuse investors.⁴⁰ The events leading up to the current “great recession” have further exacerbated concerns that at least some aspects of shareholder orientation may have detrimental consequences, particularly in the financial industry.⁴¹ More fundamentally, it has often been argued that hostile takeovers and executive compensation, as currently implemented in most firms, do not actually serve the shareholder interest or that they guide the incentives of directors too strongly toward short-term share-value maximization. Some have argued that short-term pressures from capital markets in general have been a leading cause of the financial crisis.⁴²

Second, the shift toward shareholder capitalism has also had an impact on how firms interact with their employees. Labor power was at its peak from the 1950s through the 1970s, maybe, in part, because labor was a scarce resource.⁴³ Looking back in 1994, business scholar Gordon Donaldson argued that economic and social pressures forced management to serve the economic interests of all major constituencies of the firm, including employees, managers, and others.⁴⁴ While the pre-1980 structure favored the “career jobholder”

³⁹ Kahan & Rock, *supra* note 7, at 884 (suggesting that executive compensation creates an incentive to bargain for a high bid price); *see also* Holmstrom & Kaplan, *supra* note 32, at 123 (pointing out that pay-for-performance plans before the 1980s were typically tied to accounting measures and not share price). *But see* Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, *Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem*, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, *Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues*, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005) (arguing that executive compensation serves rent-seeking by management).

⁴⁰ Mark J. Roe, *The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance*, 1 CORP. GOV. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005).

⁴¹ *E.g.*, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, *Regulating Bankers' Pay*, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 269–74 (2010) (suggesting that executive pay packages resulted in excessive risk-taking in the financial industry).

⁴² *See, e.g.*, Lynne L. Dallas, *Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance*, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012); Kent Greenfield, *The Puzzle of Short-Termism*, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 629–30 (2011).

⁴³ *See, e.g.*, DIGNAM & GALANIS, *supra* note 22, at 200–01, 222–23 (describing labor bargaining power at its peak); DONALDSON, *supra* note 29, at 161.

⁴⁴ DONALDSON, *supra* note 29, at 19.

interest in sustained corporate growth, the pendulum subsequently began to swing toward the financial interest of shareholders.⁴⁵ Modern economic theory provides us with an account of why, at least under certain circumstances, a “balancing board” of the pre-1980 type that is not only beholden to the shareholder interest may, at least under certain circumstances, be economically efficient. Not only shareholders, but also other corporate constituencies may be the corporation’s residual claimants and should therefore be taken into account in the debate about the overarching goals of corporate governance. Employees, most of all, are often thought to be relevant as a matter of policy because of the specific human capital they sometimes contribute.⁴⁶ In Blair and Stout’s team production model of corporate law, the board of directors is seen as a mediating hierarchy, standing between shareholders and other corporate constituencies. Without a strong slant in favor of any particular group, directors are positioned to assign the rents produced by the corporation to all groups, thus permitting specific investment and allowing long-term business development.⁴⁷ Opportunistic “hold up” of other team members by shareholders with a short-term orientation is therefore made more difficult.⁴⁸ In this model, the attenuation of shareholder control over directors is seen as an advantage, since it facilitates specific investment by non-shareholder groups and the long-term development of the corporation.⁴⁹ As noted by Jeffrey

⁴⁵ *Id.* at 12, 17, 165–68.

⁴⁶ See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, *THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES* 55–59 (2006) (arguing that workers are residual claimants like shareholders because of pension benefits and their inability to diversify).

⁴⁷ Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, *A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law*, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 288–89 (1999); see also Dignam & Galanis, *supra* note 27, at 221 (“[d]ispersed ownership emerged . . . with a management unconstrained by shareholders and with a greater discretion to share resources with stakeholders.”); Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, *Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats*, 14 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 96, 99–101 (2005), available at http://bsfrey.ch./articles/412_05.pdf; Martin Gelter, *The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance*, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 136–43 (2009); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, *Power in a Theory of the Firm*, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387, 404–06, 423–24 (1998).

⁴⁸ Lynn A. Stout, *The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control*, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 795–97 (2007). Institutional investors specifically are often criticized as having short-term objectives. See, e.g., Jacoby, *supra* note 19, at 285.

⁴⁹ See Blair & Stout, *supra* note 47; see also Kent Greenfield, *The Impact of “Going Private” on Corporate Stakeholders*, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 75, 86 (2008) (“If management is more autonomous, it is possible for managers to use their autonomy to allocate more of the corporate surplus to employees and other stakeholders.”); see also LYNN STOUT, *THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH* 52–54, 86, 91 (2012) (suggesting a

Gordon, the Blair and Stout story seems to provide a good fit for the role played by the “managerial” board of the 1950s.⁵⁰ Firms were effectively run by top management, particularly CEOs, who had little reason to emphasize the interests of shareholders over those of other corporate “constituencies.”

Corporate law still reflects the managerialist world;⁵¹ a prominent example is the board’s wide discretion to defend against hostile takeovers,⁵² which has often been criticized by shareholder primacists.⁵³ To this day, direct shareholder influence on managerial decision-making is lower in the United States than in European corporate governance systems.⁵⁴ While it would be obviously wrong to equate shareholder primacy with shareholder power, there are reasons to believe that pro-shareholder mechanisms such as “modern” executive compensation are often cosmetic and do not actually benefit shareholders all that much. But clearly, a lot has changed since 1980. As Gordon points out, the role of the board of directors has shifted from a managerial board to the contemporary monitoring board, whose professed objective is to monitor management on behalf of shareholders.⁵⁵ Moreover, the temporary prevalence of hostile takeovers and the rise of equity-based executive

new line of criticism analogous to the “Tragedy of the Commons,” according to which shareholder primacy policies may also be harmful because corporations focusing on shareholder wealth will be more successful in the short run, while hurting the economy overall by reducing the value of other investments and depleting long-run development potential).

⁵⁰ See Jeffrey N. Gordon, *The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices*, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1513 (2007).

⁵¹ E.g., Christopher M. Bruner, *Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” Corporation*, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 593–603 (2010) (describing how Delaware law remains at least partly committed to managerial governance); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, *Legitimizing Power: The Changing Status of the Board of Directors*, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM, *supra* note 18, at 60, 76–77.

⁵² *Moran v. Household Int’l Inc.*, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (finding that the board has the power to issue a poison pill, commonly known as the poison pill, which is subject to the business judgment rule); *Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.*, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that takeover defense must be “reasonable . . . to the threat posed”); *Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp.*, 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) (defense must be coercive or preclusive to fail the Unocal test); see, e.g., William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, *The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide*, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1086 (2002) (“*Moran* . . . and *Unocal* . . . upheld the primacy of directorial power . . .”).

⁵³ E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, *Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It)*, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 512 (2001).

⁵⁴ Sofie Cools, *The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers*, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 736–50 (2005); Gelter, *supra* note 47, at 148–51, 156–61.

⁵⁵ Gordon, *supra* note 50, at 1514 n.187.

compensation must have shifted the balance toward shareholders at least to some extent, since these instruments set incentives closer to shareholder interests than to those of employees. But even if all of these changes were without effect, shareholder primacy has won as an idea explaining how large corporations ought to be governed.⁵⁶ All reform proposals have to be justified in the language of shareholder primacy.

III. FROM DEFINED BENEFIT TO DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS

A second, maybe even more consequential, shift occurred during the same period beginning in the 1970s, specifically in the private pension system. Part A describes the change and provides data for the transformation of the pension system, and Part B explores its reasons.

A. *The Empirical Facts*

In the period approximately between 1920 and the 1970s, large employers provided a comprehensive set of benefits, such as retirement and health insurance, to workers.⁵⁷ Specifically, coverage with employer-sponsored pension plans increased during the post-war decades, primarily because of the growth of big business, the tax treatment of pensions, and collective bargaining.⁵⁸

Large employers typically introduced pension plans because unions and employees favored them. Unions pushed for employer-provided pension plans because Social Security benefits were considered grossly inadequate.⁵⁹ Social Security, having been created during the New Deal, eroded quickly in the 1940s due to inflation.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, *Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm*, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 717 (1996) (“[T]he shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . has been fully internalized by American managers.”).

⁵⁷ David Charny, *The Employee Welfare State in Transition*, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1601 (1996).

⁵⁸ Steven Sass, *The Development of Employer Retirement Income Plans: From the Nineteenth Century to 1980*, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME 76, 83–85 (Gordon L. Clark & Alicia H. Munnell eds., 2007) [hereinafter: OXFORD HANDBOOK] (noting a “dramatic” expansion of coverage from 15% in 1940 to approaching 50% in 1980); Munnell, *infra* note 60, at 363.

⁵⁹ ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDÉN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 6 (2004).

⁶⁰ STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 120 (1997); see Alicia H. Munnell, *Employer-Sponsored Plans: The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution*, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, *supra* note 58, at 359 (“[V]oluntary employer-sponsored pensions play a major role in supplementing relatively modest pay-as-you-go public pensions . . .”).

The predominant form of private pension was the DB plan, under which an employee receives a pension of a specified amount upon retirement. Employers hoped that DBs would help to attract talented workers. Unions were equally interested, because they typically negotiated the plans and were often able to control their administration when they took the form of a “Taft-Hartley” arrangement.⁶¹ Generous pension plans were thought to secure union support of labor peace.⁶²

An advantage of a DB plan for employees is that it is funded by the employer,⁶³ who bears the investment risk: when the plan becomes underfunded, the employer has to fill the gap to allow it to fulfill specified pension obligations. Employees bear risk when the plan is underfunded, uninsured, and the employer is financially unable to support it.⁶⁴

Traditional DB plans were designed to create an incentive for employees to stay in the same firm until retirement⁶⁵: benefits were frequently defined in terms of a percentage of the income in the highest-paid years of employment, multiplied by a factor increasing with years of service.⁶⁶ The strong weight on the last years in the career, typically the highest earning ones, resulted in an incentive to stay in the same company.⁶⁷ An employee changing his job mid-

⁶¹ See Teresa Ghilarducci, *Organized Labor and Pensions*, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, *supra* note 58, at 380, 391–93; SASS, *supra* note 60, at 124–42 (discussing the role of organized labor in the establishment of company pension plans); JAMES A. WOOTEN, *THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY* 34–39 (2004). Regarding Taft-Hartley plans, see *infra* Part IV.C.

⁶² SASS, *supra* note 58, at 86.

⁶³ E.g., Barry L. Friedman, *Individual Accounts and the Continuing Debate over Social Security Reform in the United States*, in RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE 205, 220 (Martin Rein & Winfried Schmähl eds., 2004); Leora Friedberg & Michael T. Owyang, *Not Your Father's Pension Plan: The Rise of 401(k) and Other Defined Contribution Plans*, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 23.

⁶⁴ E.g., Friedman, *supra* note 63, at 220 (noting the risk of employer bankruptcy in a DB plan); see also SASS, *supra* note 58, at 87 (“If the employer went bust, so would the benefits of current and future pensioners.”).

⁶⁵ See generally RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, *PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE* 10–29 (1997) (discussing how DB plans were used to create an implicit contract between employers and employees that resulted in low turnover).

⁶⁶ In other cases, benefits were computed on the basis of a fixed dollar amount for each year of service. E.g., EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, *THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA* 1 (2007); Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 365 (giving the example of 1.5% of final three-year average pay for each year of service, which adds up to 30 % of income for an employee with a twenty-year employment history with the firm); Edward A. Zelinsky, *The Cash Balance Controversy*, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 687 (2000).

⁶⁷ MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 2; Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 365; SASS, *supra* note 58, at 87 (explaining that typically pension claims only vested after ten

career risked losing substantial benefits. For example, when leaving the firm at age forty-five with a claim to a monthly pension of one-hundred dollars upon retirement, the employee would not lose that claim, but it would be put on hold until retirement twenty or thirty years later, without any adjustment to the time value of money.⁶⁸

All of this changed in the late 1970s, when employers gradually began to phase out DB plans and to replace them with DC plans such as the now ubiquitous 401(k) plans.⁶⁹ These differ from DB plans in that the employer does not promise a pension payment based on a specific formula, but promises solely to make contributions to the worker's retirement account. Workers typically have some options regarding how to direct their investment, and consequently bear the investment risk.⁷⁰ The employer has no subsequent funding obligation if the plan has no investment success.

While DC plans dominated among pension plans with fewer than 100 participants even in the 1970s, subsequently DC plans completely eclipsed DB plans among larger plans.⁷¹ There were 20,035 DB plans and 8,587 DC plans with more than 100 participants in 1975, but only 11,368 DB plans and 70,125 DC plans with more than 100 participants in 2006. Figure 1 illustrates how DC plans eclipsed DB plans among large employers in the mid-1980s⁷²:

years with the same employer).


⁶⁸ ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 39–40. The administrative hassle resulting from switching may have further increased the incentive to stay with a particular firm, given that claims were not portable and employees needed to deal with all prior employers when retiring.

⁶⁹ *E.g.*, WOOTEN, *supra* note 61, at 278 (“As late as 1979, more than 80% of individuals who participated in a private retirement plan were in a defined-benefit plan.”); *see also* Barry L. Friedman, *Individual Accounts and the Continuing Debate Over Social Security Reform in the United States*, in *RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PENSION REFORM* 205, 220 (Martin Rein & Wilfried Schmähl eds., 2004).


⁷⁰ *E.g.*, Edward A. Zelinsky, *The Defined Contribution Paradigm*, 114 *YALE L. J.* 451, 458–61 (2004).

⁷¹ *See generally* MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 16.

⁷² US DEPT. OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS (2009), *available at* <http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1975-2006historicaltables.pdf>. The surge in 2005 is the result of changes in reporting requirements and the Department of Labor's counting method. *See id.* at 31.




The total number of pension plan participants is perhaps even more illustrative. As shown in Figure 2, the number of active (contributing) pension plan participants has strongly increased⁷³:



⁷³ *Id.* at 5. The data also include workers participating both in a DB and a DC plan.

More than 27 million American workers actively participated in DB plans in 1975. Their number stagnated to barely less than 20 million by 2006. By contrast, the number of active DC plan participants rose from a meager 11 million to almost 66 million.⁷⁴ In relative terms, the roles of DB and DC plans reversed: While in 1981, 60% of pension beneficiaries relied solely on DB plans, in 2001 about 60% only had a DC plan.⁷⁵

The increase in pension plan assets is no less impressive, as shown by Figure 3.⁷⁶ Interestingly, the value of assets owned by DB plans remained larger than those of DC plans up to the mid-1990s⁷⁷:



The development of pension assets is maybe the most interesting factor because it shows the significance of retirement savings as a branch of the financial industry that has grown in importance. Consider Figure 4, which shows the same data as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States⁷⁸:


⁷⁴ The total number of members of DB plans increased from about 33 to 42 million, whereas that of DC plans increased from 11.5 to almost 80 million. The comparison with the number of active members indicates that DB plans are being phased out, with an increasing proportion of members being retirees.

⁷⁵ Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 365–66.

⁷⁶ US DEPT. OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., *supra* note 72.

⁷⁷ A possible reason could be that the last generation of workers relying primarily on DB began to retire at that time.

⁷⁸ Christopher Chantrill, *US Gross Domestic Product GDP History*,



As a percentage of GDP, pension assets increased from less than 16% in 1975 to 42.42% in 2006, with a peak at more than 47% in 1999. The increase in the late 1990s and the subsequent sharp downturn are obviously explained by the dot.com bubble and the stock market decline when it burst.

Concurrently, the financial dependence of senior citizens on private pension plans compared to other sources of income increased from the 1970s to the 1990s; while the share of income from Social Security payments stayed more or less the same at about 30%, the share of capital increased from about 30% to 40% from the 1970s to the 1990s.⁷⁹ Thus, only comparing private pensions and Social Security, the relative importance of the latter decreased.⁸⁰ Needless to say, for a vast number of Americans in the lower income brackets, it remains the main source of income after retirement.⁸¹ But for the

U.S.GOVERNMENTSPENDING.COM, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_gdp_history (last visited Apr. 9, 2013).

⁷⁹ Sass, *supra* note 58, at 90; see also Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 364 (noting that Social Security typically provides workers with about 30% of pre-retirement income).

⁸⁰ Jacob S. Hacker, *Policy Drift: The Hidden Politics of US Welfare State Retrenchment*, in *BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES* 40, 69 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005) (showing a decrease of the significance of Social Security as a share of combined pension benefits from about 50% in 1970 to less than 40% in 2001).

⁸¹ *Id.* at 64 (“The likelihood that a worker’s employer will offer a pension plan decreases dramatically with income . . .”); see ATSUHIRO YAMADA, *OECD LABOUR MKT. & SOC. POLICY OCCASIONAL PAPERS, THE EVOLVING RETIREMENT INCOME PACKAGE* 48 (Paper No. 63, 2002), available at <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5lgsjhvj7qvd.pdf?expires=1365543162&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=F11D6F00C58B231F27F99C7CFEC2B9BE>; Sass, *supra* note 58, at 91 (noting that the bulk of capital earnings accrue to high and middle-income

middle and upper brackets, private pensions clearly increased in significance. For the top 40% income earners among retirees, private pensions are a very important source of income.⁸²

The 401(k) plan and related pension savings vehicles such as the independent retirement account (IRA), allow their beneficiaries to choose and to allocate their pension wealth according to their personal risk preferences. This provides future retirees with the impression of being in control over their financial well-being⁸³ and may have contributed to the popularity of such plans.⁸⁴ As shown in Tables 1 and 2, a large proportion of assets both in DB and DC plans are invested in equity⁸⁵:

DB	1987	1992	1997	2002	2007	2008	2009
Equity	36.5%	46.5%	51.7%	53.9%	54.4%	41.0%	37.2%
Bonds	31.6%	28.8%	24.5%	23.2%	22.2%	35.0%	36.9%
Cash items	10.1%	7.7%	6.6%	3.1%	2.2%	3.6%	3.2%
Other assets	21.8%	17.0%	17.2%	19.8%	21.3%	20.5%	22.7%

DC	1987	1992	1997	2002	2007	2008	2009
Equity	35.4%	38.4%	36.7%	29.2%	29.6%	27.2%	27.5%
Bonds	15.8%	10.7%	5.9%	10.4%	5.9%	9.5%	8.2%
Cash items	10.5%	10.8%	6.7%	7.1%	4.3%	6.3%	5.3%
Other assets	38.3%	40.2%	50.7%	53.3%	60.2%	56.4%	59.0%

In both cases, equity constitutes a large portion of the investment, whose proportion relative to the total, as can be seen by the decrease after 2007, is immediately affected by trends in the stock market. Conspicuously, the share (and absolute amount) of bonds is very

earners, while low-income earners tend to rely on social security to a higher degree).

⁸² See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH, EDUC., & HUMAN SERVS. DIV., RETIREMENT INCOME: IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSION REFORM, S. REP. NO. 97-81, at 25–26 (1997), available at <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97081.pdf> (providing data for 1994).

⁸³ See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 71.

⁸⁴ ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 29–30 (“[T]he defined contribution paradigm reflects . . . a conception which carries tremendous appeal in a culture which . . . places a high value on private property, individual autonomy, and self-sufficiency.”).

⁸⁵ EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., PENSION INVESTMENT REPORT 14 (2010).

small in DC plans, whereas the share of the “other assets” category, which includes mutual funds, is very large. Mutual funds, in turn, invest a large proportion of their assets in equity instruments.⁸⁶ Potential retirees are therefore to a greater extent dependent on the development of the stock market, and to a lesser extent, of the bond market. The share of equity in DB plans is equally large or even larger if mutual funds are not taken into account. But from an employee’s perspective, equity assets of a DB plan are very different. Given that the employer bears the investment risk, the stock market does not matter as long as the employer remains solvent.

Equity is popular because it is the only type of investment to yield profits that are high enough “to make retirement income programs work.”⁸⁷ Employee stock option plans (ESOPs) are a special case; firms may have good reasons to encourage employees to invest their retirement assets with them, for instance to create greater identification with the firm and to maximize shareholder wealth,⁸⁸ or to overcome hurdles to bargaining with employees in times of economic transition.⁸⁹ Just before the market downturn in 2001, in a number of large firms—including Proctor & Gamble, Coca-Cola, and General Electric—more than 75% of 401(k) plan assets consisted of company stock.⁹⁰ As a consequence of scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, in which many employees lost most of their pensions, investment in company stock has decreased from 19% of all 401(k) assets in 1999 to 9% in 2009.⁹¹

⁸⁶ *E.g.*, MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 75.

⁸⁷ SASS, *supra* note 60, at 249.

⁸⁸ *But see* Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, & Cass R. Sunstein, *The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans*, 50 J. L. & ECON. 45 (2007) (providing evidence that employees systematically underestimate the risk of holding company stock, while employers overestimate the benefits of ESOPs); *see also* Joshua D. Rauh, *Own company stock in defined contribution pension plans: A takeover defense?*, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 379 (2006) (suggesting that company stock ownership is, among other reasons, encouraged by firms because it lowers the chance of success for hostile takeovers).

⁸⁹ Jeffrey N. Gordon, *Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The Case of United Airlines*, in *COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH*, 387, 393–95, 404–06 (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (suggesting that ESOPs sometimes allow firms to trade stock ownership against high wages in order to make the employee share variable when high profits have become less certain).

⁹⁰ David Millon, *Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership*, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 113, 118 (2002); MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 101.

⁹¹ EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., *ISSUE BRIEF NO. 350*, 23 (2010); MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 113 (providing data stock losses for employees in 12 companies in 2001–2002).

B. Reasons for the Shift

No single explanation has emerged for the shift from DB to DC plans, but a number of factors that seem to have played a role have been identified. The most important one is regulatory requirements intended to protect retirees, which made DB plans unattractive and costly for employers. Several regulatory choices seem to be jointly responsible.

1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act

Congress adopted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974. ERISA immediately resulted in the termination of many private benefit plans that became too costly for employers to maintain.⁹² ERISA ultimately led the United States down the path toward a “defined contribution society.”⁹³

ERISA imposed more severe regulatory burdens on DB plans than on DC plans. A number of bankruptcies that left employees without pensions had raised public awareness that employees required better protection against underfunding.⁹⁴ The most frequently cited example is the 1964 closing of the Studebaker automobile plant in South Bend, Indiana, which left 8,500 employees with no, or significantly reduced, retirement benefits.⁹⁵ Critics argued that the computation of funding for promised future retirement benefits was actuarially complex. Management was therefore in the position to use the resulting uncertainty about pension benefits to attract workers by sending the signal that the firm was offering high pensions, while in reality it was uncertain whether their successors several decades down the road would honor this promise.⁹⁶

Congress stepped in with a complicated statute to make sure employees actually got what they were promised. First, DB plans were subjected to minimum funding rules, given that DB plans had previously often been woefully underfunded.⁹⁷ Second, ERISA

⁹² BRUNO STEIN, *SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSIONS IN TRANSITION* 84–85 (1980) (discussing and giving data about plan terminations after ERISA).

⁹³ ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 38; *see also* Sylvester J. Schieber, Richard Dunn, & David L. Wray, *The Future of the Defined Contribution Revolution*, in *LIVING WITH DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS* 273 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998).

⁹⁴ SASS, *supra* note 60, at 202–13 (discussing the legislative process that led to the enactment of ERISA).

⁹⁵ *See* SASS, *supra* note 60, at 183–86; MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 8; WOOTEN, *supra* note 61, at 51–79.

⁹⁶ Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 367; ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 43.

⁹⁷ *See, e.g.*, E. PHILIP DAVIS, *PENSION FUNDS* 99 (1995); SASS, *supra* note 60, at 186 (reporting that union-bargained DB plans only had an average funding ratio of

introduced mandatory vesting standards, under which employees have non-forfeitable rights to a specified percentage of benefits depending on the number of years of service.⁹⁸ Third, firms not only had to comply with administrative and accounting requirements, but also contribute to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to insure pension benefits.⁹⁹ Fourth, ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on trustees managing the plan assets,¹⁰⁰ which exposes employers to a liability risk. With this heavy burden on DB plans, DC plans became relatively more attractive.¹⁰¹

Employers also began to see the potential of selling their stock to employees in the form of ESOPs in order to align the interests of employees and shareholders.¹⁰² These are easier to set up in the form of a DC plan, since ERISA established a 10% limit on the acquisition of the employer's own stock that applies only to DB plans.¹⁰³

2. § 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code

The second important legislative development was § 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code, which was adopted by Congress in 1978. Like ERISA, it was not a conscious regulatory choice intended to make DC plans more attractive, but was rather intended to solve the controversy under what circumstances deferred salaries that are paid into a pension plan should be taxed in the year when work is performed and the plan is funded, or when the employee receives the actual payment.¹⁰⁴

60%). Obviously, DC plans are not subject to the funding requirement, given that employers do not promise a particular benefit that could be funded. 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(8) (2006) (exempting "individual account plans,"—DC plans—from the funding requirement); *see also* PETER J. WIEDENBECK, *ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW* 13 (2010) (describing additional requirements for DB plans and legislative motives for the differentiation).

⁹⁸ 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006), *see, e.g.*, STEIN, *supra* note 92, at 78–79.

⁹⁹ Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (1974); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1311 (2006); *see* Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 367; ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 44. The PBGC guarantees pension payments only up to a specific amount that also depends on the age at retirement (with lower guarantee for early retirees). *See Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables*, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., <http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum-guarantee.html> (last visited Apr. 11, 2013).

¹⁰⁰ 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (1974); 28 U.S.C. § 1104.

¹⁰¹ *See* MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 9; ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 46.

¹⁰² ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 47; *see also* Gordon, *supra* note 89, at 393–95, 404–06 (suggesting that employee ownership allows firms to make part of employee compensation variable in times of economic transition).

¹⁰³ 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2); § 1107(b)(1).

¹⁰⁴ While the IRS argued for "constructive receipt" of elective deferred pay arrangements, and hence taxation in the year when the plan is funded, the contrary

Two aspects further made 401(k) plans more attractive to employers. First, § 401(k) also allowed matching contributions by the employer to be deductible before taxes.¹⁰⁵ Given this tax advantage, companies made matching contributions contingent on employees investing the funds in the employer's stock.¹⁰⁶ Second, these plans typically allow employees to control the funds in their own accounts and to direct them to investment vehicles in line with their personal preferences.¹⁰⁷ ERISA encouraged the creation of "participant-directed" DC plans because the employer or other persons designated as, or deemed to be, fiduciaries are not liable for investment losses that result from the beneficiaries' choices.¹⁰⁸ Consequently, participant direction has become very common. Between 1988 and 2005, the share of participant-directed plans (among DC plans) increased from 10% to 67%, with these plans now accounting for 86% instead of 15% of participants.¹⁰⁹

3. The Changing Industrial Structure of the Economy

The regulatory changes discussed so far followed, accompanied, or accelerated changes in the structure of the economy and how firms interacted with employees. Labor economists have plausibly interpreted traditional DB plans and their peculiar design as a way of managing the workforce. First, private pensions were initially

view held that benefits should be taxed when they are received, i.e. during retirement, when the employee is typically in a lower tax bracket. ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 49–50. Section 401(k) was passed as a compromise between the two positions by permitting a favorable tax treatment only when the employer implemented certain social policy goals such as non-discrimination between workers of different income levels for deferred compensation arrangement. See I.R.C. § 401(k)(3), (11) (2006). While it was not initially clear whether the new statute could apply to pension plans, the IRS clarified the issue in a 1981 regulation. MICHAEL J. CLOWES, *THE MONEY FLOOD: HOW PENSION FUNDS REVOLUTIONIZED INVESTING 188–90* (2000) (discussing the history of the regulation); MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 5.

¹⁰⁵ Richard A. Ippolito, *Toward Explaining The Growth of Defined Contribution Plans*, 34 INDUS. REL. 1, 13–14 (1995); see I.R.C. § 401(m).

¹⁰⁶ Millon, *supra* note 90, at 115; MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 101.

¹⁰⁷ ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 51.

¹⁰⁸ 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1). It suffices if participants have the choice between three investment options. See, e.g., WIEDENBECK, *supra* note 97, at 136–38; ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 51; Michael E. Murphy, *Pension Plans and the Prospects of Corporate Self-Regulation*, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 503, 549 (2007) (“[S]ection 404(c) effectively relieves the corporate sponsor of fiduciary responsibility for the plan . . .”).

¹⁰⁹ William E. Even & David A. MacPherson, *Growth of Participant Direction in Defined Contribution Plans*, 49 INDUS. REL. 190, 196 (2010); see *id.* at 194, 206 (suggesting that the possibility to escape 404(c) fiduciary liability has played a role, albeit not the only one); see also Schieber et al., *supra* note 93, at 275.

introduced to set incentives for employees to retire at the age preferred by the firm.¹¹⁰ Second, as pointed out above, DB plans helped to tie workers to their employer by inhibiting job changes.¹¹¹ Third, the underfunding of DB plans very likely prevented unions from “holding up” the employer.¹¹² Underfunding creates a strong deterrent for unions against driving a very hard bargain vis-à-vis the employer. A large outflow of assets to current workers would likely endanger the firm’s future ability to supplement the funding gap, and thus make it less likely that retirement benefits could be fully paid. On the other side of the bargaining table, unions tended to favor DB plans because of the cohesive effects they had on the workforce and because it put them into the central position of negotiating the DB formula with the employer.¹¹³ Obviously, ERISA’s funding and vesting requirements made this balance more difficult to sustain;¹¹⁴ furthermore, the inflation of the 1970s destroyed the amount of the “bond,” namely, the underfunded amount.¹¹⁵ These factors in combination undermined the rationale for DB plans.

Initially, business leaders and unions were skeptical of many regulatory elements proposed for pension reform.¹¹⁶ ERISA was largely the product of eager reformers in Congress who put aside interest group politics and responded to public opinion, which had increasingly become concerned about workers left without pensions after bankruptcies.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁰ WOOTEN, *supra* note 61, at 20–21.

¹¹¹ *Supra* Part III.A.

¹¹² Richard A. Ippolito, *The Economic Function of Underfunded Pension Plans*, 28 J.L. & ECON. 611, 615–16 (1985). In economic parlance, “hold up” makes reference to a situation where two actors are in a long-term relationship, in which at least one of them has made a specific investment on which it expects to receive a return. The other party can threaten to exit the relationship in order to expropriate the quasi-rent on the investment. In an employment relationship there may be hold up opportunities for both parties.

¹¹³ ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 33–34.

¹¹⁴ SASS, *supra* note 60, at 210 (explaining that workers would still get the pension if union demands bankrupted the employer).

¹¹⁵ Ippolito, *supra* note 112, at 629.

¹¹⁶ SASS, *supra* note 60, at 200, 202; WOOTEN, *supra* note 61, at 100–01 (explaining resistance by both business and union leaders in an advisory committee rejecting proposals made by the Kennedy administration in 1963). *But see* SASS, *supra* note 60, at 215 (explaining that by the early 1970s, the CIO had become “the only powerful interest group that supported reform”). Unions were split on the issue of vesting, which was seen as desirable by those in industry dominated by single-employer plans, but was seen as detrimental by unions controlling multi-employer plans. *See* WOOTEN, *supra* note 61, at 142–43.

¹¹⁷ SASS, *supra* note 60, at 218–19; *see also* WOOTEN, *supra* note 61, at 177–78 (describing efforts to obtain union support for ERISA).

The significance of unions generally, and industries in which the pension bargain of the type described above was struck specifically, has decreased significantly since the 1970s. Union membership in the American workforce plummeted from 35% in 1953 to 9% in 2003.¹¹⁸ Econometric studies have found that about half of the shift between 1979 and 1989 can be explained by “a reduction in the employment share in firms and industries that had relatively strong preferences for defined benefit plans.”¹¹⁹ Losses for DB plans occurred mainly among non-unionized workers.¹²⁰ Thus, DC plans also began to be used for personnel management purposes: § 401(k) allows firms to match the additional contributions of workers,¹²¹ which enables them to reward those with a high propensity to save. This may allow firms to identify better workers, the theory being that these individuals are more often able to defer gratification to the future.¹²²

Trade liberalization in manufacturing may also have eliminated rents that could be assigned to labor, and thus led to pressures to cut costs.¹²³ Decreased job tenure and stagnant wages further undercut the rationale for DB plans.¹²⁴ In part, the shift toward DC plans may thus have been a response to a development that was already on the way. At least in part, however, the legislative changes outlined in the preceding parts contributed to the change independently, since they led to DB plans becoming less attractive due unintended consequences of these laws.

4. Redistributive Pension Plan Terminations

The final explanation is the least benign one: during the 1980s, it became financially attractive for firms to terminate DB pension

¹¹⁸ Ghilarducci, *supra* note 61, at 384; *see also* SASS, *supra* note 60, at 229, 239; Michael L. Wachter, *Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World*, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 613, 634 (2007).

¹¹⁹ Ippolito, *supra* note 105, at 18; *see also* Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, *The Stampede Toward Defined Contribution Pension Plans: Fact or Fiction?*, 31 INDUS. REL. 361 (1992) (explaining that about half of the shift was caused by changes in employment in different industries); *see also* ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 33; *see also* SASS, *supra* note 60, at 229.

¹²⁰ Ippolito, *supra* note 105, at 9–10.

¹²¹ For instance, a 401(k) plan might have a base contribution of 5% made by the employee and an additional 5% made by the employer. If the employee decided to save another percent, the firm can then decide to match that contribution by paying another (tax-deductible) percent into the plan.

¹²² *See* Ippolito, *supra* note 105, at 14; IPPOLITO, *supra* note 65, at 85; *see also* Richard A. Ippolito, *Stayers as “Workers” and “Savers”*, 37J. HUMAN RES. 275 (2002).

¹²³ *See* Gordon, *supra* note 18, at 1524–33.

¹²⁴ *See id.* at 1544–46.

plans in a move called “termination for reversion.” Many DB plans had become overfunded, i.e. the trust held a larger amount of assets than was needed to cover expected pension payments.¹²⁵ Firms used the opportunity to terminate DB plans and create DC plans instead, while taking the excess value of the plan assets (over the net present value of the pension payments) into corporate profits.¹²⁶ Legally, plan terminations were made possible by a 1983 ruling by the IRS (encouraged by the Department of Labor), which clarified that plan terminations were permissible not only in narrow cases of “business necessity,” but also generally, as long as the employer bought an annuity for the existing benefits from an insurance company.¹²⁷

In the words of the labor economist Richard Ippolito, the “ruling dramatically altered the defined benefit pension contract,” since it allowed employers to terminate plans outside of financial distress in order to create profits.¹²⁸ For workers, a termination meant that future payouts no longer depended on their salaries at the end

¹²⁵ One major reason was high interest rates that depressed the discounted value of pensions. Mitchell A. Petersen, *Pension Reversions and Worker-Stockholder Wealth Transfers*, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1033, 1035 (1992); Margaret M. Blair, *The Great Pension Grab: Comments on Richard Ippolito, Bankruptcy and Workers: Risks, Compensation and Pension Contracts*, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1305, 1307 (2004). In the 1990s, a soaring stock market continued to make DB plans look overfunded in spite of lower interest rates.

¹²⁶ Richard A. Ippolito, *Tenuous Property Rights: The unraveling of defined benefit contracts in the US*, in PENSION POLICY IN AN INTEGRATING EUROPE 175, 176 (Onorato Castellino & Elsa Fornero eds., 2003);

see also Norman P. Stein, *Reversions from Pension Plans: History, Policies, and Prospects*, 44 TAX L. REV. 259, 277–79 (1989) (surveying legal methods of pension plan terminations under the tax code).

¹²⁷ See Ippolito, *supra* note 126. Until 1983, the Internal Revenue Code had prohibited payouts to employers until all employee claims were satisfied. 26 I.R.C. § 401(a)(2). Funds remaining in the plan could only be captured by the employer in cases of actuarial error. 25 C.F.R. § 1.401-2(b)(1). A termination was permissible only in narrowly defined situations of “business necessity” (i.e. financial distress). Rev. Rul. 71-152, 1971-1 C.B. 126 (1971); Richard A. Ippolito, *Bankruptcy and Workers: Risks, Compensation and Pension Contracts*, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1251, 1287 (2004); see also Stein, *supra* note 126, at 261, 293 (discussing the historical context of the ruling). The IRS’s 1983 ruling made it clear that plan terminations purely made for the purpose of capturing a reversion were permissible if the employer bought an annuity for the existing benefits from an insurance company. Rev. Rul. 83-52, 1983-1 C.B. 87 (1983). See Ippolito, *supra* note 126; WIEDENBECK, *supra* note 97, at 279; Stein, *supra* note 126, at 261–62, 282. It also allowed firms to use less conservative assumptions when computing a plan’s amount of liabilities. See Stein, *supra* note 126, at 305–06.

¹²⁸ Ippolito, *supra* note 127, at 1287; see also Charny, *supra* note 57, at 1613, 1629 (suggesting that employers reneged on implicit deals with workers by cutting benefits after LBOs); Stein, *supra* note 126, at 262 (explaining that the 1983 ruling reflected a new understanding of the tax code that protected only employee benefits accrued at the time of termination, but did not protect expectations under an implicit contract relating to future wage increases and adjustment to inflation).

of their careers, but rather at the time of the plan's termination.¹²⁹ Furthermore, the funding risk for future pension contributions was shifted from shareholders to employees (and the PBGC).¹³⁰

Terminations often happened after a leveraged buyout (LBO),¹³¹ an acquisition that burdens the target firm with debt taken out to finance the purchase. Not only do LBOs often create strong pressures to cut costs at the expense of employees, but reversions in particular were seen as permitting raiders to violate implicit contracts with workers by taking the profit instead of using it to enhance pension benefits.¹³² In many cases, reversions seem to have resulted in considerable redistribution from workers to shareholders, since employees seemingly were not compensated for the higher risk of default.¹³³ There were about 585 terminations between 1980 and 1985, and more than 1,500 in 1986 alone.¹³⁴ Between 1980 and 1989, 1,635 plans were terminated, yielding an aggregate of \$18 billion (corresponding to 45% of these plans' assets) to employers.¹³⁵ Admittedly, most DB plans were shut down in the context of factory closures, but about one-third were pure asset reversions that seem to support a redistributive theory.¹³⁶

From 1986 onwards, Congress attempted to protect plans from terminations by imposing a reversion tax.¹³⁷ The long-term effect, however, was to make DB plans even more unattractive to employers.¹³⁸ Employers reacted by reducing the target funding

¹²⁹ Richard A. Ippolito & William H. James, *LBO, Reversions, and Implicit Contracts*, 47 J. FIN. 139, 142 (1992); Stein, *supra* note 126, at 276.

¹³⁰ Blair, *supra* note 125, at 1306–07.

¹³¹ Ippolito & James, *supra* note 129; *see also* CLOWES, *supra* note 104, at 187–88 (discussing individual cases of LBO-financed plan reversions).

¹³² Gordon, *supra* note 18, at 1543.

¹³³ *See* Blair, *supra* note 125, at 1308–09 (discussing the relative costs of risk-bearing incurred by shareholders and employees).

¹³⁴ Ippolito, *supra* note 126, at 177.

¹³⁵ Stein, *supra* note 126, at 259–60.

¹³⁶ Ippolito, *supra* note 126, at 182; *see also* Petersen, *supra* note 125, at 1052 (firms where the pension bond is the largest are most likely to be affected by a reversion, which lends support to the transfer theory).

¹³⁷ Richard A. Ippolito, *Reversion Taxes, Contingent Benefits, and the Decline in Pension Funding*, 44 J.L. & ECON. 199, 200 (2001). The tax was originally 10%, but subsequently increased to 15% in 1988 and to 50% in 1990. Ippolito, *supra* note 127, at 1288; Stein, *supra* note 126, at 262–63, 320.

¹³⁸ Ippolito, *supra* note 137, at 203–04 (explaining that the reversion tax discourages excess funding of DB plans because it makes it expensive to remove excess assets). Ippolito also points out that Congress, in 1986, passed legislation that disallowed overfunding a plan by more than 150% (without losing the associated tax benefits), although the effect of the limit is small compared to the tax. *Id.* at 204, 218–19; I.R.C. § 412(c)(7); 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(7), as amended by P.L. 100-203, Dec.

ratios and ultimately by converting DB plans into cash balance plans, allowing them to avoid the tax penalty.¹³⁹

IV. EFFECTS ON EMPLOYEES' HUMAN CAPITAL AND PENSION WEALTH

The transformation of the American pension system came about not through deliberate planning, but largely as an unintended consequence of regulation that was primarily intended to protect workers.¹⁴⁰ This Part proceeds by explaining why this had important consequences for both workers and corporate governance, describes the tradeoff between the two assets employees have in an employment relationship—namely human capital and pension wealth (discussed in Part IV.A), and explains their exposure to varying risks under different pension systems (Parts IV.B and IV.C). Parts IV.D and IV.E retrace the changes in the tradeoff resulting from the shift from DB to DC plans and suggest that this fundamentally changed the impact pro-investor corporate governance policies have on workers.

A. *The Tradeoff*

Consider the situation of a middle-class employee. Very broadly speaking, most of us cover our living expenses from two sources. First, we typically rely on a constant income stream to make a living, most of which comes from employed labor. We therefore care not only about our current job, but also about our education, skills, and

22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330.

¹³⁹ Ippolito, *supra* note 127, at 1288–89. While cash balance plans are formally DB plans where the employer guarantees a specified amount, each employee is assigned a fictitious account with a monetary value corresponding to his pension claim, thus making the plan look much like a DC plan. *E.g.*, Friedman, *supra* note 63, at 221; GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE, *THE DECLINE OF THE TRADITIONAL PENSION* 55 (2010). A conversion is therefore not considered a termination, but an amendment to the plan. Ippolito, *supra* note 127, at 1289 n.41.

¹⁴⁰ Once the idea was established, investment vehicles functioning on the same principle were created and began to spread widely. Individual retirement accounts (IRAs), which are endowed with tax advantages to provide similar tax advantages for individuals not covered by pension plans, became available as an investment vehicle to anyone in 1981. Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34 (1981). Even though their tax advantages were again limited to low-income earners in 1986 (Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986)), but they continued to proliferate. ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 52–58. Other examples include health savings accounts, which allow those that have high-deductible health insurance to save for medical expenses, and Educational Savings Accounts. *See* Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act, P.L. 108-173 (2003) (superseding the older Medical Savings Accounts); I.R.C. § 529 (educational savings accounts). *See also* ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 60–70, 83–84 (discussing various types of investment vehicles). In each case, the investment risk is borne by the individual.

abilities; in other words, the potential to earn a living in the future. The expected present value from this can be referred to as our human capital in a broad sense,¹⁴¹ and we should deeply care about policies affecting our earnings potential. Second, we rely on savings to cover our expenses when we fall on hard times, such as a period of unemployment, or when we are no longer able or willing to work. Retirement savings are the most important component. We therefore care about policies that affect our pension plans, which is why it is valuable to explore both human and financial capital more deeply. The tradeoff between these two sources is of crucial importance to the shareholder primacy debate. Employees' human capital interest, resulting from rent-seeking or returns on specific human capital investment, is generally less secure when managers in a corporation are strongly focused on maximizing shareholder wealth. Because of the rise of DC plans, however, pro-shareholder policies have gained in relative importance compared to pro-employee policies that protect their position with a particular employer.

B. Human Capital and Pension Plans

Employees typically prefer to stay at their current jobs unless others offer clear advantages. There are basically two possible reasons for this. First, employees may be able to extract rents from their employers. It is often costly for employers to hire and train new employees. Incumbents may therefore have some bargaining power to obtain wages and benefits above their marginal product. Unions and legal institutions that enhance employees' power may allow employees to organize and to extract rents from employers collectively.¹⁴² In a corporation, these rents reduce profits for shareholders.

Second, employees may have a human capital investment in their current jobs in the form of skills and training. According to economic theory, human capital can be general, i.e. useful in a wide range of occupations. It can be industry-specific, meaning that the acquired skills are applicable across a range of similar or equivalent jobs in different firms. It can also be firm-specific, meaning that it is

¹⁴¹ See, generally, Burton A. Weisbrod, *The Valuation of Human Capital*, 69 J. POL. ECON. 425, 427 (1961) (defining human capital as expected future earnings).

¹⁴² Much of the corporate law literature seems to favor this interpretation. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, *A Theory of Path Dependence and Corporate Ownership and Governance*, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 150 (1999) (suggesting that German codetermination allows unions to extract rents from shareholders).

useful with a particular employer.¹⁴³ Firm-specific investment is beneficial when workers are able to do their jobs more quickly and efficiently, make fewer mistakes, and create higher-quality products, thus rendering the firm more competitive.¹⁴⁴ Firm-specific human capital obviously includes skills to perform a particular job, e.g. to use a particular machine. Few skills may be useful to only one employment relationship, but idiosyncratic combinations of skills may be.¹⁴⁵ In this case, particular subsets of skills, but not the whole package, may be transferable given that no other job requires the same combination. In other cases, the employee's specific skill may be of an organizational nature. In the context of pension contracts, Richard Ippolito gives the example of a worker who "has worked with the same people for a long time, and really knows how to create teams that work together for different types of jobs."¹⁴⁶ In other words, employees may also need to learn to work within a different corporate culture or organizational structure and how to navigate it to be as effective as possible.¹⁴⁷

The role of pension plans in the employer-employee relationship depends on who pays for the creation of human capital. If the employer pays for the employee's training, he will want to make sure that the employee stays at least until the employer has recovered his investment. Individual employees can threaten to leave in order to extract higher wages or other advantages from the employer.¹⁴⁸ If a

¹⁴³ GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 11–36 (1964); *see also* HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 26 (1996); James M. Malcomson, *Individual Employment Contracts*, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2291, 2311–37 (Orley Aschenfelter & David Card eds., 1999) (reviewing the literature on contractual protection of specific investment); David Neumark, *Productivity, Compensation, and Retirement*, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, *supra* note 58, at 721, 722; Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, *Does good corporate governance include employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards*, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 673, 679 (2006).

¹⁴⁴ *See, e.g.*, Lawrence E. Mitchell, *Toward a New Law and Economics*, GEO. WASH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 495, at 51 (2010) (suggesting that firms financed by venture capitalists thrive when there is substantial human capital in these firms), *available at* <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557730>.

¹⁴⁵ EDWARD P. LAZEAR, INSIDE THE FIRM 342 (2011) (giving the example of work in a tax software company requiring knowledge of computer programming, economics, and tax law).

¹⁴⁶ Ippolito, *supra* note 127, at 1254; *see also* Egon Franck, Stephan Nüesch, & Jan Pieper, *Specific Human Capital as a Source of Superior Team Performance*, 63 SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 376, 377–81 (2011) (discussing team-specific capital).

¹⁴⁷ John C. Coffee, Jr., *Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web*, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 74 (1986).

¹⁴⁸ *See* Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, *Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance*, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 509–16 (1999) (suggesting that Japanese firms are able invest in employee training because these

trained group of employees is hard to replace, unions are in a good position to engage in rent-seeking. DB pension plans tie employees to the employer and make it more difficult for them to “hold up” the firm; before ERISA, DB plans penalized individual employees who switched jobs.¹⁴⁹ On the collective level, pervasive underfunding of DB plans made it more difficult for unions to drive a hard bargain.¹⁵⁰ Thus, pension arrangements in effect turned industry-specific skills into firm-specific skills, and consequently reduced employees’ potential to extract rents from the firm. ERISA made this kind of arrangement impossible.¹⁵¹

If the cost of the creation of firm-specific human capital is borne by employees, the situation is different. Employees will only be willing to invest if there is a return, such as higher future wages, expanded benefits after a period of continuous employment, and a high likelihood of advancing in the corporate hierarchy.¹⁵² They may have an expectation to make a certain income within the firm, enjoy particular working conditions and benefits, and have certain career prospects if they do a good job. From the perspective of human capital theory, all of these expectations are considered (quasi-)rents on an investment made early in the employment relationship. A related, but not entirely identical issue is that employees may need to move to obtain a particular job. Employers often cover relocation expenses to attract employees, since being in a particular location may also turn industry-specific skills into firm-specific ones.¹⁵³ Some of the costs may not be recoverable, such as those of reorganizing one’s social life.¹⁵⁴ Thus, while employees are in principle free to switch jobs, they may be de facto “locked in” with their current

have no outside career options).

¹⁴⁹ *Supra* notes 65–68 and accompanying text.

¹⁵⁰ *Supra* notes 112–113 and accompanying text.

¹⁵¹ Furthermore, firms may prefer to confer benefits only to long-term, high-skill employees. ERISA’s non-discrimination requirement prevents firms from targeting specific types of employees. Charny, *supra* note 57, at 1622–23.

¹⁵² See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, *Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers*, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37 (ALAN J. AUERBACH ed., 1988) (discussing implicit contracts between firms and employees); Charny, *supra* note 57, at 1606–07, 1608 (discussing the use of pension to encourage investment in employer-specific skills by employees).

¹⁵³ See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 35 (1994) (quoting an engineer comparing the difficulty of getting another job in the same industry in Texas and in Silicon Valley).

¹⁵⁴ In this context, economists speak of regionally immobile “social capital” that reduces worker mobility. See Michael Bräuninger & Andreia Tolciu, *Should I Stay or Should I Go? Regional Mobility and Social Capital*, 167 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 434, 434–36 (2011).

employer. Moving to a job in another region where the same skill set is required may be deterred by the cost of moving.

The question, then, is how employees can obtain reasonable assurance that employers will not renege on worker expectations and engage in what is known as “hold up” in economic terminology. As explained above, under the team production model of corporate law, the board of directors is in the position to balance the interests of the firm’s various constituencies. The board, therefore, may protect employees by shutting out shareholders, who may engage in holdup, from decision-making.¹⁵⁵ This fits well with descriptions of how firms operated from the 1950s through the 1970s: the institutional goal of firms was not so much profit maximization as growth and continued survival. Employees were fired less easily because of the demoralizing effects on the team.¹⁵⁶

In the labor economics literature, DB pension plans add another angle to the analysis, namely as part of a long-term, partly implicit contract that rewards loyalty with wages that increase with seniority.¹⁵⁷ DB plans create an incentive for promotion-achieving performance and firm-specific investment, given that they reward a long tenure in the firm and because pension payments depend on late-career salary (typically resulting from promotion within the firm).¹⁵⁸ This is plausible when pension plans cannot be terminated because of legal hurdles, when they are entrenched because of deals with powerful unions, and when a managerialist board has no incentive to cut labor cost in order to create shareholder wealth.

For the descriptive point about shareholder primacy, it is relatively unimportant whether the rent-seeking explanation or the human capital explanation is empirically more significant.¹⁵⁹ It suffices to realize that employment constitutes an asset. This asset’s value is the net present value of expected income streams—from

¹⁵⁵ *Supra* notes 45–50 and accompanying text.

¹⁵⁶ O’Kelley, *supra* note 25, at 35–36 (describing the goals of the “Galbraithian” technostructure).

¹⁵⁷ Edward P. Lazear, *Why is There Mandatory Retirement?*, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1261 (1979); Edward P. Lazear, *The Future of Personnel Economics*, 110 ECON. J. F611, F617–F619 (2000); Friedberg & Owyang, *supra* note 63, at 27; Neumark, *supra* note 143, at 723–24.

¹⁵⁸ *See, e.g.*, Neumark, *supra* note 143, at 724–25 (discussing the incentive set by DB plans for specific human capital investment); MACKENZIE, *supra* note 139, at 48–49 (“Final-salary pension plans . . . create a powerful incentive for strong (or at least promotion achieving) performance on the job and loyalty to the firm, and reward the build-up of know-how that is specific to the firm.”).

¹⁵⁹ *See* Neumark, *supra* note 143, at 725–26 (surveying the evidence for various theories about human capital).

future wages, benefits, and vacation time—in the current job, minus the equivalent income streams in the next best job.¹⁶⁰ Margaret Blair estimates that the value of a job is considerable for employees, given that employees who are laid off in the course of a plant closing typically earn 10–15% less in their subsequent jobs.¹⁶¹ This figure should realistically vary between jobs, and it should be greater for employees with either better rent-seeking opportunities at the firm, or greater specific investment and therefore expectations to receive quasi-rents from continued employment.¹⁶² The bottom line for analyzing the politics of corporate governance is that employees have a desire to keep their jobs, and to support policies that foster and protect returns on their human capital.

C. The Exposure of Pension Wealth to Risk

While policies relating to their employment position are clearly important to workers, expected retirement benefits are their other major asset. There are clear differences between DB and DC plans that influence employee preferences with respect to policies relating to pension wealth.

In a DB plan, the employer bears the plan's funding risk. The major issue for employees is plan underfunding combined with the risk of the employer's default. ERISA addressed the issue with the requirement to set up a trust to hold pension assets.¹⁶³ While firms had begun to set up trusts for tax reasons decades earlier,¹⁶⁴ they were often underfunded. Previously, employees had to hope that the firm stayed in business and continued to fund the plan; in other words, one of the main risks for employees was whether the firm would continue to honor its commitment and avoid going into

¹⁶⁰ Ippolito, *supra* note 127, at 1253. Rationally, an employee would only switch jobs if the value of another job minus the cost of switching exceeds the value of the current one. *Id.* at 1254.

¹⁶¹ Blair, *supra* note 125, at 1310.

¹⁶² Unionization can also be a possible consequence of or reason for firm-specific investment, since unions protect employees' rents and quasi-rents. Unionization rates tend to be higher in manufacturing, where implicit deals with workers and specific investment are sometimes thought to be more common. *E.g.*, Charny, *supra* note 57, at 1625–26.

¹⁶³ 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006).

¹⁶⁴ John H. Langbein, *The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce*, 107 *YALE L. J.* 165, 169 (1997). By contrast, in some European countries such as Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and Austria, firms often commit to paying retirement benefits directly, and thus need to fund provisions for future payments in their balance sheets. GORDON L. CLARK, *PENSION FUND CAPITALISM* 59–60 (2000) (discussing “book reserve” plans in Germany).

bankruptcy.¹⁶⁵ Even with the insurance provided by the PBGC today, beneficiaries of a DB plan run the risk of losing the uninsured portion of the plan when the firm is not financially solvent and the plan becomes underfunded (for instance, because of a capital market downturn).¹⁶⁶ If firms are unable to fill the funding gap at that time, employees may lose a portion of their pension.¹⁶⁷

Risks for employees are different in today's DC world. On the one hand, 401(k) plans are individual accounts that are controlled by the beneficiary, who can transfer them to a new employer's plan or shift the assets into an IRA. This reduces switching costs and the degree to which employees are tied to a particular employer. On the other hand, with a DC plan, potential retirees bear the investment risk because the employer does not have to jump in if the plan assets do not suffice to meet pension obligations.

The amount of funds available for retirement depends on investment success.¹⁶⁸ DC plans such as 401(k)s and IRAs (often consisting of 401(k) assets rolled over after a job change)¹⁶⁹ are invested in publicly-traded securities. The share of investment in stocks strongly increased at least between 1989 and 2001, when more than half of 401(k) plans reported to invest "mostly in stock."¹⁷⁰ Consequently, it is important for future retirees that capital markets—in particular equity markets—are doing well. In the bull markets of the 1980s and 1990s, and even in the years after the 2002 financial scandals, many employees did quite well and accumulated a significant retirement bonus. The financial crisis that started in 2008 showed the downside of the defined contribution society: pension assets were flattened, which made it difficult for many to retire as planned.¹⁷¹ Thus, in theory, a DC plan should eliminate the

¹⁶⁵ *E.g.*, Friedman, *supra* note 63, at 220 (noting the risk of employer bankruptcy in a defined benefit plan); *see also* Sass, *supra* note 58, at 87 ("If the employer went bust, so would the benefits of current and future pensioners . . ."); MACKENZIE, *supra* note 139, at 53.

¹⁶⁶ *Supra* note 99 and accompanying text.

¹⁶⁷ Friedman, *supra* note 63, at 220.

¹⁶⁸ *E.g.*, MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 68.

¹⁶⁹ MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 69.

¹⁷⁰ Andrew A. Samwick & Jonathan Skinner, *How Will 401(k) Pension Plans Affect Retirement Income?*, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 329, 333–34 (2004) (reporting an increase of investment "mostly in stocks" from 23.69% to 54.54% between 1989 and 2001, and a decrease of investment "mostly in bonds" from 39.52% to 10.31%).

¹⁷¹ *See, e.g.*, Edward Whitehouse, Anna D'Addio & Andrew Reilly, *Investment Risk and Pensions: Impact on Individual Retirement Incomes and Government Budgets*, OECD SOCIAL, EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION WORKING PAPERS No. 87, 47 (2009) ("Pension funds lost 23% of their value in OECD countries in 2008 . . .").

employee's risk-bearing with respect to the bankruptcy of the employer, since it is not involved in pension payments other than in a DB plan. That, however, assumes that retirement accounts are properly diversified. During the boom years, many firms encouraged employees to invest in the firms' own shares, often in the form of ESOPs. But even normal retirement accounts were often weighed heavily in favor of the employer, partly because employers often only matched employee contributions that were invested in their own stock. Obviously, putting retirement assets into ESOPs makes employees bear the risk of the development of their employers' stock. Excessive investment in company stock has led to disaster for some employees in cases such as Enron, where many lost much of their retirement savings.¹⁷² Of course, stock market downturns also affect DB plans; DB plans become less liquid, and it may become harder to make pension payments due to liquidity constraints. In severe cases, the sponsoring firm may have to pitch in to close the funding gap.¹⁷³ The financial crisis of 2008–2009 has severely impacted the remaining DB plans, forcing firms to reduce shareholders' equity by putting funding liabilities on their balance sheets.¹⁷⁴

Thus, the core difference in the employee's financial position is that, in a DC plan, an employee is a shareholder, namely either a diversified investor in the capital market or in his own employer through an ESOP. In the case of well-diversified investment, employees should no longer have a strong interest in the employer's financial well-being, except to the extent that it protects their human capital.¹⁷⁵ If the pension plan is heavily invested in the employer, the employee becomes a long-term shareholder, strongly dependent on the firm's long-term development.

By contrast, in a DB plan the position of the employee compares to that of a bondholder of the employer, specifically a secured bondholder to the extent of the guarantee by the PBGC and that of

¹⁷² See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 113 (providing statistics about cases where significant amounts of retirement assets were lost, and discussing Enron in more detail); Jeffrey N. Gordon, *What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections*, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1248–49 (2002) (describing the retirement problem of Enron employees); Millon, *supra* note 90, at 119.

¹⁷³ See OECD, PRIVATE PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2008, 18–19 (2009).

¹⁷⁴ James J. Hanks, Jr., *Legal Capital and the Model Business Corporation Act: An Essay for Bayless Manning*, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 229–30 (2011).

¹⁷⁵ The overall well-being of the respective industry should still matter to the individual employee, as long as he has industry-specific human capital, and to unions hoping to maintain membership.

an unsecured bondholder for additional amounts.¹⁷⁶ The employee depends on the employer to meet his obligations and to continue to fund plans, and is subject to the risk of opportunistic benefit cuts.¹⁷⁷ Like a bondholder, employees do not participate in general upswings in the economy that elevate values above the promised amount¹⁷⁸ and are also subject to the risk of inflation.¹⁷⁹

D. Shifting Employee Interests

Even assuming a constant level of human capital investment during the past thirty years, the shift from DB to DC plans must have had consequences for what policies are in the interest of employees, particularly when shareholder interests and employee interests conflict.¹⁸⁰ Employees depend less on their employer for their financial capital, and more strongly on the capital market. For many families, their 401(k) plans represent the bulk of the available financial assets and thus determine financial security in retirement.¹⁸¹ Capital markets have therefore become very important for the middle class.

The classic shareholder-labor controversy of this type is whether managers should be allowed to defend against hostile takeovers. By default, both managers and workers would prefer a “quiet life,” meaning an absence of hostile takeovers disrupting their routine and putting their jobs at risk.¹⁸² A takeover puts employees at risk since it often results in significant restructuring of the enterprise, which

¹⁷⁶ Ippolito, *supra* note 127, at 1258–59; Shigeto Kashiwazaki & Hiroharu Fukazawa, *Current Situation and Issues of Retirement Benefit (Corporate Pension) in Japan*, 7 JAPAN LAB. REV. 66, 73 (2010) (making the analogous argument for Japan). Empirical evidence shows that shareholders effectively pick up the tab, and that corporate equity risk reflects the riskiness of the assets held by a firm’s pension plan. See Li Jin, Robert C. Merton, & Zvi Bodie, *Do a firm’s equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?*, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2006).

¹⁷⁷ Kashiwazaki & Fukazawa, *supra* note 176, at 73–74. Note that pension plan underfunding undercuts diversification because employees again depend on the employer. See Ippolito, *supra* note 127, at 1259 (arguing that the underfunding of pension plans discourages unions from engaging in holdup to the detriment of shareholders); Ippolito, *supra* note 112, at 611.

¹⁷⁸ PETER F. DRUCKER, *THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION* 94–95 (1976).

¹⁷⁹ *Id.* at 96–97; Markus Roth, *German Private Pension Law*, in *IMAGINING THE IDEAL PENSION SYSTEM* 131, 143 (Dana M. Muir & John A. Turner eds., 2011).

¹⁸⁰ Arthur R. Pinto, *The United States*, in *PUBLIC COMPANIES AND THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS* 13, 22–23 (Sabrina Bruno & Eugenio Ruggiero eds., 2011).

¹⁸¹ MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, *supra* note 59, at 68–69.

¹⁸² *E.g.*, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullianathan, *Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences*, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1066–67 (2003) (suggesting that managers prefer a “quiet life” not involving confrontation with labor).

often leads to changes to corporate objectives, product lines, factories, and thus conditions of work and maybe the downsizing of the workforce. Labor, therefore, typically prefers strong takeover defenses. Shareholders may want managers to defend against hostile takeovers to the extent that this drives up the price paid by the bidder,¹⁸³ but they will want a takeover to go forward once managers have bargained for a good price with the bidder.¹⁸⁴

The shift in the private pension system has thus influenced the effects of different policies on employees. An employee saving for retirement in a DB plan firm needs to care little about how corporate law policies affect share values generally, and the value of her employer specifically. Her two objectives—protecting her human capital and her pension wealth—can be achieved by largely the same means, namely by staying in the firm and hoping for a favorable working environment and workplace conditions, for promotion opportunities within the firm, and for the firm's continued operation of the pension plan. The capital market is only important when an employer loses its ability to fund the plan. Even if employees have no firm-specific human capital investment, in a traditional DB plan they have specific financial capital as de facto bondholders of their firm and are thus subject to a possible holdup threat. Pro-shareholder policies that create pressure to cut costs and downsize may not only threaten their human capital, but also their financial capital if the end result is a reduction of pension benefits, or even the ultimate termination of a DB plan following an LBO.¹⁸⁵ Pension wealth, therefore, will generate little, if any, worker preferences for pro-shareholder policies at the expense of labor in DB plans.¹⁸⁶ Workers

¹⁸³ In the debates about Delaware takeover law, managers at least claim that bidders offer an inadequate price because the stock market does not fully reflect the value and the potential of the firm, and that shareholders are likely to be duped into accepting an inadequate offer. See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, *supra* note 52, at 1091 (“The first argument is that stockholders with diversified portfolios will be better served if informed directors are permitted to block business combinations that they believe in good faith are ill-advised.”).

¹⁸⁴ This is the rationale for so-called *Revlon* duties, according to which the board of directors is required to maximize price once a sale of the company has become inevitable. *Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).

¹⁸⁵ For a discussion of opportunistic terminations, see *supra* Part III.B.4.

¹⁸⁶ Peter Drucker coined the term “pension fund socialism” in a 1976 book and argued that employees already owned American business through DB plans. But he acknowledged that, psychologically, employees neither knew that they were owners nor perceived or experienced ownership. DRUCKER, *supra* note 178, at 97. The reason is that employees in DB plans are better characterized as creditors than as owners. See also Robert Charles Clark, *The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on*

will strongly prefer policies that result in a stable labor environment and will disfavor pro-shareholder policies that are antagonistic to that result. While they may care about the governance and efficiency of the firm to the extent needed to achieve these goals, they will likely disfavor risk-taking because of their large idiosyncratic risk in the firm.

In a DC plan, pro-shareholder policies will have a direct impact on employee wealth that may change whether a particular policy is beneficial or detrimental to employees. For example, a proposed policy that facilitates hostile takeovers may reduce the value of human capital, while at the same time increase the value of pension wealth. That does not imply that workers no longer need to care about their jobs. Even if there is no specific human capital, workers bear a “switching cost” and often have to accept less well-paying jobs. On the margin, however, the closer connection between share value and pension wealth in DC plans implies that the benefits of pro-shareholder corporate policies are greater than in DB plans, thus making these relatively more advantageous compared to pro-labor policies.¹⁸⁷

E. Shareholder Primacy and Social Welfare

Weighing the pro-shareholder and pro-labor policy objectives against each other, an overall social welfare analysis will most likely come to a different conclusion in the corporate DB world of the 1970s, as compared to the DC world of today. In a hypothetical society where nine out of ten employees are subject to a DB plan and one is subject to a DC plan, the larger number of workers is more likely to benefit from pro-labor policies that generally protect human capital, as opposed to pro-shareholder policies that benefit DC pension wealth and have little impact on DB pension wealth. If the numbers are reversed, a redistributive policy change that benefits shareholders at the expense of employees may hurt human capital to some extent, but for many employees, this will be outweighed by benefits to DC pension wealth, while the impact on DB pension wealth will be smaller.

A well-meaning social planner would therefore very likely favor a different corporate law policy. Leaving other possible effects of the

Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 567–68 (1981) (predicting a growing influence of pension fund administrators).

¹⁸⁷ While an ESOP would seem to make workers prefer less risky corporate decisions given their non-diversified portfolio, a generous takeover premium might sometimes help to overcome worker resistance.

change aside, the optimal point in a shareholder-labor scale will shift closer to full shareholder primacy in a world where DC plans dominate. The shift to greater shareholder primacy since the 1970s may reflect the fact that the effects of pro-shareholder policies on employees have become relatively more beneficial.¹⁸⁸

The analysis so far has assumed that the extent of human capital investment has remained constant and that it is also unchanged in its degree of specificity, the conclusion being that it is desirable for the balance to shift to some extent in favor of investor interests. But to optimize policy choices, one would need to determine the relative significance of firm-specific human capital and pension wealth. Margaret Blair estimates that the value of specific human capital is typically several times as large as pension wealth.¹⁸⁹

Apart from that, the transformation of pension wealth may have affected incentives to invest in specific human capital. The growth of DC plans coincided and maybe was partly a consequence of the decline of “large hierarchic firms and unionized industries,” and the simultaneous growth of “high-tech firms and small, non-unionized companies.”¹⁹⁰ Relatedly, labor mobility began to increase in the late 1960s.¹⁹¹ Thus, firm-specific human capital may have become less important in the U.S. economy during the past decades.

The increase in labor mobility, which was influenced by a variety of economic, social, and technological factors, started earlier than the change in the pension system. Industries preferring DB plans likely declined for other reasons, while other industries prospered.¹⁹² Traditional DB plans, however, were suited to industries with a stable workforce and not those in which workers tend to switch jobs

¹⁸⁸ Changes in the pension system may have contributed to the popularity of shareholder primacy in academia. As a business school professor put it at a conference on shareholder primacy: “The closer I get to retirement, the more I like shareholder wealth maximization.” This tongue-in-cheek remark reflects that with increasing age, human capital (understood as net present value of future earnings) decreases, while pension wealth (net present value of pensions) increases.

¹⁸⁹ Blair, *supra* note 125, at 1310.

¹⁹⁰ Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 367; *see also* Gustman & Steinmeier, *supra* note 119.

¹⁹¹ *E.g.*, Gueorgui Kambourov & Iouri Manovskii, *Rising Occupational and Industry Mobility in the United States: 1968–1997*, 49 INT’L ECON. REV 41 (2008) (describing an increase in mobility both between jobs and between different industries).

¹⁹² Different levels of investment in human capital may be optimal in different industries, and it may even be possible to organize work in ways that require different levels of firm-specific human capital within a specific industry. *See, e.g.*, MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 263–66 (1995) (discussing differences in worker mobility and wage premia for incumbents between industries).

frequently in the course of their careers.¹⁹³ Since ERISA made it more difficult to inhibit mobility, it may have made the former industries relatively less competitive. Thus, it probably accelerated the trend toward more mobility, less firm-specific human capital, and possibly more general or industry-specific human capital.¹⁹⁴ The regulatory changes of the 1970s further helped the transformation of the American economy.

Note that the point on social welfare is one of relative efficiency of shareholder orientation given specific circumstances. The overall effects of the change are more complex and probably indeterminate: on the one hand, the reduction of firm-specific investment may have hurt the American economy, and DC plans may harm workers by burdening them with investment risk they are not well suited to bear. DC funds are also sometimes thought to have a shorter time horizon than DB funds and may therefore make it harder for firms to pursue long-term projects.¹⁹⁵ On the other hand, the shift to DC plans may also have reduced employee resistance against innovation and changes in the work environment. Larger financial markets may have encouraged economic growth.

V. THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

This Part explores the consequences for the interest group politics of corporate governance. Parts V.A and V.B consider the general political environment and suggest that changes in the pension system helped to align the interests of workers with those of shareholders, thus leading to the rise of the “transparency coalition” identified by political scientists. Parts V.C, V.D, and V.E provide an illustration of this seismic shift in the politics of corporate governance by looking at the rise of shareholder activism during the same period. A significant contribution to shareholder activism came from unions, which embraced the newly found “capitalist” interest of workers as equity investors, and thus began to promote shareholder wealth maximization as one of their policy objectives. The shift from DB to DC plans was very likely not the only factor; indeed, some of the most important shareholder activists are public pension plans operating

¹⁹³ Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 367.

¹⁹⁴ See Jacoby, *supra* note 19, at 286 (suggesting that firms no longer invest in long-term projects such as employee training due to the short-term horizon of institutional investors).

¹⁹⁵ E.g., Michel Goyer, *Capital Mobility, Varieties of Institutional Investors, and the Transforming Stability of Corporate Governance in France and Germany*, in BEYOND VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 195, 203 (Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes, & Mark Thatcher eds., 2007).

under a DB system, who also became more strongly involved in equity markets due to regulatory changes. The objective is to show that the implementation of pro-shareholder reforms is partly the unintended consequence of changes in the pension sector that made the proposition of shareholder primacy more attractive.

A. Shareholders and the Center-Left

The increased importance of pension wealth for the welfare and security of individuals also had an impact on the politics of corporate governance. With the middle class increasingly depending on pension savings, shareholders have become an important political constituency.¹⁹⁶ Shareholders are sometimes even thought of “as a proxy for the median voter.”¹⁹⁷ Consequently, the political center-left has championed the cause of shareholders, since an anti-management agenda resonates with members of the middle class, who are often both shareholders and employees.¹⁹⁸ Pro-shareholder reforms of the past twenty years tended to be endorsed by the Democratic Party and opposed by the Republicans, who were often in favor of reforms that sought to cabin allegedly excessive litigation.¹⁹⁹ This is most clear in the context of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which reacted to the corporate governance crises of Enron and the Great Recession respectively²⁰⁰: democrats supported reforms that provided stronger securities regulation, “Say on Pay” and “Proxy Access,” whereas Republicans, alongside lobbyists such as the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce, generally aligned themselves with critics who argued that overregulation was liable to stifle the economy. Some of the initiatives that led to the most recent reforms, such as the 2009 proposal for a Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, clearly established a connection between corporate governance failures and “losses that have been borne by millions of Americans who are shareholders through their pension plans, 401(k) plans, and direct

¹⁹⁶ Davis, *supra* note 14, at 1129 (suggesting the increasing political importance of shareholder value due to the increase in the number of households invested in the stock market from 20% in 1983 to 50% in 2001).

¹⁹⁷ William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, *The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market*, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 81, 139 (2011).

¹⁹⁸ Christopher M. Bruner, *Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis*, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 338 (2011).

¹⁹⁹ See John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, *The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform*, 34 POL. & SOC'Y 463, 480–84 (2006).

²⁰⁰ JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER 108–36 (2010).

investments[.]”²⁰¹ One of the most telling examples in which the pro-shareholders forces were not successful is the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which was intended to curtail securities litigation and was enacted by a Republican Congress over President Clinton’s veto.²⁰²

B. The “Transparency Coalition” and Its Effects

The major corporate governance reforms of the last two decades have primarily affected securities law and have sought to make management more transparent and more accountable to the investing public. The dividing line on these policy issues tended to run between management and all other groups in corporate governance. In situations like this, it is comparatively easy for what Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn have christened the “transparency coalition” to dominate corporate law policymaking. In such a situation, managers have to yield to the demands of investors and workers on the political level, both of whom benefit from transparency.²⁰³

Not all corporate governance issues lend themselves to a shareholder-worker coalition, however. In contrast to the shared interest in transparency, employees may be more skeptical about increasing the actual decision-making power of shareholders, particularly in decisions with redistributive effects between capital and labor. Some hostile takeovers likely entailed such conflicts. In Delaware, where takeover law took shape in the case law in the 1980s and early 1990s, managers retained their preeminence as the leading interest group to shape the law on takeover defenses, without having to enter into coalitions. In most cases, managers of companies threatened by hostile takeovers were the prime sponsors of anti-

²⁰¹ Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, S.1074, 111th Cong. § 2(3) (2009); *see also* Bruner, *supra* note 198, at 337–38 (citing from the bill and describing the Obama administration’s agenda to help the middle class).

²⁰² CIOFFI, *supra* note 200, at 105–07. It is certainly not a new development for the Democratic Party to side with investors against managers. As John W. Cioffi and Martin Höpner point out, “the New Deal of the 1930s created modern securities regulation.” Cioffi & Höpner, *supra* note 199, at 484. Adolf Berle advocated shareholder primacy and was an advisor to President Roosevelt. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, *Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation*, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 114–18 (2008). William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter document that Berle’s erstwhile opponent E. Merrick Dodd associated himself with representatives of managers who saw planning by the managerial elite as the way out of the incipient Great Depression. *Id.* at 123–24.

²⁰³ GOUREVITCH & SHINN, *supra* note 22, at 210–11.

takeover statutes,²⁰⁴ but they often received passive or active support from unions.²⁰⁵ In some cases, legislation supported solely by managers would have been unlikely to pass without the endorsement of a traditional Democratic constituency such as labor.²⁰⁶

Takeovers, however, are no longer as politically salient as they were in the 1980s. During that period, DC plans had only begun to supplant DB plans; thus, political decisions on state takeover law might actually come out differently in today's environment. The corporate governance reforms and reform projects of the past two decades were intended to make managers *more* accountable to shareholders. Putting independent directors in charge of the board's audit committee,²⁰⁷ strengthening auditor independence,²⁰⁸ strengthening shareholder voice in director appointments,²⁰⁹ and "Say on Pay"²¹⁰ would at first glance not seem to have colorable detrimental consequences for employees.

But it is sometimes thought that in the managerial model of the 1950s, employees tacitly or explicitly formed coalitions with management to the detriment of outside shareholders;²¹¹ in this view, management agreed to generous deals regarding wages and benefits for employees, while unions would not object to "sweet deals" or private benefits of control for top management. Obviously, reforms increasing transparency and strengthening shareholder voice may be making this kind of deal more difficult. Conceivably, in a stakeholder model of corporate governance, corporate opacity might make it

²⁰⁴ See William J. Carney, *The Production of Corporate Law*, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 749–51 (1998) (listing corporate sponsors of statutes).

²⁰⁵ John C. Coffee, Jr., *The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups*, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 437 n.8 (1988); Eric W. Orts, *Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes*, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 24–25 (1992); Mark J. Roe, *A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance*, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 63–64 (1991); Jonathan D. Springer, *Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False Fears*, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 96 (1999).

²⁰⁶ See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., *Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of the States*, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 491, 496–97 (1988).

²⁰⁷ Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 775 (2002).

²⁰⁸ See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Title II, 116 Stat. at 771–75.

²⁰⁹ Regarding the SEC's efforts to expand "shareholder access" to the company's proxy statement, see *supra* note 21.

²¹⁰ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 951, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (introducing a new Securities Exchange Act § 14A, which requires shareholder votes on executive compensation). On the preceding discussion, see, Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Say on Pay": *Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in*, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009).

²¹¹ E.g., Marleen O'Connor, *Labor's Role in the American Corporate Governance Structure*, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97, 101 (2000); GOUREVITCH & SHINN, *supra* note 22, at 237–38; GOMEZ & KORINE, *supra* note 14, at 99–135.

easier to engage in long-run deals with labor that would be assessed very critically under the short-term pressures emanating from the capital markets.²¹² In a less transparent corporate world where managers are less exposed to pressures from the capital markets, it may be easier to implement pension plans, whose conceivable benefits for human capital²¹³ are hard to assess for the financial market.²¹⁴ The bottom line is that changes in corporate governance that result in increased transparency could be a factor associated with both the shift toward DC plans and the increasing dominance of shareholder over labor interests.

C. *The Rise of Institutional Investors*

The changes in the private pension landscape have also had the effect of channeling the political power of shareholder value through the pension system,²¹⁵ thus increasing the significance of the financial industry, both on the level of individual firms where pension wealth is invested and on the political level. Due to institutional constraints, the effects on the politics are more nuanced than one might expect.

There are several models of how pension wealth is managed. Their structure is determined by the Taft-Hartley Act, which allows employer-provided pension plans to have at most 50% union representatives on their board of trustees.²¹⁶ Thus, pension plans are

²¹² Institutional investors in general and pension funds in particular are often criticized for their short-term orientation. *E.g.*, Jacoby, *supra* note 19, at 285. Relatedly, the argument that hostile takeovers maximize shareholder wealth rests on the assumption that market values reflect long-term firm value with reasonable accuracy. See Jill E. Fisch, *Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy*, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 674 (2007) (“academic endorsement of . . . short-term stock price . . . may reinforce inappropriate managerial decisions”); Michael L. Wachter, *Takeover Defenses When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient*, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 819–23 (2003).

²¹³ See *supra* Parts III.B.3, IV.B, and IV.C.


²¹⁴ Furthermore, with the rise of the DC paradigm, DB pension plans are becoming less familiar to shareholders, to whom they may appear as an unjustified privilege of unionized workers. Compare the debate about pension benefits of public employees. *Move Public Employees Into 401(k)s?: Room for Debate*, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2011), <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/27/why-not-401ks-for-public-employees>.

²¹⁵ Tom Hadden, *Corporate Governance by Institutional Investors? Some Problems from the International Perspective*, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 89, 94 (Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum, & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 1993) (stating that pension fund managers are only interested in shareholder wealth).

²¹⁶ The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 prohibits employers from making payments to unions, including union-run pension funds, except plans with equal representation of employees and employers (i.e., unions and managers) on the board. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). The

controlled either by corporate managers or under shared control by employers and unions. Employer-pension plans obviously do not appear as separate actors in corporate governance.²¹⁷ Plans under shared management—so-called Taft-Hartley plans—are usually multi-employer plans and therefore dominated by unions, which are independent corporate governance players. By contrast, 401(k) assets are typically invested in mutual funds.

Consider the Conference Board's data on equity ownership in the United States²¹⁸:



Act was part of the backlash to the New Deal, when managers feared increased union influence and induced Congress to pass the Act prohibiting payments to plans that were fully controlled by unions, which unions might have used to fund strikes or activity directing against employers. See Mark J. Roe, *The Modern Corporation and Private Pensions*, 41 UCLA L. REV. 75, 84–85 (1993) (discussing interest groups in the legislative process); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, *Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions*, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1075–77 (1998) (describing the origin, structure, and prevalence of Taft-Hartley Plans); Murphy, *supra* note 108, at 531–32. ERISA applies to both corporate pension plans and Taft-Hartley plans, which are often multi-employer plans and are typically dominated by unions. See Marleen O'Connor, *Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Welfare*, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345, 1357 (1997). Pension plans directly controlled by employers do not engage in shareholder activism. Roe, *supra*, note 215, at 109.

²¹⁷ Bernard S. Black, *Shareholder Passivity Reexamined*, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 596–98 (1990); Roe, *supra* note 216, at 109 (“ERISA rules and pension structure help protect managers from intrusive shareholders”); Murphy, *supra* note 108, at 525–29.

²¹⁸ MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION 25–26 (2010).

Figure 5 illustrates the growth of institutional investment from 1980 through 2009. Total institutional investment increased from \$436.2 billion in 1980 to \$13,473 billion in 2007, just before the financial crisis. These figures of course do not only include vehicles for pension wealth,²¹⁹ and not all investment company assets are pension assets (although a large part is).




Figure 6²²⁰ shows that the share of institutional investors in equity investment also increased relatively, namely from less than 30% to around 50%. Private and public pension funds initially grew from a share of about 17% and 3% respectively (relative to total equity investment). After 1990, private funds began to lose market share, while public funds largely maintained theirs, with private funds showing up with 14.7% in 2007 and public ones with 7.8% in the same year. Meanwhile, investment companies' share increased from only 3.1% in 1980 to 22% in 2007. Overall, the total share of these three types of investment vehicles grew from 23% to 42.5% of the equities market.

D. Unions as Corporate Governance Activists

The newfound significance of capital markets for workers was of course not lost on unions, which began to use their power for the

²¹⁹ Insurance companies, savings institutions, and foundations are omitted from Figures 5 and 6.

²²⁰ Data from TONELLO & RABIMOV, *supra* note 218 (obvious mathematical error corrected by the author).

benefit of their constituents. Unions no longer only engage in classical industrial action, but have also become some of the most visible shareholder activists,²²¹ both through Taft-Hartley pension plans and through their own holdings.²²² Some unions, such as AFL-CIO and the Teamsters, were parties in notable corporate law cases relating to shareholder voting, some of which ostensibly had nothing to do with labor issues.²²³ Furthermore, in the early 1990s, unions switched alliances with respect to takeovers: instead of siding with managers to oppose them,²²⁴ they began to join forces with other shareholders to obtain the highest return on their investment.²²⁵ Unions have supported corporate governance legislation intended to hold managers more accountable to shareholders, including Sarbanes-Oxley²²⁶ and shareholder proxy access.²²⁷ They generally support pro-shareholder institutions such as the Council of Institutional Investors and the International Corporate Governance Network.²²⁸

²²¹ E.g., Marleen O'Connor, *Labor's Role in the Shareholder Revolution*, in WORKING CAPITAL: THE POWER OF LABOR'S PENSIONS 67, 67 (Archon Fung, Tessa Hebb & Joel Rogers eds., 2001). Shareholder activism is often part of a so-called "comprehensive campaign," in the course of which unions employ all available tactics against a firm, including public relations and legislative initiatives. James J. Brudney, *Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union Comprehensive Campaigns*, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 738 (2010).

²²² See Schwab & Thomas, *supra* note 216, at 1081 (pointing out that unions are not subject to ERISA fiduciary duties with their own holdings).

²²³ E.g., *Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); *The Food and Allied Serv. Trade Dep't v. Wal-Mart*, No. Civ. A. 12551, 1992 WL 111285 (Del. Ch. Ct. May 20, 1992) (seeking a stock list to inform shareholders about the use of prison labor); *Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Co., Inc.*, 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999) (finding that shareholders may propose and adopt a bylaw requiring the redemption of a poison pill). See also *AFSCME v. AIG*, 462 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2006) (public sector union seeking bylaw amendment to allow shareholder proxy access); *CA Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan*, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (public-sector union seeking a bylaw amendment requiring the reimbursement of shareholders for expenses relating to contested director elections).

²²⁴ E.g., Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, *Should Labor be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals*, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 47 (1998).

²²⁵ O'Connor, *supra* note 211, at 101, 109–10; see Thomas & Martin, *supra* note 224, at 48–51 (describing the historical development of union activism).

²²⁶ See Sanford M. Jacoby, *Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and Democracy*, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 17, 51–52 (2008) (describing the AFL-CIO's support for Sarbanes-Oxley).

²²⁷ See *id.* at 55–56 (discussing union support for shareholder proxy access); Sanford M. Jacoby, *The Future of Labor and Finance*, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 111, 116 (2008).

²²⁸ Brishen Rogers, *The Complexities of Shareholder Primacy: A Response to Sanford Jacoby*, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 95, 98–99 (2008).

Part of this may be attributable to highly contextualized decisions to engage in shareholder activism and the fragmented character of the American labor movement: unions have little reason to care about workers in other firms who are not their members. A single national union might have reacted differently. Nevertheless, it seems paradoxical for unions, whose purpose is to represent employees, to support hostile takeovers and other business measures that may entail downsizing and job cuts.²²⁹ Their changed focus looks justified, however, when one realizes that unions have been operating under very different circumstances in recent decades: membership decreased dramatically during the 1980s.²³⁰ While unions certainly continued to have an interest in preserving jobs in order to maintain their membership, because of aging cohorts of workers retiring, a larger percentage of their constituents were pensioners. Consequently, obtaining a good return on their investments for aging members became relatively more important.²³¹ In addition, ERISA may also have played a role in instigating union shareholder activism, given that the pension plan's board members were subject to the statute's fiduciary duty.²³²

The view of unions as true shareholder activists has of course been challenged. In the popular press, it has sometimes been suggested that unions use their influence as shareholders to advance a general political agenda.²³³ In the more nuanced academic

²²⁹ Simon Deakin, *The Rise of Finance: What Is It, What Is Driving It, What Might Stop It?*, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 67, 71 (2008); see also Teresa Ghilarducci, *Solving the Paradox of Workers as Shareholders: A Comment on Sanford Jacoby*, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 85, 88 (2008) (ironically suggesting that unions are funding their "class enemies").

²³⁰ O'Connor, *supra* note 211, at 101; O'Connor, *supra* note 216, at 1379; Wachter, *supra* note 118, at 582, 634 (plotting the percentage of union workers 1930–2005); Murphy, *supra* note 108, at 532 (describing a decline in union membership from 30% to 9% between the 1950s and 2000). Takeovers in which unionized employees were laid off seem to have been one of the reasons. Thomas & Martin, *supra* note 224, at 41, 47–48.

²³¹ See Thomas & Martin, *supra* note 224, at 49 (describing the new-found union opposition to takeover defenses); Teresa Ghilarducci, James Hawley & Andrew William, *Labour's Paradoxical Interest and the Evolution of Corporate Governance*, 24 J. L. & SOC'Y 26, 34 (1997). The success of "comprehensive campaigns" by unions that include shareholder activism has apparently also contributed to growth in union membership since 2005, particularly in the services industries. Brudney, *supra* note 221, at 742.

²³² Schwab & Thomas, *supra* note 216, at 1077–78; O'Connor, *supra* note 211, at 129–30; see also Rogers, *supra* note 228, at 107 (suggesting that the ERISA trustee duty would weigh against union use of shareholder activism for other ends than wealth maximization).

²³³ E.g., *Pension Fund Blackmail*, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2005, at A10 (accusing the

discussion, critics such as Reinier Kraakman suggested that unions are likely to prioritize workers' interests over shareholder wealth, given that the former are tied up in a specific firm. Thus, labor can capture rents in the guise of wages; by contrast, the pension investment in shares is spread out over a diversified portfolio and thus hard to influence through activism.²³⁴ But an empirical study by Schwab and Thomas found that union activism more often than not works in favor of shareholder wealth.²³⁵ While the anecdotal and empirical picture is certainly ambiguous, both public and private sector unions have initiated and supported measures that are generally thought to be in the interest of shareholders. These include pro-takeover initiatives such as pill-redemption bylaws, staggered boards,²³⁶ and bylaw amendments relating to shareholder voting, such as the contested issue of majority voting instead of plurality voting in elections for directors.²³⁷ There were also some widely publicized cases where unions pushed "corporate social

AFL-CIO of influencing managers to oppose private social security accounts).

²³⁴ Reinier Kraakman, *The Mystery of Union Shareholder Activism: Commentary on Schwab and Thomas*, in *EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING* 431, 433–34 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998). To protect workers from excessive risk, diversification is mandated by section 404 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C)), which may inhibit private pension fund activism. See Murphy, *supra* note 108, at 506–07.

²³⁵ Schwab & Thomas, *supra* note 216, at 1090 (summarizing their finding that unions have become "sophisticated players in corporate-governance battles," where the "battles emphasize efficiency and firm value"); see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, *supra* note 22, at 251 (identifying "an emerging tendency for workers to make common cause with shareholders"); see also Murphy, *supra* note 108, at 539.

²³⁶ *E.g.*, UNITE v. May Dept. Stores Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999); see Schwab & Thomas, *supra* note 216, at 1045 ("The most frequent proposals in the 1995 and 1996 proxy seasons were those to redeem or vote on poison pills and to repeal classified boards . . .").

²³⁷ See, e.g., SEC No-action letter to Penn Nat'l Gaming, Inc. (Mar. 30, 2011), available at <http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2011/unitehere033011-14a8.pdf> (addressing UNITE's 14a-8 majority voting proposal); SEC No-action letter to NRG Energy, Incl. (Jan. 28, 2009), available at <http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2009/liuna012809-14a8.pdf> (discussing LIUNA's majority vote proposal); SEC No-action letter to Suntrust Banks (Jan. 13, 2010), available at <http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2010/unitedbrotherhood011510-14a-8.pdf> (addressing the United Brotherhood of Carpenters's 14a-8 proposal); WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, *COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS* 214–17 (3d ed. 2009) (example of pension fund using 14a- to introduce majority voting); SEC No-action letter to Verizon Communications (Feb. 2, 2009), available at <http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2009/ibew020209-14a8.pdf> (discussing private sector union proposal to introduce cumulative voting).

responsibility” proposals or labor issues.²³⁸ Still, even without a full empirical assessment, it seems fair to say that union activism has to a large degree helped the cause of shareholder primacy. As early as 1994, other shareholders trusted unions enough for the evidence to show that union proposals received more votes than others.²³⁹ This is a significant change compared to union activities a few decades earlier.

E. Activism by Other Institutional Investors

One might object that union-sponsored plans have traditionally been DB plans. But union-sponsored plans are increasingly becoming DC plans. Because the influence of share value on pension wealth has increased, unions are more likely to support shareholder-wealth-oriented proposals.²⁴⁰ Generally, however, public pension funds have been much more active shareholders, most notably the biggest pension fund in the country, CalPERS.²⁴¹ While government employees typically enjoy DB plans, the fiduciary requirement and the increased difficulty in securing state money to cover funding gaps may have incited them to promote shareholder wealth. Before 1980, very little public pension money was invested in equities because state pension systems were typically not permitted to invest a large proportion of their portfolio in shares.²⁴² Until a 1984 amendment to the California constitution, CalPERS could only invest up to 25% of

²³⁸ *Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.*, 54 F.3d 69 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995) (14a-8 proposal relating to Wal-Mart’s allegedly discriminatory policies); see O’Connor, *supra* note 221, at 71–73; O’Connor, *supra* note 211, at 113–15 (surveying union use of shareholder proposals in the context of labor disputes or negotiations); see also *United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Int’l Paper Co.*, 1992, 801 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (union activism relating to environmental policies); O’Connor, *supra* note 216, at 1363–66 (describing the controversy about alleged employment discrimination at Cracker Barrel); Anabtawi, *supra* note 21, at 590 (describing United Food Worker’s Union use of pension holdings to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis Safeway).

²³⁹ Thomas & Martin, *supra* note 224, at 67–68; Schwab & Thomas, *supra* note 216, at 1052.

²⁴⁰ Schwab & Thomas, *supra* note 216, at 1040.

²⁴¹ *E.g.*, Sanford M. Jacoby, *Convergence by Design: The Case of CalPERS in Japan*, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 239, 243–54 (2007) (describing the history of shareholder activism by CalPERS); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fish, *On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance*, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 315 (2008); Aaron Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, *Corporate Governance: Calpers Targets Directors Who Neglect Holders*, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2004, at C1 (describing CalPERS’s renewed efforts at shareholder activism); see also *Westland Police & Fire Retirement Sys. v. Axcelis Techs. Inc.*, 1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010) (public sector pension plan seeking to put a majority voting bylaw amendment on the target company’s proxy statement).

²⁴² Jacoby, *supra* note 226, at 46.

its portfolio in stocks.²⁴³ For similar regulatory reasons, many pension funds had few or no equities in their portfolios until the mid-1990s.²⁴⁴ The proponents of the Californian amendment argued that prudent equity investment would create a higher yield and thus save taxpayers money.²⁴⁵ With regulation receding and equities increasingly perceived as the highest-yielding class of investment, pension funds across the country shifted into equities.²⁴⁶ In other words, the equity-based model penetrated the public sector because private pension funds displayed better performance.²⁴⁷ Ultimately, the success of the private DC model may therefore have contributed to changing practices in the public sector.

Nevertheless, it is not surprising that state and local government pension funds are among the most active institutional investors.²⁴⁸ One reason may be that some of them are unusually large, and another that they comprise about 40% of the pension sector.²⁴⁹ Having to accommodate demographic challenges and funding gaps, public pension funds largely embraced the idea of shareholder primacy.²⁵⁰ Large pension funds are likely to be more active because they have more predictable inflows and outflows, and because their

²⁴³ CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 17 (amended 1984); CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, Primary Election, June 5, 1984, Proposition 21 (proposition to amend the California constitution to allow state pension plans to eliminate the 25% ceiling in order to allow higher investment returns). CalPERS had been required to invest only in long-term bonds that matched its payment obligations, but was permitted to invest 25% of its portfolio in stocks in 1967. See Bruce E. Aronson, *A Japanese CalPERS or a New Model for Institutional Investor Activism? Japan's Pension Fund Association and the Emergence of Shareholder Activism in Japan*, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 571, 593 n.55 (2011). The ceiling was eliminated in 1984. See *id.*

²⁴⁴ David Hess, *Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices*, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 194 (2005). In Minnesota and New York, public pension plans were permitted to invest in equities in 1995 and 1996 respectively. Compare 1994 MINN. CHAPTER LAW 604, § 356A.06, subd. 7(f) (permitting investment into equities of up to 85% of plan funds), with 1989 MINN. SESS. LAW SERV. 319, § 6, subd. 6(B) (not listing corporate stock among permissible investment vehicles). 1996 SESS. LAW NEWS OF N.Y. CH. 712 (A. 11226). Compare NY RETIREMENT & SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (1996) § 177(2) (permitting at most 2% of fund assets being invested in equities), with NY RETIREMENT & SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (1997) § 177(2) (permitting 60%).

²⁴⁵ CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, *supra* note 243, at 26, 27.

²⁴⁶ CLARK, *supra* note 164, at 65 (explaining that equities became attractive in bull markets).

²⁴⁷ Hess, *supra* note 244, at 194.

²⁴⁸ E.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, *The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States*, J. APP. CORP. FIN., vol. 19, no. 1, at 55, 56–58 (2007) (discussing the role of public pension funds).

²⁴⁹ Black, *supra* note 217, at 598–99; Anabtawi, *supra* note 21, at 588.

²⁵⁰ Jacoby, *supra* note 226, at 46.

portfolios inevitably mirror the economy as a whole, thus eliminating the exit option.²⁵¹ Like unions, they also have other controversial political and social goals, given that they must appeal to their political constituents.²⁵² Generally, however, public pension funds look to the “shareholder wealth bottom line” when acting as shareholder activists.²⁵³ Taking into account that the public sector clients of public pension plans never worked at the companies in which their retirement savings were invested, it has apparently been easy for public pension plans to favor shareholder interests over labor interests; public pension fund activism has often led to layoffs and divestitures.²⁵⁴

The spread of 401(k) plans contributed to the enormous expansion of the mutual fund industry, in which much of these savings are invested.²⁵⁵ Interestingly, mutual funds have embraced shareholder activism comparatively late and have been described as “relatively docile shareholders” because they rarely engage in activism.²⁵⁶ They have often been described as “vot[ing] with their feet” by selling if they are discontent with management.²⁵⁷ Moreover, some observers have criticized possible conflicts of interest of mutual fund managers. Arguably, fund managers are sometimes inclined to

²⁵¹ BLAIR, *supra* note 192, at 167–68.

²⁵² Black, *supra* note 217, at 599–600 (pointing out that some public pension fund managers have to face elections); see Mark J. Roe, *Delaware's Politics*, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2524–25 (2005) (giving an account of CalPERS' tendency to get involved in labor disputes and CSR issues); Hess, *supra* note 244, at 206 (discussing criticism of CalPERS' activism).

²⁵³ See Ghilarducci et al., *supra* note 231, at 30 (reporting that CalPERS targeted firms because of poor performance).

²⁵⁴ Jacoby, *supra* note 226, at 47 (quoting a CalPERS official commenting that some firms may need to lay off more employees); see O'Connor, *supra* note 211, at 110 (describing criticism that pension fund managers are driving downsizing).

²⁵⁵ Jennifer S. Taub, *Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisors to Advocate for Shareholders' Rights*, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 848, 858 (2009); Murphy, *supra* note 108, at 544–45; see David J. Carter, *Mutual Fund Boards and Shareholder Action*, 3 VILL. J. L. & INV. MGMT. 6, 19, 22 (2001) (summarizing data about 401(k) investment in mutual funds); Alan R. Palmiter, *Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why not disclose?*, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1426, 1428 (2002) (providing data about the growth of the mutual fund industry).

²⁵⁶ Leo E. Strine, *The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face*, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 687 (2005); see also Palmiter, *supra* note 256, at 1430–31; Jacoby, *supra* note 226, at 55; Anne Tucker, *The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in the Market*, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299, 1302–07 (2012) (highlighting agency problems between investors and mutual funds managers).

²⁵⁷ E.g., Daniel Gross, *Some Mutual Funds Are Joining the Activist Bandwagon*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/business/mutfund/15active.html> (quoting an investment analyst).

please corporate managers, who are in the position to direct employees' 401(k) wealth to investment companies that do not object to the firm's corporate governance practices.²⁵⁸ There is some evidence that business ties make mutual funds vote in a more manager-friendly way, but the data are not entirely unambiguous.²⁵⁹ Counterintuitively, Cremers and Romano found that even a 2003 SEC rule requiring disclosure of voting decisions has led not to more pro-shareholder votes by mutual funds, but rather to an increased support of executive compensation plans proposed by management.²⁶⁰

Scholars have advanced several explanations for the failure of 401(k) plans to produce the level of shareholder activism that would seem optimal from the perspective of investors: first, mutual funds make money through the fees they charge investors,²⁶¹ and the funds tend to be strongly diversified, so that benefits from shareholder

²⁵⁸ Palmiter, *supra* note 256, at 1432; Jacoby, *supra* note 226, at 55; Murphy, *supra* note 108, at 560; *see* Black, *supra* note 217, at 602 (“(i) mutual funds often invest 401(k) and defined contribution pension plan funds for corporations, and thus face some of the same pressures as other corporate pension fund managers”); Roger W. Ferguson, *Riding Herd on Company Management*, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2010, at A15 (President of TIAA-CREF pointing out mutual funds managers' possible conflicts of interest).

²⁵⁹ Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, *Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds*, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 552 (2007) (finding no relationship between business ties and voting patterns on the firm level, but an aggregate propensity of mutual fund families with more business ties to vote in favor of management); Taub, *supra* note 255, at 875–76 (finding that mutual funds were less likely to vote in favor of shareholder proposals when the same mutual fund family also managed the company's 401(k) plan). For data on mutual fund proxy voting, *see* also Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, *Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evidence on Corporate Governance*, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157 (2006); Rasha Ashraf, Narayanan Jayaraman & Harley E. Ryan, Jr., *Do Pension-Related Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation*, 47 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 567 (2012) (finding that funds with pension-related business ties are more likely to vote in favor of managers, irrespective of ties with the specific firm).

²⁶⁰ K.J. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, *Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Rules*, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 220 (2011); *see* Proxy Voting by Investment Companies, Securities Act Release, No. 8188, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), ¶ 86826, at 87,142 (Jan. 31, 2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 6564-85 (requiring disclosure); Murphy, *supra* note 108, at 546; *see* Aaron Lucchetti, *Monthly Mutual Funds Review – Labor Puts Pressure on Funds – AFL-CIO's Trumka Discusses Why Unions Push for More Disclosure*, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2003, at R1 (discussing union support for disclosure of union votes); Jacoby, *supra* note 226, at 55; Taub, *supra* note 255, at 864 (describing conflicts of interest at Deutsche Bank resulting from its investment bank advising a takeover), and 868–69 (discussing Fidelity's vote at Intel in light of it managing Intel's 401(k) plan).

²⁶¹ Strine, *supra* note 256, at 687.

activism on the firm level are captured by other shareholders.²⁶² Second, mutual funds also tend to focus on short-term investments, which is typically not compatible with shareholder activism.²⁶³ Nevertheless, at least some mutual funds have become more active in recent years, pushing for shareholder wealth alongside other institutional investors.²⁶⁴ Mutual funds have also generally supported proposals, such as proxy access, to strengthen the role of shareholders in corporate governance.²⁶⁵

The purpose of this Article is not to comprehensively explain shareholder activism and proxy voting by institutional investors that seek to bring managers more in line with shareholder concerns. Overall, there are considerable limitations to shareholder activism by any type of institutional investor, such as diversification and the lack of staff to take a deeply engaged role in systematic corporate governance research.²⁶⁶ The enthusiasm about institutional investor activism expressed by shareholder primacists certainly faded in the late 1990s and 2000s.²⁶⁷ In recent years, other factors have pushed firms more strongly to cater to the interests of shareholders, including the influence of proxy advisors, particularly Institutional Shareholder Services, on the voting decisions of financial institutions,²⁶⁸ activism by hedge funds taking larger stakes in firms.²⁶⁹ The growth of the pension sector played a role for the development of the latter as well, since a sizeable proportion of hedge fund capital is today provided by pension funds.²⁷⁰

²⁶² *Id.* at 687.

²⁶³ Palmiter, *supra* note 255, at 1431.

²⁶⁴ *Id.* at 1435–40; Gross, *supra* note 257; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, *Embattled CEOs*, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1001 (2010); see Black, *supra* note 217, at 602 (describing Fidelity's transient opposition to an antitakeover statute in 1990); Gretchen Morgenson, *Belated Apologies in Proxy Land*, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/20/business/yourmoney/20gret.html> (describing Putnam Funds attempt to influence firms); see also Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, *Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders*, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1276 (2008) (discussing mutual fund activism by Fidelity and Vanguard).

²⁶⁵ *E.g.*, Letter from Barbara Krumsiek of Calvert Group Ltd. to Securities and Exchange Commission (July 23, 2007) available at <http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-537/4537-79.pdf> (supporting SEC proposal on proxy access).

²⁶⁶ *E.g.*, Coffee, *supra* note 33, at 1975 (pointing out the limitations of even CalPERS' possibilities).

²⁶⁷ *Id.* at 1981–83 (discussing possible reasons).

²⁶⁸ James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, *ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals*, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2010).

²⁶⁹ Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, *Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control*, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007).

²⁷⁰ THECITYUK, HEDGE FUNDS 2013, at 4, chart 10, available at <http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/hedge-funds-2012>

The point of this section and the preceding ones is not been to suggest that the shift from DB to DC plans has encouraged shareholder activism; to the contrary, there might be less of it in the future as more workers are shifted into DC plans. The argument has been that labor-oriented institutions such as unions and pension funds have increasingly accepted the objective of shareholder wealth maximization as important for their constituencies. It may well be that shareholder activism is a relatively insignificant for managers; mutual funds' practice of selling shares of firms with whose performance they are dissatisfied may well be considerably more important for creating pressure on firms to maintain a high share price (and possibly to focus on short-term gains). Mutual fund managers have good reasons to care about the performance of the stock in their portfolio, but not about how firms treat their employees; this holds true even if they manage the same employees' pension wealth, since fund managers are institutionally completely separated from workers. While pension savings and the increase in the institutional character of share ownership have certainly encouraged shareholder activism and the implementation of reforms in line with the shareholder primacy vision, actual pressures to maximize share price might well increase as DB investment continues to be replaced by DC investment.

VI. PENSIONS AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY ABROAD

A quick look at other developed economies, particularly continental European countries and Japan, confirms the thesis that the shift from DB to DC plans is linked to the move from managerial to shareholder capitalism in the United States. Both in terms of their corporate governance and pension systems, these countries look more—but not entirely—like the United States did before the changes described in Parts II to V.

With respect to corporate governance, it is often claimed that in countries outside the common law world, shareholders are not very well protected, share ownership is concentrated, and capital markets are comparatively small.²⁷¹ More importantly for this Article,

(showing pension funds as the source of 22% of hedge fund assets in 2012, up from 15% in 2004).

²⁷¹ The reasons are highly disputed. Based on cross-sectional empirical studies, it is often argued that the civil law tradition is less amenable to investor protection than the common law. Rafeal La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, *The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins*, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008). According to the contrary view, left-wing politics inhibited the development of pro-shareholder institutions in Continental Europe. Mark J. Roe, *Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern*

continental Europe and Japan are usually thought to be characterized by models that give precedence to other constituencies over shareholders.²⁷² Germany, alongside a number of other Central and Northern European countries, stands out by giving employees representation on the board of directors, and thus at least some influence on corporate matters.²⁷³ Japanese firms have long been known for strong pro-worker orientation, in particular a “lifetime employment” relationship with employees.²⁷⁴ In combination with strong cross-ownership structures within the so-called “keiretsu,”²⁷⁵ Japanese firms can probably even be called labor-dominated. But even in jurisdictions with little or no employee participation in boardroom decision-making such as France and Italy, the extensive powers of controlling shareholders are balanced by strong labor laws that are considerably more strongly weighed in favor of employees than in the United States.²⁷⁶

While there are of course many differences among the various Continental European pension systems as well as between the European and Japanese systems, there are two comparative patterns. First, government-funded Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) pensions systems play a greater role for retirees, at least in Continental Europe, than Social Security does in the United States. While data from different countries are often directly comparable, the OECD figures on the sources of retirement income of those over 65 are probably most

Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 502–16 (2006).

²⁷² E.g., Brian R. Cheffins, *The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc.”: The Case of Executive Pay*, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 500–01 (2001); Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 6, at 443–49; Amir N. Licht, *The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style*, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 733 (2004); Klaus J. Hopt, *Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic Integration in Europe*, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 208–09 (1994).

²⁷³ See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, *Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities*, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 168 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999); Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, *The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies*, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 89, 100–01 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009).

²⁷⁴ E.g., Caslav Pejovic, *Japanese Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms*, 29 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 483, 492–95 (2011).

²⁷⁵ A keiretsu is a set of companies characterized by a common main bank, interlocking directorships and cross-ownership between the firms belonging to it. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, *Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization*, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 872–73, 882–84 (1993).

²⁷⁶ See, e.g., Gelter, *supra* note 47, at 171–73 (discussing employment law in Continental Europe).

illustrative.²⁷⁷

	Public transfers	Work	Capital
France	85.44%	6.50%	8.07%
Germany	73.07%	12.09%	14.84%
Italy	72.20%	23.80%	4.00%
Japan	48.34%	44.29%	7.37%
United Kingdom	49.36%	12.09%	38.55%
United States	36.13%	34.20%	29.67%

In the Continental European jurisdictions, public transfers (i.e. public pensions) dominate. The United Kingdom resembles the United States more closely, except that less income is derived from work above sixty-five. Japan similarly stands out because of its high percentage of income derived from work, which is likely due to the generous company pensions provided by large Japanese firms. Nevertheless, the low significance of income based on capital is striking. Only looking at the ratio between public transfer and capital in each country would show that the relative importance of public and private pensions is similar to Continental Europe.

Like Social Security, PAYGO systems abroad take the form of a DB plan underwritten by the government: employees and employers pay contributions to a government entity, which uses these funds to pay current retirees. The amount of the pension normally depends on the number of years worked, contributions made, and the age of retirement.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁷ OECD, *PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 60* (2009). The data (for a larger set of countries) are available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/635426478286>. Similar data for a small set of countries are also available for 1978–1980 at OECD, *REFORMING PUBLIC PENSIONS*, OECD SOCIAL POLICY STUDIES No. 5, 55 (1988).

²⁷⁸ Lothar Schruoff, *Pensions and Post-Retirement Benefits by Employers in Germany*, 64 *BROOK. L. REV.* 795, 795 (1998); Bert Rürup, *The German Pension System: Status Quo and Reform Options*, in *SOCIAL SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN EUROPE* 137, 139–43 (Martin Feldstein & Horst Siebert eds., 2002); Kathryn L. Moore, *Lessons from the French Funding Debate*, 65 *OHIO ST. L. J.* 5, 9, 13 (2004) (describing the DB formula for French public pensions); Charles Yuji Horioka, *Japan's Public Pension System in the Twenty-First Century*, in *JAPAN'S NEW ECONOMY* 99, 99–101 (Magnus Blomström, Byron Gangnes & Sumner La Croix eds., 2001) (Japan); see also Friedrich K. Kübler, *Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma*, 57 *BROOK. L. REV.* 97, 100 (1991) (reporting that in 1991, a German pension of a typical retiree corresponded to 70% of the last salary).

Second, private pensions in Continental Europe and Japan tend to be of the DB variety more often than in the United States or the United Kingdom,²⁷⁹ with domestic pension funds long remaining limited in significance.²⁸⁰ Both German and Japanese company pensions are traditionally “book reserve” plans, in which the firm commits to paying a specified pension in the future without setting up a trust fund.²⁸¹ In 1996, about 56% of German employment-related pension claims took this form.²⁸² In France, employers’ organizations and labor unions jointly set up a national DB pension plan in the years after World War II.²⁸³

The United Kingdom is an exception to the European pattern. Its corporate governance system has long been characterized by shareholder-centrism and differed both from the managerialism in the United States and the labor models of Continental Europe and Japan.²⁸⁴ Like the U.S. pension system, the U.K. system is characterized by a low level of state pensions and a high level of private pensions.²⁸⁵ As in the United States, pension reforms during

²⁷⁹ E.g., Gordon L. Clark, *Pension Systems: A Comparative Perspective* 7 (2000), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=228948>.

²⁸⁰ E.g., Kübler, *supra* note 278, at 99 (“Pension funds so far have had very little importance.”).

²⁸¹ Charny, *supra* note 57, at 1641; Stefan Prigge, *A Survey of German Corporate Governance*, in *CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH* 943, 1019 (Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch & Stefan Prigge eds., 1998); MACKENZIE, *supra* note 139, at 227–28 (all discussing Germany); David Rajnes, *The Evolution of Japanese Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans*, 67 SOC. SEC. BUL. 89, 91, 93 (2007) (discussing Japan); Robert L. Clark, *Japanese Pension Plans in Transition*, BENEFITS Q., First Quarter 1996, at 59 (discussing DB payouts to retirees in Japan).

²⁸² Schruoff, *supra* note 278, at 804; see also Ahrend, *supra* note 281, at 86 (providing the 1991 data).

²⁸³ Lucy apRoberts, *Comments*, in *SECURING EMPLOYER-BASED PENSIONS* 105, 109–10 (Zvi Bodie, Olivia S. Mitchell & John A. Turner eds., 1996).

²⁸⁴ E.g., BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, *CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED* 30 (2008) (pointing out that in UK companies, shareholders can recall the board); Bruner, *supra* note 51, at 593–611; Dignam & Galanis, *supra* note 27, at 221–22 (both comparing the United Kingdom and the United States). The most known example is maybe the “City Code on Takeovers and Mergers,” which provides a self-regulatory framework for takeovers favoring shareholder choice.

²⁸⁵ The Basic State Pension is comparatively low for European standards and provides an average replacement ratio of only about 15%. Carl Emmerson & Paul Johnson, *Pension Provision in the United Kingdom*, in *PENSION SYSTEMS AND RETIREMENT INCOMES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES* 296, 299, 301 (Richard Disney & Paul Johnson eds., 2001); see also David Blake, *The United Kingdom: Examining the Switch from Low Public Pensions to High-Cost Private Pensions*, in *SOCIAL SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN EUROPE*, *supra* note 278, at 317, 317 (noting that public finances are thus less affected by demographic change). The “State Second Pension” (S2P), which replaced a

the early 1980s encouraged British firms to shift from traditional DB plans to DC plans.²⁸⁶ Since the mid-1990s, the vast majority of new employer-sponsored plans have been DC plans, and more than half of existing DB plans have been phased out.²⁸⁷

This brief comparison reveals a pattern: countries where workers rely more strongly on government pensions and DB plans than those in the United States also exhibit less developed pro-shareholder institutions in their corporate laws. In the case of a stock market downturn, the modern American worker is immediately affected by the loss of value of his or her retirement account. With stock markets much smaller relative to GDP²⁸⁸ and individual household savings more often held in savings accounts, movements in the stock market typically do not matter very much for the middle class in these countries.²⁸⁹ From the perspective of the Continental European or Japanese middle-class, it is “rich folks on Wall Street” who lose money in a stock market downturn. Retirement benefits primarily depend on the government’s ability and willingness to fund the public pension system and, in some cases, employers’ ability to pay pensions.

Christopher Bruner has proposed that the United Kingdom became more shareholder-centric than the United States because the British welfare state provides more benefits, particularly health care, than those provided by large firms to their employees in the United States.²⁹⁰ In other words, U.S. workers are more dependent on their employers. As this Article shows, the shift from DB to DC plans has considerably reduced one aspect of dependence not highlighted by Bruner. While Bruner’s explanation is complementary to this one, the effects of the change in the pension system are likely even more consequential, since they turned workers into shareholders.

While it would be beyond the scope of this Article to fully explore the complex relationships among pension systems, corporate ownership structures, and possible international convergence toward

similar plan known as SERPS in 2002, allows an opt-out into a private plan. Emmerson & Johnson, *supra* note 285, at 303.

²⁸⁶ Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 371–74; MACKENZIE, *supra* note 139, at 245–46 (all discussing changes in the British private pension system).

²⁸⁷ Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 375.

²⁸⁸ See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, *Legal Determinants of External Finance*, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131 (1997).

²⁸⁹ Marcel Tyrell & Reinhard H. Schmidt, *Pension Systems and Financial Systems in Europe: A Comparison from the Point of View of Complementarity*, 47 IFO-STUDIEN 469, 488–89 (2001) (suggesting that German firms with “book reserve” pensions rely less on capital markets compared to their UK equivalents).

²⁹⁰ Bruner, *supra* note 51, at 579.

shareholder primacy, some authors have identified demographic problems of public PAYGO pension systems both in Europe and Japan and an increasing international trend toward DC pension plans as a driver for this form of international convergence in corporate governance.²⁹¹ In Continental Europe and Japan, a connection with the political movement to push national pension systems into the direction of the DC paradigm since the early 1990s seems very likely. Conspicuously, scholars identified some degree of convergence in corporate governance and a trend toward the shareholder model during the same period.²⁹²

VII. CONCLUSION

This Article argues that the place of shareholder primacy in the corporate governance system of the United States has shifted, at least partly due to the change from DB plans to DC plans. When DC plans predominate, the advantages of shareholder primacy over a more expansive view of the objective of corporate law weigh more strongly than they did in the heyday of managerial capitalism. The implication is that policies that give more weight to shareholders over labor have become relatively more desirable. The shift from DB to DC plans made Americans more directly dependent on capital markets and thus helped to make shareholder primacy and shareholder wealth maximization more attractive intellectual positions.

The impact on the actual politics of corporate governance is more ambiguous. While a clear causal link is difficult to establish, it is clear that causation, at least in part, runs from the pension system to corporate governance. Regulatory changes that pushed the pension system to where it is today, most of all ERISA, were intended to protect workers and not the consequence of changes in the financial system. Thus, these changes in pension law were an exogenous factor that indirectly and unintentionally helped to transform corporate governance. The greater dependence of workers' pension wealth on the capital market instead of the employer possibly resulted in a reduction of firm-specific human capital, and thus strengthened political support for shareholder

²⁹¹ GOUREVITCH & SHINN, *supra* note 22, at 215–17; MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 289 (2008).

²⁹² See Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 6; Ronald J. Gilson, *Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function*, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001) (both discussing convergence of corporate governance practices); Bebchuk & Roe, *supra* note 142 (suggesting that path dependence impedes convergence).

primacy. Many shareholder primacists would probably agree that pro-shareholder reforms often remain cosmetic. Nevertheless, unions, which were once opponents of both management and shareholders in securing better conditions for workers, were co-opted into shareholder capitalism through the pension system. The seeds for the development may have been sowed through the Taft-Hartley Act's system of pension plans, run jointly by employers and unions, but it came to full fruition only when shareholder value started to become of profound importance to unions and their aging constituents. Shareholder activism partly originated from institutions largely operating within the DB paradigm, such as union and public pension funds, which were also driven to increase equity investment by regulatory changes from the early 1980s onwards. As far as private pension funds are concerned, ERISA's fiduciary and funding requirements—which also helped to drive investment into DC plans—contributed to the spread of shareholder activism. With union pension power declining because of the shift to 401(k) plans, unions are aware that they need to seek alliances with the managers of these plans to maintain their activist agenda.²⁹³

History is said to repeat. The end of the economic crisis that began in 2008 is still not in sight, and the popular press frequently draws comparisons to the Great Depression of the 1930s. When the Great Depression devastated private investment in the stock markets and pension savings, the political response was the introduction of Social Security.²⁹⁴ Today, the reaction seems to be the opposite. During the past three decades, the ubiquitous 401(k) plan has become the default expectation for retirement benefits in the United States. A growing number of Americans have become aware of corporate governance issues and how they affect their retirement prospects. DC plans are even considered appropriate for public employees,²⁹⁵ and the Bush administration proposed to convert Social

²⁹³ Jacoby, *supra* note 226, at 56 (discussion of AFL-CIO proxy disclosure); *see also* Coffee, *supra* note 33, at 1987–88 (speculating about a possible decline of pension fund activism during the rise of 401(k) plans); *see, e.g.*, Gina Chon, *Share-Buying Plan Opposed – Investor Group Resists Proposed SEC Rule to Shorten 13(D) Filing Time Frame*, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2011, at B2 (discussing alliances between mutual funds and pension funds to oppose changes to SEC's rules that may make coordination between shareholder activists more difficult).

²⁹⁴ Maria O'Brian Hylton, *Evaluating the Case for Social Security Reform: Elderly Poverty, Paternalism, and Private Pensions*, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 749, 751–754 (1998); CLARK, *supra* note 164, at 50; CLOWES, *supra* note 104, at 21; Munnell, *supra* note 60, at 362.

²⁹⁵ *See Move Public Employees Into 401(k)s?*, *supra* note 214.

Security into a contribution-based system with individual accounts.²⁹⁶

Thus, in spite of criticism, it seems that the shareholder movement will continue and even gain more strength. With employees often having the choice between different mutual fund families, IRAs, and other investment vehicles for their pension contributions, pressure on institutional investors to exert their corporate governance role more actively is bound to increase. Detractors of shareholder primacy often oppose pro-shareholder reforms on the level of corporations, and sometimes promote reform proposals that oppose the shareholder-oriented model. This type of discussion tends to emphasize the corporate governance of firms, the demand side of the capital market. This Article shows that changes in the pension system unleashed powerful forces on the supply side of the capital market that keep pushing corporate governance ever more strongly toward shareholder primacy. Skeptics of shareholder primacy must rethink their agenda and address U.S. dependence on equity investment. Otherwise, attempts to challenge the dominant model will be futile. Shareholder primacy, with its positive and negative implications, will be here to stay.

²⁹⁶ *E.g.*, ZELINSKY, *supra* note 66, at 93.